Can the Revoke Article 50 petition change the course of Brexit?

Bristol, UK Mar 26, 2019, 01.22 PM(IST) Written By: The Conversation

File photo. Photograph:( Reuters )

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For some reason, support for revoking Article 50 (as measured by this petition at least) has been smaller in the UK’s Celtic fringe. 

By Ron Johnston, Charles Pattie and David Manley*

Not surprisingly, much public attention has been given to the online petition asking parliament to revoke Article 50 so that the UK will remain within the European Union. It attracted more than 5m signatures within a week of being launched, making it the most signed petition since the government’s e-petition site began. It crashed the system multiple times over the course of the first few days. 

Critics of the petition, largely drawn from those who promoted and continue to support Brexit, claim that it is yet another attempt by those who opposed Leave to subvert the democratic decision reached by a clear majority in the June 2016 referendum. They claim that many of those opposed to leaving the EU cannot accept that decision and are using whatever methods they can to overturn it. 

Are they right? The numbers signing the e-petition are remarkable. But even if we assume (as seems reasonable) that almost all signatories were Remain voters, most Remainers have not (yet) signed. As of the time of writing, two-thirds had not done so.

This does not mean, of course, that those who have not signed are therefore opposed to the petition (we cannot know – and there may well be people who have not signed because they never sign petitions at all, even when they support a petition’s cause).

But we can assess whether support for revoking Article 50 is related to support for Remain by comparing their respective geographies. Data are available on the number of signatories to the petition in each of the UK’s 650 parliamentary constituencies (signatories were asked to give a postcode, and this can be matched to the relevant constituency). 

As of March 25, the spread varied considerably. Only 2.6 per cent of the people registered to vote in Walsall North in 2018 (1,722), for example, had signed the 2019 petition. Meanwhile, over in Bristol West, 39.9 per cent of the electorate had signed.

By comparison, estimates suggested that 74.2 per cent of Walsall North’s voters supported Brexit in 2016, compared to just 20.7 per cent in Bristol West. These extremes are at the ends of a clear continuum for all 650 UK constituencies: the larger the vote for Brexit in 2016 the smaller the percentage who have signed the petition. 

Regional surprises

There are some variations around this general trend, however. For instance, far fewer voters in Wales, Scotland and, especially, Northern Ireland have supported the petition than in England. This is particularly surprising given that both Northern Ireland and Scotland voted to remain in 2016. A statistical model describing the general trend allows us to predict what the typical percentage signing the petition would be in constituencies with different Brexit votes in 2016. Based on such a model, we calculate that in English constituencies where 50 per cent supported Leave in the referendum, on average about 13 per cent signed the petition. In similar Scottish constituencies, it was only 6.1 per cent and in Northern Ireland only 5.4 per cent. Wales, of course, voted Leave, but in constituencies, there were around 50 per cent voted to leave, support for the petition now was about 10.4 per cent.

For some reason, support for revoking Article 50 (as measured by this petition at least) has been smaller in the UK’s Celtic fringe.

The critics – not surprisingly – are right, at least in the sense that the petition appeals most to Remain supporters. The geography of support for revoking Article 50 and the UK remaining in the EU is very largely the same as the geography of support for Remain three years ago: on average there has been no change – although we have to wonder why the Scots and Northern Irish have been relatively silent this time. 

*(Ron Johnston is Professor of Geography, University of Bristol, Charles Pattie is a Professor of Electoral Geography, University of Sheffield and David Manley is a Professor of Human Geography, University of Bristol. )

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)