A nationalist Turkish television station with close ties to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has dug up a 12-year-old map that projects Turkey’s sphere of influence in 2050 as stretching from South-eastern Europe on the northern coast of the Mediterranean and Libya on its southern shore across North Africa, the Gulf and the Levant into the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Buoyed by last year’s Azerbaijani defeat of Armenia, TGRT, a subsidiary of Ihlas Holding, a media and construction conglomerate that has won major government tenders, used the map to advance a policy that has long constituted the agenda of some of Mr Erdogan’s closest advisors.

The broadcasting of the map, first published in a book authored by George Freidman, the founder of Stratfor, an influential American corporate intelligence group, followed calls by pan-Turkic daily Turkiye, Ihlas’ daily newspaper that has the fourth-largest circulation in Turkey, to leverage the Azerbaijani victory to create a military alliance of Turkic states.

In a country that ranks only second to China as the world’s foremost jailer of journalists, Ihlas Holding media would not be pushing a pan-Turkic, Islam-laced Turkish regional policy without tacit government approval at the very least.

The media group’s push reflects Turkish efforts to capitalize on the fact that Turkey’s latest geopolitical triumph with Azerbaijan’s Turkish-backed victory is already producing tangible results. The military victory has positioned Azerbaijan, and by extension Turkey, as an alternative transportation route westwards that would allow Central Asian nations to bypass corridors dominated by either Russia or Iran.

Turkmenistan, recognizing the changing geopolitical map, rushed in January to end a long-standing dispute with Azerbaijan and agree on the joint exploitation of Caspian Sea oil deposits. The agreement came on the heels of a deal in December for the purchase from ENI Turkmenistan of up to 40,000 tonnes of petroleum a month by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR).

The agreement could boost the completion of a Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline (TPC) that would feed into the recently operational Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), bypass Russia and Iran, and supply Greece and Bulgaria via the former Soviet republic.

Last month, Azerbaijan agreed with Turkmenistan and Afghanistan to develop the Lapis Lazuli transport corridor that would link the war-ravaged country to Turkey. At about the same time, Kazakhstan began exporting copper cathodes to Turkey via Azerbaijan in a first step intended to capitalize on the Caucasian nation’s position as a transit hub.

Azerbaijan and Turkey’s newly found advantage has rung alarm bells among Russian and Iranian analysts with close ties to their respective governments even though the TGRT broadcast may have been primarily intended to whip up nationalist fervour at home and test regional responses.

Russian and Iranian politicians and analysts appeared to take the broadcast in that vein. Nonetheless, they were quick to note that Friedman’s projection includes Russia’s soft underbelly in the northern Caucasus as well as Crimea while Iranians took stock of the fact that the Turkish sphere of influence would border on Iran to the north, south and west.

Turkey and Ukraine have in recent months agreed to cooperate in the development of technologies with military applications related to engines, avionics, drones, anti-ship and cruise missiles, radar and surveillance systems, robotics, space, and satellites. Turkey has refused to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea, home to Crimean Tartars, and criticized Russian support for Ukrainian rebels.

Most Russian commentators sought to downplay the significance of the map, leaving Andrei Krasov, deputy chairman of the defence committee of the Russian parliament’s lower house to warn that “if they (the Turks) want to test the strength of the Russian spirit and our weapons, let them try.”

With Iran excluded from TGRT and Stratfor’s projection of Turkey’s emerging sphere of influence, Iranian officials and analysts have largely not responded to the revival of the map.

Yet, Iran’s actions on the ground suggest that the Islamic republic has long anticipated Turkish moves even though it was caught off guard by last year’s Azerbaijani-Armenian war.

For one, Iran has in the past year sought to bolster its military presence in the Caspian Sea and forge close naval ties with the basin’s other littoral states - Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.

Viewed from Tehran, TGRT’s broadcasting of the Stratfor map was the latest in a series of provocative Turkish moves.

They include Mr. Erdogan’s recital of a nationalist poem while attending a military parade in Azerbaijan that calls for reuniting two Iranian ethnic Azeri provinces with the former Soviet republic and publication by state-run Turkish Radio and Television’s Arabic service of a map on Instagram, depicting Iran’s oil-rich province of Khuzestan with its large population of ethnic Arabs as separate from Iran.

The Instagram posting came days after the disclosure that Habib Chaab, a leader of the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz, or ASMLA, had been kidnapped in Istanbul by an Iraqi Kurdish drug baron in cooperation with Iranian intelligence and transported to Iran.

While senior Iranian officials talked down the Turkish provocations, Iran’s semi-official Fars News Agency left little doubt about what Iran’s true sentiments were.

“Those who have greedy eyes on the territories this side of the Aras River had better study history and see that Azerbaijan, specifically the people of Tabriz, have always pioneered in defending Iran. If Iran had not helped you on the night of the coup, you would have had a fate like that of former Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi,’ protesters chanted in front of the Turkish consulate in Tabriz, the capital of Iran’s East Azerbaijan province.

The protesters were responding to Mr. Erdogan’s poem recital and referring to the failed military coup against him in 2016 as well as the toppling of Mr. Morsi in 2013 in a takeover by the Egyptian armed forces.

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

A nationalist Turkish television station with close ties to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has dug up a 12-year-old map that projects Turkey’s sphere of influence in 2050 as stretching from South-eastern Europe on the northern coast of the Mediterranean and Libya on its southern shore across North Africa, the Gulf and the Levant into the Caucasus and Central Asia.

A nationalist Turkish television station with close ties to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has dug up a 12-year-old map that projects Turkey’s sphere of influence in 2050 as stretching from South-eastern Europe on the northern coast of the Mediterranean and Libya on its southern shore across North Africa, the Gulf and the Levant into the Caucasus and Central Asia. Buoyed by last year’s Azerbaijani defeat of Armenia, TGRT, a subsidiary of Ihlas Holding, a media and construction conglomerate that has won major government tenders, used the map to advance a policy that has long constituted the agenda of some of Mr Erdogan’s closest advisors. The broadcasting of the map, first published in a book authored by George Freidman, the founder of Stratfor, an influential American corporate intelligence group, followed calls by pan-Turkic daily Turkiye, Ihlas’ daily newspaper that has the fourth-largest circulation in Turkey, to leverage the Azerbaijani victory to create a military alliance of Turkic states. In a country that ranks only second to China as the world’s foremost jailer of journalists, Ihlas Holding media would not be pushing a pan-Turkic, Islam-laced Turkish regional policy without tacit government approval at the very least. The media group’s push reflects Turkish efforts to capitalize on the fact that Turkey’s latest geopolitical triumph with Azerbaijan’s Turkish-backed victory is already producing tangible results. The military victory has positioned Azerbaijan, and by extension Turkey, as an alternative transportation route westwards that would allow Central Asian nations to bypass corridors dominated by either Russia or Iran. Turkmenistan, recognizing the changing geopolitical map, rushed in January to end a long-standing dispute with Azerbaijan and agree on the joint exploitation of Caspian Sea oil deposits. The agreement came on the heels of a deal in December for the purchase from ENI Turkmenistan of up to 40,000 tonnes of petroleum a month by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR). The agreement could boost the completion of a Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline (TPC) that would feed into the recently operational Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), bypass Russia and Iran, and supply Greece and Bulgaria via the former Soviet republic. Last month, Azerbaijan agreed with Turkmenistan and Afghanistan to develop the Lapis Lazuli transport corridor that would link the war-ravaged country to Turkey. At about the same time, Kazakhstan began exporting copper cathodes to Turkey via Azerbaijan in a first step intended to capitalize on the Caucasian nation’s position as a transit hub. Azerbaijan and Turkey’s newly found advantage has rung alarm bells among Russian and Iranian analysts with close ties to their respective governments even though the TGRT broadcast may have been primarily intended to whip up nationalist fervour at home and test regional responses. Russian and Iranian politicians and analysts appeared to take the broadcast in that vein. Nonetheless, they were quick to note that Friedman’s projection includes Russia’s soft underbelly in the northern Caucasus as well as Crimea while Iranians took stock of the fact that the Turkish sphere of influence would border on Iran to the north, south and west. Turkey and Ukraine have in recent months agreed to cooperate in the development of technologies with military applications related to engines, avionics, drones, anti-ship and cruise missiles, radar and surveillance systems, robotics, space, and satellites. Turkey has refused to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea, home to Crimean Tartars, and criticized Russian support for Ukrainian rebels. Most Russian commentators sought to downplay the significance of the map, leaving Andrei Krasov, deputy chairman of the defence committee of the Russian parliament’s lower house to warn that “if they (the Turks) want to test the strength of the Russian spirit and our weapons, let them try.” With Iran excluded from TGRT and Stratfor’s projection of Turkey’s emerging sphere of influence, Iranian officials and analysts have largely not responded to the revival of the map. Yet, Iran’s actions on the ground suggest that the Islamic republic has long anticipated Turkish moves even though it was caught off guard by last year’s Azerbaijani-Armenian war. For one, Iran has in the past year sought to bolster its military presence in the Caspian Sea and forge close naval ties with the basin’s other littoral states - Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Viewed from Tehran, TGRT’s broadcasting of the Stratfor map was the latest in a series of provocative Turkish moves. They include Mr. Erdogan’s recital of a nationalist poem while attending a military parade in Azerbaijan that calls for reuniting two Iranian ethnic Azeri provinces with the former Soviet republic and publication by state-run Turkish Radio and Television’s Arabic service of a map on Instagram, depicting Iran’s oil-rich province of Khuzestan with its large population of ethnic Arabs as separate from Iran. The Instagram posting came days after the disclosure that Habib Chaab, a leader of the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz, or ASMLA, had been kidnapped in Istanbul by an Iraqi Kurdish drug baron in cooperation with Iranian intelligence and transported to Iran. While senior Iranian officials talked down the Turkish provocations, Iran’s semi-official Fars News Agency left little doubt about what Iran’s true sentiments were. “Those who have greedy eyes on the territories this side of the Aras River had better study history and see that Azerbaijan, specifically the people of Tabriz, have always pioneered in defending Iran. If Iran had not helped you on the night of the coup, you would have had a fate like that of former Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi,’ protesters chanted in front of the Turkish consulate in Tabriz, the capital of Iran’s East Azerbaijan province. The protesters were responding to Mr. Erdogan’s poem recital and referring to the failed military coup against him in 2016 as well as the toppling of Mr. Morsi in 2013 in a takeover by the Egyptian armed forces. (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

Opinion: Turkey signals sweeping regional ambitions

To call for an end to violence and discrimination against women and the scrapping of a proposed law that would restrict travel for many women, hundreds of women's right activists and their supporters took to streets in Nepal's capital on Friday.&nbsp;

The protesters marching in the heart of Kathmandu chanted slogans demanding equality. Activists say even though the country's constitution guarantees equal rights to women, there is much more that needs to be done to make it a reality.&nbsp;

They point to the proposed law that would require women under 40 years of age to get permission from their family and local government to travel to the Middle East or Africa as a violation of human rights. The government has said the regulation would help stop human trafficking, but has pointed out it is just a proposal and not a law till now.&nbsp;

The protesters tried to march to the prime minister's office but were blocked by riot police and barbed wire barricades. There were no clashes or violence.&nbsp;

Reshu Aryal, a rights activist in the rally, said she wanted to protest what she saw as police and official indifference to discrimination and sexual violence against women and girls.&nbsp;

To call for an end to violence and discrimination against women and the scrapping of a proposed law that would restrict travel for many women, hundreds of women's right activists and their supporters took to streets in Nepal's capital on Friday.

To call for an end to violence and discrimination against women and the scrapping of a proposed law that would restrict travel for many women, hundreds of women's right activists and their supporters took to streets in Nepal's capital on Friday. The protesters marching in the heart of Kathmandu chanted slogans demanding equality. Activists say even though the country's constitution guarantees equal rights to women, there is much more that needs to be done to make it a reality. They point to the proposed law that would require women under 40 years of age to get permission from their family and local government to travel to the Middle East or Africa as a violation of human rights. The government has said the regulation would help stop human trafficking, but has pointed out it is just a proposal and not a law till now. The protesters tried to march to the prime minister's office but were blocked by riot police and barbed wire barricades. There were no clashes or violence. Reshu Aryal, a rights activist in the rally, said she wanted to protest what she saw as police and official indifference to discrimination and sexual violence against women and girls.

Hundreds rally for women's rights in Nepal

A recent online <a href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/GAMAAN-Iran-Religion-Survey-2020-English.pdf">survey</a> by scholars at two Dutch universities of Iranian attitudes towards religion has revealed a stunning rejection of state-imposed adherence to conservative religious mores as well as the role of religion in public life.

Although compatible with a trend across the Middle East, the survey’s results based on 50,000 respondents, who overwhelmingly said they resided in the Islamic republic, suggested that Iranians were in the frontlines of the region’s quest for religious change.

The trend puts a dent in the efforts of Iran as well as its rivals — Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates —&nbsp;that are competing for religious soft power and leadership of the Muslim world.

Among the rivals, the UAE, populated in majority by non-nationals, is the only one to start acknowledging changing attitudes and demographic realities. Authorities in November lifted the ban on consumption of alcohol and cohabitation among unmarried couples.

Nonetheless, the change in attitudes threatens to undercut the efforts of Iran as well as its Middle Eastern competitors to cement their individual interpretations of Islam as the Muslim world’s dominant narrative by rejecting religious dogma and formalistic and ritualistic religious practice propagated and/or imposed by governments and religious authorities.

“It becomes an existential question. The state wants you to be something that you don’t want to be,” said Pooyan Tamimi Arab, one of the organisers of the Iran survey, speaking in an interview. “Political disappointment steadily turned into religious disappointment… Iranians have turned away from institutional religion on an unprecedented scale.”

In a similar vein, Turkish art historian Nese Yildiran recently warned that a fatwa issued by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Directorate of Religious Affairs or Diyanet declaring popular talismans to ward off “the evil eye” as forbidden by Islam fueled criticism of one of the best-funded branches of government.

The fatwa followed the issuance of similar religious opinions banning the dying of men’s moustaches and beards, feeding dogs at home, tattoos, and playing the national lottery as well as statements that were perceived to condone or belittle child abuse and violence against women.

Funded by a Washington-based Iranian human rights groups, the Iranian survey, coupled with other research and opinion polls across the Middle East and North Africa, suggests that not only Muslim youth, but also other age groups, who are increasingly sceptical towards religious and worldly authority, aspire to more individual, more spiritual experiences of religion.

Their quest runs the gamut from changes in personal religious behaviour to conversions in secret to other religions because apostasy is banned and, in some cases, punishable by death to an abandonment of religion in favour of agnosticism or atheism.

Responding to the Iranian survey, 80 per cent of the participants said they believed in God, but only 32.2 per cent identified themselves as Shiite Muslims, a far lower percentage than asserted in official figures of predominantly Shiite Iran.

More than a third of the respondents said that they either did not belong to a religion or were atheists or agnostics. Between 43 and 53 per cent, depending on age group, suggested that their religious views had changed over time with six per cent of those saying that they had converted to another religious orientation.

Sixty-eight per cent said they opposed the inclusion of religious precepts in national legislation. Seventy per cent rejected public funding of religious institutions while 56 per cent opposed mandatory religious education in schools. Almost 60 per cent admitted that they do not pray, and 72 per cent disagreed with women being obliged to wear a hijab in public.

An unpublished slide of the survey shows the change in religiosity reflected in the fact that an increasing number of Iranians no longer name their children after religious figures.

A five-minute YouTube clip allegedly related to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards attacked the survey despite having distributed the questionnaire once the pollsters disclosed in their report that the poll had been supported by an exile human rights group.

“Tehran may well be the least religious capital in the Middle East. Clerics dominate the news headlines and play the communal elders in soap operas, but I never saw them on the street, except on billboards. Unlike most Muslim countries, the call to prayer is almost inaudible… Alcohol is banned but home delivery is faster for wine than for pizza… Religion felt frustratingly hard to locate and the truly religious seemed sidelined, like a minority,” wrote journalist Nicholas Pelham based on a visit in 2019 during which he was detained for several weeks.

The survey’s results as well as observations by analysts and journalists like Mr. Pelham stroke with responses to various polls of Arab public opinion in recent years that showed that, despite 40 per cent of those polled defining religion as the most important constituent element of their identity, 66 per cent saw a need for religious institutions to be reformed.

The polls suggested further that public opinion would support the reconceptualization of Muslim jurisprudence to remove obsolete and discriminatory concepts like that of the kafir or infidel.

Responses by governments in Iran, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East to changing attitudes towards religion and religiosity demonstrate the degree to which they perceive the change as a threat, often expressed in existential terms.

In one of the latest responses, Mohammad Mehdi Mirbaqeri, a prominent Shiite cleric and member of Iran’s powerful Assembly of Experts that appoints the country’s supreme leader, last month described Covid-19 as a “secular virus” and a declaration of war on “religious civilization” and “religious institutions.”

Saudi Arabia went further by defining the “calling for atheist thought in any form” with terrorism in its anti-terrorism law. Saudi dissident and activist Rafi Badawi was sentenced on charges of apostasy to ten years in prison and 1,000 lashes for questioning why Saudis should be obliged to adhere to Islam and asserting that the faith did not have answers to all questions.

Analysts, writers, journalists, and pollsters have traced changes in attitudes in the Middle East and North Africa for much of the past decade.

Kuwaiti writer Sajed al-Abdali noted in 2012 that “it is essential that we acknowledge today that atheism exists and is increasing in our society, especially among our youth, and evidence of this is in no short supply.”

Mr. Arab argues nine years later that his latest survey “shows that there is a social basis” for concern among authoritarian and autocratic governments that employ religion to further their geopolitical goals and seek to maintain their grip on potentially restive populations.

A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute.

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

A recent online survey by scholars at two Dutch universities of Iranian attitudes towards religion has revealed a stunning rejection of state-imposed adherence to conservative religious mores as well as the role of religion in public life.

A recent online survey by scholars at two Dutch universities of Iranian attitudes towards religion has revealed a stunning rejection of state-imposed adherence to conservative religious mores as well as the role of religion in public life. Although compatible with a trend across the Middle East, the survey’s results based on 50,000 respondents, who overwhelmingly said they resided in the Islamic republic, suggested that Iranians were in the frontlines of the region’s quest for religious change. The trend puts a dent in the efforts of Iran as well as its rivals — Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates — that are competing for religious soft power and leadership of the Muslim world. Among the rivals, the UAE, populated in majority by non-nationals, is the only one to start acknowledging changing attitudes and demographic realities. Authorities in November lifted the ban on consumption of alcohol and cohabitation among unmarried couples. Nonetheless, the change in attitudes threatens to undercut the efforts of Iran as well as its Middle Eastern competitors to cement their individual interpretations of Islam as the Muslim world’s dominant narrative by rejecting religious dogma and formalistic and ritualistic religious practice propagated and/or imposed by governments and religious authorities. “It becomes an existential question. The state wants you to be something that you don’t want to be,” said Pooyan Tamimi Arab, one of the organisers of the Iran survey, speaking in an interview. “Political disappointment steadily turned into religious disappointment… Iranians have turned away from institutional religion on an unprecedented scale.” In a similar vein, Turkish art historian Nese Yildiran recently warned that a fatwa issued by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Directorate of Religious Affairs or Diyanet declaring popular talismans to ward off “the evil eye” as forbidden by Islam fueled criticism of one of the best-funded branches of government. The fatwa followed the issuance of similar religious opinions banning the dying of men’s moustaches and beards, feeding dogs at home, tattoos, and playing the national lottery as well as statements that were perceived to condone or belittle child abuse and violence against women. Funded by a Washington-based Iranian human rights groups, the Iranian survey, coupled with other research and opinion polls across the Middle East and North Africa, suggests that not only Muslim youth, but also other age groups, who are increasingly sceptical towards religious and worldly authority, aspire to more individual, more spiritual experiences of religion. Their quest runs the gamut from changes in personal religious behaviour to conversions in secret to other religions because apostasy is banned and, in some cases, punishable by death to an abandonment of religion in favour of agnosticism or atheism. Responding to the Iranian survey, 80 per cent of the participants said they believed in God, but only 32.2 per cent identified themselves as Shiite Muslims, a far lower percentage than asserted in official figures of predominantly Shiite Iran. More than a third of the respondents said that they either did not belong to a religion or were atheists or agnostics. Between 43 and 53 per cent, depending on age group, suggested that their religious views had changed over time with six per cent of those saying that they had converted to another religious orientation. Sixty-eight per cent said they opposed the inclusion of religious precepts in national legislation. Seventy per cent rejected public funding of religious institutions while 56 per cent opposed mandatory religious education in schools. Almost 60 per cent admitted that they do not pray, and 72 per cent disagreed with women being obliged to wear a hijab in public. An unpublished slide of the survey shows the change in religiosity reflected in the fact that an increasing number of Iranians no longer name their children after religious figures. A five-minute YouTube clip allegedly related to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards attacked the survey despite having distributed the questionnaire once the pollsters disclosed in their report that the poll had been supported by an exile human rights group. “Tehran may well be the least religious capital in the Middle East. Clerics dominate the news headlines and play the communal elders in soap operas, but I never saw them on the street, except on billboards. Unlike most Muslim countries, the call to prayer is almost inaudible… Alcohol is banned but home delivery is faster for wine than for pizza… Religion felt frustratingly hard to locate and the truly religious seemed sidelined, like a minority,” wrote journalist Nicholas Pelham based on a visit in 2019 during which he was detained for several weeks. The survey’s results as well as observations by analysts and journalists like Mr. Pelham stroke with responses to various polls of Arab public opinion in recent years that showed that, despite 40 per cent of those polled defining religion as the most important constituent element of their identity, 66 per cent saw a need for religious institutions to be reformed. The polls suggested further that public opinion would support the reconceptualization of Muslim jurisprudence to remove obsolete and discriminatory concepts like that of the kafir or infidel. Responses by governments in Iran, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East to changing attitudes towards religion and religiosity demonstrate the degree to which they perceive the change as a threat, often expressed in existential terms. In one of the latest responses, Mohammad Mehdi Mirbaqeri, a prominent Shiite cleric and member of Iran’s powerful Assembly of Experts that appoints the country’s supreme leader, last month described Covid-19 as a “secular virus” and a declaration of war on “religious civilization” and “religious institutions.” Saudi Arabia went further by defining the “calling for atheist thought in any form” with terrorism in its anti-terrorism law. Saudi dissident and activist Rafi Badawi was sentenced on charges of apostasy to ten years in prison and 1,000 lashes for questioning why Saudis should be obliged to adhere to Islam and asserting that the faith did not have answers to all questions. Analysts, writers, journalists, and pollsters have traced changes in attitudes in the Middle East and North Africa for much of the past decade. Kuwaiti writer Sajed al-Abdali noted in 2012 that “it is essential that we acknowledge today that atheism exists and is increasing in our society, especially among our youth, and evidence of this is in no short supply.” Mr. Arab argues nine years later that his latest survey “shows that there is a social basis” for concern among authoritarian and autocratic governments that employ religion to further their geopolitical goals and seek to maintain their grip on potentially restive populations. A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox. Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute. (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

Opinion: Iranians move into front line of the Middle East’s quest for religious change

China would like the world to believe that the Middle East and North Africa region does not rank high on its totem pole despite its energy dependence, significant investment and strategic relationships with the region. In many ways, China is not being deceptive. With relations with the United States rapidly deteriorating, China’s primary focus is on what it views as its main battleground: the Asia–Pacific. China is nonetheless realising that remaining aloof in the Middle East may not be sustainable.

It was only in 2016 that China published its first and only Middle East-related white paper, devoted to the Arab states rather than the region as a whole. Apart from rehashing China’s long-standing foreign policy principles, the paper highlighted opportunities for win-win cooperation in many areas.

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&nbsp;

Investment figures tell a similar story. Of the US$2 trillion in Chinese overseas investment between 2005 and 2019, a mere US$198 billion or under 5 per cent went to the Middle East and North Africa.

Half Full Rather Than Half Empty

What turns the glass half full is the fact that the Middle East fulfils almost half of China’s energy needs. Moreover, some of China’s investments, particularly in ports and adjacent industrial parks in the Gulf, Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean, are strategically important. What was once primarily a Belt and Road “string of pearls” linking Indian Ocean ports has evolved into a network that stretches from Djibouti in east Africa through Oman’s port of Duqm and the United Arab Emirates’ Jebel Ali port into a near dominant position in the eastern Mediterranean and onwards into the Indo–Pacific.

Also Read | <a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions-blogs/active-presence-of-chinese-intelligence-in-afghanistan-356208">Active presence of Chinese intelligence in Afghanistan</a>

China already exerts influence in the eastern Mediterranean region through its involvement in ports in Greece, Turkey, Israel and Egypt. It has expressed interest in the Lebanese port of Tripoli and may well seek access to the Russian-controlled ports of Tartus and Latakia.

Asserting the importance of the Middle East, Niu Xinchun, director of Middle East Studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), wrote back in 2017: “The politics and security of the Middle East [are] inextricably related to China. This is the first time in history that China has possessed political, economic and security interests in the Middle East simultaneously."&nbsp;CICIR is widely viewed as China’s most influential think tank.

Also Read | <a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions-blogs/gulf-state-religious-moderation-falls-by-the-wayside-in-pakistan-355099">Gulf state religious moderation falls by the wayside in Pakistan</a>

Recently, however, Niu has apparently taken an antipodal position, maintaining that the Middle East doesn't feature prominently in China’s strategic calculations.&nbsp;

This shift was part of a game of shadow boxing to subtly warn the Gulf, and particularly Saudi Arabia, to dial down tension with Iran.

To ensure that its message is not lost on the region, China could well ensure that its future investments contribute to job creation, a key priority for Middle Eastern states struggling to come to grips with the economic crisis Middle East political economy scholar Karen Young noted that Chinese investment has so far focused on a small number of locations and had not significantly generated jobs.

Subtle Messaging

Subtle Chinese messaging was also at the core of China’s public response to Iranian leaks that it was close to signing a 25-year partnership with the Islamic republic that would lead to a whopping US$400 billion investment to develop the country’s oil, gas and transportation sectors.

Also Read | <a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions-blogs/opinion-religious-aberrations-in-pakistan-354245">Opinion: Religious aberrations in Pakistan</a> 
 
China limited itself to a non-committal on-the-record reaction and low-key semi-official commentary.&nbsp;

Writing in the Shanghai Observer, a secondary Communist party newspaper, Middle East scholar Fan Hongda was less guarded. Fan argued that the agreement, though nowhere close to implementation, highlighted “an important moment of development” at a time that US–Chinese tensions allowed Beijing to pay less heed to American policies.&nbsp;

Diplomacy with “Chinese Characteristics”

Nonetheless, China’s evasiveness on the Iran agreement constituted a recognition that the success of its Belt and Road initiative and its ability to avoid being sucked uncontrollably into the Middle East’s myriad conflicts depends on a security environment that reduces tension.

Reflecting what appears to be a shift in China’s approach to regional security, Chinese scholars Sun Degang and Wu Sike suggested that Chinese characteristics would involve “seeking common ground while reserving differences”&nbsp;

A Blunt Rebuke

But China’s conflict management diplomacy may not go down well with the Gulf Arabs, notably Saudi Arabia, judging by what for Saudi media was a blunt and rare recent critique of the People’s Republic. In a game of shadow-boxing in which intellectuals and journalists front for officials who prefer the luxury of plausible deniability, Saudi Arabia responded bluntly in a column authored by Baria Alamuddin, a Lebanese journalist who regularly writes columns for Saudi media.

Alamuddin warned that China was being lured to financially bankrupt Lebanon by Hizballah. She suggested in a column published by Arab News that Hizballah’s seduction of China was occurring against the backdrop of a potential massive 25-year cooperation agreement between the China and Iran.&nbsp;

A Hair in the Soup

Further complicating Chinese efforts to nudge the Middle East towards some degree of stabilisation are China’s technology and military sales with no constraints on their use or regard for the potential geopolitical fallout. The sales include drone and ballistic missile technology as well as the building blocks for a civilian nuclear programme for Saudi Arabia, which would significantly enhance the kingdom’s ability to develop nuclear weapons.

These sales have fuelled fears, for different reasons, in Jerusalem and Tehran of a new regional arms race.

Washington’s indifference may change, assuming that the recent rejection by the US Embassy in Abu Dhabi of an offer by the UAE to donate hundreds of Covid-19 test kits for screening of its staff was a shot across the Gulf’s bow. A US official said the tests were rejected because they were either Chinese-made or involved BGI Genomics, a Chinese company.

A Major Battlefield

Digital and satellite technology involving Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei’s 5G cellular technology rollout is set to be a major battlefield. US officials have warned that the inclusion of Huawei in Gulf networks could jeopardise sensitive communications.

US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker said the US had advised its Middle Eastern partners in the region to take “a careful look at investment, major contracts and infrastructure projects.”&nbsp;

Schenker warned that agreements with Huawei meant “basically all the information and your data is going to Huawei, property of the Chinese Communist Party”.&nbsp;

The rollout of China’s BeiDou Satellite Navigation System (BDS), which competes with the US’ Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia’s GLONASS and Europe’s Galileo, sets the stage for battle. Countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Turkey have signed up for what is known as China’s Digital Silk Road Initiative. So far, Pakistan is the only country known to have been granted access to BeiDou’s military applications.

The successful launch in July of a mission to Mars, the Arab world’s first interplanetary initiative, suggested that the UAE was seeking to balance its engagement with the United States and China in an effort not to get caught in the growing divergence between the two powers. The mission, dubbed Hope Probe, was coordinated with US rather than Chinese institutions. It launched from Japan’s Tanegashima Space Center.

You Can Run, But You Can’t Hide

A continuously deteriorating relationship between USA and China is a worst-case scenario for Middle Eastern states. It would progressively reduce their ability to walk a fine line.&nbsp;

Ironically, the US desire to recalibrate its engagement with the Middle East and a realisation on the part of Saudi Arabia and Iran that their interests are best served by a reduction of tension could serve as a catalyst for a new Gulf security architecture.

None of the parties are at a point where they are willing to publicly entertain the possibility of such a collective security architecture. Nonetheless, such a multilateral security architecture would ultimately serve all parties’ interest.

China would like the world to believe that the Middle East and North Africa region does not rank high on its totem pole despite its energy dependence, significant investment and strategic relationships with the region.

China would like the world to believe that the Middle East and North Africa region does not rank high on its totem pole despite its energy dependence, significant investment and strategic relationships with the region. In many ways, China is not being deceptive. With relations with the United States rapidly deteriorating, China’s primary focus is on what it views as its main battleground: the Asia–Pacific. China is nonetheless realising that remaining aloof in the Middle East may not be sustainable. It was only in 2016 that China published its first and only Middle East-related white paper, devoted to the Arab states rather than the region as a whole. Apart from rehashing China’s long-standing foreign policy principles, the paper highlighted opportunities for win-win cooperation in many areas. × Investment figures tell a similar story. Of the US$2 trillion in Chinese overseas investment between 2005 and 2019, a mere US$198 billion or under 5 per cent went to the Middle East and North Africa. Half Full Rather Than Half Empty What turns the glass half full is the fact that the Middle East fulfils almost half of China’s energy needs. Moreover, some of China’s investments, particularly in ports and adjacent industrial parks in the Gulf, Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean, are strategically important. What was once primarily a Belt and Road “string of pearls” linking Indian Ocean ports has evolved into a network that stretches from Djibouti in east Africa through Oman’s port of Duqm and the United Arab Emirates’ Jebel Ali port into a near dominant position in the eastern Mediterranean and onwards into the Indo–Pacific. Also Read | Active presence of Chinese intelligence in Afghanistan China already exerts influence in the eastern Mediterranean region through its involvement in ports in Greece, Turkey, Israel and Egypt. It has expressed interest in the Lebanese port of Tripoli and may well seek access to the Russian-controlled ports of Tartus and Latakia. Asserting the importance of the Middle East, Niu Xinchun, director of Middle East Studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), wrote back in 2017: “The politics and security of the Middle East [are] inextricably related to China. This is the first time in history that China has possessed political, economic and security interests in the Middle East simultaneously." CICIR is widely viewed as China’s most influential think tank. Also Read | Gulf state religious moderation falls by the wayside in Pakistan Recently, however, Niu has apparently taken an antipodal position, maintaining that the Middle East doesn't feature prominently in China’s strategic calculations. This shift was part of a game of shadow boxing to subtly warn the Gulf, and particularly Saudi Arabia, to dial down tension with Iran. To ensure that its message is not lost on the region, China could well ensure that its future investments contribute to job creation, a key priority for Middle Eastern states struggling to come to grips with the economic crisis Middle East political economy scholar Karen Young noted that Chinese investment has so far focused on a small number of locations and had not significantly generated jobs. Subtle Messaging Subtle Chinese messaging was also at the core of China’s public response to Iranian leaks that it was close to signing a 25-year partnership with the Islamic republic that would lead to a whopping US$400 billion investment to develop the country’s oil, gas and transportation sectors. Also Read | Opinion: Religious aberrations in Pakistan China limited itself to a non-committal on-the-record reaction and low-key semi-official commentary. Writing in the Shanghai Observer, a secondary Communist party newspaper, Middle East scholar Fan Hongda was less guarded. Fan argued that the agreement, though nowhere close to implementation, highlighted “an important moment of development” at a time that US–Chinese tensions allowed Beijing to pay less heed to American policies. Diplomacy with “Chinese Characteristics” Nonetheless, China’s evasiveness on the Iran agreement constituted a recognition that the success of its Belt and Road initiative and its ability to avoid being sucked uncontrollably into the Middle East’s myriad conflicts depends on a security environment that reduces tension. Reflecting what appears to be a shift in China’s approach to regional security, Chinese scholars Sun Degang and Wu Sike suggested that Chinese characteristics would involve “seeking common ground while reserving differences” A Blunt Rebuke But China’s conflict management diplomacy may not go down well with the Gulf Arabs, notably Saudi Arabia, judging by what for Saudi media was a blunt and rare recent critique of the People’s Republic. In a game of shadow-boxing in which intellectuals and journalists front for officials who prefer the luxury of plausible deniability, Saudi Arabia responded bluntly in a column authored by Baria Alamuddin, a Lebanese journalist who regularly writes columns for Saudi media. Alamuddin warned that China was being lured to financially bankrupt Lebanon by Hizballah. She suggested in a column published by Arab News that Hizballah’s seduction of China was occurring against the backdrop of a potential massive 25-year cooperation agreement between the China and Iran. A Hair in the Soup Further complicating Chinese efforts to nudge the Middle East towards some degree of stabilisation are China’s technology and military sales with no constraints on their use or regard for the potential geopolitical fallout. The sales include drone and ballistic missile technology as well as the building blocks for a civilian nuclear programme for Saudi Arabia, which would significantly enhance the kingdom’s ability to develop nuclear weapons. These sales have fuelled fears, for different reasons, in Jerusalem and Tehran of a new regional arms race. Washington’s indifference may change, assuming that the recent rejection by the US Embassy in Abu Dhabi of an offer by the UAE to donate hundreds of Covid-19 test kits for screening of its staff was a shot across the Gulf’s bow. A US official said the tests were rejected because they were either Chinese-made or involved BGI Genomics, a Chinese company. A Major Battlefield Digital and satellite technology involving Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei’s 5G cellular technology rollout is set to be a major battlefield. US officials have warned that the inclusion of Huawei in Gulf networks could jeopardise sensitive communications. US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker said the US had advised its Middle Eastern partners in the region to take “a careful look at investment, major contracts and infrastructure projects.” Schenker warned that agreements with Huawei meant “basically all the information and your data is going to Huawei, property of the Chinese Communist Party”. The rollout of China’s BeiDou Satellite Navigation System (BDS), which competes with the US’ Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia’s GLONASS and Europe’s Galileo, sets the stage for battle. Countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Turkey have signed up for what is known as China’s Digital Silk Road Initiative. So far, Pakistan is the only country known to have been granted access to BeiDou’s military applications. The successful launch in July of a mission to Mars, the Arab world’s first interplanetary initiative, suggested that the UAE was seeking to balance its engagement with the United States and China in an effort not to get caught in the growing divergence between the two powers. The mission, dubbed Hope Probe, was coordinated with US rather than Chinese institutions. It launched from Japan’s Tanegashima Space Center. You Can Run, But You Can’t Hide A continuously deteriorating relationship between USA and China is a worst-case scenario for Middle Eastern states. It would progressively reduce their ability to walk a fine line. Ironically, the US desire to recalibrate its engagement with the Middle East and a realisation on the part of Saudi Arabia and Iran that their interests are best served by a reduction of tension could serve as a catalyst for a new Gulf security architecture. None of the parties are at a point where they are willing to publicly entertain the possibility of such a collective security architecture. Nonetheless, such a multilateral security architecture would ultimately serve all parties’ interest.

Opinion | Looming large: The Middle East braces for fallout of US–China divide

Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has taken to Twitter to berate the US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, after reports emerged that the top American diplomat has accused Tehran of having links with al-Qaeda.

In fiery remarks, Zarif called the allegations allegedly based on intelligence data "fictitious", adding that Mr “we lie, cheat, steal" Pompeo, "is pathetically ending his disastrous career with more warmongering lies."

"No one is fooled," Zarif tweeted. "All 9/11 terrorists came" from Pompeo's "favourite" Middle East "destinations" he added. "NONE from Iran."

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From designating Cuba to fictitious Iran "declassifications” and AQ claims, Mr. “we lie, cheat, steal" is pathetically ending his disastrous career with more warmongering lies. 
 
No one is fooled. All 9/11 terrorists came from <a href="https://twitter.com/SecPompeo?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@SecPompeo</a>'s favorite ME destinations; NONE from Iran.
— Javad Zarif (@JZarif) <a href="https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/1349018857067991046?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">January 12, 2021</a></blockquote>
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The majority of the perpetrators of the September 11, 2001, attacks in New York came from US-ally Saudi Arabia.

Earlier in on Tuesday, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said, without providing hard evidence, that al-Qaeda had established a new home base in Iran.

The New York Times reported in November that al-Qaeda’s Abu Muhammad al-Masri, accused of helping to mastermind the 1998 bombings of two US embassies in Africa, was gunned down by Israeli operatives in Iran. Iran denied the report, saying there were no al-Qaeda “terrorists” on its soil.

Pompeo told a news conference at the National Press Club in Washington that he was announcing publicly for the first time that al-Masri died on August 7 last year.

Pompeo said his presence in Iran was no surprise, and added: “Al-Masri’s presence inside Iran points to the reason that we’re here today ... al-Qaeda has a new home base: it is the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

"I would say Iran is indeed the new Afghanistan –- as the key geographic hub for Al-Qaeda -- but it's actually worse.&nbsp;

"Unlike in Afghanistan, when Al-Qaeda was hiding in the mountains, Al-Qaeda today is operating under the hard shell of the Iranian regime's protection."

(With inputs from agencies)

Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has taken to Twitter to berate the US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, after reports emerged that the top American diplomat has accused Tehran of having links with al-Qaeda.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has taken to Twitter to berate the US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, after reports emerged that the top American diplomat has accused Tehran of having links with al-Qaeda. In fiery remarks, Zarif called the allegations allegedly based on intelligence data "fictitious", adding that Mr “we lie, cheat, steal" Pompeo, "is pathetically ending his disastrous career with more warmongering lies." "No one is fooled," Zarif tweeted. "All 9/11 terrorists came" from Pompeo's "favourite" Middle East "destinations" he added. "NONE from Iran." From designating Cuba to fictitious Iran "declassifications” and AQ claims, Mr. “we lie, cheat, steal" is pathetically ending his disastrous career with more warmongering lies. No one is fooled. All 9/11 terrorists came from @SecPompeo's favorite ME destinations; NONE from Iran. — Javad Zarif (@JZarif) January 12, 2021 × The majority of the perpetrators of the September 11, 2001, attacks in New York came from US-ally Saudi Arabia. Earlier in on Tuesday, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said, without providing hard evidence, that al-Qaeda had established a new home base in Iran. The New York Times reported in November that al-Qaeda’s Abu Muhammad al-Masri, accused of helping to mastermind the 1998 bombings of two US embassies in Africa, was gunned down by Israeli operatives in Iran. Iran denied the report, saying there were no al-Qaeda “terrorists” on its soil. Pompeo told a news conference at the National Press Club in Washington that he was announcing publicly for the first time that al-Masri died on August 7 last year. Pompeo said his presence in Iran was no surprise, and added: “Al-Masri’s presence inside Iran points to the reason that we’re here today ... al-Qaeda has a new home base: it is the Islamic Republic of Iran.” "I would say Iran is indeed the new Afghanistan –- as the key geographic hub for Al-Qaeda -- but it's actually worse. "Unlike in Afghanistan, when Al-Qaeda was hiding in the mountains, Al-Qaeda today is operating under the hard shell of the Iranian regime's protection." (With inputs from agencies)

9/11 terrorists came from Pompeo's favourite Middle East destinations: Iran's Foreign Minister

A record number of people including children have been prosecuted for insulting Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, reports Al Arabiya.

According to the statistics released by the Turkish Justice Ministry, a total of 128,872 probes were launched over six years for "insulting" the president.

Prosecutors have evaluated 36,066 complaints and launched criminal cases for 11,371 of them, in 2019 alone, Al Arabiya adds.

Reports have shown that 903 minors, including 264 children aged between 12 and 14, stood trial for "insulting" Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan over six years.

There has been a dramatic uptick in the number of cases filed for "insulting" the president during Erdogan's tenure.

Those convicted of insulting the president may be imprisoned for a period of between one and four years. The sentence is likely to be increased by one-sixth if the act is committed explicitly.

(With inputs from agencies)

A record number of people including children have been prosecuted for insulting Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, reports Al Arabiya. According to the statistics released by the Turkish Justice Ministry, a total of 128,872 probes were launched over six years for "insulting" the president.

A record number of people including children have been prosecuted for insulting Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, reports Al Arabiya. According to the statistics released by the Turkish Justice Ministry, a total of 128,872 probes were launched over six years for "insulting" the president. Prosecutors have evaluated 36,066 complaints and launched criminal cases for 11,371 of them, in 2019 alone, Al Arabiya adds. Reports have shown that 903 minors, including 264 children aged between 12 and 14, stood trial for "insulting" Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan over six years. There has been a dramatic uptick in the number of cases filed for "insulting" the president during Erdogan's tenure. Those convicted of insulting the president may be imprisoned for a period of between one and four years. The sentence is likely to be increased by one-sixth if the act is committed explicitly. (With inputs from agencies)

Hundreds of children stood trial for ‘insulting’ Turkish President Erdogan

The triple threat of conflict, climate change and COVID-19 is driving the crises in nearly all Emergency Watchlist countries, threatening famine in several in 2021.

These countries face the biggest humanitarian crisis in year 2021

The Yemen conflict is the world's worst humanitarian crisis. But it is the children of Yemen that are the worst-affected. Children malnutrition is soaring in the war-torn country. This week on the West Asia Post, Ghadi Francis decodes this growing crisis.

The West Asia Post | Child malnutrition soars in Yemen

History is not the first thing that comes to mind when one thinks of young, energy-rich monarchies of the Gulf that often punch above their weight in geopolitics and geoeconomics. Yet, that is the rich, mostly unknown story of Qatar that Michael Quentin Morton tells in his book, Masters of the Pearl: A History of Qatar (Reaktion Books, 2020).

It is a story that sheds light on a country that is ruled by an autocratic family that has wielded power for centuries and that frequently dominates headlines with its grand and often controversial ambitions, including its hosting of the 2022 World Cup, as well as its predicaments, controversies, and idiosyncrasies. Michael Quentin Morton, author of nine books on the Gulf and oil, brings an understanding of Qatari history to the table based on extensive research and the fact that he lived in Qatar and UAE at a young age. His father worked there as a Geologist.

Morton puts into perspective Qatar’s differences with Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE that exploded in 2017 with the imposition of a diplomatic and economic boycott that its detractors unsuccessfully hoped would force Qatar to fall into line with their designs for the Gulf and the Middle East at large. Morton draws the reader in by weaving a well-written tale of tribal intrigue, regional and historic animosities, and big power rivalry.

It is a history that on the one hand illustrates the forces that have shaped Qatar and other Gulf states and on the other describes how much the region has and is changing as the result of economic and social development and wealth garnered from oil and gas. Masters of the Pearl constitutes a critical, yet compassionate contribution to an understanding of a small state that manages to punch above its weight and the stormy winds that it attracts.

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do&nbsp;not represent the views of&nbsp;WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse&nbsp;the views of the writer)

History is not the first thing that comes to mind when one thinks of young, energy-rich monarchies of the Gulf that often punch above their weight in geopolitics and geoeconomics.

History is not the first thing that comes to mind when one thinks of young, energy-rich monarchies of the Gulf that often punch above their weight in geopolitics and geoeconomics. Yet, that is the rich, mostly unknown story of Qatar that Michael Quentin Morton tells in his book, Masters of the Pearl: A History of Qatar (Reaktion Books, 2020). It is a story that sheds light on a country that is ruled by an autocratic family that has wielded power for centuries and that frequently dominates headlines with its grand and often controversial ambitions, including its hosting of the 2022 World Cup, as well as its predicaments, controversies, and idiosyncrasies. Michael Quentin Morton, author of nine books on the Gulf and oil, brings an understanding of Qatari history to the table based on extensive research and the fact that he lived in Qatar and UAE at a young age. His father worked there as a Geologist. Morton puts into perspective Qatar’s differences with Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE that exploded in 2017 with the imposition of a diplomatic and economic boycott that its detractors unsuccessfully hoped would force Qatar to fall into line with their designs for the Gulf and the Middle East at large. Morton draws the reader in by weaving a well-written tale of tribal intrigue, regional and historic animosities, and big power rivalry. It is a history that on the one hand illustrates the forces that have shaped Qatar and other Gulf states and on the other describes how much the region has and is changing as the result of economic and social development and wealth garnered from oil and gas. Masters of the Pearl constitutes a critical, yet compassionate contribution to an understanding of a small state that manages to punch above its weight and the stormy winds that it attracts. (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer)

Masters of the pearl: Understanding Qatar critically

Public debates about China’s Middle East policy are as much internal Chinese discussions as they are indications of where Beijing’s thinking is going and efforts to nudge countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to accommodate potential policy changes.

Relying on scholars rather than officials, China is signalling to Gulf states adjustments they would have to make to enable China to become more engaged in regional security and geopolitics.

The subtext in the scholars’ writings and statements is that a failure to reduce tension, particularly with Iran, could persuade China to either reduce its economic involvement in the Middle East or focus on relations with non-Arab states, two of which are arch-rivals of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

At the bottom line, China’s subtle hints at what it would like Gulf states to do is in line with a Russian proposal that calls for a non-aggression agreement with Iran and possibly Turkey that would significantly reduce the risk of disputes spinning out of control and allow China to expand its engagement beyond economics.

In the latest blast, Chinese Middle East scholar Fan Hongda suggested that China rather than “overestimating” the importance of Arab states should pay more attention to the Middle East’s non-Arab powers, Turkey, Israel, and particularly Iran.

"Given Iran's expressed willingness to strengthen bilateral relations (with Beijing), China needs to respond more actively," Mr Fan said in an op-ed published by Lianhe Zaobao, a Chinese language newspaper in Singapore.

Driving the point home, Mr Fan argued in two articles in Hamshahri, a popular Iranian newspaper published by the municipality of Tehran, that China should forge closer ties to Iran irrespective of US policy or potential Arab opposition. “These overcautious concerns have no advantage whatsoever for the 'second most powerful country in the world,” Mr Fan said referring to China.

The timing of Mr Fan’s article will not have been lost on Gulf leaders. It comes on the back of the publication in Iran of a draft 25-year multi-billion dollar Chinese-Iranian agreement on economic and military cooperation. The draft sparked intense speculation about Chinese Middle East policy and how realistic an agreement was.

To capitalize on the speculation, Iran substantially increased the number of companies populating its pavilion at this month’s China International Expo (CIIE) in Shanghai.

Mr Fan’s article was further published as US President-elect Joe Biden prepares to take office in January with the stated intention to break with Donald J. Trump’s harsh ‘maximum pressure’ sanctions policy and return the United States to the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program. Mr Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018.

China’s suggestion that it has alternatives in the Middle East puts pressure on countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE as they try to come to grips with a Biden administration that is likely to put greater emphasis on human rights and take a more critical view towards Gulf involvement in wars in Yemen and Libya.

Similarly, the suggestion anticipated a Biden administration effort to rejigger, if not reduce, the United States’ security commitment to the Middle East and possibly entertain a more multilateral regional architecture.

Mr Fan’s proposal follows an article by prominent Chinese scholars Sun Degang and Wu Sike &nbsp;arguing that the Middle East was a “key region in big power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in a new era.”

Messrs. Sun and Wu indicated that Chinese characteristics would involve “seeking common ground while reserving differences,” a formula that implies conflict management rather than conflict resolution.

The scholars said Chinese engagement in Middle Eastern security would seek to build an inclusive and shared regional collective security mechanism based on fairness, justice, multilateralism, comprehensive governance, and the containment of differences.

Earlier, Niu Xinchun, director of Middle East studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), widely viewed as one of China’s most influential think tanks, adopted a different tone to drive the same message home: China’s interest in the Middle East was waning. To avoid losing China, Gulf states need to create a degree of stability.

“For China, the Middle East is always on the very distant backburner of China’s strategic global strategies … Covid-19, combined with the oil price crisis, will dramatically change the Middle East. (This) will change China’s investment model in the Middle East,” Mr. Niu said.

With few exceptions, Gulf states and media have largely remained silent about Chinese voices that reflect thinking in Beijing that calls into question China’s relations with key Arab states.

No doubt, Gulf states believe that China’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy and their significance to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) makes them all but indispensable.

The BRI is Chinese President’s Xi Jinping’s energy, infrastructure, and telecommunications-driven Eurasia-wide signature foreign policy initiative.

While the Gulf states may not be wrong, they remain vulnerable in an environment in which shifts in US policy force them to hedge their bets and be more attentive to the positions of China in an increasingly multi-polar world. 
 
Said Mordechai Chaziza, an expert on China-Middle East relations: “Beijing has indeed become more concerned about the stability of Middle Eastern regimes. Its growing regional interests combined with its BRI ambitions underscore that Middle East stability, particularly in the Persian Gulf, is now a matter of strategic concern for China.” 
A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox.

(With inputs from Dr Alessandro Arduino, he is a principal research fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore.)

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do&nbsp;not represent the views of&nbsp;WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse&nbsp;the views of the writer)

Public debates about China’s Middle East policy are as much internal Chinese discussions as they are indications of where Beijing’s thinking is going and efforts to nudge countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to accommodate potential policy changes.

Public debates about China’s Middle East policy are as much internal Chinese discussions as they are indications of where Beijing’s thinking is going and efforts to nudge countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to accommodate potential policy changes. Relying on scholars rather than officials, China is signalling to Gulf states adjustments they would have to make to enable China to become more engaged in regional security and geopolitics. The subtext in the scholars’ writings and statements is that a failure to reduce tension, particularly with Iran, could persuade China to either reduce its economic involvement in the Middle East or focus on relations with non-Arab states, two of which are arch-rivals of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. At the bottom line, China’s subtle hints at what it would like Gulf states to do is in line with a Russian proposal that calls for a non-aggression agreement with Iran and possibly Turkey that would significantly reduce the risk of disputes spinning out of control and allow China to expand its engagement beyond economics. In the latest blast, Chinese Middle East scholar Fan Hongda suggested that China rather than “overestimating” the importance of Arab states should pay more attention to the Middle East’s non-Arab powers, Turkey, Israel, and particularly Iran. "Given Iran's expressed willingness to strengthen bilateral relations (with Beijing), China needs to respond more actively," Mr Fan said in an op-ed published by Lianhe Zaobao, a Chinese language newspaper in Singapore. Driving the point home, Mr Fan argued in two articles in Hamshahri, a popular Iranian newspaper published by the municipality of Tehran, that China should forge closer ties to Iran irrespective of US policy or potential Arab opposition. “These overcautious concerns have no advantage whatsoever for the 'second most powerful country in the world,” Mr Fan said referring to China. The timing of Mr Fan’s article will not have been lost on Gulf leaders. It comes on the back of the publication in Iran of a draft 25-year multi-billion dollar Chinese-Iranian agreement on economic and military cooperation. The draft sparked intense speculation about Chinese Middle East policy and how realistic an agreement was. To capitalize on the speculation, Iran substantially increased the number of companies populating its pavilion at this month’s China International Expo (CIIE) in Shanghai. Mr Fan’s article was further published as US President-elect Joe Biden prepares to take office in January with the stated intention to break with Donald J. Trump’s harsh ‘maximum pressure’ sanctions policy and return the United States to the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program. Mr Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018. China’s suggestion that it has alternatives in the Middle East puts pressure on countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE as they try to come to grips with a Biden administration that is likely to put greater emphasis on human rights and take a more critical view towards Gulf involvement in wars in Yemen and Libya. Similarly, the suggestion anticipated a Biden administration effort to rejigger, if not reduce, the United States’ security commitment to the Middle East and possibly entertain a more multilateral regional architecture. Mr Fan’s proposal follows an article by prominent Chinese scholars Sun Degang and Wu Sike arguing that the Middle East was a “key region in big power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in a new era.” Messrs. Sun and Wu indicated that Chinese characteristics would involve “seeking common ground while reserving differences,” a formula that implies conflict management rather than conflict resolution. The scholars said Chinese engagement in Middle Eastern security would seek to build an inclusive and shared regional collective security mechanism based on fairness, justice, multilateralism, comprehensive governance, and the containment of differences. Earlier, Niu Xinchun, director of Middle East studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), widely viewed as one of China’s most influential think tanks, adopted a different tone to drive the same message home: China’s interest in the Middle East was waning. To avoid losing China, Gulf states need to create a degree of stability. “For China, the Middle East is always on the very distant backburner of China’s strategic global strategies … Covid-19, combined with the oil price crisis, will dramatically change the Middle East. (This) will change China’s investment model in the Middle East,” Mr. Niu said. With few exceptions, Gulf states and media have largely remained silent about Chinese voices that reflect thinking in Beijing that calls into question China’s relations with key Arab states. No doubt, Gulf states believe that China’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy and their significance to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) makes them all but indispensable. The BRI is Chinese President’s Xi Jinping’s energy, infrastructure, and telecommunications-driven Eurasia-wide signature foreign policy initiative. While the Gulf states may not be wrong, they remain vulnerable in an environment in which shifts in US policy force them to hedge their bets and be more attentive to the positions of China in an increasingly multi-polar world. Said Mordechai Chaziza, an expert on China-Middle East relations: “Beijing has indeed become more concerned about the stability of Middle Eastern regimes. Its growing regional interests combined with its BRI ambitions underscore that Middle East stability, particularly in the Persian Gulf, is now a matter of strategic concern for China.” A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox. (With inputs from Dr Alessandro Arduino, he is a principal research fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore.) (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer)

Subtly, China pressures Gulf states to reduce regional tensions

Meir Javedanfar is an Iranian-born Israeli Middle East commentator. He left Iran in 1987, eight years after the Iranian Revolution and now lives in Israel. He worked as a foreign affairs commentator at BBC Persian.

Iran blames Israel for assassinating nuclear scientist in Tehran

A breakthrough in the prelude to Afghanistan peace talks has failed to materialise after more than two months of intensive negotiations.

WION Dispatch: What's next for Afghan peace talks?

External affairs minister Jaishankar on Wednesday visited Gulf's oldest temple - the Shreenathji (Shree Krishna) Hindu Temple - in Bahrain built by the Thattai Hindu community which had arrived from the Sindh, undivided India.

The 200-year-old Shree Krishna temple was built in 1817 and situated in Bahrain's capital Manama. Jaishankar is currently on a three-nation visit to United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Seychelles during November 24-29.

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Began the day with darshan at the 200 year-old Shreenathji Temple at Manama. A testimony to our time- tested and close bonds with Bahrain. <a href="https://t.co/U3lD3PrGMG">pic.twitter.com/U3lD3PrGMG</a>
— Dr. S. Jaishankar (@DrSJaishankar) <a href="https://twitter.com/DrSJaishankar/status/1331462916374097926?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November 25, 2020</a></blockquote>
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On a two-day visit to Bahrain from November 24 to 25, Jaishankar held talks on bilateral issues as well as regional and international issues of mutual interest with his Bahraini counterpart Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani.

He also conveyed condolences on behalf of the government and people of India to the Bahraini leadership on the sad demise of Prime Minister of Bahrain Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa on November 11.

"Started Bahrain visit with a warm meeting with FM Dr Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani. Conveyed sincere condolences on the passing away of former PM HRH Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa," Jaishankar tweeted late Tuesday night.

"Discussed our historical ties and cooperation in diverse sectors. Exchanged views on regional and international issues. Thanked Bahrain for taking special care of the Indian community during COVID times," he said.

The novel coronavirus has infected over 85,800 people and claimed 339 lives in the oil-rich Gulf nation.

According to the website of the Indian Embassy in Bahrain, the country has around 350,000 Indian nationals, which comprise a third of Bahrain's total population of 1.4 million.

Jaishankar is on a six-day tour of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Seychelles beginning Tuesday. The visit is seen as important as it comes in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic.

From Bahrain, Jaishankar will travel to UAE where he is scheduled to meet his counterpart Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

During his UAE trip, Jaishankar will discuss ways for Indian workers to resume their jobs in UAE in the post-COVID scenario. More than 3 million Indians live and work in the UAE, the MEA had said in a statement before the commencement of the minister's journey.

In the last leg of his tour, the external affairs minister will travel to Seychelles on November 27 and 28.

In Seychelles, Jaishankar will call-on the newly elected President, Wavel Ramkalawan, to present greetings of Prime Minister Modi and will discuss with him the priorities of the new government and avenues for further strengthening of bilateral relations, the MEA said.

Jaishankar will also hold bilateral consultations with the newly appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and Tourism Sylvestre Radegonde, it said.&nbsp;

(With inputs from agencies)

External affairs minister Jaishankar on Wednesday visited Gulf's oldest temple - the Shreenathji (Shree Krishna) Hindu Temple - in Bahrain built by the Thattai Hindu community which had arrived from the Sindh, undivided India.

External affairs minister Jaishankar on Wednesday visited Gulf's oldest temple - the Shreenathji (Shree Krishna) Hindu Temple - in Bahrain built by the Thattai Hindu community which had arrived from the Sindh, undivided India. The 200-year-old Shree Krishna temple was built in 1817 and situated in Bahrain's capital Manama. Jaishankar is currently on a three-nation visit to United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Seychelles during November 24-29. Began the day with darshan at the 200 year-old Shreenathji Temple at Manama. A testimony to our time- tested and close bonds with Bahrain. pic.twitter.com/U3lD3PrGMG — Dr. S. Jaishankar (@DrSJaishankar) November 25, 2020 × On a two-day visit to Bahrain from November 24 to 25, Jaishankar held talks on bilateral issues as well as regional and international issues of mutual interest with his Bahraini counterpart Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani. He also conveyed condolences on behalf of the government and people of India to the Bahraini leadership on the sad demise of Prime Minister of Bahrain Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa on November 11. "Started Bahrain visit with a warm meeting with FM Dr Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani. Conveyed sincere condolences on the passing away of former PM HRH Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa," Jaishankar tweeted late Tuesday night. "Discussed our historical ties and cooperation in diverse sectors. Exchanged views on regional and international issues. Thanked Bahrain for taking special care of the Indian community during COVID times," he said. The novel coronavirus has infected over 85,800 people and claimed 339 lives in the oil-rich Gulf nation. According to the website of the Indian Embassy in Bahrain, the country has around 350,000 Indian nationals, which comprise a third of Bahrain's total population of 1.4 million. Jaishankar is on a six-day tour of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Seychelles beginning Tuesday. The visit is seen as important as it comes in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic. From Bahrain, Jaishankar will travel to UAE where he is scheduled to meet his counterpart Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan. During his UAE trip, Jaishankar will discuss ways for Indian workers to resume their jobs in UAE in the post-COVID scenario. More than 3 million Indians live and work in the UAE, the MEA had said in a statement before the commencement of the minister's journey. In the last leg of his tour, the external affairs minister will travel to Seychelles on November 27 and 28. In Seychelles, Jaishankar will call-on the newly elected President, Wavel Ramkalawan, to present greetings of Prime Minister Modi and will discuss with him the priorities of the new government and avenues for further strengthening of bilateral relations, the MEA said. Jaishankar will also hold bilateral consultations with the newly appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and Tourism Sylvestre Radegonde, it said. (With inputs from agencies)

External affairs minister Jaishankar visits 200-year-old Hindu temple in Bahrain

Reforms which take effect in March 2021 will allow foreign workers the right to change jobs by transferring sponsorship to new employers.

Saudi Arabia reforms its Kafala system for foreign workers

The US state department has notified Congress that it intends to sell 50 F35 fighter jets to the United Arab Emirates, after Israel agreed last week to drop its objections.

US moves ahead with sale of 50 F-35 fighter jets to the UAE

Watch this week's West Asia Post as Ghadi Francis talks to Ali Hamdan, an adviser to the Lebanese Parliament Speaker for more on the Lebanon-Israel maritime talks. Also on the show, we explore how autocrats are hijacking mega sporting events to expand their soft power? For more such stories, keep watching the West Asia post with Ghadi Francis every Friday at 8:30 PM, only on WION.

The West Asia Post - Episode 3

Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani arrived in Doha on Monday, where peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban have stalled.

Afghanistan’s president Ashraf Ghani lands in Doha amid peace talks

As sunset nears, the residents of Iraq's Mosul flock to a golden-tinted statue of a woman looking out over their scarred city with an expression of steady defiance.

Iraq: New statues shake off months of ISIS brutality

In a gesture signifying close India-Kuwait ties, the Indian flag was at half-mast in the country and at all the Indian missions across the world on Sunday as New Delhi paid its homage to departed Amir of Kuwait, Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah. The Amir died last week on 29th September. He had served as the foreign minister of the country for over forty years and Amir for over fourteen years.

India's envoy to Kuwait, Sibi George called him a "great friend and well-wisher" of&nbsp;India.&nbsp;

"He contributed immensely in building our bilateral partnership. He visited India several occasions including his memorable State visit," said George.

"As Amir, he welcomed several hundreds of thousands of Indians to Kuwait. We cherish his special liking for Indians and the special care he took for Indians here," he added.

Over one million Indian community members are present in Kuwait, making them the largest expatriate community in the West Asian country.

The Envoy said, "with his passing away, the Indian Community in Kuwait has also lost a benevolent leader who showered special care and affection on them. Indians today are loved and respected in this country.".

The Indian flag was at half-mast at the Indian mission in Kuwait, with Indian diplomats and officials marking 2 minutes of silence in his honour at 11 am local time.

The Indian President and Prime Minister had also sent out condolence message on the demise of Kuwaiti leader. PM Modi in his message said,"His highness played a leading role in strengthening our bilateral relations, and always took special care of the Indian community in Kuwait". External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar had visited the Kuwaiti Embassy in New Delhi to sign the condolence book.

In a gesture signifying close India-Kuwait ties, the Indian flag was at half-mast in the country and at all the Indian missions across the world on Sunday as New Delhi paid its homage to departed Amir of Kuwait, Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah.

In a gesture signifying close India-Kuwait ties, the Indian flag was at half-mast in the country and at all the Indian missions across the world on Sunday as New Delhi paid its homage to departed Amir of Kuwait, Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah. The Amir died last week on 29th September. He had served as the foreign minister of the country for over forty years and Amir for over fourteen years. India's envoy to Kuwait, Sibi George called him a "great friend and well-wisher" of India. "He contributed immensely in building our bilateral partnership. He visited India several occasions including his memorable State visit," said George. "As Amir, he welcomed several hundreds of thousands of Indians to Kuwait. We cherish his special liking for Indians and the special care he took for Indians here," he added. Over one million Indian community members are present in Kuwait, making them the largest expatriate community in the West Asian country. The Envoy said, "with his passing away, the Indian Community in Kuwait has also lost a benevolent leader who showered special care and affection on them. Indians today are loved and respected in this country.". The Indian flag was at half-mast at the Indian mission in Kuwait, with Indian diplomats and officials marking 2 minutes of silence in his honour at 11 am local time. The Indian President and Prime Minister had also sent out condolence message on the demise of Kuwaiti leader. PM Modi in his message said,"His highness played a leading role in strengthening our bilateral relations, and always took special care of the Indian community in Kuwait". External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar had visited the Kuwaiti Embassy in New Delhi to sign the condolence book.

Indian flag flies at half-mast out of respect for departed Amir of Kuwait

A historic deal was signed between Israel, UAE and Bahrain. The deal was more than 70 years in the making. Abraham Accords, the peace deal signed by Israel, Bahrain and UAE changes West Asian politics completely. The deal was sealed&nbsp;in August and signed yesterday.

US President Donald Trump has pulled off a big foreign policy win just weeks before US Presidential Elections. UAE and Bahrain, two Arab countries are now allies of Israel.

Arabs and Israel have fought for decades. Arabs backed Palestine and insisted that Israel-Palestine issue should be settled. This was their condition to give recognition to Israel as a country. The dispute has not been settled but Abraham Accords have been signed nonetheless.

More Arab countries are expected to normalise relations with Israel soon. Until now only Egypt and Jordan had ties with Israel.

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Trump is calling Abraham Accords 'The dawn of the new Middle East'. This peace deal is the most significant diplomatic achievement of Trump.

The Abraham Accords, named after the common patriarch of Jews, Muslims and Christians, is the beginning of Israel's rapprochement with Arab world.

Palestinians have called this a betrayal. In reality, support to Palestine has long been reduced to political symbolism. Arab countries have had covert dealings with Israel in past. 
&nbsp; 
The Abraham Accords paves the way&nbsp;for Israel and other signatories to set up embassies, open travel routes and sign business deals.

It's a big win for Israel PM Benjamin Netanyahu too. Israel celebrated the deal by projecting flags of all four countries on the old city walls in Jerusalem. Netanyahu called the deal 'A Path to Peace'

Big Shift in West Asia

US is orchestrating a big shift in West Asia. Both UAE and Bahrain are allies of Saudi Arabia. Both countries will benefit a lot from the deal. UAE, while projecting an image that it has taken care of Palestinian interests while signing the deal, can now access advanced American weaponry like F-35 jets. Similarly, Bahrain can now have access to high tech Israeli weapons.&nbsp;

But here's the real deal.

By signing Abraham Accords, a stronger alliance against Iran is taking shape in West Asia. Trump has even said that five more countries may recognise Israel.

What does this mean?

It means that Israel-Palestine conflict no longer dictates terms of engagement in West Asia. It's not about Jews versus Arab anymore. It's now sectarian, Shia versus Sunni. 
&nbsp; 
Iran is on one side, and Sunni states in the gulf alongside Israel are on the other side.

Iran can count on Turkey for support. Pakistan does not back the deal but it is indebted to the Saudis.

What will happen next?

Israel is now recognised by Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain and UAE. Next in line are these countries.

Saudi Arabia:&nbsp;This is a strong possibility. Saudi Arabia is already co-operating with Israel against Iran. It is also said that Bahrain signed the deal only after nod from the Saudis. But Saudi Arabia itself signing the deal would be a major development.

Oman: Oman congratulated Israel and UAE on their agreement. It has often played the role of interlocutor between Israel and Arab world.

Beyond West Asia, names of countries like Sudan and Morocco are also doing rounds.

&nbsp; 
What happens to Palestine?

Palestinians are angry and they are protesting. They say that agreement should not be called a peace deal as it has no representation from Palestine.

A historic deal was signed between Israel, UAE and Bahrain. The deal was more than 70 years in the making. Abraham Accords, the peace deal signed by Israel, Bahrain and UAE changes West Asian politics completely.

A historic deal was signed between Israel, UAE and Bahrain. The deal was more than 70 years in the making. Abraham Accords, the peace deal signed by Israel, Bahrain and UAE changes West Asian politics completely. The deal was sealed in August and signed yesterday. US President Donald Trump has pulled off a big foreign policy win just weeks before US Presidential Elections. UAE and Bahrain, two Arab countries are now allies of Israel. Arabs and Israel have fought for decades. Arabs backed Palestine and insisted that Israel-Palestine issue should be settled. This was their condition to give recognition to Israel as a country. The dispute has not been settled but Abraham Accords have been signed nonetheless. More Arab countries are expected to normalise relations with Israel soon. Until now only Egypt and Jordan had ties with Israel. × Trump is calling Abraham Accords 'The dawn of the new Middle East'. This peace deal is the most significant diplomatic achievement of Trump. The Abraham Accords, named after the common patriarch of Jews, Muslims and Christians, is the beginning of Israel's rapprochement with Arab world. Palestinians have called this a betrayal. In reality, support to Palestine has long been reduced to political symbolism. Arab countries have had covert dealings with Israel in past. The Abraham Accords paves the way for Israel and other signatories to set up embassies, open travel routes and sign business deals. It's a big win for Israel PM Benjamin Netanyahu too. Israel celebrated the deal by projecting flags of all four countries on the old city walls in Jerusalem. Netanyahu called the deal 'A Path to Peace' Big Shift in West Asia US is orchestrating a big shift in West Asia. Both UAE and Bahrain are allies of Saudi Arabia. Both countries will benefit a lot from the deal. UAE, while projecting an image that it has taken care of Palestinian interests while signing the deal, can now access advanced American weaponry like F-35 jets. Similarly, Bahrain can now have access to high tech Israeli weapons. But here's the real deal. By signing Abraham Accords, a stronger alliance against Iran is taking shape in West Asia. Trump has even said that five more countries may recognise Israel. What does this mean? It means that Israel-Palestine conflict no longer dictates terms of engagement in West Asia. It's not about Jews versus Arab anymore. It's now sectarian, Shia versus Sunni. Iran is on one side, and Sunni states in the gulf alongside Israel are on the other side. Iran can count on Turkey for support. Pakistan does not back the deal but it is indebted to the Saudis. What will happen next? Israel is now recognised by Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain and UAE. Next in line are these countries. Saudi Arabia: This is a strong possibility. Saudi Arabia is already co-operating with Israel against Iran. It is also said that Bahrain signed the deal only after nod from the Saudis. But Saudi Arabia itself signing the deal would be a major development. Oman: Oman congratulated Israel and UAE on their agreement. It has often played the role of interlocutor between Israel and Arab world. Beyond West Asia, names of countries like Sudan and Morocco are also doing rounds. What happens to Palestine? Palestinians are angry and they are protesting. They say that agreement should not be called a peace deal as it has no representation from Palestine.

Abraham Accords: USA orchestrates huge change in West Asia

There is no doubt that the peace accord between the UAE and Israel became a reality due to efforts of US President Donald Trump. Following the footsteps of UAE, Bahrain also restored its relations withe Israel and both these countries gave recognition to Israel. This is a creditable achievement of Trump as it was not an easy peace exercise.

Four Arab countries namely Egypt, Jordan, UAE and Bahrain now recognise Israel as a sovereign country. Reports say that Saudi Arabia may also opt for friendly relations with Israel though it may not immediately recognise Israel as a sovereign country.

Not surprisingly, Palestinians have protested against UAE and Bahrain.

There is increasing realisation among Arab countries in Middle East about fruitlessness of conflict with Israel. This cnflict has not helped Palestinians in any way so far. On the other hand it created hardships. Palestinians are virtually living in isolation without any hope for future.

Success of Trump's peace initiative in Middle East can certainly change the face of the region.

It will be good for Palestinians to see the writing on the wall about existence of Israel and come up with peaceful resolution. This will enable Palestinians to live in peace and realise their potential for growth and development.

Apart from Trump's peace initiative in Middle East, another remarkable initiative is his attempts to have peaceful relations with North Korea.&nbsp;

US is the most powerful county in the world while North Korea is an impoverished nation. But yet Trump went all the way to Singapore for a summit with Kim Jong-Un. The fact that the initiative did not succeed in establishing peace between two nations does not minimise importance of his initiative.

President Trump's efforts to bring Taliban to the negotiating table has not received due appreciation in the US or in other countries.

It is true that Trump has initiated trade war with China. But many believe that this was a necessary step as China has been exhibiting aggressive behaviour. It should be noted that Trump limited his conflict with China and the trade dispute did not spiral into outright military conflict.

Though ritics and section of media in the US appear to be doing everything possible to denigrate Trump in the run up to US Presidential elections, fairness demands that Trump should be given due credit by American people for his remarkable peace initiative Middle East and similar strategies with repect to North Korea and Afghanistan.

Trump even offered to mediate between India and Pakistan. He was ridiculed and criticised. India and China rejected his offer of mediation. Nevertheless, Trump offered his service towards the cause of peace which is laudable.

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.) 
&nbsp;

There is no doubt that the peace accord between the UAE and Israel became a reality due to efforts of US President Donald Trump. Following the footsteps of UAE, Bahrain also restored its relations withe Israel and both these countries gave recognition to Israel.

There is no doubt that the peace accord between the UAE and Israel became a reality due to efforts of US President Donald Trump. Following the footsteps of UAE, Bahrain also restored its relations withe Israel and both these countries gave recognition to Israel. This is a creditable achievement of Trump as it was not an easy peace exercise. Four Arab countries namely Egypt, Jordan, UAE and Bahrain now recognise Israel as a sovereign country. Reports say that Saudi Arabia may also opt for friendly relations with Israel though it may not immediately recognise Israel as a sovereign country. Not surprisingly, Palestinians have protested against UAE and Bahrain. There is increasing realisation among Arab countries in Middle East about fruitlessness of conflict with Israel. This cnflict has not helped Palestinians in any way so far. On the other hand it created hardships. Palestinians are virtually living in isolation without any hope for future. Success of Trump's peace initiative in Middle East can certainly change the face of the region. It will be good for Palestinians to see the writing on the wall about existence of Israel and come up with peaceful resolution. This will enable Palestinians to live in peace and realise their potential for growth and development. Apart from Trump's peace initiative in Middle East, another remarkable initiative is his attempts to have peaceful relations with North Korea. US is the most powerful county in the world while North Korea is an impoverished nation. But yet Trump went all the way to Singapore for a summit with Kim Jong-Un. The fact that the initiative did not succeed in establishing peace between two nations does not minimise importance of his initiative. President Trump's efforts to bring Taliban to the negotiating table has not received due appreciation in the US or in other countries. It is true that Trump has initiated trade war with China. But many believe that this was a necessary step as China has been exhibiting aggressive behaviour. It should be noted that Trump limited his conflict with China and the trade dispute did not spiral into outright military conflict. Though ritics and section of media in the US appear to be doing everything possible to denigrate Trump in the run up to US Presidential elections, fairness demands that Trump should be given due credit by American people for his remarkable peace initiative Middle East and similar strategies with repect to North Korea and Afghanistan. Trump even offered to mediate between India and Pakistan. He was ridiculed and criticised. India and China rejected his offer of mediation. Nevertheless, Trump offered his service towards the cause of peace which is laudable. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Credit where it is due: Trump deserves praise for West Asia peace deal

Bahrain has joined the United Arab Emirates in striking an agreement to normalize relations with Israel, President Donald Trump said on Friday

Bahrain agrees to normalize relations with Israel

Iran's President Hassan Rouhani on Wednesday hailed the show of unity by parties to a 2015 nuclear deal, after they defeated US efforts to restore international sanctions.

Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia, dubbed the "4+1", are struggling to save the accord after the United States withdrew from it in 2018.

Also read:&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/france-britain-and-germany-regret-us-end-to-iran-nuclear-waivers-301999">France, Britain and Germany regret US end to Iran nuclear waivers</a>

Washington unilaterally reimposed sanctions on the Islamic republic.

Iran has stepped up its nuclear activities in the past year in retaliation for Washington's pullout from the deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA.

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"Fortunately, yesterday in Vienna, the 4+1 clearly stated that they stand by the JCPOA and that America does not have the right to misuse it," Rouhani said in remarks to the weekly cabinet meeting broadcast on state television.

"They have not only pulled out of the JCPOA but also punished whoever has abided by it."

Rouhani called Washington's drive to reimpose UN sanctions against Iran "futile and childish."

European Union senior official Helga Schmid, who chaired the talks in Vienna, said the participants were "united in resolve to preserve" the nuclear agreement.

Schmid said that the US cannot launch the process to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran using a Security Council resolution enshrining a deal they have abandoned.

In a boost to Tuesday's talks, Iran last week agreed to let UN nuclear inspectors visit two sites suspected of having hosted undeclared activity in the early 2000s.

Rouhani said he had spoken to the current Security Council president, Abdou Abarry of Niger, who he said "shared our views" that the US cannot reimpose international sanctions.

The Security Council last week blocked the US bid to reimpose sanctions.

Washington also failed to rally enough support to extend an arms embargo on Iran, that is scheduled to begin being rolled back from October.

Rouhani hailed the pushbacks against the US as a "victory" for Tehran and a "disgraceful failure" for Washington.

Iran's President Hassan Rouhani on Wednesday hailed the show of unity by parties to a 2015 nuclear deal, after they defeated US efforts to restore international sanctions.

Iran's President Hassan Rouhani on Wednesday hailed the show of unity by parties to a 2015 nuclear deal, after they defeated US efforts to restore international sanctions. Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia, dubbed the "4+1", are struggling to save the accord after the United States withdrew from it in 2018. Also read: France, Britain and Germany regret US end to Iran nuclear waivers Washington unilaterally reimposed sanctions on the Islamic republic. Iran has stepped up its nuclear activities in the past year in retaliation for Washington's pullout from the deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. "Fortunately, yesterday in Vienna, the 4+1 clearly stated that they stand by the JCPOA and that America does not have the right to misuse it," Rouhani said in remarks to the weekly cabinet meeting broadcast on state television. "They have not only pulled out of the JCPOA but also punished whoever has abided by it." Rouhani called Washington's drive to reimpose UN sanctions against Iran "futile and childish." European Union senior official Helga Schmid, who chaired the talks in Vienna, said the participants were "united in resolve to preserve" the nuclear agreement. Schmid said that the US cannot launch the process to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran using a Security Council resolution enshrining a deal they have abandoned. In a boost to Tuesday's talks, Iran last week agreed to let UN nuclear inspectors visit two sites suspected of having hosted undeclared activity in the early 2000s. Rouhani said he had spoken to the current Security Council president, Abdou Abarry of Niger, who he said "shared our views" that the US cannot reimpose international sanctions. The Security Council last week blocked the US bid to reimpose sanctions. Washington also failed to rally enough support to extend an arms embargo on Iran, that is scheduled to begin being rolled back from October. Rouhani hailed the pushbacks against the US as a "victory" for Tehran and a "disgraceful failure" for Washington.

Iran hails 'united resolve' to preserve nuclear deal against US

In fresh news coming out of Qatar related to labour laws in the country, labourers may find some reprieve after changes in the pre-existing laws.

As part of country’s Kafala employment system, all labourers were required to fetch the permission of their ongoing employers before switching jobs.

International criticism for Kafala

This provision has been heavily criticised by international labour groups and organisations. Qatar has been for long in scathing hot water for its treatment of labourers and exploitation of cheap labour in the country, which is rich in oil and natural gas.

Also read:&nbsp;<a href="/world/qatar-enacts-key-worker-reforms-amid-criticism-324134" hreflang="en">Qatar enacts key worker reforms amid criticism</a>

After news of the country hosting the upcoming 2022 FIFA World Cup broke out, fresh narratives of exploitation started spurring up from the country.

New labour laws in the country imply that the Kafala system is effectively ‘dismantled’, as a United Nations labour body put it on Sunday.

Starting now, migrant labourers will no longer require the permission of their employers to terminate the contract and begin a fresh job, the International Labor Organization said.

Change to follow

Another major change has taken shape in the country’s labour laws. Qatar now has a minimum monthly wage of 1,000 Riyals ($275). Once the new provisions are published in the country’s official gazette, the law will take effect, as per the ILO.

Additionally, employers will now be required to provide allowances for food and rent in case the wage is unable to cover it.

Also read:&nbsp;<a href="/world/qatar-wins-air-blockade-case-at-international-court-of-justice-313286" hreflang="en">Qatar wins air blockade case at International Court of Justice</a>

Kafala system has been heavily criticised for binding workers to employers, and saw a minor change in 2018 as well. Earlier, the employers could decide whether their worker could leave the job and/or their country.

At the same time, the country’s citizens have one of the world’s highest per-capita incomes owing to its rich reserves. Owing to the oil and natural gas reserves, the country is witnessing a boom in construction. Employees come from South Asian countries like India and Nepal, who fell within the ambit of the Kafala system until now.

Many activists felt that the system allowed for the abuse of foreign workers and denial of rights.

In fresh news coming out of Qatar related to labour laws in the country, labourers may find some reprieve after changes in the pre-existing laws. As part of country’s Kafala employment system, all labourers were required to fetch the permission of their ongoing employers before switching jobs.

In fresh news coming out of Qatar related to labour laws in the country, labourers may find some reprieve after changes in the pre-existing laws. As part of country’s Kafala employment system, all labourers were required to fetch the permission of their ongoing employers before switching jobs. International criticism for Kafala This provision has been heavily criticised by international labour groups and organisations. Qatar has been for long in scathing hot water for its treatment of labourers and exploitation of cheap labour in the country, which is rich in oil and natural gas. Also read: Qatar enacts key worker reforms amid criticism After news of the country hosting the upcoming 2022 FIFA World Cup broke out, fresh narratives of exploitation started spurring up from the country. New labour laws in the country imply that the Kafala system is effectively ‘dismantled’, as a United Nations labour body put it on Sunday. Starting now, migrant labourers will no longer require the permission of their employers to terminate the contract and begin a fresh job, the International Labor Organization said. Change to follow Another major change has taken shape in the country’s labour laws. Qatar now has a minimum monthly wage of 1,000 Riyals ($275). Once the new provisions are published in the country’s official gazette, the law will take effect, as per the ILO. Additionally, employers will now be required to provide allowances for food and rent in case the wage is unable to cover it. Also read: Qatar wins air blockade case at International Court of Justice Kafala system has been heavily criticised for binding workers to employers, and saw a minor change in 2018 as well. Earlier, the employers could decide whether their worker could leave the job and/or their country. At the same time, the country’s citizens have one of the world’s highest per-capita incomes owing to its rich reserves. Owing to the oil and natural gas reserves, the country is witnessing a boom in construction. Employees come from South Asian countries like India and Nepal, who fell within the ambit of the Kafala system until now. Many activists felt that the system allowed for the abuse of foreign workers and denial of rights.

Qatar's heavily criticised kafala system officially 'dismantled', more labour reforms underway

The Middle East’s 21 billionaires have amassed US$63 million every day since March

Wealth of 21 billionaires in Mena region shoots up

The recently concluded UAE-Israel deal dominated the briefings of US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, on his current visit to Israel and other countries in the region. It was &nbsp;also the central theme in his headlining address, recorded in Jerusalem, for the Republican National Convention where Donald Trump was officially endorsed as the Republican Presidential candidate.

Extolling the Abraham Accords that seek to normalize relations between UAE and Israel, Pompeo hinted at other Arab states following suit and a plan for the Middle East that normalizes trade and business relations, removal of travel restrictions and greater security cooperation to tackle threats, including Iran, ‘rogue’ regimes and non-state actors.

The symbolic significance of this deal cannot be overstated – the UAE becomes the third Middle eastern country to normalize relations with Israel after Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994. It is however the first Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state to take this action.&nbsp;

Though UAE and other Gulf nations have been steadily improving relations with Israel for almost a decade, the formal recognition was held back due to the imperatives of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. The initiative demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied since 1967 in exchange for a &nbsp;diplomatic recognition of the state of Israel. In this case the UAE agreed to recognize Israel in exchange for less – a promise by Israeli PM Netanyahu to temporarily halt annexation of almost a third of West Bank territories, an idea proposed as part of President’s Trump’s middle eastern plan.&nbsp;

The short term political compulsions driving the deal are evident – it provides breathing space to Netanyahu who has been beleaguered by corruption charges and regular protests demanding his resignation. He has portrayed this deal as a vindication of his foreign policy stand that peace with Arab countries does not need a solution of the Palestinian issue. For President Trump, this will be a talking point of his deal making capability in US Presidential Elections in November at a time when opinion polls put him behind his rival Democrat candidate Joe Biden. For the UAE, this has been a ‘diplomatic win’ - &nbsp;garnering them the US favour, benefit of Israel’s ‘hard power’ in its proxy wars and a vindication of its independent foreign policy.&nbsp;

The long term imperatives, however, are more complex and multi-layered and will determine the future of the security in the region.&nbsp;

1.&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;At the local level the Arab Spring &amp; following civil unrest has spooked several Gulf monarchies that realize that they need to focus on continuing effective governance to maintain their political legitimacy. Conflict with Israel has been diluted in order to avoid diversion of resources and re-orient the foreign policy aims. In addition, Israel is capable of fulfilling the Gulf states’ need for sophisticated security and surveillance platforms to police their own populations.&nbsp;

2.&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;At the regional stage, the UAE and Israel’s foreign policy aims have converged at three main levels.&nbsp;

a.&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;A significant common factor has been to counter the Iranian ‘arc of influence’ that extends from Yemen where Iran backed Houthi rebels are engaged in a conflict with Saudi and UAE-led coalition forces supporting President Hadi, Lebanon (via Hezbollah), Iraq &amp; also in Syria with Iran’s support to President Assad. In the last few years, Yemen based Houthi rebels are purported to have acquired sophisticated ‘drone technology’ used to target Saudi airports and military installations and suspected to have disrupted operations at the Dubai airport in 2018. In 2019, attacks on oil tankers, including a UAE vessel just outside the Strait of Hormuz, were also blamed on Iranian proxies. This is a common cause with Israel that has been engaged in a conflict with Hezbollah, has targeted Iranian backed groups in Syria and tackled Hamas in Gaza, with whom Iran has ‘contentious cooperation’.&nbsp;

b.&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;The second imperative has been countering ‘political Islam’ in all its forms – whether Shia variety allied to Iran or the Sunni groups including the Muslim brotherhood &amp; its offshoots such as Hamas and terror groups like Islamic state and the remnants of Al-Qaeda. Many Arab states realize that Israel’s ‘hard power’ including defence technology, cyber surveillance can be instrumental in helping them protect their own interests.&nbsp;

3.&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;At the international level, both UAE and Israel hope that the deal will keep the US sufficiently engaged in the Middle East on their side. For UAE Crown Prince, MBZ (Mohammed Bin Zayed) this is an opportunity to regain the US backing after it garnered backlash from the US Congress for its role in the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and its backing of General Haftar in Libya who is fighting the GNA (Government of National Accord backed by the UN) nominally supported by the US. This deal is also likely to ensure that Israel and UAE can obtain advanced US weaponry and its support in international fora for its strategic objectives. This becomes relevant especially in the context of an increasing China-Iran rapprochement and increased Russian-Iranian cooperation in nations like Syria.&nbsp;

So while these imperatives have pushed the two parties towards the deal, what are the future prospects? There has been commentary on the prospect that if other Arab Gulf states were to follow the UAE, then that can constitute a chance to re-write the security landscape of the region. There has also been a proposal that UAE with its exalted standing in the Middle East can play mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by bringing on board Palestinian stakeholders to develop concrete counter proposals to Trump’s Middle East plan. 
However at least in the short to mid term the above view seems little optimistic. Though Netanyahu has agreed to temporarily to halt West Bank annexation, his hardline &amp; opportunistic politics means that he is unlikely to give concessions that will be required if a lasting Israel-Palestine peace settlement has to be achieved. On the Palestinian side, it is a divided house with too many stakeholders along with radical Islamist groups like Hamas whose use of terror tactics will be a stumbling bloc.

Moreover this deal does not address the fundamental drivers of conflict in the region. The geo-political faultlines have been shifting for almost a decade from the Arab-Israel conflict to the emergence of Iran and its ‘political Islamist’ allies as the ‘bigger fish to fry’. What this deal might end up doing is formalizing the contours of the two opposing blocs that are engaged in proxy conflicts across the Middle East, squeezing out the space that was available to countries like UAE for backchannel negotiations with Iran. While the loosely defined ‘anti-Iran bloc’ has more economic and military power, Iran’s proxies have made sizeable gains across the region - in Yemen (where Houthis control strategic choke points), in Syria (where President Assad has gained control of almost the entire country). In Lebanon, Hezbollah is kept in check mainly by Israeli military action.&nbsp;

In the short to the mid term, Israel’s addition to this ‘club’ of Gulf monarchies and US’s continued attempts to destabilize the Iranian regime can actually exacerbate tensions as Iran will seek to retaliate against the ‘perceived’ grouping. In addition, the self-interests of regional powers are likely to lead them to take individual sides in conflicts blurring the dynamics of the blocs &amp; adding to uncertainty. The UAE’s role in Yemen as both a part of the KSA-led coalition supporting President Hadi &amp; a backer of Southern Transitional Council demanding secession from Yemen is a case in point.&nbsp;

A genuine change in the security architecture of the region will require détente between Middle East’s two rival blocs, addressing the self-interested claims of region’s nations that is complicating proxy conflicts and emergence of one of the international powers as a neutral and unbiased mediator.&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

The recently concluded UAE-Israel deal dominated the briefings of US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, on his current visit to Israel and other countries in the region.

The recently concluded UAE-Israel deal dominated the briefings of US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, on his current visit to Israel and other countries in the region. It was also the central theme in his headlining address, recorded in Jerusalem, for the Republican National Convention where Donald Trump was officially endorsed as the Republican Presidential candidate. Extolling the Abraham Accords that seek to normalize relations between UAE and Israel, Pompeo hinted at other Arab states following suit and a plan for the Middle East that normalizes trade and business relations, removal of travel restrictions and greater security cooperation to tackle threats, including Iran, ‘rogue’ regimes and non-state actors. The symbolic significance of this deal cannot be overstated – the UAE becomes the third Middle eastern country to normalize relations with Israel after Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994. It is however the first Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state to take this action. Though UAE and other Gulf nations have been steadily improving relations with Israel for almost a decade, the formal recognition was held back due to the imperatives of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. The initiative demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied since 1967 in exchange for a diplomatic recognition of the state of Israel. In this case the UAE agreed to recognize Israel in exchange for less – a promise by Israeli PM Netanyahu to temporarily halt annexation of almost a third of West Bank territories, an idea proposed as part of President’s Trump’s middle eastern plan. The short term political compulsions driving the deal are evident – it provides breathing space to Netanyahu who has been beleaguered by corruption charges and regular protests demanding his resignation. He has portrayed this deal as a vindication of his foreign policy stand that peace with Arab countries does not need a solution of the Palestinian issue. For President Trump, this will be a talking point of his deal making capability in US Presidential Elections in November at a time when opinion polls put him behind his rival Democrat candidate Joe Biden. For the UAE, this has been a ‘diplomatic win’ - garnering them the US favour, benefit of Israel’s ‘hard power’ in its proxy wars and a vindication of its independent foreign policy. The long term imperatives, however, are more complex and multi-layered and will determine the future of the security in the region. 1. At the local level the Arab Spring & following civil unrest has spooked several Gulf monarchies that realize that they need to focus on continuing effective governance to maintain their political legitimacy. Conflict with Israel has been diluted in order to avoid diversion of resources and re-orient the foreign policy aims. In addition, Israel is capable of fulfilling the Gulf states’ need for sophisticated security and surveillance platforms to police their own populations. 2. At the regional stage, the UAE and Israel’s foreign policy aims have converged at three main levels. a. A significant common factor has been to counter the Iranian ‘arc of influence’ that extends from Yemen where Iran backed Houthi rebels are engaged in a conflict with Saudi and UAE-led coalition forces supporting President Hadi, Lebanon (via Hezbollah), Iraq & also in Syria with Iran’s support to President Assad. In the last few years, Yemen based Houthi rebels are purported to have acquired sophisticated ‘drone technology’ used to target Saudi airports and military installations and suspected to have disrupted operations at the Dubai airport in 2018. In 2019, attacks on oil tankers, including a UAE vessel just outside the Strait of Hormuz, were also blamed on Iranian proxies. This is a common cause with Israel that has been engaged in a conflict with Hezbollah, has targeted Iranian backed groups in Syria and tackled Hamas in Gaza, with whom Iran has ‘contentious cooperation’. b. The second imperative has been countering ‘political Islam’ in all its forms – whether Shia variety allied to Iran or the Sunni groups including the Muslim brotherhood & its offshoots such as Hamas and terror groups like Islamic state and the remnants of Al-Qaeda. Many Arab states realize that Israel’s ‘hard power’ including defence technology, cyber surveillance can be instrumental in helping them protect their own interests. 3. At the international level, both UAE and Israel hope that the deal will keep the US sufficiently engaged in the Middle East on their side. For UAE Crown Prince, MBZ (Mohammed Bin Zayed) this is an opportunity to regain the US backing after it garnered backlash from the US Congress for its role in the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and its backing of General Haftar in Libya who is fighting the GNA (Government of National Accord backed by the UN) nominally supported by the US. This deal is also likely to ensure that Israel and UAE can obtain advanced US weaponry and its support in international fora for its strategic objectives. This becomes relevant especially in the context of an increasing China-Iran rapprochement and increased Russian-Iranian cooperation in nations like Syria. So while these imperatives have pushed the two parties towards the deal, what are the future prospects? There has been commentary on the prospect that if other Arab Gulf states were to follow the UAE, then that can constitute a chance to re-write the security landscape of the region. There has also been a proposal that UAE with its exalted standing in the Middle East can play mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by bringing on board Palestinian stakeholders to develop concrete counter proposals to Trump’s Middle East plan. However at least in the short to mid term the above view seems little optimistic. Though Netanyahu has agreed to temporarily to halt West Bank annexation, his hardline & opportunistic politics means that he is unlikely to give concessions that will be required if a lasting Israel-Palestine peace settlement has to be achieved. On the Palestinian side, it is a divided house with too many stakeholders along with radical Islamist groups like Hamas whose use of terror tactics will be a stumbling bloc. Moreover this deal does not address the fundamental drivers of conflict in the region. The geo-political faultlines have been shifting for almost a decade from the Arab-Israel conflict to the emergence of Iran and its ‘political Islamist’ allies as the ‘bigger fish to fry’. What this deal might end up doing is formalizing the contours of the two opposing blocs that are engaged in proxy conflicts across the Middle East, squeezing out the space that was available to countries like UAE for backchannel negotiations with Iran. While the loosely defined ‘anti-Iran bloc’ has more economic and military power, Iran’s proxies have made sizeable gains across the region - in Yemen (where Houthis control strategic choke points), in Syria (where President Assad has gained control of almost the entire country). In Lebanon, Hezbollah is kept in check mainly by Israeli military action. In the short to the mid term, Israel’s addition to this ‘club’ of Gulf monarchies and US’s continued attempts to destabilize the Iranian regime can actually exacerbate tensions as Iran will seek to retaliate against the ‘perceived’ grouping. In addition, the self-interests of regional powers are likely to lead them to take individual sides in conflicts blurring the dynamics of the blocs & adding to uncertainty. The UAE’s role in Yemen as both a part of the KSA-led coalition supporting President Hadi & a backer of Southern Transitional Council demanding secession from Yemen is a case in point. A genuine change in the security architecture of the region will require détente between Middle East’s two rival blocs, addressing the self-interested claims of region’s nations that is complicating proxy conflicts and emergence of one of the international powers as a neutral and unbiased mediator.

Israel-UAE deal: A symbolic peace unlikely to address the conflict triggers in Middle East

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