When Pakistani AQ Khan network helped Iran's atomic programme and possibly helped its quest for a nuclear weapon

Abdul Qadeer Khan, Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, died of Covid in 2021. At the time of his death, he was a controversial figure, once a national hero of Pakistan who fell into disgrace after it emerged that he led a global proliferation network. That network was among key contributors to Iran's nuclear programme, currently under bombardment by Israel and the US amid an ongoing war. Here's the story of the Khan network.

How AQ Khan proliferation network helped Iran nuclear programme

The AQ Khan network's help to Iran's nuclear programme included helping the Islamic Republic build capabilities that could be used for nuclear weapons. Back in the 1980s and 1990s, the Pakistani metallurgist's clandestine proliferation network supplied Iran with critical nuclear technology as well as expertise.

What did the AQ Khan Network give to Iran?

It is believed that the AQ Khan network provided Iran with centrifuge technology and components. It included designs, components, and technical drawings for gas centrifuges, particularly P-1 and later P-2 models, used for enriching uranium. The designs were reportedly derived from those Khan had stole from from Dutch firm URENCO, when he was working in the Netherlands in the 1970s.

Iran got more than 2,000 centrifuge components and sub-assemblies, which helped build its secret pilot enrichment workshops in Kalaye Electrical Company, Tehran, among other places, in the 1989-1995 period.

The Pakistani technology transfer is corroborated by the fact that centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz nuclear enrichment site looked similar to those at Pakistan’s Kahuta facility.

Khan network gave Iran uranium enrichment technical know-how

Khan’s network also reportedly gave Iran technical know-how, including blueprints and specifications for uranium enrichment. It is thought to have assisted in setting up uranium hexafluoride gas processes for Iran, that are critical for producing highly enriched uranium. HEU is a prerequisite for developing nuclear weapons.

Did Pakistan give initial designs for nuclear weapons to Iran?

According to multiple reports, Iranian scientists were trained in Pakistan on nuclear enrichment technology in 1988. It has been reported also that the Khan network gave Iran some blueprints for a Chinese nuclear warhead design. These reports are, however, inconclusive.

But in 2018, when Israeli intel agency Mossad uncovered documents on the Amad Project, the secretive nuclear weapons programme of Iran in 1999–2003, it emerged that Pakistani designs may have been reworked in its warhead development.

It is believed that the AQ Khan network provided assistance to Iran for high-explosive tests, detonator development for implosion-type bombs in this period.

How did AQ Khan network operate?

Centrifuge components and other nuclear materials were sent to Iran via intermediaries in countries like Dubai and Malaysia. It had been widely reported that a Sri Lankan, BSA Tahir, helped transfer P-2 centrifuge components to Iran for $3 million. Iran's payments for such transfers, running into millions of dollars, were made through foreign bank accounts.

After its 2003 inspections, the UN nuclear agency IAEA reported that Iran’s P-1 model centrifuges were obtained from a 'foreign intermediary', identified as Khan, in 1989.

Khan helped Iran cut time for enrichment capabilities

The aid from the Khan network - both technology and expertise - possibly helped Iran cut its nuclear development timeline by a decade. It gave Iran a headstart in uranium enrichment at scale, in sites like Natanz.

The Khan network was exposed in 2003, when Natanz facility - till then undeclared - was revealed. Iran agreed to name its suppliers, leading to global pressure on Pakistan, and the televised confession by AQ Khan in 2004 that led to his house arrest and eventual downfall from national hero to disgrace.

Did Pakistani establishment help Khan in nuclear proliferation?

In his confession and subsequent remarks, Khan said he acted own his own to sell nuclear technology to Iran as well as Libya, North Korea and possibly other countries. But at the time, allegations swirled that Pakistani officials such as Gen Mirza Aslam Beg either had approved, or were aware of, the Khan network's transfers to Iran.

In subsequent years, Khan had alleged he faced pressure from the then Pakistani PM Benazir Bhutto's government, though these claims were rejected by officials.

Interestingly, Iran's cooperation with IAEA at the time, and revelation of details of Khan's involvement in it, were seen by some in Pakistan as a betrayal of Pakistan's ‘Muslim brotherhood’ gesture. The episode caused a strain in Iran-Pakistan relations at the time.

Could Iran have developed a nuclear programme without Khan network's help?

Quite possibly so, because the Iranian nuclear programme was receiving help from several other countries, most notably Russia and China. But the AQ Khan network gave it much-needed acceleration.