US midterms: Could a Democratic House be good for India?

The US midterm election could become an unexpected and paradoxical development for India, in its increasingly complicated relationship with Washington. In the wake of the US-Iran war, Democrats are favoured to win the House in November, raising the possibility that a divided Congress could restrict President Donald Trump's unilateral tariff and trade policies, though it would likely maintain the Russian oil sanctions. The paradox is that the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi does not have a shared ideological or party alignment with Democrats, who are more critical of his hypernationalism, human rights and democracy record. But the stakes are more than just tariffs and ideological alignment.

Changing India-US relations

For the past decade, India has been assuming that Washington's counter-China policy automatically translates into a pro-India logic. But since US President Trump's return to office, it seems that the US is becoming increasingly docile with China, and erratic with its traditional partners like Europe and India.

It would not be a complete miscalculation to see the US and China as partners, if not allies. Theirs is a managed rivalry that compartmentalises issues such as the US-Iran war and the AI arms race, and both want a stable, bilateral truce that protects their supply chains and markets. For India, the real risk is treating either one as a reliable friend.

Washington's envoy Christopher Landau publicly stated that the United States will not repeat its "China mistake" with India.

Yet the US remains India's key partner for markets, technology and defence, but since 2025 it is evident Washington will use that dependence as leverage. China has benefited from Trump's pressure on India, pushing Delhi toward it. India and China held border talks in Beijing in August and agreed to keep seeking a settlement, with the next round in India in 2027; though China's relations with Pakistan have not changed.

Following the recent Trump–Xi "G2" summit in Washington, New Delhi has become vocal about Washington's persistent tariff threat. Last week, at an event in New York, Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar called Washington an insensitive partner to India’s concerns over “terrorism”, pointing to its warming relations with Pakistan and its “self-centred” trade policies. The shift reflects a central tenet of realist International Relations: there are no eternal allies or perpetual enemies, only eternal and perpetual interests.

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A Democratic House may favour India

Even so, a bipartisan gathering of the Senate India Caucus on Capitol Hill on October 1, 2026, underscored that mainstream Democrats view India as an irreplaceable security anchor in the Indo-Pacific. Despite the ideological differences, a Democratic House might favour India over China and act as a legislative buffer against erratic executive policies.

Sanctions, though, are a different matter. India is using the finalisation of its long-delayed bilateral trade deal with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer as leverage. But the US could try to force India to concede its leverage with the Russian oil sanctions, which kick in October 18, before the midterms or a new House could be sworn in. The House has paved the way for legislation allowing up to 100% tariffs on buyers of Russian oil. The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 was passed with overwhelming bipartisan support. So India is unlikely to get any concession on Russian oil from Democrats. Both India and China are expected to keep buying anyway, so it will remain a developing issue once control shifts. Even without a House majority, Trump will retain his executive power and dictate foreign policy, so volatility might continue.