India’s decision to cancel the Indus Waters Treaty after the Pahalgam terror attack has opened a dangerous new chapter for South Asia. Pakistan, which depends heavily on the Indus River system, supplying around 90 per cent of its agricultural needs, has threatened retaliation. However, despite the rhetoric, Pakistan is in no real position to fight a war over water. Let's understand why - 

Signed in 1960 with World Bank mediation, the Indus Waters Treaty divided six rivers between India and Pakistan. India received control over the eastern rivers — Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej — while Pakistan was granted rights to the western rivers — Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. The western rivers constitute nearly 80 per cent of the total annual flow of the Indus Basin, amounting to approximately 135 million acre-feet of water each year — making them critical for Pakistan’s agriculture, drinking water, and power generation. This treaty has been the backbone of Pakistan’s agricultural economy and urban survival for over six decades.

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Weaponisation of Water

Now, with the treaty suspended, India has the power to build dams, divert flows, or even restrict water headed towards Pakistan. The consequences for Pakistan would be swift and severe. Drinking water shortages could emerge within 2–3 weeks. Irrigation systems, crucial for sustaining Pakistan’s agriculture, would begin to break down shortly after. Punjab, which produces over 75 per cent of Pakistan’s wheat and 90 per cent of its rice, could see its crop output collapse — a devastating blow to both the economy and food security.

The threat also extends to electricity supply of Pakistan. Hydroelectric plants such as Mangla (with a capacity of 1,000 MW) and Tarbela (one of the world's largest earth-filled dams, producing around 4,888 MW) rely entirely on the western rivers. In the absence of steady water flow, Pakistan would face blackouts, crippling industries that contribute nearly 19 per cent to its GDP and affecting daily civilian life. Amidst a conflict, the collapse of basic services could quickly trigger unrest among Pakistan’s 241 million citizens, leading to riots and political instability.

From a strategic perspective, India’s control over water gives it a massive advantage without direct military engagement. Pakistan’s armed forces, numbering around 650,000 active personnel, require stable logistical support, including water for troops and bases. Sustaining a prolonged military operation would become increasingly difficult for Pakistan, compromising field operations, equipment movement, and troop welfare.

More worryingly for Pakistan, this crisis accelerates an already grim timeline. Even before the current standoff, the United Nations had warned that Pakistan could become a water-scarce country by 2025, with per capita water availability expected to fall below 1,000 cubic meters — the threshold defining "water scarcity." Without access to the Indus system, that timeline is no longer theoretical.

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Meanwhile, Pakistan’s economy is already under enormous strain. Its foreign reserves have fallen to just around $8 billion — barely enough to cover less than two months of imports. Inflation is soaring above 25 per cent and the country remains heavily reliant on IMF bailouts and foreign loans. Entering a war under such conditions would almost certainly push the country toward economic collapse.

Internationally, Islamabad finds itself increasingly isolated. Even China, Pakistan’s largest creditor with investments worth over $65 billion under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is unlikely to intervene militarily over river waters. Western countries, viewing India as a growing $3.7 trillion economy and an important democratic partner in the Indo-Pacific, are increasingly siding with New Delhi.

Losing access to the Indus waters would strike at the very foundations of Pakistan’s economy, governance, and society. While Pakistan may threaten retaliation, the brutal truth is hard to escape: it cannot afford a war over water — not today, and not in the foreseeable future.

Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.