New Delhi, India
A popular but accurate maxim applies to foreign affairs: you can choose your friends, but not your neighbours. A nation must live permanently with its neighbours, the only question being whether they will be friends, foes, or something in between. India's destiny in South Asia is to live with a constant fluctuation in relations with most of its neighbours. The implementation of its wise ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy depends on both India and its eight immediate neighbours such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar.
December witnessed two important visits: the incoming visit of Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) from 15 to 17 December and the outgoing visit of Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri to Dhaka on December 9. Both served as useful yardsticks to measure where India’s relations with these two nations stood at present.
Visit of SL President
The Sri Lankan President chose India for his first visit abroad as a clear signal that he considered this relationship to be of the highest importance. Still, it should not be interpreted as his choosing India over China. It only indicated that, while he would exercise his freedom to shape Sri Lanka-China ties the way his government considers fit, the ties with India will figure high on his agenda.
The backdrop of the visit lent special significance to it. AKD has come a long way from his leftist past and activism in the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which has now metamorphosed itself into a political coalition named the National People’s Power (NPP). His recent victories in the presidential and parliamentary elections and embracing pragmatism over ideology indicate the likelihood of a friendly equation with New Delhi. His emergence as the new political star has led to the complete marginalization of the UNP and SLFP, the two mainstream parties that dominated politics for decades.
The speed with which AKD’s state visit was arranged and its positive outcome are noteworthy. India’s generous assistance and unwavering support to Sri Lanka during and after the unprecedented economic crisis in 2022 won the deep appreciation of the visiting leader. The joint statement depicts the India-Sri Lanka partnership as “underpinned by deep-rooted cultural and civilizational ties, geographical proximity and the people-to-people relations.” Political and security cooperation, as well as issues concerning economy, trade, economy, energy, and cultural relations, were tackled in a constructive manner.
The two governments decided that the shared challenges facing them in the Indian Ocean region would be handled through the Colombo Security Dialogue and bilaterally. AKD reiterated Sri Lanka’s stated position of not permitting its territory to be used in any manner inimical to India’s security. Whether this means the end or reduction in visits by Chinese surveillance vessels to Sri Lankan ports will need to be watched as the year-long moratorium is about to end. However, the stress on forging greater cooperation through regional institutions such as the IORA and BIMSTEC was welcome. A noticeable trade-off was revealed: India extended support to Sri Lanka‘s application to become a member of BRICS even as Sri Lanka supported India’s candidature for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council for 2028–29.
On legacy issues, little progress could be achieved. The Indian side publicly reiterated its hope that the Sri Lankan government would fulfil the aspirations of the Tamil minority, but it omitted a reference to the implementation of the 13th Amendment. Sri Lankan reaction to the revised formulation is not known. On the contentious issue of fisheries, what the two leaders did was kick the ball back to officials who were instructed to continue their “engagement.” However, on other aspects of bilateral cooperation, the two governments announced a solid programme of action. The promise of “a futuristic vision”, complete with investment-led growth and physical, digital, and energy connectivity, is enticing. Clearly, India-Sri Lanka relations are in a good place today.
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FS in Dhaka
The visit of the Indian foreign secretary to Dhaka took place in the background of continuing deterioration in India-Bangladesh relations since the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her arrival in India to seek shelter on 5 August. The students’ agitation against her government in previous months assumed serious proportions. As it evolved, Islamists and other political forces opposed to the ruling Awami League government, and some foreign interests succeeded in engineering a regime change. The Interim government, headed by Muhammad Yunus as the Chief Adviser, began work on a hostile note, demanding Hasina’s repatriation and declaring that its installation represented “the second liberation” of Bangladesh.
Between August and December 2024, diplomatic contacts were maintained to ensure the continuation of regular exchanges between the two governments, including through a meeting between External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and his counterpart in September in New York. During his day-long visit, Foreign Secretary Misri held discussions with his counterpart, the Foreign Affairs Adviser, and the Chief Adviser to review the entire gamut of issues to restore normalcy in this relationship. The dialogue agenda in Dhaka included items stretching from political and security matters to commerce, connectivity, and cooperation in water, power, and energy sectors, as well as development cooperation, consular, cultural, and people-to-people ties.
Each side has had concerns and grievances against the other. For India, attacks on the minorities, including the Hindus, represented a significant issue. Attacks on its cultural, religious, and diplomatic properties caused much concern, too. The eruption of vitriolic rhetoric in the Bangladesh media was also noted, damaging the positive image India enjoyed due to its massive cooperation with Bangladesh and its vital role in the nation’s liberation. The Bangladesh side has also been exercised over several matters beyond seeking Hasina’s speedy return from India. The Misri visit was thus an occasion for a candid and constructive exchange of views. He emphasized the people-centric and people-oriented dimensions of this relationship between the two countries, which required careful nurturing. The visit has restored some normalcy to this relationship.
Civil society in India has been deeply concerned over recent developments in Bangladesh. In an open letter to the people of Bangladesh, many eminent Indian citizens urged individuals and institutions in Bangladesh to work towards restoring democracy and secularism, including the rights of Hindus and other religious minorities. They also called for “early free, fair and inclusive elections.” Meanwhile, Dhaka announced that major reforms must precede elections, which were likely to take place between late 2025 and the first half of 2026.
Prospects
Political changes in a country inevitably affect its foreign policy. Changes in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh during 2024 were bound to impact their approach towards India. Under the new president, Sri Lanka has demonstrated its inclination to accord due importance to its relations with India. How it manages its equations with Asia’s two major powers, India and China, will be monitored closely.
On the other hand, the change in Dhaka was a significant setback to India and India-Bangladesh relations. New Delhi took the welcome initiative to arrange the FS-level dialogue. Given its multiple vulnerabilities, the new dispensation in Dhaka must shoulder its responsibility to stabilize and improve its relationship with India in mutual interest. Whether this is achieved and the challenges on the way could be a burning question in the opening months of 2025.
Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.