What is Sanae Takaichi's post-pacifist Japan and why does India matter?
&imwidth=600&imheight=450&format=webp&quality=medium "What is Sanae Takaichi's post-pacifist Japan and why does India matter?")
Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi speaks to the media following the earthquake in Aomori prefecture, at the Prime Minister’s Office in Tokyo on June 25, 2026. Photograph: (AFP)
Japanese PM Sanae Takaichi's India visit highlights Tokyo's post-pacifist security strategy, growing defence cooperation, and concerns over China.
Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is in New Delhi for a three-day official visit. She will attend the 16th India-Japan Annual Summit and hold formal talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This trip comes amid growing tension in the Indo-Pacific, making the visit significant. Takaichi highlighted that India and Japan both share fundamental values and strategic interests. Defence is being seen as an important strategic node in the cooperation between the two nations, as Japan has abandoned its post-World War II pacifism, specifically since Takaichi took the reins of the country.
What is this new post-pacifist Japan?
Chinese media and officials frame Takaichi as completing the "Abe Doctrine," which regional analysts term as “Takaichi realism”, dismantling the legal and moral scaffolding of postwar pacifism and decades of self-imposed military limits. Japan is attempting to pivot from passive defence to proactive regional deterrence. Takaichi has been specifically leading the torch, working to bolster Japan's defence capabilities in the face of China's military buildup and North Korea's missile and nuclear programs.
Her government has increased defence spending to a record 9 trillion yuan, roughly 2 per cent of the GDP and is partnering with regional powers on next-generation military technologies. In April 2026, Tokyo scrapped its ban on lethal weapons exports, saying no single country can protect its own peace and security alone. She is also pushing to revise Article 9, the constitutional clause which renounces war, after winning a super majority in the lower house in February 2026. She has asserted that she wants to initiate the revision by the end of 2026. Abe had considered his failure to amend it as his deepest political regret. Though Takaiachi faces political gridlock in the upper house and pushback from the public, she has taken it upon herself as a personal vow.
On the contrary, many analysts suggest that this is just Japanese constitutional theatre; a symbolic housekeeping on something that's already in practice. Japan has quietly upgraded its military capability, implicating the ambiguity of Article 9. For example, reclassifying Izumo-class helicopter carriers to operate F-35B stealth fighters just by reinterpreting what is “minimum necessary self-defence”, similarly acquired long-range Tomahawk missiles under the quiet guise of "counterstrike capability". The Japan Self-Defence Forces are already among the top 10 military forces globally. It maintains one of the most technologically advanced militaries in the world, while avoiding a constitutional referendum and its political backlash.
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Where does New Delhi fit in this narrative?
The US has become an increasingly unreliable partner ever since Donald Trump took over the office in 2025. On the other hand, China has increasingly become agressive on Taiwn. The recent Trump-Xi summit and the erratic handling of the $14 billion weapons deliveries to Taiwan have made Tokyo anxious. Trump is using Taiwan as a bargaining chip with China for trade leverage. Meanwhile, Trump's Secretary of War hinted that the US war with Iran has depleted its Tomahawk missile arsenal, so it will not be any time soon that the US will be able to deliver missile stockpiles to Japan. If there were not enough hints for Tokyo to seek other options.
Entering New Delhi, which is a nuclear power and leveraging it as a deterrent at Beijing's Himalayan border is part of the “Takaichi realism” doctrine. Tokyo views New Delhi not just as an economic partner, but as a crucial, nuclear-armed strategic counterweight capable of balancing power in the Indo-Pacific. India is a nuclear-armed state that chose to remain outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), serving as the pragmatic vision of the restrictive post war pacifism. Further, the two nations are seeking to create a defence ecosystem, spanning military drones, stealth frigates, and semiconductor supply chains. The scope of collaboration is not limited, as Japan is pushing to institutionalise a Quad Defence Ministers’ Meeting in India to build on the existing foreign ministerial dialogue. While India occupies an interesting middle position, useful to Japan strategically, but not a security ally in the traditional sense, India has strong incentives to keep it that way. India maintains a strategic silence and does not take sides on Taiwan. It stayed silent even during Modi-Takaichi meetings on the G20 sidelines, despite the China-Japan diplomatic row. It remains to be seen how much New Delhi can risk angering Beijing by being part of a security alliance, as it has its own unresolved China relationship and tries to stabilise border relations.
