The U.S. Department of war is reportedly drafting a revised classified nuclear strategy led by defence planners to give the Commander-in-Chief new options in regional conflicts. The policy focuses on integrating lower-yield tactical nuclear weapons to defend allies from attacks by Russia or China. We break down what tactical nukes are, and what this strategy means for NATO allies.

Trump Goes Nuclear, Prepares for War with China, Russia | GRAVITAS 

China's rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal is reshaping the global strategic landscape. New assessments suggest Beijing is narrowing key capability gaps with the United States and Russia, raising questions about the future of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. As China modernises its missile forces, expands silo fields, and develops advanced delivery systems, analysts warn that the global nuclear balance may be entering a new era. This report examines China's nuclear ambitions, the shifting balance of power, and what it could mean for international security.

Beijing Closes The Nuclear 'Attack' Gap: Global Nuclear Balance Starts To Shift

India's K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile with 3,500-km range strengthens sea-based nuclear deterrence through underwater stealth, advanced guidance systems and credible second-strike capability against regional nuclear-armed adversaries.

How India’s new K-4 missile could be a major deterrence game-changer

It refers to the ability to launch nuclear weapons from land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles and strategic bombers. Very few states have reached this level because it demands decades of technological investment, vast financial resources and strategic clarity.

Only 4 countries have the ultimate nuclear weapon advantage. Who controls the world’s nuclear triads?

When examining how many types of land-based nuclear missiles the country possesses, the picture centres around two missile families developed over several decades: the Prithvi series and the Agni series.

From Prithvi to Agni: How many types of land-based nuclear missiles does India have?

Germany's Merz expressed interest in holding talks with France and the UK about the possibility of sharing nuclear capabilities. The proposal aims to strengthen European security and cooperation on defense matters.

EU nations seek to boost nuclear deterrence

Amid the ongoing Ukraine war, Kremlin said on Wednesday (October 26) said that Russian President Vladimir Putin oversaw the training of nuclear deterrence forces, troops that are responsible for responding to threats of nuclear war.&nbsp;

A Kremlin statement said: "The tasks envisaged during the training of the strategic deterrence forces were completed in full, and all missiles reached their targets."&nbsp;

The statement added that "under the leadership of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Vladimir Putin, a training session was held with ground, sea and air strategic deterrence forces".&nbsp;

Russian state television showed Putin overseeing the drills from a control room. Also, the nation's Zvezda military news channel showed Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu telling Putin that the Russian forces practised "delivering a massive nuclear strike by strategic offensive forces in response to an enemy nuclear strike".&nbsp;

WATCH |&nbsp;Indian, Russian defence ministers hold talks: Russia raises concern over use of 'Dirty Bomb'&nbsp;

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Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines and Tupolev strategic bomber planes were involved in the exercises, the Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov told Putin.&nbsp;

The drills also included Tu-95 long-rage aircraft as Russia tested launching missiles from the Kamchatka peninsula in the Russian Far East. Also from the waters of the Barents Sea in the Arctic.&nbsp;

The drills came amid Russia has expressed concerns over Ukraine plotting the usage of the "dirty bomb", which is a conventional explosive device that is laced with toxic nuclear material.&nbsp;

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Amid the ongoing Ukraine war, Kremlin said on Wednesday (October 26) said that Russian President Vladimir Putin oversaw the training of nuclear deterrence forces, troops that are responsible for responding to threats of nuclear war.

Amid the ongoing Ukraine war, Kremlin said on Wednesday (October 26) said that Russian President Vladimir Putin oversaw the training of nuclear deterrence forces, troops that are responsible for responding to threats of nuclear war. A Kremlin statement said: "The tasks envisaged during the training of the strategic deterrence forces were completed in full, and all missiles reached their targets." The statement added that "under the leadership of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Vladimir Putin, a training session was held with ground, sea and air strategic deterrence forces". Russian state television showed Putin overseeing the drills from a control room. Also, the nation's Zvezda military news channel showed Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu telling Putin that the Russian forces practised "delivering a massive nuclear strike by strategic offensive forces in response to an enemy nuclear strike". WATCH | Indian, Russian defence ministers hold talks: Russia raises concern over use of 'Dirty Bomb' × Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines and Tupolev strategic bomber planes were involved in the exercises, the Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov told Putin. The drills also included Tu-95 long-rage aircraft as Russia tested launching missiles from the Kamchatka peninsula in the Russian Far East. Also from the waters of the Barents Sea in the Arctic. The drills came amid Russia has expressed concerns over Ukraine plotting the usage of the "dirty bomb", which is a conventional explosive device that is laced with toxic nuclear material. WATCH WION LIVE HERE You can now write for wionews.com and be a part of the community. Share your stories and opinions with us here.

Russia-Ukraine war: Vladimir Putin oversees training of nuclear deterrence forces

The post-Second World War decadal confrontation between the former USSR and the West, known as the Cold War, spawned both the theory and practice of deterrence. Conceptually, and practically deterrence, in the context of almost nuclear parity between the two entities, meant Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). &nbsp;Broken down, and roughly it meant that if a nuclear threshold (not to be confused with nuclear break out) was breached by one party, the other would respond with ‘massive retaliation’ decimating this party. In a convoluted way, MAD held peace till the former USSR dissolved on account of mostly internal contradictions. Obiter dictum, nuclear deterrence could also be used by states to pursue other policies under its shield. Deterrence, as a security concept was then applied by most states (It also has/had pure military connotations). If deterrence became central to the security problematique, then what do&nbsp;military successes of Ukrainians against Russian forces mean? Will deterrence continue to hold? Will it obtain peace?

Admittedly speculative, Ukraine’s latest military advances, may not have occurred without some outside and superior advice. War and success or failure in the same, is to belabor the obvious, about strategy. Or, in other words, it's how you organize and use your forces – no matter how limited or superior these are- it is superior strategy and organization that determine both your tactical and strategic successes. If speculation about Ukrainian forces being offered superior advice on strategy and battlefield tactics is right, then it may be that Western strategists have offered it. The advice would naturally be predicated on a robust understanding of the posture -historical and contemporary – of Russian forces, their generalship and its reflex, factoring in of Russian’s strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities. In other words, the Russian military approach would have been war-gamed and then presented to the Ukrainians who then may have incorporated these into their military maneuvers and tactics.

If this theory holds, then it would not be lost on Vladimir Putin. The Russian president’s ostensible premise for invading Ukraine – NATO expansion, regime change in Ukraine etc- appear to be just these: ostensible rationales. The real agenda does not appear to &nbsp;be to reclaim the former USSR but to create a Greater Russia- a Russia that is in Putin’s eyes redeemed and restored to its civilizational glory. There then is both prestige and maximalist inherent in Russia’s war aims. This is overlaid by the realignment of global politics and international relations – the kind that suggests a Cold War 2.0 is in the making. Against this larger backdrop and canvas, what lessons would Putin draw from his troops’ debacle?

That the West is serious and determined to thwart his agenda is the answer. Given that the war has dragged on for six months now and that yesterday’s military advance of the Ukrainians was not only a military debacle but also carried a demonstration and rhetorical effect that would boost Ukrainians morale(in effect shaping them as a nation and thus strengthening their resolve), Putin basically has two choices.

One is total war. This would call for all out mobilization of the Russian polity, society and the state. But this approach has clear limitations: it would not only exhaust Russia but leave it drained against the backdrop of unprecedented sanctions. Besides the obvious economic problems this poses, the approach is fraught with political risk for Russia.

The other , more dark and more ominous is that Putin may consider nuclear deterrence a dead letter, so to speak. This would entail not just the implied threat of nuclear weapons but their actual use. Of course, this is an apocalyptic measure but when zero sum thinking dominates, apocalypse now could in the minds of the leader of a state mean a better option than a retreat- something that could be very costly for Putin politically. The hope and the wish here is that good sense prevails and nukes are not used – either as a first or last resort.

But even if nukes are not used, what does all this mean for deterrence?

I think given the grand realignment and rejigg that is taking place in the chessboard of international politics, deterrence or more accurately nuclear deterrence, while not entirely dead, would lose its value in terms of nuclear weapons and the doctrines governing their use as the ultimate security guarantor. Yesterday’s Ukrainian advances and Russian losses are ominous. The hope, to repeat is, that none of this comes to pass. But states across the world would have taken notice and there would be paradigm shifts in the offing. But all said and done, if deterrence as the ultimate security guarantor will fail, then what governs relations between states in an anarchic world? What can lead to relative peace? What can prevent nuclear Armageddon?

To answer this question, I will hark back to the theory I have propounded in some of my essays: wars are not , necessarily and always a ‘continuation of state policy’ These , often times, begin &nbsp;in the minds of statesmen. This, of course , is a theory, but if it holds, then perhaps only statesmen can end it.

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

The post-Second World War decadal confrontation between the former USSR and the West, known as the Cold War, spawned both the theory and practice of deterrence. Conceptually, and practically deterrence, in the context of almost nuclear parity between the two entities, meant Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

The post-Second World War decadal confrontation between the former USSR and the West, known as the Cold War, spawned both the theory and practice of deterrence. Conceptually, and practically deterrence, in the context of almost nuclear parity between the two entities, meant Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Broken down, and roughly it meant that if a nuclear threshold (not to be confused with nuclear break out) was breached by one party, the other would respond with ‘massive retaliation’ decimating this party. In a convoluted way, MAD held peace till the former USSR dissolved on account of mostly internal contradictions. Obiter dictum, nuclear deterrence could also be used by states to pursue other policies under its shield. Deterrence, as a security concept was then applied by most states (It also has/had pure military connotations). If deterrence became central to the security problematique, then what do military successes of Ukrainians against Russian forces mean? Will deterrence continue to hold? Will it obtain peace? Admittedly speculative, Ukraine’s latest military advances, may not have occurred without some outside and superior advice. War and success or failure in the same, is to belabor the obvious, about strategy. Or, in other words, it's how you organize and use your forces – no matter how limited or superior these are- it is superior strategy and organization that determine both your tactical and strategic successes. If speculation about Ukrainian forces being offered superior advice on strategy and battlefield tactics is right, then it may be that Western strategists have offered it. The advice would naturally be predicated on a robust understanding of the posture -historical and contemporary – of Russian forces, their generalship and its reflex, factoring in of Russian’s strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities. In other words, the Russian military approach would have been war-gamed and then presented to the Ukrainians who then may have incorporated these into their military maneuvers and tactics. If this theory holds, then it would not be lost on Vladimir Putin. The Russian president’s ostensible premise for invading Ukraine – NATO expansion, regime change in Ukraine etc- appear to be just these: ostensible rationales. The real agenda does not appear to be to reclaim the former USSR but to create a Greater Russia- a Russia that is in Putin’s eyes redeemed and restored to its civilizational glory. There then is both prestige and maximalist inherent in Russia’s war aims. This is overlaid by the realignment of global politics and international relations – the kind that suggests a Cold War 2.0 is in the making. Against this larger backdrop and canvas, what lessons would Putin draw from his troops’ debacle? That the West is serious and determined to thwart his agenda is the answer. Given that the war has dragged on for six months now and that yesterday’s military advance of the Ukrainians was not only a military debacle but also carried a demonstration and rhetorical effect that would boost Ukrainians morale(in effect shaping them as a nation and thus strengthening their resolve), Putin basically has two choices. One is total war. This would call for all out mobilization of the Russian polity, society and the state. But this approach has clear limitations: it would not only exhaust Russia but leave it drained against the backdrop of unprecedented sanctions. Besides the obvious economic problems this poses, the approach is fraught with political risk for Russia. The other , more dark and more ominous is that Putin may consider nuclear deterrence a dead letter, so to speak. This would entail not just the implied threat of nuclear weapons but their actual use. Of course, this is an apocalyptic measure but when zero sum thinking dominates, apocalypse now could in the minds of the leader of a state mean a better option than a retreat- something that could be very costly for Putin politically. The hope and the wish here is that good sense prevails and nukes are not used – either as a first or last resort. But even if nukes are not used, what does all this mean for deterrence? I think given the grand realignment and rejigg that is taking place in the chessboard of international politics, deterrence or more accurately nuclear deterrence, while not entirely dead, would lose its value in terms of nuclear weapons and the doctrines governing their use as the ultimate security guarantor. Yesterday’s Ukrainian advances and Russian losses are ominous. The hope, to repeat is, that none of this comes to pass. But states across the world would have taken notice and there would be paradigm shifts in the offing. But all said and done, if deterrence as the ultimate security guarantor will fail, then what governs relations between states in an anarchic world? What can lead to relative peace? What can prevent nuclear Armageddon? To answer this question, I will hark back to the theory I have propounded in some of my essays: wars are not , necessarily and always a ‘continuation of state policy’ These , often times, begin in the minds of statesmen. This, of course , is a theory, but if it holds, then perhaps only statesmen can end it. (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

Will Ukrainian battlefield successes kill nuclear deterrence?

North Korea discussed new policies for increasing its "nuclear war deterrence" during a military meeting presided over by leader Kim Jong Un, AFP reported quoting news agency KCNA reported Sunday.

North Korea discussed new policies for increasing its "nuclear war deterrence" during a military meeting presided over by leader Kim Jong Un, AFP reported quoting news agency KCNA reported Sunday. The report did not specify what the nuclear deterrence entailed, but said that "crucial measures" were taken at the meeting "for considerably increasing the firepower strike ability of the artillery pieces of the Korean People's Army". "Set forth at the meeting were new policies for further increasing the nuclear war deterrence of the country," KCNA said. Discussions at the Central Military Commission meeting also centred on "putting the strategic armed forces on a high alert operation" in line with the "building and development of the armed forces of the country". If the meeting, the date of which was not given, occurred in the last several days, it marks Kim's first public appearance in almost three weeks, according to South Korean news agency Yonhap. News of North Korea's nuclear discussions came after a report Friday in The Washington Post that US President Donald Trump's administration had discussed holding the first US nuclear test since 1992 as a potential warning to Russia and China.

North Korea discusses new policies for increasing 'nuclear war deterrence': Report

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