From India’s perspective, the Quad is arguably one of the three most significant plurilateral groupings of the 21st century, the other two being G20 and BRICS. G20 helps India play a global role of the kind it always aspires to as a potential member of the UN Security Council. BRICS is an instrument for exercising its strategic autonomy. On the other hand, Quad serves as insurance against China's threat and an enabler for India to be a consequential player in the Indo-Pacific. 

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As a proactive grouping of three treaty allies – the US, Japan, and Australia – and a common strategic partner – India, the Quad achieved considerable progress before and during the Biden years. The question it now faces is whether it will grow or fade away during Trump 2.0. The answer may lie in the grouping’s recent past and present but also in certain future trends. 

The rear view 

Between 21 September 2024 and 21 January 2025, three important developments relating to the Quad took place. Taken together, they provide a clear picture of where the grouping stands today and where it may be heading tomorrow. 

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First, President Joe Biden hosted the Wilmington Summit on 21 September 2024, his swan song for the Quad, in the growth of which he played a decisive role. During his four years in the White House, the four leaders met six times (which included two online meetings), whereas their foreign ministers held eight meetings in the last five years. The summit in Wilmington presented an overall report card of the Quad’s achievements. The grouping claimed to be “more strategically aligned than ever before.” It sought to uphold the international order based on the rule of law. It represented nearly 2 billion people and over one-third of the global GDP. Its principal projection was that it is “A Global Force for Good.” 

By way of amplification, the Wilmington Declaration recalled how its members contributed to health security in the Indo-Pacific region by delivering over 400 million COVID-19 doses in 2021 and 2022 and  800 million vaccines globally, in addition to other measures. Subsequently, the Quad launched its ‘Cancer Moonshot’ which focuses on combating cervical cancer. Besides, the list of other activities included tangible work towards humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, quality infrastructure, critical and emerging technologies, cyber and space cooperation, Quad Investors Network (QUIN), and people-to-people initiatives. It was a mixed statement of achievements, plans, and aspirations, showing that the Quad remains a work in progress. The summit also deliberated on the original raison d'être of the Quad, namely China’s coercive and aggressive behaviour in the region, but preferred to stay amply diplomatic in its utterances. 

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Second, the Quad Foreign Ministers issued a joint statement on 31 December 2024 to commemorate its 20th anniversary. It traces its origin to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. At that time, the Navies of the four countries came together to readily help the affected nations and peoples to cope with one of the worst disasters in history. The ministers noted pertinently, “What began as an emergency response to a catastrophe has grown into a full-fledged partnership, delivering positive outcomes for the people of the region.” They also reiterated their leaders’ vision of “a free and open Indo-Pacific that is peaceful, stable and prosperous, underpinned by effective regional institutions.” 

Third, the day after President Donald Trump’s inauguration, the Quad Foreign Ministers held their meeting in Washington on 21 January 2025, with Marco Rubio replacing Antony Blinken as the US secretary of state. The fact that the meeting took place so quickly suggested continuity and bipartisan support in the US for the grouping. Although the meeting resulted in the shortest possible two-paragraph statement, it reaffirmed the shared commitment to strengthening a free and open Indo-Pacific where the rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty, and territorial integrity are upheld and defended. The brevity of the statement also indicated that the new administration would, at the proper time, find a way to shape the Quad in accordance with its own needs, perceptions, and past record. 

The road ahead 

The Quad’s trajectory in 2025 (and beyond) is likely to be moulded by multiple factors, most of which relate to China. Mr. Trump has just imposed a 10% additional tariff on imports from China, a likely precursor of appropriate counter-measures by the Chinese side. Nevertheless, factoring in his friendly statements and gestures towards China and the administration's internal dynamics, it is apt to presume that US-China relations may follow a zigzag course, not a straight line. It is only when Washington fails in its attempt to befriend Beijing that it may turn to supply new oxygen to the Quad. When it does so, it is unlikely to be much interested in following the ‘global good’ part of the agenda. Instead, it may prefer to strengthen and invest in the maritime security pillar of the grouping. 

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Another relevant factor here is the path India-China relations may take in the coming months. The Xi Jinping-Modi summit in Kazan last October was preceded and followed by a series of important bilateral meetings and developments. Even though experts think the status quo ante (as prevailed before the Galwan clash in June 2020) is yet to be fully achieved, a thaw in bilateral relations has set in. Some experts argue that while the US is indeed India’s most valuable partner, the latter needs to normalize relations with Beijing to cope with an unpredictable US policy. “In short, India and China,” wrote Kanti Bajpai, a reputed scholar, “face a common challenge – how to enhance their bargaining power with the US.” This explains why India will advance on two roads: encourage a restricted rapprochement with China and work determinedly to strengthen the Quad through an early summit. 

The other two partners, Japan and Australia, matter too. Their internal developments may influence the Quad. As treaty allies, they are likely to work in close coordination with Washington, but they, too, are in the process of making sense of America’s new China policy.  

Conclusion 

Some figures in the Biden administration tried to project India as the real leader in the Quad. This was flattering for Delhi, but it should not be taken at face value. In the new era that began on January 20, the US is the most important leader, and, therefore, President Trump will decide what he wants to do with this grouping. He is unlikely to be interested in domains like energy and climate change, health security, and infrastructure development. Further, if China does not cooperate with it, Washington may not hesitate to begin strengthening various security dimensions of the Quad. The other three partners would do well to be ready with their calibrated and coordinated responses. 

President Trump plans to visit China and India in the coming months. This may be preceded by a meeting between him and PM Modi. These discussions will bring much-needed clarity about the immediate future of the Quad. 

Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.