India's power move near Malacca Strait: How Great Nicobar project can checkmate China

India’s $10 billion Great Nicobar Island Development Project, a commercial-military initiative, could alter the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific, as it may emerge as New Delhi's observation point for Chinese commercial and energy ships passing through the Strait of Malacca. Recent media reports and analysis have highlighted how the military and commercial infrastructure developments in India's southernmost point could alter geostrategic and defence equations in the Indo-Pacific region. Here is what you should know.

Why the Strait of Malacca is important for China

About $3.5 trillion in global trade moves through the Strait of Malacca every year, including around two-thirds of Chinese maritime traffic. One of the world’s narrow maritime chokepoints - only 2.8 km wide at its narrowest point - the Strait of Malacca is used by China to ship 80 per cent of its oil imports each year. The potential blocking or disruption of this strait in the event of a conflict, such as over Taiwan, is a major strategic concern for China.

Why the Great Nicobar project is a power move by India

Great Nicobar Island, the southernmost point of Indian territory, lies near the northern approaches to the Strait of Malacca and overlooks the Six Degree Channel, through which much of Chinese maritime trade passes. India launched the Great Nicobar project in 2021. Construction is progressing on a deep-water transhipment port at Galathea Bay, an international airport, township infrastructure, and a 450 MVA gas- and solar-based power plant. With a natural depth of 18–20 metres, the port is planned to handle 4 million Twenty-foot Equivalent Units by 2028.

Military significance of the Great Nicobar project

But the real story is about the emerging Indian military capabilities in Great Nicobar, which could soon become a major naval hub capable of monitoring Chinese ship movements, both commercial and military, including submarine activity. To this extent, there are already signs of India expanding strategic facilities across the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, of which Great Nicobar Island is a part. The recent developments include the building of a second airfield at Chingen, expansion of INS Baaz — the southernmost air station of the Indian Armed Forces — at Campbell Bay, new radar and underwater surveillance systems, and improved naval communications infrastructure.

China is likely to view these developments as threats to its sea lines of communication during a conflict. Chinese shipping routes from the Middle East pass close to India’s maritime zone, and India could potentially monitor or restrict Chinese energy flows from the vantage point of Great Nicobar.

China’s infrastructure projects can be seen as attempts to build alternatives to the Strait of Malacca

The Belt and Road Initiative, China’s massive infrastructure project involving multiple nations, could be interpreted as an attempt to create alternatives to the Strait of Malacca for its commercial and energy shipment needs. China’s efforts to create a network of ports and infrastructure across the Indian Ocean include Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Kyaukphyu in Myanmar. This is part of China’s decades-long “string of pearls” strategy, which India could now counter with its moves in Great Nicobar.

Andamans could emerge as India’s new commercial shipping hub

Once fully developed, the commercial aspect of the Great Nicobar project, particularly the transhipment hub, could reduce India’s dependence on foreign logistics infrastructure for moving its cargo, 25 per cent of which currently passes through foreign ports.

This could help India emerge as a commercial competitor along the sea lines of communication between the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca.

With this strategic move in the Andamans, India may evolve from a passive power in the Indo-Pacific into one capable of influencing or disrupting some of China’s most vital trade and energy routes.