The trimming of the Quad

The Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Washington on 1 July was of considerable consequence, especially as an indicator of how the Trump administration 2.0 viewed the plurilateral grouping of the US, India, Japan, and Australia as an instrument to implement its Indo-Pacific strategy. The message from Washington is to reconfirm that the Quad would stay, but it may work to achieve a less comprehensive agenda than before. Besides, its inner solidarity may be moulded by what happens between now and the next summit to be hosted by India later in the year.

Several significant developments are expected in the coming months. First, more clarity is awaited in US-China relations following the conclusion of the tariff agreement and reports of a Trump visit to China. Then, the tariff agreements between the US and India, as well as those with Japan, have been on the anvil. With India, there is the additional complication stemming from a public disagreement over the US’s ‘mediatory role’ in ending the India-Pakistan military conflict. The US-Japan equation is not in good shape at present. The US President and the Australian Prime Minister are yet to meet. Hence, the four foreign ministers faced the daunting task of redefining the Quad, while imparting it some fresh momentum. They did what they could, and then left it to their top leaders to give it a more precise shape at the forthcoming summit.

Contours of agreement

The Biden administration, claiming full glory for its contribution to the development of the Quad, produced a 5,700-word Wilmington Declaration in September 2024, which asserted: “The Quad is here to stay.” The new administration seemed to agree by hosting the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 20 January 2025, the day of Trump’s inauguration. They voiced their “shared agreement to strengthen a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Yet, the brevity of their joint statement was striking.

Five months later, the foreign ministers became relatively more articulate. At the conclusion of their latest meeting, they issued a 10-paragraph-long joint statement. It made a conscious effort to trim the large number of issues that the Quad mechanism had addressed during the Biden years.

Some of the issues missing from the latest common position include global health and health security, the Cancer Moonshot, climate adaptation and clean energy, as well as the previous emphasis on people-to-people initiatives. The joint statement of July 1 stresses a shared commitment to “a free and open Indo-Pacific,” but deletes the other two adjectives – “inclusive and resilient.” It speaks of “a new, ambitious and strong agenda” that would be focused on four key areas, namely, maritime and traditional security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technology (replacing “technologies” of the previous era), and humanitarian assistance and emergency response. The reference to the Quad as “a global good” is also missing.

The Washington meeting accorded significant importance to the Quad Minerals Initiative, promoting collective resilience through collaboration to secure and diversify critical minerals. Supply chains will continue to strengthen the Quad Indo-Pacific Logistics Network without hindrance. There is also an important project to launch the Ports of the Future Partnership in Mumbai in 2025. A clear understanding of the trimming of the Quad cooperation programme can be obtained by comparing the official ‘Factsheet’ issued on 21 September 2024 and on 1 July 2025.

Regional issues

For the Quad nations, the Indo-Pacific architecture continues to be based on three pillars: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).

The joint statement has devoted two paragraphs to the China challenge, calling out China’s objectionable activities in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and expressing strong opposition and serious concern over them as well as on China’s “non-market policies and practices.” This has, of course, been done without naming the country as such, while leaving the reader in no doubt that the reference is indeed to China. In this respect, the document closely follows the previous approach. It also resembles the language used by the G7 nations at the conclusion of their latest summit hosted by Canada.

Two other nations drew the specific attention of the Quad foreign ministers: North Korea and Myanmar. The ministers reaffirmed their commitment to “the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula”. They expressed deep concern about

countries that are deepening military cooperation with North Korea in a direct undermining of the global non-proliferation regime.

In Myanmar, the worsening crisis was noted as a concerning development, with the Quad throwing its weight behind ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus. This formula has failed to bring about any progress towards the peaceful resolution of the post-coup crisis. The Myanmar military government is set to hold elections in a few months, but the Quad avoided commenting on them, probably because no consensus exists. India recently advised the regime to advance towards early restoration of a democratic process by ensuring that elections are “inclusive and credible”. India favours “a Myanmar-owned and Myanmar-led transition towards a peaceful, stable and democratic future”. In contrast, the other three countries appeared to have reservations on this score to varying degrees.

Meeting a few weeks after the Pahalgam terrorist attack and India-Pakistan military hostilities, the Quad had no option but to forge a common stand on this question vital to India. It condemned the terrorist attack “in the strongest terms.” Then it fell on the language used by the UN Security Council to call for “the perpetrators, organizers and financiers of this reprehensible act to be brought to justice without any delay.” However, what was missing was a direct condemnation of Pakistan, support for India’s assertion that the world must have a zero tolerance policy on terrorism, and for India’s right of self-defense against cross-border terrorism. This delayed and inadequate response by the Quad displeased many in India.

Complete silence on the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East revealed policy divergences among the four nations.

Assessment

The ministerial meeting, on the whole, showed some progress, but the preparatory task for the Quad summit remains heavy and challenging. On the bilateral level, equations between India and the US, as well as those between Japan and the US, need to be improved. On the plurilateral plane, the members need to be clearer about their respective approaches towards China. In the meantime, India needs to keep improving its bilateral and trilateral cooperation with Australia and Japan.

Furthermore, in macro policy terms, a vital coincidence needs to be taken into account. As New Delhi prepares to host the Quad summit later in the year, the burden of the BRICS presidency in 2026 will also be placed on its shoulders. This brings prestige, but also presents a highly complex challenge in balancing and managing the paradox of leading the Quad – an essentially Western grouping – and the BRICS – an essentially non-Western grouping.

This intricate challenge arises at a time when India seeks to safeguard the gains achieved in India-US relations over the past two decades, as well as to maintain the reset of ties with China, five years after the Galwan clash.

Indeed, interesting times lie ahead for Indian diplomacy in the next 18 months.