<p>For much of the West-led foreign media, India is still the land of snake charmers. A chaotic nation that can't organise anything big, definitely not a global summit. From dismissive coverage, an overt focus on US President Donald Trump's so-called ‘looming shadow’, India-China rivalry to a near-blackout, foreign media tried running down the BRICS Summit 2026 held in New Delhi this past weekend. The only problem? Nobody cared what the Western media had to say.</p><h2>BRICS summit’s own agenda was hardly mentioned in much of the Western media coverage</h2><p>The focus of several global media groups was on issues that were not at the top of the official BRICS agenda: the Ukraine-Russia war, the Iran conflict, and so on. BRICS, meanwhile, was busy forging consensus on some of the thorniest issues the world was facing. Because they weren't waiting for diktats from the West.</p><p>BRICS leaders had work to do, as they were representing around 40 per cent of global GDP and half the world’s population. And at the end, the summit unanimously adopted the nearly 140-point, 45-page New Delhi Declaration, by consensus. As chair and host of BRICS 2026, India had the challenge of holding together an expanded and politically diverse grouping. And it did so, without turning BRICS into an explicitly anti-Western bloc.</p><p><a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/brics-summit-2026-brics-joint-declaration-adopted-amid-west-asia-1789273195098/embed">https://www.wionews.com/videos/brics-summit-2026-brics-joint-declaration-adopted-amid-west-asia-1789273195098/embed</a></p><h2>From Trump to Russia-Ukraine: Foreign media used Western geopolitical lenses</h2><p>The BBC headline said, “Trump shadow looms large over BRICS as Modi hosts Putin and Xi”. So somehow, BRICS was all about how to deal with Trump. The New York Times focused on India and China competing for influence in the Global South. It didn't anticipate that dialogue can help iron out differences.</p><p>Bloomberg gave Prime Minister Narendra Modi credit for forging consensus “in the shadow” of the worsening Iran war. It acknowledged that what happened in Delhi was a diplomatic coup, but immediately returned to the argument that the Xi-Modi thaw “concealed deeper divisions”. For context, despite all the anti-China stance and rhetoric of the US, Trump will be meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping in a few days from now.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/photos/brics-in-pictures-leaders-diplomacy-and-viral-moments-from-delhi-summit-1789316925917">BRICS in pictures: Leaders, diplomacy and viral moments from Delhi summit</a></p><h2>Was BRICS the forum to solve wars? Some Western media seem to think so</h2><p>The Financial Times, The Independent and others highlighted internal tensions within BRICS, such as differences between Iran and Gulf members. They talked up the Ukraine-Russia war, as if the BRICS Summit was called to resolve these conflicts. They openly questioned how much the summit could actually deliver. If they read the Declaration, they will know.</p><p>Ironically, Ukraine – whose president gets prominent airtime at practically all West-led summits – barely figured in the New Delhi Declaration or the talks preceding it.</p><p>On West Asia, the language was respectful, measured, diplomatic and all-encompassing, with BRICS calling for restraint. None of the belligerents – Iran, the US or Israel – were explicitly named. But to the Western media, these omissions were evidence of weakness. They didn't see that while the major powers could not get the text or spirit right on a truce in West Asia or Ukraine, India's greatest achievement was the consensus itself.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions/did-brics-summit-2026-prove-that-an-11-member-bloc-with-india-and-china-in-it-can-still-agree-on-key-issues-1789292891454">Did BRICS Summit 2026 prove that an 11-member bloc with India and China in it can still agree on key issues?</a></p><h2>China-India rivalry: The recurring Western media angle</h2><p>Most of the outlets highlighted competition, and not cooperation, between China and India. The coverage nitpicked on the ‘limitations’ of the thaw in relations. Brushed under the carpet was the fact that Xi was visiting a nation with which China had border clashes in Doklam and the Galwan Valley only a few years ago. Or that China-India trade continued to grow despite the tensions.</p><p>Also ignored was that, despite this ‘rivalry’, the summit had a single voice on terrorism, Global South representation, UN and IMF reform, local-currency payments, digital infrastructure and artificial intelligence. These were aspects that demonstrated that cooperation was possible despite differences.</p><h2>You bring the photos, I'll dismiss that summit</h2><p>Visuals are everything, and what angle a media outlet turns its lens towards speaks a lot about the thinking process of its newsroom. The photos that appeared alongside articles in much of the Western media coverage tell their own story: giant BRICS or Modi billboards paired with bicycles, mopeds, auto-rickshaws and street workers.</p><p>That's reductionism. Western media needed confirmation that India is still poor. Their photo cropping did that job.</p><h2>Ignoring tells a story: BRICS received less prominence than its scale</h2><p>In many cases, Western publications relegated the coverage to wire reports or analytical pieces. On print and TV, BRICS was not a top prime-time or front-page story.</p><p>India was aware of the burden of expectations in a fragmented world. “Will they succeed or fail?”, was the story Western media was salivating over. In the run-up to the summit, India deliberately avoided excessive banners, speeches and publicity.</p><p>The foreign media tried to portray BRICS as a divided, ineffective or anti-Western project. India was not trying to create a NATO-style alliance. India wanted to prove that countries with competing interests could still reach consensus.</p><p>At the end of the day, an increasingly diverse bloc agreed to agree. That was the point of the summit.</p><p><i><strong>Disclaimer: The writer's views do not represent those of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer."</strong>&nbsp;</i></p>

Western media coverage of BRICS Summit 2026 focused on Trump, Ukraine, Iran and India-China rivalry. India instead delivered consensus, exposing the gap between the summit's agenda and foreign media coverage.

For much of the West-led foreign media, India is still the land of snake charmers. A chaotic nation that can't organise anything big, definitely not a global summit. From dismissive coverage, an overt focus on US President Donald Trump's so-called ‘looming shadow’, India-China rivalry to a near-blackout, foreign media tried running down the BRICS Summit 2026 held in New Delhi this past weekend. The only problem? Nobody cared what the Western media had to say. BRICS summit’s own agenda was hardly mentioned in much of the Western media coverage The focus of several global media groups was on issues that were not at the top of the official BRICS agenda: the Ukraine-Russia war, the Iran conflict, and so on. BRICS, meanwhile, was busy forging consensus on some of the thorniest issues the world was facing. Because they weren't waiting for diktats from the West. BRICS leaders had work to do, as they were representing around 40 per cent of global GDP and half the world’s population. And at the end, the summit unanimously adopted the nearly 140-point, 45-page New Delhi Declaration, by consensus. As chair and host of BRICS 2026, India had the challenge of holding together an expanded and politically diverse grouping. And it did so, without turning BRICS into an explicitly anti-Western bloc. https://www.wionews.com/videos/brics-summit-2026-brics-joint-declaration-adopted-amid-west-asia-1789273195098/embed From Trump to Russia-Ukraine: Foreign media used Western geopolitical lenses The BBC headline said, “Trump shadow looms large over BRICS as Modi hosts Putin and Xi”. So somehow, BRICS was all about how to deal with Trump. The New York Times focused on India and China competing for influence in the Global South. It didn't anticipate that dialogue can help iron out differences. Bloomberg gave Prime Minister Narendra Modi credit for forging consensus “in the shadow” of the worsening Iran war. It acknowledged that what happened in Delhi was a diplomatic coup, but immediately returned to the argument that the Xi-Modi thaw “concealed deeper divisions”. For context, despite all the anti-China stance and rhetoric of the US, Trump will be meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping in a few days from now. Also read: BRICS in pictures: Leaders, diplomacy and viral moments from Delhi summit Was BRICS the forum to solve wars? Some Western media seem to think so The Financial Times, The Independent and others highlighted internal tensions within BRICS, such as differences between Iran and Gulf members. They talked up the Ukraine-Russia war, as if the BRICS Summit was called to resolve these conflicts. They openly questioned how much the summit could actually deliver. If they read the Declaration, they will know. Ironically, Ukraine – whose president gets prominent airtime at practically all West-led summits – barely figured in the New Delhi Declaration or the talks preceding it. On West Asia, the language was respectful, measured, diplomatic and all-encompassing, with BRICS calling for restraint. None of the belligerents – Iran, the US or Israel – were explicitly named. But to the Western media, these omissions were evidence of weakness. They didn't see that while the major powers could not get the text or spirit right on a truce in West Asia or Ukraine, India's greatest achievement was the consensus itself. Also read: Did BRICS Summit 2026 prove that an 11-member bloc with India and China in it can still agree on key issues? China-India rivalry: The recurring Western media angle Most of the outlets highlighted competition, and not cooperation, between China and India. The coverage nitpicked on the ‘limitations’ of the thaw in relations. Brushed under the carpet was the fact that Xi was visiting a nation with which China had border clashes in Doklam and the Galwan Valley only a few years ago. Or that China-India trade continued to grow despite the tensions. Also ignored was that, despite this ‘rivalry’, the summit had a single voice on terrorism, Global South representation, UN and IMF reform, local-currency payments, digital infrastructure and artificial intelligence. These were aspects that demonstrated that cooperation was possible despite differences. You bring the photos, I'll dismiss that summit Visuals are everything, and what angle a media outlet turns its lens towards speaks a lot about the thinking process of its newsroom. The photos that appeared alongside articles in much of the Western media coverage tell their own story: giant BRICS or Modi billboards paired with bicycles, mopeds, auto-rickshaws and street workers. That's reductionism. Western media needed confirmation that India is still poor. Their photo cropping did that job. Ignoring tells a story: BRICS received less prominence than its scale In many cases, Western publications relegated the coverage to wire reports or analytical pieces. On print and TV, BRICS was not a top prime-time or front-page story. India was aware of the burden of expectations in a fragmented world. “Will they succeed or fail?”, was the story Western media was salivating over. In the run-up to the summit, India deliberately avoided excessive banners, speeches and publicity. The foreign media tried to portray BRICS as a divided, ineffective or anti-Western project. India was not trying to create a NATO-style alliance. India wanted to prove that countries with competing interests could still reach consensus. At the end of the day, an increasingly diverse bloc agreed to agree. That was the point of the summit. Disclaimer: The writer's views do not represent those of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer."

<p>Western media coverage of BRICS Summit 2026 focused on Trump, Ukraine, Iran and India-China rivalry. India instead delivered consensus, exposing the gap between the summit's agenda and foreign media coverage.</p>

BRICS Summit 2026 was played down, dismissed or nearly blacked out by Western media. That didn't work

<p>The BRICS Summit 2026 in New Delhi will be remembered as the germinating ground for future growth of the grouping. Several political and economic aspects could get a fillip in the coming years, from local-currency use and payment interoperability to institutional deepening. Progress is slow, but real. The only thing holding BRICS back from achieving its full potential is the need for consensus-based decision-making in a diverse grouping. Here is how things are likely to shape up.</p><h2>Partner-country expansion</h2><p>The partner-country tier created at the 2024 Kazan Summit was a response to demand from more than 30 interested nations. There are now 11 full members: the original five — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — joined by Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam are the 10 partner countries, which can attend summits and foreign ministers’ meetings, endorse declarations and join select working groups.&nbsp;</p><p>The partner model is an influence multiplier. Countries like Nigeria and Thailand are likely to become full members under criteria emphasising geographic balance, good relations with all members, UN membership, support for multilateral reforms. The stress is on criteria-driven expansion. When new nations join either as full members or partners, BRICS’ reach will grow further into Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America. This will boost the collective GDP, which is already around 40 per cent of the world in terms of purchasing power parity, as well as the grouping’s population, energy and minerals weight, and intra-group trade leverage.</p><p>But expansion could come with slow decision-making and internal tensions, particularly given the shifting China-India dynamics. Nevertheless, further expansion will give BRICS more leverage as a broader Global South platform.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions/did-brics-summit-2026-prove-that-an-11-member-bloc-with-india-and-china-in-it-can-still-agree-on-key-issues-1789292891454">Did BRICS Summit 2026 prove that an 11-member bloc with India and China in it can still agree on key issues?</a></p><h2>Dedollarisation: The reality check</h2><p>While dedollarisation was a buzzword for some time, the stress is on mitigation and diversification, not a coordinated assault to dethrone the fiat currency of the world. The 2025 Rio de Janeiro and 2026 New Delhi summits stressed more practical local-currency trade mechanisms while respecting national priorities.</p><p>Intra-BRICS local-currency settlement has risen significantly. Such bilateral trade accounts for nearly 90 per cent in case of some member states. Bilateral swaps between countries such as China and Brazil are growing. Gold accumulation by BRICS members' central banks, along with a reduced dollar share in some payments, is contributing to these alternative arrangements.</p><p>Dollar dominance in global reserves is not easy to remove. The high levels of local-currency bilateral trade involve countries sanctioned by the US or the West, such as Russia and Iran, while China also faces growing trade and technology restrictions.&nbsp;</p><p>There are issues of trust, convertibility and liquidity that could prevent full dedollarisation. In the next few years, growth in local-currency trade and financing will continue. Non-dollar energy and commodity deals could become more frequent.</p><p>A multipolar payments landscape under the BRICS Payments mechanism is the more likely outcome, where the dollar coexists with the renminbi, rupee, rouble and other local currencies. The countries are looking to reduce vulnerability to sanctions and volatility rather than eliminate dollar use.</p><p><a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/brics-summit-new-delhi-declaration-adopted-with-full-consensus-big-diplomatic-win-for-india-1789283084511/embed">https://www.wionews.com/videos/brics-summit-new-delhi-declaration-adopted-with-full-consensus-big-diplomatic-win-for-india-1789283084511/embed</a></p><h2>Common currency appears to be stalled due to trust deficit</h2><p>A common BRICS currency, while actively discussed in the media, is not a priority. There are near-term political and economic hurdles, mainly the trust deficit among BRICS members such as India and China. Ahead of the summit, India said there was no proposal for a BRICS currency as of now. In the past, both Brazil and Russia had proposed common reference units, mainly involving gold and currency baskets. But these remain at the conceptual or pilot stage.</p><p>The problem is the diversity of the BRICS economies. They have different inflation rates, monetary regimes, capital controls, convertibility and fiscal policies. India prefers complementarity with existing systems rather than an outright euro-like currency. Given this, creating a credible currency will need institutional integration far beyond mere consensus. Therefore, the focus is likely to continue on national currencies and interoperability.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/brics-summit-2026-pm-modi-praises-india-s-chairmanship-sends-critical-minerals-and-supply-chain-message-on-day-2-china-xi-jinping-present-1789277773320">BRICS Summit 2026: PM Modi's 'critical minerals' and 'supply chain' message on Day 2 in front of China's Xi</a></p><h2>Trade and payment mechanisms: An area of promise</h2><p>Trade and payment mechanisms are the most active issues when it comes to economic cooperation. The member states are keen to reduce costs, risks and intermediary dependence through local-currency settlements and linking existing rails rather than building a single rival to the SWIFT payment system. There is support for bilateral settlement systems, swaps and clearing arrangements. The BRICS Payment Task Force (BPTF) continues work on cross-border solutions that are fast, low-cost, inclusive, efficient, transparent and secure.</p><p>The focus will continue to be on creating linkages between fast digital payment systems such as India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Brazil’s Pix, as well as exploring central bank digital currency (CBDC) interoperability. Pilot projects are ongoing for BRICS Pay, a decentralised messaging and gateway system linking national payment systems. BRICS Bridge, a multi-CBDC settlement system inspired by mBridge, as well as BRICS Clear, a settlement and depositary infrastructure, are ideas being explored.</p><h2>New Development Bank: Emerging as BRICS core</h2><p>From an idea whose time has come, the New Development Bank (NDB) is emerging as a core BRICS institution. By the middle of 2026, NDB’s cumulative approvals had neared $44 billion.</p><p>Projects span infrastructure and sustainability. Local-currency financing had risen to around 29 per cent of the total portfolio by the end of 2025.</p><p>More than a political bloc, the BRICS story is one of financial evolution supporting a more multipolar order through practical tools that enhance member autonomy and South-South connectivity. The payment systems and NDB are among the institutions that will deliver tangible value to the grouping, much more than a common currency and rapid dedollarisation.&nbsp;</p><p>The future will depend on the external environment, particularly US policies, and cohesion among BRICS members.</p><p>For BRICS, it is an alternative world order, not a New World Order.</p>

BRICS is moving towards partner-country expansion, local-currency trade, interoperable payment systems and stronger NDB financing. There is a sense to prioritise practical financial tools over a common currency or rapid dedollarisation.

The BRICS Summit 2026 in New Delhi will be remembered as the germinating ground for future growth of the grouping. Several political and economic aspects could get a fillip in the coming years, from local-currency use and payment interoperability to institutional deepening. Progress is slow, but real. The only thing holding BRICS back from achieving its full potential is the need for consensus-based decision-making in a diverse grouping. Here is how things are likely to shape up. Partner-country expansion The partner-country tier created at the 2024 Kazan Summit was a response to demand from more than 30 interested nations. There are now 11 full members: the original five — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — joined by Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam are the 10 partner countries, which can attend summits and foreign ministers’ meetings, endorse declarations and join select working groups. The partner model is an influence multiplier. Countries like Nigeria and Thailand are likely to become full members under criteria emphasising geographic balance, good relations with all members, UN membership, support for multilateral reforms. The stress is on criteria-driven expansion. When new nations join either as full members or partners, BRICS’ reach will grow further into Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America. This will boost the collective GDP, which is already around 40 per cent of the world in terms of purchasing power parity, as well as the grouping’s population, energy and minerals weight, and intra-group trade leverage. But expansion could come with slow decision-making and internal tensions, particularly given the shifting China-India dynamics. Nevertheless, further expansion will give BRICS more leverage as a broader Global South platform. Also read: Did BRICS Summit 2026 prove that an 11-member bloc with India and China in it can still agree on key issues? Dedollarisation: The reality check While dedollarisation was a buzzword for some time, the stress is on mitigation and diversification, not a coordinated assault to dethrone the fiat currency of the world. The 2025 Rio de Janeiro and 2026 New Delhi summits stressed more practical local-currency trade mechanisms while respecting national priorities. Intra-BRICS local-currency settlement has risen significantly. Such bilateral trade accounts for nearly 90 per cent in case of some member states. Bilateral swaps between countries such as China and Brazil are growing. Gold accumulation by BRICS members' central banks, along with a reduced dollar share in some payments, is contributing to these alternative arrangements. Dollar dominance in global reserves is not easy to remove. The high levels of local-currency bilateral trade involve countries sanctioned by the US or the West, such as Russia and Iran, while China also faces growing trade and technology restrictions. There are issues of trust, convertibility and liquidity that could prevent full dedollarisation. In the next few years, growth in local-currency trade and financing will continue. Non-dollar energy and commodity deals could become more frequent. A multipolar payments landscape under the BRICS Payments mechanism is the more likely outcome, where the dollar coexists with the renminbi, rupee, rouble and other local currencies. The countries are looking to reduce vulnerability to sanctions and volatility rather than eliminate dollar use. https://www.wionews.com/videos/brics-summit-new-delhi-declaration-adopted-with-full-consensus-big-diplomatic-win-for-india-1789283084511/embed Common currency appears to be stalled due to trust deficit A common BRICS currency, while actively discussed in the media, is not a priority. There are near-term political and economic hurdles, mainly the trust deficit among BRICS members such as India and China. Ahead of the summit, India said there was no proposal for a BRICS currency as of now. In the past, both Brazil and Russia had proposed common reference units, mainly involving gold and currency baskets. But these remain at the conceptual or pilot stage. The problem is the diversity of the BRICS economies. They have different inflation rates, monetary regimes, capital controls, convertibility and fiscal policies. India prefers complementarity with existing systems rather than an outright euro-like currency. Given this, creating a credible currency will need institutional integration far beyond mere consensus. Therefore, the focus is likely to continue on national currencies and interoperability. Also read: BRICS Summit 2026: PM Modi's 'critical minerals' and 'supply chain' message on Day 2 in front of China's Xi Trade and payment mechanisms: An area of promise Trade and payment mechanisms are the most active issues when it comes to economic cooperation. The member states are keen to reduce costs, risks and intermediary dependence through local-currency settlements and linking existing rails rather than building a single rival to the SWIFT payment system. There is support for bilateral settlement systems, swaps and clearing arrangements. The BRICS Payment Task Force (BPTF) continues work on cross-border solutions that are fast, low-cost, inclusive, efficient, transparent and secure. The focus will continue to be on creating linkages between fast digital payment systems such as India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Brazil’s Pix, as well as exploring central bank digital currency (CBDC) interoperability. Pilot projects are ongoing for BRICS Pay, a decentralised messaging and gateway system linking national payment systems. BRICS Bridge, a multi-CBDC settlement system inspired by mBridge, as well as BRICS Clear, a settlement and depositary infrastructure, are ideas being explored. New Development Bank: Emerging as BRICS core From an idea whose time has come, the New Development Bank (NDB) is emerging as a core BRICS institution. By the middle of 2026, NDB’s cumulative approvals had neared $44 billion. Projects span infrastructure and sustainability. Local-currency financing had risen to around 29 per cent of the total portfolio by the end of 2025. More than a political bloc, the BRICS story is one of financial evolution supporting a more multipolar order through practical tools that enhance member autonomy and South-South connectivity. The payment systems and NDB are among the institutions that will deliver tangible value to the grouping, much more than a common currency and rapid dedollarisation. The future will depend on the external environment, particularly US policies, and cohesion among BRICS members. For BRICS, it is an alternative world order, not a New World Order.

<p>BRICS is moving towards partner-country expansion, local-currency trade, interoperable payment systems and stronger NDB financing. There is a sense to prioritise practical financial tools over a common currency or rapid dedollarisation.</p>

BRICS of the future: From partner country expansion to trade mechanisms - what could change, what might not

<p>As the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi under India’s chairship concludes on Sunday (September 13), its greatest success would be the unanimous adoption of the New Delhi Declaration. The detailed 45-page, 140-point document demonstrated that the expanded 11-member grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia can still forge consensus despite their individual differences.</p><h2>Consensus language on West Asia conflict</h2><p>Consensus demanded intensive late-night negotiations lasting until 4 am. But consensus was achieved. What was thought to be insurmountable was achieved. Iran and the UAE had to be on board with the language on the West Asia conflict. In the backdrop was the failure to produce a joint statement on the same issue during the BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting earlier in the year. As chair, India facilitated the carefully worded compromise. That included expressing serious concern over escalation, deliberate attacks on civilian infrastructure and peaceful nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. In what looked like a counterpoint to the US expression ‘maximum pressure’, the Delhi Declaration called for “maximum restraint.” It sought the protection of civilians, respect for sovereignty and a return to dialogue. There was no blame game. And the declaration was passed with no objections, as announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/brics-summit-2026-pm-modi-praises-india-s-chairmanship-sends-critical-minerals-and-supply-chain-message-on-day-2-china-xi-jinping-present-1789277773320">BRICS Summit 2026: PM Modi's 'critical minerals' and 'supply chain' message on Day 2 in front of China's Xi</a></p><h2>No ambiguity on terrorism: Pahalgam attack condemned</h2><p>A sensitive topic for India, on which it did not always get the backing of China, terrorism was a closely-watched issue. The wording was important. The declaration explicitly condemned, in the strongest terms, the April 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir that left 26 people dead.</p><p>It used zero-tolerance language on terrorism in all forms, cross-border movement of terrorists, financing and safe havens, and, most importantly, the ‘rejection of double standards’. Clearly, China concurred with the inclusion of such language.</p><h2>Support for India’s UNSC aspirations</h2><p>Mentioned among calls for comprehensive UN reform, including reform of the Security Council to make it more democratic, representative, effective and reflective of developing countries and the Global South, was support for India’s aspirations.</p><p>China and Russia, the two permanent members of the UN Security Council from BRICS, reiterated their support for the aspirations of India and Brazil to play a greater role in the UN, including at the UNSC.</p><p><a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/brics-summit-2026-new-delhi-declaration-adopted-with-full-consensus-a-diplomatic-win-for-india-1789283129951/embed">https://www.wionews.com/videos/brics-summit-2026-new-delhi-declaration-adopted-with-full-consensus-a-diplomatic-win-for-india-1789283129951/embed</a></p><h2>Push against the West from tariffs to climate, but in subtle language</h2><p>It was not lost on anyone which countries the BRICS declaration was referring to when it pushed back against certain trade and climate measures. Trump tariffs and energy trade curbs have, in the past couple of years, affected several BRICS nations, particularly China, India, Russia and Brazil.</p><p>The summit took a clear stance against unilateral tariffs and trade restrictions. This, as well as climate change measures such as the EU-led carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs), were described as potentially unilateral, punitive, discriminatory or protectionist and inconsistent with international law.</p><p>The declaration called unilateral coercive measures and sanctions contrary to international law.</p><p>It called for a better position for the Global South in key financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund &nbsp;and World Bank, as well as greater representation in global trade institutions such as the World Trade Organization.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions/brics-at-20-the-rule-takers-want-to-become-rule-shapers-1789237550996">BRICS at 20: The rule-takers want to become rule-shapers</a></p><h2>United on economic and financial cooperation</h2><p>The declaration made it clear that the BRICS Payment Task Force is going to continue working towards efficient, fast and low-cost cross-border payments among member countries. Without mentioning dedollarisation or a BRICS currency, it advocated local-currency trade settlements and investments.</p><p>There was also the establishment of the BRICS Task Force on Growth and Development, a proposed BRICS repository for digital public infrastructure with pilot projects, and a BRICS-New Development Bank Knowledge Portal.</p><h2>The China-India optics that went well</h2><p>The China-India dynamic was being keenly watched, given that President Xi Jinping was visiting the nation after a long gap. The group gave its support to China’s 2027 chairship.&nbsp;</p><p>The group achieved consensus on a wide range of issues, including global governance, multilateralism, multipolarity, sustainable growth and people-to-people ties.</p><p>The spirit was one of mutual respect. The prior deadlocks were resolved.&nbsp;</p><p>BRICS Summit Declartion might be largely declaratory and initiative-based. But it is far better than the paralysis seen in several other regional and multilateral organisations.</p><p>The Declaration was adopted on the first day of the summit itself. But its outcomes remain subject to subsequent implementation. That can happen only when the grouping remains consensus- and respect-based.</p>

The New Delhi Declaration was marked a BRICS consensus on a range of issues, from West Asia, terrorism, India’s UNSC aspirations, trade restrictions, and Global South representation in global organisations. 


As the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi under India’s chairship concludes on Sunday (September 13), its greatest success would be the unanimous adoption of the New Delhi Declaration. The detailed 45-page, 140-point document demonstrated that the expanded 11-member grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia can still forge consensus despite their individual differences. Consensus language on West Asia conflict Consensus demanded intensive late-night negotiations lasting until 4 am. But consensus was achieved. What was thought to be insurmountable was achieved. Iran and the UAE had to be on board with the language on the West Asia conflict. In the backdrop was the failure to produce a joint statement on the same issue during the BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting earlier in the year. As chair, India facilitated the carefully worded compromise. That included expressing serious concern over escalation, deliberate attacks on civilian infrastructure and peaceful nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. In what looked like a counterpoint to the US expression ‘maximum pressure’, the Delhi Declaration called for “maximum restraint.” It sought the protection of civilians, respect for sovereignty and a return to dialogue. There was no blame game. And the declaration was passed with no objections, as announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Also read: BRICS Summit 2026: PM Modi's 'critical minerals' and 'supply chain' message on Day 2 in front of China's Xi No ambiguity on terrorism: Pahalgam attack condemned A sensitive topic for India, on which it did not always get the backing of China, terrorism was a closely-watched issue. The wording was important. The declaration explicitly condemned, in the strongest terms, the April 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir that left 26 people dead. It used zero-tolerance language on terrorism in all forms, cross-border movement of terrorists, financing and safe havens, and, most importantly, the ‘rejection of double standards’. Clearly, China concurred with the inclusion of such language. Support for India’s UNSC aspirations Mentioned among calls for comprehensive UN reform, including reform of the Security Council to make it more democratic, representative, effective and reflective of developing countries and the Global South, was support for India’s aspirations. China and Russia, the two permanent members of the UN Security Council from BRICS, reiterated their support for the aspirations of India and Brazil to play a greater role in the UN, including at the UNSC. https://www.wionews.com/videos/brics-summit-2026-new-delhi-declaration-adopted-with-full-consensus-a-diplomatic-win-for-india-1789283129951/embed Push against the West from tariffs to climate, but in subtle language It was not lost on anyone which countries the BRICS declaration was referring to when it pushed back against certain trade and climate measures. Trump tariffs and energy trade curbs have, in the past couple of years, affected several BRICS nations, particularly China, India, Russia and Brazil. The summit took a clear stance against unilateral tariffs and trade restrictions. This, as well as climate change measures such as the EU-led carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs), were described as potentially unilateral, punitive, discriminatory or protectionist and inconsistent with international law. The declaration called unilateral coercive measures and sanctions contrary to international law. It called for a better position for the Global South in key financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, as well as greater representation in global trade institutions such as the World Trade Organization. Also read: BRICS at 20: The rule-takers want to become rule-shapers United on economic and financial cooperation The declaration made it clear that the BRICS Payment Task Force is going to continue working towards efficient, fast and low-cost cross-border payments among member countries. Without mentioning dedollarisation or a BRICS currency, it advocated local-currency trade settlements and investments. There was also the establishment of the BRICS Task Force on Growth and Development, a proposed BRICS repository for digital public infrastructure with pilot projects, and a BRICS-New Development Bank Knowledge Portal. The China-India optics that went well The China-India dynamic was being keenly watched, given that President Xi Jinping was visiting the nation after a long gap. The group gave its support to China’s 2027 chairship. The group achieved consensus on a wide range of issues, including global governance, multilateralism, multipolarity, sustainable growth and people-to-people ties. The spirit was one of mutual respect. The prior deadlocks were resolved. BRICS Summit Declartion might be largely declaratory and initiative-based. But it is far better than the paralysis seen in several other regional and multilateral organisations. The Declaration was adopted on the first day of the summit itself. But its outcomes remain subject to subsequent implementation. That can happen only when the grouping remains consensus- and respect-based.

<p>The New Delhi Declaration marked a BRICS consensus on a range of issues, from West Asia, terrorism, India’s UNSC aspirations, trade restrictions, and Global South representation in global organisations.&nbsp;<br>&nbsp;</p>

Did BRICS Summit 2026 prove that an 11-member bloc with India and China in it can still agree on key issues?

<p>When it comes to climate change, the BRICS Summit's New Delhi Declaration reads less like a communique and more like a negotiating position for the Global South. The bloc representing 40 percent of global GDP, 26 percent of global trade and nearly half the world's population made a clear push that can be described simply as: We want to not just follow the rules on climate change, we want to write them too. Coming as it did after the devastating Nepal floods, climate change was not an incidental aspect of the BRICS Declaration. It was woven throughout seperate sections of the 45-page document.</p><h2>The most pertinent features of BRICS Declaration on climate change:</h2><ul><li>Climate finance is part of the growth and development agenda</li><li>Debt is identified as a barrier to climate investment.&nbsp;</li><li>Climate adaptation appears directly in discussions involving central banks and finance ministries</li><li>BRICS seeks more financing options for developing economies, with a clear demand on developed countries when it comes to adoption.</li><li>Trade policy is explicitly linked to the countries’ capacity to adapt. This is reflected in the challenge to carbon border measures.&nbsp;</li><li>Opposition to protectionism is linked with support for multilateral trade rules even as BRICS vows to continue cooperation on trade and carbon markets&nbsp;</li><li>There are boundaries between climate and security, with concern expressed about attempts to link security with the climate-change agenda.</li></ul><p>"For a grouping as diverse and geopolitically complex as BRICS, achieving consensus on a forward-looking climate framework is no small feat," says Aarti Khosla, Founder and Director of Climate Trends.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/brics-stitches-climate-into-its-trade-and-growth-agenda-experts-say-1789231897615">BRICS stitches climate into its trade and growth agenda, experts say</a></p><h2>The pushback on ‘carbon borders’: The most significant point?</h2><p>The BRICS joint declaration's opposition to the so-called ‘carbon border adjustment mechanisms’ (CBAMs) pushed by European Union has perhaps the sharpest language on climate change issues. And that, was a work in progress. At the 12th BRICS Environment Ministers' Meeting in Delhi, the bloc had already described CBAM as punitive, discriminatory and protectionist . Now it is etched in the leaders' text, which called CBAM “unilateral, punitive, discriminatory and protectionist,” that undermined developing countries' efforts to address climate impacts and build adaptive capacity.&nbsp;</p><p>The message to Brussels: Climate ambition and tariff policy can't travel in the same bus.</p><p>Elsewhere, the declaration demanded to restore a functioning WTO dispute-settlement system. It also warned that tariffs pursued under environmental objectives disrupt supply chains and widen economic disparities.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/brics-built-350-meetings-worth-of-climate-cooperation-this-year-almost-none-of-it-comes-with-money-1789145877091">BRICS built 350 meetings' worth of climate cooperation this year, almost none of it comes with money</a></p><h2>Net Zero goes missing from the text</h2><p>Rathin Roy, Distinguished Professor at the Kautilya School of Public Policy, points to a conspicuous absence of what he calls “that favourite Euro-American phrase — Net Zero.”</p><p>"For the BRICS, Net Zero is an outcome of a profoundly unsustainable development system."</p><p>The keyword here is differentiated responsibilities and national circumstances. Fossil fuels will remain in the energy mix of emerging and developing economies, while renewables, hydrogen and nuclear energy will sit alongside.</p><p>Developing economies will scale up clean energy on timelines set by their own development needs, not by deadlines written elsewhere.</p><p><a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/brics-summit-2026-can-brics-turn-climate-pledges-into-action-1788943824383/embed">https://www.wionews.com/videos/brics-summit-2026-can-brics-turn-climate-pledges-into-action-1788943824383/embed</a></p><h2>After Nepal flood tragedy, resilience is not just a buzzword&nbsp;</h2><p>BRICS Summit was taking place just two weeks after the glacier-triggered floods in Nepal killed nearly 1,400 people, and the declaration pushed adaptation, climate finance and disaster risk reduction to the front of the text.</p><p>For most of the bloc, climate is not an emissions accounting problem. It is a question of whether infrastructure survives the next monsoon.<br>And the Declaration reflected the urgency. The text leaned hard into preparedness, with mentions on early-warning integration, voluntary principles for climate-resilient urban infrastructure, anticipatory action and drought-resilient seed systems.&nbsp;</p><p>Debt was named as a barrier to climate investment, and developed countries were asked for additional, predictable and accessible adaptation finance.</p><p>Ulka Kelkar of WRI India highlights that the proposed Insurance Resilience Centre and Risk Lab could offer an alternative to conventional insurance approaches that lose effectiveness as climate risk rises.</p><h2>BRICS wants to write climate change rules, not just follow them</h2><p>The declaration firmly connects climate adaptation to reforms of global financial and economic systems. It seeks IMF quota reform, a correction in World Bank shareholding patterns and greater developing-country representation at the UN, while backing Ethiopia's COP32 presidency and sending a constructive signal to COP31.</p><p>Archana Chaudhary of Climate Trends aptly concludes the BRICS framing: emerging economies are asking not only for a greater share of global growth, but a greater role in writing the rules that shape it.</p><p>Li Shuo says the real test is whether BRICS can translate rhetoric into stronger climate action as Western countries retreat from their commitments. That will decide what kind of geopolitical force the bloc becomes.</p>

With the New Delhi Declaration, BRICS appears to have set up its negotiating stance on climate change. The text highlighted the need for balancing the Global South's energy requirements with climate commitments. It rejected carbon border taxes, and kept fossil fuels in the mix.

When it comes to climate change, the BRICS Summit's New Delhi Declaration reads less like a communique and more like a negotiating position for the Global South. The bloc representing 40 percent of global GDP, 26 percent of global trade and nearly half the world's population made a clear push that can be described simply as: We want to not just follow the rules on climate change, we want to write them too. Coming as it did after the devastating Nepal floods, climate change was not an incidental aspect of the BRICS Declaration. It was woven throughout seperate sections of the 45-page document. The most pertinent features of BRICS Declaration on climate change: Climate finance is part of the growth and development agenda Debt is identified as a barrier to climate investment. Climate adaptation appears directly in discussions involving central banks and finance ministries BRICS seeks more financing options for developing economies, with a clear demand on developed countries when it comes to adoption. Trade policy is explicitly linked to the countries’ capacity to adapt. This is reflected in the challenge to carbon border measures. Opposition to protectionism is linked with support for multilateral trade rules even as BRICS vows to continue cooperation on trade and carbon markets There are boundaries between climate and security, with concern expressed about attempts to link security with the climate-change agenda. "For a grouping as diverse and geopolitically complex as BRICS, achieving consensus on a forward-looking climate framework is no small feat," says Aarti Khosla, Founder and Director of Climate Trends. Also read: BRICS stitches climate into its trade and growth agenda, experts say The pushback on ‘carbon borders’: The most significant point? The BRICS joint declaration's opposition to the so-called ‘carbon border adjustment mechanisms’ (CBAMs) pushed by European Union has perhaps the sharpest language on climate change issues. And that, was a work in progress. At the 12th BRICS Environment Ministers' Meeting in Delhi, the bloc had already described CBAM as punitive, discriminatory and protectionist . Now it is etched in the leaders' text, which called CBAM “unilateral, punitive, discriminatory and protectionist,” that undermined developing countries' efforts to address climate impacts and build adaptive capacity. The message to Brussels: Climate ambition and tariff policy can't travel in the same bus. Elsewhere, the declaration demanded to restore a functioning WTO dispute-settlement system. It also warned that tariffs pursued under environmental objectives disrupt supply chains and widen economic disparities. Also read: BRICS built 350 meetings' worth of climate cooperation this year, almost none of it comes with money Net Zero goes missing from the text Rathin Roy, Distinguished Professor at the Kautilya School of Public Policy, points to a conspicuous absence of what he calls “that favourite Euro-American phrase — Net Zero.” "For the BRICS, Net Zero is an outcome of a profoundly unsustainable development system." The keyword here is differentiated responsibilities and national circumstances. Fossil fuels will remain in the energy mix of emerging and developing economies, while renewables, hydrogen and nuclear energy will sit alongside. Developing economies will scale up clean energy on timelines set by their own development needs, not by deadlines written elsewhere. https://www.wionews.com/videos/brics-summit-2026-can-brics-turn-climate-pledges-into-action-1788943824383/embed After Nepal flood tragedy, resilience is not just a buzzword BRICS Summit was taking place just two weeks after the glacier-triggered floods in Nepal killed nearly 1,400 people, and the declaration pushed adaptation, climate finance and disaster risk reduction to the front of the text. For most of the bloc, climate is not an emissions accounting problem. It is a question of whether infrastructure survives the next monsoon. And the Declaration reflected the urgency. The text leaned hard into preparedness, with mentions on early-warning integration, voluntary principles for climate-resilient urban infrastructure, anticipatory action and drought-resilient seed systems. Debt was named as a barrier to climate investment, and developed countries were asked for additional, predictable and accessible adaptation finance. Ulka Kelkar of WRI India highlights that the proposed Insurance Resilience Centre and Risk Lab could offer an alternative to conventional insurance approaches that lose effectiveness as climate risk rises. BRICS wants to write climate change rules, not just follow them The declaration firmly connects climate adaptation to reforms of global financial and economic systems. It seeks IMF quota reform, a correction in World Bank shareholding patterns and greater developing-country representation at the UN, while backing Ethiopia's COP32 presidency and sending a constructive signal to COP31. Archana Chaudhary of Climate Trends aptly concludes the BRICS framing: emerging economies are asking not only for a greater share of global growth, but a greater role in writing the rules that shape it. Li Shuo says the real test is whether BRICS can translate rhetoric into stronger climate action as Western countries retreat from their commitments. That will decide what kind of geopolitical force the bloc becomes.

<p>With the New Delhi Declaration, BRICS appears to have set up its negotiating stance on climate change. The text highlighted the need for balancing the Global South's energy requirements with climate commitments. It rejected carbon border taxes, and kept fossil fuels in the mix.</p>

BRICS Summit climate change stance: Delhi Declaration hints at changing priorities of Global South

<p>Pakistan's Ministry of Information and Broadcasting accused Al Jazeera of "yellow journalism" for its coverage of violence during the Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) elections. Users in Pakistan reported that access to the Qatari broadcaster's website had been blocked, though there is no formal government directive on this. This came days after a Pakistani general warned against Afghanistan-India ties, asking the Muslim-majority neighbour not to associate with 'kafirs', or disbelievers. But Al Jazeera is a channel from Qatar, a Muslim-majority nation with which Pakistan has traditionally enjoyed friendly relations. So it is not about ‘’kafirs". Then what is it?</p><h2>Kafir narrative punctured: Criticism of Pakistan is the problem</h2><p>On July 31, Pakistan Army spokesperson Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry said: "Allah Almighty has made it very clear — do not take the kafirs [disbelievers] as your friends or protectors. If you do so, then you are no longer among the Muslims." Reacting to recent remarks by an Afghan Taliban minister that India and Afghanistan shared the same DNA, Chaudhry framed the relationship as one of master and slave. "RSS-BJP are masters, Taliban their slaves," he said, referring to India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its ideological fountainhead, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).</p><p>This is typical Pakistan, invoking a religious binary to explain geopolitical rivalries and casting itself as the defender of the Muslim world confronting hostile, non-Muslim adversaries.</p><p>But none of this matters when Pakistan is killing or suppressing its own people, from PoJK to the regions along its border with Afghanistan, including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.</p><p>If Pakistan can restrict, vilify, and delegitimise reporting by one of the most influential media organisations in the Islamic world, then kafirs are not its problem; scrutiny is.</p><h2>Don't kill the messenger: Nothing wrong with Al Jazeera reporting on PoJK violence</h2><p>The recent protests and their violent suppression in PoJK followed allegations of electoral irregularities and unrest surrounding the polls in the territory, which New Delhi does not recognise as part of Pakistan, maintaining that Jammu and Kashmir, including areas under Pakistan's illegal occupation, are inalienable parts of India.</p><p>Pakistan could have responded with fact-based arguments addressing the substance of Al Jazeera's reportage through transparency or independent verification. Instead, its Ministry of Information and Broadcasting accused the broadcaster of "selective reporting" from "handpicked polling stations". It alleged that Al Jazeera had used "scripted statements" to serve "external actors with vested interests".</p><p>It amounted to questioning, and then 'killing', the messenger rather than addressing the events on the ground, and asing the crucial question: Why are people in PoJK unhappy?</p><p>There was no transparent, publicly notified prohibition on Al Jazeera issued by either the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) or the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, at the time of writing this.&nbsp;<br>Instead, users reported that Al Jazeera's website had become inaccessible, suggesting an unofficial or extra-legal restriction rather than a formally declared ban.</p><h2>A Chinese model of digital censorship architecture: Pakistan's 'little Great Firewall'</h2><p>By the time you read this, access to the Al Jazeera website may well have been restored. And that is precisely the problem. In recent years, this has become a familiar pattern in Pakistan's digital censorship regime: websites disappear without formal orders, only to reappear later without explanation, making accountability almost impossible.</p><p>That censorship is possible because Pakistan now has one of South Asia's — and perhaps the world's — most sophisticated systems of internet control, increasingly modelled on China's approach to censorship.</p><p>Under Section 37 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), further strengthened through subsequent amendments, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) can block online content on broad and vaguely defined grounds such as "national security", "public order", or even the "glory of Islam".</p><p>To facilitate this, Pakistan has deployed a Web Monitoring System, initially built around technology supplied by Sandvine.</p><p>This has been expanded with capabilities comparable to China's internet filtering system, commonly referred to as the Great Firewall.&nbsp;<br>Much like the Chinese model, Pakistan now possesses the technological capability to block URLs, filter keywords, inspect internet traffic through deep packet inspection, and compel online platforms to remove content within prescribed timelines.&nbsp;<br>Circumventing these restrictions has become increasingly difficult because of VPN registration requirements and tighter licensing frameworks.</p><h2>Journalism, monitored: Pakistan's multipronged attack on media</h2><p>This digital control is reinforced by expanding bureaucratic oversight of journalism itself. The 2026 Foreign Media Facilitation Guidelines mandate that all foreign correspondents, freelancers, and stringers operating in Pakistan register with the government and obtain prior No Objection Certificates (NOCs) before reporting from most parts of the country outside Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi.</p><p>As reporting on PoJK increased amid the violence that killed dozens, the government tightened the implementation of these guidelines and further restricted access to sensitive areas.</p><p>Clearly, the objective is to manage and suppress narratives, not enable independent reporting.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/pok-violence-escalates-67-dead-as-india-rejects-pakistan-s-polls-as-a-cosmetic-exercise-gravitas-1785260044466">PoK violence escalates: 67 dead as India rejects Pakistan's polls as a 'cosmetic exercise' | Gravitas</a></p><h2>Pakistan's media blackouts are nothing new: Remember the Osama raid?</h2><p>The curbs on Al Jazeera are nothing new. Remember the Abbottabad raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011? That single operation exposed the fact that the world's most wanted terrorist had been living for years inside Pakistan, close to a major military academy, raising uncomfortable questions that Islamabad struggled to answer for years.</p><p>When the US Navy SEALs entered Pakistani territory to eliminate the al-Qaeda chief behind the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Pakistan asked international broadcasters, including CNN, the BBC, Al Jazeera, Fox News, Voice of America, and Sky News, to halt live reporting and leave the area.</p><p>Radio Mashaal was suspended in 2018 after being accused of anti-Pakistan reporting. The BBC has periodically faced restrictions. Local broadcasters such as Geo News have repeatedly been suspended or taken off air. Indian television channels remain banned. Numerous digital platforms critical of the government have been blocked or throttled.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/j-k-leaders-unite-to-condemn-crackdown-on-pok-protesters-call-for-dialogue-1785399859433">J&amp;K leaders unite to condemn crackdown on PoK protesters, call for dialogue</a></p><h2>Press freedom: A 'very serious' problem in Pakistan</h2><p>Pakistan ranks 153rd out of 180 countries in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), placing it in the "Very Serious" category. Freedom House classifies Pakistan as only "Partly Free" overall, while rating its internet environment as "Not Free".</p><p>Military influence over the media, legal intimidation, digital censorship, enforced disappearances of journalists, and restrictions on independent reporting all contribute to these dubious distinctions.</p><p><a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/pok-erupts-against-pakistan-protest-leader-declares-kashmir-is-occupied-territory-1784093238306/embed">https://www.wionews.com/videos/pok-erupts-against-pakistan-protest-leader-declares-kashmir-is-occupied-territory-1784093238306/embed</a></p><h2>Is external criticism ‘anti-Muslim’ for Pakistan?</h2><p>The Pakistani establishment — comprising the government, military, and intelligence apparatus — often invokes Islam as the defining faultline separating Pakistan from India.</p><p>External criticism is frequently portrayed as an extension of prejudice against a Muslim state. Such religious framing collapses when critical reporting on Pakistan originates not from New Delhi, London, or Washington, but from Doha.</p><p>Al Jazeera's reporting is not the work of a "kafir" state pursuing an anti-Islam agenda.</p><h2>So what's the moral of this story?</h2><p>States that are uncomfortable with independent journalism resort to crackdowns regardless of ideology, religion, or the geography of their critics.</p><p>Discredit the reporter, question the channel's motives, invoke national security, tighten access, and restrict the flow of information.</p><p>Pakistan's handling of Al Jazeera demonstrates precisely this instinct. It reveals that the Pakistani establishment's objection is not to criticism from non-Muslim countries.</p><p>It is to criticism itself.<br>It is about inconvenient truths.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p><i>DISCLAIMER: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of WION.</i></p>

Pakistan's restrictions on Al Jazeera over PoJK election coverage expose a pattern of media censorship, internet control and narrative management. This has nothing to do with its 'kafir' rhetoric against critics, as the broadcaster is from Qatar, a fellow Muslim nation. 

Pakistan's Ministry of Information and Broadcasting accused Al Jazeera of "yellow journalism" for its coverage of violence during the Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) elections. Users in Pakistan reported that access to the Qatari broadcaster's website had been blocked, though there is no formal government directive on this. This came days after a Pakistani general warned against Afghanistan-India ties, asking the Muslim-majority neighbour not to associate with 'kafirs', or disbelievers. But Al Jazeera is a channel from Qatar, a Muslim-majority nation with which Pakistan has traditionally enjoyed friendly relations. So it is not about ‘’kafirs". Then what is it? Kafir narrative punctured: Criticism of Pakistan is the problem On July 31, Pakistan Army spokesperson Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry said: "Allah Almighty has made it very clear — do not take the kafirs [disbelievers] as your friends or protectors. If you do so, then you are no longer among the Muslims." Reacting to recent remarks by an Afghan Taliban minister that India and Afghanistan shared the same DNA, Chaudhry framed the relationship as one of master and slave. "RSS-BJP are masters, Taliban their slaves," he said, referring to India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its ideological fountainhead, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). This is typical Pakistan, invoking a religious binary to explain geopolitical rivalries and casting itself as the defender of the Muslim world confronting hostile, non-Muslim adversaries. But none of this matters when Pakistan is killing or suppressing its own people, from PoJK to the regions along its border with Afghanistan, including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. If Pakistan can restrict, vilify, and delegitimise reporting by one of the most influential media organisations in the Islamic world, then kafirs are not its problem; scrutiny is. Don't kill the messenger: Nothing wrong with Al Jazeera reporting on PoJK violence The recent protests and their violent suppression in PoJK followed allegations of electoral irregularities and unrest surrounding the polls in the territory, which New Delhi does not recognise as part of Pakistan, maintaining that Jammu and Kashmir, including areas under Pakistan's illegal occupation, are inalienable parts of India. Pakistan could have responded with fact-based arguments addressing the substance of Al Jazeera's reportage through transparency or independent verification. Instead, its Ministry of Information and Broadcasting accused the broadcaster of "selective reporting" from "handpicked polling stations". It alleged that Al Jazeera had used "scripted statements" to serve "external actors with vested interests". It amounted to questioning, and then 'killing', the messenger rather than addressing the events on the ground, and asing the crucial question: Why are people in PoJK unhappy? There was no transparent, publicly notified prohibition on Al Jazeera issued by either the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) or the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, at the time of writing this. Instead, users reported that Al Jazeera's website had become inaccessible, suggesting an unofficial or extra-legal restriction rather than a formally declared ban. A Chinese model of digital censorship architecture: Pakistan's 'little Great Firewall' By the time you read this, access to the Al Jazeera website may well have been restored. And that is precisely the problem. In recent years, this has become a familiar pattern in Pakistan's digital censorship regime: websites disappear without formal orders, only to reappear later without explanation, making accountability almost impossible. That censorship is possible because Pakistan now has one of South Asia's — and perhaps the world's — most sophisticated systems of internet control, increasingly modelled on China's approach to censorship. Under Section 37 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), further strengthened through subsequent amendments, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) can block online content on broad and vaguely defined grounds such as "national security", "public order", or even the "glory of Islam". To facilitate this, Pakistan has deployed a Web Monitoring System, initially built around technology supplied by Sandvine. This has been expanded with capabilities comparable to China's internet filtering system, commonly referred to as the Great Firewall. Much like the Chinese model, Pakistan now possesses the technological capability to block URLs, filter keywords, inspect internet traffic through deep packet inspection, and compel online platforms to remove content within prescribed timelines. Circumventing these restrictions has become increasingly difficult because of VPN registration requirements and tighter licensing frameworks. Journalism, monitored: Pakistan's multipronged attack on media This digital control is reinforced by expanding bureaucratic oversight of journalism itself. The 2026 Foreign Media Facilitation Guidelines mandate that all foreign correspondents, freelancers, and stringers operating in Pakistan register with the government and obtain prior No Objection Certificates (NOCs) before reporting from most parts of the country outside Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi. As reporting on PoJK increased amid the violence that killed dozens, the government tightened the implementation of these guidelines and further restricted access to sensitive areas. Clearly, the objective is to manage and suppress narratives, not enable independent reporting. Also read: PoK violence escalates: 67 dead as India rejects Pakistan's polls as a 'cosmetic exercise' | Gravitas Pakistan's media blackouts are nothing new: Remember the Osama raid? The curbs on Al Jazeera are nothing new. Remember the Abbottabad raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011? That single operation exposed the fact that the world's most wanted terrorist had been living for years inside Pakistan, close to a major military academy, raising uncomfortable questions that Islamabad struggled to answer for years. When the US Navy SEALs entered Pakistani territory to eliminate the al-Qaeda chief behind the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Pakistan asked international broadcasters, including CNN, the BBC, Al Jazeera, Fox News, Voice of America, and Sky News, to halt live reporting and leave the area. Radio Mashaal was suspended in 2018 after being accused of anti-Pakistan reporting. The BBC has periodically faced restrictions. Local broadcasters such as Geo News have repeatedly been suspended or taken off air. Indian television channels remain banned. Numerous digital platforms critical of the government have been blocked or throttled. Also read: J&K leaders unite to condemn crackdown on PoK protesters, call for dialogue Press freedom: A 'very serious' problem in Pakistan Pakistan ranks 153rd out of 180 countries in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), placing it in the "Very Serious" category. Freedom House classifies Pakistan as only "Partly Free" overall, while rating its internet environment as "Not Free". Military influence over the media, legal intimidation, digital censorship, enforced disappearances of journalists, and restrictions on independent reporting all contribute to these dubious distinctions. https://www.wionews.com/videos/pok-erupts-against-pakistan-protest-leader-declares-kashmir-is-occupied-territory-1784093238306/embed Is external criticism ‘anti-Muslim’ for Pakistan? The Pakistani establishment — comprising the government, military, and intelligence apparatus — often invokes Islam as the defining faultline separating Pakistan from India. External criticism is frequently portrayed as an extension of prejudice against a Muslim state. Such religious framing collapses when critical reporting on Pakistan originates not from New Delhi, London, or Washington, but from Doha. Al Jazeera's reporting is not the work of a "kafir" state pursuing an anti-Islam agenda. So what's the moral of this story? States that are uncomfortable with independent journalism resort to crackdowns regardless of ideology, religion, or the geography of their critics. Discredit the reporter, question the channel's motives, invoke national security, tighten access, and restrict the flow of information. Pakistan's handling of Al Jazeera demonstrates precisely this instinct. It reveals that the Pakistani establishment's objection is not to criticism from non-Muslim countries. It is to criticism itself. It is about inconvenient truths. DISCLAIMER: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of WION.

<p>Pakistan's restrictions on Al Jazeera over PoJK election coverage expose a pattern of media censorship, internet control and narrative management. This has nothing to do with its 'kafir' rhetoric against critics, as the broadcaster is from Qatar, a fellow Muslim nation.&nbsp;</p>

Pakistan 'blocks' Al Jazeera website over PoJK reportage: So it's not about 'kafirs', is it?

<p>Many Indian politicians and bureaucrats have children or spouses studying or working abroad and, in some cases, living in developed countries as permanent residents or citizens. This is often highlighted when controversies arise, such as during the recent National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET-UG) paper leak protests, when some alleged that Indian leaders and officials were out of touch with the realities faced by the youth because their own children were studying or working abroad. This is not the case in China, where, for over a decade, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has tracked, monitored and, at times, named, shamed or cracked down on the practice of officials sending their spouses or children abroad to live or settle. They are referred to by the derogatory term 'Naked Officials'. China views the issue through the lens of corruption, illicit asset flight and personal enrichment. If an official's family is abroad, the government may also regard it as a potential national security risk warranting scrutiny, disclosure and restrictions. This is not, however, treated as automatic proof of guilt.</p><p>But what about India? Here is how China tackles 'Naked Officials', and what India can learn from it.</p><h2>The 'Naked Official' policy in China is over a decade old</h2><p>'Naked Officials', or 'Luǒ Guān' in Chinese, refers to officials of the Communist Party of China (CPC) or the Chinese state whose spouse and/or children have emigrated or settled abroad, whether as permanent residents or citizens, while the official remains in office. The term generally applies where the official stays in China while their immediate family relocates overseas, leaving the official 'naked' or without close family in the country. For well over a decade, China has sought to regulate and monitor this category of public officials.</p><p>In 2009, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the Communist Party of China called for increased oversight of 'Naked Officials'. In 2010, the Ministry of Supervision formally introduced regulations to strengthen the management of state functionaries whose spouses and children had both emigrated abroad. The primary focus was information gathering and enhanced supervision to prevent corruption, illicit asset transfers and capital flight.</p><p>Since then, the policies have been tightened. Promotion rules were revised in 2014, including the introduction of steps such as the Measures for the Management of Posts Held by State Functionaries Whose Spouses Have Emigrated Abroad. These effectively barred such officials from promotion to sensitive positions and prohibited them from serving in military, diplomatic, national security, intelligence, confidential and other key leadership roles.</p><p><a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/china-s-corruption-crackdown-gao-yichen-ousted-from-ccp-1769229383243/embed">https://www.wionews.com/videos/china-s-corruption-crackdown-gao-yichen-ousted-from-ccp-1769229383243/embed</a></p><p>The first major provincial crackdown took place in the same year in Guangdong Province, where investigators identified more than 1,000 'Naked Officials'. Of these, 866 were reportedly demoted, reassigned, required to resign or retire early. Those affected reportedly included mayors and other senior local officials. Around 200 subsequently arranged for their families to return to mainland China, enabling them to remain eligible for certain positions.</p><p>By the end of 2014, the Central Organisation Department of the Communist Party reported identifying around 3,200 'Naked Officials' nationwide, with more than 1,000 either disciplined, reassigned or otherwise removed from sensitive posts.</p><p>The next major tightening came in 2022, when the Communist Party of China Central Committee prohibited spouses and children of ministerial-level officials from holding overseas real estate or shares in foreign companies, as part of broader restrictions aimed at reducing conflicts of interest, limiting opportunities for hidden wealth and strengthening anti-corruption measures.</p><p>In the past 12 months, there have been renewed internal inspections. The wider net has reportedly included even 'quasi-Naked Officials', &nbsp;whose children live abroad but whose spouses remained in China. Nationwide surveys were conducted by the Central Organisation Department. Several officials lost promotions or appointments following these inspections, with internal disciplinary campaigns calling for their removal from leadership positions where they were found to fall within the relevant categories.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/chinese-military-court-awards-suspended-death-sentences-to-former-defence-ministers-1778165436148">Chinese military court awards suspended death sentences to former defence ministers</a></p><h2>No 'Naked Official' policy in India: How are Indian ministers and officials with relatives abroad treated?</h2><p>In India, there is no law requiring ministers, Members of Parliament, Members of State Legislative Assemblies, or senior civil servants to publicly disclose whether their spouses or children are permanent residents or citizens of another country, or whether their immediate family lives abroad for study or work. Likewise, there is no dedicated legal framework requiring the disclosure of substantial overseas assets held by immediate family members, beyond the general asset declarations required under election laws, service rules or tax laws.</p><p>Election candidates are required to disclose their own assets, liabilities and financial interests through affidavits filed with the Election Commission of India, while certain public servants are subject to service conduct rules governing asset declarations. In addition, residents may have reporting obligations regarding foreign assets under the Income-tax Act, where applicable. However, India has no China-style registry or disclosure framework relating specifically to senior public officials whose immediate family members reside, work or have permanently settled abroad.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/six-military-lawmakers-of-china-stripped-off-their-posts-amid-xi-jinping-s-deepening-anti-corruption-drive-1782578304014">Six military lawmakers of China stripped off their posts amid Xi Jinping's deepening anti-corruption drive</a></p><h2>It's time to start a debate on 'Naked Officials' in India</h2><p>The Chinese model on 'Naked Officials' does not automatically presume that every such official is corrupt. It does, however, proceed on the principle that such circumstances may warrant greater disclosure, vigilance and institutional scrutiny because of potential conflicts of interest, corruption risks or concerns about illicit asset flight.</p><p>In India, many politicians and senior officials have overseas family connections that would likely fall within the scope of such scrutiny if a similar framework existed.&nbsp;</p><p>Legislation requiring disclosures by ministers, MPs, MLAs, senior civil servants and other holders of high public office could be considered as a transparency measure.</p><p>Such mandated disclosures could answer questions such as:</p><ul><li>Is the official's spouse or child a permanent resident or citizen of another country?</li><li>Does the official's immediate family currently reside abroad, or have they done so in the recent past?</li><li>Do the official or their immediate family members own substantial overseas assets, such as real estate, bank accounts or business interests, where disclosure is otherwise legally required?</li><li>Are any immediate family members employed by, or hold significant financial interests in, foreign governments, foreign state-owned enterprises or strategically sensitive foreign companies?</li><li>Have any immediate family members obtained long-term residence, investment visas or citizenship through investment programmes in another country?</li></ul><h2>Disclosure without presumption of guilt is the need</h2><p>Such a framework would be intended to promote transparency, accountability and conflict-of-interest safeguards. It would not presume wrongdoing or corruption, nor would it justify sweeping conclusions about an individual's loyalty, integrity or patriotism.</p><p>There is nothing inherently wrong with sending one's child abroad to study, work or live, and doing so does not, by itself, amount to evidence of corruption, divided loyalties or disloyalty to India.</p><p>Any policy, if introduced, should include appropriate safeguards for privacy, due process and legitimate personal circumstances. It should also apply uniformly across all political parties, governments and holders of high public office, without fear, favour or exception.</p><p>Ultimately, the question goes beyond any individual or political party: should India establish a transparent disclosure regime requiring senior public officials to declare significant immediate family connections abroad, similar to the disclosure and scrutiny mechanisms adopted in parts of China's governance framework?</p><p>Think about it.</p>

China subjects so-called 'Naked Officials' who have their spouses or children abroad to greater scrutiny and disclosure. Could India adopt a similar transparency framework for ministers and senior public officials? Think about it



Many Indian politicians and bureaucrats have children or spouses studying or working abroad and, in some cases, living in developed countries as permanent residents or citizens. This is often highlighted when controversies arise, such as during the recent National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET-UG) paper leak protests, when some alleged that Indian leaders and officials were out of touch with the realities faced by the youth because their own children were studying or working abroad. This is not the case in China, where, for over a decade, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has tracked, monitored and, at times, named, shamed or cracked down on the practice of officials sending their spouses or children abroad to live or settle. They are referred to by the derogatory term 'Naked Officials'. China views the issue through the lens of corruption, illicit asset flight and personal enrichment. If an official's family is abroad, the government may also regard it as a potential national security risk warranting scrutiny, disclosure and restrictions. This is not, however, treated as automatic proof of guilt. But what about India? Here is how China tackles 'Naked Officials', and what India can learn from it. The 'Naked Official' policy in China is over a decade old 'Naked Officials', or 'Luǒ Guān' in Chinese, refers to officials of the Communist Party of China (CPC) or the Chinese state whose spouse and/or children have emigrated or settled abroad, whether as permanent residents or citizens, while the official remains in office. The term generally applies where the official stays in China while their immediate family relocates overseas, leaving the official 'naked' or without close family in the country. For well over a decade, China has sought to regulate and monitor this category of public officials. In 2009, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the Communist Party of China called for increased oversight of 'Naked Officials'. In 2010, the Ministry of Supervision formally introduced regulations to strengthen the management of state functionaries whose spouses and children had both emigrated abroad. The primary focus was information gathering and enhanced supervision to prevent corruption, illicit asset transfers and capital flight. Since then, the policies have been tightened. Promotion rules were revised in 2014, including the introduction of steps such as the Measures for the Management of Posts Held by State Functionaries Whose Spouses Have Emigrated Abroad. These effectively barred such officials from promotion to sensitive positions and prohibited them from serving in military, diplomatic, national security, intelligence, confidential and other key leadership roles. https://www.wionews.com/videos/china-s-corruption-crackdown-gao-yichen-ousted-from-ccp-1769229383243/embed The first major provincial crackdown took place in the same year in Guangdong Province, where investigators identified more than 1,000 'Naked Officials'. Of these, 866 were reportedly demoted, reassigned, required to resign or retire early. Those affected reportedly included mayors and other senior local officials. Around 200 subsequently arranged for their families to return to mainland China, enabling them to remain eligible for certain positions. By the end of 2014, the Central Organisation Department of the Communist Party reported identifying around 3,200 'Naked Officials' nationwide, with more than 1,000 either disciplined, reassigned or otherwise removed from sensitive posts. The next major tightening came in 2022, when the Communist Party of China Central Committee prohibited spouses and children of ministerial-level officials from holding overseas real estate or shares in foreign companies, as part of broader restrictions aimed at reducing conflicts of interest, limiting opportunities for hidden wealth and strengthening anti-corruption measures. In the past 12 months, there have been renewed internal inspections. The wider net has reportedly included even 'quasi-Naked Officials', whose children live abroad but whose spouses remained in China. Nationwide surveys were conducted by the Central Organisation Department. Several officials lost promotions or appointments following these inspections, with internal disciplinary campaigns calling for their removal from leadership positions where they were found to fall within the relevant categories. Also read: Chinese military court awards suspended death sentences to former defence ministers No 'Naked Official' policy in India: How are Indian ministers and officials with relatives abroad treated? In India, there is no law requiring ministers, Members of Parliament, Members of State Legislative Assemblies, or senior civil servants to publicly disclose whether their spouses or children are permanent residents or citizens of another country, or whether their immediate family lives abroad for study or work. Likewise, there is no dedicated legal framework requiring the disclosure of substantial overseas assets held by immediate family members, beyond the general asset declarations required under election laws, service rules or tax laws. Election candidates are required to disclose their own assets, liabilities and financial interests through affidavits filed with the Election Commission of India, while certain public servants are subject to service conduct rules governing asset declarations. In addition, residents may have reporting obligations regarding foreign assets under the Income-tax Act, where applicable. However, India has no China-style registry or disclosure framework relating specifically to senior public officials whose immediate family members reside, work or have permanently settled abroad. Also read: Six military lawmakers of China stripped off their posts amid Xi Jinping's deepening anti-corruption drive It's time to start a debate on 'Naked Officials' in India The Chinese model on 'Naked Officials' does not automatically presume that every such official is corrupt. It does, however, proceed on the principle that such circumstances may warrant greater disclosure, vigilance and institutional scrutiny because of potential conflicts of interest, corruption risks or concerns about illicit asset flight. In India, many politicians and senior officials have overseas family connections that would likely fall within the scope of such scrutiny if a similar framework existed. Legislation requiring disclosures by ministers, MPs, MLAs, senior civil servants and other holders of high public office could be considered as a transparency measure. Such mandated disclosures could answer questions such as: Is the official's spouse or child a permanent resident or citizen of another country? Does the official's immediate family currently reside abroad, or have they done so in the recent past? Do the official or their immediate family members own substantial overseas assets, such as real estate, bank accounts or business interests, where disclosure is otherwise legally required? Are any immediate family members employed by, or hold significant financial interests in, foreign governments, foreign state-owned enterprises or strategically sensitive foreign companies? Have any immediate family members obtained long-term residence, investment visas or citizenship through investment programmes in another country? Disclosure without presumption of guilt is the need Such a framework would be intended to promote transparency, accountability and conflict-of-interest safeguards. It would not presume wrongdoing or corruption, nor would it justify sweeping conclusions about an individual's loyalty, integrity or patriotism. There is nothing inherently wrong with sending one's child abroad to study, work or live, and doing so does not, by itself, amount to evidence of corruption, divided loyalties or disloyalty to India. Any policy, if introduced, should include appropriate safeguards for privacy, due process and legitimate personal circumstances. It should also apply uniformly across all political parties, governments and holders of high public office, without fear, favour or exception. Ultimately, the question goes beyond any individual or political party: should India establish a transparent disclosure regime requiring senior public officials to declare significant immediate family connections abroad, similar to the disclosure and scrutiny mechanisms adopted in parts of China's governance framework? Think about it.

<p>China subjects so-called 'Naked Officials' who have their spouses or children abroad to greater scrutiny and disclosure. Could India adopt a similar transparency framework for ministers and senior public officials? Think about it</p><p>&nbsp;</p>

You are a 'Naked Official' in China if you hold high posts and have children or spouse abroad. What about India?

<p>The military preparations by Taiwan to face a potential invasion by China, and the increasing aerial and naval incursions by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) along the Taiwan Trait, are bringing back the so-called 'Davidson Window' debate. This is a kind of notional timeline linked to a warning by a US military official about when China could be capable of attempting to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, by force if required. China has in recent years pushed back against interpretations of the Davidson Window as an invasion deadline, with its leaders often saying there is no fixed timetable for reunification. Nevertheless, events on the ground point to a continuing military build-up. Here is a backgrounder:</p><h2>Taiwan tensions: Significance of the 2027 deadline and the Davidson Window</h2><p>In simple terms, the ‘Davidson Window’ is a military readiness milestone rather than a prediction of a definite invasion date. The year 2027 was highlighted by Admiral Philip Davidson. In 2021, the then commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command warned that China could have the capability to attempt to take control of Taiwan by 2027. That is why 2027 came to be known as the 'Davidson Window' in strategic and military circles. The strategic concept boosted US efforts to assist Taiwan bolster its defences. The Congress authorised billions of dollars worth of military aid for the 2021-2027 timeline mentioned in the Davidson Window.&nbsp;</p><p><a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/taiwan-seeks-up-to-14-billion-arms-package-from-washington-1780648033678/embed">https://www.wionews.com/videos/taiwan-seeks-up-to-14-billion-arms-package-from-washington-1780648033678/embed</a></p><h2>Why is 2027 significant for China?</h2><p>The year 2027 overlaps with several internal Chinese milestones. It is the 100th anniversary of the PLA's founding. The year will also precede the 21st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, where President Xi Jinping is widely expected to seek another term in power. If he secures another five-year term, Xi will become China's longest-serving paramount leader since Mao Zedong.&nbsp;</p><p>The year 2027 also marks the culmination of a PLA modernisation goal set by Xi Jinping, who instructed the military to accelerate capabilities needed to fight and win modern wars.</p><p>US officials have repeatedly stressed that 2027 should be viewed as a readiness target, not an invasion deadline. Former CIA Director William Burns said Xi had instructed the PLA to be ready to conduct an invasion of Taiwan by 2027, but added that this did not mean a decision to launch one had been made.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/kill-zone-in-taiwan-strait-why-taiwan-is-expanding-its-anti-ship-arsenal-against-china-which-missiles-form-its-core-1780562189356">‘Kill zone’ in Taiwan Strait: Why Taiwan is expanding its anti-ship arsenal against China, which missiles form its core</a></p><h2>Is China really preparing to invade Taiwan in 2027?</h2><p>Xi has been dismissive of suggestions that Beijing has set 2027 as an invasion date, reportedly telling US officials in 2023 that there were no such plans. A US intelligence assessment released in March 2026 said China does not currently plan to invade Taiwan in 2027 and has no fixed timetable for reunification. The report said Beijing still prefers to achieve unification without the use of force if possible, while continuing to develop military options and contingency plans. The US Annual Threat Assessment concluded that Beijing prefers non-kinetic means if possible. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/china-deploys-more-than-100-ships-near-taiwan-after-trump-xi-meeting-says-taipei-1779539283078">China deploys more than 100 ships near Taiwan after Trump-Xi meeting, says Taipei</a></p><h2>Taiwan and China: Shift from invasion risk to coercive pressure</h2><p>Nevertheless, the year 2027 remains a capability checkpoint that worries military planners. It would also carry political symbolism for Xi if China were able to make significant progress towards its Taiwan-related objectives by then.</p><p>Recent military developments across the Taiwan Strait should be seen in this context.&nbsp;</p><p>In late 2024 and 2025, China conducted a series of large-scale military exercises around Taiwan, including blockade and encirclement simulations. In December 2025, the PLA held "Justice Mission" drills that featured scenarios linked to isolating and pressuring the island. &nbsp;</p><h2>Taiwan's military preparations</h2><p>Taiwan plans to deploy High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and other long-range strike assets to strengthen deterrence, including on strategically important outlying islands such as Penghu and Dongyin. Taiwan is also seeking to advance major US arms purchases, with reports indicating that discussions have included packages worth up to US$14 billion.</p><p>It is considering additional long-range precision-strike capabilities and continues to invest in asymmetric warfare systems, such as anti-ship missiles, drones and mobile launchers.</p><p>Domestic debates continue in Taiwan over special defence budgets, amid opposition resistance and legislative wrangling. In 2026, proposals for substantial additional defence spending remained under debate.&nbsp;</p><p>Taiwan is also expanding its anti-ship missile arsenal, with plans to field significantly larger numbers of Harpoon and indigenous Hsiung Feng missiles by the end of the decade as part of its strategy to deter a Chinese blockade or invasion.&nbsp;</p><h2>Trump's ambivalence amid PLA's aerial and naval activity around Taiwan</h2><p>Dozens of Chinese aircraft sorties and multiple naval vessels are regularly detected around the Taiwan. Chinese military pressure has increasingly taken the form of so-called "grey-zone" operations that stop short of open conflict.</p><p>The administration of President Donald Trump, meanwhile, has at times sent mixed signals on how the United States would respond to a Taiwan contingency. Trump has claimed that Xi assured him China would not attack Taiwan during his presidency, although Beijing has not publicly confirmed such an understanding. At the same time, US officials have continued public reaffirmations of support for Taiwan's defence needs and arms purchases.</p><p>The key question, therefore, is not whether China will necessarily attack Taiwan in 2027, but whether the PLA will have achieved by then the military capabilities that Chinese leaders may wish to keep available as an option. Increasingly, US intelligence assessments suggest that 2027 - the year of 'Davidson Window' - &nbsp;should be seen as a readiness benchmark rather than a deadline for war.</p>

The Davidson Window is a US strategic concept on China's military readiness for a Taiwan contingency by 2027. PLA build-up, drills and Taiwan's defence efforts keep concerns alive even as both US and China do not foresee an all-out invasion in the near term. Here is what you know:

The military preparations by Taiwan to face a potential invasion by China, and the increasing aerial and naval incursions by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) along the Taiwan Trait, are bringing back the so-called 'Davidson Window' debate. This is a kind of notional timeline linked to a warning by a US military official about when China could be capable of attempting to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, by force if required. China has in recent years pushed back against interpretations of the Davidson Window as an invasion deadline, with its leaders often saying there is no fixed timetable for reunification. Nevertheless, events on the ground point to a continuing military build-up. Here is a backgrounder: Taiwan tensions: Significance of the 2027 deadline and the Davidson Window In simple terms, the ‘Davidson Window’ is a military readiness milestone rather than a prediction of a definite invasion date. The year 2027 was highlighted by Admiral Philip Davidson. In 2021, the then commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command warned that China could have the capability to attempt to take control of Taiwan by 2027. That is why 2027 came to be known as the 'Davidson Window' in strategic and military circles. The strategic concept boosted US efforts to assist Taiwan bolster its defences. The Congress authorised billions of dollars worth of military aid for the 2021-2027 timeline mentioned in the Davidson Window. https://www.wionews.com/videos/taiwan-seeks-up-to-14-billion-arms-package-from-washington-1780648033678/embed Why is 2027 significant for China? The year 2027 overlaps with several internal Chinese milestones. It is the 100th anniversary of the PLA's founding. The year will also precede the 21st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, where President Xi Jinping is widely expected to seek another term in power. If he secures another five-year term, Xi will become China's longest-serving paramount leader since Mao Zedong. The year 2027 also marks the culmination of a PLA modernisation goal set by Xi Jinping, who instructed the military to accelerate capabilities needed to fight and win modern wars. US officials have repeatedly stressed that 2027 should be viewed as a readiness target, not an invasion deadline. Former CIA Director William Burns said Xi had instructed the PLA to be ready to conduct an invasion of Taiwan by 2027, but added that this did not mean a decision to launch one had been made. Also read: ‘Kill zone’ in Taiwan Strait: Why Taiwan is expanding its anti-ship arsenal against China, which missiles form its core Is China really preparing to invade Taiwan in 2027? Xi has been dismissive of suggestions that Beijing has set 2027 as an invasion date, reportedly telling US officials in 2023 that there were no such plans. A US intelligence assessment released in March 2026 said China does not currently plan to invade Taiwan in 2027 and has no fixed timetable for reunification. The report said Beijing still prefers to achieve unification without the use of force if possible, while continuing to develop military options and contingency plans. The US Annual Threat Assessment concluded that Beijing prefers non-kinetic means if possible. Also read: China deploys more than 100 ships near Taiwan after Trump-Xi meeting, says Taipei Taiwan and China: Shift from invasion risk to coercive pressure Nevertheless, the year 2027 remains a capability checkpoint that worries military planners. It would also carry political symbolism for Xi if China were able to make significant progress towards its Taiwan-related objectives by then. Recent military developments across the Taiwan Strait should be seen in this context. In late 2024 and 2025, China conducted a series of large-scale military exercises around Taiwan, including blockade and encirclement simulations. In December 2025, the PLA held "Justice Mission" drills that featured scenarios linked to isolating and pressuring the island. Taiwan's military preparations Taiwan plans to deploy High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and other long-range strike assets to strengthen deterrence, including on strategically important outlying islands such as Penghu and Dongyin. Taiwan is also seeking to advance major US arms purchases, with reports indicating that discussions have included packages worth up to US$14 billion. It is considering additional long-range precision-strike capabilities and continues to invest in asymmetric warfare systems, such as anti-ship missiles, drones and mobile launchers. Domestic debates continue in Taiwan over special defence budgets, amid opposition resistance and legislative wrangling. In 2026, proposals for substantial additional defence spending remained under debate. Taiwan is also expanding its anti-ship missile arsenal, with plans to field significantly larger numbers of Harpoon and indigenous Hsiung Feng missiles by the end of the decade as part of its strategy to deter a Chinese blockade or invasion. Trump's ambivalence amid PLA's aerial and naval activity around Taiwan Dozens of Chinese aircraft sorties and multiple naval vessels are regularly detected around the Taiwan. Chinese military pressure has increasingly taken the form of so-called "grey-zone" operations that stop short of open conflict. The administration of President Donald Trump, meanwhile, has at times sent mixed signals on how the United States would respond to a Taiwan contingency. Trump has claimed that Xi assured him China would not attack Taiwan during his presidency, although Beijing has not publicly confirmed such an understanding. At the same time, US officials have continued public reaffirmations of support for Taiwan's defence needs and arms purchases. The key question, therefore, is not whether China will necessarily attack Taiwan in 2027, but whether the PLA will have achieved by then the military capabilities that Chinese leaders may wish to keep available as an option. Increasingly, US intelligence assessments suggest that 2027 - the year of 'Davidson Window' - should be seen as a readiness benchmark rather than a deadline for war.

<p>The Davidson Window is a US strategic concept on China's military readiness for a Taiwan contingency by 2027. PLA build-up, drills and Taiwan's defence efforts keep concerns alive even as both US and China do not foresee an all-out invasion in the near term. Here is what you know:</p>

Will China attack Taiwan in 2027? What's the Davidson Window?

<p>Recent comments by some Big Tech top brass on Artificial Intelligence adoption are providing a reality check moment: Is AI adoption really helping companies cut costs, bring in efficient processes, and improve bottom lines? The ‘token burn rate’ of AI tools — particularly agentic AI models like Claude — is rising faster than the return on investment (ROI) for the firms using AI. In simplest terms, tokens are the total input-output measurement of computing required to answer your queries, prompts, or chats with an AI interface. OpenAI CEO Sam Altman has admitted that the “job apocalypse” that he and many other AI advocates predicted is not happening as fast as he thought. Why is AI still not able to bring the expected rewards for companies that adopted it? Why are firms like Starbucks re-hiring humans after having adopted or integrated AI into their workflows?</p><h2>AI adoption meets reality</h2><p>After a couple of years of hype, enterprise AI adoption is entering a more sceptical and realistic phase. Companies that adopted AI saw an explosion in token consumption, the main criterion used by AI tools for billing. But firms like Uber are now realising that this is not translating into productivity gains, shipped features, or workforce reductions. Some are now asking the question: Is AI spending economically justified as a cost-cutting and productivity-increasing measure? Some are realising that the “AI apocalypse” may arrive much before the long-predicted jobs apocalypse, because AI stocks could fall if adoption is not in tandem with the billions of dollars spent on computing power to answer user queries.</p><h2>Uber president’s warning: Astronomical token growth meets unclear business value</h2><p>Uber President and COO Andrew Macdonald recently said AI investments are becoming “harder to justify”, as companies cannot yet connect rising AI usage to concrete business outcomes. Speaking on the <i>Rapid Response</i> podcast, Macdonald talked of a widening gap between AI-assisted coding activity and actual delivered value. “You talk to your senior engineering leaders, and you’re saying, ‘Okay, how many projects that were on the cutting room floor got moved above the line because of the productivity gains, because 25 per cent of our code commits were via Claude Code last quarter?’ That link is not there yet,” he said. “If you’re not actually able to draw a direct line to how much useful features and functionality you’re shipping to your users, that trade becomes harder to justify.”</p><p>Macdonald noted that token usage and AI-generated code commits are going up “in a really astronomical direction”. Yet Uber still struggles to tie those metrics to measurable gains in productivity, feature delivery, or user outcomes, he said.</p><h2>Firms are burning through their AI budgets but have little to show for productivity or cost gains</h2><p>Uber reportedly exhausted its entire 2026 AI coding tools budget within roughly four months because of extremely high employee adoption — around 95 per cent in some teams. This means that, when given a chance, employees would use AI for most of their tasks, driving up the costs. In Uber’s case, the AI budget costs were partially offset by reduced hiring of humans.</p><p>Macdonald’s reality check came weeks after his own company’s CEO, Dara Khosrowshahi, talked of AI as a way to dramatically increase throughput. Uber was targeting between 20 and 100 per cent productivity gains per employee while slowing down hiring. But that doesn't seem to be happening.</p><h2>The basic problem with enterprise AI: Usage is easy to measure, but value gains are not</h2><p>Macdonald’s remarks are an example of growing doubts across several AI-user industries about whether spending on AI is generating returns on investment fast enough. AI coding tools are usage-based systems where costs rise as usage increases. Those using AI — such as developers — consume more tokens very quickly.</p><p>AI token costing is different from traditional software licences. The costs can rise exponentially, particularly with agentic workflows and large-context usage. Companies can easily measure and track token counts, code generation volume, AI-assisted commits, or tool adoption rates. But in many cases, this is not going hand in hand with increases in shipped features, faster delivery cycles, better products, or higher revenue.</p><h2>Some firms are moving from ‘AI pilot project’ hype to more disciplined use of AI: Enter the token throttling era</h2><p>Several enterprises expected that AI would help cut down large engineering teams while producing equal or greater output, but they are unable to prove this in real life. The causes are many: AI integration challenges, organisational friction, and quality issues that require human testing, monitoring, and control.</p><p>Reports indicate that some of these companies are now transitioning from the exuberant “pilot and hype” phase of AI adoption to a more financially disciplined era focused on accountability. Both AI providers and companies that adopt AI are increasingly relying on “token throttling”: &nbsp;methods by which caps are introduced on how many tokens users or teams can consume within specific time windows.</p><p>AI providers such as Anthropic and OpenAI use throttling to manage GPU capacity and stabilise services in order to limit queues and “Too Many Requests” errors. They are trying to ensure fair access and control compute costs. Limits include tokens-per-minute caps, rolling usage windows, weekly caps, and peak-hour restrictions.</p><p>On the other hand, companies using AI tools are also implementing their own throttling systems and governance policies to prevent uncontrolled spending from heavy users or autonomous coding agents. These controls reflect how quickly costs can spiral in AI workflows, particularly agentic coding systems that repeatedly process large codebases and contexts.</p><h2>How much are companies spending on AI tokens?</h2><p>It depends on usage intensity, which AI models are used, and how much automation is introduced using AI. Anthropic, the firm behind Claude, estimates that average Claude Code usage costs roughly $6 per active developer per day. It said that 90 per cent of users stay below $12 daily. This translates to approximately $100–$250 per developer per month for moderate-to-heavy usage. For context, Anthropic’s enterprise plans roughly cost $200 for coding workflows of power users, around $85 for typical users, and $25 for light users per month. But all this depends on a specific company’s usage patterns. One company with 100 engineers might spend only about $2,500 monthly overall, while extreme outliers can consume $500–$1,400 worth of tokens in a single day when running agentic workflows with massive contexts.</p><p>Some startups have reportedly seen AI spending grow 15 times within months, jumping from roughly $200 per developer monthly to nearly $3,000 as adoption deepened and workflows became more AI-dependent.</p><p>This is why human governance, throttling, and budget controls are becoming standard enterprise practices.</p><h2>Claude vs OpenAI: The pricing arms race</h2><p>Token costs are central to enterprise budgeting for AI adoption. In flagship models, Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4.7 charges approximately $5 per million input tokens and $25 per million output tokens. Note that one million input tokens are roughly equal to 750,000 words. Output tokens are charged at a higher rate than input tokens.</p><p>OpenAI’s GPT-5.5 is priced at around $5 input and $30 output. Anthropic is therefore slightly cheaper for high-end, output-heavy workloads. Most coding and production use of AI is happening in the mid-tier market. Here, OpenAI is generally cheaper. Claude Sonnet 4.6 costs roughly $3 input and $15 output per million tokens, while OpenAI’s GPT-5.4 costs about $2.50 input and $15 output. OpenAI’s GPT-5.4 Mini is significantly cheaper at $0.75 input and $4.50 output. At the budget tier, OpenAI has a stronger cost advantage. GPT-5.4 Nano costs around $0.20 input and $1.25 output per million tokens, while Claude Haiku 4.5 costs roughly $1 input and $5 output.</p><p>But remember, you get what you pay for.</p><p><a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/us-iran-war-military-operations-used-anthropic-ai-despite-white-house-ban-1772367271311/embed">https://www.wionews.com/videos/us-iran-war-military-operations-used-anthropic-ai-despite-white-house-ban-1772367271311/embed</a></p><h2>Enterprises are rethinking AI deployment versus human engineers</h2><p>It is emerging that heavy AI coding usage could end up costing more than simply paying human engineers. Businesses are looking at cost-cutting methods while adopting AI. They often mix AI providers depending on the workload. Claude is popular for coding, reasoning, and long-context tasks despite higher costs, while OpenAI is frequently favoured for broader cost efficiency. Regardless of the AI provider, real-world developer costs commonly remain in the $100 to $400 monthly range for serious AI-assisted engineering work. The cost differential is leading some companies to mix and match AI and humans.&nbsp;</p><p>Microsoft, which gave thousands of engineers access to Anthropic’s Claude Code in late 2025, saw AI usage costs rise so sharply that it started cancelling many direct Claude licences in divisions like Experiences &amp; Devices. The company is shifting employees towards its own cheaper tool, GitHub Copilot CLI, mainly to control token spending.</p><p>Starbucks, which rolled out its AI inventory system called “Automated Counting” across North American stores to reduce manual work and improve efficiency, had to shut it down after nine months. The AI system frequently made mistakes, often miscounting or mislabelling items like milk and syrups, forcing employees to spend extra time double-checking inventory manually. In this case, instead of saving labour, the AI tool created additional work and operational problems. Starbucks has since shifted focus back towards consistency and human staffing, including hiring more baristas.</p><p>Companies like Meta and Amazon encouraged heavy internal AI use, but are finding out now that newer agentic AI systems consume vastly more computing power than normal chatbot use. In some cases, agentic workflows can use up to 1,000 times more tokens than standard AI queries, leading to increase in AI bills faster than companies can measure real productivity gains.</p><h2>A reality check from OpenAI CEO: Sam Altman admits the jobs apocalypse hasn’t arrived</h2><p>It is in this context that we have to read Sam Altman’s recent comments acknowledging that AI has displaced far fewer jobs than he and other AI evangelists expected just one or two years ago. The OpenAI CEO said at the Commonwealth Bank of Australia conference that he was “delighted to be wrong” about the pace of white-collar job elimination. “I thought there would have been more impact on entry-level white-collar jobs being eliminated by now than has actually happened.”</p><p>He said OpenAI had been “roughly right” about technological progress, but “pretty wrong” about the social and economic implications. “I don’t think we’re going to have the kind of jobs apocalypse that some of the companies in our space advocate or talk about.”</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/photos/anthropic-blocks-entire-company-out-of-claude-without-a-reasonable-explanation-1776854687090">Anthropic blocks entire company out of Claude without a reasonable explanation</a></p><h2>Why AI adoption isn’t translating into mass job cuts</h2><p>Altman thinks the slower-than-expected displacement is due to the enduring importance of human interaction, organisational inertia, and the complexities of AI integration into workflows. Acknowledging the persistent “human part” of work, he said, “We really do care about our interactions with people.” People still value trust, judgement, relationships, and authentic communication, he noted, while sharing how his own attempts to outsource his email and Slack communications to AI made him realise that meaningful interactions could not simply be automated away.</p><h2>Why enterprises will move only slowly on AI adoption</h2><p>Even when AI systems are technically far more capable, organisations face institutional friction, risk aversion, AI integration challenges, oversight requirements, and structural complexity that delay real transformation. This leads to a paradoxical situation: AI adoption and token usage are growing extremely quickly, but businesses are struggling to convert that activity into measurable reductions in headcount, faster shipping cycles, or clear bottom-line improvements.</p><p>This is why some firms are moving from an “AI experimentation” phase to a “scrutiny and governance” phase, where spending controls, throttling, ROI measurement, and human oversight are becoming central priorities.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/technology/-10-000-bugs-in-a-month-how-anthropic-s-ai-is-changing-cybersecurity-1779526061436">‘10,000 bugs in a month’: How Anthropic’s AI is changing cybersecurity</a></p><h2>AI washing and re-hiring of humans: How organisational reality is outpacing AI hype</h2><p>From the point of view of these companies, the economic and organisational limits of AI adoption are arriving faster than mass labour displacement. There are two things happening. One is “AI washing”, where layoffs are blamed on AI, but the real causes are elsewhere. The second is re-hiring after premature job cuts. These two aspects are creating scepticism about exaggerated AI automation narratives.</p><p>There is no doubt that AI is improving productivity in targeted workflows. But these gains often lead companies to pursue more ambitious goals rather than simply reduce staff. AI-led efficiency increases total consumption instead of lowering it, and it creates the need to increase AI budgets.</p><p>A more sober consensus appears to be emerging in at least some companies that, while AI capability is advancing rapidly, organisational absorption is much slower.</p><p>For now, the immediate crisis for many enterprises is not mass unemployment — it is runaway AI spending without clear accountability. Big Tech companies like Microsoft, Meta, Google-Alphabet, and Amazon are pumping massive capital expenditure into AI infrastructure, estimated to total up to $700 billion. But investors and executives are seeking clearer monetisation and productivity links.</p><p>The AI apocalypse, financially speaking, may arrive before the jobs apocalypse if and when AI provider companies fail to scale adoption in tandem with the computing costs involved in answering queries.</p>

Companies adopting AI are facing soaring token costs, unclear ROI, and slower-than-expected job cuts. Firms like Uber, Microsoft, and Starbucks are rethinking the balance between AI spending and human staffing. Is the AI vs human labour hype already over?

Recent comments by some Big Tech top brass on Artificial Intelligence adoption are providing a reality check moment: Is AI adoption really helping companies cut costs, bring in efficient processes, and improve bottom lines? The ‘token burn rate’ of AI tools — particularly agentic AI models like Claude — is rising faster than the return on investment (ROI) for the firms using AI. In simplest terms, tokens are the total input-output measurement of computing required to answer your queries, prompts, or chats with an AI interface. OpenAI CEO Sam Altman has admitted that the “job apocalypse” that he and many other AI advocates predicted is not happening as fast as he thought. Why is AI still not able to bring the expected rewards for companies that adopted it? Why are firms like Starbucks re-hiring humans after having adopted or integrated AI into their workflows? AI adoption meets reality After a couple of years of hype, enterprise AI adoption is entering a more sceptical and realistic phase. Companies that adopted AI saw an explosion in token consumption, the main criterion used by AI tools for billing. But firms like Uber are now realising that this is not translating into productivity gains, shipped features, or workforce reductions. Some are now asking the question: Is AI spending economically justified as a cost-cutting and productivity-increasing measure? Some are realising that the “AI apocalypse” may arrive much before the long-predicted jobs apocalypse, because AI stocks could fall if adoption is not in tandem with the billions of dollars spent on computing power to answer user queries. Uber president’s warning: Astronomical token growth meets unclear business value Uber President and COO Andrew Macdonald recently said AI investments are becoming “harder to justify”, as companies cannot yet connect rising AI usage to concrete business outcomes. Speaking on the Rapid Response podcast, Macdonald talked of a widening gap between AI-assisted coding activity and actual delivered value. “You talk to your senior engineering leaders, and you’re saying, ‘Okay, how many projects that were on the cutting room floor got moved above the line because of the productivity gains, because 25 per cent of our code commits were via Claude Code last quarter?’ That link is not there yet,” he said. “If you’re not actually able to draw a direct line to how much useful features and functionality you’re shipping to your users, that trade becomes harder to justify.” Macdonald noted that token usage and AI-generated code commits are going up “in a really astronomical direction”. Yet Uber still struggles to tie those metrics to measurable gains in productivity, feature delivery, or user outcomes, he said. Firms are burning through their AI budgets but have little to show for productivity or cost gains Uber reportedly exhausted its entire 2026 AI coding tools budget within roughly four months because of extremely high employee adoption — around 95 per cent in some teams. This means that, when given a chance, employees would use AI for most of their tasks, driving up the costs. In Uber’s case, the AI budget costs were partially offset by reduced hiring of humans. Macdonald’s reality check came weeks after his own company’s CEO, Dara Khosrowshahi, talked of AI as a way to dramatically increase throughput. Uber was targeting between 20 and 100 per cent productivity gains per employee while slowing down hiring. But that doesn't seem to be happening. The basic problem with enterprise AI: Usage is easy to measure, but value gains are not Macdonald’s remarks are an example of growing doubts across several AI-user industries about whether spending on AI is generating returns on investment fast enough. AI coding tools are usage-based systems where costs rise as usage increases. Those using AI — such as developers — consume more tokens very quickly. AI token costing is different from traditional software licences. The costs can rise exponentially, particularly with agentic workflows and large-context usage. Companies can easily measure and track token counts, code generation volume, AI-assisted commits, or tool adoption rates. But in many cases, this is not going hand in hand with increases in shipped features, faster delivery cycles, better products, or higher revenue. Some firms are moving from ‘AI pilot project’ hype to more disciplined use of AI: Enter the token throttling era Several enterprises expected that AI would help cut down large engineering teams while producing equal or greater output, but they are unable to prove this in real life. The causes are many: AI integration challenges, organisational friction, and quality issues that require human testing, monitoring, and control. Reports indicate that some of these companies are now transitioning from the exuberant “pilot and hype” phase of AI adoption to a more financially disciplined era focused on accountability. Both AI providers and companies that adopt AI are increasingly relying on “token throttling”: methods by which caps are introduced on how many tokens users or teams can consume within specific time windows. AI providers such as Anthropic and OpenAI use throttling to manage GPU capacity and stabilise services in order to limit queues and “Too Many Requests” errors. They are trying to ensure fair access and control compute costs. Limits include tokens-per-minute caps, rolling usage windows, weekly caps, and peak-hour restrictions. On the other hand, companies using AI tools are also implementing their own throttling systems and governance policies to prevent uncontrolled spending from heavy users or autonomous coding agents. These controls reflect how quickly costs can spiral in AI workflows, particularly agentic coding systems that repeatedly process large codebases and contexts. How much are companies spending on AI tokens? It depends on usage intensity, which AI models are used, and how much automation is introduced using AI. Anthropic, the firm behind Claude, estimates that average Claude Code usage costs roughly $6 per active developer per day. It said that 90 per cent of users stay below $12 daily. This translates to approximately $100–$250 per developer per month for moderate-to-heavy usage. For context, Anthropic’s enterprise plans roughly cost $200 for coding workflows of power users, around $85 for typical users, and $25 for light users per month. But all this depends on a specific company’s usage patterns. One company with 100 engineers might spend only about $2,500 monthly overall, while extreme outliers can consume $500–$1,400 worth of tokens in a single day when running agentic workflows with massive contexts. Some startups have reportedly seen AI spending grow 15 times within months, jumping from roughly $200 per developer monthly to nearly $3,000 as adoption deepened and workflows became more AI-dependent. This is why human governance, throttling, and budget controls are becoming standard enterprise practices. Claude vs OpenAI: The pricing arms race Token costs are central to enterprise budgeting for AI adoption. In flagship models, Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4.7 charges approximately $5 per million input tokens and $25 per million output tokens. Note that one million input tokens are roughly equal to 750,000 words. Output tokens are charged at a higher rate than input tokens. OpenAI’s GPT-5.5 is priced at around $5 input and $30 output. Anthropic is therefore slightly cheaper for high-end, output-heavy workloads. Most coding and production use of AI is happening in the mid-tier market. Here, OpenAI is generally cheaper. Claude Sonnet 4.6 costs roughly $3 input and $15 output per million tokens, while OpenAI’s GPT-5.4 costs about $2.50 input and $15 output. OpenAI’s GPT-5.4 Mini is significantly cheaper at $0.75 input and $4.50 output. At the budget tier, OpenAI has a stronger cost advantage. GPT-5.4 Nano costs around $0.20 input and $1.25 output per million tokens, while Claude Haiku 4.5 costs roughly $1 input and $5 output. But remember, you get what you pay for. https://www.wionews.com/videos/us-iran-war-military-operations-used-anthropic-ai-despite-white-house-ban-1772367271311/embed Enterprises are rethinking AI deployment versus human engineers It is emerging that heavy AI coding usage could end up costing more than simply paying human engineers. Businesses are looking at cost-cutting methods while adopting AI. They often mix AI providers depending on the workload. Claude is popular for coding, reasoning, and long-context tasks despite higher costs, while OpenAI is frequently favoured for broader cost efficiency. Regardless of the AI provider, real-world developer costs commonly remain in the $100 to $400 monthly range for serious AI-assisted engineering work. The cost differential is leading some companies to mix and match AI and humans. Microsoft, which gave thousands of engineers access to Anthropic’s Claude Code in late 2025, saw AI usage costs rise so sharply that it started cancelling many direct Claude licences in divisions like Experiences & Devices. The company is shifting employees towards its own cheaper tool, GitHub Copilot CLI, mainly to control token spending. Starbucks, which rolled out its AI inventory system called “Automated Counting” across North American stores to reduce manual work and improve efficiency, had to shut it down after nine months. The AI system frequently made mistakes, often miscounting or mislabelling items like milk and syrups, forcing employees to spend extra time double-checking inventory manually. In this case, instead of saving labour, the AI tool created additional work and operational problems. Starbucks has since shifted focus back towards consistency and human staffing, including hiring more baristas. Companies like Meta and Amazon encouraged heavy internal AI use, but are finding out now that newer agentic AI systems consume vastly more computing power than normal chatbot use. In some cases, agentic workflows can use up to 1,000 times more tokens than standard AI queries, leading to increase in AI bills faster than companies can measure real productivity gains. A reality check from OpenAI CEO: Sam Altman admits the jobs apocalypse hasn’t arrived It is in this context that we have to read Sam Altman’s recent comments acknowledging that AI has displaced far fewer jobs than he and other AI evangelists expected just one or two years ago. The OpenAI CEO said at the Commonwealth Bank of Australia conference that he was “delighted to be wrong” about the pace of white-collar job elimination. “I thought there would have been more impact on entry-level white-collar jobs being eliminated by now than has actually happened.” He said OpenAI had been “roughly right” about technological progress, but “pretty wrong” about the social and economic implications. “I don’t think we’re going to have the kind of jobs apocalypse that some of the companies in our space advocate or talk about.” Also read: Anthropic blocks entire company out of Claude without a reasonable explanation Why AI adoption isn’t translating into mass job cuts Altman thinks the slower-than-expected displacement is due to the enduring importance of human interaction, organisational inertia, and the complexities of AI integration into workflows. Acknowledging the persistent “human part” of work, he said, “We really do care about our interactions with people.” People still value trust, judgement, relationships, and authentic communication, he noted, while sharing how his own attempts to outsource his email and Slack communications to AI made him realise that meaningful interactions could not simply be automated away. Why enterprises will move only slowly on AI adoption Even when AI systems are technically far more capable, organisations face institutional friction, risk aversion, AI integration challenges, oversight requirements, and structural complexity that delay real transformation. This leads to a paradoxical situation: AI adoption and token usage are growing extremely quickly, but businesses are struggling to convert that activity into measurable reductions in headcount, faster shipping cycles, or clear bottom-line improvements. This is why some firms are moving from an “AI experimentation” phase to a “scrutiny and governance” phase, where spending controls, throttling, ROI measurement, and human oversight are becoming central priorities. Also read: ‘10,000 bugs in a month’: How Anthropic’s AI is changing cybersecurity AI washing and re-hiring of humans: How organisational reality is outpacing AI hype From the point of view of these companies, the economic and organisational limits of AI adoption are arriving faster than mass labour displacement. There are two things happening. One is “AI washing”, where layoffs are blamed on AI, but the real causes are elsewhere. The second is re-hiring after premature job cuts. These two aspects are creating scepticism about exaggerated AI automation narratives. There is no doubt that AI is improving productivity in targeted workflows. But these gains often lead companies to pursue more ambitious goals rather than simply reduce staff. AI-led efficiency increases total consumption instead of lowering it, and it creates the need to increase AI budgets. A more sober consensus appears to be emerging in at least some companies that, while AI capability is advancing rapidly, organisational absorption is much slower. For now, the immediate crisis for many enterprises is not mass unemployment — it is runaway AI spending without clear accountability. Big Tech companies like Microsoft, Meta, Google-Alphabet, and Amazon are pumping massive capital expenditure into AI infrastructure, estimated to total up to $700 billion. But investors and executives are seeking clearer monetisation and productivity links. The AI apocalypse, financially speaking, may arrive before the jobs apocalypse if and when AI provider companies fail to scale adoption in tandem with the computing costs involved in answering queries.

<p>Companies adopting AI are facing soaring token costs, unclear ROI, and slower-than-expected job cuts. Firms like Uber, Microsoft, and Starbucks are rethinking the balance between AI spending and human staffing. Is the AI vs human labour hype already over?</p>

AI adoption is not leading to a job apocalypse or saving many firms real money. Make haste slowly? A reality check

<p>India has seen political protests, student movements and anti-establishment waves before. But few have looked like the Cockroach Janata Party. The CJP exploded online in May 2026 with memes, AI-generated protest songs, parody manifestos and a flood of “cockroach” imagery. Within days, its Instagram following reportedly crossed 21 million before the account was allegedly hacked — a number larger than the ruling BJP’s online base. More than a million people reportedly signed up to join the party through online forms. For some, it was hilarious internet theatre. For others, it exposed something deeper: growing frustration among India’s youth. The real question is whether CJP is an actual political movement — or simply the internet venting in memes. It is a fever. Fever is a symptom of an underlying disease. It is time to address the fever.</p><h2>Cockroach Janata Party: The remark that triggered everything</h2><p>The movement began after remarks attributed to India’s Chief Justice, Surya Kant, during a court hearing. He reportedly compared certain unqualified or jobless entrants in professions like law and journalism to “cockroaches” and “parasites”. The backlash was immediate.</p><p>The Chief Justice later clarified that his comments were aimed at people with fake degrees, not genuinely unemployed youth. But by then, social media had already transformed the controversy into a viral rebellion. The meme machine had started. The damage was done.</p><p><a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/-cockroach-janta-party-overtakes-bjp-in-number-of-followers-on-instagram-1779381079293/embed">https://www.wionews.com/videos/-cockroach-janta-party-overtakes-bjp-in-number-of-followers-on-instagram-1779381079293/embed</a></p><h2>Enter Abhijeet Dipke</h2><p>At the centre of the movement is Abhijeet Dipke, a Boston University student and former political communications strategist who had been earlier associated with the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). After the controversy erupted over the justice's remarks, Dipke posted a simple question on X: “What if all cockroaches come together?”</p><p>Dipke launched social media handles, a website and online sign-up forms. The branding was intentionally absurd: membership requirements included being unemployed, chronically online, lazy and capable of “professional-level ranting”. Even the name — Cockroach Janata Party — was a parody of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP.</p><p>What followed was a perfect storm for internet virality: satire, anger, identity politics and algorithm-friendly content.</p><h2>The real question: Why did CJP go viral?</h2><p>CJP tapped into something festering underneath. Millions of young Indians are frustrated with unemployment, rising living costs, exam scandals and shrinking opportunities. Incidents like the NEET-UG 2026 question paper leak intensified distrust in institutions that are supposed to reward merit.</p><p>India’s youth unemployment rate varies depending on the dataset, but the broader anxiety is undeniable. Millions compete for limited government jobs and entrance exams for higher education and specialist fields. Even small disruptions like leaked papers, delayed results and recruitment scams hit hard, leading to enormous emotional reactions.</p><p>CJP is exploiting that frustration. That is what every opportunistic political movement does.</p><p>It converted anger into an internet cultural movement. Instead of ideology or speeches, its supporters used AI videos, parody songs, slogans and humour — instantly shareable content that was emotionally accessible to a generation raised online and spending large amounts of time scrolling.</p><p>Dipke himself described the movement as a spontaneous satirical reaction, not a structured political organisation.</p><p>Hold that thought. Because that distinction is contentious.</p><h2>The crackdown and shifting narratives</h2><p>As CJP grew, controversy followed. Its X account was allegedly blocked. Dipke moved the Delhi High Court. He claimed the movement’s Instagram account was hacked. &nbsp;Reports also emerged of police deployment outside his family home in India after alleged death threats against him and his relatives.</p><p>The movement quickly became part of a discussion on censorship, suppression and state pressure.</p><p>Whether one agrees with CJP or not, the perception of a crackdown often fuels online movements even further.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/-cockroaches-are-just-getting-started-more-drama-to-unfold-cjp-addresses-speculation-over-its-future-1779693042605">'Cockroaches are just getting started': More drama to unfold? CJP addresses speculation over its future</a></p><h2>Bots, ‘foreign links’ and political opportunism</h2><p>The bigger CJP became, the more questions emerged about who was really behind it. Claims circulated that some followers originated from Pakistani IP addresses or bot networks. Dipke denied those allegations vehemently. Meanwhile, opposition politicians from parties like Congress, AAP and Trinamool Congress began openly supporting the CJP trend. Karnataka Youth Congress workers even distributed “I am a cockroach” T-shirts.</p><p>That created another problem for CJP.</p><p>The movement initially positioned itself as anti-establishment and critical of the entire political class. But once mainstream parties started embracing it, CJP risked becoming another political tool for them.</p><p>As has happened in the past, another youth movement could be hijacked and co-opted by mainstream political parties.</p><p>Questions around Dipke’s own political past added to the scepticism. Was CJP truly organic? Or was it simply smart political branding disguised as rebellion? Is it possible for a single person to suddenly populate the internet with well-designed websites, logos, videos and multiple social media handles? Is Dipke really acting alone?</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/india-s-students-deserve-better-cockroach-janata-party-revives-petition-targeting-edu-minister-dharmendra-pradhan-neet-2026-paper-leak-1779774614724">'India’s students deserve better': Cockroach Janata Party revives petition targeting Edu Minister Dharmendra Pradhan</a></p><h2>Can memes become a movement?</h2><p>This is where the hype meets reality. CJP has dominated social media timelines, but not the streets.</p><p>Yes, there are online petitions and viral campaigns. But there are no major rallies nationwide or visible offline structures. No organisation. No leadership network. No policy framework. No electoral roadmap. No ideology. Just some obviously unachievable manifesto items.</p><p>That is the weakness of many internet movements. Going viral is easy. Building institutions is not.</p><p>Memes can amplify anger. But they cannot automatically solve unemployment, reform education systems, generate economic growth or reduce the cost of living.</p><p>Satire can expose frustration. It cannot replace governance.</p><p>CJP itself embraces irony by calling itself the “Voice of the Lazy &amp; Unemployed”. That branding works online because self-deprecating humour resonates with digital culture. But politics in the real world demands organisation, negotiation and long-term strategy. Definitely not a place for the lazy.</p><p>The internet rewards outrage and performance. Real politics rewards endurance.</p><h2>CJP is a symptom, not a solution</h2><p>CJP is best understood as a symptom of underlying maladies. It reflects the frustrations of a generation dealing with economic uncertainty, hyper-competition in a tech-mediated world, and distrust in institutions. It also reflects the changing nature of protest itself. Young people increasingly express political anger through reels and Reddit rather than traditional street movements.</p><p>But frustration alone does not create political change.</p><p>Many anti-establishment youth movements around the world generated massive online excitement before fading once the hashtag trend cycle ended. Without structure, leadership and offline infrastructure, momentum disappears quickly.</p><p>That does not make CJP meaningless.</p><p>In fact, its success is a warning sign for mainstream politics, across all parties. Millions of young Indians clearly feel unheard. They are willing to rally around satire because conventional political language no longer connects with them.</p><p>CJP may not become a real political party. It may never contest elections or build a ground network.</p><p>But it has already succeeded at one thing: forcing India’s political ecosystem to notice a generation that increasingly communicates from the easy confines of mobile screens.</p><h2>Entertainment or early warning system?</h2><p>For now, Cockroach Janata Party remains more internet spectacle than political revolution.</p><p>It is loud, viral, chaotic and culturally effective. But whether it can survive outside social media feeds is another question.</p><p>Can the self-identified “cockroaches” organise beyond their device screens?</p><p>That answer will decide whether CJP becomes a historical footnote — or the first sign of a new kind of political and social unrest.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p><i>Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.</i></p>

Cockroach Janata Party became a viral online movement after remarks by Chief Justice Surya Kant sparked memes, satire and youth anger over unemployment, exam scandals and distrust in institutions. But can it really transform into a political movement?

India has seen political protests, student movements and anti-establishment waves before. But few have looked like the Cockroach Janata Party. The CJP exploded online in May 2026 with memes, AI-generated protest songs, parody manifestos and a flood of “cockroach” imagery. Within days, its Instagram following reportedly crossed 21 million before the account was allegedly hacked — a number larger than the ruling BJP’s online base. More than a million people reportedly signed up to join the party through online forms. For some, it was hilarious internet theatre. For others, it exposed something deeper: growing frustration among India’s youth. The real question is whether CJP is an actual political movement — or simply the internet venting in memes. It is a fever. Fever is a symptom of an underlying disease. It is time to address the fever. Cockroach Janata Party: The remark that triggered everything The movement began after remarks attributed to India’s Chief Justice, Surya Kant, during a court hearing. He reportedly compared certain unqualified or jobless entrants in professions like law and journalism to “cockroaches” and “parasites”. The backlash was immediate. The Chief Justice later clarified that his comments were aimed at people with fake degrees, not genuinely unemployed youth. But by then, social media had already transformed the controversy into a viral rebellion. The meme machine had started. The damage was done. https://www.wionews.com/videos/-cockroach-janta-party-overtakes-bjp-in-number-of-followers-on-instagram-1779381079293/embed Enter Abhijeet Dipke At the centre of the movement is Abhijeet Dipke, a Boston University student and former political communications strategist who had been earlier associated with the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). After the controversy erupted over the justice's remarks, Dipke posted a simple question on X: “What if all cockroaches come together?” Dipke launched social media handles, a website and online sign-up forms. The branding was intentionally absurd: membership requirements included being unemployed, chronically online, lazy and capable of “professional-level ranting”. Even the name — Cockroach Janata Party — was a parody of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP. What followed was a perfect storm for internet virality: satire, anger, identity politics and algorithm-friendly content. The real question: Why did CJP go viral? CJP tapped into something festering underneath. Millions of young Indians are frustrated with unemployment, rising living costs, exam scandals and shrinking opportunities. Incidents like the NEET-UG 2026 question paper leak intensified distrust in institutions that are supposed to reward merit. India’s youth unemployment rate varies depending on the dataset, but the broader anxiety is undeniable. Millions compete for limited government jobs and entrance exams for higher education and specialist fields. Even small disruptions like leaked papers, delayed results and recruitment scams hit hard, leading to enormous emotional reactions. CJP is exploiting that frustration. That is what every opportunistic political movement does. It converted anger into an internet cultural movement. Instead of ideology or speeches, its supporters used AI videos, parody songs, slogans and humour — instantly shareable content that was emotionally accessible to a generation raised online and spending large amounts of time scrolling. Dipke himself described the movement as a spontaneous satirical reaction, not a structured political organisation. Hold that thought. Because that distinction is contentious. The crackdown and shifting narratives As CJP grew, controversy followed. Its X account was allegedly blocked. Dipke moved the Delhi High Court. He claimed the movement’s Instagram account was hacked. Reports also emerged of police deployment outside his family home in India after alleged death threats against him and his relatives. The movement quickly became part of a discussion on censorship, suppression and state pressure. Whether one agrees with CJP or not, the perception of a crackdown often fuels online movements even further. Also read: 'Cockroaches are just getting started': More drama to unfold? CJP addresses speculation over its future Bots, ‘foreign links’ and political opportunism The bigger CJP became, the more questions emerged about who was really behind it. Claims circulated that some followers originated from Pakistani IP addresses or bot networks. Dipke denied those allegations vehemently. Meanwhile, opposition politicians from parties like Congress, AAP and Trinamool Congress began openly supporting the CJP trend. Karnataka Youth Congress workers even distributed “I am a cockroach” T-shirts. That created another problem for CJP. The movement initially positioned itself as anti-establishment and critical of the entire political class. But once mainstream parties started embracing it, CJP risked becoming another political tool for them. As has happened in the past, another youth movement could be hijacked and co-opted by mainstream political parties. Questions around Dipke’s own political past added to the scepticism. Was CJP truly organic? Or was it simply smart political branding disguised as rebellion? Is it possible for a single person to suddenly populate the internet with well-designed websites, logos, videos and multiple social media handles? Is Dipke really acting alone? Also read: 'India’s students deserve better': Cockroach Janata Party revives petition targeting Edu Minister Dharmendra Pradhan Can memes become a movement? This is where the hype meets reality. CJP has dominated social media timelines, but not the streets. Yes, there are online petitions and viral campaigns. But there are no major rallies nationwide or visible offline structures. No organisation. No leadership network. No policy framework. No electoral roadmap. No ideology. Just some obviously unachievable manifesto items. That is the weakness of many internet movements. Going viral is easy. Building institutions is not. Memes can amplify anger. But they cannot automatically solve unemployment, reform education systems, generate economic growth or reduce the cost of living. Satire can expose frustration. It cannot replace governance. CJP itself embraces irony by calling itself the “Voice of the Lazy & Unemployed”. That branding works online because self-deprecating humour resonates with digital culture. But politics in the real world demands organisation, negotiation and long-term strategy. Definitely not a place for the lazy. The internet rewards outrage and performance. Real politics rewards endurance. CJP is a symptom, not a solution CJP is best understood as a symptom of underlying maladies. It reflects the frustrations of a generation dealing with economic uncertainty, hyper-competition in a tech-mediated world, and distrust in institutions. It also reflects the changing nature of protest itself. Young people increasingly express political anger through reels and Reddit rather than traditional street movements. But frustration alone does not create political change. Many anti-establishment youth movements around the world generated massive online excitement before fading once the hashtag trend cycle ended. Without structure, leadership and offline infrastructure, momentum disappears quickly. That does not make CJP meaningless. In fact, its success is a warning sign for mainstream politics, across all parties. Millions of young Indians clearly feel unheard. They are willing to rally around satire because conventional political language no longer connects with them. CJP may not become a real political party. It may never contest elections or build a ground network. But it has already succeeded at one thing: forcing India’s political ecosystem to notice a generation that increasingly communicates from the easy confines of mobile screens. Entertainment or early warning system? For now, Cockroach Janata Party remains more internet spectacle than political revolution. It is loud, viral, chaotic and culturally effective. But whether it can survive outside social media feeds is another question. Can the self-identified “cockroaches” organise beyond their device screens? That answer will decide whether CJP becomes a historical footnote — or the first sign of a new kind of political and social unrest. Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.

<p>Cockroach Janata Party became a viral online movement after remarks by Chief Justice Surya Kant sparked memes, satire and youth anger over unemployment, exam scandals and distrust in institutions. But can it really transform into a political movement?</p>

Cockroach Janata Party is a fever. Time to prevent the epidemic

<p>India is hosting the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting on Tuesday (May 26) in New Delhi. Chaired by External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, the meeting - first in India since 2023- will be attended by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi. One of the Quad's key focuses has been the Indo-Pacific, where China was seen as a key player and focus of deliberations of the group formally called the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. But this year, the meeting is happening against two backdrops that affect all Quad members in some manner: the Iran war and the US-China rapprochement. The meeting takes place days after the summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. This might possibly change the strategic context of the Quad meeting, according to several analyses.</p><h2>Trump downplayed frictions with China. How will Quad view this?</h2><p>One aspect being reported is that Rubio, who arrived in New Delhi after accompanying Trump to Beijing, would seek to reassure India, Japan and Australia that the US continues to be committed to the Indo-Pacific despite Trump's clear push to downplay security friction with China. The Trump-Xi summit, in reality, did not yield much despite the talk of the emergence of a "G2" — China and the US. This so-far imagined alignment is a situation where China and the US would partition spheres of influence and sideline India, but no major development happened at the summit to point in that direction. This means the status quo in the region is more or less intact, as the summit was mostly transactional, with some trade deals signed or promised.&nbsp;</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/marco-rubio-lands-in-india-s-kolkata-for-first-official-visit-quad-talks-and-trade-high-on-agenda-1779502037666">Marco Rubio lands in India's Kolkata for first official visit; QUAD talks and trade high on agenda</a></p><h2>Quad is not dead, but…</h2><p>India's concerns about a possible US-China rapprochement have subsided as the undercurrents of US-China competition across various sectors remain intact. Observers from think tanks like the Eurasia Review provided the 'Quad is not dead' argument. However, they noted that the grouping has lost some of its initial political bite. The formulations about a "free and open Indo-Pacific" — emphasising freedom of navigation and undisrupted trade flows — might remain unchanged, but whether the Quad will reassert it in strong language remains to be seen.</p><p><a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/india-to-host-quad-foreign-minister-s-meeting-amid-west-asia-tension-1779469266200/embed">https://www.wionews.com/videos/india-to-host-quad-foreign-minister-s-meeting-amid-west-asia-tension-1779469266200/embed</a></p><h2>China's diplomatic moves can't go unnoticed in Quad meetings</h2><p>The Quad meeting is happening in the wake of intense diplomatic activity involving Xi, which essentially saw US adversaries visiting China. This included Russian President Vladimir Putin (amid the Ukraine war), senior Iranian officials (amid the Iran-US war), and Pakistani leaders (amid continuing India-Pakistan tensions). China, in essence, is hosting several leaders seen as adversarial to the US and some members of the Quad.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/rubio-meets-pm-modi-in-delhi-as-india-us-talks-focus-on-energy-quad-and-trade-1779530790043">Rubio meets PM Modi in Delhi as India-US talks focus on energy, QUAD and trade</a></p><h2>Quad countries are feeling the pinch of Hormuz disruptions caused by Iran war</h2><p>It is not clear if the Iran war and the ongoing economic strain caused by global maritime disruptions like the Strait of Hormuz tensions would be part of the language of negotiations or the communiqué of the Quad foreign ministers. While its focus is mainly on the Indo-Pacific, the Quad had explicitly discussed supply chains and maritime security in the past. Those aspects remain highly relevant for the current meeting.</p><h2>Quad language will be watched closely</h2><p>The Delhi Quad meeting will be watched for the language that emerges from deliberations in the context of the above factors. This is going to be the first test of how the US can channel regional allies to adapt to the second Trump administration's off-again, on-again approach to Beijing.</p><p>The main deliberations are likely to be on maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific, maritime security, and addressing the ongoing crisis in West Asia. Beyond the multilateral session, the visiting foreign ministers are holding bilateral talks with Indian officials and calling on Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The meeting will lay the groundwork and roadmap for the upcoming Quad Leaders' Summit later this year.</p><p>It will likely discuss critical minerals and supply chain resilience, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, infrastructure, and connectivity. Emerging technologies, cyber, health security, and counter-terrorism are also likely topics for discussion.</p><p>The meeting will also review past work on vaccines, infrastructure, and maritime domain awareness.</p>

India is hosting the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Delhi just days after the Trump-Xi summit. Quad members might be having concerns around US-China rapprochement. Iran war and Hormuz disruptions have affected most of them. How will Indo-Pacific security focus of Quad play out?

India is hosting the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting on Tuesday (May 26) in New Delhi. Chaired by External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, the meeting - first in India since 2023- will be attended by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi. One of the Quad's key focuses has been the Indo-Pacific, where China was seen as a key player and focus of deliberations of the group formally called the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. But this year, the meeting is happening against two backdrops that affect all Quad members in some manner: the Iran war and the US-China rapprochement. The meeting takes place days after the summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. This might possibly change the strategic context of the Quad meeting, according to several analyses. Trump downplayed frictions with China. How will Quad view this? One aspect being reported is that Rubio, who arrived in New Delhi after accompanying Trump to Beijing, would seek to reassure India, Japan and Australia that the US continues to be committed to the Indo-Pacific despite Trump's clear push to downplay security friction with China. The Trump-Xi summit, in reality, did not yield much despite the talk of the emergence of a "G2" — China and the US. This so-far imagined alignment is a situation where China and the US would partition spheres of influence and sideline India, but no major development happened at the summit to point in that direction. This means the status quo in the region is more or less intact, as the summit was mostly transactional, with some trade deals signed or promised. Also read: Marco Rubio lands in India's Kolkata for first official visit; QUAD talks and trade high on agenda Quad is not dead, but… India's concerns about a possible US-China rapprochement have subsided as the undercurrents of US-China competition across various sectors remain intact. Observers from think tanks like the Eurasia Review provided the 'Quad is not dead' argument. However, they noted that the grouping has lost some of its initial political bite. The formulations about a "free and open Indo-Pacific" — emphasising freedom of navigation and undisrupted trade flows — might remain unchanged, but whether the Quad will reassert it in strong language remains to be seen. https://www.wionews.com/videos/india-to-host-quad-foreign-minister-s-meeting-amid-west-asia-tension-1779469266200/embed China's diplomatic moves can't go unnoticed in Quad meetings The Quad meeting is happening in the wake of intense diplomatic activity involving Xi, which essentially saw US adversaries visiting China. This included Russian President Vladimir Putin (amid the Ukraine war), senior Iranian officials (amid the Iran-US war), and Pakistani leaders (amid continuing India-Pakistan tensions). China, in essence, is hosting several leaders seen as adversarial to the US and some members of the Quad. Also read: Rubio meets PM Modi in Delhi as India-US talks focus on energy, QUAD and trade Quad countries are feeling the pinch of Hormuz disruptions caused by Iran war It is not clear if the Iran war and the ongoing economic strain caused by global maritime disruptions like the Strait of Hormuz tensions would be part of the language of negotiations or the communiqué of the Quad foreign ministers. While its focus is mainly on the Indo-Pacific, the Quad had explicitly discussed supply chains and maritime security in the past. Those aspects remain highly relevant for the current meeting. Quad language will be watched closely The Delhi Quad meeting will be watched for the language that emerges from deliberations in the context of the above factors. This is going to be the first test of how the US can channel regional allies to adapt to the second Trump administration's off-again, on-again approach to Beijing. The main deliberations are likely to be on maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific, maritime security, and addressing the ongoing crisis in West Asia. Beyond the multilateral session, the visiting foreign ministers are holding bilateral talks with Indian officials and calling on Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The meeting will lay the groundwork and roadmap for the upcoming Quad Leaders' Summit later this year. It will likely discuss critical minerals and supply chain resilience, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, infrastructure, and connectivity. Emerging technologies, cyber, health security, and counter-terrorism are also likely topics for discussion. The meeting will also review past work on vaccines, infrastructure, and maritime domain awareness.

<p>India is hosting the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Delhi just days after the Trump-Xi summit. Quad members might be having concerns around US-China rapprochement. Iran war and Hormuz disruptions have affected most of them. How will Indo-Pacific security focus of Quad play out?</p>

Quad foreign ministers' meet takes place in Delhi after Trump-Xi summit. What will be different?

<p>The US Department of War (DoW) released the first tranche of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) and Unidentified Flying Object (UFO) files on Friday (May 8). Critics and experts are already saying there is not much new. Part of the Presidential Unsealing and Reporting System for UAP Encounters (PURSUE), the release came after a directive from President Donald Trump for greater transparency on UAPs, extraterrestrial life, and related topics.</p><h2>What's really new in the UFO files?</h2><p>This is not the only dump, but part of an ongoing rolling release that will likely have new tranches every few weeks. The effort involves multiple agencies, including the Department of Defence (DoD), the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the State Department, and others.</p><p>The DoW aggregated and declassified material presented as never-before-seen or newly compiled and released them in full.&nbsp;</p><p>This includes some videos, recent military sensor data, and specific historical sections. The &nbsp;new aspect is that it centralised the documents in one public portal.&nbsp;</p><p>Some FBI files or Apollo-related imagery may have had partial prior leaks or releases, even as the government portrayed it as a broader, official dump.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p><a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/ufo-sighting-claims-back-in-focus-us-releases-162-files-regarding-aliens-1778295569126/embed">https://www.wionews.com/videos/ufo-sighting-claims-back-in-focus-us-releases-162-files-regarding-aliens-1778295569126/embed</a></p><h2>US UFO files release: Much ado without new information?</h2><p>The current release did not bring forth a great deal of new information, according to analysts and observers. Sceptics argue the UFO files continued a pattern of hyped releases yielding incremental, non-revolutionary information.</p><p>Reports in The New York Times and experts such as former AARO head Sean Kirkpatrick and author Garrett Graff described the initial files as murky, inconclusive blobs and dots.</p><p>It mostly contained grainy footage explainable by conventional means such as jet engines, diffraction patterns, balloons, and drones, consistent with prior declassifications.</p><p>There is no smoking gun in the releases so far, such as bodies of aliens, reverse-engineered aircraft, or clear admissions of extraterrestrial technology.</p><p>Some critics called it a distraction from current crises at home and abroad that the Trump administration is facing, with others using terms like "nothing burger" to describe it.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/photos/-ufo-files-released-5-most-shocking-unresolved-military-encounters-in-the-pentagon-dump-1778249886269">‘UFO files released’: 5 most shocking unresolved military encounters in the Pentagon dump</a></p><h2>What was in the initial release of UFO files?</h2><p>The files, hosted at war.gov/ufo, include declassified documents, eyewitness reports, intelligence summaries, diplomatic cables, photos, and videos.</p><p>The Friday release had around 162 files, including 120 Portable Document Format (PDF) documents, 28 videos, and 14 image files totalling more than 35 minutes of footage, according to reports.</p><p>Many of them concern unresolved cases the government cannot definitively identify due to insufficient data. Some are redacted for privacy or security reasons.</p><p>The files span from FBI records on flying discs from 1947 to 1968 all the way up to recent incidents such as military encounters with flying objects in the 2020s.</p><p>The FBI historical case files include 1947-era sightings and photos from Oak Ridge.</p><p>Also shared are federal law enforcement reports of hovering orbs and silent objects in the western United States.</p><h2>What could be seen in the UFO files?</h2><p>Military infrared or sensor footage showing objects with anomalous manoeuvres is on display, including a 90-degree turn by a craft travelling at low speed off Greece in 2023. There are other encounters in Iraq, Syria, and the Persian Gulf.</p><p>There are archival NASA and space exploration-related images, such as objects near the lunar horizon during Apollo missions, and audio of Gemini 7 astronauts reporting an object.</p><p>Various photos and videos of orbs, star-shaped objects, and clusters of dots are shared, but they are often murky or low-resolution.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/photos/-defeating-us-sensors-the-unexplained-ufo-phenomena-that-baffled-us-fighter-pilots-1778310915645">‘Defeating US sensors’: The unexplained UFO phenomena that baffled US fighter pilots</a></p><h2>Draw your own conclusions: US release of UFO files leaves more questions than answers</h2><p>The Trump administration is asking people to make their own conclusions, presenting the report release as empowering public judgement. Some UAP enthusiasts found specific videos and manoeuvres interesting.</p><p>Yet, the files leave more questions than answers, as the site shared raw materials for public and private analysis with no official government conclusions provided on extraterrestrial origins or breakthroughs. Officials such as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Director of National Security Tulsi Gabbard emphasised "unprecedented transparency" and invited the public to review and draw their own conclusions.</p><p>But that is a Herculean task. The full analysis will take time.</p><h2>Tens of millions of more UFO records on the cards?</h2><p>&nbsp;</p><p>While the initiative is noteworthy for its transparency, the fresh compilations of videos, photos, and reports do not deliver paradigm-shifting revelations in the first batch.</p><p>According to reports, Friday's release was the first tranche of a massive effort that could involve tens of millions of records. Some of these could focus on unresolved cases.</p><p>Trump administration supporters are calling it a step towards transparency that previous US governments did not match at this scale.</p>

The first tranche of UFO and UAP files released by the Trump administration offers no great new information, according to experts and reports. The declassified videos, photos, and reports do not give any proof of extraterrestrial life. So what was in them?

The US Department of War (DoW) released the first tranche of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) and Unidentified Flying Object (UFO) files on Friday (May 8). Critics and experts are already saying there is not much new. Part of the Presidential Unsealing and Reporting System for UAP Encounters (PURSUE), the release came after a directive from President Donald Trump for greater transparency on UAPs, extraterrestrial life, and related topics. What's really new in the UFO files? This is not the only dump, but part of an ongoing rolling release that will likely have new tranches every few weeks. The effort involves multiple agencies, including the Department of Defence (DoD), the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the State Department, and others. The DoW aggregated and declassified material presented as never-before-seen or newly compiled and released them in full. This includes some videos, recent military sensor data, and specific historical sections. The new aspect is that it centralised the documents in one public portal. Some FBI files or Apollo-related imagery may have had partial prior leaks or releases, even as the government portrayed it as a broader, official dump. https://www.wionews.com/videos/ufo-sighting-claims-back-in-focus-us-releases-162-files-regarding-aliens-1778295569126/embed US UFO files release: Much ado without new information? The current release did not bring forth a great deal of new information, according to analysts and observers. Sceptics argue the UFO files continued a pattern of hyped releases yielding incremental, non-revolutionary information. Reports in The New York Times and experts such as former AARO head Sean Kirkpatrick and author Garrett Graff described the initial files as murky, inconclusive blobs and dots. It mostly contained grainy footage explainable by conventional means such as jet engines, diffraction patterns, balloons, and drones, consistent with prior declassifications. There is no smoking gun in the releases so far, such as bodies of aliens, reverse-engineered aircraft, or clear admissions of extraterrestrial technology. Some critics called it a distraction from current crises at home and abroad that the Trump administration is facing, with others using terms like "nothing burger" to describe it. Also read: ‘UFO files released’: 5 most shocking unresolved military encounters in the Pentagon dump What was in the initial release of UFO files? The files, hosted at war.gov/ufo, include declassified documents, eyewitness reports, intelligence summaries, diplomatic cables, photos, and videos. The Friday release had around 162 files, including 120 Portable Document Format (PDF) documents, 28 videos, and 14 image files totalling more than 35 minutes of footage, according to reports. Many of them concern unresolved cases the government cannot definitively identify due to insufficient data. Some are redacted for privacy or security reasons. The files span from FBI records on flying discs from 1947 to 1968 all the way up to recent incidents such as military encounters with flying objects in the 2020s. The FBI historical case files include 1947-era sightings and photos from Oak Ridge. Also shared are federal law enforcement reports of hovering orbs and silent objects in the western United States. What could be seen in the UFO files? Military infrared or sensor footage showing objects with anomalous manoeuvres is on display, including a 90-degree turn by a craft travelling at low speed off Greece in 2023. There are other encounters in Iraq, Syria, and the Persian Gulf. There are archival NASA and space exploration-related images, such as objects near the lunar horizon during Apollo missions, and audio of Gemini 7 astronauts reporting an object. Various photos and videos of orbs, star-shaped objects, and clusters of dots are shared, but they are often murky or low-resolution. Also read: ‘Defeating US sensors’: The unexplained UFO phenomena that baffled US fighter pilots Draw your own conclusions: US release of UFO files leaves more questions than answers The Trump administration is asking people to make their own conclusions, presenting the report release as empowering public judgement. Some UAP enthusiasts found specific videos and manoeuvres interesting. Yet, the files leave more questions than answers, as the site shared raw materials for public and private analysis with no official government conclusions provided on extraterrestrial origins or breakthroughs. Officials such as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Director of National Security Tulsi Gabbard emphasised "unprecedented transparency" and invited the public to review and draw their own conclusions. But that is a Herculean task. The full analysis will take time. Tens of millions of more UFO records on the cards? While the initiative is noteworthy for its transparency, the fresh compilations of videos, photos, and reports do not deliver paradigm-shifting revelations in the first batch. According to reports, Friday's release was the first tranche of a massive effort that could involve tens of millions of records. Some of these could focus on unresolved cases. Trump administration supporters are calling it a step towards transparency that previous US governments did not match at this scale.

<p>The first tranche of UFO and UAP files released by the Trump administration offers no great new information, according to experts and reports. The declassified videos, photos, and reports do not give any proof of extraterrestrial life. So what was in them?</p>

UFO files release was a dud? First tranche does not reveal much as Trump administration asks people to draw their own conclusions

<p>A day after the Kerala Assembly election results were announced on May 4, I saw flex boards in the south Indian state's Ernakulam district, describing KC Venugopal as the 'only king'. It was a clear indication that the Congress party leader was favoured by many party workers for the post of chief minister, over other names doing the rounds: VD Satheeshan, Ramesh Chennithala and Shashi Tharoor. Over the next few days, the good old 'groupism' for which the Congress party in Kerala is infamous came to the fore. Multiple flex boards came up across cities favouring Satheesan too. A prominent state leader of the party, Satheesan was considered the face of the Congress election campaign and victory. By the end of the week, it emerged that 47 out of the 63 elected Congress legislators favour Venugopal, who is most likely to become the CM. But what does this infighting signify?</p><h2>UDF victory marred by factionalism over who should be Kerala CM</h2><p>The Congress-led United Democratic Front (UDF) had a sweeping victory in the Kerala Assembly elections, winning around 102 seats, with Congress alone bagging 63. Yet, the Congress high command is yet to announce the chief minister, amid an intense internal contest that has spilled onto the streets.</p><p>Veteran leader Ramesh Chennithala and Congress MP Shashi Tharoor do not appear to have either party or cadre support for the chief minister's role. That then leaves Venugopal and Satheesan in the fray.</p><p><a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/kc-venugopal-vs-vd-satheesan-kerala-congress-power-dynamics-under-spotlight-1778061566661/embed">https://www.wionews.com/videos/kc-venugopal-vs-vd-satheesan-kerala-congress-power-dynamics-under-spotlight-1778061566661/embed</a></p><h2>Odds are in favour of KC Venugopal</h2><p>Venugopal, who is All India Congress Committee General Secretary, is being favoured by both the Congress high command and the majority of Congress MLAs. Venugopal has been playing a national role in recent years as a Member of Parliament from Alappuzha. There have already been 'leaked' lists of support for Venugopal, which show around 80 per cent preference for him. Some UDF MLAs from the Malabar region also favour him, according to reports. He is being praised for his organisational role and close ties to Congress leaders Rahul Gandhi and Mallikarjun Kharge.</p><h2>VD Satheesan worked his way up in Congress, but is likely to be snubbed</h2><p>VD Satheesan, who never held a ministerial post in past Congress governments, was a strong Leader of the Opposition during the last Assembly. He has support from Congress workers at the grassroots level. He led the opposition effectively in the Assembly and spearheaded the Congress party's election campaign in Kerala. Reportedly, MLAs from the UDF ally party Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) support him. He is seen as a street leader with mass appeal, who confronted Pinarayi Vijayan's Left government directly.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/kerala-cm-race-intensifies-as-vd-satheesan-supporters-launch-street-march-1778250413911">Kerala CM race intensifies as VD Satheesan supporters launch street march</a></p><h2>VD Satheesan vs Venugopal CM race leads to street protests, flex wars</h2><p>Amid public and private displays of protests on streets and online, the delay in announcing the CM post is causing fears of a resurgence of factionalism in Congress. Supporters of Satheesan held marches, rallies and protests across the state, shouting slogans like “Only VD”, particularly in Thiruvananthapuram, Kottayam, Ernakulam and Alappuzha districts. Some tore down posters and flex boards favouring Venugopal, and one worker in Kottayam attempted self-immolation, which was foiled.</p><p>The battle is also being fought online, with social media posts and factional lobbying.</p><p>The local Congress body, the Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee (KPCC), urged workers to stop protests, demonstrations and flex-board wars to maintain unity, knowing fully well how these could damage the party. But some defiance continued throughout the past week.</p><p>Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/cong-s-keralam-s-cm-contenders-who-among-vd-satheesan-ramesh-chennithala-kc-venugopal-or-shashi-tharoor-will-get-the-crown-1777903537339">Cong’s Keralam CM contenders: Who among VD Satheesan, Ramesh Chennithala, KC Venugopal, or Shashi Tharoor will get the crown?</a></p><h2>Satheesan wants CM post or nothing amid accusations Venugopal is being parachuted from Delhi</h2><p>Supporters of Satheesan allege that the Congress high command in New Delhi is 'parachuting' a non-MLA like Venugopal to the CM post. Venugopal will have to contest a by-election to be fully eligible for the CM post, after he is sworn in. This is usually engineered by contesting in a party stronghold constituency.</p><p>The Venugopal camp stresses the numerical support within the Congress Legislature Party (CLP) for the leader, and the utility of his strong ties to the central leadership.</p><p>Satheesan supporters are highlighting his role as the face of the campaign and opposition for five years, and his ground-level popularity.&nbsp;</p><p>Satheesan himself has reportedly taken a firm stand: CM post or nothing. He would not take any ministerial role or compromise, and would remain an MLA.</p><h2>What next for the Congress chief minister race in Kerala?</h2><p>The Congress Legislative Party in Kerala passed a resolution saying it will abide by the high command's decision on chief minister post.&nbsp;</p><p>&nbsp;But aggressive private lobbying is continuing behind the scenes.</p><p>AICC observers Ajay Maken and Mukul Wasnik have completed consultations with MLAs and submitted their reports. Key leaders, including Satheesan and KPCC chief Chennithala, have been summoned to Delhi for discussions. A final decision is likely on or before May 11. The swearing-in ceremony will possibly take place next week, with Rahul Gandhi likely to attend.</p><p>But Congress appears to have spoiled the mood of victory. The government is controversial on arrival. The factionalism that plagued the party in the state for decades is likely to return once again.</p>

Kerala chief minister race: Congress party's victory in Kerala assembly election 2026  triggered a fierce CM race between KC Venugopal and VD Satheesan. This is reviving memories of factionalism. With protests on streets and online, the government is controversial even before starting

A day after the Kerala Assembly election results were announced on May 4, I saw flex boards in the south Indian state's Ernakulam district, describing KC Venugopal as the 'only king'. It was a clear indication that the Congress party leader was favoured by many party workers for the post of chief minister, over other names doing the rounds: VD Satheeshan, Ramesh Chennithala and Shashi Tharoor. Over the next few days, the good old 'groupism' for which the Congress party in Kerala is infamous came to the fore. Multiple flex boards came up across cities favouring Satheesan too. A prominent state leader of the party, Satheesan was considered the face of the Congress election campaign and victory. By the end of the week, it emerged that 47 out of the 63 elected Congress legislators favour Venugopal, who is most likely to become the CM. But what does this infighting signify? UDF victory marred by factionalism over who should be Kerala CM The Congress-led United Democratic Front (UDF) had a sweeping victory in the Kerala Assembly elections, winning around 102 seats, with Congress alone bagging 63. Yet, the Congress high command is yet to announce the chief minister, amid an intense internal contest that has spilled onto the streets. Veteran leader Ramesh Chennithala and Congress MP Shashi Tharoor do not appear to have either party or cadre support for the chief minister's role. That then leaves Venugopal and Satheesan in the fray. https://www.wionews.com/videos/kc-venugopal-vs-vd-satheesan-kerala-congress-power-dynamics-under-spotlight-1778061566661/embed Odds are in favour of KC Venugopal Venugopal, who is All India Congress Committee General Secretary, is being favoured by both the Congress high command and the majority of Congress MLAs. Venugopal has been playing a national role in recent years as a Member of Parliament from Alappuzha. There have already been 'leaked' lists of support for Venugopal, which show around 80 per cent preference for him. Some UDF MLAs from the Malabar region also favour him, according to reports. He is being praised for his organisational role and close ties to Congress leaders Rahul Gandhi and Mallikarjun Kharge. VD Satheesan worked his way up in Congress, but is likely to be snubbed VD Satheesan, who never held a ministerial post in past Congress governments, was a strong Leader of the Opposition during the last Assembly. He has support from Congress workers at the grassroots level. He led the opposition effectively in the Assembly and spearheaded the Congress party's election campaign in Kerala. Reportedly, MLAs from the UDF ally party Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) support him. He is seen as a street leader with mass appeal, who confronted Pinarayi Vijayan's Left government directly. Also read: Kerala CM race intensifies as VD Satheesan supporters launch street march VD Satheesan vs Venugopal CM race leads to street protests, flex wars Amid public and private displays of protests on streets and online, the delay in announcing the CM post is causing fears of a resurgence of factionalism in Congress. Supporters of Satheesan held marches, rallies and protests across the state, shouting slogans like “Only VD”, particularly in Thiruvananthapuram, Kottayam, Ernakulam and Alappuzha districts. Some tore down posters and flex boards favouring Venugopal, and one worker in Kottayam attempted self-immolation, which was foiled. The battle is also being fought online, with social media posts and factional lobbying. The local Congress body, the Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee (KPCC), urged workers to stop protests, demonstrations and flex-board wars to maintain unity, knowing fully well how these could damage the party. But some defiance continued throughout the past week. Also read: Cong’s Keralam CM contenders: Who among VD Satheesan, Ramesh Chennithala, KC Venugopal, or Shashi Tharoor will get the crown? Satheesan wants CM post or nothing amid accusations Venugopal is being parachuted from Delhi Supporters of Satheesan allege that the Congress high command in New Delhi is 'parachuting' a non-MLA like Venugopal to the CM post. Venugopal will have to contest a by-election to be fully eligible for the CM post, after he is sworn in. This is usually engineered by contesting in a party stronghold constituency. The Venugopal camp stresses the numerical support within the Congress Legislature Party (CLP) for the leader, and the utility of his strong ties to the central leadership. Satheesan supporters are highlighting his role as the face of the campaign and opposition for five years, and his ground-level popularity. Satheesan himself has reportedly taken a firm stand: CM post or nothing. He would not take any ministerial role or compromise, and would remain an MLA. What next for the Congress chief minister race in Kerala? The Congress Legislative Party in Kerala passed a resolution saying it will abide by the high command's decision on chief minister post. But aggressive private lobbying is continuing behind the scenes. AICC observers Ajay Maken and Mukul Wasnik have completed consultations with MLAs and submitted their reports. Key leaders, including Satheesan and KPCC chief Chennithala, have been summoned to Delhi for discussions. A final decision is likely on or before May 11. The swearing-in ceremony will possibly take place next week, with Rahul Gandhi likely to attend. But Congress appears to have spoiled the mood of victory. The government is controversial on arrival. The factionalism that plagued the party in the state for decades is likely to return once again.

<p>Kerala chief minister race: Congress party's victory in Kerala assembly election 2026 &nbsp;triggered a fierce CM race between KC Venugopal and VD Satheesan. This is reviving memories of factionalism. With protests on streets and online, the government is controversial even before starting</p>

KC Venugopal Vs VD Satheesan: Kerala chief minister race brings back good old 'groupism' in Congress party

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