The evolution of Army Aviation since its establishment in 1986 has been marked by exceptional professionalism and operational effectiveness. From its inception, the Indian Army has recognised the necessity of integral aviation support, ensuring battlefield mobility, reconnaissance, and firepower at every level of engagement. The decision to divide helicopter assets between the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Army on 1 November 1986 was based on that era’s strategic and operational considerations.
While the Indian Army was allocated Reconnaissance & Observation (R&O) and Utility helicopters, the IAF retained control over Medium Lift Helicopters (MLH) and Attack Helicopters (AH) under the assumption that it would provide aviation support to the Army as required.
However, over the past 38 years, the operational environment has undergone a fundamental transformation. Theatre-wide realignments, the emergence of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), and the rebalancing of forces towards the Northern Borders have significantly altered the nature of battlefield requirements. The Army’s combat doctrine has evolved to demand integrated aviation capabilities that extend beyond outdated 1986-era policies.
Today, Army Aviation operates a diverse fleet—including Chetak, Cheetah, Cheetal, Dhruv (ALH), Rudra (ALH-WSI), and Prachand (LCH)—in multiple roles. Recognizing the Army’s increasing proficiency in rotary-wing operations, the Government of India (GoI) transferred ownership of AHs to the Army in 2012. However, the continued IAF ownership of MLH and select AHs remains a significant operational constraint for the Indian Army.
The Need for Full Ownership of Helicopters by the Indian Army
At present, Army Aviation operates all classes of helicopters except Medium Lift (Mi-17) and Heavy Lift (Chinook) helicopters, which remain under IAF control. This arrangement creates significant challenges on multiple fronts.
First, the Army remains dependent on the IAF for critical battlefield aviation support, forcing operational commanders to rely on an external service for helicopter deployment. The outdated and bureaucratic demand procedures result in delays that can prove costly in high-intensity combat scenarios.
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Second, the retention of these assets by the IAF is based on an obsolete policy framework, which no longer aligns with the realities of modern warfare. The IA’s proven competence in handling increasingly complex rotary-wing operations negates the argument of IAF’s supposed “core competence” in aviation assets.
Third, battlefield dynamics demand terrain-independent helicopter forces to enable swift manoeuvrability and firepower across India’s Northern and Western frontiers. In Punjab and Rajasthan, the layered obstacle systems and dense built-up areas constrain traditional mechanised formations. Similarly, in the Himalayan terrain, the need for rapid troop movement across valleys necessitates integral attack helicopters and airlift capabilities under Army control.
Given these factors, the operational necessity for integrating all battlefield aviation assets under Army Aviation is clear. The reluctance to transition these assets stems not from operational logic but from inter-service considerations, including turf protection and institutional resistance to change.
Lessons from Global Militaries
The issue of aviation asset ownership is not unique to India. Historically, major global militaries have faced similar inter-service conflicts, with lessons that highlight the need for a clear demarcation of responsibilities.
● United States (US Army vs. US Air Force): A prolonged dispute over helicopter ownership lasted from 1947 to 1966, despite proven battlefield requirements in Korea and Vietnam. The Johnson-McConnell Agreement (1966) finally settled the issue, with the US Army retaining rotary-wing assets while the US Air Force (USAF) controlled fixed-wing aircraft.
● France: The French military resolved its inter-service aviation dispute by transferring all rotary-wing assets to the Army while the Air Force retained control of fixed-wing aircraft. This eliminated operational conflicts and improved battlefield responsiveness.
● China (PLA) and Pakistan Army: Unlike the IA, both the PLA and Pakistan Army operate fully integrated combat aviation forces, including MLH and AHs. This head start has allowed them to develop advanced doctrines for rotary-wing combat operations, placing them at an advantage.
Within India, the precedent for transferring aviation assets already exists. The Indian Navy took control of its fixed-wing assets in 1976, and Army Aviation was granted AH ownership in 2012—both over IAF objections. The resistance to transferring MLH follows the same pattern, but operational imperatives must take precedence over inter-service turf battles.
The Way Forward: A Phased Transition of Helicopter Assets
To achieve operational effectiveness, the transfer of helicopters to the Indian Army must be executed in a phased manner.
In the immediate term, the Indian Army must assume command and control of MLH (Mi-17) and AHs while the IAF continues to operate them from their bases. This would ensure that Army field commanders directly oversee their deployment without procedural delays. Additionally, Army Aviation Brigades must be designated as the primary command units for all aviation operations within the Tactical Battle Area (TBA).
Over the medium term, the Indian Army should develop a dedicated training and logistics ecosystem for MLH, ensuring the seamless absorption of these assets. All IAF-operated helicopters assigned to Army operations should be integrated into Army Corps-level planning cycles to facilitate operational synergy.
In the long run, the Indian Army should assume full ownership of all rotary-wing assets required for Army operations. The IAF may retain limited helicopters for long-range strategic and specialised missions, but primary battlefield aviation responsibilities should rest with the Army. A collaborative framework must be established to ensure interoperability in airspace management, logistics, and joint mission execution.
This approach would eliminate bureaucratic inefficiencies and streamline command structures, enhance operational flexibility, and align Indian military aviation with global best practices.
A Critical Operational Imperative
The case for the Indian Army’s full ownership of its battlefield aviation assets is clear and urgent. The evolving nature of warfare demands that rotary-wing forces operate as an integral component of combined arms formations rather than remain under a separate service’s jurisdiction. Lessons from global militaries affirm that integrated battlefield aviation enhances combat efficiency and response times.
While inter-service coordination will remain vital, the Indian Army must assume full responsibility for helicopters required in Army operations. The delay in restructuring aviation command structures could prove costly, especially in an era where air mobility, rapid response, and precision strike capabilities are critical to combat success.
A structured, phased transition of helicopter assets to Army Aviation will ensure that the Indian military is better prepared to meet the challenges of future warfare. The time for decisive action is now—waiting any longer will only compromise operational effectiveness and national security.
About the Author
Maj Gen Sandeepan Handa, PVSM (Retd) is a former Additional Director General of Army Aviation. Over a 38-year military career, he has held command and staff positions across Army Aviation and is an experienced aviator, flying instructor, and senior aviation commander.
(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)