Can Reza Pahlavi II really run Iran if the Islamic Republic is ousted by a US military operation?

In the past few months, Reza Pahlavi II has emerged from relative political obscurity and publicly called for regime change in Iran. Emboldened by the Trump administration's pressure tactics, the US military build-up in the Middle East, and ongoing anti-regime protests, the exiled crown prince of the former Shah regime has been making all the right noises about a possible return to his home country to lead a transition. But can he really run Iran if the regime of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is ousted by the US through force? What kind of domestic support does he have? Here is a deep dive:

Difficult to assess Pahlavi's popularity

The Islamic Republic has a track record of arresting and punishing supporters of the Shah’s erstwhile regime. This makes it very difficult to gauge how much support monarchists currently enjoy inside Iran. Some online polling, which is often anonymous and relies on VPNs or the dark web, may not be entirely accurate, as only internet-savvy, urban, or more educated individuals are likely to have responded. One of the most cited independent surveys comes from GAMAAN (Group for Analysing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran). The Netherlands-based non-profit organisation uses anonymous online polling.

A June 2024 GAMAAN survey with over 77,000 respondents inside Iran, representing the literate adult population, showed that Reza Pahlavi was the most popular opposition figure. However, even in that survey, only 31 per cent chose him, either as their first or second most preferred leader.

According to the survey, support for Pahlavi was higher among men (36 per cent), older respondents (34 per cent among those aged over 50), and less-educated groups (33 per cent). There were also regional differences, with the highest levels of support coming from Gilan (42.5 per cent), Alborz (40 per cent), and North Khorasan (38 per cent) provinces.

Overall, the polling suggests that roughly one-third of respondents support Pahlavi.

Is there nostalgia for pre-revolutionary Iran?

Reza Pahlavi gained some visibility during the anti-hijab protests of 2022–2023 sparked by Mahsa Amini’s death. During the 2025–2026 waves of protests linked to economic crises, currency depreciation, and regional conflicts, Pahlavi gained further prominence by openly calling for strikes, unity, and regime change. Slogans praising the Pahlavi era were heard during some demonstrations.

Pahlavi has positioned himself as a unifying transitional figure for democracy and does not appear to be insisting on the restoration of the monarchy.

Some recent protests have included chants expressing pro-monarchy or nationalist sentiments, such as “Reza Shah, bless your soul”.

But it would be wrong to assume that the younger generation, which has been at the forefront of many protests, is longing for the Shah dynasty, which they have never experienced. Those most likely to feel nostalgic for the pre-1979 era would be individuals who were young at the time of the revolution and are now in their fifties or sixties.

How popular is Reza Pahlavi inside Iran?

Based on available polling data, he is among the most prominent anti-regime figures, but he does not enjoy majority, or universal, support. Most of his supporters belong to secular, nationalist, and older segments of the population.

His popularity appears lower among younger people and ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Baluch, and Azeris. Some women and those who favour republican or decentralised political models are also less enthusiastic about Pahlavi.

The disconnect: Pahlavi has lived his entire adult life outside Iran

Since around the age of 18, Reza Pahlavi has lived outside Iran — initially for pilot training and then in exile following the 1979 revolution that ousted his father's dynasty.

This has limited his ability to build on-the-ground organisational networks. There are no well-established grassroots structures that would make him an obvious choice in the event of regime change. Some critics view him as opportunistic or overly aligned with Western interests.

Reza Pahlavi has been perceived as pro-US, with recent examples including his strong praise for President Donald Trump’s threats to attack Iran. His meetings with Israeli leaders and US conservative figures have also been criticised in certain quarters.

Regime change in Iran would not be smooth

Any collapse of the regime would likely trigger a domino effect of events: mass protests, internal instability, external pressure, or military defections. Opposition groups might struggle to unite immediately. External actors such as the US could play a role in shaping a new government if the current system were completely dismantled.

Pahlavi has cultivated an image as a potential transitional leader, frequently emphasising secular democracy, free elections, and a framework of “national cooperation”. He has also engaged in post-Islamic Republic planning initiatives, including the 2025 Iran Prosperity Project.

However, an important question remains: is most of his support largely symbolic, amplified by diaspora communities and Western media?

He might be able to secure certain advantages, such as international recognition or sanctions relief — but at what cost?

Pahlavi could serve as a unifying figure in the event of a power vacuum. By his own statements, he is not seeking personal rule. He could potentially act as a ceremonial or interim leader and facilitate a transition to a non-Islamist political system.

The odds against Pahlavi becoming Iran’s ruler

Pahlavi does not appear to have a formal domestic political network or a ready pool of officials capable of governing a future regime — or at least none have been publicly identified.

He currently lacks military backing or a loyal institutional base. Obviously, he has no administrative experience inside Iran.

Iranian opposition groups remain deeply divided, with monarchists, republicans, leftists, ethnic activists, and women’s rights groups each pursuing different agendas. The restoration of the monarchy does not appear to be widely supported, with only around 20–25 per cent explicitly favouring it.

Pahlavi’s perceived closeness to pro-Israel or Western conservative circles could alienate segments of society wary of foreign influence.

As mentioned, sudden ouster of the Islamist regime could lead to a fragmented transition. In such circumstances, power might be more likely to fall into the hands of military figures, clerical authorities, or even armed groups formed by former troops and their chiefs.

An exile such as Pahlavi may not command the same level of institutional leverage — unless a US administration were to actively install him with the backing of American military, intelligence, and bureaucratic structures.

In short, while Reza Pahlavi has meaningful support as a symbol of change and could play a role in a democratic transition, actually governing Iran in the long term would present significant challenges.

As a visible figure in the West, he might be well-placed to facilitate elections or national reconciliation efforts.

However, running Iran would require broader domestic consensus, robust organisational capacity, and the ability to overcome deep societal divisions.

It remains unclear whether these conditions would be achievable in a post-Islamic Republic scenario. He may ultimately prove more viable as a unifying figurehead than as a guaranteed ruler.