It’s now official, finally. There will be no alliance between the Congress and the Aam Aadmi Party in Delhi. This is a setback for both the parties since they now have to take on the Bharatiya Janata Party individually. The BJP had swept all the seven seats on offer in 2014 and is sitting pretty now, given the division of its anti-votes.&nbsp; 
 
The failure to strike an alliance is a reflection of the larger problems that the opposition faces in formulating a coalition to take on Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his party at the national level. &nbsp; 
&nbsp; 
After various aborted attempts at a national-level alliance, there had been a realisation that the most pragmatic way to prevent the BJP from retaining power was to form state-level alliances.&nbsp;

Thus, the Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party came together in Maharashtra, the Congress and the National Conference structured a deal in Jammu &amp; Kashmir, the JD (S) and the Congress maintained their partnership in Karnataka despite problems, the Congress struck a coalition with the DMK in Tamil Nadu, and the Samajwadi Party and the BSP, otherwise bitterly opposed to each other, aligned in Uttar Pradesh. It was expected that, along the same lines, the AAP and the Congress would join hands in Delhi. The idea was to somehow short-circuit Modi and his party and work out an arrangement post-poll results. &nbsp;

The manner in which the situation unfolded over the weeks in Delhi does no credit to either the Congress or the AAP. All through this time, conflicting signals were sent out, giving the impression that neither of them was approaching the challenge with maturity. But the AAP came out worse because it was seen as the more desperate party to reach an understanding. 
 
It was repeatedly snubbed by the Congress and yet it continued to send feelers. Once Sheila Dikshit became Delhi’s Congress, it became near certain that no deal would be made. Dikshit was vehemently opposed to an understanding with the AAP, given the history of conflict between her and AAP supremo and Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal. Her lobby made it known to the high command that the party would be better off fighting alone. There were two reasons for this stand. The first was that the Congress is expecting a surge in its popularity as compared to 2014 and wanted to cash in on it, without surrendering seats to an alliance partner. The second was that &nbsp;Dikshit and her people were worried about the adverse public reaction to an AAP-Congress partnership — after all, the AAP was born out of an anti-corruption movement directed against a Congress-led regime at the Centre. &nbsp;

Despite her stature, Dikshit’s opinion may well have been ignored, had the AAP not insisted on an understanding with the Congress for Haryana as part of the Delhi deal. The Congress was in no mood to accommodate Kejriwal’s party in the neighbouring state because it saw no political gain for itself since the AAP has only a scattered presence in Haryana.&nbsp;

The Congress also realised that Kejriwal was seeking to spread his wings by riding piggyback on the Congress and eventually weakening its presence in those regions. &nbsp;

It appears from media reports that Congress president Rahul Gandhi favoured an alliance with the AAP in Delhi, and his point man PC Chacko was burning the midnight oil to make this happen. But Chacko had come up against a resolute Dikshit — though, for the record, the former Chief Minister said she would abide by the high command’s final decision. &nbsp;

That said, the fact is that Congress has seen itself pushed out of coalition arrangements in a few key states. In Uttar Pradesh, which sends the highest number of MPs to the Lok Sabha, it was kept out of the SP-BSP-RLD combine. It has failed to stitch an alliance with regional players in Haryana. Its understanding with Chandrababu Naidu’s TDP in the Telangana state polls has collapsed, both in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.

And it could not reach an agreement with the Left Front in West Bengal to take on an entrenched Trinamool Congress and a resurgent BJP. To add to its woes, the Congress has been pushed down the pecking order in the past years by the BJP even in states where it had been an important opposition — such as in Odisha and West Bengal, and even the North-East where it has not been able to work out deals with powerful regional outfits to take on the BJP and its allies who are part of the North-East Democratic Alliance. &nbsp;

With a three-way contest now certain in Delhi, the major contenders have decided to play it safe, more or less banking on tested candidates. While the AAP has projected most of its senior faces, the BJP has made only slight changes, such as including cricketer Gautam Gambhir as a candidate. The Congress too has relied on the old faces. If the BJP wins resoundingly, the AAP and the Congress will blame each other for their rout. If the BJP is contained, both will seek to corner the credit to themselves. &nbsp;

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

It’s now official, finally. There will be no alliance between the Congress and the Aam Aadmi Party in Delhi. This is a setback for both the parties since they now have to take on the Bharatiya Janata Party individually.

It’s now official, finally. There will be no alliance between the Congress and the Aam Aadmi Party in Delhi. This is a setback for both the parties since they now have to take on the Bharatiya Janata Party individually. The BJP had swept all the seven seats on offer in 2014 and is sitting pretty now, given the division of its anti-votes. The failure to strike an alliance is a reflection of the larger problems that the opposition faces in formulating a coalition to take on Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his party at the national level. After various aborted attempts at a national-level alliance, there had been a realisation that the most pragmatic way to prevent the BJP from retaining power was to form state-level alliances. Thus, the Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party came together in Maharashtra, the Congress and the National Conference structured a deal in Jammu & Kashmir, the JD (S) and the Congress maintained their partnership in Karnataka despite problems, the Congress struck a coalition with the DMK in Tamil Nadu, and the Samajwadi Party and the BSP, otherwise bitterly opposed to each other, aligned in Uttar Pradesh. It was expected that, along the same lines, the AAP and the Congress would join hands in Delhi. The idea was to somehow short-circuit Modi and his party and work out an arrangement post-poll results. The manner in which the situation unfolded over the weeks in Delhi does no credit to either the Congress or the AAP. All through this time, conflicting signals were sent out, giving the impression that neither of them was approaching the challenge with maturity. But the AAP came out worse because it was seen as the more desperate party to reach an understanding. It was repeatedly snubbed by the Congress and yet it continued to send feelers. Once Sheila Dikshit became Delhi’s Congress, it became near certain that no deal would be made. Dikshit was vehemently opposed to an understanding with the AAP, given the history of conflict between her and AAP supremo and Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal. Her lobby made it known to the high command that the party would be better off fighting alone. There were two reasons for this stand. The first was that the Congress is expecting a surge in its popularity as compared to 2014 and wanted to cash in on it, without surrendering seats to an alliance partner. The second was that Dikshit and her people were worried about the adverse public reaction to an AAP-Congress partnership — after all, the AAP was born out of an anti-corruption movement directed against a Congress-led regime at the Centre. Despite her stature, Dikshit’s opinion may well have been ignored, had the AAP not insisted on an understanding with the Congress for Haryana as part of the Delhi deal. The Congress was in no mood to accommodate Kejriwal’s party in the neighbouring state because it saw no political gain for itself since the AAP has only a scattered presence in Haryana. The Congress also realised that Kejriwal was seeking to spread his wings by riding piggyback on the Congress and eventually weakening its presence in those regions. It appears from media reports that Congress president Rahul Gandhi favoured an alliance with the AAP in Delhi, and his point man PC Chacko was burning the midnight oil to make this happen. But Chacko had come up against a resolute Dikshit — though, for the record, the former Chief Minister said she would abide by the high command’s final decision. That said, the fact is that Congress has seen itself pushed out of coalition arrangements in a few key states. In Uttar Pradesh, which sends the highest number of MPs to the Lok Sabha, it was kept out of the SP-BSP-RLD combine. It has failed to stitch an alliance with regional players in Haryana. Its understanding with Chandrababu Naidu’s TDP in the Telangana state polls has collapsed, both in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. And it could not reach an agreement with the Left Front in West Bengal to take on an entrenched Trinamool Congress and a resurgent BJP. To add to its woes, the Congress has been pushed down the pecking order in the past years by the BJP even in states where it had been an important opposition — such as in Odisha and West Bengal, and even the North-East where it has not been able to work out deals with powerful regional outfits to take on the BJP and its allies who are part of the North-East Democratic Alliance. With a three-way contest now certain in Delhi, the major contenders have decided to play it safe, more or less banking on tested candidates. While the AAP has projected most of its senior faces, the BJP has made only slight changes, such as including cricketer Gautam Gambhir as a candidate. The Congress too has relied on the old faces. If the BJP wins resoundingly, the AAP and the Congress will blame each other for their rout. If the BJP is contained, both will seek to corner the credit to themselves. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Alliance fallout: If BJP wins in Delhi, AAP and Congress will blame each other for their rout

Every election season witnesses politicians making objectionable remarks against their rivals, and every poll season has the Election Commission of India warning the offenders and reminding them of the code of conduct. On a few occasion the poll panel ‘acts’ by banning the accused from conducting or attending poll meetings for a few days. After that, it’s back to normal. So, why do politicians make comments that are violative of the Code of Conduct? Not only that, why do they use offensive words that are also against basic norms of civility?&nbsp;

The first reason is to do with the toothlessness of the Election Commission of India. If it finds some remark adversarial to the Model Code&nbsp;of Conduct, it can take two steps: Warn the accused, or bar him from campaigning. The second usually follows after the first. On paper, it can even debar a candidate from contesting, but that’s rare. Bal Thackeray had been disqualified from contesting elections for six years after he was found guilty of appealing to religious sentiments on behalf of a Shiv Sena leader in the 1987 Maharashtra Assembly elections. But that was after the court stepped in and Section 123 (3) of the Representation of the People Act was invoked. The Election Commission of India has often pointed out that its orders are usually non-binding in nature and that the Code of Conduct must be made legally binding to check objectionable content during poll campaigning. &nbsp;

The poll panel’s helplessness has only emboldened the political class. Already, in the course of the ongoing poll campaign, various offensive remarks have been made by leaders ranging from one end of the political spectrum to another. The Election Commission of India sought details of these statements but seemed to be taking its own time, leading the Supreme Court to step in and said, “Mr Election Commission, you have to act very promptly. You cannot drag matters like this. Get into action immediately.” &nbsp;

Thus prompted, the poll panel swung into action and placed restrictions on a bunch of leaders — Mayawati, Yogi Adityanath, Azam Khan, Maneka Gandhi. They were barred from addressing rallies for periods ranging from 48 hours to 72 hours. Expectedly, the affected leaders cried foul, claiming they had done no wrong.&nbsp;

But even within the restrictions, it is fettered with, the poll panel can be at least a bit more effective. As Chief Election Commissioner, TN Seshan had managed to curb offensive speeches in the 1990s through a mix of dire threats against such offence and action on the ground. He expressed his resolve to cancel or postpone elections in case the candidates failed to adhere to the code.&nbsp;

His warnings had the desired impact, though it did not fully stamp out the practice, especially when it came to appealing to religious sentiments.&nbsp;

It is ironical that various politicians flout a code of conduct which they themselves contributed to framing. The set of norms which comprise the Model Conduct of Conduct had been created through a consensus among political parties which agreed to abide by it. There are eight parts to the code, each dealing with different aspects of the norms to be followed by parties and candidates during poll campaigning. They are: Guidelines on poll manifestos; steps that the party in power should take; observers that the poll panel appoints; entry into polling booths; rules to be followed on polling day; organisation of processions; conduct of meetings; and, general conduct. The last one covers a range of dos and don’t, such as refraining from appealing to caste or religion to attract votes or using corrupt means, avoiding personal or private criticism of rivals and instead limiting criticism to policies or programmes, and not resorting to any activity which “may aggravate existing differences or create mutual hatred or cause tension between different castes and communities, religious or linguistic”. &nbsp;The code comes into effect from the day poll dates are announced.&nbsp;

The code of conduct is in keeping with Article 324 of the Constitution of India, which gives the Election Commission of India the power to supervise elections to Parliament and state legislatures. The code was first introduced back in 1960 in the Kerala Assembly elections, and then in the 1962 general elections. Over the years, it has evolved with experience and feedback from political parties. In 1979, a provision to regulate the party in power was introduced; in 2013, on directions of the Apex Court, the poll panel added a section on guidelines concerning election manifestos to ensure that the documents did not offer objectionable material.&nbsp;

Given that the fact that the Model Code of Conduct is not enforceable by law, aggrieved parties have to fall back on various others legal provisions in the Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal procedure and the Representation of the People Act, to get justice. But the process is time-consuming, and a verdict is more likely than not, to come after polling is done and even results are out. In a report on electoral reforms, the Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice had recommended the inclusion of the model code of conduct into the Representation of the People Act, for effective redressal. The time has come to give the Election Commission more teeth.&nbsp;

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)&nbsp;

Every election season witnesses politicians making objectionable remarks against their rivals, and every poll season has the Election Commission of India warning the offenders and reminding them of the code of conduct.

Every election season witnesses politicians making objectionable remarks against their rivals, and every poll season has the Election Commission of India warning the offenders and reminding them of the code of conduct. On a few occasion the poll panel ‘acts’ by banning the accused from conducting or attending poll meetings for a few days. After that, it’s back to normal. So, why do politicians make comments that are violative of the Code of Conduct? Not only that, why do they use offensive words that are also against basic norms of civility? The first reason is to do with the toothlessness of the Election Commission of India. If it finds some remark adversarial to the Model Code of Conduct, it can take two steps: Warn the accused, or bar him from campaigning. The second usually follows after the first. On paper, it can even debar a candidate from contesting, but that’s rare. Bal Thackeray had been disqualified from contesting elections for six years after he was found guilty of appealing to religious sentiments on behalf of a Shiv Sena leader in the 1987 Maharashtra Assembly elections. But that was after the court stepped in and Section 123 (3) of the Representation of the People Act was invoked. The Election Commission of India has often pointed out that its orders are usually non-binding in nature and that the Code of Conduct must be made legally binding to check objectionable content during poll campaigning. The poll panel’s helplessness has only emboldened the political class. Already, in the course of the ongoing poll campaign, various offensive remarks have been made by leaders ranging from one end of the political spectrum to another. The Election Commission of India sought details of these statements but seemed to be taking its own time, leading the Supreme Court to step in and said, “Mr Election Commission, you have to act very promptly. You cannot drag matters like this. Get into action immediately.” Thus prompted, the poll panel swung into action and placed restrictions on a bunch of leaders — Mayawati, Yogi Adityanath, Azam Khan, Maneka Gandhi. They were barred from addressing rallies for periods ranging from 48 hours to 72 hours. Expectedly, the affected leaders cried foul, claiming they had done no wrong. But even within the restrictions, it is fettered with, the poll panel can be at least a bit more effective. As Chief Election Commissioner, TN Seshan had managed to curb offensive speeches in the 1990s through a mix of dire threats against such offence and action on the ground. He expressed his resolve to cancel or postpone elections in case the candidates failed to adhere to the code. His warnings had the desired impact, though it did not fully stamp out the practice, especially when it came to appealing to religious sentiments. It is ironical that various politicians flout a code of conduct which they themselves contributed to framing. The set of norms which comprise the Model Conduct of Conduct had been created through a consensus among political parties which agreed to abide by it. There are eight parts to the code, each dealing with different aspects of the norms to be followed by parties and candidates during poll campaigning. They are: Guidelines on poll manifestos; steps that the party in power should take; observers that the poll panel appoints; entry into polling booths; rules to be followed on polling day; organisation of processions; conduct of meetings; and, general conduct. The last one covers a range of dos and don’t, such as refraining from appealing to caste or religion to attract votes or using corrupt means, avoiding personal or private criticism of rivals and instead limiting criticism to policies or programmes, and not resorting to any activity which “may aggravate existing differences or create mutual hatred or cause tension between different castes and communities, religious or linguistic”. The code comes into effect from the day poll dates are announced. The code of conduct is in keeping with Article 324 of the Constitution of India, which gives the Election Commission of India the power to supervise elections to Parliament and state legislatures. The code was first introduced back in 1960 in the Kerala Assembly elections, and then in the 1962 general elections. Over the years, it has evolved with experience and feedback from political parties. In 1979, a provision to regulate the party in power was introduced; in 2013, on directions of the Apex Court, the poll panel added a section on guidelines concerning election manifestos to ensure that the documents did not offer objectionable material. Given that the fact that the Model Code of Conduct is not enforceable by law, aggrieved parties have to fall back on various others legal provisions in the Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal procedure and the Representation of the People Act, to get justice. But the process is time-consuming, and a verdict is more likely than not, to come after polling is done and even results are out. In a report on electoral reforms, the Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice had recommended the inclusion of the model code of conduct into the Representation of the People Act, for effective redressal. The time has come to give the Election Commission more teeth. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Campaign ban on Mayawati, Maneka, Azam, Yogi: Election Commission needs more teeth to tackle poll code violations

The BJP’s vision document for the 2019 elections is a cocktail of the old and the new, as well as an assertion of certain narratives related to national security that have resonated with the people in recent months. The old has, among other things, its commitment to the construction of a Ram temple in Ayodhya in a lawful and harmonious manner. The new has a roadmap to make India a five-trillion-dollar economy, a massive push to infrastructure, further booster shots for the Make in India campaign, employment generation ideas and a more simplified Goods and Services Tax regime. But it is the party’s position on national security which stands out, primarily because both Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his senior party colleagues have made it a key election issue. The other reason is that the BJP’s commitment in the 'Sankalp Patra' on this subject contrasts sharply with that of the Congress’s promise in its manifesto.&nbsp;

The BJP’s stand on Article 370 and Article 35A, which are exclusive to Jammu &amp; Kashmir, have been known for long. But the underlining of its commitment to scrap the two provisions becomes especially important in an election season. The party seems to have come around to the view that one of the ways to effectively tackle the problems that the state keeps throwing up at regular intervals is to divest it of the special provisions which were supposed to have helped integrate it better with the rest of India. &nbsp;

The other reason for the BJP to give the issue prominence in its vision document was to put the Congress on the defensive. The Congress had in its manifesto promised to retain Article 370. It’s position on Article 35A too is that of maintaining the status quo. However, the popular perception nationwide seems to be veering towards a rethink on these provisions, and that fits well with the BJP’s overall nationalist agenda. &nbsp;

The BJP would be pleased with the response after it set the cat among the pigeons. Both the state’s leading parties, the National Conference and the Peoples Democratic Party have reacted strongly against the promise and warned that any tinkering with the two provisions would result in India losing hold over Kashmir. This is playing straight into the BJP’s hand since the party has for long been maintaining that these parties promote soft separatism and are not just reluctant to act against separatists but also back them when the Centre acts against them. There is more than a grain of truth in the BJP’s allegation, and taking the matter to the people helps the party burnish its nationalist credentials.&nbsp;

One may wonder if such strong statements do not harm the BJP’s prospects in Kashmir valley. The first fact is that the BJP has little electoral prospects in that region. The second fact is that there is a constituency beyond Kashmir in the state — Jammu, for instance, where the BJP has a strong presence and which would be more than satisfied with the party’s position on the issue. But even more importantly, there is the larger constituency beyond the state itself which aligns with the BJP’s thoughts on the matter and can help the party garner more seats nationally.&nbsp;&nbsp;

The 'Sankalp Patra' also promises to strengthen the country’s Armed Forces, have zero tolerance to terror, and continue to give a free hand to the forces to deal with terror. Read alongside the Congress manifesto which has spoken about reviewing the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, the BJP’s vision document virtually endorses AFSPA and leaves the issue to be decided in consultation with the Armed Forces. &nbsp;

In confirmation of its belligerent stand on anti-national activities, the vision document does not, as the Congress manifesto does, speak of scrapping the sedition law. Here it’s important to note that the vision document commits the party to “taking necessary and effective steps against Left-wing extremism to eliminate this menace in the next five years”. The connection cannot be missed, given that many Maoist sympathisers have been in recent months facing the heat for their support to Left-wing extremism, and the cry for charges of sedition to be slapped against them have grown from Right-wing elements.&nbsp;

The BJP’s aggressive stance, which has been reflected in the Sankalp Patra, should not surprise those who have been following the party’s election campaign. Led by Prime Minister Modi, it has made nationalism and national security, apart from development, the fulcrum of its poll narrative. The Congress has willy nilly extended a helping hand by its soft attitude, with senior Union Minister Arun Jaitely quipping that the BJP’s vision document had not been crafted by any 'tukde-tukde' group. The party clearly believes that it has the upper hand when it comes to keeping the focus on national security and nationalism.&nbsp;

&nbsp; (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.) &nbsp; 
&nbsp;

The BJP’s vision document for the 2019 elections is a cocktail of the old and the new, as well as an assertion of certain narratives related to national security that have resonated with the people in recent months.

The BJP’s vision document for the 2019 elections is a cocktail of the old and the new, as well as an assertion of certain narratives related to national security that have resonated with the people in recent months. The old has, among other things, its commitment to the construction of a Ram temple in Ayodhya in a lawful and harmonious manner. The new has a roadmap to make India a five-trillion-dollar economy, a massive push to infrastructure, further booster shots for the Make in India campaign, employment generation ideas and a more simplified Goods and Services Tax regime. But it is the party’s position on national security which stands out, primarily because both Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his senior party colleagues have made it a key election issue. The other reason is that the BJP’s commitment in the 'Sankalp Patra' on this subject contrasts sharply with that of the Congress’s promise in its manifesto. The BJP’s stand on Article 370 and Article 35A, which are exclusive to Jammu & Kashmir, have been known for long. But the underlining of its commitment to scrap the two provisions becomes especially important in an election season. The party seems to have come around to the view that one of the ways to effectively tackle the problems that the state keeps throwing up at regular intervals is to divest it of the special provisions which were supposed to have helped integrate it better with the rest of India. The other reason for the BJP to give the issue prominence in its vision document was to put the Congress on the defensive. The Congress had in its manifesto promised to retain Article 370. It’s position on Article 35A too is that of maintaining the status quo. However, the popular perception nationwide seems to be veering towards a rethink on these provisions, and that fits well with the BJP’s overall nationalist agenda. The BJP would be pleased with the response after it set the cat among the pigeons. Both the state’s leading parties, the National Conference and the Peoples Democratic Party have reacted strongly against the promise and warned that any tinkering with the two provisions would result in India losing hold over Kashmir. This is playing straight into the BJP’s hand since the party has for long been maintaining that these parties promote soft separatism and are not just reluctant to act against separatists but also back them when the Centre acts against them. There is more than a grain of truth in the BJP’s allegation, and taking the matter to the people helps the party burnish its nationalist credentials. One may wonder if such strong statements do not harm the BJP’s prospects in Kashmir valley. The first fact is that the BJP has little electoral prospects in that region. The second fact is that there is a constituency beyond Kashmir in the state — Jammu, for instance, where the BJP has a strong presence and which would be more than satisfied with the party’s position on the issue. But even more importantly, there is the larger constituency beyond the state itself which aligns with the BJP’s thoughts on the matter and can help the party garner more seats nationally. The 'Sankalp Patra' also promises to strengthen the country’s Armed Forces, have zero tolerance to terror, and continue to give a free hand to the forces to deal with terror. Read alongside the Congress manifesto which has spoken about reviewing the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, the BJP’s vision document virtually endorses AFSPA and leaves the issue to be decided in consultation with the Armed Forces. In confirmation of its belligerent stand on anti-national activities, the vision document does not, as the Congress manifesto does, speak of scrapping the sedition law. Here it’s important to note that the vision document commits the party to “taking necessary and effective steps against Left-wing extremism to eliminate this menace in the next five years”. The connection cannot be missed, given that many Maoist sympathisers have been in recent months facing the heat for their support to Left-wing extremism, and the cry for charges of sedition to be slapped against them have grown from Right-wing elements. The BJP’s aggressive stance, which has been reflected in the Sankalp Patra, should not surprise those who have been following the party’s election campaign. Led by Prime Minister Modi, it has made nationalism and national security, apart from development, the fulcrum of its poll narrative. The Congress has willy nilly extended a helping hand by its soft attitude, with senior Union Minister Arun Jaitely quipping that the BJP’s vision document had not been crafted by any 'tukde-tukde' group. The party clearly believes that it has the upper hand when it comes to keeping the focus on national security and nationalism. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

National security BJP's 'sankalp' as party manifesto vows to repeal Articles 370 & 35A, end left-wing extremism

The law permits a candidate to contest from two seats, and so there is nothing irregular in Rahul Gandhi deciding to contest from two Lok Sabha constituencies. But the law is not the issue here; the issue is political in nature. From the time it became officially known that the Congress president would fight from Wayanad in Kerala, in addition to re-contesting from Amethi — from where he is the sitting Member of Parliament — his party has been trying to justify the decision using various ways. Whether that defence sounds credible is one matter, but the fact that the Congress has been pushed to the back foot should be a source of satisfaction for the Bharatiya Janata Party.&nbsp; 
 
Congress has given two broad explanations. The first is that it is not unusual for politicians to contest from two constituencies. The party has pointed to Narendra Modi fighting the 2014 Lok Sabha polls from Varanasi and Vadodara. There are many other examples too, but the Modi analogy is flawed. Leaders generally take this route to be ‘safe’, in case the feedback from one constituency is not very assuring. Modi was not a Lok Sabha MP when he decided to take the national plunge. He had 26 ‘safe’ seats in Gujarat, and thus safety could not have been a reason for his choice of Varanasi as an additional constituency.&nbsp;

The idea was to energise his party in Uttar Pradesh where once the BJP was strong but had fallen on bad times since the previous two decades. Besides, Uttar Pradesh, with 80 Lok Sabha seats, was the key to win over the Centre. We now know that the strategy worked wonderfully for the party.&nbsp; 
 
Rahul Gandhi won in 2014 with a vastly reduced margin as compared to 2009 from Amethi. And this happened when he faced a newcomer to electoral politics, Smriti Irani. It needs to be remembered that, in a show of arrogance which is characteristic of the Nehru-Gandhi family, Priyanka Gandhi Vadra had then quipped: “Irani who?” Since then, Irani has maintained close touch with the constituency, arguably visiting it more frequently than the incumbent MP. The so-called Nehru-Gandhi bastion fell to the BJP in the 2017 State elections, where the Congress could not win a single Assembly constituency. &nbsp;

Over the last five years, with the BJP regime at the Centre and later in the state, Rahul Gandhi’s constituency has benefitted from the equation. The development in the period and lack of it in the previous times despite the Congress chief being its representative is the narrative that the BJP has been relentlessly pushing in the constituency. There is an additional factor to be considered — the refusal of the SP-BSP combine to put up a candidate in the constituency. Apparently, this has been done as a token of magnanimity, and to also ensure that the anti-BJP votes do not split. But it is a double-edged sword. There is no certainty that a majority of the votes that would have gone to SP-BSP candidate will fall in the Congress’s kitty. There is a possibility that some of them might end up in the BJP’s coffer, especially if neither Mayawati nor Akhilesh campaigns for Rahul Gandhi.&nbsp;

In sum, the Congress president faces a tougher contest than even the last time, and this is probably the reason why he has chosen a ‘safe’ seat in Wayanad. How safe even that, remains to be seen, given that the Communist Party of India (Marxist), which too in the fray from that constituency, has vowed to defeat the Congress heavyweight.&nbsp;

The second explanation the Congress has given for the Wayanad choice is that the party wants to ‘bridge’ the north-south divide, carry forward Indira Gandhi’s south-bound legacy, and boost the Congress’s prospects in Kerala. The fact is that Indira Gandhi had contested from Chikmagalur in Karnataka after facing a shocking and humiliating defeat from Rae Bareli in the post-Emergency elections. Karnataka had big leaders from the ruling Janata Dal at the Centre, and yet she won because by then the Janata Party experiment had just about begun to fall apart. The narrative of the north-south divide is specious because by that logic there must have been a west-north divide too when Modi contested from Vadodara and Varanasi — and he managed to bridge it! As for boosting the Congress’s chances in the state, that, for now, remains a fond hope.&nbsp;

The fact is: The choice of Wayanad is self-explanatory, and it has nothing to do with bridging any regional divide or taking a legacy forward. According to the 2011 Census, the percentage of Muslim and Christian population taken together is over 50 per cent, and the Congress believes that the demographics provided a safe enough cushion for Rahul Gandhi to emerge victorious. As per the same Census, nearly 95 per cent of the population lives in rural regions which, the Congress calculates, can be exploited in the party’s favour. &nbsp; 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.) 
&nbsp;&nbsp;

The law permits a candidate to contest from two seats, and so there is nothing irregular in Rahul Gandhi deciding to contest from two Lok Sabha constituencies. But the law is not the issue here; the issue is political in nature.

The law permits a candidate to contest from two seats, and so there is nothing irregular in Rahul Gandhi deciding to contest from two Lok Sabha constituencies. But the law is not the issue here; the issue is political in nature. From the time it became officially known that the Congress president would fight from Wayanad in Kerala, in addition to re-contesting from Amethi — from where he is the sitting Member of Parliament — his party has been trying to justify the decision using various ways. Whether that defence sounds credible is one matter, but the fact that the Congress has been pushed to the back foot should be a source of satisfaction for the Bharatiya Janata Party. Congress has given two broad explanations. The first is that it is not unusual for politicians to contest from two constituencies. The party has pointed to Narendra Modi fighting the 2014 Lok Sabha polls from Varanasi and Vadodara. There are many other examples too, but the Modi analogy is flawed. Leaders generally take this route to be ‘safe’, in case the feedback from one constituency is not very assuring. Modi was not a Lok Sabha MP when he decided to take the national plunge. He had 26 ‘safe’ seats in Gujarat, and thus safety could not have been a reason for his choice of Varanasi as an additional constituency. The idea was to energise his party in Uttar Pradesh where once the BJP was strong but had fallen on bad times since the previous two decades. Besides, Uttar Pradesh, with 80 Lok Sabha seats, was the key to win over the Centre. We now know that the strategy worked wonderfully for the party. Rahul Gandhi won in 2014 with a vastly reduced margin as compared to 2009 from Amethi. And this happened when he faced a newcomer to electoral politics, Smriti Irani. It needs to be remembered that, in a show of arrogance which is characteristic of the Nehru-Gandhi family, Priyanka Gandhi Vadra had then quipped: “Irani who?” Since then, Irani has maintained close touch with the constituency, arguably visiting it more frequently than the incumbent MP. The so-called Nehru-Gandhi bastion fell to the BJP in the 2017 State elections, where the Congress could not win a single Assembly constituency. Over the last five years, with the BJP regime at the Centre and later in the state, Rahul Gandhi’s constituency has benefitted from the equation. The development in the period and lack of it in the previous times despite the Congress chief being its representative is the narrative that the BJP has been relentlessly pushing in the constituency. There is an additional factor to be considered — the refusal of the SP-BSP combine to put up a candidate in the constituency. Apparently, this has been done as a token of magnanimity, and to also ensure that the anti-BJP votes do not split. But it is a double-edged sword. There is no certainty that a majority of the votes that would have gone to SP-BSP candidate will fall in the Congress’s kitty. There is a possibility that some of them might end up in the BJP’s coffer, especially if neither Mayawati nor Akhilesh campaigns for Rahul Gandhi. In sum, the Congress president faces a tougher contest than even the last time, and this is probably the reason why he has chosen a ‘safe’ seat in Wayanad. How safe even that, remains to be seen, given that the Communist Party of India (Marxist), which too in the fray from that constituency, has vowed to defeat the Congress heavyweight. The second explanation the Congress has given for the Wayanad choice is that the party wants to ‘bridge’ the north-south divide, carry forward Indira Gandhi’s south-bound legacy, and boost the Congress’s prospects in Kerala. The fact is that Indira Gandhi had contested from Chikmagalur in Karnataka after facing a shocking and humiliating defeat from Rae Bareli in the post-Emergency elections. Karnataka had big leaders from the ruling Janata Dal at the Centre, and yet she won because by then the Janata Party experiment had just about begun to fall apart. The narrative of the north-south divide is specious because by that logic there must have been a west-north divide too when Modi contested from Vadodara and Varanasi — and he managed to bridge it! As for boosting the Congress’s chances in the state, that, for now, remains a fond hope. The fact is: The choice of Wayanad is self-explanatory, and it has nothing to do with bridging any regional divide or taking a legacy forward. According to the 2011 Census, the percentage of Muslim and Christian population taken together is over 50 per cent, and the Congress believes that the demographics provided a safe enough cushion for Rahul Gandhi to emerge victorious. As per the same Census, nearly 95 per cent of the population lives in rural regions which, the Congress calculates, can be exploited in the party’s favour. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Lok Sabha polls 2019: Rahul Gandhi chose to contest from Wayanad because Amethi may no longer be a 'safe' seat for him

After the May 2014 victory, the Bharatiya Janata Party under the Narendra Modi-Amit Shah duo decided to bench its newly elected MPs of seventy years and above. None was given a ministerial berth, and the tallest among them were designated as ‘mentors’. That the so-called Margdarshak Mandal of which these veteran leaders were made members, ended up a showpiece, should not have surprised anyone, because it was an informal arrangement to register a generational shift within the party.

That shift has now been formalised with ticket distribution for the 2019 general elections. If in 2014, the senior founding members of the party contested elections, this time around they have been kept out of the electoral fray.&nbsp; 
 
LK Advani, MM Joshi, Kalraj Mishra, Shanta Kumar and Karia Munda are only three of such names that have been ‘persuaded’ to not contest. The decision is in keeping with the party’s strategy of pushing up new faces and preparing them for a longer inning in active politics as parliamentarians. It also signals curtains for the veterans who formed the backbone of the party in its earlier, formative stages. While the BJP leadership of the day has stated that these seniors had themselves expressed their desire to keep away from the electoral fray, it is obvious that some of them have not been happy with their exclusion.&nbsp;

Yet, they have little leverage in today’s BJP to cause the party any real harm.&nbsp;

There are those who had seen the writing on the wall earlier on and rebelled. Yashwant Sinha is prominent among them. After being left out of the ministry in 2014 and realising months later that there was no scope of rehabilitation, he began to speak bitterly against the present leadership, including Prime Minister Modi. That his son Jayant Sinha was taken in as a minister and given charge of important portfolios, did not work as an emollient on his wounds.&nbsp;

It would be erroneous to judge the decision of keeping the veterans out as a sign of ‘ingratitude’. With the change in time, the old has to make way for the new. it would have added to the stature of these veteran leaders had they themselves taken the initiative and declared their non-availability, and pledged to work whole-heartedly for the newer crop of leaders. Instead, they sulked and revolted. A few others, though not seventy-five plus of age, cast their lot with the seniors and regularly took potshots at the Prime Minister and Amit Shah. One such name is Shatrughan Sinha who is now firmly in the opposition camp and is slated to contest against senior BJP leader Ravi Shankar Prasad from the Patna Sahib seat in Bihar.&nbsp;

The Advani case is especially interesting. He has represented the Gandhinagar Lok Sabha constituency in Gujarat and won handsomely from there. It is an open secret that Amit Shah had played a stellar role in Advani’s successful bids from there, so much so that, had the BJP veteran not stepped in the constituency, he would have still won. Now, Shah will himself contest from the same seat that he had managed with aplomb for Advani. Amit Shah’s inclusion in the list of candidates has come as no surprise since it had been anticipated that ever since he became a Rajya Sabha member, he would seek to make it to the so-called lower House.&nbsp;

There was a time when Advani, along with Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had the final say in ticket distribution in the BJP. It is an indication of changed circumstances that, let alone having a say in candidate selection, Advani could not get a ticket for himself. it is truly a political sunset for him, because, even as the most prominent name in the Margdarshak Mandal, he has little role to play; indeed, the Mandal itself is a decorative item.&nbsp;

Joshi too has come to the end of his political journey. In 2014, he was displaced from Varanasi and packed off to Kanpur. He won from the latter seat by riding the Modi wave. The denial of a ticket to him had to do with his age, but the decision was also taken on the winnability factor. Joshi was not seen as a winnable candidate from the constituency — one, because the popular feedback in the region went against him, and two, because the BJP was up against the formidable SP-BSP alliance.&nbsp;

With the purge of veterans, the BJP is hoping to kill two birds with one stone. Stem anti-incumbency and project a fresh look for the party. Yashwant Sinha had sarcastically remarked that the party’s new leadership considered those above 75 years of age as “brain dead”. It remains to be seen whether the BJP’s new move turns out to be brainy.&nbsp; 
 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

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After the May 2014 victory, the Bharatiya Janata Party under the Narendra Modi-Amit Shah duo decided to bench its newly elected MPs of seventy years and above. None was given a ministerial berth, and the tallest among them were designated as ‘mentors’.

After the May 2014 victory, the Bharatiya Janata Party under the Narendra Modi-Amit Shah duo decided to bench its newly elected MPs of seventy years and above. None was given a ministerial berth, and the tallest among them were designated as ‘mentors’. That the so-called Margdarshak Mandal of which these veteran leaders were made members, ended up a showpiece, should not have surprised anyone, because it was an informal arrangement to register a generational shift within the party. That shift has now been formalised with ticket distribution for the 2019 general elections. If in 2014, the senior founding members of the party contested elections, this time around they have been kept out of the electoral fray. LK Advani, MM Joshi, Kalraj Mishra, Shanta Kumar and Karia Munda are only three of such names that have been ‘persuaded’ to not contest. The decision is in keeping with the party’s strategy of pushing up new faces and preparing them for a longer inning in active politics as parliamentarians. It also signals curtains for the veterans who formed the backbone of the party in its earlier, formative stages. While the BJP leadership of the day has stated that these seniors had themselves expressed their desire to keep away from the electoral fray, it is obvious that some of them have not been happy with their exclusion. Yet, they have little leverage in today’s BJP to cause the party any real harm. There are those who had seen the writing on the wall earlier on and rebelled. Yashwant Sinha is prominent among them. After being left out of the ministry in 2014 and realising months later that there was no scope of rehabilitation, he began to speak bitterly against the present leadership, including Prime Minister Modi. That his son Jayant Sinha was taken in as a minister and given charge of important portfolios, did not work as an emollient on his wounds. It would be erroneous to judge the decision of keeping the veterans out as a sign of ‘ingratitude’. With the change in time, the old has to make way for the new. it would have added to the stature of these veteran leaders had they themselves taken the initiative and declared their non-availability, and pledged to work whole-heartedly for the newer crop of leaders. Instead, they sulked and revolted. A few others, though not seventy-five plus of age, cast their lot with the seniors and regularly took potshots at the Prime Minister and Amit Shah. One such name is Shatrughan Sinha who is now firmly in the opposition camp and is slated to contest against senior BJP leader Ravi Shankar Prasad from the Patna Sahib seat in Bihar. The Advani case is especially interesting. He has represented the Gandhinagar Lok Sabha constituency in Gujarat and won handsomely from there. It is an open secret that Amit Shah had played a stellar role in Advani’s successful bids from there, so much so that, had the BJP veteran not stepped in the constituency, he would have still won. Now, Shah will himself contest from the same seat that he had managed with aplomb for Advani. Amit Shah’s inclusion in the list of candidates has come as no surprise since it had been anticipated that ever since he became a Rajya Sabha member, he would seek to make it to the so-called lower House. There was a time when Advani, along with Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had the final say in ticket distribution in the BJP. It is an indication of changed circumstances that, let alone having a say in candidate selection, Advani could not get a ticket for himself. it is truly a political sunset for him, because, even as the most prominent name in the Margdarshak Mandal, he has little role to play; indeed, the Mandal itself is a decorative item. Joshi too has come to the end of his political journey. In 2014, he was displaced from Varanasi and packed off to Kanpur. He won from the latter seat by riding the Modi wave. The denial of a ticket to him had to do with his age, but the decision was also taken on the winnability factor. Joshi was not seen as a winnable candidate from the constituency — one, because the popular feedback in the region went against him, and two, because the BJP was up against the formidable SP-BSP alliance. With the purge of veterans, the BJP is hoping to kill two birds with one stone. Stem anti-incumbency and project a fresh look for the party. Yashwant Sinha had sarcastically remarked that the party’s new leadership considered those above 75 years of age as “brain dead”. It remains to be seen whether the BJP’s new move turns out to be brainy. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

L K Advani and Murli Manohar Joshi's exit from electoral fray: The old has to make way for the new

Sometime in early 2003, I approached Manohar Parrikar, then Goa’s chief minister, with a problem. I had been, a few months ago, appointed as his media advisor and concurrently deputed as director, Department of Information and Publicity, Government of Goa. I was having trouble with the bureaucracy in pushing ahead some of my ideas to revamp the functioning of the department — ideas that I had discussed with him and gained his approval for.&nbsp;

He heard me out, smiled, and said: “You have to learn to work with the babus. They are instinctively trained to object, not facilitate. I have found my way of dealing with them, without antagonising them. You have to discover your own method.”&nbsp;

The incident encapsulates the style of Parrikar, the man and the politician. He always ‘found’ ways to deal with challenges. He never shied away from confrontation but did his best to ensure that it did not result in bad blood or enduring enmity. Which is why he had supporters and admirers from not just all walks of life but across the political spectrum. The quality was demonstrably evident some two years ago when the state elections results threw up a hung House. Two leading regional parties publicly announced that they would be part of a BJP-led coalition to prevent Congress from coming to power, only if Parrikar was made the chief minister.

The BJP’s central leadership asked Parrikar, who was then the country’s defence minister, to return to the state.&nbsp;

When I was in office, many bureaucrats would reach out to me under the (false) impression that I enjoyed leverage with him and could put in a good word on their behalf with the chief minister. It’s true that Parrikar loved it when those in the bureaucracy and the media praised him. But he had no respect for sycophants though tolerated them. In private conversations, he would tell me that such persons were spineless and that he had greater regard for those who complimented his good work but also constructively criticised when his government slipped.&nbsp;

I recall an occasion when the local media had been miffed over some comment of his and decided to protest by wearing black bands at his events. When I informed him of the issue, he brushed it aside and remarked that it was a ‘passing fad’. At a Press conference soon after, in which certain members of the media sported the black band, he smilingly observed that the bands looked ‘nice’ on the sleeves. He added that his intention was not to deride the media when he made the comment which some journalists had found objectionable and that he fully respected their freedom of expression. That was the end of the media protest.&nbsp;

That Parrikar was committed to a free but responsible media is evident from yet another incident. One fine day, the state Governor called me and the Secretary, Information, for an audience. After the usual courtesies, the Governor enquired about the functioning of the information &amp; publicity department which I headed. Before I could say anything, he remarked:&nbsp;

“You people must keep an eye on those in the media that are critical of the government. Track their movements…” Both the Secretary and I were taken aback but kept our counsel. Later, when I narrated the incident to Parrikar, he laughed and said I should “ignore such nonsense”. &nbsp; &nbsp;

Parrikar did not like to pull up senior bureaucrats in front of others, but on rare occasions, I saw him do so. At a meeting called to discuss the promotion of tourism in the state, he was severely critical of the Tourism Secretary, telling her that she did not understand the Goan ethos, which is why the plans she had presented were unworkable. He was less restrained with party workers and office-bearers, many of whom he had known for years and developed a close relationship with. He would reprimand them and scoff at them, but no offence would be taken by those in the line of fire because they knew their Manohar “bhai” had no malice.&nbsp;

&nbsp;Various commentators have, since his death, written and spoken of his many qualities, both as defence minister and chief minister. They have rightly pointed out that no politician from Goa had risen to such national prominence as he had — with a pan-India image. His decisiveness as a leader too has been talked about. I will recollect one instance. Once it became clear that Goa would be the permanent venue for the International Film Festival of India, Parrikar swung into action to get the infrastructure in place in time for the prestigious event. He despatched a three-member delegation — I was one of the members — to the Cannes International Film Festival in France with an aim to learn. He read the report we submitted on our return with keen interest and realised that the scale and proportion in which the Cannes event was held could not possibly be replicated in Goa. However, the real challenge lay elsewhere, in the absence of infrastructure. There was not even a multiplex, nor office space for the newly created the Entertainment Society of Goa that was tasked with organising the event. And there was barely 12 months to get all of these in place. &nbsp;

Parrikar immersed himself with missionary zeal to meet the challenge. He would be at the site — the old Goa Medical College complex, where the new infrastructure was to come up — morning and evening.&nbsp;

He would interact with the officials concerned, the contractors, even the masons and other labourers. It was a sight to have the state’s Chief Minister standing atop the rubble of concrete being pulled down to make way for a spanking new building and the multiplex, giving directions and encouraging everyone around. Needless to add, the place was ready for the inaugural event of IFFI-Goa.&nbsp;

Parrikar was full of energy when he was at his fittest; he displayed spirit when he was crippled by illness in the last few months of his life. Lesser people would have given up, but he attended office and Assembly proceedings with a feeder tube dangling from his nose, and though he needed assistance to walk a few steps. That was his josh. &nbsp; 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

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Sometime in early 2003, I approached Manohar Parrikar, then Goa’s chief minister, with a problem. I had been, a few months ago, appointed as his media advisor and concurrently deputed as director, Department of Information and Publicity, Government of Goa.

Sometime in early 2003, I approached Manohar Parrikar, then Goa’s chief minister, with a problem. I had been, a few months ago, appointed as his media advisor and concurrently deputed as director, Department of Information and Publicity, Government of Goa. I was having trouble with the bureaucracy in pushing ahead some of my ideas to revamp the functioning of the department — ideas that I had discussed with him and gained his approval for. He heard me out, smiled, and said: “You have to learn to work with the babus. They are instinctively trained to object, not facilitate. I have found my way of dealing with them, without antagonising them. You have to discover your own method.” The incident encapsulates the style of Parrikar, the man and the politician. He always ‘found’ ways to deal with challenges. He never shied away from confrontation but did his best to ensure that it did not result in bad blood or enduring enmity. Which is why he had supporters and admirers from not just all walks of life but across the political spectrum. The quality was demonstrably evident some two years ago when the state elections results threw up a hung House. Two leading regional parties publicly announced that they would be part of a BJP-led coalition to prevent Congress from coming to power, only if Parrikar was made the chief minister. The BJP’s central leadership asked Parrikar, who was then the country’s defence minister, to return to the state. When I was in office, many bureaucrats would reach out to me under the (false) impression that I enjoyed leverage with him and could put in a good word on their behalf with the chief minister. It’s true that Parrikar loved it when those in the bureaucracy and the media praised him. But he had no respect for sycophants though tolerated them. In private conversations, he would tell me that such persons were spineless and that he had greater regard for those who complimented his good work but also constructively criticised when his government slipped. I recall an occasion when the local media had been miffed over some comment of his and decided to protest by wearing black bands at his events. When I informed him of the issue, he brushed it aside and remarked that it was a ‘passing fad’. At a Press conference soon after, in which certain members of the media sported the black band, he smilingly observed that the bands looked ‘nice’ on the sleeves. He added that his intention was not to deride the media when he made the comment which some journalists had found objectionable and that he fully respected their freedom of expression. That was the end of the media protest. That Parrikar was committed to a free but responsible media is evident from yet another incident. One fine day, the state Governor called me and the Secretary, Information, for an audience. After the usual courtesies, the Governor enquired about the functioning of the information & publicity department which I headed. Before I could say anything, he remarked: “You people must keep an eye on those in the media that are critical of the government. Track their movements…” Both the Secretary and I were taken aback but kept our counsel. Later, when I narrated the incident to Parrikar, he laughed and said I should “ignore such nonsense”. Parrikar did not like to pull up senior bureaucrats in front of others, but on rare occasions, I saw him do so. At a meeting called to discuss the promotion of tourism in the state, he was severely critical of the Tourism Secretary, telling her that she did not understand the Goan ethos, which is why the plans she had presented were unworkable. He was less restrained with party workers and office-bearers, many of whom he had known for years and developed a close relationship with. He would reprimand them and scoff at them, but no offence would be taken by those in the line of fire because they knew their Manohar “bhai” had no malice. Various commentators have, since his death, written and spoken of his many qualities, both as defence minister and chief minister. They have rightly pointed out that no politician from Goa had risen to such national prominence as he had — with a pan-India image. His decisiveness as a leader too has been talked about. I will recollect one instance. Once it became clear that Goa would be the permanent venue for the International Film Festival of India, Parrikar swung into action to get the infrastructure in place in time for the prestigious event. He despatched a three-member delegation — I was one of the members — to the Cannes International Film Festival in France with an aim to learn. He read the report we submitted on our return with keen interest and realised that the scale and proportion in which the Cannes event was held could not possibly be replicated in Goa. However, the real challenge lay elsewhere, in the absence of infrastructure. There was not even a multiplex, nor office space for the newly created the Entertainment Society of Goa that was tasked with organising the event. And there was barely 12 months to get all of these in place. Parrikar immersed himself with missionary zeal to meet the challenge. He would be at the site — the old Goa Medical College complex, where the new infrastructure was to come up — morning and evening. He would interact with the officials concerned, the contractors, even the masons and other labourers. It was a sight to have the state’s Chief Minister standing atop the rubble of concrete being pulled down to make way for a spanking new building and the multiplex, giving directions and encouraging everyone around. Needless to add, the place was ready for the inaugural event of IFFI-Goa. Parrikar was full of energy when he was at his fittest; he displayed spirit when he was crippled by illness in the last few months of his life. Lesser people would have given up, but he attended office and Assembly proceedings with a feeder tube dangling from his nose, and though he needed assistance to walk a few steps. That was his josh. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Blog: Manohar Parrikar never shied away from confrontations and inspired others to do the same

There are broadly three categories of political migrants during the election season. The first comprises leaders that have been denied tickets by their respective parties and thus switch over to a rival camp which offers them the chance to contest. The second has leaders who have been long-time rebels waiting for the right occasion to jump ship. The third group consists of politicians that latch on to current developments other than purely political as a reason to leave their parties, even though politics remains a consideration.&nbsp;

In the present context, the first classification would feature a host of figures from all sides — for instance, sitting BJP Member of Parliament Shyama Charan Gupta, who crossed over to the Samajwadi Party after he realised that he would not get the ticket from the Bharatiya Janata Party. The second group has the likes of Kirti Azad, who for months as a sitting MP from the BJP, had criticised the party and its leadership on a variety of issues; and ‘Jay’ Panda, who came over to the BJP from the Biju Janata Dal after spending several months condemning his original party while remaining there.&nbsp;

Prominent in the third category is Tom Vadakkan, until recently a senior Congress leader, a one-time aide to Sonia Gandhi and vociferous supporter of the dynasty. He recently joined the BJP, saying he had been deeply upset by the Congress’s response to the Pulwama attack and the air strikes which were conducted inside Pakistani territory. This group also boasts of politicians from the Trinamool Congress who have migrated to the BJP, angry with West Bengal chief minister and Trinamool supremo Mamata Banerjee over her politics and the manner she has responded to issues of national security.&nbsp;

But there is a fourth classification too, which is unique in the sense that, so far, there is only one person in this list. A few days ago, senior Janata Dal (Secular) leader Danish Ali quit his party and joined the Bahujan Samaj Party. What makes the switchover stand out is his claim that he had the blessing of the senior-most JD (S) leaders, HD Deve Gowda and Karnataka Chief Minister HD Kumaraswamy, for his action. It is difficult to digest this contention, not just because it is unbelievable that the leadership of a party he quits would consent to his joining a different party.&nbsp;

Kumaraswamy’s remark that Danish Ali’s move was a “thoughtful political decision taken by JD (S) and BSP to win more seats in the Lok Sabha election” must be taken with a pinch of salt.&nbsp;

Only a few weeks ago, the BSP had pulled out of the coalition regime in Karnataka led by the JD(S), causing embarrassment to the JD(S). How will it help the party if Danish Ali works to expand the BSP’s based in the state where the JD(S) is already struggling to keep the alliance with the Congress going? As JD(S) leader, Danish Ali had played a significant role in getting his party and the Congress together to foil the BJP’s chances of forming a government in Karnataka after the last election had resulted in a hung Assembly. Only days before he announced his departure from the JD(S), he had met Congress president Rahul Gandhi to sort out the alliance frictions. &nbsp;

The fact is that, despite these optics, Danish Ali had begun to nurse misgivings about the Congress. He must have been as frustrated as the senior JD(S) leadership with the conduct of the senior alliance partner. HD Kumaraswamy may have reconciled to drinking the “poison” of the alliance, but Danish Ali perhaps felt choked enough to not endure the situation any further. His decision to join the BSP was more out of compulsion than choice. He could obviously not go to the Congress, and he would have been a misfit in the BJP. The Samajwadi Party had even a smaller presence in Karnataka than the BSP. Moreover, unlike the BSP, the SP was more inclined in favour of Congress. &nbsp; 
 
It is being said by him and his supporters that the development should be seen as Danish Ali’s attempt to strengthen the hands of anti-Narendra Modi forces. It is difficult to understand this line of reasoning. He brings nothing on the table for the BSP in Karnataka, not to speak of Uttar Pradesh. He is a lightweight politician in any case, and for BSP chief Mayawati, he would have mere optical value. It is possible that Danish Ali is now looking for a new place of work — Uttar Pradesh, which he has suddenly remembered is his birthplace. There is speculation that the BSP could offer him the ticket from one of the ’safer’ constituencies in the state, possibly Amroha. If that is the case, it more honestly explains Danish Ali’s decision.&nbsp; 
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(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

There are broadly three categories of political migrants during the election season. The first comprises leaders that have been denied tickets by their respective parties and thus switch over to a rival camp which offers them the chance to contest.

There are broadly three categories of political migrants during the election season. The first comprises leaders that have been denied tickets by their respective parties and thus switch over to a rival camp which offers them the chance to contest. The second has leaders who have been long-time rebels waiting for the right occasion to jump ship. The third group consists of politicians that latch on to current developments other than purely political as a reason to leave their parties, even though politics remains a consideration. In the present context, the first classification would feature a host of figures from all sides — for instance, sitting BJP Member of Parliament Shyama Charan Gupta, who crossed over to the Samajwadi Party after he realised that he would not get the ticket from the Bharatiya Janata Party. The second group has the likes of Kirti Azad, who for months as a sitting MP from the BJP, had criticised the party and its leadership on a variety of issues; and ‘Jay’ Panda, who came over to the BJP from the Biju Janata Dal after spending several months condemning his original party while remaining there. Prominent in the third category is Tom Vadakkan, until recently a senior Congress leader, a one-time aide to Sonia Gandhi and vociferous supporter of the dynasty. He recently joined the BJP, saying he had been deeply upset by the Congress’s response to the Pulwama attack and the air strikes which were conducted inside Pakistani territory. This group also boasts of politicians from the Trinamool Congress who have migrated to the BJP, angry with West Bengal chief minister and Trinamool supremo Mamata Banerjee over her politics and the manner she has responded to issues of national security. But there is a fourth classification too, which is unique in the sense that, so far, there is only one person in this list. A few days ago, senior Janata Dal (Secular) leader Danish Ali quit his party and joined the Bahujan Samaj Party. What makes the switchover stand out is his claim that he had the blessing of the senior-most JD (S) leaders, HD Deve Gowda and Karnataka Chief Minister HD Kumaraswamy, for his action. It is difficult to digest this contention, not just because it is unbelievable that the leadership of a party he quits would consent to his joining a different party. Kumaraswamy’s remark that Danish Ali’s move was a “thoughtful political decision taken by JD (S) and BSP to win more seats in the Lok Sabha election” must be taken with a pinch of salt. Only a few weeks ago, the BSP had pulled out of the coalition regime in Karnataka led by the JD(S), causing embarrassment to the JD(S). How will it help the party if Danish Ali works to expand the BSP’s based in the state where the JD(S) is already struggling to keep the alliance with the Congress going? As JD(S) leader, Danish Ali had played a significant role in getting his party and the Congress together to foil the BJP’s chances of forming a government in Karnataka after the last election had resulted in a hung Assembly. Only days before he announced his departure from the JD(S), he had met Congress president Rahul Gandhi to sort out the alliance frictions. The fact is that, despite these optics, Danish Ali had begun to nurse misgivings about the Congress. He must have been as frustrated as the senior JD(S) leadership with the conduct of the senior alliance partner. HD Kumaraswamy may have reconciled to drinking the “poison” of the alliance, but Danish Ali perhaps felt choked enough to not endure the situation any further. His decision to join the BSP was more out of compulsion than choice. He could obviously not go to the Congress, and he would have been a misfit in the BJP. The Samajwadi Party had even a smaller presence in Karnataka than the BSP. Moreover, unlike the BSP, the SP was more inclined in favour of Congress. It is being said by him and his supporters that the development should be seen as Danish Ali’s attempt to strengthen the hands of anti-Narendra Modi forces. It is difficult to understand this line of reasoning. He brings nothing on the table for the BSP in Karnataka, not to speak of Uttar Pradesh. He is a lightweight politician in any case, and for BSP chief Mayawati, he would have mere optical value. It is possible that Danish Ali is now looking for a new place of work — Uttar Pradesh, which he has suddenly remembered is his birthplace. There is speculation that the BSP could offer him the ticket from one of the ’safer’ constituencies in the state, possibly Amroha. If that is the case, it more honestly explains Danish Ali’s decision. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Lok Sabha elections 2019: The curious case of political switchovers

The Bharatiya Janata Party and Congress are different in many ways. But one striking difference is the manner in which these parties react to electoral outcomes. In victory, the BJP turns its attention to the next challenge instead of spending too much time basking in glory. The Congress exults so much that it loses sight of the new obstacles ahead. Following a setback, the BJP quickly rethinks its strategy, even going to the extent of casting away earlier narratives. Congress, on the other hand, sinks into despair and nearly loses the ability to emerge from the crisis.&nbsp;

Let us consider a few instances. Late last year, the BJP lost three important north Indian states which it had ruled. Stung by the result, it swung into action to summon whatever leverage it had to reach out to allies it had antagonised earlier. It kept aside past acrimony with the Shiv Sena, even the latter’s open criticism of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and saved the partnership which was as good as dead. It’s a fact that Shiv Sena too saw merit in burying the past in its own interest, but had the BJP not demonstrated a desire to let bygones be bygones, the Shiv Sena would have kept its promise of going it alone in the Lok Sabha elections. Ideological similarities, which was cited by both parties to justify the alliance, would not have come in the way of a parting of ways. Now, suddenly, the Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party, which were salivating at the prospect of the Sena and the BJP contesting against each other, are on the back foot.&nbsp; 
 
In the south, the BJP moved swiftly to forge an alliance with the AIADMK and the PMK. There is speculation that the DMDK too will join the coalition. The BJP’s speed took many by surprise, given that it happened before even the Congress and the DMK, who have been virtually together for a long time, could formally announce their partnership. Nobody is predicting that the BJP-AIADMK combine will trounce the Congress-DMK, but at least there may not be a one-sided contest.&nbsp; 
 
In Uttar Pradesh, where the BJP faces a formidable opponent in the SP-BSP coalition, the party has sought to placate disgruntled regional allies, and there are prospects that the outreach will bear fruit. Neither the Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party OP Rajbhar nor the Apna Dal (Sonelal) of Anupriya Patel, whom the senior leadership of the BJP has moved to retain in the NDA fold, has real chances if it goes with the Congress. &nbsp; 
 
Now contrast the Congress’s reaction after its victory in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh. It is so confident (over-confident) that it spurned repeated attempts by the Aam Aadmi Party for an alliance in Delhi. The party’s Delhi unit under the leadership of Sheila Dikshit put its foot down in opposing the partnership, despite the high command seemingly eager for the alliance. Both the Congress and the AAP realise that together they had a better chance to take on the BJP, yet personal animosity came in the way of an electoral understanding. The result is, most opinion polls are predicting a clean sweep for the BJP in the seven seats in Delhi.&nbsp; 
 
Cussedness, apart, there is also tepidness in the Congress’s actions post the wins late last year. The party initially grabbed the headlines with the announcement of Priyanka Gandhi Vadra being made general secretary in charge of eastern Uttar Pradesh. But after the impressive roadshow in Lucknow, nothing has been heard of her. The Congress, instead of helming a new narrative with Priyanka in the front seat, is back to its tired old Rafale lament and ‘Chowkidar is a thief’ refrain. To make matters worse for itself, it appears to have caught the wrong end of the stick on the air strikes the Indian Air Force has conducted deep inside Pakistan.&nbsp;

The BJP had followed the 2014 victory with a series of wins in state Assembly elections, including breaking the glass ceiling, so to say, in states such as Tripura and Assam. It recorded a massive win in Uttar Pradesh. Meanwhile, it renewed its alliance with the Janata Dal (United) in Bihar and performed well enough in Karnataka, though it could not form the government there.&nbsp;

Whether in victory or defeat, the BJP has studiously concentrated on greenfield states — Odisha and West Bengal — where it is expected to perform well. The Congress, on the other hand, despite the booster shot it got recently, has failed to make any headway in either of the two states. In the first, it stands no chance, and in the second it depends on Mamata Banerjee to contain the BJP. Incidentally, unlike the BJP, the Congress had once upon a time ruled these states for long periods of time. &nbsp;&nbsp; 
&nbsp; 
While it is not clear if the BJP has regained all of the ground it had lost in the past months, recent developments have revived its prospects of a return in the coming general election. Congress needs to do better if it hopes to oust the Modi regime.&nbsp; 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

The Bharatiya Janata Party and Congress are different in many ways. But one striking difference is the manner in which these parties react to electoral outcomes.

The Bharatiya Janata Party and Congress are different in many ways. But one striking difference is the manner in which these parties react to electoral outcomes. In victory, the BJP turns its attention to the next challenge instead of spending too much time basking in glory. The Congress exults so much that it loses sight of the new obstacles ahead. Following a setback, the BJP quickly rethinks its strategy, even going to the extent of casting away earlier narratives. Congress, on the other hand, sinks into despair and nearly loses the ability to emerge from the crisis. Let us consider a few instances. Late last year, the BJP lost three important north Indian states which it had ruled. Stung by the result, it swung into action to summon whatever leverage it had to reach out to allies it had antagonised earlier. It kept aside past acrimony with the Shiv Sena, even the latter’s open criticism of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and saved the partnership which was as good as dead. It’s a fact that Shiv Sena too saw merit in burying the past in its own interest, but had the BJP not demonstrated a desire to let bygones be bygones, the Shiv Sena would have kept its promise of going it alone in the Lok Sabha elections. Ideological similarities, which was cited by both parties to justify the alliance, would not have come in the way of a parting of ways. Now, suddenly, the Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party, which were salivating at the prospect of the Sena and the BJP contesting against each other, are on the back foot. In the south, the BJP moved swiftly to forge an alliance with the AIADMK and the PMK. There is speculation that the DMDK too will join the coalition. The BJP’s speed took many by surprise, given that it happened before even the Congress and the DMK, who have been virtually together for a long time, could formally announce their partnership. Nobody is predicting that the BJP-AIADMK combine will trounce the Congress-DMK, but at least there may not be a one-sided contest. In Uttar Pradesh, where the BJP faces a formidable opponent in the SP-BSP coalition, the party has sought to placate disgruntled regional allies, and there are prospects that the outreach will bear fruit. Neither the Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party OP Rajbhar nor the Apna Dal (Sonelal) of Anupriya Patel, whom the senior leadership of the BJP has moved to retain in the NDA fold, has real chances if it goes with the Congress. Now contrast the Congress’s reaction after its victory in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh. It is so confident (over-confident) that it spurned repeated attempts by the Aam Aadmi Party for an alliance in Delhi. The party’s Delhi unit under the leadership of Sheila Dikshit put its foot down in opposing the partnership, despite the high command seemingly eager for the alliance. Both the Congress and the AAP realise that together they had a better chance to take on the BJP, yet personal animosity came in the way of an electoral understanding. The result is, most opinion polls are predicting a clean sweep for the BJP in the seven seats in Delhi. Cussedness, apart, there is also tepidness in the Congress’s actions post the wins late last year. The party initially grabbed the headlines with the announcement of Priyanka Gandhi Vadra being made general secretary in charge of eastern Uttar Pradesh. But after the impressive roadshow in Lucknow, nothing has been heard of her. The Congress, instead of helming a new narrative with Priyanka in the front seat, is back to its tired old Rafale lament and ‘Chowkidar is a thief’ refrain. To make matters worse for itself, it appears to have caught the wrong end of the stick on the air strikes the Indian Air Force has conducted deep inside Pakistan. The BJP had followed the 2014 victory with a series of wins in state Assembly elections, including breaking the glass ceiling, so to say, in states such as Tripura and Assam. It recorded a massive win in Uttar Pradesh. Meanwhile, it renewed its alliance with the Janata Dal (United) in Bihar and performed well enough in Karnataka, though it could not form the government there. Whether in victory or defeat, the BJP has studiously concentrated on greenfield states — Odisha and West Bengal — where it is expected to perform well. The Congress, on the other hand, despite the booster shot it got recently, has failed to make any headway in either of the two states. In the first, it stands no chance, and in the second it depends on Mamata Banerjee to contain the BJP. Incidentally, unlike the BJP, the Congress had once upon a time ruled these states for long periods of time. While it is not clear if the BJP has regained all of the ground it had lost in the past months, recent developments have revived its prospects of a return in the coming general election. Congress needs to do better if it hopes to oust the Modi regime. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

In victory or defeat, BJP responds to electoral outcomes more maturely

After India successfully conducted air strikes on terror camps operated by Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) inside Pakistan, experts observed that New Delhi had ‘crossed the Rubicon’ this time around. It’s a good time to recall that, within Pakistan too, the Rubicon had been crossed in different ways on a few occasions in the recent past by intrepid people, but the outcome had been less than fortunate for the initiators. The Pakistani deep state had prevailed.&nbsp; 
 
Pakistani journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad had dared to explore the complex links between religiously fanatic elements within the Pakistan army and outside. He relied on inside information to report on the continuing infiltration of extremists into the Army and the Jihadi connect. But when he put out a story on the Mehran naval base attack in 2011, saying that it had been an insider job, he had crossed the line as far as the deep state was concerned. In the last week of May, Shahzad was kidnapped, tortured and killed, and his body was left in a drain as a grim reminder to anyone who may have harboured thoughts challenging the status quo. &nbsp; 
 
The heavily protected Mehran naval base, situated near Karachi, had been attacked by a handful of Pakistani Jihadists, and several names complicit in the incident, including retired defence personnel, came to light. The audacious attempt was eventually contained, but not before severe damage was done to some of the navy's expensive assets and the Pakistani defence force’s image. Predictably, in the hysteria that erupted, two things happened. First, denial. And second, approving blame to the US, India and Israel. The second was not bought by the world community, and the first had no leg to stand on after the Pakistani establishment led by General Pervez Musharraf had to crack down on the local perpetrators and weed out radical elements from within the ranks of its Armed Forces.&nbsp;

Shahzad’s Mehran report was the last major one that he would file. He not only wrote that the Mehran attack was an insider job, but also reported that a purge had been in progress which had divided security personnel as well as the rogue elements outside along ethnic and religious lines. But he was not the only journalist to be punished thus. There was the American Daniel Pearl, who too had crossed the Rubicon almost a decade before Shahzad did.&nbsp;

Pearl, who was primarily based in Mumbai while reporting on the south Asian region for The Wall Street Journal, had visited Pakistan as part of an investigative report he was working on, with a view to unravel links involving the Al Qaeda and a British citizen, better known as the ‘Shoe Bomber’. In February 2002, he was kidnapped, tortured and executed by his captors. His decomposed body and the severed head were discovered a few months later. He had entered dangerous territory, one that could expose the complicity of the deep state.&nbsp; 
 
The group that claimed ‘credit’ for the kidnapping and subsequent action was the National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty. This outfit accused Pearl of being an American spy. It demanded the release of all Pakistani terror detainees as well as lifting of the embargo on the US shipment of F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan, as some of the conditions for Pearl’s release. It is inconceivable that an outfit could so brazenly function right inside Pakistan without some sort of official ‘turning the blind eye’ at the least.&nbsp;

It’s not only journalists in Pakistan, whether Pakistani or otherwise, who have paid with their lives for crossing the Rubicon. Even high-profile politicians who summoned the courage to challenge extremist elements, either inside or out of the system, fell to radical elements while the official establishment remained inactive — or implicitly supportive of the fanatics. Salman Taseer is a case in point. A liberal politician associated with the Pakistan Peoples Party of Benazir Bhutto, he was assassinated in January 2011 in Islamabad by his bodyguard, who shot him with an assault rifle 27 times hear his home. Taseer’s crime was that he had vehemently and publicly opposed his country’s blasphemy law, which had the backing of not just extremist groups but also influential sections of the Pakistani Deep State. A show of state mourning was thereafter organised but it deceived none. &nbsp;

Radical elements, both outside the political system and within, had been enraged by his public pronouncements in support of one Asia Bibi, who had been sentenced to death by a court of law for having ‘blasphemed’ Islam. After the assassination, hundreds of prominent Pakistan clerics had lent support to the assassin and urged the people to boycott Taseer’s funeral. &nbsp; 
 
The connect between extremist elements and the Pakistani state has been often commented upon by one of the country’s most prominent former envoy, Husain Haqqani, in his books and public discourses. Haqqani is now located outside Pakistan and has many times quipped that terrorists are more secure in Pakistan than he would be if he were to return to his country. He too crossed the Rubicon many times, but fortunately, he remains safe for now.&nbsp;

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

After India successfully conducted air strikes on terror camps operated by Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) inside Pakistan, experts observed that New Delhi had ‘crossed the Rubicon’ this time around.

After India successfully conducted air strikes on terror camps operated by Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) inside Pakistan, experts observed that New Delhi had ‘crossed the Rubicon’ this time around. It’s a good time to recall that, within Pakistan too, the Rubicon had been crossed in different ways on a few occasions in the recent past by intrepid people, but the outcome had been less than fortunate for the initiators. The Pakistani deep state had prevailed. Pakistani journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad had dared to explore the complex links between religiously fanatic elements within the Pakistan army and outside. He relied on inside information to report on the continuing infiltration of extremists into the Army and the Jihadi connect. But when he put out a story on the Mehran naval base attack in 2011, saying that it had been an insider job, he had crossed the line as far as the deep state was concerned. In the last week of May, Shahzad was kidnapped, tortured and killed, and his body was left in a drain as a grim reminder to anyone who may have harboured thoughts challenging the status quo. The heavily protected Mehran naval base, situated near Karachi, had been attacked by a handful of Pakistani Jihadists, and several names complicit in the incident, including retired defence personnel, came to light. The audacious attempt was eventually contained, but not before severe damage was done to some of the navy's expensive assets and the Pakistani defence force’s image. Predictably, in the hysteria that erupted, two things happened. First, denial. And second, approving blame to the US, India and Israel. The second was not bought by the world community, and the first had no leg to stand on after the Pakistani establishment led by General Pervez Musharraf had to crack down on the local perpetrators and weed out radical elements from within the ranks of its Armed Forces. Shahzad’s Mehran report was the last major one that he would file. He not only wrote that the Mehran attack was an insider job, but also reported that a purge had been in progress which had divided security personnel as well as the rogue elements outside along ethnic and religious lines. But he was not the only journalist to be punished thus. There was the American Daniel Pearl, who too had crossed the Rubicon almost a decade before Shahzad did. Pearl, who was primarily based in Mumbai while reporting on the south Asian region for The Wall Street Journal, had visited Pakistan as part of an investigative report he was working on, with a view to unravel links involving the Al Qaeda and a British citizen, better known as the ‘Shoe Bomber’. In February 2002, he was kidnapped, tortured and executed by his captors. His decomposed body and the severed head were discovered a few months later. He had entered dangerous territory, one that could expose the complicity of the deep state. The group that claimed ‘credit’ for the kidnapping and subsequent action was the National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty. This outfit accused Pearl of being an American spy. It demanded the release of all Pakistani terror detainees as well as lifting of the embargo on the US shipment of F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan, as some of the conditions for Pearl’s release. It is inconceivable that an outfit could so brazenly function right inside Pakistan without some sort of official ‘turning the blind eye’ at the least. It’s not only journalists in Pakistan, whether Pakistani or otherwise, who have paid with their lives for crossing the Rubicon. Even high-profile politicians who summoned the courage to challenge extremist elements, either inside or out of the system, fell to radical elements while the official establishment remained inactive — or implicitly supportive of the fanatics. Salman Taseer is a case in point. A liberal politician associated with the Pakistan Peoples Party of Benazir Bhutto, he was assassinated in January 2011 in Islamabad by his bodyguard, who shot him with an assault rifle 27 times hear his home. Taseer’s crime was that he had vehemently and publicly opposed his country’s blasphemy law, which had the backing of not just extremist groups but also influential sections of the Pakistani Deep State. A show of state mourning was thereafter organised but it deceived none. Radical elements, both outside the political system and within, had been enraged by his public pronouncements in support of one Asia Bibi, who had been sentenced to death by a court of law for having ‘blasphemed’ Islam. After the assassination, hundreds of prominent Pakistan clerics had lent support to the assassin and urged the people to boycott Taseer’s funeral. The connect between extremist elements and the Pakistani state has been often commented upon by one of the country’s most prominent former envoy, Husain Haqqani, in his books and public discourses. Haqqani is now located outside Pakistan and has many times quipped that terrorists are more secure in Pakistan than he would be if he were to return to his country. He too crossed the Rubicon many times, but fortunately, he remains safe for now. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Crossing the Rubicon: Many Pakistani nationals have paid a heavy price for exposing army and jihadi connect

The Bharatiya Janata Party is finally getting its act together on the alliance front. Over the last few days, it managed to salvage its partnership with the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra; stitched a deal with the AIADMK and one other smaller outfit in Tamil Nadu; and seemingly placated the Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party (SBSP) in Uttar Pradesh, which had threatened to quit the NDA. Senior BJP leaders have also reached out to another disgruntled NDA constituent, Apna Dal (Sonelal), in Uttar Pradesh.&nbsp;

Besides, the party has set its sight on a few post-poll partnerships since it felt, for good reasons, that a pre-election understanding would be counter-productive. A later understanding with the YSR Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh is one such possibility. 
 
A pre-poll tie-up between the BJP and the YSR Congress Party does not make sense because the latter’s leader Jagan Mohan Reddy is seeking to exploit the issue of his state not been given a special status in the upcoming elections, and here he wants to put the BJP-led NDA regime in the dock. At the same time, he is more opposed to Chandrababu Naidu and the TDP, who are his main rivals in Andhra Pradesh. Now that Naidu has quit the NDA, the coast is clear for Jagan Mohan Reddy to strike a bargain with the BJP post-results. &nbsp;

In Telangana, the TRS is dependent on Muslim votes, which is why he has consistently humoured Asaduddin Owaisi, who has pockets of influence in the old Hyderabad city. Given that Owaisi is a bitter critic of the BJP and the TRS needs him more in the pre-poll stage than it needs the BJP, any understanding between the TRS and the BJP will have to wait until after the results are announced.

As for the BJD, the ruling party in Odisha is facing a severe challenge from the BJP this time around, and many poll pundits are seeing a surge in the number of BJP seats from the state following the Lok Sabha polls.&nbsp;

Since both the BJP and the BJD have now locked horns, any pact can happen only after the election dust has settled down. It must be remembered that in the five years gone by, both the BJD and the YSR Congress party, especially the BJD, had backed many of the Modi government’s initiatives. More importantly, it has maintained a distance from the various ‘third front’ confabulations across the country.&nbsp;

That said, the deal between the Shiv Sena and the BJP is the most important development of all. Maharashtra is an important state, contributing 48 seats to the Lok Sabha. Most poll analysts had pointed out that, if the two parties contested separately — and against each other as a consequence — both would be major losers, and the gainer would be the Congress-Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) alliance. It was perhaps this realisation than a sudden spurt of love for each other that compelled the warring allies to bury the hatchet.

This also explains the give and take both the parties agreed to, with the Sena settling for a couple of seats lesser than the BJP for the Lok Sabha and the BJP accepting a 50:50 sharing basis for the state Assembly polls that are to follow in a few months of the general elections. The Sena-BJP pact has seriously undermined the prospects of the Congress-NCP coalition. It would be wrong to say that all creases have been ironed out, but a tentative partnership is still better than no partnership. &nbsp;

In Uttar Pradesh, both the Apna Dal (Sonelal) and the SBSP are small players but they have a committed vote base. The latter had won no Lok Sabha seat in 2014 but did better in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly polls after it allied with the BJP, winning four constituencies. Its leader OP Rajbhar has had problems with the Yogi Adityanath government in the state, but things appear to have settled down somewhat after his marathon meeting with BJP president Amit Shah.&nbsp;

Yet, the final word is yet to be said, since the seat-sharing matter remains to be tackled. Apna Dal (Sonelal) too has grievances similar to that of the SBSP — that big brother BJP has not given it the respect it deserves. Its leader Anupriya Patel is a Minister in Modi’s government but there is a feeling that the party has been neglected but the BJP, more especially after the latter rode to an unprecedented victory in the last State polls. Given the tough challenge it faces in Uttar Pradesh from the Samajwadi Party-Bahujan Samaj Party combine, the BJP would not want its allies in the state to walk away. &nbsp;&nbsp;

Will the outreach and the alliances, new and old, work for the BJP? In Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh, they should have an impact. One is not sure about Tamil Nadu, though, where the AIADMK has become unpopular, and weak after a split in the party. Its unpopularity could drag down the BJP (which, not having a big mass base there, has to depend on the regional ally), as well as the other regional partner, the PMK.

Nevertheless, with every seat counting in what is billed as a furiously contested 2019 Lok Sabha election, the BJP can at least take heart from the alliances it has managed to secure. 
 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

The Bharatiya Janata Party is finally getting its act together on the alliance front. Over the last few days, it managed to salvage its partnership with the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra; stitched a deal with the AIADMK and one other smaller outfit in Tamil Nadu; and seemingly placated the Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party (SBSP) in Uttar Pradesh, which had threatened to quit the NDA.

The Bharatiya Janata Party is finally getting its act together on the alliance front. Over the last few days, it managed to salvage its partnership with the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra; stitched a deal with the AIADMK and one other smaller outfit in Tamil Nadu; and seemingly placated the Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party (SBSP) in Uttar Pradesh, which had threatened to quit the NDA. Senior BJP leaders have also reached out to another disgruntled NDA constituent, Apna Dal (Sonelal), in Uttar Pradesh. Besides, the party has set its sight on a few post-poll partnerships since it felt, for good reasons, that a pre-election understanding would be counter-productive. A later understanding with the YSR Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh is one such possibility. A pre-poll tie-up between the BJP and the YSR Congress Party does not make sense because the latter’s leader Jagan Mohan Reddy is seeking to exploit the issue of his state not been given a special status in the upcoming elections, and here he wants to put the BJP-led NDA regime in the dock. At the same time, he is more opposed to Chandrababu Naidu and the TDP, who are his main rivals in Andhra Pradesh. Now that Naidu has quit the NDA, the coast is clear for Jagan Mohan Reddy to strike a bargain with the BJP post-results. In Telangana, the TRS is dependent on Muslim votes, which is why he has consistently humoured Asaduddin Owaisi, who has pockets of influence in the old Hyderabad city. Given that Owaisi is a bitter critic of the BJP and the TRS needs him more in the pre-poll stage than it needs the BJP, any understanding between the TRS and the BJP will have to wait until after the results are announced. As for the BJD, the ruling party in Odisha is facing a severe challenge from the BJP this time around, and many poll pundits are seeing a surge in the number of BJP seats from the state following the Lok Sabha polls. Since both the BJP and the BJD have now locked horns, any pact can happen only after the election dust has settled down. It must be remembered that in the five years gone by, both the BJD and the YSR Congress party, especially the BJD, had backed many of the Modi government’s initiatives. More importantly, it has maintained a distance from the various ‘third front’ confabulations across the country. That said, the deal between the Shiv Sena and the BJP is the most important development of all. Maharashtra is an important state, contributing 48 seats to the Lok Sabha. Most poll analysts had pointed out that, if the two parties contested separately — and against each other as a consequence — both would be major losers, and the gainer would be the Congress-Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) alliance. It was perhaps this realisation than a sudden spurt of love for each other that compelled the warring allies to bury the hatchet. This also explains the give and take both the parties agreed to, with the Sena settling for a couple of seats lesser than the BJP for the Lok Sabha and the BJP accepting a 50:50 sharing basis for the state Assembly polls that are to follow in a few months of the general elections. The Sena-BJP pact has seriously undermined the prospects of the Congress-NCP coalition. It would be wrong to say that all creases have been ironed out, but a tentative partnership is still better than no partnership. In Uttar Pradesh, both the Apna Dal (Sonelal) and the SBSP are small players but they have a committed vote base. The latter had won no Lok Sabha seat in 2014 but did better in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly polls after it allied with the BJP, winning four constituencies. Its leader OP Rajbhar has had problems with the Yogi Adityanath government in the state, but things appear to have settled down somewhat after his marathon meeting with BJP president Amit Shah. Yet, the final word is yet to be said, since the seat-sharing matter remains to be tackled. Apna Dal (Sonelal) too has grievances similar to that of the SBSP — that big brother BJP has not given it the respect it deserves. Its leader Anupriya Patel is a Minister in Modi’s government but there is a feeling that the party has been neglected but the BJP, more especially after the latter rode to an unprecedented victory in the last State polls. Given the tough challenge it faces in Uttar Pradesh from the Samajwadi Party-Bahujan Samaj Party combine, the BJP would not want its allies in the state to walk away. Will the outreach and the alliances, new and old, work for the BJP? In Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh, they should have an impact. One is not sure about Tamil Nadu, though, where the AIADMK has become unpopular, and weak after a split in the party. Its unpopularity could drag down the BJP (which, not having a big mass base there, has to depend on the regional ally), as well as the other regional partner, the PMK. Nevertheless, with every seat counting in what is billed as a furiously contested 2019 Lok Sabha election, the BJP can at least take heart from the alliances it has managed to secure. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Alliance arithmetic: BJP to beat opposition at its own game?

The Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) is facing difficult moments just ahead of the general elections. It was looking to score political points on two issues but had to suffer setbacks in both. First, the Supreme Court has held that the Delhi government — headed by AAP leader and chief minister Arvind Kejriwal — had no powers to constitute commissions of inquiry and that the anti-corruption branch of the government could not investigate cases against central government officials. Second, the Congress has spurned the AAP’s offer for an electoral alliance to jointly take on the Bharatiya Janata Party in the coming polls. &nbsp;

AAP leaders have reacted furiously to the apex court’s ruling, with Kejriwal exclaiming, ‘What sort of verdict is this!” But his party colleague and Rajya Sabha member Sanjay Singh went a step further, wondering whether the court would give a judgement against the Modi regime. There have been demands by AAP’s detractors to slap a contempt of court case against the Rajya Sabha member. So far the court has not taken note of the remarks, and some BJP leaders have said the party would take a call soon on moving a contempt plea.&nbsp;&nbsp;

In February 2015, soon after the AAP government took charge for a second time, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs issues a notification that services would be under the purview of the Lieutenant Governor, who is a representative of the central government. The notification also stated that the state’s anti-corruption branch would not register cases against central government employees, let alone investigate those instances. In August 2016, following AAP’s appeal, the Delhi High Court snubbed AAP by ruling that the Lt Governor was the administrative head. 
 
The matter went to the Supreme Court, and in July 2018, the court said that the Lt Governor would retain powers in matters related to police, public order and land, but that decisions of the elected regime did not require the Lt Governor’s concurrence. While this last ruling was exploited as a ‘victory’ by all sides, the confusion over the powers of the Lt Governor and the elected government remained largely unaddressed.&nbsp;&nbsp;

The February 14 order is clearer, and yet one issue remains unsettled: That of controlling authority over the administrative services. The two-judge bench which delivered the latest ruling was divided on whether the state regime had powers over the administrative cadre of the rank below joint secretary, and a larger Bench will now look into the matter. Thus, while the AAP can still hope for a favourable verdict on this count, it's on the backfoot for the moment. Its opponents have hailed the court order and claimed it is a slap on the face of an ‘anarchist Kejriwal’ and his government.&nbsp;

The second setback, that of the Congress’s refusal to align with the AAP, is equally embarrassing for Delhi’s ruling party. The Delhi unit of the Congress under its new leader Sheila Dikshit is not keen on any understanding with the AAP in the state. Kejriwal has had the mortification of being snubbed openly on the matter, and he has had to concede that so far, his desire to have a pact with the Congress to contain the BJP has not gone anywhere. Kejriwal seems to have forgotten the anti-graft campaign he had been a prominent part of, against the then Dikshit regime in Delhi — a campaign that eventually fetched his power in Delhi and the chief ministership too. Then he had threatened to jail the senior Congress leader.&nbsp;

But why is the AAP over-eager to tie up with the Congress, when it claims to have the overwhelming support of the people? How is it that a party which has a near monopoly in numbers in the Delhi Assembly, has to crave for support from another party which has no representation from Delhi, either in the Lok Sabha or in the Assembly? There are two essential reasons. The first is that the AAP fears a washout in Delhi, similar to the one in 2014 — the best-case scenario could be a seat or two. The second is that unlike in 2014, the party’s prospects in Punjab, which gave it four MPs, are bleak. The AAP’s Punjab affairs are in a shambles, with various party leaders having left the organisation. Besides, the Congress led by Captain Amarinder Singh is sitting pretty in the state; let alone the AAP, even the BJP-Akali Dal combine will find it difficult to counter the Chief Minister.&nbsp;&nbsp;

Five years ago, the AAP had first formed the government with the Congress’s outside backing and soon enough ended the arrangement after ‘apologising’ to the people for the mistake (of having taken the support). Then, the parting of ways clicked for the AAP as it stormed back to power. Today it needs the Congress to remain relevant in the Lok Sabha. How things change!&nbsp;

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

&nbsp;

&nbsp;&nbsp;

The Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) is facing difficult moments just ahead of the general elections. It was looking to score political points on two issues but had to suffer setbacks in both.

The Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) is facing difficult moments just ahead of the general elections. It was looking to score political points on two issues but had to suffer setbacks in both. First, the Supreme Court has held that the Delhi government — headed by AAP leader and chief minister Arvind Kejriwal — had no powers to constitute commissions of inquiry and that the anti-corruption branch of the government could not investigate cases against central government officials. Second, the Congress has spurned the AAP’s offer for an electoral alliance to jointly take on the Bharatiya Janata Party in the coming polls. AAP leaders have reacted furiously to the apex court’s ruling, with Kejriwal exclaiming, ‘What sort of verdict is this!” But his party colleague and Rajya Sabha member Sanjay Singh went a step further, wondering whether the court would give a judgement against the Modi regime. There have been demands by AAP’s detractors to slap a contempt of court case against the Rajya Sabha member. So far the court has not taken note of the remarks, and some BJP leaders have said the party would take a call soon on moving a contempt plea. In February 2015, soon after the AAP government took charge for a second time, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs issues a notification that services would be under the purview of the Lieutenant Governor, who is a representative of the central government. The notification also stated that the state’s anti-corruption branch would not register cases against central government employees, let alone investigate those instances. In August 2016, following AAP’s appeal, the Delhi High Court snubbed AAP by ruling that the Lt Governor was the administrative head. The matter went to the Supreme Court, and in July 2018, the court said that the Lt Governor would retain powers in matters related to police, public order and land, but that decisions of the elected regime did not require the Lt Governor’s concurrence. While this last ruling was exploited as a ‘victory’ by all sides, the confusion over the powers of the Lt Governor and the elected government remained largely unaddressed. The February 14 order is clearer, and yet one issue remains unsettled: That of controlling authority over the administrative services. The two-judge bench which delivered the latest ruling was divided on whether the state regime had powers over the administrative cadre of the rank below joint secretary, and a larger Bench will now look into the matter. Thus, while the AAP can still hope for a favourable verdict on this count, it's on the backfoot for the moment. Its opponents have hailed the court order and claimed it is a slap on the face of an ‘anarchist Kejriwal’ and his government. The second setback, that of the Congress’s refusal to align with the AAP, is equally embarrassing for Delhi’s ruling party. The Delhi unit of the Congress under its new leader Sheila Dikshit is not keen on any understanding with the AAP in the state. Kejriwal has had the mortification of being snubbed openly on the matter, and he has had to concede that so far, his desire to have a pact with the Congress to contain the BJP has not gone anywhere. Kejriwal seems to have forgotten the anti-graft campaign he had been a prominent part of, against the then Dikshit regime in Delhi — a campaign that eventually fetched his power in Delhi and the chief ministership too. Then he had threatened to jail the senior Congress leader. But why is the AAP over-eager to tie up with the Congress, when it claims to have the overwhelming support of the people? How is it that a party which has a near monopoly in numbers in the Delhi Assembly, has to crave for support from another party which has no representation from Delhi, either in the Lok Sabha or in the Assembly? There are two essential reasons. The first is that the AAP fears a washout in Delhi, similar to the one in 2014 — the best-case scenario could be a seat or two. The second is that unlike in 2014, the party’s prospects in Punjab, which gave it four MPs, are bleak. The AAP’s Punjab affairs are in a shambles, with various party leaders having left the organisation. Besides, the Congress led by Captain Amarinder Singh is sitting pretty in the state; let alone the AAP, even the BJP-Akali Dal combine will find it difficult to counter the Chief Minister. Five years ago, the AAP had first formed the government with the Congress’s outside backing and soon enough ended the arrangement after ‘apologising’ to the people for the mistake (of having taken the support). Then, the parting of ways clicked for the AAP as it stormed back to power. Today it needs the Congress to remain relevant in the Lok Sabha. How things change! (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

With setbacks from Supreme Court and Congress, the road ahead is tough for Aam Aadmi Party

One wonders why Jyotiraditya Scindia has been made the Congress party’s general secretary in-charge for western Uttar Pradesh for the 2019 Lok Sabha elections. He doesn’t bring any special understanding of the region to the table, nor is he a charismatic figure there.

Also, although technically on a footing equal with Priyanka Gandhi Vadra, who too has been appointed general secretary but in charge of eastern Uttar Pradesh, Scindia cannot hope to match her profile or stature within the party even with the new assignment. One can, therefore, only speculate on the reasons.&nbsp;

Here’s speculation number one. The appointment is Congress president Rahul Gandhi’s way of keeping him away from the politics of Madhya Pradesh, where Kamal Nath is ensconced as chief minister. Scindia had been a formidable candidate to take over the reins of the government after the Congress displaced a Bharatiya Janata Party regime in the state recently.&nbsp;

He was both popular and close to Rahul Gandhi. When the Congress high command decided in Kamal Nath’s favour, it reportedly offered Scindia the deputy chief minister’s post, which was declined. Since then, the party felt it is prudent to avoid situations of direct conflict between Scindia and Kamal Nath, and thus, shifted the young leader out.&nbsp;

Speculation number two: The appointment is a way to cut Scindia down to size. His refusal to accept the deputy’s position was seen as a snub to the high command and to the Kamal Nath-Digvijaya Singh lobby. He was, thus, given charge of a region where the Congress stands little chance of doing well and can be made a scapegoat after the Congress fails in the region. Only days prior to his appointment, Scindia&nbsp;had a long meeting with senior BJP leader and former chief minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan with whom he is said to share a good rapport. That may have rankled the high command too.&nbsp; 
 
And speculation number three is that Scindia will be used a foil in the post-result scenario for comparison with Priyanka’s performance in eastern Uttar Pradesh, where the Congress has a fighting chance to win a fistful of seats — at least two to four. This may be nothing to talk about, but it’s still better than zero, which is what many analysts believe the Congress will get in the western parts of the state.&nbsp;&nbsp;

Admittedly, all this is speculation. What is not speculation but a fact is that the Congress is weak and anaemic in western Uttar Pradesh. It could not do well even in the 2017 Assembly elections when most analysts had predicted trouble for the BJP there for a variety of factors. The Jats, comprising some 17 per cent of the population, are a dominant factor. 
 
They were supposedly angry with the BJP for having made a non-Jat the chief minister of neighbouring Haryana. Besides, they were said to have been a spanner in the works of the BJP’s larger Hindu consolidation drive. The Muslims, another important segment in the region, were upset with the BJP too. Ajit Singh’s party, the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), was tipped to spoil the BJP’s party and thus help others such as the Congress to gain a foothold in the region. And yet, nothing of these happened. The Congress failed miserably and the BJP romped home.&nbsp;

The situation is perhaps worse for the Congress this coming Lok Sabha polls. Not only is it pitted against the BJP but it has to also counter the combined might of the Samajwadi Party-Bahujan Samaj Party- RLD. If the Jats are indeed so upset with the BJP that they have decided to vote against it, they will in probability go with the new alliance. The Muslims will not waste their votes on the Congress if they sense that the party is on a weak footing. Which voter segment is the Congress banking on?&nbsp;

Western Uttar Pradesh is also communally sensitive. The Muzaffarnagar riots during the Samajwadi party rule had led to a Hindu-Muslim polarisation of sorts, which benefitted the BJP in the last Assembly polls and brought no gains to the Congress which was unsure of its stand. The new grand alliance has the Dalit-Muslim plan up its sleeve this time to neutralise a possible Hindu re-consolidation. 
 
In the 2017 polls, the RLD had tied up with the Congress but gained little out of that alliance. Many believed that the Congress had pulled down Ajit Singh’s party, which is why the RLD has dumped the Congress for the 2019 elections.

Look at it any which way, Scindia’s official foray into western Uttar Pradesh’s politics is fraught with danger.&nbsp; 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.) 
&nbsp;

One wonders why Jyotiraditya Scindia has been made the Congress party’s general secretary in-charge for western Uttar Pradesh for the 2019 Lok Sabha elections. He doesn’t bring any special understanding of the region to the table, nor is he a charismatic figure there.

One wonders why Jyotiraditya Scindia has been made the Congress party’s general secretary in-charge for western Uttar Pradesh for the 2019 Lok Sabha elections. He doesn’t bring any special understanding of the region to the table, nor is he a charismatic figure there. Also, although technically on a footing equal with Priyanka Gandhi Vadra, who too has been appointed general secretary but in charge of eastern Uttar Pradesh, Scindia cannot hope to match her profile or stature within the party even with the new assignment. One can, therefore, only speculate on the reasons. Here’s speculation number one. The appointment is Congress president Rahul Gandhi’s way of keeping him away from the politics of Madhya Pradesh, where Kamal Nath is ensconced as chief minister. Scindia had been a formidable candidate to take over the reins of the government after the Congress displaced a Bharatiya Janata Party regime in the state recently. He was both popular and close to Rahul Gandhi. When the Congress high command decided in Kamal Nath’s favour, it reportedly offered Scindia the deputy chief minister’s post, which was declined. Since then, the party felt it is prudent to avoid situations of direct conflict between Scindia and Kamal Nath, and thus, shifted the young leader out. Speculation number two: The appointment is a way to cut Scindia down to size. His refusal to accept the deputy’s position was seen as a snub to the high command and to the Kamal Nath-Digvijaya Singh lobby. He was, thus, given charge of a region where the Congress stands little chance of doing well and can be made a scapegoat after the Congress fails in the region. Only days prior to his appointment, Scindia had a long meeting with senior BJP leader and former chief minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan with whom he is said to share a good rapport. That may have rankled the high command too. And speculation number three is that Scindia will be used a foil in the post-result scenario for comparison with Priyanka’s performance in eastern Uttar Pradesh, where the Congress has a fighting chance to win a fistful of seats — at least two to four. This may be nothing to talk about, but it’s still better than zero, which is what many analysts believe the Congress will get in the western parts of the state. Admittedly, all this is speculation. What is not speculation but a fact is that the Congress is weak and anaemic in western Uttar Pradesh. It could not do well even in the 2017 Assembly elections when most analysts had predicted trouble for the BJP there for a variety of factors. The Jats, comprising some 17 per cent of the population, are a dominant factor. They were supposedly angry with the BJP for having made a non-Jat the chief minister of neighbouring Haryana. Besides, they were said to have been a spanner in the works of the BJP’s larger Hindu consolidation drive. The Muslims, another important segment in the region, were upset with the BJP too. Ajit Singh’s party, the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), was tipped to spoil the BJP’s party and thus help others such as the Congress to gain a foothold in the region. And yet, nothing of these happened. The Congress failed miserably and the BJP romped home. The situation is perhaps worse for the Congress this coming Lok Sabha polls. Not only is it pitted against the BJP but it has to also counter the combined might of the Samajwadi Party-Bahujan Samaj Party- RLD. If the Jats are indeed so upset with the BJP that they have decided to vote against it, they will in probability go with the new alliance. The Muslims will not waste their votes on the Congress if they sense that the party is on a weak footing. Which voter segment is the Congress banking on? Western Uttar Pradesh is also communally sensitive. The Muzaffarnagar riots during the Samajwadi party rule had led to a Hindu-Muslim polarisation of sorts, which benefitted the BJP in the last Assembly polls and brought no gains to the Congress which was unsure of its stand. The new grand alliance has the Dalit-Muslim plan up its sleeve this time to neutralise a possible Hindu re-consolidation. In the 2017 polls, the RLD had tied up with the Congress but gained little out of that alliance. Many believed that the Congress had pulled down Ajit Singh’s party, which is why the RLD has dumped the Congress for the 2019 elections. Look at it any which way, Scindia’s official foray into western Uttar Pradesh’s politics is fraught with danger. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Is Congress trying to keep Jyotiraditya Scindia away from MP?

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Zee News Rajasthan

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Rajesh Singh

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