Can India play a role in ending the war in Ukraine? 

New Delhi, India

Prime Minister Narendra Modi's recent visit to Ukraine has put India in the spotlight as a potential peacemaker. While Delhi may soon play a larger role in finding a solution to Europe's long war, it is important that its actions are based on correct assumptions and an understanding of what different peace could mean for Europe and its own interests. 

What kind of peace? 

2.5 years after Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the war is becoming more protracted and a new consensus is emerging that it will end at the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield. This strengthens the position of India - which has always held this view and has good relations with both sides of the conflict - as a possible mediator. While Poland and many Western countries welcome Prime Minister Modi's warnings that "this is not an era for war" and his continued calls for dialogue and diplomacy, we must be fully aware that not every end to this war will be acceptable and celebrated by all. What matters is the kind of peace we seek. How this war ends will have a profound impact on Europe's security architecture and India's strategic interests. 

Ukraine and its Western allies still hope that the final settlement of this war will uphold the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty of states. For them, a lasting peace would require at least a return to the pre-February 2022 situation. Officially, Ukraine still maintains that negotiations must be based on President Zelensky's 10-point plan. Therefore, the Polish-Indian Strategic Partnership Declaration emphasised the call for a 'just' peace, and President Zelensky offered India to host the next peace summit, but on the condition that the declaration from the previous summit in Switzerland be signed. 

This scenario could be achieved in two main ways. Either Putin is defeated militarily or he is persuaded to change his mind and withdraw his troops from Ukraine. But more and more people doubt that either option is realistic.  

But a negotiated settlement also carries many risks. For Ukraine, any deal on Russia's terms would undermine its statehood, complicate its reconstruction and threaten its very existence. Ukraine needs a peace treaty, not an act of surrender. Europe needs reassurance that Russia will not resume its war against Ukraine or any other member of the European Union or NATO after a few years' pause as it replenishes its arsenal. Every country needs a guarantee that changing borders by force is not an accepted form of modern international behaviour. It will be a mammoth task to negotiate an agreement that is not seen as a victory for an aggressor. 

What if Russia wins? 

This means that Russia can win both on the battlefield and through negotiations. But both solutions would be detrimental not only to the security of Ukraine and Europe but also to India's core strategic interests. If anyone in India is hoping for a Russian victory, they should be careful what they wish for. This would hurt India in three ways: 

First, it would send a signal that a great power can openly violate the sovereignty of its neighbour, seize its territory on any pretext and walk away with impunity. This would not only legitimise the flagrant violation of international norms and principles for which India stands, but could also encourage other powers, including in Asia, to follow suit. 

Second, it would strain the West's relationship with Russia for the foreseeable future, pushing it further into the arms of China. Without a withdrawal from Ukraine, there can be no return to business as usual in Europe-Russia relations. Russia, cut off from Western markets and possibly under continued sanctions, would have to rely even more on its only partner - China. If India's neutrality in the Russian-Ukrainian war was intended to give Russia an alternative and help it distance itself from China, allowing a Russian victory would have the opposite effect - cementing the Sino-Russian alliance.  

Finally, it would undermine US credibility in the Indo-Pacific and weaken all the networks and mechanisms (including QUAD) built up over the years to counterbalance and contain China's rise in the region. With less appetite across Asia to share the fate of Ukraine, the US would find it harder to provide security. Chinese dominance could be more imminent.  

Can Ukraine win? 

But this scenario is based on the calculation that Ukraine is doomed to failure. I would argue, however, that such a possibility is based on a number of false assumptions about the ongoing war. Three of them stand out.  

The first is that Russia is invincible. The Poles would be the first to remind you that this is not true, as they were one of the few in history to conquer Moscow in 1612. Poland also defeated the Bolshevik Russian army at the Battle of the Vistula in 1920, which halted the march of Communism into Western Europe and which the British historian Norman Davis has named one of the 18 most important battles in human history. Russia lost a war with Japan in 1905 and again in Afghanistan in 1989. It took the Afghans almost a decade, but they not only repelled the invasion, they also helped to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union. It proves that even a nuclear Russia can be defeated, although it may take time and possibly a change of leadership in the Kremlin. It will take great courage and a strong will to fight, which the Ukrainians have. It would also require continued foreign military and economic support and the international isolation of Russia. But can Ukraine get any more foreign support? 

This brings us to the second misconception widely held in India: that US support for Ukraine will not last much longer after Presidential elections in November this year that may bring back Donald Trump to the White House. Yet, I would say that whoever wins, it is highly unlikely that the US will abandon Ukraine. Not out of morality or some kind of sympathy for the victim. But because continued support for Ukraine serves vital American strategic and security interests. 

First, there is business. Of the more than $51 billion in military aid sent to Ukraine, most has gone back to the American defence industry, bringing revenue and jobs to American voters. Second, it is strategic. If the US sees China as its main threat (which it does), why hand victory to China's main ally on a silver platter? Finally, it is security, because it helps to reduce the military arsenals not only of Russia, but also of North Korea and Iran, other main enemies of the US. In fact, the war in Ukraine is costing the US far less in blood and treasure than its 20-year involvement in Afghanistan, yet it is yielding far greater benefits in all dimensions. Therefore, no matter who wins the November elections, he or she may like to continue military aid to Ukraine (possibly in a different form, such as on the basis of a lend-lease agreement), while leaving economic support to European partners. 

And here we come to the third misunderstanding of the war in Ukraine. Many in India believe that growing war fatigue in Europe will strengthen anti-war populists and undermine the will to continue supporting Ukraine. But after two and a half years of conflict, we do not see this in the polls or at the ballot box. In fact, pan-continental elections to the European Parliament have returned the very same forces that had vowed to support Ukraine "for as long as it takes". Elections in France and the UK have not turned Europe inwards as many predicted, while the new pro-European government in Poland has redoubled efforts to mobilise resources to rearm Europe and increase support for Ukraine. The European Union and its members have already pledged €77 billion to Ukraine and have already secured a further €50 billion over the next five years. Europe will continue to help Ukraine fight Russian aggression because it fears it could be next.   

Europe and India have a common interest in ending the war? 

While a new phase of the war in Ukraine opens up more space for diplomacy, it is still very likely that it will last for years, with negative consequences for Europe and the Global South. Nevertheless, it seems that the final resolution will be dictated by developments on the battlefield. And for all the pessimism, any outcome is still possible. So, as India prepares to play a greater diplomatic role, it must tread carefully lest it help hand Russia a victory in the guise of a 'peace deal'. Not because of Western expectations, but because it would not be in India's own interests. 

Apart from the strategic reasons outlined above, it is also not good for India to allow colonial war to succeed. It may be due to a historical misunderstanding of Russia that many Indians do not see the aggression against Ukraine for what it is - a futile attempt to remake an empire. It is true that during the Cold War the Soviet Union supported the decolonisation process, acting in its own interests of competition with the US. But many in the global South overlook the fact that Russia colonised many nations in Europe and Asia in the past. Instead of fighting European colonialism, it was one of the driving forces behind it. The only difference was that the Russian invading armies arrived by land rather than by sea. Now Russia wants to turn back the clock and reverse the process of decolonisation. In 1991, Russia accepted the independence of Ukraine within its current borders and now claims that this was a mistake. It is as if Britain had a change of heart and wanted to take back its former colonies in India. 

It is easy to understand why India has so far refrained from condemning Russia's aggression - it has good historical, security, energy and ideological reasons. But at the same time, while Russia is part of India's past, the West is its future. It is the US or Europe, not Russia, that can provide India with the strategic assets it needs to fuel its growth - be it capital and technology, or foreign markets for Indian goods and labour, or advanced weaponry and diplomatic support on the global stage. But as long as India enjoys a relationship of trust with Russia, it could use it to help its friend out of this senseless war. 

Paradoxically, India and the West share a long-term interest when it comes to Russia. Both are concerned about the growing Sino-Russian alliance, and a prolonged war in Ukraine does not serve them well. Both would prefer to see non-imperial Russia befriend the West, not China. And that will only be possible if the endgame of the war in Ukraine is acceptable to Ukraine and the West. The world would appreciate India helping to negotiate not just any peace, but the 'just' peace. And that is what makes India's task so difficult.