Pahalgam terror strike: Calculated strategy or suicidal gamble by Pakistan

In this era of Grey Zone Warfare, the military is just one of the four critical dimensions of response to an enemy action, the other ones being Diplomatic, Informational and Economic. Pakistan’s trump card, to wriggle out of the situation, it has got itself into, has to be sourced from one of these four. Also, Pakistan’s ability to withstand India’s response will also be a product of these four components of Comprehensive National Power (CNP). 

Assessment of CNP

• Diplomatically, Pakistan is increasingly isolated. Even its traditional backers like the US, Saudi Arabia, and UAE are fatigued with Pakistan’s inability to reform and have stronger interests tied to India’s market and stability today. More so, the geostrategic environment has shifted favourably for India. Pakistan has miserably failed to factor in this change while sponsoring the Pahalgam genocide of 26 Hindu tourists. 

• The informational dimension of warfare has gained ground over the years and the same is evident from the Israel-Hamas conflict and Russia-Ukraine War. It involves Perception Management, building a narrative and public diplomacy. On all these counts credibility of the nation and the contextual correctness matter. Due to its history of using terror as an instrument of state policy, separatism festering within and friends turning aliens, it will not be able to withstand India’s information warfare offensive. 

• Economically, Pakistan is on life support. Its dependency on IMF bailouts, Chinese debt, and Gulf funding leaves it too vulnerable to sustain a prolonged or even limited conflict. Terror funds received in the name of Islamic Jihad and Kashmir issue have also dried and none of the erstwhile sponsors are willing to fund these activities.  

• Militarily, the nuclear deterrent remains, but the conventional imbalance with India has widened significantly over the last decade. India’s capability for swift, precise, and escalatory retaliation (surgical strikes, Balakot air strikes) has been demonstrated. Neither did its nuclear bluff work nor could it piece together a worthwhile military response. There are fractures within the ranks of Pakistan military and morale is in the boots. Pakistan Army has been receiving the drubbing from all quarters and the soldiers have little faith in their Generals. 

• Military power primarily translates into the Force Availability, Force Posturing, Force Composition and Force Application. Due to the internal security situation, political instability and public dissatisfaction, Pakistan Army is already overstretched.  Even partial mobilization by Indian Army or fractional posturing by its offensive formations, Pakistan will be forced to deploy all its assets on its eastern fronts, leaving the hinterland and the backyard bare. This would provide the best-case scenario for Baluchistani liberation forces and Afghanistan to resolve their conflict favourably. If action by Indian forces create conditions for re-orientation by Pakistan Armed Forces simply by positioning and repositioning of strike elements over a period of one month, Pakistan will run out of logistics. If India escalated the Line of Control, Pakistan Army will run out of ammunition. If Indian Air Force adopts forward posture and undertakes maneuvers, it will cost Pakistan heavily. Likewise, Naval drills threatening Karachi to Gwadar will put Pakistani military establishment into disarray. 

Thus, the only “trump card” Pakistan believes it has is the threat of escalation through nuclear deterrence. However, this card too has lost its relevance, as India has developed calibrated response strategies under the nuclear overhang.

Pakistan failed to appreciate the geopolitical situation

Indeed, Pakistan seems to be fighting old battles with outdated assumptions. The world order has shifted dramatically:

• The United States is no longer heavily invested in South Asia as it was during the Cold War or the early War on Terror. Its focus has pivoted to countering China in the Indo-Pacific.

• China, Pakistan’s “all-weather ally,” is embroiled in its own economic crisis and geopolitical confrontations. It will not risk major international fallout for Pakistan’s adventurism.

• Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and UAE have moved closer to India for economic and strategic reasons. They are unlikely to back Pakistan militarily or diplomatically in a crisis.

• Russia is engaged in Ukraine, and Europe is consumed by its own economic and security challenges.

• Global priorities (climate change, AI race, economic recovery) mean less appetite for crisis management in South Asia. It is believed that Trump administration has divided the globe into various zones and given India a freehand in South Asia.

In short, Pakistan is misreading the global landscape if it expects sympathy or intervention.

Will the international community intervene?

Pakistan assumed that, like always, the international community will intervene and stop the escalation. Historically, this assumption held true: during 1999 (Kargil War), 2001 (Parliament attack), and 2008 (Mumbai attacks), international pressure on India helped prevent full-scale escalation.

However, this playbook is obsolete today:

• India’s international standing has risen dramatically. As a key partner in Quad (with US, Japan, Australia) and a vital economic hub, India is seen as a responsible power.

• Pakistan’s credibility is tarnished, especially post-9/11, Osama bin Laden’s capture in Abbottabad, and continued export of terrorism. Moreover, the games that Pakistan played in Afghanistan against US interests has exposed it’s duplicity with friends as well foes alike. 

Global patience on Kashmir conundrum

India showed strategic patience in past expecting Pakistan to change it’s behavior. Likewise, the world supported India’s measures to resolve the Kashmir issue politically. Now, global Patience has worn out and the world wants India to have its way. This evident from the fact that no major power has shown serious concern or called for restraint after the Pahalgam attack. Silence speaks volumes. This eerie global silence is an important signal.

• After Pulwama (2019), there was some diplomatic noise about “restraint.”

• After Pahalgam (2024), there is strategic silence — implying tacit acceptance of India’s right to respond.

This silence suggests a new geopolitical consensus: that India has the right to defend its citizens and sovereignty, and Pakistan must bear consequences if it provokes conflict.

It also signals that global players may not intervene early this time, especially if India’s response is seen as precise, proportionate, and within international norms. Unfortunately for Pakistan, the scope of such a response has widened since Israel-Hamas conflict and India can bite as much as it’s capacity allows. 

After Army and Air Force actions in past, could it be the Navy now?

This is a realistic and dangerously interesting possibility.

• India’s Navy has significantly upgraded its operational readiness, particularly in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

• The Navy could be used for blockades (e.g., shutting down Karachi Port operations) or maritime strikes without escalating into a full-scale ground war.

• A naval blockade (like the one considered during Kargil) would cripple Pakistan’s economy within weeks, given its reliance on sea trade.

• Such a move would minimize ground confrontation, avoid unnecessary civilian casualties, and still deliver a strategic and economic blow.

Moreover, maritime actions could complicate Pakistan’s ability to project victimhood internationally — making it harder to claim aggression in traditionally land-centric disputes like Kashmir.

Thus, if escalation occurs, it is not unlikely that the Indian Navy will play a prominent, if not central, role this time.

Dangerous days ahead

Pakistan is caught between a collapsing internal order and a rapidly changing external environment. Its assumptions of old diplomatic interventions, military parity, and strategic sympathy no longer hold.

General Asim Munir’s gamble, therefore, appears less like a calculated move and more like an act of desperation masked as strategy.

If Pakistan persists down this path, it risks not just defeat on the battlefield, but complete collapse of whatever limited international credibility it still retains. These are, indeed, dangerously interesting times — with consequences far beyond the immediate theater of conflict.

We may sum up the whole scenario as:

Pakistan, under General Asim Munir’s leadership, appears to be overplaying a weak hand by provoking a crisis with India.

It has no real trump card — economically fragile, diplomatically isolated, militarily outmatched, and politically unstable. The only perceived leverage is nuclear deterrence, but even that has lost much of its psychological edge as India has demonstrated calibrated retaliation (surgical strikes, Balakot) under the nuclear threshold.

Pakistan misread the geopolitical reality. Unlike in the past, today’s world has shifted: the US is focused elsewhere, China is cautious, Gulf countries are closer to India, and the global appetite for crisis intervention has diminished.

Islamabad wrongly assumed that international pressure would force India to exercise restraint, as it did in Kargil or Mumbai. However, after the Pahalgam massacre, no major country has called for restraint — signaling a new global mood that recognizes India’s right to act against terror.

Interestingly, India’s response might come via the Navy this time. With past precedents of the Army (surgical strikes) and Air Force (Balakot), a naval blockade or strike could paralyze Pakistan’s economy without triggering a full land war — a smart, asymmetric escalation.

In short, Pakistan has trapped itself by betting on outdated assumptions, while India has broader international support, superior strategic options, and the initiative to dictate terms.

These are dangerously interesting times — not just for India-Pakistan relations, but for the future stability of the region.