When the history of India’s drone revolution is written, General Upendra Dwivedi’s name will appear not merely as a procurement champion but as the officer who understood the difference between buying drones and building a drone-capable force. That distinction, between inventory and architecture, is the Drone General’s real and most technically significant contribution.&nbsp;The numbers are well established. From a few hundred drones at the start of his tenure to over 50,000 by the time he retires on June 30, 2026. More than 25 Drone and Counter-Drone Hubs have been established across military stations. Precision engagement and surveillance systems extended to ranges approaching 500 kilometres. These figures represent genuine capability growth, but they are outputs. The more interesting question is what produced them.&nbsp;The answer lies in infrastructure, doctrine and indigenous development, pursued simultaneously rather than sequentially. The Drone and Counter-Drone Hubs were not simply storage facilities. They were designed as integrated nodes for training, induction, maintenance, and operational employment, giving the Army the ability to sustain drone operations across multiple theatres rather than concentrating capability in a handful of specialist units.&nbsp;New warfighting formations were built to embed drone employment at every echelon. Bhairav Battalions at the formation level, Ashni Platoons at the sub-unit level, Divyastra Batteries and Shaktibaan Regiments at higher formations, together with the continuing evolution of Integrated Battle Groups, represent a layered architecture in which unmanned systems are integral to combined arms operations rather than bolted on as an afterthought.&nbsp;The indigenous dimension is technically significant. Partnerships with DRDO, private sector firms, start-ups and MSMEs accelerated the development of Indian-designed and manufactured drones, counter-drone systems and AI-enabled battlefield technologies. This matters not just for self-reliance, but for adaptability, domestically produced systems can be modified, upgraded and tailored to specific operational requirements in ways that off-the-shelf foreign acquisitions cannot.&nbsp;Counter-drone capability received equal attention, a reflection of mature thinking. A force that invests heavily in offensive drone capacity while neglecting protection against adversary systems creates a dangerous asymmetry. The Drone General understood that the same revolution making drones central to Indian operations was simultaneously making Indian forces more vulnerable to adversary drones. The hub network and the counter-drone formations were built as a paired response to that reality.&nbsp;Operation Sindoor served as the system-level test. The integration of drones, loitering munitions, electronic warfare and real-time intelligence in a single coordinated campaign demonstrated not just that individual systems worked, but that the architecture connecting them functioned under operational conditions. That is the harder problem, and its resolution in a live context carries more weight than any exercise outcome.&nbsp;Nearly 25 doctrines and policy documents issued during his tenure provided the conceptual scaffolding. The ambition stated explicitly within them, that every soldier should be drone-capable, set a training and readiness standard that will define capability assessments for years to come.&nbsp;The Drone General leaves behind not a collection of unmanned systems but a force-wide architecture for employing them. That is the achievement that will endure.&nbsp;&nbsp;(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

During Operation Sindoor, the integration of drones, loitering munitions, electronic warfare and real-time intelligence in a single coordinated campaign demonstrated not just that individual systems worked, but that the architecture connecting them functioned under operational conditions.

When the history of India’s drone revolution is written, General Upendra Dwivedi’s name will appear not merely as a procurement champion but as the officer who understood the difference between buying drones and building a drone-capable force. That distinction, between inventory and architecture, is the Drone General’s real and most technically significant contribution. The numbers are well established. From a few hundred drones at the start of his tenure to over 50,000 by the time he retires on June 30, 2026. More than 25 Drone and Counter-Drone Hubs have been established across military stations. Precision engagement and surveillance systems extended to ranges approaching 500 kilometres. These figures represent genuine capability growth, but they are outputs. The more interesting question is what produced them. The answer lies in infrastructure, doctrine and indigenous development, pursued simultaneously rather than sequentially. The Drone and Counter-Drone Hubs were not simply storage facilities. They were designed as integrated nodes for training, induction, maintenance, and operational employment, giving the Army the ability to sustain drone operations across multiple theatres rather than concentrating capability in a handful of specialist units. New warfighting formations were built to embed drone employment at every echelon. Bhairav Battalions at the formation level, Ashni Platoons at the sub-unit level, Divyastra Batteries and Shaktibaan Regiments at higher formations, together with the continuing evolution of Integrated Battle Groups, represent a layered architecture in which unmanned systems are integral to combined arms operations rather than bolted on as an afterthought. The indigenous dimension is technically significant. Partnerships with DRDO, private sector firms, start-ups and MSMEs accelerated the development of Indian-designed and manufactured drones, counter-drone systems and AI-enabled battlefield technologies. This matters not just for self-reliance, but for adaptability, domestically produced systems can be modified, upgraded and tailored to specific operational requirements in ways that off-the-shelf foreign acquisitions cannot. Counter-drone capability received equal attention, a reflection of mature thinking. A force that invests heavily in offensive drone capacity while neglecting protection against adversary systems creates a dangerous asymmetry. The Drone General understood that the same revolution making drones central to Indian operations was simultaneously making Indian forces more vulnerable to adversary drones. The hub network and the counter-drone formations were built as a paired response to that reality. Operation Sindoor served as the system-level test. The integration of drones, loitering munitions, electronic warfare and real-time intelligence in a single coordinated campaign demonstrated not just that individual systems worked, but that the architecture connecting them functioned under operational conditions. That is the harder problem, and its resolution in a live context carries more weight than any exercise outcome. Nearly 25 doctrines and policy documents issued during his tenure provided the conceptual scaffolding. The ambition stated explicitly within them, that every soldier should be drone-capable, set a training and readiness standard that will define capability assessments for years to come. The Drone General leaves behind not a collection of unmanned systems but a force-wide architecture for employing them. That is the achievement that will endure. (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

During Operation Sindoor, the integration of drones, loitering munitions, electronic warfare and real-time intelligence in a single coordinated campaign demonstrated not just that individual systems worked, but that the architecture connecting them functioned under operational conditions.

From inventory to architecture: The Drone General’s real achievement

Non-Functional Financial Upgradation (NFFU) is a pay parity mechanism introduced on the recommendations of the Sixth Central Pay Commission (6th CPC), effective 01 January 2006 and applicable to officers of organised Group A Central Services.&nbsp;Officers of the Indian Armed Forces, who face the steepest promotion pyramid and the earliest compulsory retirement ages in the Central Government, remain the sole excluded category, despite the 7th CPC’s recommendation to the contrary. This article examines the origins of NFFU, the resulting pay disparity, and the case for its priority extension to the armed forces.&nbsp;NFFU was introduced by the 6th CPC with effect from 01 January 2006 to remedy pay stagnation among officers of organised Group A Central Services.&nbsp;Under the scheme, when an IAS officer of a particular batch is empanelled to a grade at the Centre, officers of other organised Group A Services from a senior batch receive financial upgradation to that grade - irrespective of whether they hold the functional responsibilities of that post. By the time of the 7th CPC, 53 civilian services were covered, including the IAS, IPS and Indian Forest Service.&nbsp;Officers of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force remain excluded. This exclusion persists despite the 7th CPC Chairman recommending extension to defence forces and despite a Supreme Court judgment (February 2019) and Cabinet decision (July 2019) extending NFFU to Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) with retrospective effect from 2006. The armed forces are now the sole category to whom this benefit has been denied – an anomaly two decades old.&nbsp;<h2>The structural pay disparity</h2>&nbsp;Under the 7th CPC defence pay matrix, a Colonel draws basic pay at Level 13 (Rs. 1,30,600 per month); Brigadier, the next rank, is at the distinct Level 13A (Rs. 1,39,600). A counterpart IAS officer of equivalent seniority, extended NFFU will draw financial benefits at Level 14 (Joint Secretary) or Level 15 (Additional Secretary) without necessarily holding those functional posts. This disparity compounds over a career when factoring in the pension, which is calculated on the last pay drawn.&nbsp;The inequity is compounded by the military’s service conditions. A Colonel retires at 54 and a Brigadier at 56, against a uniform civilian superannuation age of 60. Promotion to Colonel requires Selection Board clearance after at least 15 years of service; promotion to Brigadier (Level 13A) is a further competitive hurdle at approximately 25 years, with a small fraction of Colonels progressing. The majority of military officers thus face sustained pay stagnation at the precise career stage where NFFU would otherwise provide relief.&nbsp;<h2>Grounds for priority extension to Armed Forces</h2>&nbsp;Constitutional equity: Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits arbitrary discrimination. Withholding a structural benefit from a service where the qualifying condition, i.e., promotional stagnation, is more acutely present than in services that receive it cannot be justified on any rational basis.&nbsp;&nbsp;The Supreme Court’s 2019 CAPF judgment affirmed that the 6th CPC had recommended NFFU precisely because stagnation made its denial inequitable; that reasoning applies with greater force to the armed forces. Pay Commissions have consistently assessed military officers as equivalent in status to civilian counterparts at corresponding grades; denial of NFFU contradicts this equivalence.&nbsp;Officer retention: The Indian Army faces a persistent officer deficit. As of July 2024, it had 42,095 officers against a sanctioned strength of 50,538; a shortfall of 16.71%, as disclosed to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence.&nbsp;Across the three services, the shortfall at field officer levels exceeds 11,000. Pay and status concerns relative to civil services have been cited as a material driver of declining intake and rising premature release applications. NFFU extension would directly address this structural perception of inequality.&nbsp;Morale and institutional cohesion: Military morale is substantially influenced by the officer’s perception of the state's reciprocal obligations. The 7th CPC itself observed that denial of NFFU undermined the status and morale of armed forces officers.&nbsp;An officer who observes that CAPF counterparts receive financial upgradation that the armed forces are denied experiences a corrosive erosion of institutional faith; with measurable consequences for initiative, risk-taking and long-term effectiveness.&nbsp;<h2>Policy recommendation and conclusion</h2>&nbsp;Extension of NFFU to the armed forces does not require a new Pay Commission. The July 2019 Cabinet decision for CAPFs demonstrates that executive action via the Ministry of Defence in consultation with the Department of Expenditure is legally and administratively sufficient. A tailored framework substituting the IAS-empanelment trigger with service-seniority benchmarks appropriate to the military's cadre structure is feasible and implementable without awaiting the 8th CPC.&nbsp;NFFU has been progressively extended over two decades - first to IPS and IFoS, then to 53 civilian services, and finally to CAPF officers. The Indian Armed Forces alone remain excluded, despite facing more demanding service conditions, steeper promotion pyramids and earlier retirement ages than every service now covered.&nbsp;This is not a principled policy choice; it is an administrative failure with measurable costs to morale, retention, and national security. The case for priority extension is unambiguous. It is a correction whose time has long passed.&nbsp;(Disclaimer: Views expressed by the author are his own and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)&nbsp;&nbsp;

Officers of the Indian Armed Forces, who face the steepest promotion pyramid and the earliest compulsory retirement ages in the Central Government, remain the sole excluded category, despite the 7th CPC’s recommendation to the contrary.

Non-Functional Financial Upgradation (NFFU) is a pay parity mechanism introduced on the recommendations of the Sixth Central Pay Commission (6th CPC), effective 01 January 2006 and applicable to officers of organised Group A Central Services. Officers of the Indian Armed Forces, who face the steepest promotion pyramid and the earliest compulsory retirement ages in the Central Government, remain the sole excluded category, despite the 7th CPC’s recommendation to the contrary. This article examines the origins of NFFU, the resulting pay disparity, and the case for its priority extension to the armed forces. NFFU was introduced by the 6th CPC with effect from 01 January 2006 to remedy pay stagnation among officers of organised Group A Central Services. Under the scheme, when an IAS officer of a particular batch is empanelled to a grade at the Centre, officers of other organised Group A Services from a senior batch receive financial upgradation to that grade - irrespective of whether they hold the functional responsibilities of that post. By the time of the 7th CPC, 53 civilian services were covered, including the IAS, IPS and Indian Forest Service. Officers of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force remain excluded. This exclusion persists despite the 7th CPC Chairman recommending extension to defence forces and despite a Supreme Court judgment (February 2019) and Cabinet decision (July 2019) extending NFFU to Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) with retrospective effect from 2006. The armed forces are now the sole category to whom this benefit has been denied – an anomaly two decades old. The structural pay disparity Under the 7th CPC defence pay matrix, a Colonel draws basic pay at Level 13 (Rs. 1,30,600 per month); Brigadier, the next rank, is at the distinct Level 13A (Rs. 1,39,600). A counterpart IAS officer of equivalent seniority, extended NFFU will draw financial benefits at Level 14 (Joint Secretary) or Level 15 (Additional Secretary) without necessarily holding those functional posts. This disparity compounds over a career when factoring in the pension, which is calculated on the last pay drawn. The inequity is compounded by the military’s service conditions. A Colonel retires at 54 and a Brigadier at 56, against a uniform civilian superannuation age of 60. Promotion to Colonel requires Selection Board clearance after at least 15 years of service; promotion to Brigadier (Level 13A) is a further competitive hurdle at approximately 25 years, with a small fraction of Colonels progressing. The majority of military officers thus face sustained pay stagnation at the precise career stage where NFFU would otherwise provide relief. Grounds for priority extension to Armed Forces Constitutional equity: Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits arbitrary discrimination. Withholding a structural benefit from a service where the qualifying condition, i.e., promotional stagnation, is more acutely present than in services that receive it cannot be justified on any rational basis. The Supreme Court’s 2019 CAPF judgment affirmed that the 6th CPC had recommended NFFU precisely because stagnation made its denial inequitable; that reasoning applies with greater force to the armed forces. Pay Commissions have consistently assessed military officers as equivalent in status to civilian counterparts at corresponding grades; denial of NFFU contradicts this equivalence. Officer retention: The Indian Army faces a persistent officer deficit. As of July 2024, it had 42,095 officers against a sanctioned strength of 50,538; a shortfall of 16.71%, as disclosed to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence. Across the three services, the shortfall at field officer levels exceeds 11,000. Pay and status concerns relative to civil services have been cited as a material driver of declining intake and rising premature release applications. NFFU extension would directly address this structural perception of inequality. Morale and institutional cohesion: Military morale is substantially influenced by the officer’s perception of the state's reciprocal obligations. The 7th CPC itself observed that denial of NFFU undermined the status and morale of armed forces officers. An officer who observes that CAPF counterparts receive financial upgradation that the armed forces are denied experiences a corrosive erosion of institutional faith; with measurable consequences for initiative, risk-taking and long-term effectiveness. Policy recommendation and conclusion Extension of NFFU to the armed forces does not require a new Pay Commission. The July 2019 Cabinet decision for CAPFs demonstrates that executive action via the Ministry of Defence in consultation with the Department of Expenditure is legally and administratively sufficient. A tailored framework substituting the IAS-empanelment trigger with service-seniority benchmarks appropriate to the military's cadre structure is feasible and implementable without awaiting the 8th CPC. NFFU has been progressively extended over two decades - first to IPS and IFoS, then to 53 civilian services, and finally to CAPF officers. The Indian Armed Forces alone remain excluded, despite facing more demanding service conditions, steeper promotion pyramids and earlier retirement ages than every service now covered. This is not a principled policy choice; it is an administrative failure with measurable costs to morale, retention, and national security. The case for priority extension is unambiguous. It is a correction whose time has long passed. (Disclaimer: Views expressed by the author are his own and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Officers of the Indian Armed Forces, who face the steepest promotion pyramid and the earliest compulsory retirement ages in the Central Government, remain the sole excluded category, despite the 7th CPC’s recommendation to the contrary.

Non-Functional Financial Upgradation (NFFU): The case for priority extension to the Indian Armed Forces

The numbers coming out of Beijing tell one story. The reality unfolding inside China tells another. China's National Bureau of Statistics reported 5.0 percent GDP growth for 2025, neatly hitting the government's annual target. But headline figures in authoritarian states are political instruments as much as economic ones, and this one is doing a great deal of heavy lifting. Independent analysts at the Rhodium Group put real growth somewhere between 2.5 and 3.0 percent — roughly half the official reading — with fixed asset investment down 11 percent in nominal terms in the second half of the year compared to the same period in 2024. The divergence between what Beijing reports and what the data actually shows is not a rounding error. It is a portrait of an economy being propped up by narrative as much as by output.&nbsp;Also Read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/trump-raises-doubts-about-supreme-leader-mojtaba-s-wellbeing-rules-out-iran-war-deal-for-now-1773538495777">Trump raises doubts about Supreme Leader Mojtaba's wellbeing, rules out Iran war deal for now</a>&nbsp;What growth did materialize in 2025 came overwhelmingly from exports. China's trade surplus jumped 20 percent to a record $1.19 trillion, with exports accounting for a third of total economic growth — the highest share since 1997. An economy of China's size cannot sustain itself on the backs of foreign consumers indefinitely, and the IMF's December 2025 Article IV assessment said exactly that, warning that China's continued reliance on exports is politically unsustainable for its trading partners and structurally unviable for China itself. The current account surplus is projected to reach 3.3 percent of GDP for 2025. Meanwhile, retail sales grew just 3.7 percent in nominal terms across the year — far too slow to rebalance an economy that desperately needs domestic demand to carry more weight.&nbsp;The property sector, now in its fifth year of contraction since the market peaked in 2021, remains the deepest wound. Roughly 80 million homes sit unsold or vacant. New housing starts are running at approximately 75 percent below their peak; property investment has fallen around 50 percent from its high. The downstream effects on local government finances have been brutal. Land lease revenues — once the fiscal lifeblood of Chinese municipalities — have cratered. Consolidated local government fiscal revenue managed just 0.2 percent year-on-year growth in the first ten months of 2025. Beijing launched a 10 trillion yuan debt-swap program in late 2024 to refinance local government financing vehicle liabilities at lower rates and longer maturities, but the scale of the structural hole means most municipalities will be in fiscal austerity for years — cutting precisely the infrastructure spending and social services that might otherwise help restore consumer confidence.&nbsp;Also Read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/-as-a-sincere-friend-china-responds-after-trump-urges-countries-to-send-warships-to-secure-strait-of-hormuz-amid-iran-threat-1773524775265">'As a sincere friend...': China responds after Trump urges countries to send warships to secure Strait of Hormuz</a>&nbsp;Deflation is now the defining condition of this economic era. An economy-wide price gauge shows China in deflation for three consecutive years — the longest such streak since the country's market transition in the late 1970s. Producer prices fell 3.6 percent year-on-year in June 2025, the ninth consecutive month of factory-gate deflation and the sharpest monthly drop in nearly two years. Consumer prices barely registered a pulse across 2025 as a whole, with core inflation remaining below 1 percent. These are not temporary fluctuations. They reflect a structural collapse in domestic demand that Xi Jinping's economic framework has not come close to addressing.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/iran-war-us-intelligence-reports-says-iran-laying-mines-in-strat-of-hormuz-1773548072232/embed">https://www.wionews.com/videos/iran-war-us-intelligence-reports-says-iran-laying-mines-in-strat-of-hormuz-1773548072232/embed</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;Chinese households know this better than any statistic captures. Youth unemployment — even after the government's 2023 statistical revision stripped students from the calculation — hit 16.9 percent for the 16-to-24 cohort in February 2025. Household savings rates have stayed elevated as families brace for job insecurity, thin pension coverage, and the continued erosion of their biggest asset: their homes. The World Bank's December 2025 China Economic Update projected consumer spending growth to remain subdued well into 2026, constrained by a soft labor market and persistent property price adjustments.&nbsp;The long-run picture is no more encouraging. China recorded 7.92 million births in 2025, the lowest figure since records began in 1949. The total population declined for a fourth consecutive year. Government subsidy programs have not reversed the trend. A shrinking workforce combined with a rapidly aging population puts mounting pressure on an already underfunded pension system — adding a slow-burn fiscal crisis to problems that are already acute.&nbsp;External conditions are worsening too. US tariffs on Chinese goods surged above 100 percent in April 2025 before a partial truce brought them back to 30 percent in May. The European Union's anti-subsidy duties on Chinese electric vehicles, imposed in mid-2024, have since been followed by additional trade friction across multiple sectors. Fitch Ratings projected in January 2026 that Chinese growth would slow further to 4.1 percent this year. The World Bank sees 4.4 percent; the IMF, 4.5 percent. Every credible independent forecast sits well below Beijing's comfort zone.&nbsp;And then there is Xi Jinping himself. Overseas Chinese media have reported that he sought treatment for a cerebral aneurysm as far back as late 2021. His notable absence from the BRICS Summit in Brazil in October 2025 and the cancellation of a planned APEC meeting with President Trump in South Korea — attributed by some analysts to internal political pressure rather than logistics — have intensified speculation about both his health and his authority within the Party. The 21st Party Congress is scheduled for 2027, and who leads China into that moment, with what mandate and in what condition, has become one of the most consequential open questions in global affairs. Xi's economic model was always a bet that the state could manufacture durable growth through investment, industrial policy, and export competitiveness. That bet has produced a real estate catastrophe, a deflation trap, hollowed-out local governments, and an increasingly isolated trading position. Without a genuine pivot toward household-level reform — stronger social safety nets, wealth redistribution, and policies that put money in ordinary people's pockets — the 5 percent headline will continue to be what it already is: a number designed to manage perceptions rather than reflect reality.

China reported 5 per cent GDP growth in 2025, but analysts estimate real growth closer to 2.5–3 per  cent, pointing to weak domestic demand, deflation, and a deep property crisis. Experts warn China’s economic model faces serious structural challenges.

The numbers coming out of Beijing tell one story. The reality unfolding inside China tells another. China's National Bureau of Statistics reported 5.0 percent GDP growth for 2025, neatly hitting the government's annual target. But headline figures in authoritarian states are political instruments as much as economic ones, and this one is doing a great deal of heavy lifting. Independent analysts at the Rhodium Group put real growth somewhere between 2.5 and 3.0 percent — roughly half the official reading — with fixed asset investment down 11 percent in nominal terms in the second half of the year compared to the same period in 2024. The divergence between what Beijing reports and what the data actually shows is not a rounding error. It is a portrait of an economy being propped up by narrative as much as by output. Also Read: Trump raises doubts about Supreme Leader Mojtaba's wellbeing, rules out Iran war deal for now What growth did materialize in 2025 came overwhelmingly from exports. China's trade surplus jumped 20 percent to a record $1.19 trillion, with exports accounting for a third of total economic growth — the highest share since 1997. An economy of China's size cannot sustain itself on the backs of foreign consumers indefinitely, and the IMF's December 2025 Article IV assessment said exactly that, warning that China's continued reliance on exports is politically unsustainable for its trading partners and structurally unviable for China itself. The current account surplus is projected to reach 3.3 percent of GDP for 2025. Meanwhile, retail sales grew just 3.7 percent in nominal terms across the year — far too slow to rebalance an economy that desperately needs domestic demand to carry more weight. The property sector, now in its fifth year of contraction since the market peaked in 2021, remains the deepest wound. Roughly 80 million homes sit unsold or vacant. New housing starts are running at approximately 75 percent below their peak; property investment has fallen around 50 percent from its high. The downstream effects on local government finances have been brutal. Land lease revenues — once the fiscal lifeblood of Chinese municipalities — have cratered. Consolidated local government fiscal revenue managed just 0.2 percent year-on-year growth in the first ten months of 2025. Beijing launched a 10 trillion yuan debt-swap program in late 2024 to refinance local government financing vehicle liabilities at lower rates and longer maturities, but the scale of the structural hole means most municipalities will be in fiscal austerity for years — cutting precisely the infrastructure spending and social services that might otherwise help restore consumer confidence. Also Read: 'As a sincere friend...': China responds after Trump urges countries to send warships to secure Strait of Hormuz Deflation is now the defining condition of this economic era. An economy-wide price gauge shows China in deflation for three consecutive years — the longest such streak since the country's market transition in the late 1970s. Producer prices fell 3.6 percent year-on-year in June 2025, the ninth consecutive month of factory-gate deflation and the sharpest monthly drop in nearly two years. Consumer prices barely registered a pulse across 2025 as a whole, with core inflation remaining below 1 percent. These are not temporary fluctuations. They reflect a structural collapse in domestic demand that Xi Jinping's economic framework has not come close to addressing. https://www.wionews.com/videos/iran-war-us-intelligence-reports-says-iran-laying-mines-in-strat-of-hormuz-1773548072232/embed Chinese households know this better than any statistic captures. Youth unemployment — even after the government's 2023 statistical revision stripped students from the calculation — hit 16.9 percent for the 16-to-24 cohort in February 2025. Household savings rates have stayed elevated as families brace for job insecurity, thin pension coverage, and the continued erosion of their biggest asset: their homes. The World Bank's December 2025 China Economic Update projected consumer spending growth to remain subdued well into 2026, constrained by a soft labor market and persistent property price adjustments. The long-run picture is no more encouraging. China recorded 7.92 million births in 2025, the lowest figure since records began in 1949. The total population declined for a fourth consecutive year. Government subsidy programs have not reversed the trend. A shrinking workforce combined with a rapidly aging population puts mounting pressure on an already underfunded pension system — adding a slow-burn fiscal crisis to problems that are already acute. External conditions are worsening too. US tariffs on Chinese goods surged above 100 percent in April 2025 before a partial truce brought them back to 30 percent in May. The European Union's anti-subsidy duties on Chinese electric vehicles, imposed in mid-2024, have since been followed by additional trade friction across multiple sectors. Fitch Ratings projected in January 2026 that Chinese growth would slow further to 4.1 percent this year. The World Bank sees 4.4 percent; the IMF, 4.5 percent. Every credible independent forecast sits well below Beijing's comfort zone. And then there is Xi Jinping himself. Overseas Chinese media have reported that he sought treatment for a cerebral aneurysm as far back as late 2021. His notable absence from the BRICS Summit in Brazil in October 2025 and the cancellation of a planned APEC meeting with President Trump in South Korea — attributed by some analysts to internal political pressure rather than logistics — have intensified speculation about both his health and his authority within the Party. The 21st Party Congress is scheduled for 2027, and who leads China into that moment, with what mandate and in what condition, has become one of the most consequential open questions in global affairs. Xi's economic model was always a bet that the state could manufacture durable growth through investment, industrial policy, and export competitiveness. That bet has produced a real estate catastrophe, a deflation trap, hollowed-out local governments, and an increasingly isolated trading position. Without a genuine pivot toward household-level reform — stronger social safety nets, wealth redistribution, and policies that put money in ordinary people's pockets — the 5 percent headline will continue to be what it already is: a number designed to manage perceptions rather than reflect reality.

China reported 5 per cent GDP growth in 2025, but analysts estimate real growth closer to 2.5–3 per &nbsp;cent, pointing to weak domestic demand, deflation, and a deep property crisis. Experts warn China’s economic model faces serious structural challenges.

China's growth on paper, stagnation in practice

Every year, the announcement of the Republic Day military awards triggers the same argument. Social media fills up with claims that the system is “top-heavy”, that generals collect medals while soldiers who face bullets are ignored. WhatsApp forwards circulate numbers showing a high share of awards going to senior officers. Commentators then jump to the conclusion that the system rewards rank, not courage.&nbsp;The numbers often quoted are not always wrong. The interpretation of those numbers usually is. This debate suffers from one basic flaw: it treats all military awards as if they mean the same thing. They do not. Once you separate different categories of awards and understand what each is meant to recognise, the claim that the system is skewed collapses.<h2>Service Awards Are Not Gallantry Awards</h2>The most common mistake is mixing service awards with gallantry awards. On Republic Day 2026, military decorations were approved for 301 personnel. President Droupadi Murmu approved military decorations for 301 Armed Forces personnel. These included 30 Param Vishisht Seva Medals, 56 Ati Vishisht Seva Medals, and 135 Vishisht Seva Medals. These Distinguished Service medals dominated the announcement, and yes, they predominantly went to senior officers of colonel rank and above, with the PVSM reserved exclusively for Lieutenant Generals, Vice Admirals, and Air Marshals.&nbsp;These medals are not for bravery in combat. They are awarded for sustained, exceptional service and command responsibility, mostly in peacetime or long-duration operational roles. The PVSM, in particular, is meant for officers who have carried the heaviest strategic responsibilities over decades of service. Naturally, that limits eligibility to very senior ranks. Critics often ask why generals receive so many awards. The answer is simple: generals do not fight patrol actions or lead assaults. Their responsibility lies elsewhere. A corps commander makes decisions that affect the lives of 60,000 soldiers under his command. His judgments on deployment, logistics, intelligence coordination, and civil-military interaction can prevent casualties—or cause them. These decisions are not dramatic, but they are decisive.&nbsp;Lieutenant General Abhijit S Pendharkar, who received the Uttam Yudh Seva Medal as Commander of 3 Corps, exemplifies this kind of operational leadership where strategic decisions have massive downstream consequences.These are the roles that Distinguished Service medals recognise. They reward the burden of command, the weight of responsibility, and the strategic impact that only comes with senior rank.&nbsp;&nbsp;Comparing these awards with battlefield gallantry statistics is methodologically absurd, like criticising a hospital for giving more administrative recognition to chief surgeons than to nurses, while ignoring that nurses receive different forms of recognition appropriate to their roles.<h2>Gallantry Awards Tell a Different Story</h2>If we look only at gallantry awards—the ones that recognise courage under fire, the picture changes completely.On Republic Day 2026, 70 gallantry awards were approved, including six posthumous. These comprised one Ashok Chakra, three Kirti Chakras, 13 Shaurya Chakras, including one posthumous, one Bar to Sena Medal for Gallantry, 44 Sena Medals for Gallantry, including five posthumous, six Nao Sena Medals for Gallantry, and two Vayu Sena Medals for Gallantry. The breakdown tells the story. Group Captain Shubhanshu Shukla received the Ashok Chakra, India's highest peacetime gallantry award. The Kirti Chakra recipients included Major Arshdeep Singh, Naib Subedar Doleshwar Subba, and Group Captain Prasanth Balakrishnan Nair. Notice the ranks represented in Shaurya Chakra awards i.e, Lieutenant Colonel Ghatage Aditya Shrikumar, multiple majors and captains, Subedar P H Moses, Lance Daffadar Baldev Chand, who was awarded posthumously, and Riflemen Manglem Sang Vaiphei and Dhurba Jyoti Dutta.&nbsp;Generals are absent from these lists, exactly as they should be. Colonel Amit Dadhwal, multiple lieutenant colonels and majors, several captains, numerous subedars and naib subedars, havildars, including Jhantu Ali Shaikh, who received his award posthumously, naiks, lance naiks, sepoys, and riflemen. One particularly poignant award went to Lance Havildar Satya Pal Singh, who received a Bar to his existing Sena Medal for Gallantry, indicating repeated acts of bravery. Combat bravery occurs at the sharp end: during counter-terrorist operations, ambushes, IED clearances, and close-quarters fighting. Senior officers are not meant to be there. Their job is to ensure those operations succeed with minimum loss.&nbsp;These situations don't involve generals because generals, by virtue of their command responsibilities, are not and should not be at that level of tactical engagement. Of the 44 Sena Medals for Gallantry awarded, the overwhelming majority went to subedars, naib subedars, havildars, naiks, lance naiks, sepoys, riflemen, and other junior ranks. The problem is not with how the system functions, but with how critics analyse it by lumping all awards together.<h2>The Numbers, Properly Read</h2>When the full awards list is examined honestly, the “top-heavy” claim does not survive scrutiny. When we examine the complete Republic Day 2026 awards announcement, the "top-heavy" narrative collapses under the weight of actual data. The 30 PVSM awards went to the most senior officers: 19 Lieutenant Generals, one Major General, four Vice Admirals, including one Surgeon Vice Admiral, and six Air Marshals. These represent the apex of three decades or more of military service, commanding formations of thousands, often in the most sensitive operational areas. Lieutenant General Dhiraj Seth commanded Southern Command, Lieutenant General Rajan Sharawat commanded 9 Corps, and Lieutenant General Gambhir Singh commanded 4 Corps. These are not ceremonial positions.&nbsp;They are commands where decisions literally determine whether operations succeed or fail, whether soldiers come home safely or in coffins. The 56 AVSM awards showed more diversity: 11 Lieutenant Generals, 23 Major Generals, one Brigadier, one Subedar, six Vice Admirals and Rear Admirals, and 13 Air Force officers from Air Marshal to Air Vice Marshal rank. Significantly, Subedar H Hokato Sema from 9 Assam received the AVSM, demonstrating that distinguished service recognition isn't exclusively a general officer club. Major General Manish Kumar received the Yudh Seva Medal as Inspector General Assam Rifles North, while Major General Vijay Mahadevan commanded Counter Insurgency Force Romeo, both operational commands where service directly translated to mission success in active insurgency zones.&nbsp;The 135 VSM awards went predominantly to Major Generals, Brigadiers, Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, with representation from Rear Admirals, Commodores, Captains, Air Vice Marshals, Air Commodores, Group Captains, Wing Commanders, and even junior ranks, including Subedar Major Rakesh Singh Rawat and Havildar Ramesh Kumar. The VSM category demonstrates how service recognition extends across the rank structure, not concentrating exclusively at the top. When critics focus only on the 30 PVSM and 56 AVSM awards, they're deliberately forming a narrative that ignores how the system distributes recognition across different categories designed for different purposes.<h2>OR-Exclusive Awards</h2>There are also medals that officers cannot receive at all. The Meritorious Service Medal (MSM) and Good Conduct Service Medal are awarded exclusively to Other Ranks and Junior Commissioned Officers. These recognise discipline, integrity, and sustained professionalism over long careers. Hundreds are awarded every year. Any serious analysis of “who gets recognised” that ignores these awards is incomplete by definition.<h2>MACP: Financial Recognition Where It Matters Most</h2>Beyond medals, the military has institutional mechanisms to prevent financial stagnation among junior ranks. The Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) scheme provides time-bound financial upgradation to Other Ranks and JCOs when promotions are limited. Officers do not receive MACP benefits. A captain stuck in rank receives no automatic financial relief. A Havildar does. This is a deliberate structural choice to protect those with limited promotion avenues. Yet MACP is never mentioned in viral critiques because it does not fit the narrative.<h2>The Myth of the “Farewell Medal”</h2>Another common claim is that senior officers receive medals automatically on retirement. This is simply untrue.Distinguished Service medals are not guaranteed. Many senior officers retire without them. Recommendations are scrutinised, questioned, and often rejected. The reason awards cluster around retirement is that senior command tenures end then, allowing performance to be assessed over a complete cycle. Timing should not be confused with entitlement.<h2>Responsibility Is Also a Burden</h2>At the heart of this debate is a deeper misunderstanding: the belief that only physical courage deserves recognition.That view is not just simplistic; it is dangerous. Wars are not won by heroics alone. Planning, logistics, intelligence, and leadership win them. A poor strategic decision can kill more soldiers than enemy fire. A good one can save lives without a single shot being fired. Military systems recognise this reality. They must reward both courage and command, differently but fairly.<h2>What Actually Affects Soldier Morale</h2>There is little evidence that soldiers resent awards given to senior officers. Those who serve understand the difference between gallantry and service recognition. They know their battalion commander’s responsibilities are not the same as theirs. What damages morale is something else entirely: when bravery goes unrecognised, when citations are delayed, when bureaucracy blocks rightful awards. That is where reform should focus—not on creating artificial resentment between ranks.<h2>The Bottom Line</h2>When the full picture is considered, India’s military awards system is far more balanced than critics claim. Gallantry awards overwhelmingly go to junior ranks. Service awards recognise command responsibility across levels. Other Ranks have exclusive medals, financial progression schemes, and honourary promotions that materially improve their lives. Senior officers receive recognition only after decades of accountability over thousands of lives.&nbsp;The system is not perfect. No human institution is. But the charge that it is structurally biased in favour of generals does not hold up to serious examination. The real problem is not the awards system. It is the habit of drawing loud conclusions from partial data. Understanding the difference between courage and command—and recognising both honestly—is the first step toward a more informed debate.&nbsp;(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

Separating facts from fiction in India’s military awards system

Every year, the announcement of the Republic Day military awards triggers the same argument. Social media fills up with claims that the system is “top-heavy”, that generals collect medals while soldiers who face bullets are ignored. WhatsApp forwards circulate numbers showing a high share of awards going to senior officers. Commentators then jump to the conclusion that the system rewards rank, not courage. The numbers often quoted are not always wrong. The interpretation of those numbers usually is. This debate suffers from one basic flaw: it treats all military awards as if they mean the same thing. They do not. Once you separate different categories of awards and understand what each is meant to recognise, the claim that the system is skewed collapses. Service Awards Are Not Gallantry Awards The most common mistake is mixing service awards with gallantry awards. On Republic Day 2026, military decorations were approved for 301 personnel. President Droupadi Murmu approved military decorations for 301 Armed Forces personnel. These included 30 Param Vishisht Seva Medals, 56 Ati Vishisht Seva Medals, and 135 Vishisht Seva Medals. These Distinguished Service medals dominated the announcement, and yes, they predominantly went to senior officers of colonel rank and above, with the PVSM reserved exclusively for Lieutenant Generals, Vice Admirals, and Air Marshals. These medals are not for bravery in combat. They are awarded for sustained, exceptional service and command responsibility, mostly in peacetime or long-duration operational roles. The PVSM, in particular, is meant for officers who have carried the heaviest strategic responsibilities over decades of service. Naturally, that limits eligibility to very senior ranks. Critics often ask why generals receive so many awards. The answer is simple: generals do not fight patrol actions or lead assaults. Their responsibility lies elsewhere. A corps commander makes decisions that affect the lives of 60,000 soldiers under his command. His judgments on deployment, logistics, intelligence coordination, and civil-military interaction can prevent casualties—or cause them. These decisions are not dramatic, but they are decisive. Lieutenant General Abhijit S Pendharkar, who received the Uttam Yudh Seva Medal as Commander of 3 Corps, exemplifies this kind of operational leadership where strategic decisions have massive downstream consequences. These are the roles that Distinguished Service medals recognise. They reward the burden of command, the weight of responsibility, and the strategic impact that only comes with senior rank. Comparing these awards with battlefield gallantry statistics is methodologically absurd, like criticising a hospital for giving more administrative recognition to chief surgeons than to nurses, while ignoring that nurses receive different forms of recognition appropriate to their roles. Gallantry Awards Tell a Different Story If we look only at gallantry awards—the ones that recognise courage under fire, the picture changes completely. On Republic Day 2026, 70 gallantry awards were approved, including six posthumous. These comprised one Ashok Chakra, three Kirti Chakras, 13 Shaurya Chakras, including one posthumous, one Bar to Sena Medal for Gallantry, 44 Sena Medals for Gallantry, including five posthumous, six Nao Sena Medals for Gallantry, and two Vayu Sena Medals for Gallantry. The breakdown tells the story. Group Captain Shubhanshu Shukla received the Ashok Chakra, India's highest peacetime gallantry award. The Kirti Chakra recipients included Major Arshdeep Singh, Naib Subedar Doleshwar Subba, and Group Captain Prasanth Balakrishnan Nair. Notice the ranks represented in Shaurya Chakra awards i.e, Lieutenant Colonel Ghatage Aditya Shrikumar, multiple majors and captains, Subedar P H Moses, Lance Daffadar Baldev Chand, who was awarded posthumously, and Riflemen Manglem Sang Vaiphei and Dhurba Jyoti Dutta. Generals are absent from these lists, exactly as they should be. Colonel Amit Dadhwal, multiple lieutenant colonels and majors, several captains, numerous subedars and naib subedars, havildars, including Jhantu Ali Shaikh, who received his award posthumously, naiks, lance naiks, sepoys, and riflemen. One particularly poignant award went to Lance Havildar Satya Pal Singh, who received a Bar to his existing Sena Medal for Gallantry, indicating repeated acts of bravery. Combat bravery occurs at the sharp end: during counter-terrorist operations, ambushes, IED clearances, and close-quarters fighting. Senior officers are not meant to be there. Their job is to ensure those operations succeed with minimum loss. These situations don't involve generals because generals, by virtue of their command responsibilities, are not and should not be at that level of tactical engagement. Of the 44 Sena Medals for Gallantry awarded, the overwhelming majority went to subedars, naib subedars, havildars, naiks, lance naiks, sepoys, riflemen, and other junior ranks. The problem is not with how the system functions, but with how critics analyse it by lumping all awards together. The Numbers, Properly Read When the full awards list is examined honestly, the “top-heavy” claim does not survive scrutiny. When we examine the complete Republic Day 2026 awards announcement, the "top-heavy" narrative collapses under the weight of actual data. The 30 PVSM awards went to the most senior officers: 19 Lieutenant Generals, one Major General, four Vice Admirals, including one Surgeon Vice Admiral, and six Air Marshals. These represent the apex of three decades or more of military service, commanding formations of thousands, often in the most sensitive operational areas. Lieutenant General Dhiraj Seth commanded Southern Command, Lieutenant General Rajan Sharawat commanded 9 Corps, and Lieutenant General Gambhir Singh commanded 4 Corps. These are not ceremonial positions. They are commands where decisions literally determine whether operations succeed or fail, whether soldiers come home safely or in coffins. The 56 AVSM awards showed more diversity: 11 Lieutenant Generals, 23 Major Generals, one Brigadier, one Subedar, six Vice Admirals and Rear Admirals, and 13 Air Force officers from Air Marshal to Air Vice Marshal rank. Significantly, Subedar H Hokato Sema from 9 Assam received the AVSM, demonstrating that distinguished service recognition isn't exclusively a general officer club. Major General Manish Kumar received the Yudh Seva Medal as Inspector General Assam Rifles North, while Major General Vijay Mahadevan commanded Counter Insurgency Force Romeo, both operational commands where service directly translated to mission success in active insurgency zones. The 135 VSM awards went predominantly to Major Generals, Brigadiers, Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, with representation from Rear Admirals, Commodores, Captains, Air Vice Marshals, Air Commodores, Group Captains, Wing Commanders, and even junior ranks, including Subedar Major Rakesh Singh Rawat and Havildar Ramesh Kumar. The VSM category demonstrates how service recognition extends across the rank structure, not concentrating exclusively at the top. When critics focus only on the 30 PVSM and 56 AVSM awards, they're deliberately forming a narrative that ignores how the system distributes recognition across different categories designed for different purposes. OR-Exclusive Awards There are also medals that officers cannot receive at all. The Meritorious Service Medal (MSM) and Good Conduct Service Medal are awarded exclusively to Other Ranks and Junior Commissioned Officers. These recognise discipline, integrity, and sustained professionalism over long careers. Hundreds are awarded every year. Any serious analysis of “who gets recognised” that ignores these awards is incomplete by definition. MACP: Financial Recognition Where It Matters Most Beyond medals, the military has institutional mechanisms to prevent financial stagnation among junior ranks. The Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) scheme provides time-bound financial upgradation to Other Ranks and JCOs when promotions are limited. Officers do not receive MACP benefits. A captain stuck in rank receives no automatic financial relief. A Havildar does. This is a deliberate structural choice to protect those with limited promotion avenues. Yet MACP is never mentioned in viral critiques because it does not fit the narrative. The Myth of the “Farewell Medal” Another common claim is that senior officers receive medals automatically on retirement. This is simply untrue. Distinguished Service medals are not guaranteed. Many senior officers retire without them. Recommendations are scrutinised, questioned, and often rejected. The reason awards cluster around retirement is that senior command tenures end then, allowing performance to be assessed over a complete cycle. Timing should not be confused with entitlement. Responsibility Is Also a Burden At the heart of this debate is a deeper misunderstanding: the belief that only physical courage deserves recognition. That view is not just simplistic; it is dangerous. Wars are not won by heroics alone. Planning, logistics, intelligence, and leadership win them. A poor strategic decision can kill more soldiers than enemy fire. A good one can save lives without a single shot being fired. Military systems recognise this reality. They must reward both courage and command, differently but fairly. What Actually Affects Soldier Morale There is little evidence that soldiers resent awards given to senior officers. Those who serve understand the difference between gallantry and service recognition. They know their battalion commander’s responsibilities are not the same as theirs. What damages morale is something else entirely: when bravery goes unrecognised, when citations are delayed, when bureaucracy blocks rightful awards. That is where reform should focus—not on creating artificial resentment between ranks. The Bottom Line When the full picture is considered, India’s military awards system is far more balanced than critics claim. Gallantry awards overwhelmingly go to junior ranks. Service awards recognise command responsibility across levels. Other Ranks have exclusive medals, financial progression schemes, and honourary promotions that materially improve their lives. Senior officers receive recognition only after decades of accountability over thousands of lives. The system is not perfect. No human institution is. But the charge that it is structurally biased in favour of generals does not hold up to serious examination. The real problem is not the awards system. It is the habit of drawing loud conclusions from partial data. Understanding the difference between courage and command—and recognising both honestly—is the first step toward a more informed debate. (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

On Republic Day 2026, military decorations were approved for 301 personnel. President Droupadi Murmu approved military decorations for 301 Armed Forces personnel. These included 30 Param Vishisht Seva Medals, 56 Ati Vishisht Seva Medals, and 135 Vishisht Seva Medals

The attack on Inquilab Mancha leader Hadi took place at a politically sensitive moment. It happened just as the Election Commission announced the schedule for the 13th National Parliament elections. Predictably, speculation followed. The interim government led by Muhammad Yunus moved quickly to suggest external involvement, hinting at Indian intelligence or other regional players.This line of explanation is familiar. In Bangladesh, blaming outside forces has often been used to manage public anger during periods of economic pressure and political tension. But when the circumstances of the attack are looked at closely, the foreign angle looks weak. The incident appears far more consistent with an internal political act, one that benefits domestic groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party (NCP), both of which stand to gain from unrest before elections.Election Timing: A Domestic Signature, Not Foreign CoincidenceThe timing of the attack is hard to ignore. Inquilab Mancha had announced plans for street mobilisation at the same time the election dates were made public. This kind of overlap is not unusual in domestic politics.Jamaat-e-Islami, weakened by years of bans and legal action, and the NCP, which survives through shifting alliances, both benefit when reformist groups are thrown off course. Bangladesh has seen similar patterns before. Jamaat has repeatedly been linked to violence during election periods, including the 2013–14 unrest that shut down large parts of Dhaka and targeted Awami League supporters.Foreign intelligence agencies rarely operate on such tight local political timelines. Their priorities tend to be broader. The precision here points much closer to home.The method of attack also matters. Witness accounts and early police findings suggest the use of crude, locally available weapons. The shooting was chaotic and public. This matches the style of street-level political violence seen in past elections. It does not resemble a carefully planned external operation.Jamaat’s Motive: Resurrecting Relevance Through ChaosJamaat-e-Islami stands to gain the most. The party was banned under Sheikh Hasina’s government and faced financial pressure after the political upheaval of 2024. Since then, it has been looking for ways to return to the political mainstream under the interim administration.Hadi was openly critical of Jamaat, particularly its role in protests and its ideological direction. Inquilab Mancha had begun attracting young, urban voters who were unhappy with both Awami League dominance and Islamist politics. That growing support threatened Jamaat’s attempt to rebuild influence.Removing Hadi weakens that challenge. The fallout also creates unrest and uncertainty around the election timeline, increasing Jamaat’s leverage. The interim government has already eased restrictions on the party, reinforcing the sense that it is being accommodated. Reports of delayed autopsies and missing or altered CCTV footage resemble earlier cases involving domestic political violence rather than foreign intelligence activity.NCP’s Shadow Role: Opportunistic Power GrabThe National Citizen Party also benefits from the disruption. Formed after the 2024 power vacuum, the NCP presents itself as a reformist, technocratic option but relies heavily on informal networks and old political connections.Hadi had criticised the NCP as an elite project that offered limited real change. With elections approaching, weakening Inquilab Mancha helps the NCP by splitting the reformist vote. Political insiders point to familiar tactics involving intermediaries and street operators, similar to what has been seen during earlier caretaker governments.Blaming external forces helps keep attention away from these internal dynamics.Debunking the External Narrative: Bangladesh’s Reflexive DeflectionClaims of a “foreign hand,” especially involving India, appear regularly in Bangladeshi politics. In this case, there is little evidence to support them. No intercepted communications, no credible intelligence leaks and no technical proof have been presented.India, dealing with its own security and regional priorities, has no clear reason to target Sharif Osman Hadi. External actors also tend to avoid public, messy attacks that draw attention. The Hadi shooting was chaotic, visible and widely recorded. That kind of incident suits domestic political actors far more than outside agencies.Broader Implications: Electoral Integrity at StakeThe attack highlights a wider problem. In Bangladesh, elections are often preceded by violence aimed at removing rivals rather than persuading voters. If this pattern continues, the upcoming polls risk being overshadowed by fear, shutdowns and economic damage, as seen in earlier election cycles.By pushing an external conspiracy narrative, the interim government risks protecting those responsible and weakening trust in the electoral process. This increases the risk that violence could disrupt or delay the 13th National Parliament elections.Path Forward: Demand AccountabilityIf Bangladesh wants to protect its democratic process, accountability is essential. Independent investigations are needed, along with the release of CCTV footage, ballistics reports and interrogation records.Deflection will not solve the problem. The interim government must allow law enforcement to act without political pressure and resist the urge to blame foreign actors. Ignoring internal forces—Jamaat’s street networks and NCP’s political manoeuvring—risks pushing the country back into a cycle of violence, weak institutions and elections that fail to gain public trust.

This line of explanation is familiar. In Bangladesh, blaming outside forces has often been used to manage public anger during periods of economic pressure and political tension. 

The attack on Inquilab Mancha leader Hadi took place at a politically sensitive moment. It happened just as the Election Commission announced the schedule for the 13th National Parliament elections. Predictably, speculation followed. The interim government led by Muhammad Yunus moved quickly to suggest external involvement, hinting at Indian intelligence or other regional players. This line of explanation is familiar. In Bangladesh, blaming outside forces has often been used to manage public anger during periods of economic pressure and political tension. But when the circumstances of the attack are looked at closely, the foreign angle looks weak. The incident appears far more consistent with an internal political act, one that benefits domestic groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party (NCP), both of which stand to gain from unrest before elections. Election Timing: A Domestic Signature, Not Foreign Coincidence The timing of the attack is hard to ignore. Inquilab Mancha had announced plans for street mobilisation at the same time the election dates were made public. This kind of overlap is not unusual in domestic politics. Jamaat-e-Islami, weakened by years of bans and legal action, and the NCP, which survives through shifting alliances, both benefit when reformist groups are thrown off course. Bangladesh has seen similar patterns before. Jamaat has repeatedly been linked to violence during election periods, including the 2013–14 unrest that shut down large parts of Dhaka and targeted Awami League supporters. Foreign intelligence agencies rarely operate on such tight local political timelines. Their priorities tend to be broader. The precision here points much closer to home. The method of attack also matters. Witness accounts and early police findings suggest the use of crude, locally available weapons. The shooting was chaotic and public. This matches the style of street-level political violence seen in past elections. It does not resemble a carefully planned external operation. Jamaat’s Motive: Resurrecting Relevance Through Chaos Jamaat-e-Islami stands to gain the most. The party was banned under Sheikh Hasina’s government and faced financial pressure after the political upheaval of 2024. Since then, it has been looking for ways to return to the political mainstream under the interim administration. Hadi was openly critical of Jamaat, particularly its role in protests and its ideological direction. Inquilab Mancha had begun attracting young, urban voters who were unhappy with both Awami League dominance and Islamist politics. That growing support threatened Jamaat’s attempt to rebuild influence. Removing Hadi weakens that challenge. The fallout also creates unrest and uncertainty around the election timeline, increasing Jamaat’s leverage. The interim government has already eased restrictions on the party, reinforcing the sense that it is being accommodated. Reports of delayed autopsies and missing or altered CCTV footage resemble earlier cases involving domestic political violence rather than foreign intelligence activity. NCP’s Shadow Role: Opportunistic Power Grab The National Citizen Party also benefits from the disruption. Formed after the 2024 power vacuum, the NCP presents itself as a reformist, technocratic option but relies heavily on informal networks and old political connections. Hadi had criticised the NCP as an elite project that offered limited real change. With elections approaching, weakening Inquilab Mancha helps the NCP by splitting the reformist vote. Political insiders point to familiar tactics involving intermediaries and street operators, similar to what has been seen during earlier caretaker governments. Blaming external forces helps keep attention away from these internal dynamics. Debunking the External Narrative: Bangladesh’s Reflexive Deflection Claims of a “foreign hand,” especially involving India, appear regularly in Bangladeshi politics. In this case, there is little evidence to support them. No intercepted communications, no credible intelligence leaks and no technical proof have been presented. India, dealing with its own security and regional priorities, has no clear reason to target Sharif Osman Hadi. External actors also tend to avoid public, messy attacks that draw attention. The Hadi shooting was chaotic, visible and widely recorded. That kind of incident suits domestic political actors far more than outside agencies. Broader Implications: Electoral Integrity at Stake The attack highlights a wider problem. In Bangladesh, elections are often preceded by violence aimed at removing rivals rather than persuading voters. If this pattern continues, the upcoming polls risk being overshadowed by fear, shutdowns and economic damage, as seen in earlier election cycles. By pushing an external conspiracy narrative, the interim government risks protecting those responsible and weakening trust in the electoral process. This increases the risk that violence could disrupt or delay the 13th National Parliament elections. Path Forward: Demand Accountability If Bangladesh wants to protect its democratic process, accountability is essential. Independent investigations are needed, along with the release of CCTV footage, ballistics reports and interrogation records. Deflection will not solve the problem. The interim government must allow law enforcement to act without political pressure and resist the urge to blame foreign actors. Ignoring internal forces—Jamaat’s street networks and NCP’s political manoeuvring—risks pushing the country back into a cycle of violence, weak institutions and elections that fail to gain public trust.

This line of explanation is familiar. In Bangladesh, blaming outside forces has often been used to manage public anger during periods of economic pressure and political tension.&nbsp;

The Hadi Attack: Internal political machinations, not external conspiracy

At its core, theatre commands are sold as an operational correction. Not a philosophical shift, not an institutional rebranding, but a practical answer to an old military problem: too many sensors, too many shooters, too many decision-makers, and not enough time to connect them when it matters. Modern conflict does not wait for files to move or chains of command to align. It rewards those who can see first, decide faster, and act with coherence across domains that no longer respect service boundaries.&nbsp;Yet, it is worth stating at the outset that for India, this operational correction is ultimately anchored on land warfare. India’s primary security challenges remain territorial, persistent, and manpower-intensive. Theatre commands, whatever their final structure, will succeed or fail based on how effectively they support the land battle, where wars are physically decided, populations are controlled, and political outcomes are enforced.&nbsp;This is where the operational argument for theaterisation is most often made. Not at the level of flags and headquarters, but in how intelligence flows, how firepower is coordinated, how forces move, and how quickly decisions travel from detection to effect.&nbsp;Modern warfare begins with sensing. Satellites, UAVs, ground radars, electronic surveillance, cyber indicators, and human intelligence feeds now generate volumes of data that no single service can process in isolation. India already operates a wide array of such assets across its services; each developed for specific operational needs. What theaterisation proposes is not more sensors, but a single operational picture that allows commanders to see the battlespace as a whole rather than through service-specific windows.&nbsp;For land forces in particular, this integration is decisive. Ground formations operate under conditions of friction, terrain constraint, and constant contact. Fragmented ISR directly translates into tactical surprise, delayed reactions, and higher attrition. Integrated ISR under a theatre commander is therefore less about technological sophistication and more about ensuring that the soldier at the edge is never operating blind because information is trapped in another service’s pipeline.&nbsp;In theory, integrated ISR under a theatre commander reduces friction. Instead of parallel intelligence chains feeding different headquarters, information converges into a shared operational understanding. The intent is straightforward: eliminate duplication, reduce blind spots, and prevent the same data from being interpreted differently by different commands. Inhigh-tempo environments along the northern borders, where land forces carry the weight of deterrence and escalation control, this convergence becomes operationally non-negotiable.&nbsp;Firepower, too, has outgrown neat service silos. Precision strikes today rarely belong to one domain. A target detected by an aerial platform may be engaged by ground-based missiles, long-range artillery, attack helicopters, or airpower. Theaterisation aims to place all shooters under a unified operational authority so that the question is no longer which service owns the asset, but which effect is required in support of the land campaign, and how quickly it can be delivered.&nbsp;This distinction matters. In Indian conditions, fires are rarely ends in themselves. They are enablers of manoeuvre, protection, and dominance for forces operating on the ground. Theatre commands, if structured correctly, allow air and maritime firepower to be employed not as parallel efforts, but as extensions of the land commander’s operational design.&nbsp;Joint fire coordination is therefore central to the theatre concept. By collapsing service-specific clearance chains, theatre commands seek to shorten the time between detection and engagement. This matters in an era where targets are mobile, fleeting, and often protected by layered defences. For ground forces engaged in contact or poised for manoeuvre, speed of fires is not just tactical advantage; it is the difference between seizing initiative and absorbing losses.&nbsp;Mobility is the third pillar often cited. India’s geography presents a demanding operational canvas, from high-altitude land borders to vast maritime spaces. Theatre commands are designed to synchronise airlift, sealift, ground movement, and logistics so that forces can be repositioned without the delays that come from negotiating inter-service boundaries.&nbsp;Here again, the land battle is the fulcrum. Airlift and sealift derive meaning only when they translate into combat power where troops are deployed, sustained, and reinforced. Theatre-level mobility seeks to ensure that land commanders can shift forces, concentrate strength, and sustain operations without being constrained by service ownership of lift and logistics.&nbsp;Underlying all of this is the concept of the decision loop. Modern military thinking places enormous emphasis on shortening the Observe–Orient–Decide–Act cycle. The side that processes information faster and acts decisively can impose tempo on the adversary. Theatre commands are structured to compress these loops by placing authority, information, and resources within the same operational framework.&nbsp;For India, decision-speed at the theatre level is especially critical for land-centric contingencies, where escalation windows are narrow and political signalling is tightly coupled to ground posture. A dispersed or ambiguous command structure risks hesitation at precisely the moment when clarity is required.&nbsp;In theory, this architecture promises coherence. One commander with one operational picture, supported by integrated staffs, directing assets across domains. The intent is to reduce latency, eliminate redundancy, and align effort across land, air, sea, cyber, and space. Yet, as with all structural reforms, the operational elegance on paper must contend with organisational reality.&nbsp;Integration at this scale demands more than reassigning assets. It requires interoperability of systems, harmonisation of procedures, and a shared professional language across services that have evolved distinct cultures, doctrines, and operational instincts over decades.&nbsp;ISR integration, for instance, is not merely about data sharing. It is about trust in interpretation, clarity in prioritisation, and agreement on thresholds for action. When multiple services rely on the same intelligence feed, the question of who validates, who authorises, and who acts becomes central. Theatre commands promise resolution through unified authority, but authority itself must be exercised in a manner that recognises the primacy of ground realities and the consequences borne by troops in contact.&nbsp;Similarly, joint fires demand more than technical connectivity. They require shared doctrines, common training standards, and mutual confidence in each other’s systems and crews. Precision does not forgive misalignment, and integrated firepower magnifies both effectiveness and error—especially when fires are supporting manoeuvre at close quarters.&nbsp;Mobility and logistics, often described as the backbone of theatre operations, bring their own complexities. Unified logistics promise efficiency, but also require deep reengineering of supply chains, maintenance practices, and inventory management. In sustained land campaigns, logistics is not a background function; it is an operational determinant.&nbsp;Decision loops, too, carry their own tensions. Speed is valuable, but clarity is essential. Compressing decision cycles without ensuring robustness of judgement can introduce risk. Theatre commands aim to balance speed with deliberation, but this balance is not static. It must be learned, practiced, and constantly adjusted through exercises and real-world contingencies.&nbsp;None of this negates the operational logic of theaterisation. Rather, it underscores the scale of what is being attempted. Integrating ISR, fires, mobility, and command into a single operational machine is not a cosmetic change. It is a redefinition of how military power is organised and applied.&nbsp;The promise is clear: fewer seams, faster responses, and a force that operates as one. The test, however, lies in whether this integration consistently strengthens the land battle—the arena where India’s wars will be fought, controlled, and concluded.&nbsp;Operational effectiveness is not produced by structures alone. It emerges from how those structures are inhabited, understood, and exercised under pressure. In the end, theaterisation at the operational level is a wager on coherence: a belief that unity of command can translate into unity of action across increasingly complex battlefields, without losing sight of where military outcomes are ultimately decided—on the ground.

Modern warfare begins with sensing. Satellites, UAVs, ground radars, electronic surveillance, cyber indicators, and human intelligence feeds now generate volumes of data that no single service can process in isolation.

At its core, theatre commands are sold as an operational correction. Not a philosophical shift, not an institutional rebranding, but a practical answer to an old military problem: too many sensors, too many shooters, too many decision-makers, and not enough time to connect them when it matters. Modern conflict does not wait for files to move or chains of command to align. It rewards those who can see first, decide faster, and act with coherence across domains that no longer respect service boundaries. Yet, it is worth stating at the outset that for India, this operational correction is ultimately anchored on land warfare. India’s primary security challenges remain territorial, persistent, and manpower-intensive. Theatre commands, whatever their final structure, will succeed or fail based on how effectively they support the land battle, where wars are physically decided, populations are controlled, and political outcomes are enforced. This is where the operational argument for theaterisation is most often made. Not at the level of flags and headquarters, but in how intelligence flows, how firepower is coordinated, how forces move, and how quickly decisions travel from detection to effect. Modern warfare begins with sensing. Satellites, UAVs, ground radars, electronic surveillance, cyber indicators, and human intelligence feeds now generate volumes of data that no single service can process in isolation. India already operates a wide array of such assets across its services; each developed for specific operational needs. What theaterisation proposes is not more sensors, but a single operational picture that allows commanders to see the battlespace as a whole rather than through service-specific windows. For land forces in particular, this integration is decisive. Ground formations operate under conditions of friction, terrain constraint, and constant contact. Fragmented ISR directly translates into tactical surprise, delayed reactions, and higher attrition. Integrated ISR under a theatre commander is therefore less about technological sophistication and more about ensuring that the soldier at the edge is never operating blind because information is trapped in another service’s pipeline. In theory, integrated ISR under a theatre commander reduces friction. Instead of parallel intelligence chains feeding different headquarters, information converges into a shared operational understanding. The intent is straightforward: eliminate duplication, reduce blind spots, and prevent the same data from being interpreted differently by different commands. In high-tempo environments along the northern borders, where land forces carry the weight of deterrence and escalation control, this convergence becomes operationally non-negotiable. Firepower, too, has outgrown neat service silos. Precision strikes today rarely belong to one domain. A target detected by an aerial platform may be engaged by ground-based missiles, long-range artillery, attack helicopters, or airpower. Theaterisation aims to place all shooters under a unified operational authority so that the question is no longer which service owns the asset, but which effect is required in support of the land campaign, and how quickly it can be delivered. This distinction matters. In Indian conditions, fires are rarely ends in themselves. They are enablers of manoeuvre, protection, and dominance for forces operating on the ground. Theatre commands, if structured correctly, allow air and maritime firepower to be employed not as parallel efforts, but as extensions of the land commander’s operational design. Joint fire coordination is therefore central to the theatre concept. By collapsing service-specific clearance chains, theatre commands seek to shorten the time between detection and engagement. This matters in an era where targets are mobile, fleeting, and often protected by layered defences. For ground forces engaged in contact or poised for manoeuvre, speed of fires is not just tactical advantage; it is the difference between seizing initiative and absorbing losses. Mobility is the third pillar often cited. India’s geography presents a demanding operational canvas, from high-altitude land borders to vast maritime spaces. Theatre commands are designed to synchronise airlift, sealift, ground movement, and logistics so that forces can be repositioned without the delays that come from negotiating inter-service boundaries. Here again, the land battle is the fulcrum. Airlift and sealift derive meaning only when they translate into combat power where troops are deployed, sustained, and reinforced. Theatre-level mobility seeks to ensure that land commanders can shift forces, concentrate strength, and sustain operations without being constrained by service ownership of lift and logistics. Underlying all of this is the concept of the decision loop. Modern military thinking places enormous emphasis on shortening the Observe–Orient–Decide–Act cycle. The side that processes information faster and acts decisively can impose tempo on the adversary. Theatre commands are structured to compress these loops by placing authority, information, and resources within the same operational framework. For India, decision-speed at the theatre level is especially critical for land-centric contingencies, where escalation windows are narrow and political signalling is tightly coupled to ground posture. A dispersed or ambiguous command structure risks hesitation at precisely the moment when clarity is required. In theory, this architecture promises coherence. One commander with one operational picture, supported by integrated staffs, directing assets across domains. The intent is to reduce latency, eliminate redundancy, and align effort across land, air, sea, cyber, and space. Yet, as with all structural reforms, the operational elegance on paper must contend with organisational reality. Integration at this scale demands more than reassigning assets. It requires interoperability of systems, harmonisation of procedures, and a shared professional language across services that have evolved distinct cultures, doctrines, and operational instincts over decades. ISR integration, for instance, is not merely about data sharing. It is about trust in interpretation, clarity in prioritisation, and agreement on thresholds for action. When multiple services rely on the same intelligence feed, the question of who validates, who authorises, and who acts becomes central. Theatre commands promise resolution through unified authority, but authority itself must be exercised in a manner that recognises the primacy of ground realities and the consequences borne by troops in contact. Similarly, joint fires demand more than technical connectivity. They require shared doctrines, common training standards, and mutual confidence in each other’s systems and crews. Precision does not forgive misalignment, and integrated firepower magnifies both effectiveness and error—especially when fires are supporting manoeuvre at close quarters. Mobility and logistics, often described as the backbone of theatre operations, bring their own complexities. Unified logistics promise efficiency, but also require deep reengineering of supply chains, maintenance practices, and inventory management. In sustained land campaigns, logistics is not a background function; it is an operational determinant. Decision loops, too, carry their own tensions. Speed is valuable, but clarity is essential. Compressing decision cycles without ensuring robustness of judgement can introduce risk. Theatre commands aim to balance speed with deliberation, but this balance is not static. It must be learned, practiced, and constantly adjusted through exercises and real-world contingencies. None of this negates the operational logic of theaterisation. Rather, it underscores the scale of what is being attempted. Integrating ISR, fires, mobility, and command into a single operational machine is not a cosmetic change. It is a redefinition of how military power is organised and applied. The promise is clear: fewer seams, faster responses, and a force that operates as one. The test, however, lies in whether this integration consistently strengthens the land battle—the arena where India’s wars will be fought, controlled, and concluded. Operational effectiveness is not produced by structures alone. It emerges from how those structures are inhabited, understood, and exercised under pressure. In the end, theaterisation at the operational level is a wager on coherence: a belief that unity of command can translate into unity of action across increasingly complex battlefields, without losing sight of where military outcomes are ultimately decided—on the ground.

Modern warfare begins with sensing. Satellites, UAVs, ground radars, electronic surveillance, cyber indicators, and human intelligence feeds now generate volumes of data that no single service can process in isolation.

Operational dimensions of theater commands: ISR, fires, mobility, and decision loops

The independence of Bangladesh in 1971 was shaped decisively by the coordinated operations of the Indian Army and the Mukti Bahini. While the Mukti Bahini’s guerrilla actions inside East Pakistan steadily eroded Pakistani military control and morale, Indian assistance—arms, training, intelligence and strategic direction—proved essential in turning these irregular fighters into an organised resistance. India’s Eastern Command established training camps, offered sustained logistical support and enabled joint operations that became critical once India entered the war formally in December 1971. The surrender of Pakistani forces on December 16 demonstrated the effectiveness of this partnership. Crucially, Indian involvement did not end with victory; it extended into institution-building. On November 21, 1971, the Bangladesh Army took shape with significant Indian guidance, transforming Mukti Bahini fighters into the nucleus of a national military force.Background: The Mukti Bahini and the Independence MovementThe Mukti Bahini emerged in early 1971 as the principal guerrilla force resisting Pakistan’s violent crackdown in East Pakistan. Composed largely of defectors from the East Pakistan Regiment and joined by committed civilians, the force relied on sabotage—railways, bridges, factories and other vital infrastructure—to weaken Pakistani command and control. They also gathered intelligence and executed coordinated strikes that gradually undermined enemy authority.At the political level, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s historic speech on 7 March 1971 called for mass mobilisation through non-cooperation. His sweeping mandate from the December 1970 elections provided the political legitimacy behind the independence movement. The Mukti Bahini’s actions, grounded in local initiative and resolve, gained momentum because they converged with this broader strategic direction. That alignment of popular energy with political leadership enabled the resistance to evolve from scattered actions into a movement capable of winning sovereignty.Indian Support and TrainingIndia’s support for the Mukti Bahini was decisive and wide-ranging. Around April–May 1971, the Indian Army’s Eastern Command launched a structured programme under “Operation Jackpot”, establishing six major training camps in West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya. By late 1971, an estimated 100,000 Mukti Bahini fighters had undergone 4–6 weeks of training in guerrilla warfare, demolition, small arms handling and intelligence gathering.Beyond training, India supplied weapons, sustained logistical help and sanctuary to the fighters and refugees—particularly in Assam, where protection and supply lines were actively supported by Indian authorities. This comprehensive assistance transformed a fragmented resistance into a coherent guerrilla force capable of striking Pakistani military targets with far greater precision and impact.Outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani War and Joint OperationsA decisive shift occurred on December 3, 1971, when Pakistan launched pre-emptive air strikes on Indian airfields, triggering India’s formal entry into the conflict. The Indian Army—working in close coordination with the Mukti Bahini—immediately began a full-scale campaign against Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, supported by synchronised land, air and naval operations.These combined efforts rapidly overpowered Pakistani formations. Joint operations disrupted Pakistan’s hold over Dhaka and other critical regions, breaking both logistical networks and the morale of the occupying forces. By December 16, 1971, Lieutenant General A.A.K. Niazi surrendered unconditionally to Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora. The capture of 93,000 Pakistani troops—one of the largest surrenders since World War II—sealed the victory of the independence movement.Formation of the Bangladesh Army with Indian HelpPlans for a sovereign Bangladeshi military force were already underway before formal independence. On November 21, 1971, the initial structure of the Bangladesh Army was established with extensive Indian assistance. Indian commanders helped organise units, set up command centres, supply arms and standardise training procedures for the emerging force.Mukti Bahini units were reorganised into battalions of the new Bangladesh Army, with Indian officers supervising training and transitions. This institutional support was vital in stabilising the security environment in post-war Bangladesh and in enabling guerrilla fighters to become part of a disciplined national military establishment.Neglected Tribute: The Indian Army’s Forgotten Sacrifice in BangladeshYet despite the scale of Indian involvement, the Indian Army’s sacrifice—approximately 2,998 killed in action and 12,189 total casualties—has remained insufficiently recognised in Bangladesh’s public narrative. The state rarely commemorates Indian soldiers, and public memorials acknowledging their role are limited. This silence reflects a selective national memory that emphasises indigenous struggle while overlooking the external military support that materially enabled liberation.ConclusionBangladesh’s liberation in 1971 cannot be understood solely through the lens of local resistance. It relied heavily on Indian military, logistical and strategic support. While the Mukti Bahini—numbering around 100,000 fighters trained in Indian camps—conducted important guerrilla operations, they could not alone have defeated Pakistan’s 93,000-strong military presence in East Pakistan. India’s Eastern Command facilitated arms supply, intelligence and training across six major camps in West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya, transforming dispersed groups into an integrated fighting force.Once India entered the war on December 3, joint operations produced Pakistan’s surrender in just 13 days—one of the shortest and most decisive campaigns in modern military history. Without India’s intervention, the Mukti Bahini would have faced severe limits in sustaining operations or compelling Pakistan’s defeat. India’s role, therefore, was indispensable in securing Bangladesh’s independence.Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer. &nbsp;

These combined efforts rapidly overpowered Pakistani formations. Joint operations disrupted Pakistan’s hold over Dhaka and other critical regions, breaking both logistical networks and the morale of the occupying forces. 

The independence of Bangladesh in 1971 was shaped decisively by the coordinated operations of the Indian Army and the Mukti Bahini. While the Mukti Bahini’s guerrilla actions inside East Pakistan steadily eroded Pakistani military control and morale, Indian assistance—arms, training, intelligence and strategic direction—proved essential in turning these irregular fighters into an organised resistance. India’s Eastern Command established training camps, offered sustained logistical support and enabled joint operations that became critical once India entered the war formally in December 1971. The surrender of Pakistani forces on December 16 demonstrated the effectiveness of this partnership. Crucially, Indian involvement did not end with victory; it extended into institution-building. On November 21, 1971, the Bangladesh Army took shape with significant Indian guidance, transforming Mukti Bahini fighters into the nucleus of a national military force. Background: The Mukti Bahini and the Independence Movement The Mukti Bahini emerged in early 1971 as the principal guerrilla force resisting Pakistan’s violent crackdown in East Pakistan. Composed largely of defectors from the East Pakistan Regiment and joined by committed civilians, the force relied on sabotage—railways, bridges, factories and other vital infrastructure—to weaken Pakistani command and control. They also gathered intelligence and executed coordinated strikes that gradually undermined enemy authority. At the political level, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s historic speech on 7 March 1971 called for mass mobilisation through non-cooperation. His sweeping mandate from the December 1970 elections provided the political legitimacy behind the independence movement. The Mukti Bahini’s actions, grounded in local initiative and resolve, gained momentum because they converged with this broader strategic direction. That alignment of popular energy with political leadership enabled the resistance to evolve from scattered actions into a movement capable of winning sovereignty. Indian Support and Training India’s support for the Mukti Bahini was decisive and wide-ranging. Around April–May 1971, the Indian Army’s Eastern Command launched a structured programme under “Operation Jackpot”, establishing six major training camps in West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya. By late 1971, an estimated 100,000 Mukti Bahini fighters had undergone 4–6 weeks of training in guerrilla warfare, demolition, small arms handling and intelligence gathering. Beyond training, India supplied weapons, sustained logistical help and sanctuary to the fighters and refugees—particularly in Assam, where protection and supply lines were actively supported by Indian authorities. This comprehensive assistance transformed a fragmented resistance into a coherent guerrilla force capable of striking Pakistani military targets with far greater precision and impact. Outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani War and Joint Operations A decisive shift occurred on December 3, 1971, when Pakistan launched pre-emptive air strikes on Indian airfields, triggering India’s formal entry into the conflict. The Indian Army—working in close coordination with the Mukti Bahini—immediately began a full-scale campaign against Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, supported by synchronised land, air and naval operations. These combined efforts rapidly overpowered Pakistani formations. Joint operations disrupted Pakistan’s hold over Dhaka and other critical regions, breaking both logistical networks and the morale of the occupying forces. By December 16, 1971, Lieutenant General A.A.K. Niazi surrendered unconditionally to Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora. The capture of 93,000 Pakistani troops—one of the largest surrenders since World War II—sealed the victory of the independence movement. Formation of the Bangladesh Army with Indian Help Plans for a sovereign Bangladeshi military force were already underway before formal independence. On November 21, 1971, the initial structure of the Bangladesh Army was established with extensive Indian assistance. Indian commanders helped organise units, set up command centres, supply arms and standardise training procedures for the emerging force. Mukti Bahini units were reorganised into battalions of the new Bangladesh Army, with Indian officers supervising training and transitions. This institutional support was vital in stabilising the security environment in post-war Bangladesh and in enabling guerrilla fighters to become part of a disciplined national military establishment. Neglected Tribute: The Indian Army’s Forgotten Sacrifice in Bangladesh Yet despite the scale of Indian involvement, the Indian Army’s sacrifice—approximately 2,998 killed in action and 12,189 total casualties—has remained insufficiently recognised in Bangladesh’s public narrative. The state rarely commemorates Indian soldiers, and public memorials acknowledging their role are limited. This silence reflects a selective national memory that emphasises indigenous struggle while overlooking the external military support that materially enabled liberation. Conclusion Bangladesh’s liberation in 1971 cannot be understood solely through the lens of local resistance. It relied heavily on Indian military, logistical and strategic support. While the Mukti Bahini—numbering around 100,000 fighters trained in Indian camps—conducted important guerrilla operations, they could not alone have defeated Pakistan’s 93,000-strong military presence in East Pakistan. India’s Eastern Command facilitated arms supply, intelligence and training across six major camps in West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya, transforming dispersed groups into an integrated fighting force. Once India entered the war on December 3, joint operations produced Pakistan’s surrender in just 13 days—one of the shortest and most decisive campaigns in modern military history. Without India’s intervention, the Mukti Bahini would have faced severe limits in sustaining operations or compelling Pakistan’s defeat. India’s role, therefore, was indispensable in securing Bangladesh’s independence. Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.

These combined efforts rapidly overpowered Pakistani formations. Joint operations disrupted Pakistan’s hold over Dhaka and other critical regions, breaking both logistical networks and the morale of the occupying forces.&nbsp;

Indian Army as architect: Structuring Bangladesh’s first military force

When we talk about defence reforms, the conversation almost always drifts to tanks, missiles, or drones. Necessary, yes. But ask any soldier and you’ll hear a quieter truth: morale is as decisive as firepower. And morale is built not just on equipment in the field, but on the well-being of families at home.That is why the GST Council’s decision of 3 September 2025, coming into effect on 22 September, matters so much. On the surface, it is a fiscal measure — trimming tax rates, exempting categories of hardware and goods. In reality, it is a reform that touches every serving soldier, every veteran, and every family living in a cantonment.<h2>Salaries, pensions, and purchasing power</h2>India’s defence budget this year is ₹6.81 lakh crore. Of that, a staggering ₹1.47 lakh crore goes to salaries and pensions for serving personnel, retirees, and their dependents. This is the real backbone of our military community.Until now, GST added a hidden weight to household expenses. Groceries, school fees, appliances, even uniforms — the cumulative bite was felt in every cantonment home. The latest rationalisation, which reduces GST rates to simpler 5 and 18 per cent slabs and exempts many essentials, means those rupees stretch further.For a sepoy’s family, that might mean not putting off the purchase of a new washing machine. For a pensioner in Jaipur, it might mean medicines that cost less each month. Small things, perhaps. But together, they add up to dignity and security.<h2>The cantonment economy</h2>Walk through a market in Ambala, Pune, or Jalandhar and you’ll see what this really means. Local shopkeepers, grocers, tailors, and electronics vendors all depend heavily on defence families’ spending. When GST on essentials falls, demand rises. And when demand rises, small-town economies breathe easier.The Army doesn’t just defend borders. It sustains entire communities in cantonments across the country. The GST reform gives those communities a timely boost, especially as we head into the festive season.<h2>Linking morale to readiness</h2>It is easy to forget how tightly morale links to readiness. A jawan manning a post on the Line of Control fights with a different resolve when he knows his family is comfortable back home. A major commanding a company in Ladakh sleeps a little easier when school bills and household expenses don’t consume his wife’s evenings.Fiscal relief, at the family level, reduces stress on serving personnel. And reduced stress translates directly into focus on the mission. We often talk of drones as force multipliers. But morale is a force multiplier too — and this reform strengthens it.<h2>Veterans and their families</h2>Let’s not overlook veterans. Many live on fixed pensions, watching costs creep upward year after year. For them, GST relief is not a technicality — it is a lifeline. Lower tax on essentials means less pressure on monthly budgets, less reliance on support networks, and more dignity in retirement.For widows and dependents of soldiers, this reform is equally important. It is a quiet acknowledgement that service to the nation extends beyond uniformed years, and that the state still stands behind those who stood for it.<h2>Beyond the household: A national signal</h2>The government is prepared to absorb between ₹48,000 crore and ₹1.1 lakh crore in revenue loss to make this reform work, depending on how the calculation is framed — lower if you look at the wider GST impact across government, higher when scoped specifically to defence-related procurement. That figure tells its own story. It is not just about balancing accounts — it is about prioritising security, not only at the border but in the lives of those who guard it.National security is not just a line of tanks. It is also the confidence of a soldier’s child in Shillong who can afford better books, or a veteran’s widow in Bhopal who manages her bills more comfortably. By easing life for soldiers and their families, the government sends a signal that security policy is people policy too.<h2>A reform felt at home and on the frontier</h2>GST 2.0 will be written up as a tax reform. But for those in uniform and those who once wore it, it will be remembered as something else: a morale reform.It makes pay and pensions go further. It strengthens cantonment economies. It uplifts veterans and their families. And in doing so, it strengthens the Army itself.Because when a military family feels secure in Ambala or Leh, the Army’s resolve on the frontier becomes that much stronger. That is the true morale dividend of GST 2.0.Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.

The latest rationalisation, which reduces GST rates to simpler 5 and 18 per cent slabs and exempts many essentials, means those rupees stretch further.

When we talk about defence reforms, the conversation almost always drifts to tanks, missiles, or drones. Necessary, yes. But ask any soldier and you’ll hear a quieter truth: morale is as decisive as firepower. And morale is built not just on equipment in the field, but on the well-being of families at home. That is why the GST Council’s decision of 3 September 2025, coming into effect on 22 September, matters so much. On the surface, it is a fiscal measure — trimming tax rates, exempting categories of hardware and goods. In reality, it is a reform that touches every serving soldier, every veteran, and every family living in a cantonment. Salaries, pensions, and purchasing power India’s defence budget this year is ₹6.81 lakh crore. Of that, a staggering ₹1.47 lakh crore goes to salaries and pensions for serving personnel, retirees, and their dependents. This is the real backbone of our military community. Until now, GST added a hidden weight to household expenses. Groceries, school fees, appliances, even uniforms — the cumulative bite was felt in every cantonment home. The latest rationalisation, which reduces GST rates to simpler 5 and 18 per cent slabs and exempts many essentials, means those rupees stretch further. For a sepoy’s family, that might mean not putting off the purchase of a new washing machine. For a pensioner in Jaipur, it might mean medicines that cost less each month. Small things, perhaps. But together, they add up to dignity and security. The cantonment economy Walk through a market in Ambala, Pune, or Jalandhar and you’ll see what this really means. Local shopkeepers, grocers, tailors, and electronics vendors all depend heavily on defence families’ spending. When GST on essentials falls, demand rises. And when demand rises, small-town economies breathe easier. The Army doesn’t just defend borders. It sustains entire communities in cantonments across the country. The GST reform gives those communities a timely boost, especially as we head into the festive season. Linking morale to readiness It is easy to forget how tightly morale links to readiness. A jawan manning a post on the Line of Control fights with a different resolve when he knows his family is comfortable back home. A major commanding a company in Ladakh sleeps a little easier when school bills and household expenses don’t consume his wife’s evenings. Fiscal relief, at the family level, reduces stress on serving personnel. And reduced stress translates directly into focus on the mission. We often talk of drones as force multipliers. But morale is a force multiplier too — and this reform strengthens it. Veterans and their families Let’s not overlook veterans. Many live on fixed pensions, watching costs creep upward year after year. For them, GST relief is not a technicality — it is a lifeline. Lower tax on essentials means less pressure on monthly budgets, less reliance on support networks, and more dignity in retirement. For widows and dependents of soldiers, this reform is equally important. It is a quiet acknowledgement that service to the nation extends beyond uniformed years, and that the state still stands behind those who stood for it. Beyond the household: A national signal The government is prepared to absorb between ₹48,000 crore and ₹1.1 lakh crore in revenue loss to make this reform work, depending on how the calculation is framed — lower if you look at the wider GST impact across government, higher when scoped specifically to defence-related procurement. That figure tells its own story. It is not just about balancing accounts — it is about prioritising security, not only at the border but in the lives of those who guard it. National security is not just a line of tanks. It is also the confidence of a soldier’s child in Shillong who can afford better books, or a veteran’s widow in Bhopal who manages her bills more comfortably. By easing life for soldiers and their families, the government sends a signal that security policy is people policy too. A reform felt at home and on the frontier GST 2.0 will be written up as a tax reform. But for those in uniform and those who once wore it, it will be remembered as something else: a morale reform. It makes pay and pensions go further. It strengthens cantonment economies. It uplifts veterans and their families. And in doing so, it strengthens the Army itself. Because when a military family feels secure in Ambala or Leh, the Army’s resolve on the frontier becomes that much stronger. That is the true morale dividend of GST 2.0. Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.

The latest rationalisation, which reduces GST rates to simpler 5 and 18 per cent slabs and exempts many essentials, means those rupees stretch further.

The morale dividend: What GST relief means for soldiers and veterans

The tragic and condemnable terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir&rsquo;s picturesque town of Pahalgam, claiming 26 innocent lives, has once again thrust Pakistan&rsquo;s long-standing tactic of strategic deception into the spotlight. While India grapples with grief and responds with measured resolve, Islamabad&rsquo;s reaction has been characterised by predictable incoherence: aggressive nuclear rhetoric, fabricated military optics, orchestrated social media disinformation, and diplomatic appeals for international intervention. Together, these actions vividly demonstrate a desperate attempt to deflect accountability, reflecting a profound strategic confusion within Pakistan&rsquo;s establishment. In the immediate aftermath of the terror strike, which claimed the lives of several innocent tourists, Pakistan&rsquo;s state-driven propaganda machinery swiftly sprang into action. What followed was a disturbing spectacle&mdash;a coordinated disinformation campaign across Pakistani social media platforms aimed squarely at deflecting blame, mocking victims, and amplifying false claims designed to undermine India&rsquo;s narrative. The extent and intensity of this coordinated disinformation campaign were laid bare by meticulous analysis. Pakistani social media handles on platform X aggressively circulated hashtags such as #ModiExposed and #IndianFalseFlag. According to detailed OSINT analysis by reputed sources, these hashtags, rapidly trending in Pakistan, were artificially amplified by a limited number of accounts clearly orchestrated to push state-backed narratives. Most disturbingly, the misinformation campaign included grotesque AI-generated videos mocking grieving families and disrespectfully caricaturing Indian leadership, actions that breach basic humanitarian norms and diplomatic decorum.
Also Read |&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/pahalgam-attack-india-cracks-the-whip-bans-all-pak-imports-mails-and-parcels-bars-port-access-to-ships-9029491" rel="noopener" target="_blank">India cracks the whip again, bans all Pak imports, mails and parcels, bars port access to ships</a> Simultaneously, misinformation tactics became more elaborate and malicious. For instance, false rumours were systematically propagated alleging malicious claims, such as the removal of senior Indian military leaders like Northern Army Commander Lieutenant General Suchindra Kumar, and even absurd assertions of an Indian Rafale jet being shot down by Pakistani forces. These outrageous fabrications were swiftly debunked by India&rsquo;s official fact-checking channels like PIB Fact Check, clearly demonstrating India&rsquo;s commitment to transparency and truth against deliberate misinformation. However, beyond these blatant propaganda actions lie even deeper contradictions within Pakistan&rsquo;s strategic messaging. A glaring example emerged where Pakistani journalists, mainstream media and social media prominently featured alleged footage of Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir boldly inspecting frontline positions along the Line of Control (LoC). Netizens, prominent journalists and OSINT specialists alike promptly identified the visuals as recycled footage from 2022&mdash;an embarrassing revelation exposing Islamabad&rsquo;s desperation to project military strength amidst dwindling internal confidence in its armed forces. Further compounding this embarrassment was a recent Pakistan Air Force (PAF) propaganda video explicitly designed to showcase military robustness. Ironically, the video prominently displayed visuals from advanced international military assets&mdash;including SpaceX&rsquo;s Falcon 9 rocket launches and S-300 air defence systems, which are not even remotely part of Pakistan&rsquo;s arsenal. Swiftly identified and mocked by OSINT communities and analysts, these glaring missteps severely damaged Pakistan&rsquo;s credibility, reinforcing perceptions of its dependence on borrowed imagery to bolster domestic morale.
Also Read |&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/india-plots-double-financial-strike-on-pakistan-to-stifle-terror-funding-jittery-islamabad-reacts-9027446" rel="noopener" target="_blank">India plots double financial strike on Pakistan to stifle terror funding, jittery Islamabad reacts</a> On the diplomatic front, the chaos was even more pronounced. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif and Railway Minister Hanif Abbasi openly escalated rhetoric to nuclear threats, brazenly stating that nuclear options remain viable should Pakistan&rsquo;s &ldquo;existence&rdquo; be threatened. Such overt threats stand in direct contradiction to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif&rsquo;s simultaneous appeals for a &ldquo;neutral, transparent investigation&rdquo; into the terror incident. To add another layer of confusion, Pakistan&rsquo;s Interior Minister vigorously promoted narratives specifically targeting Western audiences with claims of imminent Indian military aggression&mdash;an obvious attempt to elicit urgent international intervention and diplomatic sympathy. This troubling incoherence among Pakistan&rsquo;s civilian and military leadership reveals a serious lack of coordinated strategic communication and highlights internal political fissures. The Pakistani leadership appears fundamentally unsure of its own strategy: simultaneously brandishing threats to domestic audiences and projecting victimhood externally. Such contradictory messages not only undermine diplomatic credibility but also significantly dilute Islamabad&rsquo;s capacity to effectively mobilise international opinion. Adding to these acute contradictions is a long-standing internal morale crisis which has been brewing within Pakistan&rsquo;s military ranks. Such challenges significantly weaken operational readiness and erode morale, leaving Pakistan strategically vulnerable precisely at a time when regional tensions remain high. Compounding these internal security concerns, Islamabad&rsquo;s ongoing military mobilisation in response to perceived Indian threats is rapidly draining its fragile economy. Independent analyses indicate Pakistan incurs millions of dollars daily due to heightened military alert status, exacerbating its already critical economic vulnerabilities, including dwindling foreign exchange reserves and rising external debts. Clearly, Islamabad&rsquo;s current aggressive posture is economically unsustainable. Historically, Pakistan&rsquo;s strategy of provoking incidents through proxies and subsequently pleading for international mediation has been a familiar and increasingly ineffective pattern. In past cases, notably after Uri, Pathankot, and Pulwama, Pakistan consistently followed similar scripts. However, in recent times, the global community, particularly key stakeholders like the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations, has displayed discernible reluctance to engage directly, advocating restraint rather than active mediation. This growing diplomatic isolation further shows Pakistan&rsquo;s declining strategic leverage and reveals Islamabad&rsquo;s desperation to force international engagement through provocations and disinformation.
Also Read |&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/bangladeshi-islamists-protest-interim-govts-proposal-for-womens-rights-9030250" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bangladeshi Islamists protest interim govt&rsquo;s proposal for women&rsquo;s rights</a>
In sharp contrast to Pakistan&rsquo;s chaotic narratives, India has maintained commendable strategic maturity and composure. Avoiding inflammatory rhetoric, India&rsquo;s calibrated response post-Pahalgam reflects confidence in diplomatic clarity, operational readiness, and strategic steadiness. This measured Indian response starkly highlights Pakistan&rsquo;s frantic and unsustainable tactics, which increasingly appear born out of insecurity rather than strength. Pakistan&rsquo;s elaborate smoke-and-mirrors propaganda reveals more weakness than strength. Islamabad&rsquo;s coordinated misinformation, contradictory diplomatic signals, the military&rsquo;s moral bankruptcy, and strained economic resources collectively highlight a severe and growing strategic desperation. As India continues to expose and counter this deception effectively, Pakistan&rsquo;s incoherent narratives crumble rapidly under scrutiny. Also Read | <a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/indias-jaishankar-hold-talks-with-russian-counterpart-lavrov-in-wake-of-pahalgam-terror-attack-9030202" rel="dofollow">'Perpetrators must be brought to justice': India's Jaishankar hold talks with Russia's Lavrov in wake of Pahalgam terror attack</a> For India, the clear path forward remains steady diplomatic engagement, vigilant military readiness, and proactive transparency in combating disinformation. The international community is increasingly aware of Islamabad&rsquo;s tactics, diminishing their efficacy. Pakistan&rsquo;s strategic confusion today vividly illustrates a fundamental truth: deception and propaganda can never sustainably replace genuine strategic depth or credible military capability. In its attempts to weaponise misinformation and exploit tragedy for propaganda, Pakistan risks falling into its own strategic trap, a reality increasingly clear to observers worldwide.
The author is a Defence &amp; Strategic Affairs Analyst, a media consultant, and author of &lsquo;Kashmir&rsquo;s Death Trap: Tales of Perfidy and Valour.&rsquo;
&nbsp;
Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.

Opinions & Blogs: The Pakistani leadership appears fundamentally unsure of its own strategy: simultaneously brandishing threats to domestic audiences and projecting victimhood externally.

The tragic and condemnable terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir’s picturesque town of Pahalgam, claiming 26 innocent lives, has once again thrust Pakistan’s long-standing tactic of strategic deception into the spotlight. While India grapples with grief and responds with measured resolve, Islamabad’s reaction has been characterised by predictable incoherence: aggressive nuclear rhetoric, fabricated military optics, orchestrated social media disinformation, and diplomatic appeals for international intervention. Together, these actions vividly demonstrate a desperate attempt to deflect accountability, reflecting a profound strategic confusion within Pakistan’s establishment. In the immediate aftermath of the terror strike, which claimed the lives of several innocent tourists, Pakistan’s state-driven propaganda machinery swiftly sprang into action. What followed was a disturbing spectacle—a coordinated disinformation campaign across Pakistani social media platforms aimed squarely at deflecting blame, mocking victims, and amplifying false claims designed to undermine India’s narrative. The extent and intensity of this coordinated disinformation campaign were laid bare by meticulous analysis. Pakistani social media handles on platform X aggressively circulated hashtags such as #ModiExposed and #IndianFalseFlag. According to detailed OSINT analysis by reputed sources, these hashtags, rapidly trending in Pakistan, were artificially amplified by a limited number of accounts clearly orchestrated to push state-backed narratives. Most disturbingly, the misinformation campaign included grotesque AI-generated videos mocking grieving families and disrespectfully caricaturing Indian leadership, actions that breach basic humanitarian norms and diplomatic decorum. Also Read | India cracks the whip again, bans all Pak imports, mails and parcels, bars port access to ships Simultaneously, misinformation tactics became more elaborate and malicious. For instance, false rumours were systematically propagated alleging malicious claims, such as the removal of senior Indian military leaders like Northern Army Commander Lieutenant General Suchindra Kumar, and even absurd assertions of an Indian Rafale jet being shot down by Pakistani forces. These outrageous fabrications were swiftly debunked by India’s official fact-checking channels like PIB Fact Check, clearly demonstrating India’s commitment to transparency and truth against deliberate misinformation. However, beyond these blatant propaganda actions lie even deeper contradictions within Pakistan’s strategic messaging. A glaring example emerged where Pakistani journalists, mainstream media and social media prominently featured alleged footage of Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir boldly inspecting frontline positions along the Line of Control (LoC). Netizens, prominent journalists and OSINT specialists alike promptly identified the visuals as recycled footage from 2022—an embarrassing revelation exposing Islamabad’s desperation to project military strength amidst dwindling internal confidence in its armed forces. Further compounding this embarrassment was a recent Pakistan Air Force (PAF) propaganda video explicitly designed to showcase military robustness. Ironically, the video prominently displayed visuals from advanced international military assets—including SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket launches and S-300 air defence systems, which are not even remotely part of Pakistan’s arsenal. Swiftly identified and mocked by OSINT communities and analysts, these glaring missteps severely damaged Pakistan’s credibility, reinforcing perceptions of its dependence on borrowed imagery to bolster domestic morale. Also Read | India plots double financial strike on Pakistan to stifle terror funding, jittery Islamabad reacts On the diplomatic front, the chaos was even more pronounced. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif and Railway Minister Hanif Abbasi openly escalated rhetoric to nuclear threats, brazenly stating that nuclear options remain viable should Pakistan’s “existence” be threatened. Such overt threats stand in direct contradiction to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s simultaneous appeals for a “neutral, transparent investigation” into the terror incident. To add another layer of confusion, Pakistan’s Interior Minister vigorously promoted narratives specifically targeting Western audiences with claims of imminent Indian military aggression—an obvious attempt to elicit urgent international intervention and diplomatic sympathy. This troubling incoherence among Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership reveals a serious lack of coordinated strategic communication and highlights internal political fissures. The Pakistani leadership appears fundamentally unsure of its own strategy: simultaneously brandishing threats to domestic audiences and projecting victimhood externally. Such contradictory messages not only undermine diplomatic credibility but also significantly dilute Islamabad’s capacity to effectively mobilise international opinion. Adding to these acute contradictions is a long-standing internal morale crisis which has been brewing within Pakistan’s military ranks. Such challenges significantly weaken operational readiness and erode morale, leaving Pakistan strategically vulnerable precisely at a time when regional tensions remain high. Compounding these internal security concerns, Islamabad’s ongoing military mobilisation in response to perceived Indian threats is rapidly draining its fragile economy. Independent analyses indicate Pakistan incurs millions of dollars daily due to heightened military alert status, exacerbating its already critical economic vulnerabilities, including dwindling foreign exchange reserves and rising external debts. Clearly, Islamabad’s current aggressive posture is economically unsustainable. Historically, Pakistan’s strategy of provoking incidents through proxies and subsequently pleading for international mediation has been a familiar and increasingly ineffective pattern. In past cases, notably after Uri, Pathankot, and Pulwama, Pakistan consistently followed similar scripts. However, in recent times, the global community, particularly key stakeholders like the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations, has displayed discernible reluctance to engage directly, advocating restraint rather than active mediation. This growing diplomatic isolation further shows Pakistan’s declining strategic leverage and reveals Islamabad’s desperation to force international engagement through provocations and disinformation. Also Read | Bangladeshi Islamists protest interim govt’s proposal for women’s rights In sharp contrast to Pakistan’s chaotic narratives, India has maintained commendable strategic maturity and composure. Avoiding inflammatory rhetoric, India’s calibrated response post-Pahalgam reflects confidence in diplomatic clarity, operational readiness, and strategic steadiness. This measured Indian response starkly highlights Pakistan’s frantic and unsustainable tactics, which increasingly appear born out of insecurity rather than strength. Pakistan’s elaborate smoke-and-mirrors propaganda reveals more weakness than strength. Islamabad’s coordinated misinformation, contradictory diplomatic signals, the military’s moral bankruptcy, and strained economic resources collectively highlight a severe and growing strategic desperation. As India continues to expose and counter this deception effectively, Pakistan’s incoherent narratives crumble rapidly under scrutiny. Also Read | 'Perpetrators must be brought to justice': India's Jaishankar hold talks with Russia's Lavrov in wake of Pahalgam terror attack For India, the clear path forward remains steady diplomatic engagement, vigilant military readiness, and proactive transparency in combating disinformation. The international community is increasingly aware of Islamabad’s tactics, diminishing their efficacy. Pakistan’s strategic confusion today vividly illustrates a fundamental truth: deception and propaganda can never sustainably replace genuine strategic depth or credible military capability. In its attempts to weaponise misinformation and exploit tragedy for propaganda, Pakistan risks falling into its own strategic trap, a reality increasingly clear to observers worldwide. The author is a Defence & Strategic Affairs Analyst, a media consultant, and author of ‘Kashmir’s Death Trap: Tales of Perfidy and Valour.’ Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.

Pakistan’s smoke and mirrors: How Islamabad’s military propaganda is unravelling and crumbling

In an environment continually defined by shifting geopolitical threats and rapidly changing military needs, the Indian Army's careful procurement process demonstrates a commendable balance of thoroughness, transparency, and strategic foresight. While critics often highlight delays and prolonged timelines, such commentary tends to overlook the critical rationale behind such deliberate caution: ensuring absolute reliability, robust operational capabilities, and soldier safety in every procurement decision.
Procurement in the Indian Army is not a casual affair&mdash;it is meticulously structured and scrutinised at multiple levels, guided strictly by comprehensive General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs). These GSQRs are frequently updated, ensuring they remain responsive to changing threat perceptions and technological advancements. In recent times, the Army has adapted these standards to address high-altitude warfare, reflecting current operational realities, notably along India&rsquo;s contested Himalayan frontiers. The extensive testing of K9 Vajra howitzers in Ladakh and the comprehensive evaluations of infantry rifles such as the SiG-716 and AK-203 exemplify this adaptive approach. Such thorough evaluations guarantee equipment effectiveness under diverse and demanding conditions, translating directly into battlefield readiness.
The Army's procurement procedure integrates a rigorous, multi-stage evaluation&mdash;from laboratory tests and troop trials to demanding field trials in varied terrains, including deserts, mountains, and plains. Agencies like the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA) actively collaborate with frontline troops, refining equipment specifications based on realistic feedback. Such exhaustive validation, though time-consuming, underscores a non-negotiable commitment: the safety of the soldier and the certainty of performance in combat situations.
Moreover, far from being static, the procurement process actively promotes innovation and adaptability. In line with India's vision of defence self-reliance under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative, the Indian Army significantly emphasises indigenous capability building. Successful indigenous defence programmes such as the Dhanush artillery system, Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher, Arjun Mk1A main battle tank, and various loitering munition platforms underline this strategic priority. It is vital to understand that delays in these indigenous projects are often linked to complex developmental challenges, rather than bureaucratic inefficiency or bias. The eventual induction of these systems vindicates the methodical, detail-oriented approach and highlights the army&rsquo;s determination to acquire systems proven effective beyond doubt.
The post-2014 reforms, including Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2016, Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020, and innovation-focused initiatives such as Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX), have significantly enhanced transparency, accountability, and industry participation. The Indian Army&rsquo;s proactive engagement with startups and MSMEs through mechanisms like the Army Design Bureau (ADB) demonstrates an innovative and forward-looking approach. Notable examples&mdash;IdeaForge, IG Drones, Siliconia Technologies, and Artemon Aerospace&mdash;illustrate how this engagement translates into tangible capabilities, with military guidance steering these startups toward operational utility rather than theoretical concepts.
Some observers incorrectly correlate caution and deliberate timelines with bureaucratic incompetence. This perspective neglects the complex realities influencing procurement timelines, including geopolitical factors affecting supply chains, shifting budgetary priorities, and intricate multi-layered approvals and audits by the Ministry of Defence, Financial Vigilance, and the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG). Furthermore, rapidly emerging threats may necessitate immediate reorientation, as demonstrated by procurement adjustments triggered by the standoff with China. Indeed, slow procurement does not equate to inefficiency&mdash;rather, it reflects careful due diligence aimed at optimising strategic decisions in an unpredictable security environment.
The meticulous scrutiny and high standards embedded within the Indian Army's procurement procedures are not impediments&mdash;they are necessities. Ensuring operational readiness requires equipment to be thoroughly tested, validated, and tailored to real-world military needs. When it comes to equipping soldiers who defend the nation under the most challenging circumstances, reliability and performance simply cannot be compromised.
Ultimately, the Indian Army's cautious yet strategic procurement process aligns national security interests with defence innovation and operational preparedness. Instead of criticising perceived delays, it is essential to appreciate the diligence, transparency, and thoroughness that underpin procurement decisions&mdash;qualities that safeguard the lives of our soldiers and strengthen the nation's defences.
Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.

Discover how the Indian Army's rigorous procurement process ensures battle readiness and reliability amidst evolving geopolitical threats and military needs.

In an environment continually defined by shifting geopolitical threats and rapidly changing military needs, the Indian Army's careful procurement process demonstrates a commendable balance of thoroughness, transparency, and strategic foresight. While critics often highlight delays and prolonged timelines, such commentary tends to overlook the critical rationale behind such deliberate caution: ensuring absolute reliability, robust operational capabilities, and soldier safety in every procurement decision. Procurement in the Indian Army is not a casual affair—it is meticulously structured and scrutinised at multiple levels, guided strictly by comprehensive General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs). These GSQRs are frequently updated, ensuring they remain responsive to changing threat perceptions and technological advancements. In recent times, the Army has adapted these standards to address high-altitude warfare, reflecting current operational realities, notably along India’s contested Himalayan frontiers. The extensive testing of K9 Vajra howitzers in Ladakh and the comprehensive evaluations of infantry rifles such as the SiG-716 and AK-203 exemplify this adaptive approach. Such thorough evaluations guarantee equipment effectiveness under diverse and demanding conditions, translating directly into battlefield readiness. The Army's procurement procedure integrates a rigorous, multi-stage evaluation—from laboratory tests and troop trials to demanding field trials in varied terrains, including deserts, mountains, and plains. Agencies like the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA) actively collaborate with frontline troops, refining equipment specifications based on realistic feedback. Such exhaustive validation, though time-consuming, underscores a non-negotiable commitment: the safety of the soldier and the certainty of performance in combat situations. Moreover, far from being static, the procurement process actively promotes innovation and adaptability. In line with India's vision of defence self-reliance under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative, the Indian Army significantly emphasises indigenous capability building. Successful indigenous defence programmes such as the Dhanush artillery system, Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher, Arjun Mk1A main battle tank, and various loitering munition platforms underline this strategic priority. It is vital to understand that delays in these indigenous projects are often linked to complex developmental challenges, rather than bureaucratic inefficiency or bias. The eventual induction of these systems vindicates the methodical, detail-oriented approach and highlights the army’s determination to acquire systems proven effective beyond doubt. The post-2014 reforms, including Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2016, Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020, and innovation-focused initiatives such as Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX), have significantly enhanced transparency, accountability, and industry participation. The Indian Army’s proactive engagement with startups and MSMEs through mechanisms like the Army Design Bureau (ADB) demonstrates an innovative and forward-looking approach. Notable examples—IdeaForge, IG Drones, Siliconia Technologies, and Artemon Aerospace—illustrate how this engagement translates into tangible capabilities, with military guidance steering these startups toward operational utility rather than theoretical concepts. Some observers incorrectly correlate caution and deliberate timelines with bureaucratic incompetence. This perspective neglects the complex realities influencing procurement timelines, including geopolitical factors affecting supply chains, shifting budgetary priorities, and intricate multi-layered approvals and audits by the Ministry of Defence, Financial Vigilance, and the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG). Furthermore, rapidly emerging threats may necessitate immediate reorientation, as demonstrated by procurement adjustments triggered by the standoff with China. Indeed, slow procurement does not equate to inefficiency—rather, it reflects careful due diligence aimed at optimising strategic decisions in an unpredictable security environment. The meticulous scrutiny and high standards embedded within the Indian Army's procurement procedures are not impediments—they are necessities. Ensuring operational readiness requires equipment to be thoroughly tested, validated, and tailored to real-world military needs. When it comes to equipping soldiers who defend the nation under the most challenging circumstances, reliability and performance simply cannot be compromised. Ultimately, the Indian Army's cautious yet strategic procurement process aligns national security interests with defence innovation and operational preparedness. Instead of criticising perceived delays, it is essential to appreciate the diligence, transparency, and thoroughness that underpin procurement decisions—qualities that safeguard the lives of our soldiers and strengthen the nation's defences. Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.

The Indian Army’s rigorous procurement process ensures battle readiness and reliability

Everything modern armies do relies on the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. Without this invisible backbone of communications, surveillance, navigation, targeting, and command systems, today&rsquo;s highly digitised forces are blind, deaf, and disconnected.
As such, modern warfare is no longer just about physical dominance. Victory now hinges on who can control the electromagnetic spectrum.
For India, the stakes could not be higher. With two nuclear-armed neighbours and contested borders stretching thousands of kilometres, the ability to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum is absolutely necessary.
So now, Electronic Warfare (EW) systems are the new high ground&mdash;used to protect assets, disrupt enemy operations, and maintain operational secrecy in a combat environment increasingly shaped by drones, satellites, and cyber strikes.
India&rsquo;s armed forces, particularly the Army, have taken decisive steps to fortify their capabilities in this domain.
EW, once a specialised support function, is now at the heart of India&rsquo;s push to dominate future battlefields.
While addressing the 64th National Defence College (NDC) Course, Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi laid out the Indian Army&rsquo;s comprehensive modernisation roadmap, structured around five strategic pillars: Jointness and Integration, Force Restructuring, Modernisation and Technology Infusion, Systems, Processes, and Functions, and Human Resource Management.
Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/indian-army-pays-tribute-to-braveheart-jco-kuldeep-chand-killed-in-kishtwar-counter-terrorism-operation-8953842" rel="dofollow noopener" target="_blank">Indian army pays tribute to 'braveheart' JCO Kuldeep Chand killed in Kishtwar counter-terrorism&nbsp;operation</a>
These pillars, he emphasised, are not standalone efforts but interconnected components of a future-ready force aligned with the challenges of modern warfare.
As part of the third pillar&mdash;Modernisation and Technology Infusion&mdash;General Dwivedi highlighted the critical need to enhance the Army&rsquo;s communication architecture, especially under contested conditions where electronic warfare (EW) threats are intensifying.
<h2>Communication Security SAMBHAV Hai</h2>
Key to this push is the Secure Army Mobile Bharat Version (SAMBHAV)&mdash;a secure mobile communication platform developed indigenously for the Indian Army.
Essentially, it is a military-grade alternative to commercial messaging and coordination apps, tailored for use in operational and tactical scenarios where security, reliability, and control are paramount.
SAMBHAV is a crucial tool in the Indian Army's efforts to strengthen EW resilience.
In electronic warfare scenarios, the first targets are usually communication networks. SAMBHAV provides a secure, encrypted mobile communication platform that allows personnel&mdash;especially at the tactical and operational levels&mdash;to stay connected without risking interception or signal compromise.
Also read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/indian-army-uses-robo-mules-nano-drones-for-relief-in-earthquake-hit-myanmar-video-8949852" rel="dofollow noopener" target="_blank">Indian Army uses Robo Mules, Nano Drones for relief in earthquake hit Myanmar - Video</a>
<h2>From Signals to Supremacy: Samyukta</h2>
Spurred by increasing threats along both its western and northern borders, the Army has embarked on a comprehensive upgrade of its EW arsenal.
At the heart of this transformation is Samyukta, India&rsquo;s first large-scale mobile integrated EW system. Co-developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL), and the Army&rsquo;s own Corps of Signals, Samyukta is designed for tactical dominance. It can intercept, monitor, and jam a vast range of enemy communications and radar systems&mdash;from High Frequency (HF) to Millimetre Waves (MMW).
Deployed on mobile platforms, it offers rapid field mobility and supports both Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Electronic Countermeasures (ECM).
<h2>Himashakti Scales Heights</h2>
But terrain matters. And along the high-altitude Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, the challenges of electronic warfare multiply. This is where Himashakti comes in&mdash;a bespoke EW solution engineered for mountain warfare.
Unlike older systems that faltered in harsh conditions, Himashakti offers precision signal detection in low-oxygen, freezing environments, and thrives in Line-of-Sight (LoS)-restricted landscapes. Its integration with drones, satellite communications, and network-centric warfare platforms ensures that the Army isn&rsquo;t just listening&mdash;it&rsquo;s also responding in real time.
By embedding EW capabilities directly into mountainous combat formations, India is signalling its intention to match China&rsquo;s growing electronic and cyber footprint across contested regions.
<h2>The Integrated Edge</h2>
Further reinforcing India&rsquo;s spectrum warfare ambitions is the Integrated Electronic Warfare Platform (IEWP)&mdash;a multi-terrain system capable of intercepting, locating, and jamming enemy communications across a frequency range that stretches from HF to K-band.
IEWP is divided into specialised mobile segments: low, mid, and high-frequency jamming units, all linked to a central Command Centre through redundant communication networks. These connections ensure the system is not only flexible but also resistant to enemy countermeasures&mdash;courtesy of ECCM (Electronic Counter-Countermeasures) protocols. It&rsquo;s a web of mobile assets, communicating across secure radio and physical lines, feeding data into command hubs that can adjust strategies on the fly.
With this, the Army is no longer just defending its networks&mdash;it is actively shaping the battlespace, degrading enemy command chains before the first bullet is even fired.
<h2>AI Integration: Revolutionising Electronic Warfare</h2>
A pivotal component of the Army&rsquo;s modernisation is the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into electronic warfare systems. AI dramatically enhances EW effectiveness by rapidly analysing vast quantities of signal data, identifying enemy electromagnetic emissions, and classifying threats in real-time.
AI-powered analytics enable the automated detection and recognition of hostile radar, communications, and navigation signals, significantly reducing the reaction time required to counter these threats. AI systems can swiftly recommend or autonomously activate jamming, spoofing, and disruption techniques, adjusting responses dynamically as enemy electronic tactics evolve.
Furthermore, AI can predict adversary behaviours by identifying patterns in electronic signatures, allowing EW units to preemptively disrupt communications and radar systems before they can effectively threaten Indian forces. This proactive capability adds a crucial layer of agility, enabling the Army to remain one step ahead in electronic dominance.
Integrating AI into platforms such as Samyukta, Himashakti, and IEWP means these systems not only react faster but can also dynamically coordinate their operations across multiple EW platforms, creating a resilient, adaptive network of electronic defence and attack capabilities.
<h2>Bridging the Gap: Cyber and EW in Lockstep</h2>
As adversaries increasingly blend cyberattacks with electronic jamming, India is responding in kind. A critical part of the Army&rsquo;s evolving doctrine is the convergence of cyber operations with EW capabilities&mdash;something that fits snugly within its broader Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) framework.
MDO, a concept originally developed in the United States, involves the coordinated use of land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace assets to achieve a strategic edge. The Indian Army is integrating these principles into joint exercises, simulating complex scenarios where EW units jam communication lines while cyber teams attack backend servers and data streams.
Recent acquisitions of high-tech radar systems and electronic countermeasure suites are testament to this vision. From disabling enemy air defences to ensuring seamless troop communication, EW is now a combat multiplier&mdash;an indispensable layer in the modern Indian military machine.
<h2>Why Electronic Warfare Must Stay Front and Centre</h2>
Pakistan&rsquo;s pursuit of advanced jamming and signal interception systems, coupled with China&rsquo;s expansive investments in cyber-electronic integration, means India cannot afford to lag behind. While Samyukta, Himashakti, and IEWP are significant strides, gaps remain&mdash;especially in cross-service coordination, real-time data fusion, and integration with space-based assets.
Bridging these divides will require more than equipment. It will need investment in training, private sector innovation, and rapid doctrinal evolution.
India&rsquo;s strategic planners must now prioritise EW innovation with the same urgency once reserved for missiles and aircraft.
In this new theatre of war, silence is no longer golden. It&rsquo;s weaponised&mdash;and the side that hears, disrupts, and controls first, wins.

For India, the stakes could not be higher. With two nuclear-armed neighbours and contested borders stretching thousands of kilometres, the ability to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum is absolutely necessary. Opinions & Blogs

Everything modern armies do relies on the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. Without this invisible backbone of communications, surveillance, navigation, targeting, and command systems, today’s highly digitised forces are blind, deaf, and disconnected. As such, modern warfare is no longer just about physical dominance. Victory now hinges on who can control the electromagnetic spectrum. For India, the stakes could not be higher. With two nuclear-armed neighbours and contested borders stretching thousands of kilometres, the ability to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum is absolutely necessary. So now, Electronic Warfare (EW) systems are the new high ground—used to protect assets, disrupt enemy operations, and maintain operational secrecy in a combat environment increasingly shaped by drones, satellites, and cyber strikes. India’s armed forces, particularly the Army, have taken decisive steps to fortify their capabilities in this domain. EW, once a specialised support function, is now at the heart of India’s push to dominate future battlefields. While addressing the 64th National Defence College (NDC) Course, Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi laid out the Indian Army’s comprehensive modernisation roadmap, structured around five strategic pillars: Jointness and Integration, Force Restructuring, Modernisation and Technology Infusion, Systems, Processes, and Functions, and Human Resource Management. Also read: Indian army pays tribute to 'braveheart' JCO Kuldeep Chand killed in Kishtwar counter-terrorism operation These pillars, he emphasised, are not standalone efforts but interconnected components of a future-ready force aligned with the challenges of modern warfare. As part of the third pillar—Modernisation and Technology Infusion—General Dwivedi highlighted the critical need to enhance the Army’s communication architecture, especially under contested conditions where electronic warfare (EW) threats are intensifying. Communication Security SAMBHAV Hai Key to this push is the Secure Army Mobile Bharat Version (SAMBHAV)—a secure mobile communication platform developed indigenously for the Indian Army. Essentially, it is a military-grade alternative to commercial messaging and coordination apps, tailored for use in operational and tactical scenarios where security, reliability, and control are paramount. SAMBHAV is a crucial tool in the Indian Army's efforts to strengthen EW resilience. In electronic warfare scenarios, the first targets are usually communication networks. SAMBHAV provides a secure, encrypted mobile communication platform that allows personnel—especially at the tactical and operational levels—to stay connected without risking interception or signal compromise. Also read: Indian Army uses Robo Mules, Nano Drones for relief in earthquake hit Myanmar - Video From Signals to Supremacy: Samyukta Spurred by increasing threats along both its western and northern borders, the Army has embarked on a comprehensive upgrade of its EW arsenal. At the heart of this transformation is Samyukta, India’s first large-scale mobile integrated EW system. Co-developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL), and the Army’s own Corps of Signals, Samyukta is designed for tactical dominance. It can intercept, monitor, and jam a vast range of enemy communications and radar systems—from High Frequency (HF) to Millimetre Waves (MMW). Deployed on mobile platforms, it offers rapid field mobility and supports both Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Electronic Countermeasures (ECM). Himashakti Scales Heights But terrain matters. And along the high-altitude Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, the challenges of electronic warfare multiply. This is where Himashakti comes in—a bespoke EW solution engineered for mountain warfare. Unlike older systems that faltered in harsh conditions, Himashakti offers precision signal detection in low-oxygen, freezing environments, and thrives in Line-of-Sight (LoS)-restricted landscapes. Its integration with drones, satellite communications, and network-centric warfare platforms ensures that the Army isn’t just listening—it’s also responding in real time. By embedding EW capabilities directly into mountainous combat formations, India is signalling its intention to match China’s growing electronic and cyber footprint across contested regions. The Integrated Edge Further reinforcing India’s spectrum warfare ambitions is the Integrated Electronic Warfare Platform (IEWP)—a multi-terrain system capable of intercepting, locating, and jamming enemy communications across a frequency range that stretches from HF to K-band. IEWP is divided into specialised mobile segments: low, mid, and high-frequency jamming units, all linked to a central Command Centre through redundant communication networks. These connections ensure the system is not only flexible but also resistant to enemy countermeasures—courtesy of ECCM (Electronic Counter-Countermeasures) protocols. It’s a web of mobile assets, communicating across secure radio and physical lines, feeding data into command hubs that can adjust strategies on the fly. With this, the Army is no longer just defending its networks—it is actively shaping the battlespace, degrading enemy command chains before the first bullet is even fired. AI Integration: Revolutionising Electronic Warfare A pivotal component of the Army’s modernisation is the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into electronic warfare systems. AI dramatically enhances EW effectiveness by rapidly analysing vast quantities of signal data, identifying enemy electromagnetic emissions, and classifying threats in real-time. AI-powered analytics enable the automated detection and recognition of hostile radar, communications, and navigation signals, significantly reducing the reaction time required to counter these threats. AI systems can swiftly recommend or autonomously activate jamming, spoofing, and disruption techniques, adjusting responses dynamically as enemy electronic tactics evolve. Furthermore, AI can predict adversary behaviours by identifying patterns in electronic signatures, allowing EW units to preemptively disrupt communications and radar systems before they can effectively threaten Indian forces. This proactive capability adds a crucial layer of agility, enabling the Army to remain one step ahead in electronic dominance. Integrating AI into platforms such as Samyukta, Himashakti, and IEWP means these systems not only react faster but can also dynamically coordinate their operations across multiple EW platforms, creating a resilient, adaptive network of electronic defence and attack capabilities. Bridging the Gap: Cyber and EW in Lockstep As adversaries increasingly blend cyberattacks with electronic jamming, India is responding in kind. A critical part of the Army’s evolving doctrine is the convergence of cyber operations with EW capabilities—something that fits snugly within its broader Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) framework. MDO, a concept originally developed in the United States, involves the coordinated use of land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace assets to achieve a strategic edge. The Indian Army is integrating these principles into joint exercises, simulating complex scenarios where EW units jam communication lines while cyber teams attack backend servers and data streams. Recent acquisitions of high-tech radar systems and electronic countermeasure suites are testament to this vision. From disabling enemy air defences to ensuring seamless troop communication, EW is now a combat multiplier—an indispensable layer in the modern Indian military machine. Why Electronic Warfare Must Stay Front and Centre Pakistan’s pursuit of advanced jamming and signal interception systems, coupled with China’s expansive investments in cyber-electronic integration, means India cannot afford to lag behind. While Samyukta, Himashakti, and IEWP are significant strides, gaps remain—especially in cross-service coordination, real-time data fusion, and integration with space-based assets. Bridging these divides will require more than equipment. It will need investment in training, private sector innovation, and rapid doctrinal evolution. India’s strategic planners must now prioritise EW innovation with the same urgency once reserved for missiles and aircraft. In this new theatre of war, silence is no longer golden. It’s weaponised—and the side that hears, disrupts, and controls first, wins.

Indian Army accelerates electronic warfare modernisation with SAMBHAV, Samyukta, Himashakti, and AI

In the evolving domain of 21st-century warfare, cyberspace has become a critical battleground, shaping the outcomes of conflicts before a single shot is fired. Cyber warfare, encompassing both offensive and defensive capabilities, has emerged as an indispensable pillar of national security and military strategy. As nations around the world invest heavily in digital warfare tools, the Indian Army is also advancing steadily to secure its networks, protect critical infrastructure, and develop precision cyber strike capabilities in line with modern threats. Cyber warfare can be broadly classified into two domains&mdash;offensive and defensive. Offensive cyber capabilities involve using cyber tools to disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy systems, networks, and infrastructure. These operations are designed to impair the adversary&rsquo;s command and control, communication networks, critical infrastructure, or weapon systems. On the other hand, defensive cyber capabilities are aimed at protecting one&rsquo;s own networks, preventing intrusions, detecting threats, and ensuring the integrity of communications and operational readiness. Global trends over the last decade have demonstrated the growing relevance of cyber capabilities in actual combat scenarios. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has perhaps been the most telling example. Even before the first tank crossed the border in February 2022, Ukraine&rsquo;s banking systems, satellite networks, and government servers were subjected to a series of coordinated cyberattacks. The deployment of malware like &ldquo;WhisperGate&rdquo; and &ldquo;HermeticWiper&rdquo; showcased the disruptive potential of offensive cyber tools. Russia also allegedly targeted Viasat&rsquo;s satellite communication systems, causing widespread outages across military and civilian networks.
Also Read |&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions/artillery-modernisation-why-the-indian-armys-high-standards-are-absolutely-non-negotiable-8906116" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Artillery modernisation: Why the Indian Army's high standards are absolutely non-negotiable!</a>&nbsp; Ukraine, meanwhile, with substantial assistance from Western allies, mounted a formidable cyber defence, leveraging both state and private capabilities to neutralise attacks and maintain digital resilience. The importance of defensive cyber operations was further highlighted in incidents like the SolarWinds breach (2020), which compromised the software supply chains of numerous U.S. government and private entities. Likewise, the Iranian and Israeli cyber confrontations over the past few years, ranging from attacks on water treatment plants to the targeting of port facilities, reflect how cyber tools are increasingly used to project power and inflict damage, often without crossing traditional thresholds of war. In this global context, the Indian Army has recognised the need to build credible cyber capabilities across the full spectrum&mdash;from safeguarding digital infrastructure to developing proactive offensive measures. The Indian Army operates under a layered approach to cybersecurity. Establishing the Defence Cyber Agency (DCA) under the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) is a milestone step towards consolidating tri-service cyber operations. The DCA is tasked with both defensive and offensive cyber roles and plays a key part in integrating cyber warfare with conventional military operations. Also Read |&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions/russia-ukraine-wired-for-war-fibre-optic-drones-redefining-conflict-8889151" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Russia, Ukraine wired for war: Fibre-optic drones redefining conflict</a> The latest Land Warfare Doctrine highlights the centrality of cyber operations in contemporary land warfare scenarios, emphasising that victory in future conflicts will hinge upon dominance in information and cyber domains. The doctrine explicitly recognises cyber warfare as critical not only for safeguarding command-and-control systems but also for enabling precision strikes, enhancing battlefield situational awareness, and disrupting adversarial operations. Thus, investing in offensive and defensive cyber capabilities is no longer optional but an operational imperative for the Indian Army to maintain strategic advantage and achieve decisive outcomes. India&rsquo;s security environment necessitates such preparedness. With persistent cyber intrusions emanating from adversarial states, especially China and Pakistan, the threat landscape is complex and evolving. Reports of cyber reconnaissance on Indian military networks attempts to breach critical infrastructure, and targeting of satellite and energy grids highlight the urgency for robust defensive mechanisms. The Indian Army has, therefore, strengthened its cyber surveillance, threat intelligence, and incident response mechanisms. Internal monitoring units, Security Operations Centres (SOCs), and Cyber Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) ensure 24/7 vigilance and rapid response capabilities.
Also Read |&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions/not-quite-shoot-to-kill-trumps-cowboy-bluster-on-tariffs-hides-a-pragmatic-subtext-8919727" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Not quite shoot-to-kill: Trump&rsquo;s cowboy bluster on tariffs hides a pragmatic subtext</a> At the same time, the Indian Army is investing in offensive cyber capabilities in line with global strategic trends. These include developing indigenous malware tools, penetration testing frameworks, and tools for network disruption and signal interception. Advanced training and skill development form another pillar of the Army&rsquo;s cyber preparedness. The Military College of Telecommunication Engineering (MCTE) in Mhow has become a hub for cyber and information warfare training. Officers and personnel are being equipped with state-of-the-art knowledge in cyber operations, ethical hacking, cryptography, and AI-driven threat analysis. Exercises and simulations replicating real-world cyberattack scenarios are routinely conducted to ensure readiness. Emerging technologies are playing a transformative role. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning are now integral to threat detection and behavioural analysis in Army networks. Blockchain-based secure communication protocols and quantum-resistant encryption methods are also being explored to avoid future cyber threats. For the Indian Army, cyber capabilities offer operational benefits beyond mere protection. Offensive cyber tools can act as force multipliers, enabling the Army to disrupt enemy networks during operations, paralyse adversary logistics, or neutralise command infrastructure in a non-kinetic, deniable manner. They serve as a form of strategic deterrence, showcasing the Army&rsquo;s ability to respond in kind to any hostile digital aggression.&nbsp; As modern warfare increasingly moves into the virtual realm, the Indian Army&rsquo;s proactive and forward-looking approach to cyber operations reflects its commitment to securing India&rsquo;s sovereignty in the information age. Both offensive and defensive cyber capabilities are not merely technological pursuits&mdash;they are foundational to national security and strategic autonomy. In a battlespace where bytes can be as decisive as bullets, India&rsquo;s growing cyber strength ensures that the Army remains future-ready, resilient, and formidable.
(Col. Danvir Singh (Retd) is a military veteran who is now associated with different television and print media as a consultant on defence and strategic affairs. He follows developments in weapon systems closely and carries out analysis on matters of Defence, Strategy, &amp; Foreign Affairs with a special focus on India&rsquo;s neighbourhood. A prolific writer, Col. Danvir, is the author of the book Kashmir&rsquo;s Death Trap: Tales of Perfidy and Valour.)
(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

Opinions & Blogs: Global trends over the last decade have demonstrated the growing relevance of cyber capabilities in actual combat scenarios. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has perhaps been the most telling example.

In the evolving domain of 21st-century warfare, cyberspace has become a critical battleground, shaping the outcomes of conflicts before a single shot is fired. Cyber warfare, encompassing both offensive and defensive capabilities, has emerged as an indispensable pillar of national security and military strategy. As nations around the world invest heavily in digital warfare tools, the Indian Army is also advancing steadily to secure its networks, protect critical infrastructure, and develop precision cyber strike capabilities in line with modern threats. Cyber warfare can be broadly classified into two domains—offensive and defensive. Offensive cyber capabilities involve using cyber tools to disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy systems, networks, and infrastructure. These operations are designed to impair the adversary’s command and control, communication networks, critical infrastructure, or weapon systems. On the other hand, defensive cyber capabilities are aimed at protecting one’s own networks, preventing intrusions, detecting threats, and ensuring the integrity of communications and operational readiness. Global trends over the last decade have demonstrated the growing relevance of cyber capabilities in actual combat scenarios. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has perhaps been the most telling example. Even before the first tank crossed the border in February 2022, Ukraine’s banking systems, satellite networks, and government servers were subjected to a series of coordinated cyberattacks. The deployment of malware like “WhisperGate” and “HermeticWiper” showcased the disruptive potential of offensive cyber tools. Russia also allegedly targeted Viasat’s satellite communication systems, causing widespread outages across military and civilian networks. Also Read | Artillery modernisation: Why the Indian Army's high standards are absolutely non-negotiable! Ukraine, meanwhile, with substantial assistance from Western allies, mounted a formidable cyber defence, leveraging both state and private capabilities to neutralise attacks and maintain digital resilience. The importance of defensive cyber operations was further highlighted in incidents like the SolarWinds breach (2020), which compromised the software supply chains of numerous U.S. government and private entities. Likewise, the Iranian and Israeli cyber confrontations over the past few years, ranging from attacks on water treatment plants to the targeting of port facilities, reflect how cyber tools are increasingly used to project power and inflict damage, often without crossing traditional thresholds of war. In this global context, the Indian Army has recognised the need to build credible cyber capabilities across the full spectrum—from safeguarding digital infrastructure to developing proactive offensive measures. The Indian Army operates under a layered approach to cybersecurity. Establishing the Defence Cyber Agency (DCA) under the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) is a milestone step towards consolidating tri-service cyber operations. The DCA is tasked with both defensive and offensive cyber roles and plays a key part in integrating cyber warfare with conventional military operations. Also Read | Russia, Ukraine wired for war: Fibre-optic drones redefining conflict The latest Land Warfare Doctrine highlights the centrality of cyber operations in contemporary land warfare scenarios, emphasising that victory in future conflicts will hinge upon dominance in information and cyber domains. The doctrine explicitly recognises cyber warfare as critical not only for safeguarding command-and-control systems but also for enabling precision strikes, enhancing battlefield situational awareness, and disrupting adversarial operations. Thus, investing in offensive and defensive cyber capabilities is no longer optional but an operational imperative for the Indian Army to maintain strategic advantage and achieve decisive outcomes. India’s security environment necessitates such preparedness. With persistent cyber intrusions emanating from adversarial states, especially China and Pakistan, the threat landscape is complex and evolving. Reports of cyber reconnaissance on Indian military networks attempts to breach critical infrastructure, and targeting of satellite and energy grids highlight the urgency for robust defensive mechanisms. The Indian Army has, therefore, strengthened its cyber surveillance, threat intelligence, and incident response mechanisms. Internal monitoring units, Security Operations Centres (SOCs), and Cyber Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) ensure 24/7 vigilance and rapid response capabilities. Also Read | Not quite shoot-to-kill: Trump’s cowboy bluster on tariffs hides a pragmatic subtext At the same time, the Indian Army is investing in offensive cyber capabilities in line with global strategic trends. These include developing indigenous malware tools, penetration testing frameworks, and tools for network disruption and signal interception. Advanced training and skill development form another pillar of the Army’s cyber preparedness. The Military College of Telecommunication Engineering (MCTE) in Mhow has become a hub for cyber and information warfare training. Officers and personnel are being equipped with state-of-the-art knowledge in cyber operations, ethical hacking, cryptography, and AI-driven threat analysis. Exercises and simulations replicating real-world cyberattack scenarios are routinely conducted to ensure readiness. Emerging technologies are playing a transformative role. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning are now integral to threat detection and behavioural analysis in Army networks. Blockchain-based secure communication protocols and quantum-resistant encryption methods are also being explored to avoid future cyber threats. For the Indian Army, cyber capabilities offer operational benefits beyond mere protection. Offensive cyber tools can act as force multipliers, enabling the Army to disrupt enemy networks during operations, paralyse adversary logistics, or neutralise command infrastructure in a non-kinetic, deniable manner. They serve as a form of strategic deterrence, showcasing the Army’s ability to respond in kind to any hostile digital aggression. As modern warfare increasingly moves into the virtual realm, the Indian Army’s proactive and forward-looking approach to cyber operations reflects its commitment to securing India’s sovereignty in the information age. Both offensive and defensive cyber capabilities are not merely technological pursuits—they are foundational to national security and strategic autonomy. In a battlespace where bytes can be as decisive as bullets, India’s growing cyber strength ensures that the Army remains future-ready, resilient, and formidable. (Col. Danvir Singh (Retd) is a military veteran who is now associated with different television and print media as a consultant on defence and strategic affairs. He follows developments in weapon systems closely and carries out analysis on matters of Defence, Strategy, & Foreign Affairs with a special focus on India’s neighbourhood. A prolific writer, Col. Danvir, is the author of the book Kashmir’s Death Trap: Tales of Perfidy and Valour.) (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

Offensive vs defensive cyber capabilities: A new frontier in military power

Author

Zee News Rajasthan

Editor

Colonel Danvir Singh

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