Nuclear black market still exists, and Iran might dial again: Inside the murky trade of radioactive material, designs and tech

The spectre of the global nuclear black market is rising again in the wake of the bombing of Iranian nuclear sites by Israel and the US B2 bombers in the just-concluded 12-day war. Iran has benefited in the past from the nuclear black market led by the Pakistani AQ Khan network. Recent news reports and studies show that the nuclear black market is alive and thriving, both offline and on the dark web, and could become a source for future nuclear weapon programmes of countries, including possibly Iran.

Recent incidents show the nuclear black market is alive

An article in the Harvard International Review in 2024 noted that there were 146 incidents involving the transfer of items related to illicit nuclear weapons development in 2021 alone. Illicit nuclear goods are becoming available to terrorist networks, with groups like Al-Qaeda expected to continue their attempts to acquire the bomb, it said.

It pointed out that the US and NATO store 20 B-61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. "In 2010, activists easily entered the compound and walked freely through the nuclear vaults for over an hour before security arrived. If an unarmed group can get inside a military compound, what will happen if a small army of dangerous actors knocks on the door?"

The UN reported in 2023 that 2.3 tonnes of uranium went missing in Libya. In the hands with technical know-how, that could be turned into 12 pounds of weapons-grade material, the HIR article noted. The uranium barrels were later found in Chad.

Nuclear manuals sold on the dark web, material smuggled by ex-Soviet networks

A study in March 2021 by Roderic G Broadhurst of Australian National University noted that DIY manuals were available on the darknet for nuclear and radiological weapons. In 2015, the Moldovan government said that the FBI had helped the former Soviet republic three times in the previous five years to thwart potential smuggling of nuclear and radioactive material. There were fears that the smugglers would try to sell the material to terrorists like ISIS.

In April 2009, three Ukrainians were arrested for trying to sell nuclear materials. They tried to sell a metal container of what they said contained some 3.7 kg of plutonium-239 for $10, according to the Ukrainian Security Service, the SBU.

In 2010, nuclear bomb material was found for sale on the Georgia black market. The highly enriched uranium had been smuggled through train inside lead-lined cigarette box.

The global nuclear black market, explained

The nuclear black market, where illicit trade of nuclear materials, technologies and expertise takes place, involves both states and non-state actors. There are three main participants: buyers, sellers and transit points. The aim of the buyers is to acquire nuclear capabilities outside the purview of international regulations.

What is traded in the nuclear black market?

Items and tech needed for nuclear weapons are sold in the black market, such as uranium enrichment technology like gas centrifuge components, and designs including digitised warhead blueprints. Fissile materials, like uranium hexafluoride and enriched uranium are highly coveted. Also on demand are dual-use equipment like high-precision machine tools, aluminium tubes and nuclear application software. Those with technical expertise are sought for consultancy on centrifuge assembly and warhead integration.

Various other pieces of the puzzle have been traded in the nuclear black market, such as infrastructure components like piping, electrical systems, and uranium feed/withdrawal equipment for enrichment facilities.

State-linked entities are allegedly involved in the nuclear black market

It has been reported in the past that state-affiliated entities in Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and Libya, were allegedly involved in the nuclear black market as buyers or sellers. Chinese state-owned companies have been implicated in providing expertise and equipment to North Korea and Iran. Pakistan was once the centre of the AQ Khan network, of which Iran was a major recipient, specifically centrifuge designs and components. North Korea is both a seller and buyer in the global nuclear black market. It has done both arms exports and procurement through front companies. Libya had sought a centrifuge facility through the Khan’s network until it abandoned its nuclear programme in 2003. Syria is reported to have sought nuclear-related materials through intermediaries.

Intermediary countries

Studies on the nuclear black market have named more than 20 countries as having been involved as transit points or places of intermediary activities. These include Malaysia, Singapore, Turkey, South Africa, Switzerland, South Korea, and the UAE. These countries were either transit hubs or supplier locations for components and expertise.

AQ Khan network

Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani scientist, led a proliferation network in the 1980s and 1990s, whose material and technology transfers went to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and other countries. The father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, Khan confessed publicly in 2004 to transferring nuclear technology to multiple countries. It was a sophisticated network of middlemen, front companies, academics, banks, businessmen and bureaucrats across Europe, West Asia, and Asia.

Iran was a big client of the nuclear black market

Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons programme, the AMAD Project that ran from 1999–2003, is recorded to have procured warhead designs from the AQ Khan network and elsewhere in the nuclear black market. These included re-engineered Pakistani designs. In this period and subsequent years, Iran is thought to have sourced materials, equipment, technology, designs, and expertise from the global nuclear black market.

Centrifuge blueprints, components, and technical drawings it acquired from the black market were used to establish secret enrichment workshops, such as the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran. Uranium hexafluoride feedstock and equipment for Natanz were also bought in the black market, with centrifuge designs resembling those from Pakistan’s Kahuta facility, which again is based on stolen European technology.

With its current nuclear capabilities bombed back by several months if not years, Iran might be tempted to dial the nuclear black market once again.