America’s new strategy: Control the system, not the world

As BRICS prepares to meet in New Delhi, it would do well to understand not only what the United States is doing, but why.

The reported American move to gain majority control over more than 65 billion barrels of Venezuela’s proven oil reserves may appear to be another dramatic episode in Washington’s relationship with Caracas. But it may also offer a window into a much larger transformation in American strategy.

The United States is becoming increasingly concerned about its dependence on resources, technologies and supply chains that it does not control. In a world of intensifying geopolitical competition, Washington appears determined to secure the foundations of its economic, technological and military power.

Oil is only one part of the equation.

Critical minerals, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, electricity generation, shipping routes, data and financial infrastructure are becoming strategic assets. Venezuela’s oil, Greenland’s geography and mineral potential, the Middle East’s energy resources and the security of the Western Hemisphere may seem like separate issues. They are increasingly connected by a single concern: American vulnerability.

Artificial intelligence makes this question even more important.

The next technological revolution will require enormous quantities of electricity, computing capacity, data centres and advanced chips. Those chips depend on complex global supply chains and critical minerals. The competition over artificial intelligence is therefore also becoming a competition over energy, minerals, manufacturing capacity and technology.

In this environment, dependence can become vulnerability.

The same logic applies to finance.

After the Second World War, the United States did not simply inherit Britain’s position as the leading global power. It helped create an international system that embedded American economic strength within a wider architecture.

Bretton Woods established the foundations of a monetary system centred on the dollar. The Marshall Plan helped rebuild Europe. NATO institutionalised American security commitments. The United Nations provided a framework for international cooperation.

The dollar subsequently became the principal currency of global trade and finance as British power and sterling declined.

This was one of the great strategic achievements of the twentieth century. American power was multiplied because other countries had an interest in participating in the system.

Today, however, that system is under pressure.

China has emerged as an economic and technological competitor. Alternative payment mechanisms are developing. Countries are diversifying their reserves. Digital currencies, cryptocurrencies and stablecoins could eventually change the architecture of international payments.

Washington therefore has a powerful incentive to ensure that the next generation of financial and technological infrastructure does not erode American influence.

This brings us to the central strategic dilemma facing the United States.

A great power that feels increasingly vulnerable naturally seeks greater control. It wants secure energy supplies, critical minerals, resilient supply chains, technological superiority and strategic access.

Some of this is entirely rational.

But there is a danger that the pursuit of security through ever greater control can create the insecurity it seeks to prevent.

History provides some uncomfortable lessons.

The British Empire possessed extraordinary naval, commercial and financial power. Yet the cost of maintaining a worldwide empire eventually became difficult to sustain.

The Soviet Union possessed enormous military capabilities, but military power could not compensate indefinitely for economic and technological weaknesses.

The United States after 1945 followed a different path. Rather than simply controlling territory and resources, it created institutions, alliances and markets through which American power could operate.

That distinction matters today.

A great power that feels insecure naturally seeks greater control. It wants secure energy supplies, critical minerals, resilient supply chains, technological superiority and strategic access.

But there is a danger in confusing security with possession.

If every major power attempts to control the resources, technologies, markets and strategic routes on which its security depends, the world could fragment into competing economic and geopolitical fortresses.

The emerging international environment already contains elements of several competing visions. Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” captures the cultural and political fragmentation of the world. Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap” describes the dangers inherent when a rising power challenges an established one. And the increasingly competitive struggle for resources and security can sometimes resemble the logic of Mad Max.

The combination would be dangerous.

This is where BRICS has an important role.

As the grouping prepares to meet in Delhi, its members need to understand the American calculation before formulating their own response. It would be tempting to interpret Washington’s actions simply as an effort to contain China, preserve dollar dominance or prevent the emergence of a multipolar world.

There is some truth in each interpretation.

But the deeper concern is vulnerability.

The United States fears dependence on foreign energy, minerals, technologies, supply chains and financial systems at precisely the moment when artificial intelligence and advanced technologies are transforming the meaning of national power.

BRICS should therefore be careful not to respond by simply constructing another system of exclusive blocs.

Its objective should be resilience rather than isolation: diversified supply chains, greater technological capability, secure energy networks and more efficient financial mechanisms, while preserving the channels of trade and dialogue that connect the major powers.

India has a particularly important role to play.

It has an interest in a genuinely multipolar international system, but it also has an interest in a stable relationship with the United States. India therefore has something that many other powers lack: the ability to understand both sides of the emerging strategic equation.

Understanding American insecurity is as important as understanding American power.

For Washington, meanwhile, there is an equally important lesson.

America does not need to control everything to remain the world’s most important power. It possesses an extraordinary combination of military strength, financial depth, technological innovation, universities, entrepreneurial capacity, natural resources and alliances.

Its greatest strategic asset may still be its ability to make other countries want to participate in a system shaped by American leadership.

Washington should therefore distinguish between control and leadership.

It should secure critical supply chains without necessarily monopolising them; maintain technological leadership while allowing allies to participate in innovation; strengthen energy security without turning every resource-rich country into a strategic possession; and preserve the dollar by maintaining the openness and credibility of American financial markets.

Most importantly, it should invest in alliances and institutions.

The United States does not need to retreat from the world. Nor should it ignore genuine vulnerabilities. The era in which economic interdependence was assumed automatically to overcome geopolitical rivalry is clearly over.

But there is a fundamental difference between an empire that seeks to possess the world and a power that seeks to organise it.

The United States will remain the world’s most important power for the foreseeable future. But its relative dominance is increasingly being challenged by the diffusion of economic, technological and military capabilities.

Its answer should not be withdrawal.

Nor should it be permanent expansion.

The objective should be strategic primacy through an open system.

That may also be the most important message for BRICS as it gathers in Delhi.

The emerging international order will not be determined simply by who controls the most oil, minerals, technology or territory.

It will ultimately be determined by who can build a system that others believe is worth participating in.

The country that controls the system does not need to control everything within it.