New Delhi, India
Three slips, a gully, a forward short leg, a backward short leg and a silly point! For cricket-loving South Asia, in which even mountainous laggard Nepal has officially risen to the highest levels of competition, the sport left by British colonial masters is a matter of both love and habit now.
It also turns out to be a good metaphor to explain many things, including foreign policy. Imagine India as a batsman now, and the close fielding set-up described above as one in which the player at the crease is surrounded by alert opponents ready to pounce and take a catch. From all signs, India's diplomatic situation in South Asia resembles a tough pitch in which it is difficult to score runs, surrounded as it is by neighbours who are not necessarily friends.
Let's take a closer look, especially after the fearful flight of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to New Delhi amid frenzied mobs staging a chaotic, revolutionary overthrow of an elected leader. Bangladesh seemed the only side of the subcontinent India could somewhat take for granted but turned turtle overnight -- and the problem could well lie in the fact that India's foreign policy crafters had taken things for granted because of the role India's army had played in carving the country out of the former East Pakistan.
A friendly leader is not necessarily the equivalent of a friendly state or friendly nation, and that is what the disruptive events at Dhaka show.
China is no cricket-playing nation, but, if critics are to be believed, has had a hand in overthrowing the regime in Dhaka. My own view is that no upsurge of the kind we are witnessing in Bangladesh can be easily explained away by a conspiracy theory or two. But rest assured, the mandarins in Beijing are at work to increase their influence in Asia and beyond.
Consider the Maldives next. Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar is off for a three-day official visit to the archipelago to talk business with President Mohamed Muizzu, who is certainly pro-China from all indications.
Maldives, in the smartest tradition of playing foreign policy games, is a small neighbour trying to get the best out of giant regional powers. The External Affairs Ministry, exhibiting a fancy for Hindi-sounding acronyms that has become a familiar style for Prime Minister Narendra Modi's BJP government, says that Maldives is a key maritime neighbour in India's Neighbourhood First policy and the vision for SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region).
That plays well on the Hindi word for ocean, but a hard look at recent developments shows that India's policy in the blue ocean may be all at sea. Not only did Muizzu storm to power on a plank hostile to India, he also demanded that Indian military personnel leave his country soon after he assumed office.
Sri Lanka, not so far away, seems to have a somewhat India-friendly president in Ranil Wickremesinghe, who was installed after a popular upsurge in 2022 against Mahinda Rajapaksa's strongman government.
But news this week that Namal Rajapaksa, the 38-year-old son of the deposed Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna leader will run for presidential elections marks an end to the uneasy support the party offered for Wickremesinghe of the United National Party. The Rajapaksas have historically been pro-China.
There is a huge and ever-present China challenge for India in dealing with Sri Lanka apart from other issues like troubles for India's fishermen. If the elections on September 21 bring back the Rajapaksas, tensions may rise.
China's involvement in Sri Lanka includes a trade surplus, economic aid, oil exploration, investments, and support for Colombo in dealing with human rights issues after its crackdown on Tamil separatists in the north and east. This legacy will remain irrespective of which party comes to power.
China expert Mohan Malik has described Beijing's increasing influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region as one that involves "encirclement, entanglement and envelopment" – broadly/respectively corresponding to military/diplomatic influence, exploitation of chinks in domestic politics and use of economic incentives.
Beyond Sri Lanka and Maldives, there is Myanmar, whose military rulers are unambiguously close to China in diplomacy, economic affairs and smothering liberal democracy.
You could simply add a ditto for Pakistan, which is officially a democracy but in effect under the strong influence of its military and intelligence establishment that acts like a state within a state.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project involves the construction of a 3,000-km infrastructure network spanning land and sea as part of Beijing's larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Launched in 2015 when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was in power in Islamabad with 51 agreements, its cost is estimated at $62 billion. With Sharif's younger brother Shahbaz taking his place in a comeback for the political dynasty, China appears stronger placed. The CPEC also involves segments in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), and that is enough to keep India concerned, apart from China's illegal encroachment into India's Ladakh region in 2020.
Recent terror attacks in Jammu show that for all the tall claims made about bringing peace and democracy back to Jammu and Kashmir, the Modi government has miles to go in the region disputed by Pakistan. Dealing with a Pakistan-China axis in the north is a huge challenge in itself.
Nepal has been relatively stable for India, but its historic ties with Beijing, north of its national pride, Mount Everest, is an ever-present factor. Things seemed to look up in June when Nepal's Maoist Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda' attended Modi's swearing-in ceremony after the general elections in India. Prachanda lost power soon thereafter in Nepal's parliament.
His successor K.P. Sharma Oli has sounded equally optimistic about ties with India. But irritants kept cropping up. Weeks before the two leaders made friendly noises, a boundary dispute cropped up when Kathmandu announced a new currency note featuring a map of Nepal that showed about 335 km of Indian territory as part of Nepal.
Bhutan has a longstanding border dispute with China, but Beijing has been making noises against Indian support to the mountain state as "interference". If you think all that is part of China's "encirclement" nudge, you are bound to find support in diplomatic conversations.
The big question is: Is India's "Look East" policy that charms Japan and Australia, or its "Vishwaguru" (global guru) stature that sends vaccines to Africa missing bigger opportunities and challenges in its own backyard? More importantly, whether it is the Ukraine war or Israel's attacks on Gaza, the Modi government has shown some audacity in foreign policy positions that add to potential troubles in its neighbourhood.
In cricketing terms, it seems the Modi government is too busy playing its natural strokes that it overlooks field positions. As they say in cricket, on a difficult pitch, you play defensive shots.
The Bangladesh crisis is a wake-up call for India to find the right balance between reckless sovereignty and smart alliances. It is time to switch from self-loving rhetoric and fancy acronyms to some down-to-earth diplomacy. It pays to be old-fashioned without being ancient.
(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)