The massive explosion in Beirut's Lebanon killing at least 100 people and injuring thousands. The death toll is expected to rise even further. Watch report.

Fineprint: Deadliest explosion due to Ammonium Nitrate in Beirut

Two enormous explosions devastated Beirut's port on Tuesday, leaving at least 73 people dead and thousands injured.

Massive explosion rips through Beirut | 78 killed & 4,000+ injured in blast | Lebanon

Lebanese authorities are failing to address the acute economic and political crisis that is endangering people’s basic rights, human rights.

Lebanon: Worst economic crisis since the end of Civil war in 1990

The United Arab Emirates has begun start-up operations in the initial unit of its first nuclear power plant, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) said on Saturday.

The announcement, coinciding with the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha, comes hot on the heels of&nbsp;the UAE's launch of the Arab world's first probe to Mars.

Also see:&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/photos/how-uaes-hope-set-off-for-mars-voyage-giving-new-hopes-314779">How UAE's 'Hope' set off for Mars voyage giving new hopes</a>

"UAE first nuclear reactor at the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant has achieved first criticality and successfully started up," tweeted Hamad Alkaabi, the country's representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

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<blockquote class="twitter-tweet">
<a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/UAE?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#UAE</a> first nuclear reactor at the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant has achieved first criticality and successfully started up.This is a historic milestone for the Nation with a vision set to deliver a new form of clean energy for the Nation. <a href="https://t.co/d8FbWEB9lJ">pic.twitter.com/d8FbWEB9lJ</a>
— Hamad Alkaabi (@hamadnuke) <a href="https://twitter.com/hamadnuke/status/1289473881351192577?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">August 1, 2020</a></blockquote>
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The Barakah nuclear power plant in Abu Dhabi, a major oil producer, is being built by Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). The plant was originally due to open in 2017 but start-up of its first reactor was repeatedly delayed.

ENEC said its subsidiary Nawah Energy Company "has successfully started up Unit 1 of the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant, located in the Al Dhafrah Region of Abu Dhabi."

The ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, wrote on Twitter that nuclear fuel had been loaded into the first of four units of what he called "the first peaceful nuclear energy reactor in the Arab world."

The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), which issued an operating licence for the plant in February, said Nawah met all regulatory requirements to start operations, after regular inspections and oversight to ensure the plant's safety.

When completed Barakah will have four reactors with 5,600 megawatts (MW) capacity. The&nbsp;UAE&nbsp;has not disclosed the total planned investment in the project.

The United Arab Emirates has begun start-up operations in the initial unit of its first nuclear power plant, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) said on Saturday.

The United Arab Emirates has begun start-up operations in the initial unit of its first nuclear power plant, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) said on Saturday. The announcement, coinciding with the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha, comes hot on the heels of the UAE's launch of the Arab world's first probe to Mars. Also see: How UAE's 'Hope' set off for Mars voyage giving new hopes "UAE first nuclear reactor at the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant has achieved first criticality and successfully started up," tweeted Hamad Alkaabi, the country's representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency. #UAE first nuclear reactor at the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant has achieved first criticality and successfully started up.This is a historic milestone for the Nation with a vision set to deliver a new form of clean energy for the Nation. pic.twitter.com/d8FbWEB9lJ — Hamad Alkaabi (@hamadnuke) August 1, 2020 × The Barakah nuclear power plant in Abu Dhabi, a major oil producer, is being built by Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). The plant was originally due to open in 2017 but start-up of its first reactor was repeatedly delayed. ENEC said its subsidiary Nawah Energy Company "has successfully started up Unit 1 of the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant, located in the Al Dhafrah Region of Abu Dhabi." The ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, wrote on Twitter that nuclear fuel had been loaded into the first of four units of what he called "the first peaceful nuclear energy reactor in the Arab world." The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), which issued an operating licence for the plant in February, said Nawah met all regulatory requirements to start operations, after regular inspections and oversight to ensure the plant's safety. When completed Barakah will have four reactors with 5,600 megawatts (MW) capacity. The UAE has not disclosed the total planned investment in the project.

UAE launches start-up operations at first nuclear power plant

Iranian health authorities on Sunday announced 163 new deaths due to the COVID-19 disease, the country's highest official one-day toll since the outbreak began in February.

Iranian health authorities on Sunday announced 163 new deaths due to the COVID-19 disease, the country's highest official one-day toll since the outbreak began in February. The previous record of 162 deaths was announced on Monday in the Islamic republic, which has been battling the Middle East's deadliest outbreak of the novel coronavirus. The new deaths bring the total toll in Iran to 11,571, health ministry spokeswoman Sima Sadat Lari said on state television. "In the past 24 hours, 2,560 people have tested positive for coronavirus, bringing the total number of infections to 240,438," Lari added. Official figures have shown a rising trajectory in fatalities and new confirmed cases since Iran reported a near-two month low in daily recorded infections in early May. The increase has prompted the government to make the wearing of masks mandatory in enclosed public spaces, with some officials and state television anchors wearing masks on camera as part of a campaign to encourage their use. Authorities have repeatedly urged the public to respect hygiene rules aimed at reining in the outbreak. But footage on state television showed people still travelling without face coverings on public transport, where masks have been obligatory for more than two months. The Islamic republic has not imposed a full-scale lockdown but has introduced restrictions, including on religious and commercial sites. But with its US sanctions-strapped economy in crisis, the country had progressively lifted measures from April, as infection numbers had declined. Official figures show that the virus has rebounded since then. Lari said almost a third of Iran's 31 provinces were classed "red", the highest category in the country's virus risk ranking. Authorities say infections in the nine provinces, all on Iran's borders, have yet to peak.

Iran reports new record one-day virus death toll of 163: Official

Like many paradigms across the globe, the coronavirus pandemic and its associated economic downturn have changed the paradigm shaping debates about Gulf security that was inevitably set to gradually migrate from a unipolar US defence umbrella that shielded energy-rich monarchies against Iran to an architecture that was more multilateral. In many ways, the pandemic’s fallout has levelled the playing field and not necessarily in ways that favour current policies of Gulf states.

Saudi Arabia’s relations with the West are increasingly being called into question, with the Saudi–Russian oil price war in March potentially having broken the camel’s back. The Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) stand to lose at least some of the financial clout that allowed them to punch above their weight even if they are likely to exclude arms purchases from their austerity measures.

Weakened financial clout comes at a moment when the Gulf states and Iran are gearing up towards an arms race in the wake of Iran’s recent satellite launch and the unveiling of an unmanned underwater vehicle against the backdrop of the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme inching towards collapse. The unmanned underwater vehicle puts Iran in an elite club, of which the only other members capable of producing them are the United States, Britain and China.[1] The satellite adds Iran to a group of only about a dozen countries able to do launches of their own. [2]

Add to this the fact that none of the regional players — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Iran, Turkey, and Israel — feel secure that any of the external powers — the United States, China, and Russia — are reliable security and geopolitical partners.

Gulf states have, for years going back to the era of Barak Obama if not Bill Clinton, increasingly perceived the United States as unfortunately their only option on the premise that they are not willing to change their policies, particularly towards Iran, but one that is demonstrably unreliable, unwilling to defend Gulf states at whatever cost, and at times at odds with them in terms of policy objectives.

The Gulf states’ problem is that neither Russia nor China offers real alternatives at least not on terms that all Gulf states are willing to accept. Russia is neither interested nor capable of replacing the United States. Moreover, its Gulf security plan is at odds with at least the policy of Saudi Arabia.

The plan calls for a security arrangement modelled on that of Europe under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It would be an arrangement that, unlike the US defence umbrella in the Gulf, includes Iran, not directed against it. It would have to involve some kind of regional agreement on non-aggression.[3]

Saudi Arabia, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has made clear that it is not interested, as is evident in the pandemic where it has refrained, in contrast to other Gulf states, from reaching out to Iran with humanitarian aid even though it last year engaged in an indirect exchange with the Islamic Republic. That exchange died with the killing by the United States in January of Iranian general Qassim Soleimani.

The Elephant in the Room

China is obviously the elephant in the room.

Logically, China and the Gulf states are in the same boat as they grapple with uncertainty about current regional security arrangements. Like the Gulf states, China has long relied on the US defence umbrella to ensure the security of the flow of energy and other goods through waters surrounding the Gulf in what the United States has termed free-riding.

In anticipation of the day when China can no longer depend on security provided by the United States free of charge, China has gradually adjusted its defence strategy and built its first foreign military facility in Djibouti facing the Gulf from the Horn of Africa. With the People’s Liberation Army Navy tasked with protecting China’s sea lines of communication and safeguarding its overseas interests, strategic planners have signalled that Djibouti is a first step in the likely establishment of further bases that would allow it to project long-range capability and shorten the time needed to resupply.

But like with the Russians, Chinese strategic planners and their Gulf counterparts may part ways when it comes to what would be acceptable geopolitical parameters for a rejuvenated regional security architecture, particularly with regard to Iran. Any new architecture would break the mould of Chinese engagement in the Middle East that is designed to shield the People’s Republic from being sucked into the region’s myriad conflicts.

The assumption has long been that China could at best postpone the execution, but that ultimately, it would have no choice but to engage in the politics of the region. More recently, influential Chinese analysts are suggesting that China has another option: turn its back on the region. That may seem incredulous given China’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy resources as well as its significant investments in the region.

These analysts argue, however, that China is able to diversify its energy sources and that Chinese investment in the Middle East is but a small percentage of overall Chinese overseas investment. They describe Chinese Middle Eastern economic relations as past their heyday with economies of both in decline and the prospects of the situation in the Middle East getting worse before it becomes better.

“China–Middle East countries is not a political strategic logic, it’s an economic logic. For China, the Middle East is always on the very distant backburner of China’s strategic global strategies … Covid-19, combined with the oil price crisis, will dramatically change the Middle East. (This) will change China’s investment model in the Middle East … The good times of China and the Middle East are already gone… Both China and the Middle Eastern economies have been slowing down … In the future, the pandemic, combined with the oil price problem, will make the Middle East situation worse. So, the China economic relationship with the Middle East will be affected very deeply,” said Niu Xinchun, director of Middle East studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), widely viewed as China’s most influential think tank.[4]

Pessimistic forecasts of economic prospects in the Middle East bolster Niu’s prediction. Data and analytics company GlobalData predicted in an email that depressed oil markets and prices in the Middle East and North Africa would lead to a contraction in non-oil sectors, including construction. “Construction activity for the remainder of 2020 is set to see poor performance … In addition, public investment is likely to be moderate, which will translate into fewer prospects for private sector businesses to grow — especially within sectors such as infrastructure. Expected increase in taxes, selected subsidy cuts and the introduction of several public sector service charges will influence households’ purchasing power, having a knock-on effect on future commercial investments,” said GlobalData economist Yasmine Ghozzi.

Moreover, the downplaying of Chinese economic interest in the Middle East fits a pattern of reduced Chinese capital outflows. “What we may not have seen is how much China has retreated financially already for the past four years … Especially since 2016, China’s outflows have come down dramatically in both lending and investment. Foreign direct investment is now at about 30 per cent of what it was in 2016,” said Agatha Kratz, associate director of Rhodium Group, an independent research provider.[5]

To be sure, Chinese officials and analysts have consistently maintained that the Middle East is not a Chinese priority, that any future battles with the United States will be fought in the Asia Pacific, not in the Gulf. Their assertions are backed up by the fact that China has yet to articulate a comprehensive policy towards the region and in 2016 issued its one and only white paper on policy towards the Arab world that essentially was an elaboration of its basic foreign and defense policy principles.

More likely than China seriously entertaining turning its back on the Middle East is the probability that it is sending the region a message that is not dissimilar from what Russia is saying: get your act together and find a way to dial down the tension. It is a message that appears to varying degrees to have been heard in the smaller Gulf states but has yet to resonate in Riyadh. It is also a message that has not been rejected out of hand by Iran.

Discussing a possible extension of a United Nations arms embargo against Iran, Saudi Ambassador Abdallah Al Mouallimi, arguing in favour of a prolongation, suggested that it would serve Russian and Chinese interests even though they would not agree with that assessment. “They have their views, we respect their views, but their interests would be better served and promoted with the embargo extended,” said Al Mouallimi.[6]

A Chinese Communist Party newspaper made days later a first reference in the People’s Republic’s state-controlled media to reports of an alleged secret 25-year multi-billion-dollar co-operation agreement in Iran amid controversy in the Islamic Republic. Chinese officials and media have largely remained silent about Iranian reports of an agreement worth anywhere between $120 billion and $400 billion that seemingly was proposed by Iran, but has yet to be accepted by China.[7]

Writing in the Shanghai Observer, a subsidiary of Liberation Daily, the official newspaper of the Shanghai Committee of the Communist Party of China, Middle East scholar Fan Hongda argued that the agreement, though nowhere close to implementation, highlighted “an important moment of development” at a time that US–Chinese tensions allowed Beijing to pay less heed to American policies.[8] Fan’s suggestion that the US–Chinese divide gave China more room to develop its relations with Iran will not have gone unnoticed in Riyadh and other Gulf capitals.

An Emerging Tug of War

How all of this may shake out could be determined by the emerging tug of war in the Middle East between China and the US. Israel has already been caught up in it and has made it's choice clear, even if it still attempting to maintain some wiggle room. Nonetheless, Israel, in the ultimate analysis, knows where its bread is buttered, particularly at a moment where the United States is the only backer of its annexationist policies. In contrast to Israel, the US is likely to find the going tougher when it comes to persuading Gulf states to limit their engagement with China, including telecom giant Huawei, which already has significant operations in the region.

Like Israel, UAE officials have sought to convey to the US that they see relations with the United States as indispensable even though that has yet to be put to a test when it comes to China. Gulf officials’ stress on the importance of ties will, however, not shield them from American demands that they review and limit their relations with China, nor its warnings that involvement of Huawei could jeopardise sensitive communications, particularly given the multiple US bases in the region, including the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and the forward headquarters of the US military’s Central Command, or Centcom, in Qatar.

The US Embassy in Abu Dhabi, in a shot across the Gulf’s bow, last month rejected a UAE offer to donate hundreds of coronavirus tests for screening of its staff. The snub was designed to put a dent in China’s health “Silk Road” diplomacy centered on its experience with the pandemic and ability to manufacture personal protective and medical equipment.

A US official said the tests were rejected because they were either Chinese-made or involved BGI Genomics, a Chinese company active in the Gulf, which raised concerns about patient privacy. The US softened the blow when the prestigious Ohio-based Cleveland Clinic sent 40 nurses and doctor to its Abu Dhabi subsidiary. The Abu Dhabi facility was tasked with treating the UAE’s most severe cases of coronavirus.[9]

The problem for the US is that it is not only Trump’s policy or lack thereof towards the Middle East that undermines confidence but it is also policies that, on the surface, have nothing to do with the Middle East. The United States has been asking its partners including Gulf states to give it time to develop an alternative to Huawei’s 5G network. Yet at the same time, it is barring the kind of people entry that technology companies need to develop systems.

A Silver Lining

No matter how the tug of war in the Middle East evolves, the silver lining is that, like China, the United States despite its desire to reduce its commitment cannot afford a power void in the region. That is what may create the basis for breaking the mould.

It will require a backing away from approaches that treat conflicts as zero-sum games not only on the part of regional players but also of external players, like in the case of the US versus Iran, and it will require engagement by all regional and external players. To achieve that, players would have to recognise that in many ways, perceptions on both sides of the Gulf divide are mirror images of one another: all parties see each other as existential threats.

Failure to break the stalemate risks conflicts becoming further entrenched and threatening to spin out of control. The opportunity is that confidence-building measures and a willingness to engage open a door towards mutually acceptable regional security arrangements and conflict resolution. However, for that to happen, major powers would have to invest political will and energy at a time when they feel they have bigger fish to fry and prioritise geopolitical jockeying.

In a twist of irony, geopolitical jockeying may prove to be an icebreaker in a world, and certainly, a region, where everything is interconnected. Increasingly, security in the Gulf is not just about security in the Gulf. It is not even just about security in the Middle East. It is about security in the Mediterranean, whether one looks at Libya on the sea’s southern shores, Syria in the east, or growing tension in the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean. And it does not stop there with regional rivalries reaching into the Black and Caspian Seas and into Central Asia.

Finally, there are the grey and black swans built into partnerships and alliances that are either becoming more fragile like those of the United States or ones that have fragility built into their DNA like the ties between Iran, Turkey, China, and Russia. Those swans could at any moment swing the pendulum one way or another.

To be sure, contrary to Western perceptions, relations between Iran, Turkey, Russia and China are not just opportunistic and driven by short-term common interests but also grounded in a degree of shared values. The fact of the matter is that men like presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei find common ground in a view of a new world order that rejects democracy and the rule of law; disregards human and minority rights; flaunts, at least for now, violations of international law; and operates on the principle of might is right.

That glue, however, is insufficient, to prevent Turkey and Russia from ending up on opposite sides of conflicts in Libya and Syria. It is also unlikely to halt the gradual erosion of a presumed division of labour in Central Asia with Russia ensuring security and China focusing on economic development. And it is doubtful it would alter the simmering rivalry between Iran and Russia in the Caspian Sea and long-standing Russian reluctance to sell Iran a desperately needed anti-missile defense system.

In short, fasten your seat belt. Gulf and broader regional security could prove to be a bumpy ride with unexpected speed bumps.

<h6>[1] “Iran’s UUV to add new dimension to its warfare capability: Forbes”, Tehran Times, 30 May 2020, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/448370/Iran-s-UUV-to-add-new-dimension-to-its-warfare-capability-Forbes. 
[2] Mike Wall, “Iran launches its 1st military satellite into orbit: reports”, Space.com, 22 April 2020, https://www.space.com/iran-launches-first-military-satellite.html. 
[3] Theodore Karasik, “Is Russia’s ‘old’ Gulf security plan the best it can do?”, Arab News, 20 July 2019, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1533096. 
[4] Niu Xinchun speaking on “How are China’s Relations with the Middle East Evolving During the COVID-19 Pandemic?”, Chatham House, 19 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2721841274725780. 
[5] Agatha Kratz speaking on “China and the Mediterranean Region in and Beyond the Pandemic, German Marshal Fund”, 3 July 2020, https://www.gmfus.org/events/china-and-mediterranean-region-and-beyond-pandemic. 
[6] Joyce Karam, “Russian and Chinese interests ‘better served’ if Iran arms embargo is extended, says Saudi official”, The National, 2 July 2020, https://www.thenational.ae/world/the-americas/russian-and-chinese-interests-better-served-if-iran-arms-embargo-is-extended-says-saudi-official-1.1042822. 
[7] Seth J Frantzman, “Iran media discuss 25-year deal between Iran and China”, The Jerusalem Post, 3 July 2020, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-media-discuss-25-year-deal-between-iran-and-china-633739. 
[8] Fan Hongda, “Iran announced a 25-year comprehensive cooperation plan with China, can Sino-Iranian relations get closer?” [观察家 | 伊朗宣布与华25年全面合作计划，中伊关系能否进一步走近？], Shanghai Observer, 20 June 2020, https://www.shobserver.com/news/detail?id=264494. 
[9] Interview with the author, 8 June 2020.</h6>

Like many paradigms across the globe, the coronavirus pandemic and its associated economic downturn have changed the paradigm shaping debates about Gulf security that was inevitably set to gradually migrate from a unipolar US defence umbrella that shielded energy-rich monarchies against Iran to an architecture that was more multilateral.

Like many paradigms across the globe, the coronavirus pandemic and its associated economic downturn have changed the paradigm shaping debates about Gulf security that was inevitably set to gradually migrate from a unipolar US defence umbrella that shielded energy-rich monarchies against Iran to an architecture that was more multilateral. In many ways, the pandemic’s fallout has levelled the playing field and not necessarily in ways that favour current policies of Gulf states. Saudi Arabia’s relations with the West are increasingly being called into question, with the Saudi–Russian oil price war in March potentially having broken the camel’s back. The Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) stand to lose at least some of the financial clout that allowed them to punch above their weight even if they are likely to exclude arms purchases from their austerity measures. Weakened financial clout comes at a moment when the Gulf states and Iran are gearing up towards an arms race in the wake of Iran’s recent satellite launch and the unveiling of an unmanned underwater vehicle against the backdrop of the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme inching towards collapse. The unmanned underwater vehicle puts Iran in an elite club, of which the only other members capable of producing them are the United States, Britain and China.[1] The satellite adds Iran to a group of only about a dozen countries able to do launches of their own. [2] Add to this the fact that none of the regional players — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Iran, Turkey, and Israel — feel secure that any of the external powers — the United States, China, and Russia — are reliable security and geopolitical partners. Gulf states have, for years going back to the era of Barak Obama if not Bill Clinton, increasingly perceived the United States as unfortunately their only option on the premise that they are not willing to change their policies, particularly towards Iran, but one that is demonstrably unreliable, unwilling to defend Gulf states at whatever cost, and at times at odds with them in terms of policy objectives. The Gulf states’ problem is that neither Russia nor China offers real alternatives at least not on terms that all Gulf states are willing to accept. Russia is neither interested nor capable of replacing the United States. Moreover, its Gulf security plan is at odds with at least the policy of Saudi Arabia. The plan calls for a security arrangement modelled on that of Europe under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It would be an arrangement that, unlike the US defence umbrella in the Gulf, includes Iran, not directed against it. It would have to involve some kind of regional agreement on non-aggression.[3] Saudi Arabia, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has made clear that it is not interested, as is evident in the pandemic where it has refrained, in contrast to other Gulf states, from reaching out to Iran with humanitarian aid even though it last year engaged in an indirect exchange with the Islamic Republic. That exchange died with the killing by the United States in January of Iranian general Qassim Soleimani. The Elephant in the Room China is obviously the elephant in the room. Logically, China and the Gulf states are in the same boat as they grapple with uncertainty about current regional security arrangements. Like the Gulf states, China has long relied on the US defence umbrella to ensure the security of the flow of energy and other goods through waters surrounding the Gulf in what the United States has termed free-riding. In anticipation of the day when China can no longer depend on security provided by the United States free of charge, China has gradually adjusted its defence strategy and built its first foreign military facility in Djibouti facing the Gulf from the Horn of Africa. With the People’s Liberation Army Navy tasked with protecting China’s sea lines of communication and safeguarding its overseas interests, strategic planners have signalled that Djibouti is a first step in the likely establishment of further bases that would allow it to project long-range capability and shorten the time needed to resupply. But like with the Russians, Chinese strategic planners and their Gulf counterparts may part ways when it comes to what would be acceptable geopolitical parameters for a rejuvenated regional security architecture, particularly with regard to Iran. Any new architecture would break the mould of Chinese engagement in the Middle East that is designed to shield the People’s Republic from being sucked into the region’s myriad conflicts. The assumption has long been that China could at best postpone the execution, but that ultimately, it would have no choice but to engage in the politics of the region. More recently, influential Chinese analysts are suggesting that China has another option: turn its back on the region. That may seem incredulous given China’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy resources as well as its significant investments in the region. These analysts argue, however, that China is able to diversify its energy sources and that Chinese investment in the Middle East is but a small percentage of overall Chinese overseas investment. They describe Chinese Middle Eastern economic relations as past their heyday with economies of both in decline and the prospects of the situation in the Middle East getting worse before it becomes better. “China–Middle East countries is not a political strategic logic, it’s an economic logic. For China, the Middle East is always on the very distant backburner of China’s strategic global strategies … Covid-19, combined with the oil price crisis, will dramatically change the Middle East. (This) will change China’s investment model in the Middle East … The good times of China and the Middle East are already gone… Both China and the Middle Eastern economies have been slowing down … In the future, the pandemic, combined with the oil price problem, will make the Middle East situation worse. So, the China economic relationship with the Middle East will be affected very deeply,” said Niu Xinchun, director of Middle East studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), widely viewed as China’s most influential think tank.[4] Pessimistic forecasts of economic prospects in the Middle East bolster Niu’s prediction. Data and analytics company GlobalData predicted in an email that depressed oil markets and prices in the Middle East and North Africa would lead to a contraction in non-oil sectors, including construction. “Construction activity for the remainder of 2020 is set to see poor performance … In addition, public investment is likely to be moderate, which will translate into fewer prospects for private sector businesses to grow — especially within sectors such as infrastructure. Expected increase in taxes, selected subsidy cuts and the introduction of several public sector service charges will influence households’ purchasing power, having a knock-on effect on future commercial investments,” said GlobalData economist Yasmine Ghozzi. Moreover, the downplaying of Chinese economic interest in the Middle East fits a pattern of reduced Chinese capital outflows. “What we may not have seen is how much China has retreated financially already for the past four years … Especially since 2016, China’s outflows have come down dramatically in both lending and investment. Foreign direct investment is now at about 30 per cent of what it was in 2016,” said Agatha Kratz, associate director of Rhodium Group, an independent research provider.[5] To be sure, Chinese officials and analysts have consistently maintained that the Middle East is not a Chinese priority, that any future battles with the United States will be fought in the Asia Pacific, not in the Gulf. Their assertions are backed up by the fact that China has yet to articulate a comprehensive policy towards the region and in 2016 issued its one and only white paper on policy towards the Arab world that essentially was an elaboration of its basic foreign and defense policy principles. More likely than China seriously entertaining turning its back on the Middle East is the probability that it is sending the region a message that is not dissimilar from what Russia is saying: get your act together and find a way to dial down the tension. It is a message that appears to varying degrees to have been heard in the smaller Gulf states but has yet to resonate in Riyadh. It is also a message that has not been rejected out of hand by Iran. Discussing a possible extension of a United Nations arms embargo against Iran, Saudi Ambassador Abdallah Al Mouallimi, arguing in favour of a prolongation, suggested that it would serve Russian and Chinese interests even though they would not agree with that assessment. “They have their views, we respect their views, but their interests would be better served and promoted with the embargo extended,” said Al Mouallimi.[6] A Chinese Communist Party newspaper made days later a first reference in the People’s Republic’s state-controlled media to reports of an alleged secret 25-year multi-billion-dollar co-operation agreement in Iran amid controversy in the Islamic Republic. Chinese officials and media have largely remained silent about Iranian reports of an agreement worth anywhere between $120 billion and $400 billion that seemingly was proposed by Iran, but has yet to be accepted by China.[7] Writing in the Shanghai Observer, a subsidiary of Liberation Daily, the official newspaper of the Shanghai Committee of the Communist Party of China, Middle East scholar Fan Hongda argued that the agreement, though nowhere close to implementation, highlighted “an important moment of development” at a time that US–Chinese tensions allowed Beijing to pay less heed to American policies.[8] Fan’s suggestion that the US–Chinese divide gave China more room to develop its relations with Iran will not have gone unnoticed in Riyadh and other Gulf capitals. An Emerging Tug of War How all of this may shake out could be determined by the emerging tug of war in the Middle East between China and the US. Israel has already been caught up in it and has made it's choice clear, even if it still attempting to maintain some wiggle room. Nonetheless, Israel, in the ultimate analysis, knows where its bread is buttered, particularly at a moment where the United States is the only backer of its annexationist policies. In contrast to Israel, the US is likely to find the going tougher when it comes to persuading Gulf states to limit their engagement with China, including telecom giant Huawei, which already has significant operations in the region. Like Israel, UAE officials have sought to convey to the US that they see relations with the United States as indispensable even though that has yet to be put to a test when it comes to China. Gulf officials’ stress on the importance of ties will, however, not shield them from American demands that they review and limit their relations with China, nor its warnings that involvement of Huawei could jeopardise sensitive communications, particularly given the multiple US bases in the region, including the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and the forward headquarters of the US military’s Central Command, or Centcom, in Qatar. The US Embassy in Abu Dhabi, in a shot across the Gulf’s bow, last month rejected a UAE offer to donate hundreds of coronavirus tests for screening of its staff. The snub was designed to put a dent in China’s health “Silk Road” diplomacy centered on its experience with the pandemic and ability to manufacture personal protective and medical equipment. A US official said the tests were rejected because they were either Chinese-made or involved BGI Genomics, a Chinese company active in the Gulf, which raised concerns about patient privacy. The US softened the blow when the prestigious Ohio-based Cleveland Clinic sent 40 nurses and doctor to its Abu Dhabi subsidiary. The Abu Dhabi facility was tasked with treating the UAE’s most severe cases of coronavirus.[9] The problem for the US is that it is not only Trump’s policy or lack thereof towards the Middle East that undermines confidence but it is also policies that, on the surface, have nothing to do with the Middle East. The United States has been asking its partners including Gulf states to give it time to develop an alternative to Huawei’s 5G network. Yet at the same time, it is barring the kind of people entry that technology companies need to develop systems. A Silver Lining No matter how the tug of war in the Middle East evolves, the silver lining is that, like China, the United States despite its desire to reduce its commitment cannot afford a power void in the region. That is what may create the basis for breaking the mould. It will require a backing away from approaches that treat conflicts as zero-sum games not only on the part of regional players but also of external players, like in the case of the US versus Iran, and it will require engagement by all regional and external players. To achieve that, players would have to recognise that in many ways, perceptions on both sides of the Gulf divide are mirror images of one another: all parties see each other as existential threats. Failure to break the stalemate risks conflicts becoming further entrenched and threatening to spin out of control. The opportunity is that confidence-building measures and a willingness to engage open a door towards mutually acceptable regional security arrangements and conflict resolution. However, for that to happen, major powers would have to invest political will and energy at a time when they feel they have bigger fish to fry and prioritise geopolitical jockeying. In a twist of irony, geopolitical jockeying may prove to be an icebreaker in a world, and certainly, a region, where everything is interconnected. Increasingly, security in the Gulf is not just about security in the Gulf. It is not even just about security in the Middle East. It is about security in the Mediterranean, whether one looks at Libya on the sea’s southern shores, Syria in the east, or growing tension in the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean. And it does not stop there with regional rivalries reaching into the Black and Caspian Seas and into Central Asia. Finally, there are the grey and black swans built into partnerships and alliances that are either becoming more fragile like those of the United States or ones that have fragility built into their DNA like the ties between Iran, Turkey, China, and Russia. Those swans could at any moment swing the pendulum one way or another. To be sure, contrary to Western perceptions, relations between Iran, Turkey, Russia and China are not just opportunistic and driven by short-term common interests but also grounded in a degree of shared values. The fact of the matter is that men like presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei find common ground in a view of a new world order that rejects democracy and the rule of law; disregards human and minority rights; flaunts, at least for now, violations of international law; and operates on the principle of might is right. That glue, however, is insufficient, to prevent Turkey and Russia from ending up on opposite sides of conflicts in Libya and Syria. It is also unlikely to halt the gradual erosion of a presumed division of labour in Central Asia with Russia ensuring security and China focusing on economic development. And it is doubtful it would alter the simmering rivalry between Iran and Russia in the Caspian Sea and long-standing Russian reluctance to sell Iran a desperately needed anti-missile defense system. In short, fasten your seat belt. Gulf and broader regional security could prove to be a bumpy ride with unexpected speed bumps. [1] “Iran’s UUV to add new dimension to its warfare capability: Forbes”, Tehran Times, 30 May 2020, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/448370/Iran-s-UUV-to-add-new-dimension-to-its-warfare-capability-Forbes. [2] Mike Wall, “Iran launches its 1st military satellite into orbit: reports”, Space.com, 22 April 2020, https://www.space.com/iran-launches-first-military-satellite.html. [3] Theodore Karasik, “Is Russia’s ‘old’ Gulf security plan the best it can do?”, Arab News, 20 July 2019, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1533096. [4] Niu Xinchun speaking on “How are China’s Relations with the Middle East Evolving During the COVID-19 Pandemic?”, Chatham House, 19 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2721841274725780. [5] Agatha Kratz speaking on “China and the Mediterranean Region in and Beyond the Pandemic, German Marshal Fund”, 3 July 2020, https://www.gmfus.org/events/china-and-mediterranean-region-and-beyond-pandemic. [6] Joyce Karam, “Russian and Chinese interests ‘better served’ if Iran arms embargo is extended, says Saudi official”, The National, 2 July 2020, https://www.thenational.ae/world/the-americas/russian-and-chinese-interests-better-served-if-iran-arms-embargo-is-extended-says-saudi-official-1.1042822. [7] Seth J Frantzman, “Iran media discuss 25-year deal between Iran and China”, The Jerusalem Post, 3 July 2020, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-media-discuss-25-year-deal-between-iran-and-china-633739. [8] Fan Hongda, “Iran announced a 25-year comprehensive cooperation plan with China, can Sino-Iranian relations get closer?” [观察家 | 伊朗宣布与华25年全面合作计划，中伊关系能否进一步走近？], Shanghai Observer, 20 June 2020, https://www.shobserver.com/news/detail?id=264494. [9] Interview with the author, 8 June 2020.

Resolving the tug of war in the Middle East amid coronavirus crisis

While much of the focus in recent weeks has been on Israel’s relations with China, the real litmus test of the United States’ ability to counter the People’s Republic’s growing footprint in the Middle East is likely to be in the Gulf.

In talks last month with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Israeli leaders made clear that while wanting to maintain close relations with China they would not risk jeopardising their long-standing ties to the United States, their closest ally and supporter of their controversial annexationist policies.

Within days of Pompeo’s visit, Israel awarded a tender for the world’s largest desalination to an Israeli company rather than a competing Chinese firm.

Similarly, Israeli officials say that Israel is unlikely to buy Chinese telecommunication giant Huawei’s 5G offering because of security considerations of its own. The US has been campaigning against the integration of Huawei components into networks of its allies.

The real Israeli test may come next year when China takes over the management of Haifa port that is often frequented by ships of the US Sixth Fleet. US officials have suggested that Chinese control of the port could impact the US Navy’s willingness to use Haifa’s facilities.

In contrast to Israel, the US is likely to find the going tougher in persuading Gulf states to limit their engagement with China, including with Huawei, which already has significant operations in the region.

Like Israel, United Arab Emirates officials have sought to convey to the US that they see relations with the United States as indispensable even though that has yet to be put to a test when it comes to China.

“The United States is our single most important strategic partnership. Sometimes people, when they think of our relationship with the US, they just look at the political/military angle. But this relationship is really much, much wider,” said UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash. &nbsp;Such a relationship, he added, is to be found in “IT, in business, investment, in soft power, in the presence of institutions such as NYU Abu Dhabi, in people like me who spent some of the best years of their lives in America.”

Gargash was speaking after Pompeo’s visit to Israel and after a senior official issued a direct warning to Gulf states.

“These states have to weigh the value of their partnership with the United States. We want our partner nations to do due diligence,” said US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker.

Describing Chinese aid as “predatory,” Schenker warned that Huawei’s participation in 5G infrastructure in the Gulf would make it difficult for American and Gulf forces to communicate. Huawei has signed agreements with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.

“Huawei’s participation in 5G infrastructure in the Gulf would make it difficult for American and Gulf forces to communicate.”

“We’re not forcing countries to choose between the United States and the PRC,” Schenker said, referring to the People’s Republic of China. “Countries can and should maintain healthy relationships with both, but we want to highlight the costs” that come with certain engagements with China.

Earlier, an unidentified senior US official warned that Gulf states “risk rupturing the long-term strategic relationship they have with the US.”

The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet operates out of Bahrain while Qatar hosts the forward headquarters of the US military’s Central Command (CENTCOM).

In a message to Israel that was also intended for the Gulf, US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman laid out US concerns.

“For two countries as close to each other as Israel and the US, when they cooperate and exchange intelligence and other secrets for their mutual protection on such a robust level, both countries need to be really careful about exposing that level of cooperation to a foreign power that may have a different agenda,” he said.

Friedman asserted that China uses investments and infrastructure projects to “infiltrate” countries. “These [Chinese] companies have the ability to flick various switches and gain access to the most sensitive communications.”

US Ambassador David Friedman asserted that China uses investments and infrastructure projects to “infiltrate” countries.

The US Embassy in Abu Dhabi, in a shot across the Gulf’s bow, last month rejected a UAE offer to donate hundreds of coronavirus tests for screening of its staff.

The snub was designed to put a dent in China’s health silk road diplomacy centered on its experience with the pandemic and ability to manufacture personal protective and medical equipment.

A US official said the tests were rejected because they were either Chinese-made or involved BGI, a Chinese genomics company active in the Gulf, which raised concerns about patient privacy.

The US softened the blow when the prestigious Ohio-based Cleveland Clinic sent 40 nurses and doctor to its Abu Dhabi subsidiary. The Abu Dhabi facility was tasked with treating the UAE’s most severe cases of coronavirus.

The seemingly escalating US effort to box in China is hampered by the fact that no US company produces a 5G alternative. “5G is the future. To reconsider Huawei, the US has to offer an alternative. So far, it hasn’t done so,” a Gulf official said.

The same dilemma applies to the United States’ desire to reduce its commitments in the Middle East. In its global rivalry with China, the US cannot afford to create the kind of void that China and Russia would not be able or willing to fill in the short-term.

“It’s a toss-up,” a Gulf analyst said. “The US can’t compete on 5G and China and Russia can’t compete on security. This is a situation and a set of relationships that requires careful management. The problem is that big power leaders show little inclination to find a middle ground. That leaves Gulf states grappling for ways to hedge their bets.” 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

While much of the focus in recent weeks has been on Israel’s relations with China, the real litmus test of the United States’ ability to counter the People’s Republic’s growing footprint in the Middle East is likely to be in the Gulf.

While much of the focus in recent weeks has been on Israel’s relations with China, the real litmus test of the United States’ ability to counter the People’s Republic’s growing footprint in the Middle East is likely to be in the Gulf. In talks last month with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Israeli leaders made clear that while wanting to maintain close relations with China they would not risk jeopardising their long-standing ties to the United States, their closest ally and supporter of their controversial annexationist policies. Within days of Pompeo’s visit, Israel awarded a tender for the world’s largest desalination to an Israeli company rather than a competing Chinese firm. Similarly, Israeli officials say that Israel is unlikely to buy Chinese telecommunication giant Huawei’s 5G offering because of security considerations of its own. The US has been campaigning against the integration of Huawei components into networks of its allies. The real Israeli test may come next year when China takes over the management of Haifa port that is often frequented by ships of the US Sixth Fleet. US officials have suggested that Chinese control of the port could impact the US Navy’s willingness to use Haifa’s facilities. In contrast to Israel, the US is likely to find the going tougher in persuading Gulf states to limit their engagement with China, including with Huawei, which already has significant operations in the region. Like Israel, United Arab Emirates officials have sought to convey to the US that they see relations with the United States as indispensable even though that has yet to be put to a test when it comes to China. “The United States is our single most important strategic partnership. Sometimes people, when they think of our relationship with the US, they just look at the political/military angle. But this relationship is really much, much wider,” said UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash. Such a relationship, he added, is to be found in “IT, in business, investment, in soft power, in the presence of institutions such as NYU Abu Dhabi, in people like me who spent some of the best years of their lives in America.” Gargash was speaking after Pompeo’s visit to Israel and after a senior official issued a direct warning to Gulf states. “These states have to weigh the value of their partnership with the United States. We want our partner nations to do due diligence,” said US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker. Describing Chinese aid as “predatory,” Schenker warned that Huawei’s participation in 5G infrastructure in the Gulf would make it difficult for American and Gulf forces to communicate. Huawei has signed agreements with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. “Huawei’s participation in 5G infrastructure in the Gulf would make it difficult for American and Gulf forces to communicate.” “We’re not forcing countries to choose between the United States and the PRC,” Schenker said, referring to the People’s Republic of China. “Countries can and should maintain healthy relationships with both, but we want to highlight the costs” that come with certain engagements with China. Earlier, an unidentified senior US official warned that Gulf states “risk rupturing the long-term strategic relationship they have with the US.” The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet operates out of Bahrain while Qatar hosts the forward headquarters of the US military’s Central Command (CENTCOM). In a message to Israel that was also intended for the Gulf, US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman laid out US concerns. “For two countries as close to each other as Israel and the US, when they cooperate and exchange intelligence and other secrets for their mutual protection on such a robust level, both countries need to be really careful about exposing that level of cooperation to a foreign power that may have a different agenda,” he said. Friedman asserted that China uses investments and infrastructure projects to “infiltrate” countries. “These [Chinese] companies have the ability to flick various switches and gain access to the most sensitive communications.” US Ambassador David Friedman asserted that China uses investments and infrastructure projects to “infiltrate” countries. The US Embassy in Abu Dhabi, in a shot across the Gulf’s bow, last month rejected a UAE offer to donate hundreds of coronavirus tests for screening of its staff. The snub was designed to put a dent in China’s health silk road diplomacy centered on its experience with the pandemic and ability to manufacture personal protective and medical equipment. A US official said the tests were rejected because they were either Chinese-made or involved BGI, a Chinese genomics company active in the Gulf, which raised concerns about patient privacy. The US softened the blow when the prestigious Ohio-based Cleveland Clinic sent 40 nurses and doctor to its Abu Dhabi subsidiary. The Abu Dhabi facility was tasked with treating the UAE’s most severe cases of coronavirus. The seemingly escalating US effort to box in China is hampered by the fact that no US company produces a 5G alternative. “5G is the future. To reconsider Huawei, the US has to offer an alternative. So far, it hasn’t done so,” a Gulf official said. The same dilemma applies to the United States’ desire to reduce its commitments in the Middle East. In its global rivalry with China, the US cannot afford to create the kind of void that China and Russia would not be able or willing to fill in the short-term. “It’s a toss-up,” a Gulf analyst said. “The US can’t compete on 5G and China and Russia can’t compete on security. This is a situation and a set of relationships that requires careful management. The problem is that big power leaders show little inclination to find a middle ground. That leaves Gulf states grappling for ways to hedge their bets.” (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

How big power rivalry is likely to unfold in the Gulf region

Fraught with multiple powder kegs that could blow up at any moment, Turkish-Russian relations constitute a study in the management of a new world order’s seemingly fragile alliances.

Much like relations between Russia and China, Russia and Iran, Turkey and Iran, and Turkey and China, Turkish-Russian ties are fragile despite the fact that they, contrary to Western perceptions, are not just opportunistic and driven by short-term common interests but also grounded in a degree of shared values.

The fact of the matter is that men like presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, find common ground in a view of a new world order that rejects democracy and the rule of law; disregards human and minority rights; flaunts, at least for now, violations of international law; and operates on the principle of might is right.

That glue, however, is insufficient, to prevent Turkey and Russia from ending up on opposite sides of conflicts in Libya and Syria.

It is also unlikely to halt the gradual erosion of a presumed division of labour in Central Asia with Russia ensuring security and China focusing on economic development.

And it is doubtful it would alter the simmering rivalry between Iran and Russia in the Caspian Sea and long-standing Russian reluctance to sell Iran a badly needed anti-missile defence system.

Similarly, the balance of power in Syria where Russia and Iran are hoping to reap the economic benefits of reconstruction after having played the key role in securing President Bashar al-Assad’s military victory could shift dramatically if and when China commits to investing in the war-devastated country. Neither Russia nor Iran have the financial muscle to compete.

So far, Turkey, Russia, China, and Iran have been adept at ensuring that differences do not get out of hand. The question is whether stopgap management of potential blow-ups is sustainable.

In Libya, Turkey temporarily halted drone operations to allow Russian mercenaries to evacuate areas lost to the Turkish-backed, internationally recognized Islamist Government of National Accord (GNA) after Turkish electronic warfare whacked Russian anti-defence missile systems operated by Moscow-supported rebels led by self-appointed Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar.

In Syria, Russia and Turkey have negotiated an uneasy ceasefire and security arrangement in Idlib, one of the last rebel strongholds, following clashes in which Turkey dealt a serious blow to the Russian and Iranian-backed forces of Al-Assad.

The band aid-solutions may serve immediate economic interests and geopolitical goals but do little to mask the four powers’ seemingly incompatible long-term hegemonic ambitions.

“What is Turkey doing [in Libya]?” asked Mesut Hakki Casin, a member of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Security and Foreign Policy Board. “The reason is that Ottomans conquered Egypt after establishing dominance and control in the straits of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Turkey is in Libya because of historical and political reasons.”

Diverging interests do not only play out on the battlefield, as is evident in the shifting balance of power in Central Asia. They are also evident in the competition in arms sales.

The credible performance of Turkish drones in Libya and Syria have boosted demand for Turkish-made unmanned aerial vehicles and electronic warfare systems and dented the infatuation with Russian anti-missile defence batteries.

Dubbed Bayraktar TB-2 and Anka-S, Turkish drones destroyed Russian-backed Syrian military units in northern Syria earlier this year even though they operated Russia’s Pantsir and Buk surface-to-air missile systems. A similar scenario played out in the defeat in western Libya of Haftar’s forces.

Clashing interests in Libya and Syria and economic woes at home accelerated by the fallout of the pandemic persuaded Erdogan to seek to improve relations with the United States and rejuvenate his personal relationship with President Donald J Trump while massaging his ties to Russia.

In a recent gesture, Botas, Turkey’s state-owned gas grid operator, opened a tender for the construction of a pipeline to Nakhichevan, an Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan. The pipeline would allow Azerbaijan to reduce imports from Iran.

Lobbyists in the United States for the Turkish business community are seeking to capitalize on the opening by pushing an offer by a Louisiana energy company to provide Turkey with “long-term, secure, competitively priced access to Turkey’s LNG terminals, gas pipeline and storage facilities” that would make the country less dependent on Russian and Iranian imports.

Erdogan and his energy minister, Fatih Donmez, have pushed the notion of diversification of Turkey’s energy imports.

“From Syria to Libya, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Erdogan now figures that Turkey needs America politically and strategically more than it did some months ago. He learned by experience that getting the United States on board by making Trump his personal friend is easier than any other way,” said veteran Turkish journalist Cengiz Candar.

Erdogan is banking on his past experience of talking to Trump directly and getting what he wants despite opposition from the Pentagon as was the case with Turkey’s most recent intervention in Syria.

“To be honest, after our conversation tonight, a new era can begin between the United States and Turkey,” Erdogan said during a television interview afterwards speaking to Trump by phone on June 9.

Erdogan’s approach may not be available to Iran with its deeply engrained distrust of the United States, but it certainly is what guides the thinking regarding Russia of numerous European leaders and politicians. No doubt, it is also an option that Putin has not lost sight of.

The web of relationships between China, Russia, Turkey, and Iran may seem formidable but the complexity of Turkish-Russian relations suggests that they may be built on more quicksand than any of the players are willing to admit.

On the principle of “It ain’t over until the fat lady has sung,” that is something that Gulf and other Middle Eastern leaders no doubt have taken note of.

 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Fraught with multiple powder kegs that could blow up at any moment, Turkish-Russian relations constitute a study in the management of a new world order’s seemingly fragile alliances.

Fraught with multiple powder kegs that could blow up at any moment, Turkish-Russian relations constitute a study in the management of a new world order’s seemingly fragile alliances. Much like relations between Russia and China, Russia and Iran, Turkey and Iran, and Turkey and China, Turkish-Russian ties are fragile despite the fact that they, contrary to Western perceptions, are not just opportunistic and driven by short-term common interests but also grounded in a degree of shared values. The fact of the matter is that men like presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, find common ground in a view of a new world order that rejects democracy and the rule of law; disregards human and minority rights; flaunts, at least for now, violations of international law; and operates on the principle of might is right. That glue, however, is insufficient, to prevent Turkey and Russia from ending up on opposite sides of conflicts in Libya and Syria. It is also unlikely to halt the gradual erosion of a presumed division of labour in Central Asia with Russia ensuring security and China focusing on economic development. And it is doubtful it would alter the simmering rivalry between Iran and Russia in the Caspian Sea and long-standing Russian reluctance to sell Iran a badly needed anti-missile defence system. Similarly, the balance of power in Syria where Russia and Iran are hoping to reap the economic benefits of reconstruction after having played the key role in securing President Bashar al-Assad’s military victory could shift dramatically if and when China commits to investing in the war-devastated country. Neither Russia nor Iran have the financial muscle to compete. So far, Turkey, Russia, China, and Iran have been adept at ensuring that differences do not get out of hand. The question is whether stopgap management of potential blow-ups is sustainable. In Libya, Turkey temporarily halted drone operations to allow Russian mercenaries to evacuate areas lost to the Turkish-backed, internationally recognized Islamist Government of National Accord (GNA) after Turkish electronic warfare whacked Russian anti-defence missile systems operated by Moscow-supported rebels led by self-appointed Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar. In Syria, Russia and Turkey have negotiated an uneasy ceasefire and security arrangement in Idlib, one of the last rebel strongholds, following clashes in which Turkey dealt a serious blow to the Russian and Iranian-backed forces of Al-Assad. The band aid-solutions may serve immediate economic interests and geopolitical goals but do little to mask the four powers’ seemingly incompatible long-term hegemonic ambitions. “What is Turkey doing [in Libya]?” asked Mesut Hakki Casin, a member of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Security and Foreign Policy Board. “The reason is that Ottomans conquered Egypt after establishing dominance and control in the straits of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Turkey is in Libya because of historical and political reasons.” Diverging interests do not only play out on the battlefield, as is evident in the shifting balance of power in Central Asia. They are also evident in the competition in arms sales. The credible performance of Turkish drones in Libya and Syria have boosted demand for Turkish-made unmanned aerial vehicles and electronic warfare systems and dented the infatuation with Russian anti-missile defence batteries. Dubbed Bayraktar TB-2 and Anka-S, Turkish drones destroyed Russian-backed Syrian military units in northern Syria earlier this year even though they operated Russia’s Pantsir and Buk surface-to-air missile systems. A similar scenario played out in the defeat in western Libya of Haftar’s forces. Clashing interests in Libya and Syria and economic woes at home accelerated by the fallout of the pandemic persuaded Erdogan to seek to improve relations with the United States and rejuvenate his personal relationship with President Donald J Trump while massaging his ties to Russia. In a recent gesture, Botas, Turkey’s state-owned gas grid operator, opened a tender for the construction of a pipeline to Nakhichevan, an Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan. The pipeline would allow Azerbaijan to reduce imports from Iran. Lobbyists in the United States for the Turkish business community are seeking to capitalize on the opening by pushing an offer by a Louisiana energy company to provide Turkey with “long-term, secure, competitively priced access to Turkey’s LNG terminals, gas pipeline and storage facilities” that would make the country less dependent on Russian and Iranian imports. Erdogan and his energy minister, Fatih Donmez, have pushed the notion of diversification of Turkey’s energy imports. “From Syria to Libya, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Erdogan now figures that Turkey needs America politically and strategically more than it did some months ago. He learned by experience that getting the United States on board by making Trump his personal friend is easier than any other way,” said veteran Turkish journalist Cengiz Candar. Erdogan is banking on his past experience of talking to Trump directly and getting what he wants despite opposition from the Pentagon as was the case with Turkey’s most recent intervention in Syria. “To be honest, after our conversation tonight, a new era can begin between the United States and Turkey,” Erdogan said during a television interview afterwards speaking to Trump by phone on June 9. Erdogan’s approach may not be available to Iran with its deeply engrained distrust of the United States, but it certainly is what guides the thinking regarding Russia of numerous European leaders and politicians. No doubt, it is also an option that Putin has not lost sight of. The web of relationships between China, Russia, Turkey, and Iran may seem formidable but the complexity of Turkish-Russian relations suggests that they may be built on more quicksand than any of the players are willing to admit. On the principle of “It ain’t over until the fat lady has sung,” that is something that Gulf and other Middle Eastern leaders no doubt have taken note of. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Fragile big power ties add to uncertainty in the Middle East

Europe’s headaches just got worse. Its efforts to contain wars on its doorstep in Libya and Syria have failed at a moment when&nbsp;Europe is struggling to control a pandemic and reverse its economic fallout.

Proxy wars that pit the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt against Qatar and Turkey have spilled out of Libya and Syria into the Eastern Mediterranean as a whole.

European nations, including France, Greece, and Cyprus, feel threatened by Turkey’s use of Libya to extend its grip on gas-rich regional waters in violation of international law. As a result, Middle Eastern and North African disputes are becoming European problems.

Libya’s internationally recognized Islamist Government of National Accord (GNA), backed by Turkish military might, has forced rebels led by Khalifa Haftar, who is supported by Russia, Egypt, France and the UAE to retreat in recent weeks from western Libya and fight to maintain control of key cities in the center of the country.

A statement last month by the foreign ministers of France, Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, and Egypt made their concerns clear.

The statement condemned Turkey’s "illegal activities" in the Eastern Mediterranean. It called on Turkey to “fully respect the sovereignty and the sovereign rights of all states in their maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean.”

Israel was conspicuously absent among the signatories even though it maintains close relations with all of them.

The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), a prominent Israeli think tank, warned that “given that Israel’s ties with Turkey have been highly problematic and relations with Russia remain delicate, Jerusalem needs to prepare for the possibility of a continuing and even growing regional influence of both, especially in light of Washington’s continued reluctance to assume a more active diplomatic or military role.”

So does Europe, which at the European Union level has so far remained on the sidelines at its peril.

“Now that the catastrophic consequences of European inaction are evident and Haftar no longer has a chance to seize power, a (European) policy shift is both possible and indispensable,” said Libya scholar Wolfram Lacher.

“Two key goals should guide European policies: first, safeguard Libya’s unity; second, counter Russian influence in Libya as a matter of priority. The U.S. shares both goals. But Europeans will only be able to act in unison if the French position shifts away from its relative tolerance for Russia and adversarial stance towards Turkey,” Lacher suggested.&nbsp; 
 
Lacher appears to believe that countering Russia would not only help thwart the threat posed by Moscow but also prevent Turkey and Russia from carving up Libya into spheres of influence, if not separate states.

Arguing that the EU can no longer afford to stand by, Lacher advised the EU to impose sanctions on Haftar in a bid to undermine Russian support for his forces.

“In parallel, Western states should finally push their interests in a stable Libya more strongly when engaging with Haftar’s other foreign supporters, particularly Egypt and the UAE, to dissuade them from further cooperation with Russia,” Lacher said.

Underlying the UAE’s Saudi-backed determination to stymie Turkey is its assertive global campaign to confront any expression of political Islam. The UAE is aided by Egypt, whose president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, came into power in a 2013 Emirati-backed military coup that toppled an elected Muslim Brotherhood president.

Coupled with an agreement between Turkey and the Tripoli-based GNA which extends the two countries maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkish involvement in the wars in Libya and Syria appears to have fueled Emirati efforts to suck Europe, and ultimately the United States, into its conflict with Turkey.

Greece and Italy — which was believed to be supporting the GNA prior to Turkey’s intervention — this week signed a maritime boundaries agreement to counter Turkish moves. The accord recognizes Greek territorial waters off its many islands in accordance with the international Law of the Sea. The Turkish-Libyan agreement ignores those rights for a number of Greek islands.

The UAE and its partners in the Eastern Mediterranean were expected to support the Greek-Italian accord.

The UAE is banking on the fact that Turkey’s traditional ties to its NATO allies, Europe and the US, are strained over a host of issues, including Turkey’s military intervention in Libya, the fate of millions of refugees primarily from Syria hosted by Turkey, and Turkey’s relationship with Russia and its acquisition of an S-400 Russian anti-missile defence system.

The UAE has been putting in place the building blocks for enhanced influence in the eastern Mediterranean for some time. Increasingly close ties to Israel, whose relations with Turkey are complex, constitute a cornerstone. So does UAE participation in Greek-led annual military exercises in which Israel, Cyprus, Italy, and the United States also take part.

Containing Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean has taken on greater significance after the UAE’s hopes for a planned EastMed pipeline that would have transported natural gas from Israeli, Cypriot and Lebanese fields via Greece to Italy, were dashed.

The pipeline threatened to replace up to half of the Qatari exports to Europe with gas from the Eastern Mediterranean.

Among Qatar’s detractors, the UAE is believed to be the most resistant to finding a compromise that would end the three-year-old UAE-Saudi-led boycott of the Gulf state.

The $7 billion, 2,200-kilometre-long pipeline project was effectively put on hold because of the economic fallout of the pandemic and the collapse of energy prices.

A consortium led by France’s Total, which includes Italian oil and gas major ENI and Novatek, Russia’s second-largest gas producer, was expected to halt drilling after its first well proved to be dry.

ENI and Total have also suspended plans for six drillings off the coast of Cyprus while ExxonMobil has delayed exploration of its two wells in the area. US explorer Noble Energy together with Shell and Herzliya-based Delek Drilling is likely to follow suit in Israel’s Aphrodite field.

All of that does not seem to deter Turkey. The country’s Official Gazette announced on May 30 that state-owned oil company Turkish Petroleum had been granted 24 exploration licenses that include waters off the coast of Greek islands such as Crete and Rhodes.

Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias’ warning that his country would answer what he called, "the Turkish provocation" if Turkey were to proceed would further draw Europe into the Eastern Mediterranean’s mushrooming imbroglio.

It is a development that would boost Emirati efforts to further corner Turkey internationally even if it would for now likely further dampen prospects for dealing a blow to Qatar. 
 
&nbsp;

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) 
&nbsp;

Europe’s headaches just got worse. Its efforts to contain wars on its doorstep in Libya and Syria have failed at a moment when Europe is struggling to control a pandemic and reverse its economic fallout.

Europe’s headaches just got worse. Its efforts to contain wars on its doorstep in Libya and Syria have failed at a moment when Europe is struggling to control a pandemic and reverse its economic fallout. Proxy wars that pit the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt against Qatar and Turkey have spilled out of Libya and Syria into the Eastern Mediterranean as a whole. European nations, including France, Greece, and Cyprus, feel threatened by Turkey’s use of Libya to extend its grip on gas-rich regional waters in violation of international law. As a result, Middle Eastern and North African disputes are becoming European problems. Libya’s internationally recognized Islamist Government of National Accord (GNA), backed by Turkish military might, has forced rebels led by Khalifa Haftar, who is supported by Russia, Egypt, France and the UAE to retreat in recent weeks from western Libya and fight to maintain control of key cities in the center of the country. A statement last month by the foreign ministers of France, Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, and Egypt made their concerns clear. The statement condemned Turkey’s "illegal activities" in the Eastern Mediterranean. It called on Turkey to “fully respect the sovereignty and the sovereign rights of all states in their maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Israel was conspicuously absent among the signatories even though it maintains close relations with all of them. The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), a prominent Israeli think tank, warned that “given that Israel’s ties with Turkey have been highly problematic and relations with Russia remain delicate, Jerusalem needs to prepare for the possibility of a continuing and even growing regional influence of both, especially in light of Washington’s continued reluctance to assume a more active diplomatic or military role.” So does Europe, which at the European Union level has so far remained on the sidelines at its peril. “Now that the catastrophic consequences of European inaction are evident and Haftar no longer has a chance to seize power, a (European) policy shift is both possible and indispensable,” said Libya scholar Wolfram Lacher. “Two key goals should guide European policies: first, safeguard Libya’s unity; second, counter Russian influence in Libya as a matter of priority. The U.S. shares both goals. But Europeans will only be able to act in unison if the French position shifts away from its relative tolerance for Russia and adversarial stance towards Turkey,” Lacher suggested. Lacher appears to believe that countering Russia would not only help thwart the threat posed by Moscow but also prevent Turkey and Russia from carving up Libya into spheres of influence, if not separate states. Arguing that the EU can no longer afford to stand by, Lacher advised the EU to impose sanctions on Haftar in a bid to undermine Russian support for his forces. “In parallel, Western states should finally push their interests in a stable Libya more strongly when engaging with Haftar’s other foreign supporters, particularly Egypt and the UAE, to dissuade them from further cooperation with Russia,” Lacher said. Underlying the UAE’s Saudi-backed determination to stymie Turkey is its assertive global campaign to confront any expression of political Islam. The UAE is aided by Egypt, whose president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, came into power in a 2013 Emirati-backed military coup that toppled an elected Muslim Brotherhood president. Coupled with an agreement between Turkey and the Tripoli-based GNA which extends the two countries maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkish involvement in the wars in Libya and Syria appears to have fueled Emirati efforts to suck Europe, and ultimately the United States, into its conflict with Turkey. Greece and Italy — which was believed to be supporting the GNA prior to Turkey’s intervention — this week signed a maritime boundaries agreement to counter Turkish moves. The accord recognizes Greek territorial waters off its many islands in accordance with the international Law of the Sea. The Turkish-Libyan agreement ignores those rights for a number of Greek islands. The UAE and its partners in the Eastern Mediterranean were expected to support the Greek-Italian accord. The UAE is banking on the fact that Turkey’s traditional ties to its NATO allies, Europe and the US, are strained over a host of issues, including Turkey’s military intervention in Libya, the fate of millions of refugees primarily from Syria hosted by Turkey, and Turkey’s relationship with Russia and its acquisition of an S-400 Russian anti-missile defence system. The UAE has been putting in place the building blocks for enhanced influence in the eastern Mediterranean for some time. Increasingly close ties to Israel, whose relations with Turkey are complex, constitute a cornerstone. So does UAE participation in Greek-led annual military exercises in which Israel, Cyprus, Italy, and the United States also take part. Containing Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean has taken on greater significance after the UAE’s hopes for a planned EastMed pipeline that would have transported natural gas from Israeli, Cypriot and Lebanese fields via Greece to Italy, were dashed. The pipeline threatened to replace up to half of the Qatari exports to Europe with gas from the Eastern Mediterranean. Among Qatar’s detractors, the UAE is believed to be the most resistant to finding a compromise that would end the three-year-old UAE-Saudi-led boycott of the Gulf state. The $7 billion, 2,200-kilometre-long pipeline project was effectively put on hold because of the economic fallout of the pandemic and the collapse of energy prices. A consortium led by France’s Total, which includes Italian oil and gas major ENI and Novatek, Russia’s second-largest gas producer, was expected to halt drilling after its first well proved to be dry. ENI and Total have also suspended plans for six drillings off the coast of Cyprus while ExxonMobil has delayed exploration of its two wells in the area. US explorer Noble Energy together with Shell and Herzliya-based Delek Drilling is likely to follow suit in Israel’s Aphrodite field. All of that does not seem to deter Turkey. The country’s Official Gazette announced on May 30 that state-owned oil company Turkish Petroleum had been granted 24 exploration licenses that include waters off the coast of Greek islands such as Crete and Rhodes. Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias’ warning that his country would answer what he called, "the Turkish provocation" if Turkey were to proceed would further draw Europe into the Eastern Mediterranean’s mushrooming imbroglio. It is a development that would boost Emirati efforts to further corner Turkey internationally even if it would for now likely further dampen prospects for dealing a blow to Qatar. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Europe caught between coronavirus and economic hardships

Mohammed Jarah and Ahmad Bustati’s warehouse in Damascus symbolized China’s emergence as the largest supplier of industrial and consumer goods to Syria on the eve of the Syrian civil war. The dilapidated warehouse was stocked with everything from Chinese laser cutting machines to plastic toys for children.

A decade of fighting dashed the two Syrian entrepreneurs’ hopes. However, things seem to be looking up for businessmen like Jarah and Bustati with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad having gained the upper hand in the war with Russian and Iranian assistance and China seeing the longer-term economic potential in Syria as a regional node of what BRI will look like irrespective of the coronavirus pandemic and its devastating economic consequences.

Syrian officials have sought to drive home China’s competitive advantages and perceived interest in taking a lead in the reconstruction of their country. “The Silk Road is not a silk road if it does not pass through Syria, Iraq and Iran,” said Buthina Shaaban, Bashar al-Assad’s media advisor, referring to the BRI.

Chinese access to the Syrian Mediterranean Sea ports of Tartus and Latakia is an attractive prospect for China’s multi-billion-dollar infrastructure, telecommunications and energy-driven initiative that seeks to link Eurasia to the People’s Republic. It would complement Beijing’s footholds in Greece’s Piraeus and the Israeli harbours of Haifa and Ashdod and echo Syria’s key position on the ancient Silk Road.

Closely connected to Chinese interest in Syrian ports is the exploration by China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd (CHEC) of the possible upgrading of the deep seaport of Tripoli, Lebanon to allow it to accommodate larger vessels. In contrast to Syrian ports, Tripoli would grant China greater freedom of action because it would not have to share control with Russia. Together with Syrian ports, Tripoli would serve as an alternative to passage through the Suez Canal.

Russia appeared to be anticipating potential Chinese moves when it last year negotiated with the Assad government an extension of its access to military bases including what it describes as a “logistics support facility of the Russian navy” in Tartus.

In the absence of making the agreement public, it remained unclear what Russian intentions are. However, modernization of Tartus for military purposes that would guarantee Russia a role in the control of the Eastern Mediterranean would have to involve upgrading it to be able to accommodate all types of vessels, including aircraft carriers.

In a further move, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his foreign and defence ministries in May to reach an agreement with Syria on the additional expansion of a 2015 accord that governs Russia’s naval presence in Tartus and allows the Russian navy to base up to 11 ships in the port for 49 years. Putin wants the life of the agreement to be extended by an additional 25 years.

“From the coast of Syria, there is an opportunity to control not only the eastern part, but the entire Mediterranean Sea,” said Captain 1st Rank Anatoly Ivanov, a Moscow-based naval expert. “The United States has in the Mediterranean Sea not only the ships of its Sixth Fleet, but also an extensive ship repair base and training centres of the Navy. For Russia, the Mediterranean Sea is much closer not only geographically, but also geopolitically. Therefore, to use the opportunity to establish (itself) more densely in Syria seems to be a reasonable measure”

Qingdao Haixi Heavy-Duty Machinery Co. has already sold Tripoli port two 28-storey container cranes capable of lifting and transporting more than 700 containers a day, while a container vessel belonging to China’s state-owned COSCO Shipping Lines docked in Tripoli in December 2018, inaugurating a new maritime route between China and the Mediterranean.

Major Chinese construction companies are also looking at building a railroad that would connect Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon to Homs and Aleppo in Syria. China has suggested that Tripoli could become a special economic zone within the &nbsp;BRI and serve as an important trans-shipment point between the People’s Republic and Europe.

Adding to China’s expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean, COSCO acquired in 2015 a 65 per cent stake in Turkey’s &nbsp;Kumport Terminal on the Ambarli coast of Istanbul. To round off the circle, Egypt’s navy last year signed an agreement with China’s Hutchinson Ports to build a terminal in Abu Qir, a port 23 kilometres northeast of Alexandria. &nbsp;Chinese companies already operate Alexandria’s own port as well as that of El Dekheila, ten kilometres west of the city.

Chinese influence in at least ten ports in six countries bordering the Eastern Mediterranean - Israel, Greece, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, and Syria - could complicate US and NATO’s ability to manoeuvre in the region.

This was one reason that the Trump administration has warned Israel that Chinese involvement in Haifa, where the Chinese have built their own pier, could jeopardize continued use of the port by the US sixth fleet.

Informing US thinking is China’s Military Strategy white paper, published in 2015, that emphasises the “strategic requirement of offshore waters defence and open seas.” It raises the spectre of Chinese-managed or owned ports in the Eastern Mediterranean serving the People’s Republic’s economic and commercial, as well as military interests.

The Chinese sway over multiple ports in the Eastern Mediterranean could also encourage &nbsp;Turkey to bolster its grip on the energy-rich waters in violation of international law. Turkish military support for the internationally recognised Libyan Government of National Accord produced a maritime agreement between the two entities that created an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean favouring expansive Turkish claims.

China’s interest in Mediterranean ports is part of a larger effort to integrate the Middle East into the maritime leg of the Belt and Road that also includes the Gulf, the Arabian Sea with the Pakistani port of Gwadar as its focal point, and the Red Sea with the establishment of the People’s Republic’s first military outpost in Djibouti.

The integration is further advanced by Chinese investment in ports and logistics facilities in among others Dubai and Oman as well as industrial parks linked to maritime infrastructure. China’s moves have been embraced by Gulf states, several of which have incorporated them in long-term plans to diversify and streamline their economies.

Qi Qianjin, China’s ambassador in Damascus, spelled out China’s interest in Syria when he stressed in 2018, in a statement in 2018 to the People’s Republic’s state-run news agency Xinhua as well as in a letter, his country’s intent to expand its economic, political, and military footprint in the.

"I think it's about time to focus all efforts on the development and reconstruction of Syria, and I think China will play a bigger role in this process by providing more aid to the Syrian people and the Syrian government," Qi said during a visit to a hospital in the Syrian capital.

Donations in recent years of at least $44 million to Syria for humanitarian purposes back up Qi’s statements.

In a letter written in August 2019, the ambassador focussed among other things, on the development of Syrian railways and seaports. The letter was published a month after Chinese President Xi Jinping promised to lend &nbsp;$20 billion to Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Jordan for reconstruction and economic development.

Few doubt that China, even prior to the coronavirus pandemic and its devastating economic fallout, is best positioned to be a key, if not the key player, in post-war reconstruction of Syria, estimated to require between &nbsp;$250 and $400 billion in investment.

This is even more the case as other potential funders, the United States, Europe, Russia and the &nbsp;Gulf Cooperation Council states, will either refuse to work with the government of Al-Assad or be consumed with fighting a domestic and global recession and substantial loss of revenues in the wake of the pandemic. &nbsp;

Moreover, in opposition to Western states, China on six occasions backed Russian vetoes in the United Nations Security Council that blocked condemnations of the &nbsp;Syrian government and its backers, Russian and Iran; calls for ceasefires; and sanctioning of alleged war criminals.

One of China’s comparative advantages in heavily sanctioned Syria is the experience it garnered in circumventing US and United Nations sanctions imposed on &nbsp;Iran and North Korea. &nbsp;

China further benefits from alternative institutions that it built like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that it either controls or in which it has considerable influence.

That has not stopped the US Justice Department from accusing Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei of operating in Syria in violation of US sanctions. The department is seeking the extradition from Canada of Meng Wanzhou, the company’s chief financial officer and daughter of its founder. Meng was detained in Canada at the request of the United States.

Seemingly oblivious to the risk of being targeted by the long arm of US justice, some 200 Chinese companies in 2018 and 58 in 2019, active in sectors such as telecommunications, oil and gas, and transportation, attended the Damascus International Fair where they discussed deals ranging from car manufacturing to development of mobile hospitals.

The participation of China National Heavy Duty Truck Company highlighted Chinese interest in the Syrian automotive sector. Syria could also prove to be a lucrative market for Chinese military exports. Al-Assad could well see Chinese interest as a way of loosening Moscow and Tehran’s grip on his country despite Russian and Iranian effort to reap the benefits of their boots-on-the-ground support for his government by winning lucrative reconstruction contracts.

China has so far refrained from responding in any real way to Syrian urging to kickstart reconstruction of critical national infrastructure even before remaining rebel strongholds in the country are reconquered. It has however exploited commercial opportunity.

The vast majority of Syrian exports go to China and Chinese goods are ubiquitous in Syrian markets. Hama, Syria’s most important industrial region after the collapse of manufacturing in Aleppo and Damascus as a result of the war, is awash with Chinese-made car parts, machine tools and equipment for the automobile, motorcycle, and shoe industry.

Multiple delegations of Chinese investors and businessmen have visited Syria in recent years. In 2018, China hosted its First Trade Fair on Syrian Reconstruction Projects with some 1,000 Chinese companies in attendance and pledged $2 billion for the construction of industrial parks.

China’s security concerns from Syria

Al-Assad’s ability to regain control of most Syria, with the exception of the rebel-held northern region of Idlib, created not only economic opportunity but also heightened already existing Chinese security concerns.

As &nbsp;Syrian government forces rolled back rebel fighters, China feared that their battle-hardened Uyghur and Central Asian contingent would gravitate towards Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan from where it would be easier to target China.

The presence of Uyghur fighters in Syria was one driver for a brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims in China’s troubled north-western province of Xinjiang. It also persuaded China to step up border security cooperation with Tajikistan and Afghanistan, where militants of the Uyghur jihadist Turkistan Islamic Party, an al-Qaeda-affiliated group, allegedly fight alongside the Taliban.

The Uyghur presence in Syria prompted China to consider sending Chinese troops to join the fight for Idlib in violation of its foreign and defense policy principles. China ultimately dropped the idea, which would have amounted to the People’s Republic’s first military intervention in recent memory beyond its borders.

Repeated unconfirmed media reports have, however, suggested that China has been sharing intelligence with Syria and has been sending military advisors for the past four years to help in the fight against Uyghur militants.

The discussion about an intervention followed a pledge in 2016 by Rear Admiral Guan Youfei of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to increase military cooperation with the &nbsp;Syrian government.

Two years later, a Syrian state-controlled newspaper, Al Watan, Qi, the Chinese ambassador, and China’s military attaché, Wong Roy Chang, as saying that China wanted to contribute “in some way” to Syrian military campaign against the rebels in Idlib. The PLAN took nine days to deny Chinese interest in getting involved in the fighting, calling the report a “misunderstanding.”

Meanwhile, while supportive of efforts to negotiate an end to the Syrian war, China has studiously avoided taking a leading role. Its sole initiative to shape the outcome of the conflict was a four-point plan that never gained significant traction.

China’s dilemma in Idlib lies partially in sensitivity to Turkish opposition to an all-out assault on Idlib. Turkey fears that it would likely spark a renewed refugee exodus and concern that Chinese involvement in an assault could whip up pro-Uyghur sentiments in Turkey despite growing anti-refugee sentiment in the country.

Turkey has long supported Uyghur rights and has frequently turned a blind eye to Uyghur militants.

An Uighur dressed in a Turkish military uniform and sporting an automatic weapon, claiming in a video clip posted on Twitter that he was fighting in the northern Syrian district of Afrin alongside Turkish-backed rebels, advised Han Chinese residents of China’s troubled north-western province of Xinjiang to leave the area. “Listen you dog bastards, do you see this? We will triumph! We will kill you all. Listen up Chinese civilians, get out of our East Turkestan. I am warning you. We shall return, and we will be victorious,” the Uyghur said.

Syria in the wider Chinese Middle East policy

Beyond its hesitancy of becoming embroiled in the Syrian war, China, despite its consistent backing of the Syrian government as a secular bulwark against Islamic extremism, feared that greater involvement in Syria could jeopardise its successful efforts to remain aloof in the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran that influenced multiple disputes in the Middle East.

That fear has receded with states in the GCC ending their long-standing support for anti-Assad rebels and cosying up to the Syrian leader in an effort to counter Iranian and Turkish influence.

Chinese aloofness also shielded it from entering into direct competition with Russia and Iran in the post-war reconstruction phase. Deepening Chinese-Russian ties in the wake of the pandemic and perceived greater Iranian dependence on China may allow for a divvying up of the pie in ways that turn Syria into an important Belt and Road node.

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

&nbsp;

Mohammed Jarah and Ahmad Bustati’s warehouse in Damascus symbolized China’s emergence as the largest supplier of industrial and consumer goods to Syria on the eve of the Syrian civil war.

Mohammed Jarah and Ahmad Bustati’s warehouse in Damascus symbolized China’s emergence as the largest supplier of industrial and consumer goods to Syria on the eve of the Syrian civil war. The dilapidated warehouse was stocked with everything from Chinese laser cutting machines to plastic toys for children. A decade of fighting dashed the two Syrian entrepreneurs’ hopes. However, things seem to be looking up for businessmen like Jarah and Bustati with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad having gained the upper hand in the war with Russian and Iranian assistance and China seeing the longer-term economic potential in Syria as a regional node of what BRI will look like irrespective of the coronavirus pandemic and its devastating economic consequences. Syrian officials have sought to drive home China’s competitive advantages and perceived interest in taking a lead in the reconstruction of their country. “The Silk Road is not a silk road if it does not pass through Syria, Iraq and Iran,” said Buthina Shaaban, Bashar al-Assad’s media advisor, referring to the BRI. Chinese access to the Syrian Mediterranean Sea ports of Tartus and Latakia is an attractive prospect for China’s multi-billion-dollar infrastructure, telecommunications and energy-driven initiative that seeks to link Eurasia to the People’s Republic. It would complement Beijing’s footholds in Greece’s Piraeus and the Israeli harbours of Haifa and Ashdod and echo Syria’s key position on the ancient Silk Road. Closely connected to Chinese interest in Syrian ports is the exploration by China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd (CHEC) of the possible upgrading of the deep seaport of Tripoli, Lebanon to allow it to accommodate larger vessels. In contrast to Syrian ports, Tripoli would grant China greater freedom of action because it would not have to share control with Russia. Together with Syrian ports, Tripoli would serve as an alternative to passage through the Suez Canal. Russia appeared to be anticipating potential Chinese moves when it last year negotiated with the Assad government an extension of its access to military bases including what it describes as a “logistics support facility of the Russian navy” in Tartus. In the absence of making the agreement public, it remained unclear what Russian intentions are. However, modernization of Tartus for military purposes that would guarantee Russia a role in the control of the Eastern Mediterranean would have to involve upgrading it to be able to accommodate all types of vessels, including aircraft carriers. In a further move, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his foreign and defence ministries in May to reach an agreement with Syria on the additional expansion of a 2015 accord that governs Russia’s naval presence in Tartus and allows the Russian navy to base up to 11 ships in the port for 49 years. Putin wants the life of the agreement to be extended by an additional 25 years. “From the coast of Syria, there is an opportunity to control not only the eastern part, but the entire Mediterranean Sea,” said Captain 1st Rank Anatoly Ivanov, a Moscow-based naval expert. “The United States has in the Mediterranean Sea not only the ships of its Sixth Fleet, but also an extensive ship repair base and training centres of the Navy. For Russia, the Mediterranean Sea is much closer not only geographically, but also geopolitically. Therefore, to use the opportunity to establish (itself) more densely in Syria seems to be a reasonable measure” Qingdao Haixi Heavy-Duty Machinery Co. has already sold Tripoli port two 28-storey container cranes capable of lifting and transporting more than 700 containers a day, while a container vessel belonging to China’s state-owned COSCO Shipping Lines docked in Tripoli in December 2018, inaugurating a new maritime route between China and the Mediterranean. Major Chinese construction companies are also looking at building a railroad that would connect Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon to Homs and Aleppo in Syria. China has suggested that Tripoli could become a special economic zone within the BRI and serve as an important trans-shipment point between the People’s Republic and Europe. Adding to China’s expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean, COSCO acquired in 2015 a 65 per cent stake in Turkey’s Kumport Terminal on the Ambarli coast of Istanbul. To round off the circle, Egypt’s navy last year signed an agreement with China’s Hutchinson Ports to build a terminal in Abu Qir, a port 23 kilometres northeast of Alexandria. Chinese companies already operate Alexandria’s own port as well as that of El Dekheila, ten kilometres west of the city. Chinese influence in at least ten ports in six countries bordering the Eastern Mediterranean - Israel, Greece, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, and Syria - could complicate US and NATO’s ability to manoeuvre in the region. This was one reason that the Trump administration has warned Israel that Chinese involvement in Haifa, where the Chinese have built their own pier, could jeopardize continued use of the port by the US sixth fleet. Informing US thinking is China’s Military Strategy white paper, published in 2015, that emphasises the “strategic requirement of offshore waters defence and open seas.” It raises the spectre of Chinese-managed or owned ports in the Eastern Mediterranean serving the People’s Republic’s economic and commercial, as well as military interests. The Chinese sway over multiple ports in the Eastern Mediterranean could also encourage Turkey to bolster its grip on the energy-rich waters in violation of international law. Turkish military support for the internationally recognised Libyan Government of National Accord produced a maritime agreement between the two entities that created an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean favouring expansive Turkish claims. China’s interest in Mediterranean ports is part of a larger effort to integrate the Middle East into the maritime leg of the Belt and Road that also includes the Gulf, the Arabian Sea with the Pakistani port of Gwadar as its focal point, and the Red Sea with the establishment of the People’s Republic’s first military outpost in Djibouti. The integration is further advanced by Chinese investment in ports and logistics facilities in among others Dubai and Oman as well as industrial parks linked to maritime infrastructure. China’s moves have been embraced by Gulf states, several of which have incorporated them in long-term plans to diversify and streamline their economies. Qi Qianjin, China’s ambassador in Damascus, spelled out China’s interest in Syria when he stressed in 2018, in a statement in 2018 to the People’s Republic’s state-run news agency Xinhua as well as in a letter, his country’s intent to expand its economic, political, and military footprint in the. "I think it's about time to focus all efforts on the development and reconstruction of Syria, and I think China will play a bigger role in this process by providing more aid to the Syrian people and the Syrian government," Qi said during a visit to a hospital in the Syrian capital. Donations in recent years of at least $44 million to Syria for humanitarian purposes back up Qi’s statements. In a letter written in August 2019, the ambassador focussed among other things, on the development of Syrian railways and seaports. The letter was published a month after Chinese President Xi Jinping promised to lend $20 billion to Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Jordan for reconstruction and economic development. Few doubt that China, even prior to the coronavirus pandemic and its devastating economic fallout, is best positioned to be a key, if not the key player, in post-war reconstruction of Syria, estimated to require between $250 and $400 billion in investment. This is even more the case as other potential funders, the United States, Europe, Russia and the Gulf Cooperation Council states, will either refuse to work with the government of Al-Assad or be consumed with fighting a domestic and global recession and substantial loss of revenues in the wake of the pandemic. Moreover, in opposition to Western states, China on six occasions backed Russian vetoes in the United Nations Security Council that blocked condemnations of the Syrian government and its backers, Russian and Iran; calls for ceasefires; and sanctioning of alleged war criminals. One of China’s comparative advantages in heavily sanctioned Syria is the experience it garnered in circumventing US and United Nations sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. China further benefits from alternative institutions that it built like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that it either controls or in which it has considerable influence. That has not stopped the US Justice Department from accusing Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei of operating in Syria in violation of US sanctions. The department is seeking the extradition from Canada of Meng Wanzhou, the company’s chief financial officer and daughter of its founder. Meng was detained in Canada at the request of the United States. Seemingly oblivious to the risk of being targeted by the long arm of US justice, some 200 Chinese companies in 2018 and 58 in 2019, active in sectors such as telecommunications, oil and gas, and transportation, attended the Damascus International Fair where they discussed deals ranging from car manufacturing to development of mobile hospitals. The participation of China National Heavy Duty Truck Company highlighted Chinese interest in the Syrian automotive sector. Syria could also prove to be a lucrative market for Chinese military exports. Al-Assad could well see Chinese interest as a way of loosening Moscow and Tehran’s grip on his country despite Russian and Iranian effort to reap the benefits of their boots-on-the-ground support for his government by winning lucrative reconstruction contracts. China has so far refrained from responding in any real way to Syrian urging to kickstart reconstruction of critical national infrastructure even before remaining rebel strongholds in the country are reconquered. It has however exploited commercial opportunity. The vast majority of Syrian exports go to China and Chinese goods are ubiquitous in Syrian markets. Hama, Syria’s most important industrial region after the collapse of manufacturing in Aleppo and Damascus as a result of the war, is awash with Chinese-made car parts, machine tools and equipment for the automobile, motorcycle, and shoe industry. Multiple delegations of Chinese investors and businessmen have visited Syria in recent years. In 2018, China hosted its First Trade Fair on Syrian Reconstruction Projects with some 1,000 Chinese companies in attendance and pledged $2 billion for the construction of industrial parks. China’s security concerns from Syria Al-Assad’s ability to regain control of most Syria, with the exception of the rebel-held northern region of Idlib, created not only economic opportunity but also heightened already existing Chinese security concerns. As Syrian government forces rolled back rebel fighters, China feared that their battle-hardened Uyghur and Central Asian contingent would gravitate towards Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan from where it would be easier to target China. The presence of Uyghur fighters in Syria was one driver for a brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims in China’s troubled north-western province of Xinjiang. It also persuaded China to step up border security cooperation with Tajikistan and Afghanistan, where militants of the Uyghur jihadist Turkistan Islamic Party, an al-Qaeda-affiliated group, allegedly fight alongside the Taliban. The Uyghur presence in Syria prompted China to consider sending Chinese troops to join the fight for Idlib in violation of its foreign and defense policy principles. China ultimately dropped the idea, which would have amounted to the People’s Republic’s first military intervention in recent memory beyond its borders. Repeated unconfirmed media reports have, however, suggested that China has been sharing intelligence with Syria and has been sending military advisors for the past four years to help in the fight against Uyghur militants. The discussion about an intervention followed a pledge in 2016 by Rear Admiral Guan Youfei of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to increase military cooperation with the Syrian government. Two years later, a Syrian state-controlled newspaper, Al Watan, Qi, the Chinese ambassador, and China’s military attaché, Wong Roy Chang, as saying that China wanted to contribute “in some way” to Syrian military campaign against the rebels in Idlib. The PLAN took nine days to deny Chinese interest in getting involved in the fighting, calling the report a “misunderstanding.” Meanwhile, while supportive of efforts to negotiate an end to the Syrian war, China has studiously avoided taking a leading role. Its sole initiative to shape the outcome of the conflict was a four-point plan that never gained significant traction. China’s dilemma in Idlib lies partially in sensitivity to Turkish opposition to an all-out assault on Idlib. Turkey fears that it would likely spark a renewed refugee exodus and concern that Chinese involvement in an assault could whip up pro-Uyghur sentiments in Turkey despite growing anti-refugee sentiment in the country. Turkey has long supported Uyghur rights and has frequently turned a blind eye to Uyghur militants. An Uighur dressed in a Turkish military uniform and sporting an automatic weapon, claiming in a video clip posted on Twitter that he was fighting in the northern Syrian district of Afrin alongside Turkish-backed rebels, advised Han Chinese residents of China’s troubled north-western province of Xinjiang to leave the area. “Listen you dog bastards, do you see this? We will triumph! We will kill you all. Listen up Chinese civilians, get out of our East Turkestan. I am warning you. We shall return, and we will be victorious,” the Uyghur said. Syria in the wider Chinese Middle East policy Beyond its hesitancy of becoming embroiled in the Syrian war, China, despite its consistent backing of the Syrian government as a secular bulwark against Islamic extremism, feared that greater involvement in Syria could jeopardise its successful efforts to remain aloof in the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran that influenced multiple disputes in the Middle East. That fear has receded with states in the GCC ending their long-standing support for anti-Assad rebels and cosying up to the Syrian leader in an effort to counter Iranian and Turkish influence. Chinese aloofness also shielded it from entering into direct competition with Russia and Iran in the post-war reconstruction phase. Deepening Chinese-Russian ties in the wake of the pandemic and perceived greater Iranian dependence on China may allow for a divvying up of the pie in ways that turn Syria into an important Belt and Road node. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

China shows greater interest in Syria amid coronavirus pandemic and deteriorating ties with the US

A second wave of the coronavirus pandemic is raising its ugly head. It is putting Middle Eastern leaders at a crossroads as they struggle to contain the disease and tackle its economic fallout.

The question is whether they are getting the message: neither containing and controlling the virus nor economic recovery is a straight shot. Both are likely to involve a process of two steps forward, one step backwards, and no state can successfully tackle the multiples crises on its own.

The Middle East is a part of the world in which conflicts and problems are not just complex but inherently interconnected. The pandemic poses not only political, economic, and social challenges. It also calls into question regional security arrangements that reinforce fault lines rather than create an environment that allows rivals to collectively manage disputes as well as diseases whose spread is not halted by physical and other boundaries.

At stake is not just regional but also global security. Focused on their own healthcare and economic crises, Western nations ignore Middle Eastern and North African instability at their peril. They risk waking up to threats that could have been anticipated.

Suspected Russian hopes that an end to the Libyan war would allow for the creation of a Russian military base on the southern shore of the Mediterranean that would complement facilities in Syria would be one such impending threat.

“Russia wants a foothold in Libya, and that’s a fact,” said Pavel Felgenhauer, a Russian military analyst at the Jamestown Foundation. US officials warned that a permanent Russian presence would enhance Russia’s efforts to weaken the already strained trans-Atlantic alliance.

The prospect of increased Russian influence in the Mediterranean coupled with China’s expanding sway over ports in the Eastern Mediterranean raises the spectre of emboldening Turkey as it aggressively seeks to grow its control of energy-rich waters in the region in violation of international law.

“To avoid the worst outcomes for an already fraught region, there is no substitute and frankly no alternative to some form of cooperation among regional actors. . . . With the Middle East likely to emerge from the COVID-19 crisis more fragile and potentially explosive than before, a cooperative architecture that can build regional resilience is an imperative,” said strategist Steven Kenney and international relations scholar Ross Harrison in a just-released Washington-based Middle East Institute report.

The economic part of the message is already evident: Putting an end to the pandemic and economic recovery will be a painful and long-drawn-out process.

Countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon, and Israel are witnessing first signs of the pandemic’s second wave.

Increasing the likelihood of a cancellation of this year’s Muslim pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca scheduled for late July, Saudi Arabia re-imposed a lockdown in the Red Sea port of Jeddah, the haj’s major gateway, after a spike in coronavirus infections. The lockdown involves a two-week, 15-hour curfew from 15:00 PM to 06:00 PM

A dramatic surge in infections in Iran, averaging 3,000 new cases a day, has rekindled the Middle East’s largest outbreak, weeks after the country appeared to have tamed the virus.

Israel closed dozens of schools and ordered any school reporting a virus case to shut down following a surge in coronavirus cases that swept through classrooms two weeks after they were allowed to reopen.

Mass social and economic protests in Lebanon, a country on the brink of financial collapse, have heightened the risk of a second wave of the pandemic.

The surge bodes ill for economic recovery.

Based on a survey of 1,228 CEOs, the Dubai Chamber of Commerce warned that a &nbsp;staggering 70 per cent of businesses in the emirate expects to close their doors within the next six months.

The warning came as the UAE government extended a nightly curfew following a doubling of infections after it eased lockdown restrictions.

Government-backed UAE carriers Emirates and Etihad Airways have since extended reduced pay for staff until September as they try to preserve cash.

Austerity measures threaten to bring the social unrest that has swept the Middle East and North Africa for the past decade closer to the Gulf.

“If it’s temporary, one or two years, I can adapt. My concern is that more taxes will be permanent — and that will be an issue,” said Mohammed, a Saudi government worker after his $266 USD a month cost of living allowance was cancelled and sales taxes were tripled as part of painful austerity measures announced by Finance Minister Mohammed Al-Jadaan.

Mohammed’s words were echoed in a rare pushback against the government by columnist Khalid Al-Sulaiman, writing in the Okaz daily, one of the kingdom’s tightly controlled media outlets.

“I was hoping [the minister] would say [the tax hike] would be reviewed after the coronavirus crisis is gone or contained, or when oil prices improve, but he did not say that. Citizens are feeling concerned that pressure on their living standards will last longer than the current crisis,” Al-Sulaiman said.

The challenges Gulf states face of an ongoing healthcare crisis and a painful, protracted, and complex road toward economic recovery, coupled with debilitating regional conflicts that not only fester but appear to be expanding, are almost insurmountable obstacles.

Kuwaiti efforts to resolve the rift in the Gulf and pressure by US President Donald J. Trump on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to lift their three-year-old air embargo of Qatar have raised, perhaps prematurely, the hope of an end to the conflict. Although there is no public indication that the parties are willing to seriously engage.

The proxy war in Libya, in which the UAE-backed forces of rebel commander Khalifa Haftar are on the defensive, is extending into the Eastern Mediterranean as Turkey claims rights in energy-rich territorial waters in violation of international law.

Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi-based English language newspaper The National, despite UAE efforts to reduce tension with Iran, seemed, to stop just short of inviting Israel to attack an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ command and control center on the outskirts of the main airport of Damascus, the capital of Syria.

“For now, the Glass House remains unshattered,” The National said in a detailed expose of the centre dubbed The Glass House.

Middle Eastern leaders are confronting the worst pandemic of crises since independence.

Addressing those predicaments requires regional and global leadership which looks beyond immediate survival and ideological and geopolitical rivalries; a leadership which recognises that stability and solutions to shared threats must be vested in longer-term managing and cooperation in tackling common challenges rather than maintaining conflict.

The problem is that few leaders seem willing or able to step up to the plate. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

A second wave of the coronavirus pandemic is raising its ugly head. It is putting Middle Eastern leaders at a crossroads as they struggle to contain the disease and tackle its economic fallout.

A second wave of the coronavirus pandemic is raising its ugly head. It is putting Middle Eastern leaders at a crossroads as they struggle to contain the disease and tackle its economic fallout. The question is whether they are getting the message: neither containing and controlling the virus nor economic recovery is a straight shot. Both are likely to involve a process of two steps forward, one step backwards, and no state can successfully tackle the multiples crises on its own. The Middle East is a part of the world in which conflicts and problems are not just complex but inherently interconnected. The pandemic poses not only political, economic, and social challenges. It also calls into question regional security arrangements that reinforce fault lines rather than create an environment that allows rivals to collectively manage disputes as well as diseases whose spread is not halted by physical and other boundaries. At stake is not just regional but also global security. Focused on their own healthcare and economic crises, Western nations ignore Middle Eastern and North African instability at their peril. They risk waking up to threats that could have been anticipated. Suspected Russian hopes that an end to the Libyan war would allow for the creation of a Russian military base on the southern shore of the Mediterranean that would complement facilities in Syria would be one such impending threat. “Russia wants a foothold in Libya, and that’s a fact,” said Pavel Felgenhauer, a Russian military analyst at the Jamestown Foundation. US officials warned that a permanent Russian presence would enhance Russia’s efforts to weaken the already strained trans-Atlantic alliance. The prospect of increased Russian influence in the Mediterranean coupled with China’s expanding sway over ports in the Eastern Mediterranean raises the spectre of emboldening Turkey as it aggressively seeks to grow its control of energy-rich waters in the region in violation of international law. “To avoid the worst outcomes for an already fraught region, there is no substitute and frankly no alternative to some form of cooperation among regional actors. . . . With the Middle East likely to emerge from the COVID-19 crisis more fragile and potentially explosive than before, a cooperative architecture that can build regional resilience is an imperative,” said strategist Steven Kenney and international relations scholar Ross Harrison in a just-released Washington-based Middle East Institute report. The economic part of the message is already evident: Putting an end to the pandemic and economic recovery will be a painful and long-drawn-out process. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon, and Israel are witnessing first signs of the pandemic’s second wave. Increasing the likelihood of a cancellation of this year’s Muslim pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca scheduled for late July, Saudi Arabia re-imposed a lockdown in the Red Sea port of Jeddah, the haj’s major gateway, after a spike in coronavirus infections. The lockdown involves a two-week, 15-hour curfew from 15:00 PM to 06:00 PM A dramatic surge in infections in Iran, averaging 3,000 new cases a day, has rekindled the Middle East’s largest outbreak, weeks after the country appeared to have tamed the virus. Israel closed dozens of schools and ordered any school reporting a virus case to shut down following a surge in coronavirus cases that swept through classrooms two weeks after they were allowed to reopen. Mass social and economic protests in Lebanon, a country on the brink of financial collapse, have heightened the risk of a second wave of the pandemic. The surge bodes ill for economic recovery. Based on a survey of 1,228 CEOs, the Dubai Chamber of Commerce warned that a staggering 70 per cent of businesses in the emirate expects to close their doors within the next six months. The warning came as the UAE government extended a nightly curfew following a doubling of infections after it eased lockdown restrictions. Government-backed UAE carriers Emirates and Etihad Airways have since extended reduced pay for staff until September as they try to preserve cash. Austerity measures threaten to bring the social unrest that has swept the Middle East and North Africa for the past decade closer to the Gulf. “If it’s temporary, one or two years, I can adapt. My concern is that more taxes will be permanent — and that will be an issue,” said Mohammed, a Saudi government worker after his $266 USD a month cost of living allowance was cancelled and sales taxes were tripled as part of painful austerity measures announced by Finance Minister Mohammed Al-Jadaan. Mohammed’s words were echoed in a rare pushback against the government by columnist Khalid Al-Sulaiman, writing in the Okaz daily, one of the kingdom’s tightly controlled media outlets. “I was hoping [the minister] would say [the tax hike] would be reviewed after the coronavirus crisis is gone or contained, or when oil prices improve, but he did not say that. Citizens are feeling concerned that pressure on their living standards will last longer than the current crisis,” Al-Sulaiman said. The challenges Gulf states face of an ongoing healthcare crisis and a painful, protracted, and complex road toward economic recovery, coupled with debilitating regional conflicts that not only fester but appear to be expanding, are almost insurmountable obstacles. Kuwaiti efforts to resolve the rift in the Gulf and pressure by US President Donald J. Trump on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to lift their three-year-old air embargo of Qatar have raised, perhaps prematurely, the hope of an end to the conflict. Although there is no public indication that the parties are willing to seriously engage. The proxy war in Libya, in which the UAE-backed forces of rebel commander Khalifa Haftar are on the defensive, is extending into the Eastern Mediterranean as Turkey claims rights in energy-rich territorial waters in violation of international law. Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi-based English language newspaper The National, despite UAE efforts to reduce tension with Iran, seemed, to stop just short of inviting Israel to attack an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ command and control center on the outskirts of the main airport of Damascus, the capital of Syria. “For now, the Glass House remains unshattered,” The National said in a detailed expose of the centre dubbed The Glass House. Middle Eastern leaders are confronting the worst pandemic of crises since independence. Addressing those predicaments requires regional and global leadership which looks beyond immediate survival and ideological and geopolitical rivalries; a leadership which recognises that stability and solutions to shared threats must be vested in longer-term managing and cooperation in tackling common challenges rather than maintaining conflict. The problem is that few leaders seem willing or able to step up to the plate. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Middle East struggles to contain coronavirus spread and tackle its economic fallout

Iranian naval activity in the Gulf and Turkish maritime expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean have hogged the limelight, but Russian and Gulf policymakers are also watching with Argus eyes moves by the Islamic Republic in the Caspian Sea.

Iran’s navy is no match for its Russian counterpart and Iran’s naval presence in the Caspian is miniscule.

Yet, recent Iranian posturing and statements, coupled with visits by senior commanders to naval facilities and a shipyard on Iran’s Caspian coast where a destroyer is being repaired and modernised, and diplomatic efforts to tighten relations with former Soviet littoral states, have raised eyebrows in Moscow as well as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

Senior military officials, including Iranian navy commander Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi, his deputy, Admiral Habibullah Sayari, and Admiral Amir Rastegari, who oversees naval construction, stressed the importance to Iranian national security of the Caspian on tours of facilities on the coast.

They also suggested closer cooperation and joint naval exercises with countries like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

“The Caspian Sea is the sea of peace and friendship and we can share our military tactics with our neighbours in this region. We are fully ready to expand ties with neighbouring and friendly countries,” Admiral Khanzadi said in April.

The Iranian moves are about more than only strengthening its military presence in a basin that it shares with Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.

A 2018 agreement among the littoral states, made necessary by the collapse of the Soviet Union, barred entry to the basin by military vessels of non-littoral states but failed to regulate the divvying up of the sea’s abundant resources.

Closer naval ties with Caspian Sea states would allow Iran to leverage its position at a time that Central Asians worry about greater Chinese security engagement in their part of the world that undermines a tacit understanding in which Russia shouldered responsibility for regional security while China focussed on economic development.

Increased Chinese engagement raises the spectre of the export of aspects of the People’s Republic’s 21st century, Orwellian surveillance state amid widespread anti-Chinese sentiment as a result of China’s brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims in the troubled north-western province of Xinjiang.

Hard hit by the economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic, Central Asians are torn between wanting to benefit from Chinese willingness to revive Belt and Road-related projects and their concerns that enhanced Chinese influence could impact their lives.

Popular sentiment forced Kyrgyzstan early on in the pandemic to cancel a $275 million logistics project. The Kazakh foreign ministry summoned the Chinese ambassador to explain an article published on a Chinese website that asserted that the Central Asian country wanted to return to Chinese rule.

Kazakh media called for China and the US to leave Kazakhstan alone after the Chinese foreign ministry claimed that the coronavirus had originated in US-funded laboratories in the country.

Iranian efforts, boosted by the Indian-funded deep seaport of Chabahar that serves as a conduit for Indian exports to Central Asia, to benefit in the margin from big Asian power rivalry, has opened the region, including the Caspian basin, to greater competition with the Islamic Republic’s Gulf opponents, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Iran hopes that geography and Central Asian distrust of past Saudi promotion of its ultra-conservative strand of Islam will work to its advantage.

That hope may not be in vain. Tajik foreign minister Sirodjidin Muhriddin, despite past troubled relations with the Islamic Republic, opted a year ago to ignore a Saudi invitation to attend an Organization of Islamic Cooperation (ICO) conference in the kingdom and visit Iran instead.

Iran has since agreed to invest $4 billion in the completion of a five kilometre-long tunnel that will link the Tajik capital of Dushanbe with the country’s second-largest city, Khujand.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have fared somewhat better in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan.

Saudi utility developer ACWA Power, in which China’s state-owned Silk Road Fund has a 49 percent stake, and the UAE’s Masdar or Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company agreed to invest in Azerbaijani renewable energy projects.

ACWA Power also recently signed agreements in Uzbekistan worth $ 2.5 billion for the construction of a power plant and a wind farm.

Perhaps Iran’s strongest trump card is that by linking the Caspian to the Arabian Sea it can provide what the Gulf states cannot: cheap and short access to the Indo-Pacific.

Already, Iran is written all over Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev’s transportation infrastructure plans. A decree issued in late 2017 identified various corridors as key to his plans, including the extension of a rail line that connects Uzbekistan’s Termez to Afghanistan’s Mazar-i-Sharif to the Afghan city of Herat from where it would branch out to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port, Chabahar; and Bazargan on the Iranian-Turkish border.

“As Tashkent seeks to diversify its economic relations, Iran continues to loom large in these calculations. For Uzbekistan, not only do Iranian ports offer the shortest and cheapest route to the sea, but several future rail projects cannot be accomplished without Tehran’s active participation,” said Central Asia analyst Umida Hashimova. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

Iranian naval activity in the Gulf and Turkish maritime expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean have hogged the limelight, but Russian and Gulf policymakers are also watching with Argus eyes moves by the Islamic Republic in the Caspian Sea.

Iranian naval activity in the Gulf and Turkish maritime expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean have hogged the limelight, but Russian and Gulf policymakers are also watching with Argus eyes moves by the Islamic Republic in the Caspian Sea. Iran’s navy is no match for its Russian counterpart and Iran’s naval presence in the Caspian is miniscule. Yet, recent Iranian posturing and statements, coupled with visits by senior commanders to naval facilities and a shipyard on Iran’s Caspian coast where a destroyer is being repaired and modernised, and diplomatic efforts to tighten relations with former Soviet littoral states, have raised eyebrows in Moscow as well as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Senior military officials, including Iranian navy commander Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi, his deputy, Admiral Habibullah Sayari, and Admiral Amir Rastegari, who oversees naval construction, stressed the importance to Iranian national security of the Caspian on tours of facilities on the coast. They also suggested closer cooperation and joint naval exercises with countries like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. “The Caspian Sea is the sea of peace and friendship and we can share our military tactics with our neighbours in this region. We are fully ready to expand ties with neighbouring and friendly countries,” Admiral Khanzadi said in April. The Iranian moves are about more than only strengthening its military presence in a basin that it shares with Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. A 2018 agreement among the littoral states, made necessary by the collapse of the Soviet Union, barred entry to the basin by military vessels of non-littoral states but failed to regulate the divvying up of the sea’s abundant resources. Closer naval ties with Caspian Sea states would allow Iran to leverage its position at a time that Central Asians worry about greater Chinese security engagement in their part of the world that undermines a tacit understanding in which Russia shouldered responsibility for regional security while China focussed on economic development. Increased Chinese engagement raises the spectre of the export of aspects of the People’s Republic’s 21st century, Orwellian surveillance state amid widespread anti-Chinese sentiment as a result of China’s brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims in the troubled north-western province of Xinjiang. Hard hit by the economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic, Central Asians are torn between wanting to benefit from Chinese willingness to revive Belt and Road-related projects and their concerns that enhanced Chinese influence could impact their lives. Popular sentiment forced Kyrgyzstan early on in the pandemic to cancel a $275 million logistics project. The Kazakh foreign ministry summoned the Chinese ambassador to explain an article published on a Chinese website that asserted that the Central Asian country wanted to return to Chinese rule. Kazakh media called for China and the US to leave Kazakhstan alone after the Chinese foreign ministry claimed that the coronavirus had originated in US-funded laboratories in the country. Iranian efforts, boosted by the Indian-funded deep seaport of Chabahar that serves as a conduit for Indian exports to Central Asia, to benefit in the margin from big Asian power rivalry, has opened the region, including the Caspian basin, to greater competition with the Islamic Republic’s Gulf opponents, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Iran hopes that geography and Central Asian distrust of past Saudi promotion of its ultra-conservative strand of Islam will work to its advantage. That hope may not be in vain. Tajik foreign minister Sirodjidin Muhriddin, despite past troubled relations with the Islamic Republic, opted a year ago to ignore a Saudi invitation to attend an Organization of Islamic Cooperation (ICO) conference in the kingdom and visit Iran instead. Iran has since agreed to invest $4 billion in the completion of a five kilometre-long tunnel that will link the Tajik capital of Dushanbe with the country’s second-largest city, Khujand. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have fared somewhat better in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. Saudi utility developer ACWA Power, in which China’s state-owned Silk Road Fund has a 49 percent stake, and the UAE’s Masdar or Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company agreed to invest in Azerbaijani renewable energy projects. ACWA Power also recently signed agreements in Uzbekistan worth $ 2.5 billion for the construction of a power plant and a wind farm. Perhaps Iran’s strongest trump card is that by linking the Caspian to the Arabian Sea it can provide what the Gulf states cannot: cheap and short access to the Indo-Pacific. Already, Iran is written all over Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev’s transportation infrastructure plans. A decree issued in late 2017 identified various corridors as key to his plans, including the extension of a rail line that connects Uzbekistan’s Termez to Afghanistan’s Mazar-i-Sharif to the Afghan city of Herat from where it would branch out to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port, Chabahar; and Bazargan on the Iranian-Turkish border. “As Tashkent seeks to diversify its economic relations, Iran continues to loom large in these calculations. For Uzbekistan, not only do Iranian ports offer the shortest and cheapest route to the sea, but several future rail projects cannot be accomplished without Tehran’s active participation,” said Central Asia analyst Umida Hashimova. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Iran's expanding naval presence in Caspian Sea puts spotlight on great power rivalry

China and the Gulf states are in the same boat as they grapple with uncertainty about regional security against the backdrop of doubts about the United States’ commitment to the region.

Like the Gulf states, China has long relied on the US defence umbrella to ensure the security of the flow of energy and other goods through waters surrounding the Gulf.

In anticipation of the day when China can no longer depend on security provided by the United States free of charge, China has gradually adjusted its defence strategy and built its first foreign military facility in Djibouti facing the Gulf from the Horn of Africa.

With the People’s Liberation Army Navy tasked with protecting China’s sea lines of communication and safeguarding its overseas interests, strategic planners have signalled that Djibouti is a first step in the likely establishment of further bases that would allow it to project long-range capability and shorten the time needed to resupply.

But Chinese strategic planners and their Gulf counterparts may part ways when it comes to what would be acceptable geopolitical parameters for a rejuvenated regional security architecture.

A rejiggered architecture would likely embed rather than exclude the US defence umbrella primarily designed to protect conservative energy-rich monarchies against Iran and counter militancy.

In contrast to China and Russia, Gulf states, as a matter of principle, favour identifying Iran as the enemy and have cold-shouldered proposals for a non-aggression agreement. But for that they need the United States to be a reliable partner that would unconditionally come to their defence at whatever cost.

For its part, China goes to great lengths to avoid being sucked into the Middle East’s myriad conflicts. Adopting a different approach, Russia has put forward a plan for a multilateral security structure based on a non-aggression understanding that would include Iran.

No doubt, China, unlike Russia, wants to postpone the moment in which it has no choice but to become involved in Gulf security. However, China could find itself under pressure sooner rather than later depending on how Gulf perceptions of risk in the continued reliance on the United States evolve.

One factor that could propel things would be a change of guard in the White House as a result of the US election in November.

Democratic presumptive candidate Joe Biden, as president, may strike a more internationalist tone than Donald Trump, though Biden administration’s relations with Saudi Arabia could prove to be more strained. Similarly, Biden’s focus, like that of Trump, is likely to be China rather than the Middle East.

By the same token, China’s appraisal of its ability to rely on the US in the Gulf could change depending on how mounting tensions with the US and potential decoupling of the world’s two largest economies unfolds.

China’s increased security engagement in Central Asia may well be an indication of how it hopes to proceed in the Gulf and the broader Middle East. China has stepped up joint military exercises with various Central Asian nations while its share of the Central Asian arms market has increased from 1.5 per cent in 2014 to 18 per cent today.

Founded in 2001 as a Central Asian security grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has expanded its relationships in South Asia and the Caucasus and admitted Iran as an observer.

Referring to China’s infrastructure, telecommunications, and energy-driven Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that seeks to link the Eurasian landmass to the People’s Republic, China and Central Asia scholar Raffaello Pantucci explained that: “China is expanding its security role in Central Asia to protect its interests in the region and is increasingly unwilling to abrogate security entirely to either local security forces or Russia.”

“By doing so, Beijing is demonstrating an approach that could be read as a blueprint for how China might advance its security relations in other BRI countries,” Pantucci wrote.

Central Asia may find it easier than the Gulf to accommodate the Chinese approach.

The problem for most of the Gulf states is that taking Chinese and Russian concerns into account in any new security arrangement would have to entail paradigm shifts in their attitudes toward Iran.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – which has recently made overtures to Iran, insist that any real détente has to involve a halt to Iranian support for proxies in various Middle Eastern countries as well as a return to a renegotiated agreement that would curb not only the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program but also its development of ballistic missiles.

Caught between the rock of perceived US unreliability and the hard place of Chinese and Russian geopolitical imperatives, smaller Gulf states, including the UAE, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, are hedging their bets by cautiously reaching out to Iran in different ways.

They hope that the overtures will take them out of the firing line should either Iran or the United States, by accident or deliberately, heighten tensions and/or spark a wider military confrontation.

To be sure, various Gulf states have different calculations. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have adopted the most hardline position toward Iran. Oman and Qatar have long maintained normal relations, while the UAE and Kuwait have made limited overtures.

In the short run, Gulf states’ realisation of China and Russia’s parameters could persuade them to maintain their levels of expenditure on weapons acquisitions. And, in the case of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to pursue the development of domestic defence industry, despite the economic fallout of the pandemic, the drop of oil and gas prices, and the shrinking of energy markets.

Probably, so will recent Iranian military advances. Iran last week publicly displayed what is believed to be an unmanned underwater vehicle that would allow the Revolutionary Guards’ navy to project greater power – because of its long-range, better-integrated weapons systems – and more efficiently lay underwater mines.

The vehicle put Iran in an even more elite club than the one it joined in April when it successfully launched a military satellite, a capability only a dozen countries have. When it comes to unmanned underwater vehicles, Iran rubs shoulder with only three countries: the United States, Britain, and China.

Iran’s advances serve two purposes: they highlight the failure of the United States’ two-year-old sanctions-driven maximum pressure campaign to force Iran’s economy on its knees, and, together with massive US arms sales to Gulf countries, they fuel a regional arms race.

To be sure, Russia and China benefit from the race to a limited degree too.

In the ultimate analysis, however, the race could contribute to heightened tensions that risk putting one more nail in the coffin of a US-dominated regional architecture. That, in turn, could force external powers like China to engage whether they want to or not.

“China is quickly learning that you can’t trade and invest in an unstable place like the Middle East if you don’t have the means to protect your interests,” said Israeli journalist David Rosenberg. “Where business executives come, warships and commando units follow, and they will follow big. 
 
&nbsp;(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

China and the Gulf states are in the same boat as they grapple with uncertainty about regional security against the backdrop of doubts about the United States’ commitment to the region.

China and the Gulf states are in the same boat as they grapple with uncertainty about regional security against the backdrop of doubts about the United States’ commitment to the region. Like the Gulf states, China has long relied on the US defence umbrella to ensure the security of the flow of energy and other goods through waters surrounding the Gulf. In anticipation of the day when China can no longer depend on security provided by the United States free of charge, China has gradually adjusted its defence strategy and built its first foreign military facility in Djibouti facing the Gulf from the Horn of Africa. With the People’s Liberation Army Navy tasked with protecting China’s sea lines of communication and safeguarding its overseas interests, strategic planners have signalled that Djibouti is a first step in the likely establishment of further bases that would allow it to project long-range capability and shorten the time needed to resupply. But Chinese strategic planners and their Gulf counterparts may part ways when it comes to what would be acceptable geopolitical parameters for a rejuvenated regional security architecture. A rejiggered architecture would likely embed rather than exclude the US defence umbrella primarily designed to protect conservative energy-rich monarchies against Iran and counter militancy. In contrast to China and Russia, Gulf states, as a matter of principle, favour identifying Iran as the enemy and have cold-shouldered proposals for a non-aggression agreement. But for that they need the United States to be a reliable partner that would unconditionally come to their defence at whatever cost. For its part, China goes to great lengths to avoid being sucked into the Middle East’s myriad conflicts. Adopting a different approach, Russia has put forward a plan for a multilateral security structure based on a non-aggression understanding that would include Iran. No doubt, China, unlike Russia, wants to postpone the moment in which it has no choice but to become involved in Gulf security. However, China could find itself under pressure sooner rather than later depending on how Gulf perceptions of risk in the continued reliance on the United States evolve. One factor that could propel things would be a change of guard in the White House as a result of the US election in November. Democratic presumptive candidate Joe Biden, as president, may strike a more internationalist tone than Donald Trump, though Biden administration’s relations with Saudi Arabia could prove to be more strained. Similarly, Biden’s focus, like that of Trump, is likely to be China rather than the Middle East. By the same token, China’s appraisal of its ability to rely on the US in the Gulf could change depending on how mounting tensions with the US and potential decoupling of the world’s two largest economies unfolds. China’s increased security engagement in Central Asia may well be an indication of how it hopes to proceed in the Gulf and the broader Middle East. China has stepped up joint military exercises with various Central Asian nations while its share of the Central Asian arms market has increased from 1.5 per cent in 2014 to 18 per cent today. Founded in 2001 as a Central Asian security grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has expanded its relationships in South Asia and the Caucasus and admitted Iran as an observer. Referring to China’s infrastructure, telecommunications, and energy-driven Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that seeks to link the Eurasian landmass to the People’s Republic, China and Central Asia scholar Raffaello Pantucci explained that: “China is expanding its security role in Central Asia to protect its interests in the region and is increasingly unwilling to abrogate security entirely to either local security forces or Russia.” “By doing so, Beijing is demonstrating an approach that could be read as a blueprint for how China might advance its security relations in other BRI countries,” Pantucci wrote. Central Asia may find it easier than the Gulf to accommodate the Chinese approach. The problem for most of the Gulf states is that taking Chinese and Russian concerns into account in any new security arrangement would have to entail paradigm shifts in their attitudes toward Iran. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – which has recently made overtures to Iran, insist that any real détente has to involve a halt to Iranian support for proxies in various Middle Eastern countries as well as a return to a renegotiated agreement that would curb not only the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program but also its development of ballistic missiles. Caught between the rock of perceived US unreliability and the hard place of Chinese and Russian geopolitical imperatives, smaller Gulf states, including the UAE, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, are hedging their bets by cautiously reaching out to Iran in different ways. They hope that the overtures will take them out of the firing line should either Iran or the United States, by accident or deliberately, heighten tensions and/or spark a wider military confrontation. To be sure, various Gulf states have different calculations. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have adopted the most hardline position toward Iran. Oman and Qatar have long maintained normal relations, while the UAE and Kuwait have made limited overtures. In the short run, Gulf states’ realisation of China and Russia’s parameters could persuade them to maintain their levels of expenditure on weapons acquisitions. And, in the case of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to pursue the development of domestic defence industry, despite the economic fallout of the pandemic, the drop of oil and gas prices, and the shrinking of energy markets. Probably, so will recent Iranian military advances. Iran last week publicly displayed what is believed to be an unmanned underwater vehicle that would allow the Revolutionary Guards’ navy to project greater power – because of its long-range, better-integrated weapons systems – and more efficiently lay underwater mines. The vehicle put Iran in an even more elite club than the one it joined in April when it successfully launched a military satellite, a capability only a dozen countries have. When it comes to unmanned underwater vehicles, Iran rubs shoulder with only three countries: the United States, Britain, and China. Iran’s advances serve two purposes: they highlight the failure of the United States’ two-year-old sanctions-driven maximum pressure campaign to force Iran’s economy on its knees, and, together with massive US arms sales to Gulf countries, they fuel a regional arms race. To be sure, Russia and China benefit from the race to a limited degree too. In the ultimate analysis, however, the race could contribute to heightened tensions that risk putting one more nail in the coffin of a US-dominated regional architecture. That, in turn, could force external powers like China to engage whether they want to or not. “China is quickly learning that you can’t trade and invest in an unstable place like the Middle East if you don’t have the means to protect your interests,” said Israeli journalist David Rosenberg. “Where business executives come, warships and commando units follow, and they will follow big. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

China can no longer rely on US defence umbrella for security in the Gulf region

The Saudi-Iranian dispute may dominate headlines but a similar rivalry between Turkey and the United Arab Emirates is equally wreaking havoc in the Middle East and North Africa.

While Saudi Arabia may in some ways have a leg up on Iran, Turkey and the UAE are at a virtual draw.

In Libya, forces of the Turkish-backed, Tripoli-based internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) are pushing UAE-backed rebels led by renegade Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar out of western Libya. Haftar further enjoys support from Saudi Arabia and Egypt with whom Turkey is also at odds.

In contrast to Libya, Turkey is discovering that in Syria the odds are stacked against it, even if its objectives in the country are more limited.

If in Libya, Turkish support for the GNA amounts to an effort to shape who controls the country as well as energy-rich waters in the Eastern Mediterranean; in Syria, Turkey is determined to prevent Syrian Kurdish nationalist forces from establishing a permanent and meaningful presence on its borders and control jihadist forces in Idlib, the last major Syrian rebel stronghold.

US abandonment of their alliance with the Kurds in the fight against the Islamic State pushed the Kurds towards cooperation with the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Kurds expect the cooperation to shield them from Turkish efforts to push them further out of border areas.

At the same time Turkey, already home to 3.6 million Syrian refugees – the single largest concentration of Syrians fleeing their war-torn and dilapidated homeland,&nbsp;also wants to stymie a potential new influx of many more if and when Idlib falls to Russian-backed Syrian government forces.

The UAE-Turkish rivalry — rooted in a battle for dominance of global Muslim religious soft power; geopolitical competition across the Muslim world, including the Middle East and the Horn of Africa; and fundamentally opposed attitudes towards political Islam — has escalated military confrontations and complicated, if not disrupted, efforts to resolve conflicts in Libya and Syria.

The UAE-Turkey scorecard is 1:1

Turkey so far has a winning hand in Libya.

In Syria, however, few doubt that Turkey will struggle to secure its interests with Al-Assad, backed not only by Russia and Iran but also the UAE, firmly in the saddle.

UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) reportedly promised Al-Assad $3 billion&nbsp;in April; $250 million of which was paid upfront, to break a ceasefire in Idlib imposed on Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan by his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.

Russia appears to have successfully thwarted Prince Mohammed’s move.

The Emirati crown prince had hoped to tie Turkey up in fighting in Syria, which would complicate Turkish military support for the GNA in Libya. Al-Assad’s failure to take up the offer likely contributed to Turkey’s ability to successfully focus on Libya in recent weeks.

The UAE has, nonetheless, one strategic advantage. Turkey’s reputation in Washington DC, much like that of Saudi Arabia, is severely tarnished. The UAE has so far skilfully evaded a similar fate, enjoying not only close ties to the United States but also Russia.

Turkish-US relations are strained over multiple issues, including Turkey’s acquisition of Russia’s acclaimed S-400 anti-missile defence system, its close cooperation with Russia and Iran, and the continued presence in the United States of Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish preacher whom Erdogan accuses of staging the failed 2016 military attempt to remove him from office.

The Trump administration has nevertheless offered Turkey ammunition to be used in military operations in north-eastern Syria as well as humanitarian assistance in a hopeless bid to persuade Ankara to push back Iranian forces in the country.

Erdogan, in a surprise move this week, demoted and then accepted the resignation of Rear-Admiral Cihat Yayci, the popular architect of Turkey’s intervention in Libya and aggressive stance in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yayci is believed to be an anti-Western Eurasianist who advocates closer Turkish relations with Russia and China.

Turkey’s ties to Russia are equally complex.

While Turkey and Russia support opposing sides in Libya, they have so far been able to balance their interests in Syria.

While Turkey and Russia support opposing sides in Libya, they have so far been able to balance their interests in Syria that sometimes coincide and sometimes diverge, leading earlier this year to clashes between Turkish and Syrian forces.

In Libya, it was Turkish drones that allegedly destroyed a Russian-made Pantsir air defence system even as hundreds of Russian mercenaries working for the Wagner Group, with close ties to the Kremlin, reportedly support Haftar’s forces.

If support for Haftar is Russia capitalizing on an opportunity to stoke a fire, UAE backing is part of Prince Mohammed’s determination to confront political Islam across the Middle East and North Africa.

“Turkey and the UAE [are] engaged in a regional power struggle. They see it as a zero-sum game, in which there is no way for both sides to win. If one wins, the other one loses,” said Sinan Ulgen, a former Turkish diplomat and chairman of the Istanbul-based Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM).

It is a zero-sum-game played on proxy battlefields that bodes ill for those unwillingly sucked into it. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

The Saudi-Iranian dispute may dominate headlines but a similar rivalry between Turkey and the United Arab Emirates is equally wreaking havoc in the Middle East and North Africa.

The Saudi-Iranian dispute may dominate headlines but a similar rivalry between Turkey and the United Arab Emirates is equally wreaking havoc in the Middle East and North Africa. While Saudi Arabia may in some ways have a leg up on Iran, Turkey and the UAE are at a virtual draw. In Libya, forces of the Turkish-backed, Tripoli-based internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) are pushing UAE-backed rebels led by renegade Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar out of western Libya. Haftar further enjoys support from Saudi Arabia and Egypt with whom Turkey is also at odds. In contrast to Libya, Turkey is discovering that in Syria the odds are stacked against it, even if its objectives in the country are more limited. If in Libya, Turkish support for the GNA amounts to an effort to shape who controls the country as well as energy-rich waters in the Eastern Mediterranean; in Syria, Turkey is determined to prevent Syrian Kurdish nationalist forces from establishing a permanent and meaningful presence on its borders and control jihadist forces in Idlib, the last major Syrian rebel stronghold. US abandonment of their alliance with the Kurds in the fight against the Islamic State pushed the Kurds towards cooperation with the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Kurds expect the cooperation to shield them from Turkish efforts to push them further out of border areas. At the same time Turkey, already home to 3.6 million Syrian refugees – the single largest concentration of Syrians fleeing their war-torn and dilapidated homeland, also wants to stymie a potential new influx of many more if and when Idlib falls to Russian-backed Syrian government forces. The UAE-Turkish rivalry — rooted in a battle for dominance of global Muslim religious soft power; geopolitical competition across the Muslim world, including the Middle East and the Horn of Africa; and fundamentally opposed attitudes towards political Islam — has escalated military confrontations and complicated, if not disrupted, efforts to resolve conflicts in Libya and Syria. The UAE-Turkey scorecard is 1:1 Turkey so far has a winning hand in Libya. In Syria, however, few doubt that Turkey will struggle to secure its interests with Al-Assad, backed not only by Russia and Iran but also the UAE, firmly in the saddle. UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) reportedly promised Al-Assad $3 billion in April; $250 million of which was paid upfront, to break a ceasefire in Idlib imposed on Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan by his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. Russia appears to have successfully thwarted Prince Mohammed’s move. The Emirati crown prince had hoped to tie Turkey up in fighting in Syria, which would complicate Turkish military support for the GNA in Libya. Al-Assad’s failure to take up the offer likely contributed to Turkey’s ability to successfully focus on Libya in recent weeks. The UAE has, nonetheless, one strategic advantage. Turkey’s reputation in Washington DC, much like that of Saudi Arabia, is severely tarnished. The UAE has so far skilfully evaded a similar fate, enjoying not only close ties to the United States but also Russia. Turkish-US relations are strained over multiple issues, including Turkey’s acquisition of Russia’s acclaimed S-400 anti-missile defence system, its close cooperation with Russia and Iran, and the continued presence in the United States of Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish preacher whom Erdogan accuses of staging the failed 2016 military attempt to remove him from office. The Trump administration has nevertheless offered Turkey ammunition to be used in military operations in north-eastern Syria as well as humanitarian assistance in a hopeless bid to persuade Ankara to push back Iranian forces in the country. Erdogan, in a surprise move this week, demoted and then accepted the resignation of Rear-Admiral Cihat Yayci, the popular architect of Turkey’s intervention in Libya and aggressive stance in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yayci is believed to be an anti-Western Eurasianist who advocates closer Turkish relations with Russia and China. Turkey’s ties to Russia are equally complex. While Turkey and Russia support opposing sides in Libya, they have so far been able to balance their interests in Syria. While Turkey and Russia support opposing sides in Libya, they have so far been able to balance their interests in Syria that sometimes coincide and sometimes diverge, leading earlier this year to clashes between Turkish and Syrian forces. In Libya, it was Turkish drones that allegedly destroyed a Russian-made Pantsir air defence system even as hundreds of Russian mercenaries working for the Wagner Group, with close ties to the Kremlin, reportedly support Haftar’s forces. If support for Haftar is Russia capitalizing on an opportunity to stoke a fire, UAE backing is part of Prince Mohammed’s determination to confront political Islam across the Middle East and North Africa. “Turkey and the UAE [are] engaged in a regional power struggle. They see it as a zero-sum game, in which there is no way for both sides to win. If one wins, the other one loses,” said Sinan Ulgen, a former Turkish diplomat and chairman of the Istanbul-based Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM). It is a zero-sum-game played on proxy battlefields that bodes ill for those unwillingly sucked into it. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Poor relations between UAE and Turkey have further complicated conflicts in the Middle East

The Firefly, an Israeli-built loitering kamikaze drone, part of the Spike family of missiles that the Jewish state has sold to various European nations, may be one reason why Gulf states, and particularly Saudi Arabia, have cosied up to Israel in a seeming reversal of their past support of Palestinian rights.

If there is one lesson that Gulf states have learned from the United States’ reduced commitment to the region and the strains in US-Saudi relations, it is that putting one’s eggs in one basket is risky business.

That has not prevented the United States from continuing to secure its place as the region’s foremost arms supplier as this month’s arms and related commercial deals prove.

The US Defence Department announced a $2.6 billion Saudi deal to acquire 1,000 air-to-surface and anti-ship missiles from Boeing. Within days, Saudi Arabia’s Al Tadrea Manufacturing Company tweeted that it had reached an agreement with Oshkosh Defence to establish a joint venture to manufacture armed vehicles in the kingdom.

The Public Investment Fund, Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, disclosed separately that it had recently taken a $ 713.7 million stake in Boeing at a time when the company, already suffering major setbacks because of its 737-Max fiasco, took a significant hit as a result of a collapse of the civilian aviation industry.

The continued Saudi arms focus on the United States has not deprived China of opportunities. China has stepped in to help Saudi Arabia produce unmanned military vehicles after the United States refused to sell its MQ-9 Reaper killer drone to the kingdom. Saudi Arabia expects production to start next year.

Like China, Russia has been urging Saudi Arabia to purchase its acclaimed S-400 anti-missile defence system. So far, the kingdom, having watched the United States cancel NATO-member Turkey’s purchase of US F-35 fighter jets and its co-production agreement of some of the plane’s components after it acquired the Russian system, has been reticent to take the Russians up on their offer.

The limitations of Saudi-Russian cooperation have since become obvious with April’s price war between the two major oil producers that sent oil markets into a tailspin from which they are unlikely to recover any time soon.

Israel, like China and Russia and unlike the United States, puts no problematic restrictions such as adherence to human rights and use of weaponry in accordance with international law on its arms sales.

But Israel has one leg up on its Chinese and Russian competitors who maintain close ties to Iran. Israel shares with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) a perception of Iran as an existential threat and a destabilising force in the Middle East that at the very least needs to be contained.

To be sure, that is a perception that Saudi Arabia and the UAE see reflected in the United States’ maximum pressure policy towards Iran which aims to force the Islamic Republic to “change its behaviour,” if not change its regime.

The problem is that maximum pressure two years into the imposition of harsh US economic sanctions has produced little result.

Add to that the fact that the United States has proven to be an unreliable ally when the chips are down, persuading the UAE and other smaller Gulf states to reach out to Iran to ensure that their critical national infrastructure does not become a target in any future major US-Iranian military conflagration.

The watershed moment for the Gulf states was when the United States failed to respond forcefully last spring and summer to alleged Iranian attacks on key Saudi oil facilities as well as oil tankers off the coast of the UAE.

The Trump administration, in a bid to reassure Gulf states, weeks later sent troops and Patriot anti-missile defence systems to Saudi Arabia to help it protect its oil installations, although the United States withdrew two of those systems earlier this month.

It took the killing of a US military contractor in December 2019 for the United States to respond to tens of Iranian-backed attacks on American targets in Iraq. And when it did, with the killing in January of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, Gulf states privately celebrated the demise of their nemesis but also feared that it was overkill, bringing the Middle East to the brink of an all-out war.

Gulf states are likely to find that cooperation with Israel has its limits too. Israel may be eager to sell weaponry and have the capability to push back at Iran in Syria. If need be, Israel can also severely damaged, if not take out, Iranian nuclear and missile facilities in military strikes that Gulf states would be unable to carry out.

But ties to Israel remain a sensitive issue in the Gulf and elsewhere in the Arab world. And Israel has so far restricted sales to non-lethal equipment and technology. That could change with a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations.

Public opinion, however, may be one reason Gulf states have refused to turn unofficial relations into diplomatic recognition, suggesting that there may be greater public empathy for Palestinians than Gulf rulers wish to admit.

That could count for more with Gulf rulers finding it increasingly difficult to provide public goods and services, among which first and foremost jobs, as a result of the global economic crisis and the collapse of oil prices. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

The Firefly, an Israeli-built loitering kamikaze drone, part of the Spike family of missiles that the Jewish state has sold to various European nations, may be one reason why Gulf states, and particularly Saudi Arabia, have cosied up to Israel in a seeming reversal of their past support of Palestinian rights.

The Firefly, an Israeli-built loitering kamikaze drone, part of the Spike family of missiles that the Jewish state has sold to various European nations, may be one reason why Gulf states, and particularly Saudi Arabia, have cosied up to Israel in a seeming reversal of their past support of Palestinian rights. If there is one lesson that Gulf states have learned from the United States’ reduced commitment to the region and the strains in US-Saudi relations, it is that putting one’s eggs in one basket is risky business. That has not prevented the United States from continuing to secure its place as the region’s foremost arms supplier as this month’s arms and related commercial deals prove. The US Defence Department announced a $2.6 billion Saudi deal to acquire 1,000 air-to-surface and anti-ship missiles from Boeing. Within days, Saudi Arabia’s Al Tadrea Manufacturing Company tweeted that it had reached an agreement with Oshkosh Defence to establish a joint venture to manufacture armed vehicles in the kingdom. The Public Investment Fund, Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, disclosed separately that it had recently taken a $ 713.7 million stake in Boeing at a time when the company, already suffering major setbacks because of its 737-Max fiasco, took a significant hit as a result of a collapse of the civilian aviation industry. The continued Saudi arms focus on the United States has not deprived China of opportunities. China has stepped in to help Saudi Arabia produce unmanned military vehicles after the United States refused to sell its MQ-9 Reaper killer drone to the kingdom. Saudi Arabia expects production to start next year. Like China, Russia has been urging Saudi Arabia to purchase its acclaimed S-400 anti-missile defence system. So far, the kingdom, having watched the United States cancel NATO-member Turkey’s purchase of US F-35 fighter jets and its co-production agreement of some of the plane’s components after it acquired the Russian system, has been reticent to take the Russians up on their offer. The limitations of Saudi-Russian cooperation have since become obvious with April’s price war between the two major oil producers that sent oil markets into a tailspin from which they are unlikely to recover any time soon. Israel, like China and Russia and unlike the United States, puts no problematic restrictions such as adherence to human rights and use of weaponry in accordance with international law on its arms sales. But Israel has one leg up on its Chinese and Russian competitors who maintain close ties to Iran. Israel shares with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) a perception of Iran as an existential threat and a destabilising force in the Middle East that at the very least needs to be contained. To be sure, that is a perception that Saudi Arabia and the UAE see reflected in the United States’ maximum pressure policy towards Iran which aims to force the Islamic Republic to “change its behaviour,” if not change its regime. The problem is that maximum pressure two years into the imposition of harsh US economic sanctions has produced little result. Add to that the fact that the United States has proven to be an unreliable ally when the chips are down, persuading the UAE and other smaller Gulf states to reach out to Iran to ensure that their critical national infrastructure does not become a target in any future major US-Iranian military conflagration. The watershed moment for the Gulf states was when the United States failed to respond forcefully last spring and summer to alleged Iranian attacks on key Saudi oil facilities as well as oil tankers off the coast of the UAE. The Trump administration, in a bid to reassure Gulf states, weeks later sent troops and Patriot anti-missile defence systems to Saudi Arabia to help it protect its oil installations, although the United States withdrew two of those systems earlier this month. It took the killing of a US military contractor in December 2019 for the United States to respond to tens of Iranian-backed attacks on American targets in Iraq. And when it did, with the killing in January of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, Gulf states privately celebrated the demise of their nemesis but also feared that it was overkill, bringing the Middle East to the brink of an all-out war. Gulf states are likely to find that cooperation with Israel has its limits too. Israel may be eager to sell weaponry and have the capability to push back at Iran in Syria. If need be, Israel can also severely damaged, if not take out, Iranian nuclear and missile facilities in military strikes that Gulf states would be unable to carry out. But ties to Israel remain a sensitive issue in the Gulf and elsewhere in the Arab world. And Israel has so far restricted sales to non-lethal equipment and technology. That could change with a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. Public opinion, however, may be one reason Gulf states have refused to turn unofficial relations into diplomatic recognition, suggesting that there may be greater public empathy for Palestinians than Gulf rulers wish to admit. That could count for more with Gulf rulers finding it increasingly difficult to provide public goods and services, among which first and foremost jobs, as a result of the global economic crisis and the collapse of oil prices. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Israel a more reliable partner to Gulf states

Soaring temperatures sent Israelis to beaches across the country on Sunday (May 17) with many violating the coronavirus restrictions. Some areas in the country and Israeli-occupied West Bank exceeded 40 degrees Celsius in the country's first seasonal heatwave.

People flock to beaches as Israel, West Bank bake in heatwave

Evening dresses made of gold mesh, gilded sunglasses and glittering crowns are sparkling again from the windows of Dubai’s historic gold souk which was shuttered during the coronavirus lockdown.

Dubai's gold market reopens after Coronavirus Lockdown

A period drama about the trials of a Jewish midwife airing on Saudi-controlled MBC for Ramadan has drawn both criticism as an attempt to promote Arab "normalisation" with Israel and praise for a rare exploration of the Gulf`s social history. 
 
'Umm Haroun', a fictional series about a multi-religious community in an unspecified Gulf Arab state in the 1930s to 1950s, began airing on Friday as part of MBC`s lineup for the Muslim holy month, when viewership typically spikes. 
 
It comes at a time when several Gulf states have broken with the recent past and made overtures to Israel, with which they have found common ground in confronting Iran. 
 
Some, including Saudi Arabia, have also backed a U.S. Middle East peace plan to move on from a conflict they say holds back the Arab world. Egypt and Jordan are the only Arab states that have peace deals with Israel.

 
An official from the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, Basim Naeem, condemned the series before it aired and told Reuters that portraying Jewish people in a sympathetic light was "cultural aggression and brain washing". 
 
Hamas, like other Palestinian groups, is vehemently opposed to the peace plan laid out by U.S. President Donald Trump`s administration. 
 
A group of regional organisations against normalising ties with Israel circulated a poster on social media urging viewers to boycott "the wicked drama", which was produced by Kuwait- and United Arab Emirates-based companies. 
 
The show`s writers, Bahraini brothers Muhammad and Ali Abdel Halim Shams, told Reuters that it had no political message. 
 
"People have spoken and judged before seeing it," said Muhammad. "The message focuses on the ways of Muslims centred on showing love, good intention and peace to non-Muslims." 
 
MBC, the Arab world`s largest private broadcaster, said that according to its data the show is the top-rated Gulf drama in Saudi Arabia for Ramadan and among the top five dramas across genres.

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The Kuwaiti actress doing the role of Umm Haroun (the Mother of Aaron). Those attacking it say it’s doing Israeli propaganda about the establishment of a Jewish state etc. 
 
Certainly unprecedented stuff. <a href="https://t.co/1rFXYOk7Ix">pic.twitter.com/1rFXYOk7Ix</a>
— Hassan Hassan (@hxhassan) <a href="https://twitter.com/hxhassan/status/1254631313304403969?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">April 27, 2020</a></blockquote>
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Umm Haroun: A Call for Normalization or a Drama That Simulates Reality?🎥🇰🇼 <a href="https://t.co/JGe0i7XSqB">pic.twitter.com/JGe0i7XSqB</a>
— ‏ The 13th Warrior (@strange16892330) <a href="https://twitter.com/strange16892330/status/1254452408496906240?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">April 26, 2020</a></blockquote>
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MBC spokesman Mazen Hayek said Umm Haroun`s main message was a human one - a nurse who heals people "irrespective of any consideration". 
 
"It also focuses on tolerance, moderation and openness, showcasing that the Middle East was once a region where acceptance of one another was the norm versus the twisted interpretation and stereotyping of the region by hardliners and extremists, over the last decades." 
 
Saudi authorities took a controlling stake in MBC Group in 2018 as they seized assets from those detained in an anti-corruption drive launched by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. 
 
MBC, which plans to move its headquarters from Dubai to Riyadh, has courted controversy before. Past shows dealt with sensitive issues like domestic violence and Islamist militancy. 
 
UNTOLD HISTORY 
 
The writers said the main character, Umm Haroun, after whom the show is named, was loosely inspired by real-life Jewish midwife Umm Jan, who arrived in Bahrain from Iraq in the 1930s. A disclaimer during the first episode said the characters and events were imaginary. 
 
Some people in Bahrain, which still has a small Jewish community, took to social media to share pictures of and a 1977 TV interview with Umm Jan, who is widely regarded as a symbol of public service in Bahrain. 
 
In Kuwait, Twitter user Abdulaziz al-Seif said the show should not be seen as pro-Israeli. 
 
"We should also differentiate between the Jewish religion and Zionism ... This show has nothing to do with normalising ties with Israel," he said in a video post after the show aired its first episode.

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The genius of directing and the audacity of the show in the Umm Haroun series makes us facing facts that should be proud of, which is the reality of Arab-Israeli integration because the origins are the same. <a href="https://t.co/yrkhDQFhKD">pic.twitter.com/yrkhDQFhKD</a>
— SAIB HADDAD (@HaddadSaib) <a href="https://twitter.com/HaddadSaib/status/1254063020109631493?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">April 25, 2020</a></blockquote>
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Veteran Kuwaiti actress Hayat Al-Fahad, who plays the midwife, told local daily Al Anbaa that young generations should know about "a people that were and still are in our world". 
 
She recently stirred debate by publicly calling for the expulsion of migrant workers amid the coronavirus pandemic. 
 
Palestinian Nadia Ali, 48, told Reuters she was no longer a fan of the actress for "getting the Jewish twisted tale into every Arab house."

A period drama about the trials of a Jewish midwife airing on Saudi-controlled MBC for Ramadan has drawn both criticism as an attempt to promote Arab "normalisation" with Israel and praise for a rare exploration of the Gulf`s social history.

A period drama about the trials of a Jewish midwife airing on Saudi-controlled MBC for Ramadan has drawn both criticism as an attempt to promote Arab "normalisation" with Israel and praise for a rare exploration of the Gulf`s social history. 'Umm Haroun', a fictional series about a multi-religious community in an unspecified Gulf Arab state in the 1930s to 1950s, began airing on Friday as part of MBC`s lineup for the Muslim holy month, when viewership typically spikes. It comes at a time when several Gulf states have broken with the recent past and made overtures to Israel, with which they have found common ground in confronting Iran. Some, including Saudi Arabia, have also backed a U.S. Middle East peace plan to move on from a conflict they say holds back the Arab world. Egypt and Jordan are the only Arab states that have peace deals with Israel. An official from the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, Basim Naeem, condemned the series before it aired and told Reuters that portraying Jewish people in a sympathetic light was "cultural aggression and brain washing". Hamas, like other Palestinian groups, is vehemently opposed to the peace plan laid out by U.S. President Donald Trump`s administration. A group of regional organisations against normalising ties with Israel circulated a poster on social media urging viewers to boycott "the wicked drama", which was produced by Kuwait- and United Arab Emirates-based companies. The show`s writers, Bahraini brothers Muhammad and Ali Abdel Halim Shams, told Reuters that it had no political message. "People have spoken and judged before seeing it," said Muhammad. "The message focuses on the ways of Muslims centred on showing love, good intention and peace to non-Muslims." MBC, the Arab world`s largest private broadcaster, said that according to its data the show is the top-rated Gulf drama in Saudi Arabia for Ramadan and among the top five dramas across genres. The Kuwaiti actress doing the role of Umm Haroun (the Mother of Aaron). Those attacking it say it’s doing Israeli propaganda about the establishment of a Jewish state etc. Certainly unprecedented stuff. pic.twitter.com/1rFXYOk7Ix — Hassan Hassan (@hxhassan) April 27, 2020 × Umm Haroun: A Call for Normalization or a Drama That Simulates Reality?🎥🇰🇼 pic.twitter.com/JGe0i7XSqB — ‏ The 13th Warrior (@strange16892330) April 26, 2020 × MBC spokesman Mazen Hayek said Umm Haroun`s main message was a human one - a nurse who heals people "irrespective of any consideration". "It also focuses on tolerance, moderation and openness, showcasing that the Middle East was once a region where acceptance of one another was the norm versus the twisted interpretation and stereotyping of the region by hardliners and extremists, over the last decades." Saudi authorities took a controlling stake in MBC Group in 2018 as they seized assets from those detained in an anti-corruption drive launched by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. MBC, which plans to move its headquarters from Dubai to Riyadh, has courted controversy before. Past shows dealt with sensitive issues like domestic violence and Islamist militancy. UNTOLD HISTORY The writers said the main character, Umm Haroun, after whom the show is named, was loosely inspired by real-life Jewish midwife Umm Jan, who arrived in Bahrain from Iraq in the 1930s. A disclaimer during the first episode said the characters and events were imaginary. Some people in Bahrain, which still has a small Jewish community, took to social media to share pictures of and a 1977 TV interview with Umm Jan, who is widely regarded as a symbol of public service in Bahrain. In Kuwait, Twitter user Abdulaziz al-Seif said the show should not be seen as pro-Israeli. "We should also differentiate between the Jewish religion and Zionism ... This show has nothing to do with normalising ties with Israel," he said in a video post after the show aired its first episode. The genius of directing and the audacity of the show in the Umm Haroun series makes us facing facts that should be proud of, which is the reality of Arab-Israeli integration because the origins are the same. pic.twitter.com/yrkhDQFhKD — SAIB HADDAD (@HaddadSaib) April 25, 2020 × Veteran Kuwaiti actress Hayat Al-Fahad, who plays the midwife, told local daily Al Anbaa that young generations should know about "a people that were and still are in our world". She recently stirred debate by publicly calling for the expulsion of migrant workers amid the coronavirus pandemic. Palestinian Nadia Ali, 48, told Reuters she was no longer a fan of the actress for "getting the Jewish twisted tale into every Arab house."

Period drama 'Umm Haroun' with Jewish characters stirs debate in Middle East

India's relationship with the Arab world was impacted in the last few weeks and one of the major reasons was fake Twitter handles used from Pakistan to defame India. However, the Indian administration has started to use diplomatic channels to reset the ties.&nbsp;

Prime Minister Narendra Modi earlier had telephonic conservations with his counterparts from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman, where he stressed on India's "Think West" foreign policy. He reportedly also highlighted the need for a collaborative and coordinated strategy to tackle the COVID-19 crisis.&nbsp;

Also read |&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/wont-let-fake-tweets-create-discord-gulf-countries-assure-india-294638">Won't let fake tweets create discord, Gulf countries assure India</a>

The Minister of External Affairs (MEA) S Jaishankar also extended his greetings on the holy month of Ramzan to the foreign ministers of the Middle East countries and thanked them for supporting the Indian diaspora. The foreign ministers of Gulf nations also lauded the contribution of the Indian community during the coronavirus outbreak and promised to support them.&nbsp;

Also read |&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/twitter-suspends-isis-fake-account-being-used-to-spread-fake-news-against-india-in-gulf-countries-294510">Twitter suspends ISI's fake account being used to spread fake news against India in Gulf countries</a>

India is also supplying drugs, including hydroxychloroquine and paracetamol to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar.&nbsp;

After Kuwait's request, India has also sent a specialised team of medical professionals for training purposes related to coronavirus.&nbsp;

The Indo-Gulf talks also touched upon the negative social media campaign and the two sides agreed to have a zero-tolerance policy towards such incidents.&nbsp;

This comes after a number of parody accounts on Twitter spread fake information which strained the ties between both the regions.&nbsp;

India also vowed that it will help in the evacuation at the earliest of the medical personnel from the Gulf who are stranded in India.&nbsp;

The recovery plan post-COVID-19 was also discussed, along with talks on energy and volatility in the oil market.&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

India's relationship with the Arab world was impacted in the last few weeks and one of the major reasons was fake Twitter handles used from Pakistan to defame India.

India's relationship with the Arab world was impacted in the last few weeks and one of the major reasons was fake Twitter handles used from Pakistan to defame India. However, the Indian administration has started to use diplomatic channels to reset the ties. Prime Minister Narendra Modi earlier had telephonic conservations with his counterparts from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman, where he stressed on India's "Think West" foreign policy. He reportedly also highlighted the need for a collaborative and coordinated strategy to tackle the COVID-19 crisis. Also read | Won't let fake tweets create discord, Gulf countries assure India The Minister of External Affairs (MEA) S Jaishankar also extended his greetings on the holy month of Ramzan to the foreign ministers of the Middle East countries and thanked them for supporting the Indian diaspora. The foreign ministers of Gulf nations also lauded the contribution of the Indian community during the coronavirus outbreak and promised to support them. Also read | Twitter suspends ISI's fake account being used to spread fake news against India in Gulf countries India is also supplying drugs, including hydroxychloroquine and paracetamol to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar. After Kuwait's request, India has also sent a specialised team of medical professionals for training purposes related to coronavirus. The Indo-Gulf talks also touched upon the negative social media campaign and the two sides agreed to have a zero-tolerance policy towards such incidents. This comes after a number of parody accounts on Twitter spread fake information which strained the ties between both the regions. India also vowed that it will help in the evacuation at the earliest of the medical personnel from the Gulf who are stranded in India. The recovery plan post-COVID-19 was also discussed, along with talks on energy and volatility in the oil market.

Diplomacy at work to ease off straining Indo-Arab ties

The coronavirus pandemic and the global economic meltdown forced Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Russia to call time out in a war that was less about prices and more about market share and survival of the fittest. The agreement among producers to cut production by 10 million barrels a day amounts to a ceasefire that will likely end once economies recover and can again sustain the cost of war.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) risk jeopardising their relationship with the United States as a result of diverging interests that became evident with the eruption of the recent oil price war. That remains true even if the war was unsustainable in the midst of a devastating pandemic.

So far, Saudi Arabia has been the focus of US wrath at the kingdom’s perceived insensitivity and recklessness while the UAE has managed to fly under the radar despite it too declaring that it would increase production in support of the price war with Russia. The question is for how long the UAE can stay off the radar.

An immediate crisis has been averted with an agreement on Sunday, April 12 between members of the Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC producers to cut production by some 10 million barrels a day.

But 13 US Republican Congressmen from oil-producing states put Saudi Arabia on notice in a two-hour phone call with Saudi Energy Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman a day after the agreement.

“The Saudis spent over a month waging war on American oil producers, all while our troops protected theirs.”

“While we appreciate them taking the first step toward fixing the problem they helped create, the Saudis spent over a month waging war on American oil producers, all while our troops protected theirs. That’s not how friends treat friends. Their actions were inexcusable and won’t be forgotten. Saudi Arabia’s next steps will determine whether our strategic partnership is salvageable,” said North Dakota Senator Kevin Cramer

The Congressmen’s notice reflected a deterioration of the kingdom’s relations with Congress over the past two years as well as US President Donald J Trump’s anger at the Saudi price war.

There is, however, a silver lining in the US-Saudi clash over oil prices even if it was suspended with the production cut agreement. The clash clarifies the parameters of the long-standing relationship between the two countries.

Eager to knock out the US shale industry, which accounts for some 10 million jobs, Saudi Arabia made clear that it would pursue its interests irrespective of US concerns or the fact that the world was in a massive economic downturn as the result of a pandemic.

“The Kingdom will . . . have to reduce its budgetary expenditures while wisely accessing its financial reserves for essential spending as it fights this potentially long-term battle of the fittest for market share in global energy,” said Ali Shihabi, a political analyst and former banker who often reflects Saudi thinking.

To accommodate sharply reduced revenues, the Saudi finance ministry has instructed government bodies to submit proposals to slash this year’s spending by up to 30 per cent, the economic consultancy Nasser Saidi and Associates said in a research note.

The US-Saudi clash has also laid bare the vulnerability of the US shale industry at a critical time. The ability of the United States to project itself as the world’s largest producer and exporter takes on added significance against the backdrop of a decline in US credibility reinforced by America’s inability to get a grip on the coronavirus crisis.

The irony is that US anger could have, just as well been, directed at the UAE, which was quick to declare its support of the Saudi move to drive prices below US shale’s breakeven point by flooding the market.

There’s “ample production capacity that will be quickly brought online given the current circumstances,” UAE Energy Minister Suhail Al Mazrouei said on March 11.

By putting Saudi Arabia, and by implication, the UAE on notice, the Congressmen were drawing battle lines for a renewed clash in the future that may have become even more inevitable as a result of the pandemic and its economic fallout.

With a likely reduction of the value of oil reserves and limited new gas stockpiles in the coming decades because of the rise of shale and renewables, Saudi Arabia needs to secure market share by capitalising on its low costs. Indeed, the kingdom has one of the world’s lowest costs of production of a barrel of oil.

The collapse in demand, low prices, and the global economic turndown increase the importance of market share. Saudi Arabia is likely to have to downsize its attention-grabbing big tickets like Neom – the futuristic city on the Red Sea, and focus on revenue and job-creating sectors.

“There’s a high likelihood (Neom) fades into nothingness. . . . The momentum will likely die out. And it will take a lot to rebuild that momentum,” said a Gulf-based economist.

In a sign of the times, JPMorgan was reportedly seeking to sell at a discount loans raised by the sovereign wealth funds of Saudi Arabia and the UAE as banks brace for a borrowing spree in the Gulf due to low oil prices.

Saudi Arabia may seek to create jobs and markets for its petrochemicals by developing plastics processing and chemicals.

Some economists suggest that Saudi Arabia and other oil producers may seek to create jobs and domestic and regional markets for their petrochemicals by pushing the development of plastics processing and chemicals.

Saudi Arabia hinted at a return to a focus on energy derivatives with the acquisition by its sovereign wealth fund of stakes worth roughly $1 billion in four major European oil companies—Equinor, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, and Eni.

“Managing heightened public expectations of the leadership will be crucial in maintaining public support for MbS when the pandemic subsides. The crisis is also a test for the progress made on Saudi Vision 2030, especially its programs to transform public services, reduce unemployment, and diversify the economy away from oil,” said Saudi Arabia scholar Yasmine Farouk.

Farouk was referring to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman by his initials and his Vision 2030 plan to lessen the kingdom’s dependence on oil revenues by diversifying its economy.

(Views expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

(First published on <a href="https://insidearabia.com/us-saudi-oil-clash-sets-stage-for-future-epic-battle/">The Inside Arabia</a>)

The coronavirus pandemic and the global economic meltdown forced Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Russia to call time out in a war that was less about prices and more about market share and survival of the fittest.

The coronavirus pandemic and the global economic meltdown forced Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Russia to call time out in a war that was less about prices and more about market share and survival of the fittest. The agreement among producers to cut production by 10 million barrels a day amounts to a ceasefire that will likely end once economies recover and can again sustain the cost of war. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) risk jeopardising their relationship with the United States as a result of diverging interests that became evident with the eruption of the recent oil price war. That remains true even if the war was unsustainable in the midst of a devastating pandemic. So far, Saudi Arabia has been the focus of US wrath at the kingdom’s perceived insensitivity and recklessness while the UAE has managed to fly under the radar despite it too declaring that it would increase production in support of the price war with Russia. The question is for how long the UAE can stay off the radar. An immediate crisis has been averted with an agreement on Sunday, April 12 between members of the Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC producers to cut production by some 10 million barrels a day. But 13 US Republican Congressmen from oil-producing states put Saudi Arabia on notice in a two-hour phone call with Saudi Energy Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman a day after the agreement. “The Saudis spent over a month waging war on American oil producers, all while our troops protected theirs.” “While we appreciate them taking the first step toward fixing the problem they helped create, the Saudis spent over a month waging war on American oil producers, all while our troops protected theirs. That’s not how friends treat friends. Their actions were inexcusable and won’t be forgotten. Saudi Arabia’s next steps will determine whether our strategic partnership is salvageable,” said North Dakota Senator Kevin Cramer The Congressmen’s notice reflected a deterioration of the kingdom’s relations with Congress over the past two years as well as US President Donald J Trump’s anger at the Saudi price war. There is, however, a silver lining in the US-Saudi clash over oil prices even if it was suspended with the production cut agreement. The clash clarifies the parameters of the long-standing relationship between the two countries. Eager to knock out the US shale industry, which accounts for some 10 million jobs, Saudi Arabia made clear that it would pursue its interests irrespective of US concerns or the fact that the world was in a massive economic downturn as the result of a pandemic. “The Kingdom will . . . have to reduce its budgetary expenditures while wisely accessing its financial reserves for essential spending as it fights this potentially long-term battle of the fittest for market share in global energy,” said Ali Shihabi, a political analyst and former banker who often reflects Saudi thinking. To accommodate sharply reduced revenues, the Saudi finance ministry has instructed government bodies to submit proposals to slash this year’s spending by up to 30 per cent, the economic consultancy Nasser Saidi and Associates said in a research note. The US-Saudi clash has also laid bare the vulnerability of the US shale industry at a critical time. The ability of the United States to project itself as the world’s largest producer and exporter takes on added significance against the backdrop of a decline in US credibility reinforced by America’s inability to get a grip on the coronavirus crisis. The irony is that US anger could have, just as well been, directed at the UAE, which was quick to declare its support of the Saudi move to drive prices below US shale’s breakeven point by flooding the market. There’s “ample production capacity that will be quickly brought online given the current circumstances,” UAE Energy Minister Suhail Al Mazrouei said on March 11. By putting Saudi Arabia, and by implication, the UAE on notice, the Congressmen were drawing battle lines for a renewed clash in the future that may have become even more inevitable as a result of the pandemic and its economic fallout. With a likely reduction of the value of oil reserves and limited new gas stockpiles in the coming decades because of the rise of shale and renewables, Saudi Arabia needs to secure market share by capitalising on its low costs. Indeed, the kingdom has one of the world’s lowest costs of production of a barrel of oil. The collapse in demand, low prices, and the global economic turndown increase the importance of market share. Saudi Arabia is likely to have to downsize its attention-grabbing big tickets like Neom – the futuristic city on the Red Sea, and focus on revenue and job-creating sectors. “There’s a high likelihood (Neom) fades into nothingness. . . . The momentum will likely die out. And it will take a lot to rebuild that momentum,” said a Gulf-based economist. In a sign of the times, JPMorgan was reportedly seeking to sell at a discount loans raised by the sovereign wealth funds of Saudi Arabia and the UAE as banks brace for a borrowing spree in the Gulf due to low oil prices. Saudi Arabia may seek to create jobs and markets for its petrochemicals by developing plastics processing and chemicals. Some economists suggest that Saudi Arabia and other oil producers may seek to create jobs and domestic and regional markets for their petrochemicals by pushing the development of plastics processing and chemicals. Saudi Arabia hinted at a return to a focus on energy derivatives with the acquisition by its sovereign wealth fund of stakes worth roughly $1 billion in four major European oil companies—Equinor, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, and Eni. “Managing heightened public expectations of the leadership will be crucial in maintaining public support for MbS when the pandemic subsides. The crisis is also a test for the progress made on Saudi Vision 2030, especially its programs to transform public services, reduce unemployment, and diversify the economy away from oil,” said Saudi Arabia scholar Yasmine Farouk. Farouk was referring to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman by his initials and his Vision 2030 plan to lessen the kingdom’s dependence on oil revenues by diversifying its economy. (Views expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) (First published on The Inside Arabia)

US-Saudi oil clash sets the stage for future epic battle

Jordan on Sunday started to deploy drones to fight the coronavirus pandemic, joining a host of Middle East countries using the technology to enforce curfews, deliver public health announcements and even monitor people's temperatures.

Also read:&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/how-beijings-diplomacy-went-from-bad-to-worse-290969" hreflang="en">How Beijing’s diplomacy went from bad to worse</a>

Jordan has declared five deaths and 323 cases of COVID-19 and says it has arrested at least 1,600 people for violating a nationwide curfew in force since last month.

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"The armed forces and security services will ensure the curfew is being respected by using modern technology such as drones and surveillance cameras," Minister of State for Information, Amjad al-Adayleh, told a press briefing late Saturday.

Also read:&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/american-leadership-wilts-amid-coronavirus-pandemic-290963" hreflang="en">American leadership wilts amid coronavirus pandemic</a>

In neighbouring Israel, where the pandemic has seen a flurry of new technologies emerge designed to contain transmission, authorities are also using the unmanned aircraft.

Israeli police said Sunday that teams in the northern coastal city of Naharia were using drones to patrol the beachfront area and enforce movement restrictions.

A police spokesperson said that the force had also been using the technology in other parts of Israel in response to the pandemic.

Several states in the oil-rich Gulf have embraced drones in the fight against COVID-19.

Kuwait, which has largely locked down the country, sent drones to the skies in mid-March to broadcast messages in multiple languages urging people to return to their homes.

Later in the month, in the United Arab Emirates, police were using drones equipped with a loudspeaker in the emirate of Sharjah to order people to stay home, while police in Dubai have taken similar steps.

The drones were giving instructions in several languages, including Arabic, English, Urdu, Hindi and Bengali.

Expatriates make up over 80 percent of the UAE population.

In Saudi Arabia, municipal authorities have deployed drones to measure the body temperature of shoppers in Buraidah, in the north-central Al-Qassim region, the state-run Saudi Press Agency reported in late March.

The drones were fitted with artificial intelligence-enabled thermal cameras, SPA said.&nbsp;

And in Oman, authorities have used the aircraft to reduce gatherings in public places in the capital Muscat.

Qatar, meanwhile, announced on Thursday that it was carrying out a drone-based "awareness drive" that targeted foreign workers, just ahead of the Islamic weekend.

The move came after images of what appeared to be foreign nationals praying on the roof of apartment buildings in a Doha suburb the previous weekend were published by local media.

The Qatari interior ministry's Twitter account on Thursday posted a video simulation of a drone directing announcements at South Asian workers.

Ninety percent of Qatar's 2.75 million people are expats, and many are from developing countries.&nbsp;

"The Ministry of Interior carries out awareness drive among expatriate communities using drones," the English-language tweet said.&nbsp;

"The messages were announced in different languages to stay away from social gatherings and not to leave home except for necessary purposes."

Qatar has officially reported three deaths and 1,325 cases of COVID-19.

A densely populated working class district southwest of the capital Doha known as the Industrial Area has been under strict lockdown since mid-March, with residents prohibited from leaving, after a number of coronavirus cases were detected there.

Jordan on Sunday started to deploy drones to fight the coronavirus pandemic, joining a host of Middle East countries using the technology to enforce curfews, deliver public health announcements and even monitor people's temperatures.

Jordan on Sunday started to deploy drones to fight the coronavirus pandemic, joining a host of Middle East countries using the technology to enforce curfews, deliver public health announcements and even monitor people's temperatures. Also read: How Beijing’s diplomacy went from bad to worse Jordan has declared five deaths and 323 cases of COVID-19 and says it has arrested at least 1,600 people for violating a nationwide curfew in force since last month. Also read: UK death toll due to coronavirus crosses over 5,000 "The armed forces and security services will ensure the curfew is being respected by using modern technology such as drones and surveillance cameras," Minister of State for Information, Amjad al-Adayleh, told a press briefing late Saturday. Also read: American leadership wilts amid coronavirus pandemic In neighbouring Israel, where the pandemic has seen a flurry of new technologies emerge designed to contain transmission, authorities are also using the unmanned aircraft. Israeli police said Sunday that teams in the northern coastal city of Naharia were using drones to patrol the beachfront area and enforce movement restrictions. A police spokesperson said that the force had also been using the technology in other parts of Israel in response to the pandemic. Several states in the oil-rich Gulf have embraced drones in the fight against COVID-19. Kuwait, which has largely locked down the country, sent drones to the skies in mid-March to broadcast messages in multiple languages urging people to return to their homes. Later in the month, in the United Arab Emirates, police were using drones equipped with a loudspeaker in the emirate of Sharjah to order people to stay home, while police in Dubai have taken similar steps. The drones were giving instructions in several languages, including Arabic, English, Urdu, Hindi and Bengali. Expatriates make up over 80 percent of the UAE population. In Saudi Arabia, municipal authorities have deployed drones to measure the body temperature of shoppers in Buraidah, in the north-central Al-Qassim region, the state-run Saudi Press Agency reported in late March. The drones were fitted with artificial intelligence-enabled thermal cameras, SPA said. And in Oman, authorities have used the aircraft to reduce gatherings in public places in the capital Muscat. Qatar, meanwhile, announced on Thursday that it was carrying out a drone-based "awareness drive" that targeted foreign workers, just ahead of the Islamic weekend. The move came after images of what appeared to be foreign nationals praying on the roof of apartment buildings in a Doha suburb the previous weekend were published by local media. The Qatari interior ministry's Twitter account on Thursday posted a video simulation of a drone directing announcements at South Asian workers. Ninety percent of Qatar's 2.75 million people are expats, and many are from developing countries. "The Ministry of Interior carries out awareness drive among expatriate communities using drones," the English-language tweet said. "The messages were announced in different languages to stay away from social gatherings and not to leave home except for necessary purposes." Qatar has officially reported three deaths and 1,325 cases of COVID-19. A densely populated working class district southwest of the capital Doha known as the Industrial Area has been under strict lockdown since mid-March, with residents prohibited from leaving, after a number of coronavirus cases were detected there.

Coronavirus: Jordan becomes latest Mideast country to deploy drones in virus response

Saudi Arabia on Tuesday reported its first death from the new coronavirus as the total number of infections spiked to 767, according to the health ministry. 
 
An Afghan resident in the western city of Medina died from the virus, the ministry said, while reporting 205 new infections -– the biggest jump in the kingdom in a single day.

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Saudi Arabia, which has reported the highest number of infections in the Gulf, began implementing a nationwide dusk-to-dawn curfew on Monday to limit the spread of the deadly COVID-19. 
 
The Arab world's biggest economy has also closed down cinemas, malls and restaurants, halted flights and suspended the year-round umrah pilgrimage as it steps up efforts to contain the virus. 
 
King Salman warned on Thursday of a "more difficult" fight ahead against the virus, as the kingdom faces the double blow of virus-led shutdowns and crashing oil prices.

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Last week, the kingdom unveiled stimulus measures amounting to 120 billion riyals ($32 billion) to support businesses and said it plans to raise borrowing to 50 percent of GDP. 
 
Similar restrictions and stimulus measures have been reported by other countries in the Gulf, where more than 2,100 coronavirus infections have been reported so far. 
 
Bahrain recorded its third death from the virus on Tuesday, while Oman said it would from March 29 suspend all passenger flights -- except to and from Musandam bordering the United Arab Emirates.

Also read:&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/iceland-confirms-first-death-from-coronavirus-288268" hreflang="en">Iceland confirms first death from coronavirus</a> 
 
Meanwhile, Kuwait's cabinet on Tuesday said anyone caught intentionally spreading the virus could face up to 10 years in jail, according to state media. 
 
Kuwait -- which has recorded 191 cases so far -- has taken the strictest measures in the Gulf by largely locking down the country to combat the spread of COVID-19.&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;

Saudi Arabia on Tuesday reported its first death from the new coronavirus as the total number of infections spiked to 767, according to the health ministry. An Afghan resident in the western city of Medina died from the virus, the ministry said, while reporting 205 new infections -– the biggest jump in the kingdom in a single day.

Saudi Arabia on Tuesday reported its first death from the new coronavirus as the total number of infections spiked to 767, according to the health ministry. An Afghan resident in the western city of Medina died from the virus, the ministry said, while reporting 205 new infections -– the biggest jump in the kingdom in a single day. Also read: Italian coronavirus cases seen '10 times higher' than official tally Saudi Arabia, which has reported the highest number of infections in the Gulf, began implementing a nationwide dusk-to-dawn curfew on Monday to limit the spread of the deadly COVID-19. The Arab world's biggest economy has also closed down cinemas, malls and restaurants, halted flights and suspended the year-round umrah pilgrimage as it steps up efforts to contain the virus. King Salman warned on Thursday of a "more difficult" fight ahead against the virus, as the kingdom faces the double blow of virus-led shutdowns and crashing oil prices. Also read: New York state accounts for over 5% of global coronavirus cases, numbers expected to increase Last week, the kingdom unveiled stimulus measures amounting to 120 billion riyals ($32 billion) to support businesses and said it plans to raise borrowing to 50 percent of GDP. Similar restrictions and stimulus measures have been reported by other countries in the Gulf, where more than 2,100 coronavirus infections have been reported so far. Bahrain recorded its third death from the virus on Tuesday, while Oman said it would from March 29 suspend all passenger flights -- except to and from Musandam bordering the United Arab Emirates. Also read: Iceland confirms first death from coronavirus Meanwhile, Kuwait's cabinet on Tuesday said anyone caught intentionally spreading the virus could face up to 10 years in jail, according to state media. Kuwait -- which has recorded 191 cases so far -- has taken the strictest measures in the Gulf by largely locking down the country to combat the spread of COVID-19.

Saudi reports first coronavirus death as infections spike

There is little indication that Middle-Eastern rulers are learning the lessons of the Coronavirus’ devastating effect.

Nor is there any suggestion that they are willing to see the pandemic as an opportunity to negotiate new social contracts at a time that the virus has temporarily taken the sails out of mass anti-government protests in various countries and discontent continues to simmer in others.

On the contrary, Iran has become the poster child of what happens when the public distrusts a government that has a track record of being untransparent from the outset of a crisis, limits freedom of expression that often creates early warning systems that could enable authorities to take timely, pre-emptive measures to avert or limit the damage, and is perceived as corrupt.

Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei saw himself forced last week to bring in the military to clear the streets after Iranians, already struggling under the impact of harsh US economic sanctions, refused to adhere to public health warnings regarding large gatherings, social distancing and advice to stay at home.

Khamenei assigned the task to the regular armed forces after the Revolutionary Guards Corps failed to persuade Iranians to heed government advice regarding the epidemic that as of this writing has infected some 14,000 people and caused 724 deaths and turned Iran into one of the world’s hardest-hit countries.

The distrust has fuelled reports and rumours that casualties exceed by far government figures and that mass graves were being prepared to cope with a much higher than stated death toll.

The Coronavirus-hit Iran, that was slow to acknowledge the severity of the crisis, only weeks after large numbers took to the streets of Iranian cities denouncing Khamenei and the Guards in protest against the government’s initial reluctance to live up to its responsibility for the mistaken downing of a Ukrainian airliner that killed 176 people.

Multiple Middle-Eastern states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and Israel have ordered closures of educational facilities, quarantines and taken steps to curtail, if not halt travel to and from Asian and European nations badly affected by the virus or temporarily interrupt all travel to their countries.

Nonetheless, an exponential spread of the virus could stress test the national health systems in both energy-rich countries that have invested in state-of-the-art medical facilities as well as war-ravaged nations like Syria, Yemen and Libya where hospitals have been prime targets of devastating airstrikes.

Potential stress tests that fail could prove risky.

Countries like Iraq, which is particularly exposed with its close ties to neighbouring Iran, Algeria and Lebanon, where many like in Iran defy advice to stay at home, have witnessed months of sustained mass anti-government protests demanding a complete overhaul of a political system perceived as corrupt and incapable of delivering public goods such as jobs, proper healthcare and other services.

Governments have, however, shown little incentive to capitalise on the temporary dwindling of protests to forge new social contracts using the need to confront the virus threat nationally as a wedge.

Fear of the virus coupled with government repression has seen the numbers of protesters in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, where demonstrators initially insisted that Iraq’s political elite was a virus worse than Corona, drop from the thousands to several hundred at best.

The same is true for Algeria and Lebanon, hit not only by the virus but also a financial crisis that is forcing it to default on its ballooning debt.

"You won't be of much help to Algeria if you're dead," quipped one person on Twitter.

Embattled governments see opportunity in the virus, just not one that will prevent the temporary lid on what is a boiling pot from exploding again once the crisis is over, possibly with a greater vengeance if Corona exposes the authorities’ and the health system’s inability to cope.

"In Algeria, the government's calls for cancelling the protests are not motivated by sanitary concerns as it is the case in France, the US or elsewhere,” said Riad Kaced, a US-based activist who flew to Algiers almost every second week to take part in the protests.

“The Algerian regime wants to seize this opportunity to strangle the Hirak and kill it off," Kaced said, referring to the protest movement by its Arabic name.

In that mould, the virus, which has so far infected 62 people in Saudi Arabia did not stop Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman from rounding up potential opponents whom he suspected of plotting against him and launching an oil war with Russia that has wreaked havoc at a time that the global economy can least afford it.

Another clear indication that Middle Eastern autocrats and discredited elites see no reason to use the virus crisis as a monkey wrench to reduce regional tensions and create political and social structures that would make their societies more resilient is their failure to crack down on opinion makers, influencers and rumour mongers that seek to weaponise Corona on tightly controlled mainstream and new media.

The Saudi and United Arab Emirates governments remained silent while pro-government voices came to the defence of Saudi-based journalist Noura al-Moteari who tweeted that the virus and its spread had been funded by Qatar in order to undermine Prince Mohammed’s plans for social and economic reform and the UAE's upcoming Expo 2020.

They also looked the other way, despite a Saudi government warning that rumour-mongers could face jail terms of up to five years and a fine of up to $800,000, after analyst Zayed al-Amri claimed on Saudi television that Turkey and Iran were using the virus to target Arab tourists and attack countries across the globe.

Said social media scholar Marc Owen Jones: 'Coronavirus is being opportunistically weaponised through disinformation and propaganda tactics aimed at demonising political opponents while exposing latent prejudices.”

The Coronavirus crisis is taking its toll, including the lives of many that good and transparent governance possibly could have saved. Ultimately, authorities will get a grip on it.

However, Corona wasn’t the first such crisis and won’t be the last. The risk is that weaponisation serves rulers’ short-term interests but contributes little to building the kind of national and regional resilience and cohesion needed to confront the next one. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) 
&nbsp;

There is little indication that Middle-Eastern rulers are learning the lessons of the Coronavirus’ devastating effect. Nor is there any suggestion that they are willing to see the pandemic as an opportunity to negotiate new social contracts at a time that the virus has temporarily taken the sails out of mass anti-government protests in various countries and discontent continues to simmer in others.

There is little indication that Middle-Eastern rulers are learning the lessons of the Coronavirus’ devastating effect. Nor is there any suggestion that they are willing to see the pandemic as an opportunity to negotiate new social contracts at a time that the virus has temporarily taken the sails out of mass anti-government protests in various countries and discontent continues to simmer in others. On the contrary, Iran has become the poster child of what happens when the public distrusts a government that has a track record of being untransparent from the outset of a crisis, limits freedom of expression that often creates early warning systems that could enable authorities to take timely, pre-emptive measures to avert or limit the damage, and is perceived as corrupt. Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei saw himself forced last week to bring in the military to clear the streets after Iranians, already struggling under the impact of harsh US economic sanctions, refused to adhere to public health warnings regarding large gatherings, social distancing and advice to stay at home. Khamenei assigned the task to the regular armed forces after the Revolutionary Guards Corps failed to persuade Iranians to heed government advice regarding the epidemic that as of this writing has infected some 14,000 people and caused 724 deaths and turned Iran into one of the world’s hardest-hit countries. The distrust has fuelled reports and rumours that casualties exceed by far government figures and that mass graves were being prepared to cope with a much higher than stated death toll. The Coronavirus-hit Iran, that was slow to acknowledge the severity of the crisis, only weeks after large numbers took to the streets of Iranian cities denouncing Khamenei and the Guards in protest against the government’s initial reluctance to live up to its responsibility for the mistaken downing of a Ukrainian airliner that killed 176 people. Multiple Middle-Eastern states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and Israel have ordered closures of educational facilities, quarantines and taken steps to curtail, if not halt travel to and from Asian and European nations badly affected by the virus or temporarily interrupt all travel to their countries. Nonetheless, an exponential spread of the virus could stress test the national health systems in both energy-rich countries that have invested in state-of-the-art medical facilities as well as war-ravaged nations like Syria, Yemen and Libya where hospitals have been prime targets of devastating airstrikes. Potential stress tests that fail could prove risky. Countries like Iraq, which is particularly exposed with its close ties to neighbouring Iran, Algeria and Lebanon, where many like in Iran defy advice to stay at home, have witnessed months of sustained mass anti-government protests demanding a complete overhaul of a political system perceived as corrupt and incapable of delivering public goods such as jobs, proper healthcare and other services. Governments have, however, shown little incentive to capitalise on the temporary dwindling of protests to forge new social contracts using the need to confront the virus threat nationally as a wedge. Fear of the virus coupled with government repression has seen the numbers of protesters in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, where demonstrators initially insisted that Iraq’s political elite was a virus worse than Corona, drop from the thousands to several hundred at best. The same is true for Algeria and Lebanon, hit not only by the virus but also a financial crisis that is forcing it to default on its ballooning debt. "You won't be of much help to Algeria if you're dead," quipped one person on Twitter. Embattled governments see opportunity in the virus, just not one that will prevent the temporary lid on what is a boiling pot from exploding again once the crisis is over, possibly with a greater vengeance if Corona exposes the authorities’ and the health system’s inability to cope. "In Algeria, the government's calls for cancelling the protests are not motivated by sanitary concerns as it is the case in France, the US or elsewhere,” said Riad Kaced, a US-based activist who flew to Algiers almost every second week to take part in the protests. “The Algerian regime wants to seize this opportunity to strangle the Hirak and kill it off," Kaced said, referring to the protest movement by its Arabic name. In that mould, the virus, which has so far infected 62 people in Saudi Arabia did not stop Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman from rounding up potential opponents whom he suspected of plotting against him and launching an oil war with Russia that has wreaked havoc at a time that the global economy can least afford it. Another clear indication that Middle Eastern autocrats and discredited elites see no reason to use the virus crisis as a monkey wrench to reduce regional tensions and create political and social structures that would make their societies more resilient is their failure to crack down on opinion makers, influencers and rumour mongers that seek to weaponise Corona on tightly controlled mainstream and new media. The Saudi and United Arab Emirates governments remained silent while pro-government voices came to the defence of Saudi-based journalist Noura al-Moteari who tweeted that the virus and its spread had been funded by Qatar in order to undermine Prince Mohammed’s plans for social and economic reform and the UAE's upcoming Expo 2020. They also looked the other way, despite a Saudi government warning that rumour-mongers could face jail terms of up to five years and a fine of up to $800,000, after analyst Zayed al-Amri claimed on Saudi television that Turkey and Iran were using the virus to target Arab tourists and attack countries across the globe. Said social media scholar Marc Owen Jones: 'Coronavirus is being opportunistically weaponised through disinformation and propaganda tactics aimed at demonising political opponents while exposing latent prejudices.” The Coronavirus crisis is taking its toll, including the lives of many that good and transparent governance possibly could have saved. Ultimately, authorities will get a grip on it. However, Corona wasn’t the first such crisis and won’t be the last. The risk is that weaponisation serves rulers’ short-term interests but contributes little to building the kind of national and regional resilience and cohesion needed to confront the next one. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Coronavirus outbreak: How Middle-East is dealing with the global pandemic

The Eastern Mediterranean has become a flash-point for the meshing of geopolitics, the struggle for regional hegemony, battles for control of resources, religious soft power rivalry, and blatant interference in the politics of others.

The complex and dangerous juxtaposition of multiple conflicting interests broadens the focus beyond Russia when it comes to meddling in elections, to include countries like Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. It blurs the lines between multiple conflicts such as the wars in Syria and Libya and the struggle for control of the Eastern Mediterranean’s newly found gas deposits. And it positions contested waters as the latest venue in which Russia and the West battle for influence.

Laying bare the multiple disputes being fought on the back of the Eastern Mediterranean with its natural gas reserves of 122 trillion cubic feet resembles peeling an onion.&nbsp;

Lining up on opposing sides are Middle Eastern, North African, and Eastern Mediterranean nations, Gulf states, Turkey, Russia, and Europe.

Perhaps, most fundamental is the degree to which Europe going forward will be able to reduce its dependence on Russian gas imports. Russia currently satisfies approximately 40 per cent of the European Union’s gas needs.

The ability to reduce Russian imports with gas from the Eastern Mediterranean potentially would allow Europe to adopt a more forceful stand in the struggle between Western liberalism and Russian civilisationalism that is likely to shape new world order.

EU dependence has so far prompted European nations to temper their defence of Western values against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s civilizational policies that include territory grabs in the Caucasus and Ukraine, intimidation of Central Asian nations, and support for Western far-right, neo-Nazi, and anti-immigration forces designed to weaken liberal democracy and strengthen groups more empathetic to the Russian leader’s worldview.

“The bad news is that the Moscow-Washington confrontation will continue; the good news is that there will be some guardrails built around it. . . .The Eastern Mediterranean, however, is emerging as an area where Russia, again, is competing with the West,” said Dmitri Trenin, head of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Trenin argued that it was the Eastern Mediterranean rather than Ukraine, Crimea, the Baltics, the Arctic, or south-eastern Europe where the tension could flare the most.

If for some nations like Greece, Cyprus, and Lebanon the struggle to control the Eastern Mediterranean’s resources is primarily about economics, for others, including Egypt and Israel it’s about projecting power. That is no truer than for Russia and Turkey, even if their interests against the backdrop of recently diverging positions on the battlefields of Libya and Syria, may differ rather than converge.

Turkey raised the stakes with its military backing of Libya’s internationally recognised Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) against the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi, Egyptian, and Russian-backed rebel leader Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA).

A GNA-Turkish maritime agreement that created an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean favouring expansive Turkish claims and the building of relations between Khalifa Haftar and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad link the war in Syria to the Eastern Mediterranean and the fighting in Libya. All at a time when Turkey and Russia manoeuvre to avoid a direct military clash in Idlib, the last stronghold of the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (SNA) rebels against Russian-backed Syrian government forces.

The economic zone, or EEZ, would block a planned pipeline that would link the EU to Israeli and Cypriot gas supplies.

If successfully enforced, the zone, coupled with Turkey’s military performance in Syria with the downing of three Syrian warplanes in as many days, would signal to regional hegemonic hopefuls, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE, that financial muscle may not be enough to impose their will.

Ironically, one key to accommodation that could have reduced the risk of the ideological and geopolitical fuse blowing up and may have contributed to creating an environment of cooperation rather than confrontation lies on the divided island of Cyprus.

Turkey, beyond insisting that Turkish participation is a sine-qua-non for any successful exploitation of Eastern Mediterranean gas, has opposed a role for predominantly Greek-Cypriot Cyprus without the inclusion of the island’s self-declared independent Turkish Cypriot north.

Turkey, which has troops in the north ever since it invaded the island in 1974, is the only country to have recognised the region as an independent state.

The idea of including northern Cyprus may be a pie in the sky in an environment in which geopolitics is a zero-sum game with civilizationalists, nationalists, and autocrats leaving little space for power-sharing. And Europe is too preoccupied with internal problems, and most recently with a new looming Syrian refugee crisis, to project a cohesive and inclusive policy approach.

Scholar and commentator Hussein Ibish cautioned that “All the elements that have compelled the parties to the eastern Mediterranean natural gas competition to develop local alliances that are increasingly melding with other strategic, diplomatic, and political contests appears likely to continue.”

Ibish blamed tension in the Eastern Mediterranean on the “strongly pro-Islamist orientation” of Turkey as “a budding would-be regional economic and political hegemon” rather than on multiple would-be hegemons.

Nonetheless, his conclusion stands that in the Eastern Mediterranean “disputes arising over narrow issues such as natural gas reserves will continue to take on far broader significance.”

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

The Eastern Mediterranean has become a flash-point for the meshing of geopolitics, the struggle for regional hegemony, battles for control of resources, religious soft power rivalry, and blatant interference in the politics of others.

The Eastern Mediterranean has become a flash-point for the meshing of geopolitics, the struggle for regional hegemony, battles for control of resources, religious soft power rivalry, and blatant interference in the politics of others. The complex and dangerous juxtaposition of multiple conflicting interests broadens the focus beyond Russia when it comes to meddling in elections, to include countries like Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. It blurs the lines between multiple conflicts such as the wars in Syria and Libya and the struggle for control of the Eastern Mediterranean’s newly found gas deposits. And it positions contested waters as the latest venue in which Russia and the West battle for influence. Laying bare the multiple disputes being fought on the back of the Eastern Mediterranean with its natural gas reserves of 122 trillion cubic feet resembles peeling an onion. Lining up on opposing sides are Middle Eastern, North African, and Eastern Mediterranean nations, Gulf states, Turkey, Russia, and Europe. Perhaps, most fundamental is the degree to which Europe going forward will be able to reduce its dependence on Russian gas imports. Russia currently satisfies approximately 40 per cent of the European Union’s gas needs. The ability to reduce Russian imports with gas from the Eastern Mediterranean potentially would allow Europe to adopt a more forceful stand in the struggle between Western liberalism and Russian civilisationalism that is likely to shape new world order. EU dependence has so far prompted European nations to temper their defence of Western values against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s civilizational policies that include territory grabs in the Caucasus and Ukraine, intimidation of Central Asian nations, and support for Western far-right, neo-Nazi, and anti-immigration forces designed to weaken liberal democracy and strengthen groups more empathetic to the Russian leader’s worldview. “The bad news is that the Moscow-Washington confrontation will continue; the good news is that there will be some guardrails built around it. . . .The Eastern Mediterranean, however, is emerging as an area where Russia, again, is competing with the West,” said Dmitri Trenin, head of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Trenin argued that it was the Eastern Mediterranean rather than Ukraine, Crimea, the Baltics, the Arctic, or south-eastern Europe where the tension could flare the most. If for some nations like Greece, Cyprus, and Lebanon the struggle to control the Eastern Mediterranean’s resources is primarily about economics, for others, including Egypt and Israel it’s about projecting power. That is no truer than for Russia and Turkey, even if their interests against the backdrop of recently diverging positions on the battlefields of Libya and Syria, may differ rather than converge. Turkey raised the stakes with its military backing of Libya’s internationally recognised Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) against the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi, Egyptian, and Russian-backed rebel leader Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA). A GNA-Turkish maritime agreement that created an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean favouring expansive Turkish claims and the building of relations between Khalifa Haftar and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad link the war in Syria to the Eastern Mediterranean and the fighting in Libya. All at a time when Turkey and Russia manoeuvre to avoid a direct military clash in Idlib, the last stronghold of the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (SNA) rebels against Russian-backed Syrian government forces. The economic zone, or EEZ, would block a planned pipeline that would link the EU to Israeli and Cypriot gas supplies. If successfully enforced, the zone, coupled with Turkey’s military performance in Syria with the downing of three Syrian warplanes in as many days, would signal to regional hegemonic hopefuls, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE, that financial muscle may not be enough to impose their will. Ironically, one key to accommodation that could have reduced the risk of the ideological and geopolitical fuse blowing up and may have contributed to creating an environment of cooperation rather than confrontation lies on the divided island of Cyprus. Turkey, beyond insisting that Turkish participation is a sine-qua-non for any successful exploitation of Eastern Mediterranean gas, has opposed a role for predominantly Greek-Cypriot Cyprus without the inclusion of the island’s self-declared independent Turkish Cypriot north. Turkey, which has troops in the north ever since it invaded the island in 1974, is the only country to have recognised the region as an independent state. The idea of including northern Cyprus may be a pie in the sky in an environment in which geopolitics is a zero-sum game with civilizationalists, nationalists, and autocrats leaving little space for power-sharing. And Europe is too preoccupied with internal problems, and most recently with a new looming Syrian refugee crisis, to project a cohesive and inclusive policy approach. Scholar and commentator Hussein Ibish cautioned that “All the elements that have compelled the parties to the eastern Mediterranean natural gas competition to develop local alliances that are increasingly melding with other strategic, diplomatic, and political contests appears likely to continue.” Ibish blamed tension in the Eastern Mediterranean on the “strongly pro-Islamist orientation” of Turkey as “a budding would-be regional economic and political hegemon” rather than on multiple would-be hegemons. Nonetheless, his conclusion stands that in the Eastern Mediterranean “disputes arising over narrow issues such as natural gas reserves will continue to take on far broader significance.” (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Eastern Mediterranean region: A microcosm of regional and global battles

By Alainna Liloia

Arab women, long relegated to the private sphere by law and social custom, are gaining new access to public life.

All countries of the Arab Gulf now have workforce “nationalisation policies” that aim to reduce dependency on migrant labour by getting more women into the workforce. Saudi Arabia set a goal of 30 per cent female labour participation by 2030. In Kuwait, female citizens outnumber male citizens in the workforce. And across the Gulf, women outnumber men in higher education enrollment.

Women are making political inroads in the region, too. In Qatar, four women have been appointed to ministerial positions since 2003. Eleven women have held cabinet positions in Kuwait since 2005, including the health minister, transportation minister and finance minister.

Even Saudi Arabia, which notoriously restricts women’s rights, reformed the guardianship system that grants authority over women to their male relatives. Since August 2019, women may obtain passports, travel abroad and register marriages and births on their own.

These changes have real-world benefits for Arab women, giving them greater economic independence and a voice in domestic and international affairs.

But Arab Muslim women in the Middle East still face substantial social and legal inequalities. Even as governments in the region tout female advancement abroad, my research on women in the Arab Gulf finds, at home, they still enforce traditional gender roles.

Women as symbols of Islam

The discovery of oil in the Arab Gulf in the 1930s turned these Islamic monarchies into global players. One result of this globalisation was that Western leaders put pressure on the region to “modernise” their laws and customs.

Championing women’s advancement is one way Gulf rulers can present a positive international image. This helps maintain good political, military and trade relationships with Europe and the United States and allays criticisms of human rights violations.

In recent years, Arab Gulf women have also fought hard for their rights. Saudi women successfully campaigned for the right to drive, which was granted in 2018. In Kuwait, activists are now pushing for better protection against domestic violence.

But Gulf rulers still need the support of conservative citizens and influential religious leaders, too. And these sectors of the population have repeatedly raised fears of Westernisation threatening local language, dress styles, food and cultural traditions.

One way Gulf rulers manage this tension, I’ve found, is by promoting Quranic interpretations that relegate women to traditional roles like bearing and raising children and caring for their families. Celebrating women’s domesticity is an easy way to signal their government’s commitment to what they consider Islamic values.

In Qatar, for example, the National Vision 2030 – an economic and social development blueprint – states that “Qatar has maintained its cultural and traditional values as an Arab and Islamic nation that considers the family to be the main pillar of society.”

And the Qataris propping up this pillar are women.

“Through their nurturing of language, codes of ethics, behavioural patterns, value systems and religious beliefs, women play an indispensable role in upholding traditional familial and cultural values,” reads a government document building on the proposals laid out in the National Vision 2030.

Religion and gender 
 
There are, of course, more gender-equal interpretations of the Quran. Islam itself does not require repressing women.

But throughout history male leaders in the Gulf have associated patriarchal gender roles with religious purity. And clerics, who have significant social and political influence in the region, enforce conservative readings of Islamic law that subordinate women.

For example, women in all of the Gulf states must receive the approval of a male guardian to marry. In Qatar, single women under 25 require permission to travel abroad, and Qatari men can argue in court to stop their wives from traveling. In Saudi Arabia, men can file a “disobedience” complaint against female relatives for leaving the house without permission.

In Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, a man can stop his wife from working if he feels her employment interferes with her domestic responsibilities or religious conduct.

As a result, women in Gulf countries find themselves caught between two contradictory agendas for the 21st century.

What women want

Many Qatari women I’ve interviewed say they struggle to balance the conflicting expectations between domestic responsibilities and emerging professional opportunities.

Sheikha, an unmarried Qatari in her late 20s who works as an academic adviser, told me she often wonders: “I have a job and future plans. Why should I marry?”

“I don’t want to say that marriage erases the dreams,” she said, “but sometimes with the family commitment you can’t do it.”

Qatari women like Sheikha tend to face significant social pressure to settle down and have children by a certain age and to make sure their education and career goals do not get in the way of domestic responsibilities.

Not all the pressure is external. Many women I met hold conservative views on marriage and the family, too.

“I started work when my last daughter got married,” Amina Al-Ansari, an associate professor at Qatar University, told me. “Before that, I took care of the house and kids.”

Al-Ansari, like all 15 Qatari women I interviewed, believes caring for the family is a woman’s religious duty.

Still can’t have it all

Conservative Qataris also view women working or studying in a gender-mixed environment as a violation of Islamic values and a sign of Westernisation.

That’s why Amal Al-Shammari, a 32-year-old Qatari who now runs a cultural association for expatriates and tourists called Embrace Doha, attended Qatar University – the country’s only gender-segregated university.

“My parents wanted me to go there to keep a good reputation. Guys assume you have lots of relationships if you go to gender-mixed universities,” she told me. “My parents wanted me to stay with the conservative way.”

As political and religious leaders in the Gulf push their national agendas, women must find their own ways to balance newfound freedoms with existing social and religious pressures.

“There is always development, improvement, but always tradition, religion, and culture,” the professor, Al-Ansari, told me, summing up these tensions.

“We are living under the umbrella of religion.”

(Alainna Liloia is PhD Student, University of Arizona)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/women-in-arab-countries-find-themselves-torn-between-opportunity-and-tradition-130460">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

&nbsp;

By Alainna Liloia Arab women, long relegated to the private sphere by law and social custom, are gaining new access to public life. All countries of the Arab Gulf now have workforce “nationalisation policies” that aim to reduce dependency on migrant labour by getting more women into the workforce.

By Alainna Liloia Arab women, long relegated to the private sphere by law and social custom, are gaining new access to public life. All countries of the Arab Gulf now have workforce “nationalisation policies” that aim to reduce dependency on migrant labour by getting more women into the workforce. Saudi Arabia set a goal of 30 per cent female labour participation by 2030. In Kuwait, female citizens outnumber male citizens in the workforce. And across the Gulf, women outnumber men in higher education enrollment. Women are making political inroads in the region, too. In Qatar, four women have been appointed to ministerial positions since 2003. Eleven women have held cabinet positions in Kuwait since 2005, including the health minister, transportation minister and finance minister. Even Saudi Arabia, which notoriously restricts women’s rights, reformed the guardianship system that grants authority over women to their male relatives. Since August 2019, women may obtain passports, travel abroad and register marriages and births on their own. These changes have real-world benefits for Arab women, giving them greater economic independence and a voice in domestic and international affairs. But Arab Muslim women in the Middle East still face substantial social and legal inequalities. Even as governments in the region tout female advancement abroad, my research on women in the Arab Gulf finds, at home, they still enforce traditional gender roles. Women as symbols of Islam The discovery of oil in the Arab Gulf in the 1930s turned these Islamic monarchies into global players. One result of this globalisation was that Western leaders put pressure on the region to “modernise” their laws and customs. Championing women’s advancement is one way Gulf rulers can present a positive international image. This helps maintain good political, military and trade relationships with Europe and the United States and allays criticisms of human rights violations. In recent years, Arab Gulf women have also fought hard for their rights. Saudi women successfully campaigned for the right to drive, which was granted in 2018. In Kuwait, activists are now pushing for better protection against domestic violence. But Gulf rulers still need the support of conservative citizens and influential religious leaders, too. And these sectors of the population have repeatedly raised fears of Westernisation threatening local language, dress styles, food and cultural traditions. One way Gulf rulers manage this tension, I’ve found, is by promoting Quranic interpretations that relegate women to traditional roles like bearing and raising children and caring for their families. Celebrating women’s domesticity is an easy way to signal their government’s commitment to what they consider Islamic values. In Qatar, for example, the National Vision 2030 – an economic and social development blueprint – states that “Qatar has maintained its cultural and traditional values as an Arab and Islamic nation that considers the family to be the main pillar of society.” And the Qataris propping up this pillar are women. “Through their nurturing of language, codes of ethics, behavioural patterns, value systems and religious beliefs, women play an indispensable role in upholding traditional familial and cultural values,” reads a government document building on the proposals laid out in the National Vision 2030. Religion and gender There are, of course, more gender-equal interpretations of the Quran. Islam itself does not require repressing women. But throughout history male leaders in the Gulf have associated patriarchal gender roles with religious purity. And clerics, who have significant social and political influence in the region, enforce conservative readings of Islamic law that subordinate women. For example, women in all of the Gulf states must receive the approval of a male guardian to marry. In Qatar, single women under 25 require permission to travel abroad, and Qatari men can argue in court to stop their wives from traveling. In Saudi Arabia, men can file a “disobedience” complaint against female relatives for leaving the house without permission. In Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, a man can stop his wife from working if he feels her employment interferes with her domestic responsibilities or religious conduct. As a result, women in Gulf countries find themselves caught between two contradictory agendas for the 21st century. What women want Many Qatari women I’ve interviewed say they struggle to balance the conflicting expectations between domestic responsibilities and emerging professional opportunities. Sheikha, an unmarried Qatari in her late 20s who works as an academic adviser, told me she often wonders: “I have a job and future plans. Why should I marry?” “I don’t want to say that marriage erases the dreams,” she said, “but sometimes with the family commitment you can’t do it.” Qatari women like Sheikha tend to face significant social pressure to settle down and have children by a certain age and to make sure their education and career goals do not get in the way of domestic responsibilities. Not all the pressure is external. Many women I met hold conservative views on marriage and the family, too. “I started work when my last daughter got married,” Amina Al-Ansari, an associate professor at Qatar University, told me. “Before that, I took care of the house and kids.” Al-Ansari, like all 15 Qatari women I interviewed, believes caring for the family is a woman’s religious duty. Still can’t have it all Conservative Qataris also view women working or studying in a gender-mixed environment as a violation of Islamic values and a sign of Westernisation. That’s why Amal Al-Shammari, a 32-year-old Qatari who now runs a cultural association for expatriates and tourists called Embrace Doha, attended Qatar University – the country’s only gender-segregated university. “My parents wanted me to go there to keep a good reputation. Guys assume you have lots of relationships if you go to gender-mixed universities,” she told me. “My parents wanted me to stay with the conservative way.” As political and religious leaders in the Gulf push their national agendas, women must find their own ways to balance newfound freedoms with existing social and religious pressures. “There is always development, improvement, but always tradition, religion, and culture,” the professor, Al-Ansari, told me, summing up these tensions. “We are living under the umbrella of religion.” (Alainna Liloia is PhD Student, University of Arizona) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Women in Arab countries find themselves torn between opportunity and tradition

The <a href="https://www.wionews.com/business-economy/oil-prices-tumble-ahead-of-opec-meeting-global-stocks-fall-265363">OPEC </a>oil cartel on Wednesday lowered its forecast for growth in global oil demand this year by nearly a fifth due to the impact of the <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/coronavirus-bats-being-sold-in-indonesias-wildlife-market-despite-warning-280332">coronavirus </a>outbreak in China.

In its monthly report on the world's oil market, <a href="https://www.wionews.com/business-economy/oil-prices-tumble-ahead-of-opec-meeting-global-stocks-fall-265363">OPEC </a>said it now expects growth in global oil demand of 0.99 million barrels per day&nbsp;this year, down from the 1.22 mbd forecast last month.

"The outbreak of the coronavirus in China during the first half of 2020 is the major factor behind this downward revision," OPEC said.

Also read:&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/oil-prices-fall-on-oversupply-worries-as-virus-hits-china-demand-279722">Oil prices fall on oversupply worries as virus hits China demand</a>

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/oil-prices-fall-on-oversupply-worries-as-virus-hits-china-demand-279722">China </a>remains in crisis mode weeks after the epidemic exploded, with much of the country shut down.

Entire cities have been quarantined and the Lunar New Year holidays were extended in a bid to contain the outbreak of what is now known as the COVID-19 virus. International airlines have also halted flights to <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/oil-prices-fall-on-oversupply-worries-as-virus-hits-china-demand-279722">China</a>.

Those disruptions are expected to hit economic output and <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/oil-prices-fall-on-oversupply-worries-as-virus-hits-china-demand-279722">China </a>has been a major source of growth in demand for oil in recent years.

Also read:&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/business-economy/slippery-slope-indias-imports-from-middle-east-at-four-year-low-275412">Slippery Slope: India's Imports from Middle East at four year low</a>

"The recent outbreak of the coronavirus in China necessitated a further downward revision to the country’s oil demand growth forecast compared to last month, as transportation fuels, notably aviation fuels, are expected to be impacted" in the first half of this year.

The impact on demand for transportation fuels was exacerbated by the outbreak coinciding with the Lunar New Year holidays, when many Chinese return home to celebrate with family.

OPEC said it had also revised lower its forecast for <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/oil-prices-fall-on-oversupply-worries-as-virus-hits-china-demand-279722">China</a>'s economic growth this year by 0.5 per cent&nbsp;points to 5.4 percent.

"The impact of the coronavirus outbreak on <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/oil-prices-fall-on-oversupply-worries-as-virus-hits-china-demand-279722">China</a>’s economy has added to the uncertainties surrounding global economic growth in 2020, and by extension global oil demand growth in 2020," it said.

The OPEC oil cartel on Wednesday lowered its forecast for growth in global oil demand this year by nearly a fifth due to the impact of the coronavirus outbreak in China.

The OPEC oil cartel on Wednesday lowered its forecast for growth in global oil demand this year by nearly a fifth due to the impact of the coronavirus outbreak in China. In its monthly report on the world's oil market, OPEC said it now expects growth in global oil demand of 0.99 million barrels per day this year, down from the 1.22 mbd forecast last month. "The outbreak of the coronavirus in China during the first half of 2020 is the major factor behind this downward revision," OPEC said. Also read: Oil prices fall on oversupply worries as virus hits China demand China remains in crisis mode weeks after the epidemic exploded, with much of the country shut down. Entire cities have been quarantined and the Lunar New Year holidays were extended in a bid to contain the outbreak of what is now known as the COVID-19 virus. International airlines have also halted flights to China. Those disruptions are expected to hit economic output and China has been a major source of growth in demand for oil in recent years. Also read: Slippery Slope: India's Imports from Middle East at four year low "The recent outbreak of the coronavirus in China necessitated a further downward revision to the country’s oil demand growth forecast compared to last month, as transportation fuels, notably aviation fuels, are expected to be impacted" in the first half of this year. The impact on demand for transportation fuels was exacerbated by the outbreak coinciding with the Lunar New Year holidays, when many Chinese return home to celebrate with family. OPEC said it had also revised lower its forecast for China's economic growth this year by 0.5 per cent points to 5.4 percent. "The impact of the coronavirus outbreak on China’s economy has added to the uncertainties surrounding global economic growth in 2020, and by extension global oil demand growth in 2020," it said.

OPEC chops global oil demand growth forecast over coronavirus

The optics seem evident: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is at odds with just about everybody.

Erdogan is on opposite sides of Russia in Syria, with Turkish and Syrian troops poised for an all-out fight in the north of the war-torn country, as well as, in Libya. He didn’t do himself any favours by coming out swinging against his supposed Russian ally during a visit to Ukraine earlier this month.

On all three flashpoints, Turkey and Russia are testing the limits of what was always at best an opportunistic, fragile partnership aimed at capitalising on a seemingly diminishing US interest in the Middle East, evident already under President Barak Obama, and in Donald Trump’s haphazard redefinition of what he sees as America’s national interests.

If that were not already a plate full, Erdogan’s relations with his US and European allies are strained over unilateral Turkish moves in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey’s acquisition of a Russian S-400 anti-missile system and/or Turkey’s military intervention in Syria as well as refugees and much more.

Turkey has threatened to close Incirlik Air Base and a critical radar station in Kurecik if the United States and the European Union fail to recognise what Turkey views as its national interests.

At the same time, Erdogan frets about his alliance with Qatar in the wake of suggestions that the Gulf state and Saudi Arabia are searching for a way to end a Saudi-led 2.5-year-old economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar.

Reports that the talks between the Kingdom and Qatar have failed may not put Erdogan’s concerns to bed with the United Arab Emirates, Qatar’s most hardline detractor, restoring postal services with the Gulf state.

The restoration, mediated by the United Nation’s Universal Postal Union, was the first time that a third-party succeeded in negotiating any easing of the boycott.

Piling it on, Erdogan’s powerful navy, imitating Chinese tactics in the South China Sea, has significantly raised tensions in the eastern Mediterranean by sending naval forces to escort Turkish drillships into contested waters and to block Greek and Cypriot petrochemical exploration vessels in waters recognised as theirs under international law.

Turkey has warned Israel that it needs Turkish approval to build together with Greece and Turkey an undersea natural gas pipeline to Europe.

As he battles on multiple regional fronts, Erdogan is walking a finely calibrated tightrope, rather than hitting out blindly at everyone, in the assumption that neither Russia nor the United States or, for that matter, Qatar, can afford to lose Turkey. By the same token, neither can Turkey risk jeopardising its relationships.

As a result, Erdogan’s confrontational moves constitute a high stakes gamble, particularly with Turkey’s military build-up in northern Syria, an area in which Erdogan does not enjoy air superiority.

The Turkish leader is betting on Russia blinking first by reigning in Syrian forces and pressing for a negotiated resolution of the crisis.

Erdogan’s provocative visit to Kyiv and backing for Ukraine in its conflict with Russia was about far more than differences over the Russian-backed Syrian assault in Idlib, the last rebel outpost in the country.

Concerned that Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 has put a halt to Turkey’s maritime dominance of the Black Sea and turned it into a Russian lake, Erdogan sought in Kyiv to play both sides against the middle.

The International Crisis Group has warned that in the Black Sea “Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea has enabled it to expand its naval capability, project power south and shift the strategic balance in its favour.”

Russia’s de facto coastline grew from 475 to 1,200 kilometres or about 25 per cent of the sea’s total shorefront since the annexation.

Add to that 300 kilometres of coastline belonging to Abkhazia, a Russian-backed breakaway region of Georgia.

In a bid to counter Russian advances, Erdogan’s gamble also constitutes a bid to persuade NATO to back Turkey in the Black Sea, reversing a decades-old policy of keeping the alliance out of the region.

With 13 Turkish soldiers being killed in the last week in two Syrian attacks on Turkish targets and Turkey claiming to have killed more than 100 Syrian soldiers in retaliation, Erdogan’s gambit appears to have produced initial dividends with the Trump administration backing the Turkish leader in his high-stakes Syrian bid.

One key joker is the degree to which Erdogan may feel that he has no choice but to escalate further than he would like to in response to far-right nationalists who resonate with a part of his voter base and are pressuring him to go for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s jugular.

"What are you waiting for? Don't beat around the bush while Turkish soldiers are being martyred in attacks carried out by soldiers of another state," said Meral Aksener, leader of the Iyi or Good Party.

Added Devlet Bahceli, head of Erdogan’s coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP): “Assad is a murderer, a criminal and the source of hostility. There will be no peace in Turkey until Assad is brought down from his throne. Turkey must start plans to enter Damascus now, and annihilate the cruel ones." 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

The optics seem evident: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is at odds with just about everybody. Erdogan is on opposite sides of Russia in Syria, with Turkish and Syrian troops poised for an all-out fight in the north of the war-torn country, as well as, in Libya.

The optics seem evident: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is at odds with just about everybody. Erdogan is on opposite sides of Russia in Syria, with Turkish and Syrian troops poised for an all-out fight in the north of the war-torn country, as well as, in Libya. He didn’t do himself any favours by coming out swinging against his supposed Russian ally during a visit to Ukraine earlier this month. On all three flashpoints, Turkey and Russia are testing the limits of what was always at best an opportunistic, fragile partnership aimed at capitalising on a seemingly diminishing US interest in the Middle East, evident already under President Barak Obama, and in Donald Trump’s haphazard redefinition of what he sees as America’s national interests. If that were not already a plate full, Erdogan’s relations with his US and European allies are strained over unilateral Turkish moves in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey’s acquisition of a Russian S-400 anti-missile system and/or Turkey’s military intervention in Syria as well as refugees and much more. Turkey has threatened to close Incirlik Air Base and a critical radar station in Kurecik if the United States and the European Union fail to recognise what Turkey views as its national interests. At the same time, Erdogan frets about his alliance with Qatar in the wake of suggestions that the Gulf state and Saudi Arabia are searching for a way to end a Saudi-led 2.5-year-old economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar. Reports that the talks between the Kingdom and Qatar have failed may not put Erdogan’s concerns to bed with the United Arab Emirates, Qatar’s most hardline detractor, restoring postal services with the Gulf state. The restoration, mediated by the United Nation’s Universal Postal Union, was the first time that a third-party succeeded in negotiating any easing of the boycott. Piling it on, Erdogan’s powerful navy, imitating Chinese tactics in the South China Sea, has significantly raised tensions in the eastern Mediterranean by sending naval forces to escort Turkish drillships into contested waters and to block Greek and Cypriot petrochemical exploration vessels in waters recognised as theirs under international law. Turkey has warned Israel that it needs Turkish approval to build together with Greece and Turkey an undersea natural gas pipeline to Europe. As he battles on multiple regional fronts, Erdogan is walking a finely calibrated tightrope, rather than hitting out blindly at everyone, in the assumption that neither Russia nor the United States or, for that matter, Qatar, can afford to lose Turkey. By the same token, neither can Turkey risk jeopardising its relationships. As a result, Erdogan’s confrontational moves constitute a high stakes gamble, particularly with Turkey’s military build-up in northern Syria, an area in which Erdogan does not enjoy air superiority. The Turkish leader is betting on Russia blinking first by reigning in Syrian forces and pressing for a negotiated resolution of the crisis. Erdogan’s provocative visit to Kyiv and backing for Ukraine in its conflict with Russia was about far more than differences over the Russian-backed Syrian assault in Idlib, the last rebel outpost in the country. Concerned that Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 has put a halt to Turkey’s maritime dominance of the Black Sea and turned it into a Russian lake, Erdogan sought in Kyiv to play both sides against the middle. The International Crisis Group has warned that in the Black Sea “Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea has enabled it to expand its naval capability, project power south and shift the strategic balance in its favour.” Russia’s de facto coastline grew from 475 to 1,200 kilometres or about 25 per cent of the sea’s total shorefront since the annexation. Add to that 300 kilometres of coastline belonging to Abkhazia, a Russian-backed breakaway region of Georgia. In a bid to counter Russian advances, Erdogan’s gamble also constitutes a bid to persuade NATO to back Turkey in the Black Sea, reversing a decades-old policy of keeping the alliance out of the region. With 13 Turkish soldiers being killed in the last week in two Syrian attacks on Turkish targets and Turkey claiming to have killed more than 100 Syrian soldiers in retaliation, Erdogan’s gambit appears to have produced initial dividends with the Trump administration backing the Turkish leader in his high-stakes Syrian bid. One key joker is the degree to which Erdogan may feel that he has no choice but to escalate further than he would like to in response to far-right nationalists who resonate with a part of his voter base and are pressuring him to go for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s jugular. "What are you waiting for? Don't beat around the bush while Turkish soldiers are being martyred in attacks carried out by soldiers of another state," said Meral Aksener, leader of the Iyi or Good Party. Added Devlet Bahceli, head of Erdogan’s coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP): “Assad is a murderer, a criminal and the source of hostility. There will be no peace in Turkey until Assad is brought down from his throne. Turkey must start plans to enter Damascus now, and annihilate the cruel ones." (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Erdogan battles on multiple fronts in risky regional power bid

The real issue with US President Donald Trump’s Israel-Palestinian peace plan is not whether it stands a chance of resolving one of the world’s most intractable conflicts or not. More important is the fact that Israel will, in violation of international law, be empowered to unilaterally annexe occupied territory and take steps towards creating an ethnically more homogenous state by transferring a significant proportion of the Jewish state’s Israeli Palestinian population to what the plan envisions as a future Palestinian entity.

Trump, by endorsing annexation and populations transfers that violate the Fourth Geneva Convention, has put Israel at the cutting edge of an emerging new world order dominated by civilizationalist leaders.

These leaders think in terms of might is right rather than adherence to international law. They envision civilisational states that define themselves and their boundaries on the basis of a specific civilization as opposed to nation-states that are determined by internationally recognised borders, population and language and have little time for the rule of law.

In doing so Trump, like many other likeminded civilizationalist leaders is contributing to a world in which mass migration, radicalisation and increased political violence will likely pose threats on a far larger scale than they do today.

If Israel indeed moves ahead with implementation of Trump’s plan, it will likely find itself at the forefront of the civilizationalist effort to shape a new world order that pays little heed to human and minority rights anchored in international law and that rejects agreements on the status of occupied land and people that were forged in the wake of the 20th century’s devastating world wars.

Becoming a flashpoint in the struggle for the shape of a new world could prove to be&nbsp;more of a curse than a blessing for Israel.

It could turn Israel into yet another but nonetheless the prime example of what civilizationalist politics is likely to produce: A illiberal, if not authoritarian state, whose policies are at best controversial rather than, as Israel likes to see itself - the Middle East’s shining and only real democracy,

Few in the international community, including a majority of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s civilizationalist counterparts, with the exception of Trump and potentially Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro and Hungary’s Victor Orban, would recognise Israel’s unilaterally declared post-annexation borders.

Responding to Trump’s plan, conservative Gulf states praised US efforts to achieve peace and called for negotiations but were careful not to endorse Trump’s blueprint while the Arab League that groups all Arab states outright rejected the proposal.

This did not stop Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of Sudan’s post-popular revolt Sovereignty Council who has close ties to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, from meeting Netanyahu a day later in Uganda.

Nonetheless, few in the international community would endorse the deprival of citizenship of some 300,000 Palestinian Israelis and their transfer together with their lands in what is known as the Triangle in central Israel to a future Palestinian state.

Only 13 per cent of Israeli Palestinians surveyed last year by the Israel Democracy Institute defined themselves as first and foremost being Palestinian while 38 per cent said their primary identity was Arab.

Meanwhile, 65 per cent said they were “proud to be Israelis.” An even larger number, 83 per cent, said they strived to be full members of Israeli society.

"Peace is made with the enemy. We are residents of the state, and we are not the enemy. The prime minister wants to save his skin at the expense of inciting hatred against the Arab population," said Shuaa Massarweh Mansour, the mayor of Taiibeh, a town of 50,000 Israeli Palestinians that was included in the plan’s suggestion for a population transfer.

Mansour was referring to last month’s indictment of Netanyahu on charges of bribery, fraud and breach of trust in three separate corruption cases.

Demonstrations on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip in response to the Trump plan were fairly muted but that is no guarantee that implementation will not provoke wide-spread protest directed not only against Israel and the United States but also the Palestine Authority.

Those protests would likely spread to Israeli Palestinians resident within Israeli borders prior to the 1967 Middle East war in which Israel conquered the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights that were annexed before Trump endorsed their incorporation into Israel, and Gaza.

An Israeli crackdown on the protesters would only add to problems created by the implementation of the Trump plan.

The plan appears to be designed to pre-empt what would be a worst-case civilizationalist scenario in which continued Israeli occupation would force Israel to choose between being a democracy and a Jewish state because of demographics that would likely see Palestinians becoming a majority of the population.

The irony is that the implementation of the plan without Palestinian consent and cooperation could produce the same dilemma.

As a result, Trump’s civilizational approach towards solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Netanyahu’s enthusiastic embrace of the plan threatens to not only put Israel on&nbsp;the cutting edge of the struggle to shape a new world order, but also risks turning Israel into a poster child of everything that is wrong with civilisationalism.

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

The real issue with US President Donald Trump’s Israel-Palestinian peace plan is not whether it stands a chance of resolving one of the world’s most intractable conflicts or not.

The real issue with US President Donald Trump’s Israel-Palestinian peace plan is not whether it stands a chance of resolving one of the world’s most intractable conflicts or not. More important is the fact that Israel will, in violation of international law, be empowered to unilaterally annexe occupied territory and take steps towards creating an ethnically more homogenous state by transferring a significant proportion of the Jewish state’s Israeli Palestinian population to what the plan envisions as a future Palestinian entity. Trump, by endorsing annexation and populations transfers that violate the Fourth Geneva Convention, has put Israel at the cutting edge of an emerging new world order dominated by civilizationalist leaders. These leaders think in terms of might is right rather than adherence to international law. They envision civilisational states that define themselves and their boundaries on the basis of a specific civilization as opposed to nation-states that are determined by internationally recognised borders, population and language and have little time for the rule of law. In doing so Trump, like many other likeminded civilizationalist leaders is contributing to a world in which mass migration, radicalisation and increased political violence will likely pose threats on a far larger scale than they do today. If Israel indeed moves ahead with implementation of Trump’s plan, it will likely find itself at the forefront of the civilizationalist effort to shape a new world order that pays little heed to human and minority rights anchored in international law and that rejects agreements on the status of occupied land and people that were forged in the wake of the 20th century’s devastating world wars. Becoming a flashpoint in the struggle for the shape of a new world could prove to be more of a curse than a blessing for Israel. It could turn Israel into yet another but nonetheless the prime example of what civilizationalist politics is likely to produce: A illiberal, if not authoritarian state, whose policies are at best controversial rather than, as Israel likes to see itself - the Middle East’s shining and only real democracy, Few in the international community, including a majority of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s civilizationalist counterparts, with the exception of Trump and potentially Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro and Hungary’s Victor Orban, would recognise Israel’s unilaterally declared post-annexation borders. Responding to Trump’s plan, conservative Gulf states praised US efforts to achieve peace and called for negotiations but were careful not to endorse Trump’s blueprint while the Arab League that groups all Arab states outright rejected the proposal. This did not stop Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of Sudan’s post-popular revolt Sovereignty Council who has close ties to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, from meeting Netanyahu a day later in Uganda. Nonetheless, few in the international community would endorse the deprival of citizenship of some 300,000 Palestinian Israelis and their transfer together with their lands in what is known as the Triangle in central Israel to a future Palestinian state. Only 13 per cent of Israeli Palestinians surveyed last year by the Israel Democracy Institute defined themselves as first and foremost being Palestinian while 38 per cent said their primary identity was Arab. Meanwhile, 65 per cent said they were “proud to be Israelis.” An even larger number, 83 per cent, said they strived to be full members of Israeli society. "Peace is made with the enemy. We are residents of the state, and we are not the enemy. The prime minister wants to save his skin at the expense of inciting hatred against the Arab population," said Shuaa Massarweh Mansour, the mayor of Taiibeh, a town of 50,000 Israeli Palestinians that was included in the plan’s suggestion for a population transfer. Mansour was referring to last month’s indictment of Netanyahu on charges of bribery, fraud and breach of trust in three separate corruption cases. Demonstrations on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip in response to the Trump plan were fairly muted but that is no guarantee that implementation will not provoke wide-spread protest directed not only against Israel and the United States but also the Palestine Authority. Those protests would likely spread to Israeli Palestinians resident within Israeli borders prior to the 1967 Middle East war in which Israel conquered the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights that were annexed before Trump endorsed their incorporation into Israel, and Gaza. An Israeli crackdown on the protesters would only add to problems created by the implementation of the Trump plan. The plan appears to be designed to pre-empt what would be a worst-case civilizationalist scenario in which continued Israeli occupation would force Israel to choose between being a democracy and a Jewish state because of demographics that would likely see Palestinians becoming a majority of the population. The irony is that the implementation of the plan without Palestinian consent and cooperation could produce the same dilemma. As a result, Trump’s civilizational approach towards solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Netanyahu’s enthusiastic embrace of the plan threatens to not only put Israel on the cutting edge of the struggle to shape a new world order, but also risks turning Israel into a poster child of everything that is wrong with civilisationalism. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Donald Trump's peace plan puts Israel on the cutting edge

A decade of anti-government protests in the Arab world have thrown popular trust in the military into the garbage bin and undermined the military’s position as one of the most trusted institutions.

Long gone are the days when protesters on Cairo’s Tahrir Square chanted 'The military and the people are one.'

In 2011 it was the barriers of fear that protesters broke. Created by autocratic rulers, fear was what long kept disgruntled from taking their grievances to the street.

In 2019 and 2020 those barriers have been further reduced with protesters refusing to back down despite the use of brutal force by law enforcement and security forces in Lebanon and Iraq and occasional violence elsewhere in the Arab world.

Changed popular perceptions of the military are the result. Increasingly, the military is seen at best as positioning itself to salvage what can be salvaged of an ancien regime and at worst the enforcer of a hated regime.

“Iraqis broke the shackles of fear and reached the point of no return. The movement will not stop, and the Iraqi people will never be silent,” said Ali Hashim, a protester in Baghdad, speaking only a week after one night of mass killings in December.

In increasingly violent clashes in Beirut earlier this month, protesters unsuccessfully sought to persuade the security forces they were attacking that their demands for a complete break with Lebanon’s political elite was also in the interest of men in uniform.

“Among the most important lessons cited by Sudanese and Algerian protesters so far are…(that) transition plans designed by the military—particularly proposals for quick elections—can be a trap,” said Middle East scholar Michele Dunne.

Algeria’s newly elected president Abdelmadjid Tebboune is struggling to garner legitimacy with mass protests continuing nine months after the toppling of Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Voters voted with their feet in last month’s presidential poll with 60 per cent abstaining.

Algeria was railroaded into the election by its powerful military in a bid to outflank protesters by holding the poll before they had an opportunity to prepare for it.

A crucial nail was driven into the coffin of the notion of a unity of purpose between protesters and armed forces with the 2013 military coup in Egypt that produced one of the Arab world’s most repressive regimes under general-turned-president Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi.

Protesters realise almost a decade after the 2011 protests in which demonstrators declared victory once leaders like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had resigned, that their only chance of success is to retain their street power until elites, including the military, agree as appears to be the case in Sudan to a truly transformational process.

In Sudan, unlike in Egypt in 2011, this meant protesters and/or civil society groups ensuring that they had a seat at the table before they surrendered the street.

In Lebanon, protests escalated as a result of the elite’s attempt to address the crisis with the appointment as prime minister of Hassan Diab, widely seen as beholden to Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed militia and political group.

Mounting violence on the streets of Lebanon and Iraq in which hundreds of protesters have been killed or wounded will do little to rebuild confidence in the military and allied security forces.

If Lebanon and Iraq are anything to go by, clashes are likely to escalate and leave deep-seated scars.

“Our backs are against the wall. We have nothing more to lose. We are fighting a regime with a history of 40 years of corruption and their armed defenders,” said a masked protester on the streets of Beirut.

Taking journalist and scholar Rami Khouri’s analysis of what he terms ‘revolutions’ that are pitted against the decades-old ‘resistance’ of hard-line Arab states, Iran and its non-state Arab allies who opposed the US, Israel and conservative Gulf states Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as a starting point, militaries become outposts of a political system that has produced brutal autocracies and/or economic and environmental mismanagement.

“Arab and Iranian ruling elites and their own citizens now openly fight and resist each other, seeking to define their countries' identities and policies. This is probably the most consequential ideological battle in the Middle East since its state system was established a century ago,” Khouri said.

It’s an epic battle that has turned the once-revered military into yet another institution that finds itself on the wrong side of history.

While Arab protesters have made that clear on the streets of Khartoum, Algiers, Beirut and Baghdad, Iranian students demanded the departure and demise of the Revolutionary Guards in anti-government demonstrations prior to and after the recent killing of Iranian general Qassim Soleimani.

"The only way out of our current predicament is the simultaneous rejection of both domestic despotism and imperial arrogance. We need a politics that doesn't merely claim security, freedom, and equality for a select group or class, but that understands these rights as inalienable and for all people," said a statement by Iranian students demanding an end to all foreign interference in the affairs of the region, be it by the United States, Iran or the conservative Gulf states. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

A decade of anti-government protests in the Arab world have thrown popular trust in the military into the garbage bin and undermined the military’s position as one of the most trusted institutions.

A decade of anti-government protests in the Arab world have thrown popular trust in the military into the garbage bin and undermined the military’s position as one of the most trusted institutions. Long gone are the days when protesters on Cairo’s Tahrir Square chanted 'The military and the people are one.' In 2011 it was the barriers of fear that protesters broke. Created by autocratic rulers, fear was what long kept disgruntled from taking their grievances to the street. In 2019 and 2020 those barriers have been further reduced with protesters refusing to back down despite the use of brutal force by law enforcement and security forces in Lebanon and Iraq and occasional violence elsewhere in the Arab world. Changed popular perceptions of the military are the result. Increasingly, the military is seen at best as positioning itself to salvage what can be salvaged of an ancien regime and at worst the enforcer of a hated regime. “Iraqis broke the shackles of fear and reached the point of no return. The movement will not stop, and the Iraqi people will never be silent,” said Ali Hashim, a protester in Baghdad, speaking only a week after one night of mass killings in December. In increasingly violent clashes in Beirut earlier this month, protesters unsuccessfully sought to persuade the security forces they were attacking that their demands for a complete break with Lebanon’s political elite was also in the interest of men in uniform. “Among the most important lessons cited by Sudanese and Algerian protesters so far are…(that) transition plans designed by the military—particularly proposals for quick elections—can be a trap,” said Middle East scholar Michele Dunne. Algeria’s newly elected president Abdelmadjid Tebboune is struggling to garner legitimacy with mass protests continuing nine months after the toppling of Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Voters voted with their feet in last month’s presidential poll with 60 per cent abstaining. Algeria was railroaded into the election by its powerful military in a bid to outflank protesters by holding the poll before they had an opportunity to prepare for it. A crucial nail was driven into the coffin of the notion of a unity of purpose between protesters and armed forces with the 2013 military coup in Egypt that produced one of the Arab world’s most repressive regimes under general-turned-president Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi. Protesters realise almost a decade after the 2011 protests in which demonstrators declared victory once leaders like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had resigned, that their only chance of success is to retain their street power until elites, including the military, agree as appears to be the case in Sudan to a truly transformational process. In Sudan, unlike in Egypt in 2011, this meant protesters and/or civil society groups ensuring that they had a seat at the table before they surrendered the street. In Lebanon, protests escalated as a result of the elite’s attempt to address the crisis with the appointment as prime minister of Hassan Diab, widely seen as beholden to Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed militia and political group. Mounting violence on the streets of Lebanon and Iraq in which hundreds of protesters have been killed or wounded will do little to rebuild confidence in the military and allied security forces. If Lebanon and Iraq are anything to go by, clashes are likely to escalate and leave deep-seated scars. “Our backs are against the wall. We have nothing more to lose. We are fighting a regime with a history of 40 years of corruption and their armed defenders,” said a masked protester on the streets of Beirut. Taking journalist and scholar Rami Khouri’s analysis of what he terms ‘revolutions’ that are pitted against the decades-old ‘resistance’ of hard-line Arab states, Iran and its non-state Arab allies who opposed the US, Israel and conservative Gulf states Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as a starting point, militaries become outposts of a political system that has produced brutal autocracies and/or economic and environmental mismanagement. “Arab and Iranian ruling elites and their own citizens now openly fight and resist each other, seeking to define their countries' identities and policies. This is probably the most consequential ideological battle in the Middle East since its state system was established a century ago,” Khouri said. It’s an epic battle that has turned the once-revered military into yet another institution that finds itself on the wrong side of history. While Arab protesters have made that clear on the streets of Khartoum, Algiers, Beirut and Baghdad, Iranian students demanded the departure and demise of the Revolutionary Guards in anti-government demonstrations prior to and after the recent killing of Iranian general Qassim Soleimani. "The only way out of our current predicament is the simultaneous rejection of both domestic despotism and imperial arrogance. We need a politics that doesn't merely claim security, freedom, and equality for a select group or class, but that understands these rights as inalienable and for all people," said a statement by Iranian students demanding an end to all foreign interference in the affairs of the region, be it by the United States, Iran or the conservative Gulf states. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Protesters push Arab militaries off their pedestal

By Yehudah Mirsky

January 28, 2020, is a date that will be remembered in Middle Eastern history – but it will take some time before anyone knows for sure how it will be remembered.

The day didn’t start well for Benjamin Netanyahu. Israel’s longest-serving prime minister also became the country’s first prime minister to be indicted while still in office. He faces multiple charges of corruption.

But Netanyahu didn’t have much time to sulk. Just a few hours later, he was standing alongside Donald Trump as the pair unveiled the US administration’s long-anticipated plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace, written in no small part in coordination with – and deeply in tune with – Netanyahu’s policies.

The fact that the plan’s unveiling came as both men face intense domestic scrutiny – the press conference interrupted coverage of Trump’s impeachment – should not be overlooked.

I have been following developments in the Middle East for a long time as a US State Department official, a lifelong student and now a professor of Israeli history, and as a dual citizen of the US and Israel. I know how complex the issues are and how past attempts at peace have fallen well short.

In Black and White

Trump’s plan comprises two different goals.

The first – fostering Israeli-Palestinian peace, or at least coexistence – is there in black and white for all to read.

The second – tying Trump and Netanyahu’s respective domestic critics into knots – is everywhere between the lines.

While the Trump administration worked on the plan in coordination with Israel and 'friendly'&nbsp;Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, it crucially did not involve the Palestinians. Palestinian resistance to the very development of this plan – out of suspicion, weakness and resentment – was met not with a carrot but a stick, with the US&nbsp;cutting all aid to Gaza and the West Bank in February 2019.

As a result, positions in the plan that might have been viewed as difficult compromises, had they been negotiated, are instead rightly seen as terms of surrender. Yes, the plan gives Palestinians a path to limited statehood, but only after ceding on the core issues of Israeli settlements, refugees and control of much of Jerusalem.

The plan was successfully kept behind the curtains while being drafted, but it now steps out onto a complicated stage.

Relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank have for some years been in utter political stalemate, even as the two have maintained working-level security cooperation. In Hamas-run Gaza, Israel has been in a long war of attrition, mixing ongoing less-than-total violence with tacit mutual understandings aimed at managing the conflict.

Meanwhile, Israel’s ties with several Sunni Arab states, especially in the Gulf, have been deepening, united by a desire to ward off Iran and its Shia proxies in Lebanon and what remains of Syria. Jordan, structurally weak but strategically important due to its location and links to Arab and Islamic actors, balances contending forces with skill and jitters.

Internal Palestinian politics are riven by the bitter rivalry between the nationalist Palestinian Authority and the Islamist group Hamas and by discontent with the Palestinian Authority’s President Mahmoud Abbas’ hold on power amid claims of corruption and mismanagement in the Palestinian semi-government.

Israeli politics is stalemated, too, and headed for its third round of parliamentary elections in less than a year, spurred by fallout from Netanyahu’s corruption scandals and fragmented opposition.

Many Israelis are alienated by Netanyahu’s endless legal troubles and divisive politics, but others are kindled by his attacks on political opponents. Meanwhile the Israeli left has failed to recover the credibility it lost on security issues following the collapse of 2000’s Camp David talks and the ensuing Second Intifada.

As for Trump, he remains popular in Israel – including among centrists, who don’t necessarily follow day-to-day US&nbsp;politics and look unfavourably on former President Barack Obama’s handling of the Middle East.

At home, Trump’s policies on Israel do not reflect that of the majority of American Jews, who tend to be politically liberal and supportive of a mutually negotiated two-state solution. Rather, Trump’s views chime with that of the smaller but more fervent American Jewish right, and above all with the millions of evangelicals who are a key plank of the president’s base.

Into all this drops the 180-page peace plan – whose heart is creating a legally recognized but geographically tiny and fragmented Palestinian state without full military powers – something that falls way short of Palestinian aspirations. Some parts of the plan are not unreasonable, and the many failed attempts at peacemaking to date call for fresh thinking. But the problems in this plan are very real.

It stakes out strong positions on the three hard issues that have bedevilled negotiations time and again: Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem and the right of return for Palestinian refugees.

The Trump plan leaves all Israeli settlements in place and proposes a network of roads and tunnels to help Palestinian move around the cantons that would make up their state.

It also freezes Jerusalem’s status quo and makes permanent Israel’s security barrier between the city’s east and west. As for the Palestinians who fled or were forced out of their homes in the 1948 war and their descendants, the plan says they are to be financially compensated. A few will be absorbed into Israel, but most will be integrated into either the envisioned Palestinian state or their current country of residence – which includes the Arab states that have refused to absorb them to date.

These stances will be politically helpful to Netanyahu and congenial to many Israelis, who want to end the country’s occupation of the Palestinians, if their own personal security can be assured.

To the Palestinians, they represent bitter pills, each of which would be hard enough to swallow on its own.

Reaction to the plan has led to talk of a possible reconciliation between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, something Israel has been trying to avoid – and put security forces on alert for further violence.

Another problem is in the thinking that is evident in the plan’s title, “Peace to Prosperity.” Blueprints for economic development are woven throughout. The ideas are laudable. But the notion that the most fervently committed Jews and Arabs will trade away their deepest convictions for financial gain is as unlikely to take hold now as it did in the Oslo Accords of the 1990s.

&nbsp;And red lines all over 
 
So what happens now?

Netanyahu has announced he will begin to annex territory, in a move his main political challenger, former Army Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, described as “reckless and irresponsible,” even as he says he accepts the plan’s broad outlines for an eventual settlement. The Palestinians for their part have rejected the proposals and taken to the streets in protest.

The plan raises some serious, immediate questions: How much unilateral action will Netanyahu take without paying a domestic price – especially with Israelis returning to the polls in March? And what responses are open to the Palestinians, other than the tried-and-failed turns to violence and appeals to the UN&nbsp;– neither of which will move Israeli public opinion in their direction?

Above all, the questions we should be asking are: What does this or any plan do concretely to improve the lives of people in the region? What practical steps could be taken to make viable coexistence – peace is too strong a word – further down the line possible or at least avert new violence triggered by thwarted expectations?

There is no easy solution to the bitter Israel-Palestinian conflict. Unilateral annexation by Israel will only further Palestinian resentment and rejectionism. Too many people, in Washington as well as the Middle East, view the conflict in terms of ideological dreams and agendas, paying little heed to the real needs of people on the ground, Israeli and Palestinian alike. Should this plan become, like so many of its predecessors, a political football on both sides of the ocean, the people who make their homes and live their lives on politicians’ playing fields will lose. 
 
(Yehudah Mirsky is Professor of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies, Brandeis University)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/has-trump-proposed-a-middle-east-peace-plan-or-terms-of-surrender-for-the-palestinians-130677">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

By Yehudah Mirsky January 28, 2020, is a date that will be remembered in Middle Eastern history – but it will take some time before anyone knows for sure how it will be remembered.

By Yehudah Mirsky January 28, 2020, is a date that will be remembered in Middle Eastern history – but it will take some time before anyone knows for sure how it will be remembered. The day didn’t start well for Benjamin Netanyahu. Israel’s longest-serving prime minister also became the country’s first prime minister to be indicted while still in office. He faces multiple charges of corruption. But Netanyahu didn’t have much time to sulk. Just a few hours later, he was standing alongside Donald Trump as the pair unveiled the US administration’s long-anticipated plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace, written in no small part in coordination with – and deeply in tune with – Netanyahu’s policies. The fact that the plan’s unveiling came as both men face intense domestic scrutiny – the press conference interrupted coverage of Trump’s impeachment – should not be overlooked. I have been following developments in the Middle East for a long time as a US State Department official, a lifelong student and now a professor of Israeli history, and as a dual citizen of the US and Israel. I know how complex the issues are and how past attempts at peace have fallen well short. In Black and White Trump’s plan comprises two different goals. The first – fostering Israeli-Palestinian peace, or at least coexistence – is there in black and white for all to read. The second – tying Trump and Netanyahu’s respective domestic critics into knots – is everywhere between the lines. While the Trump administration worked on the plan in coordination with Israel and 'friendly' Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, it crucially did not involve the Palestinians. Palestinian resistance to the very development of this plan – out of suspicion, weakness and resentment – was met not with a carrot but a stick, with the US cutting all aid to Gaza and the West Bank in February 2019. As a result, positions in the plan that might have been viewed as difficult compromises, had they been negotiated, are instead rightly seen as terms of surrender. Yes, the plan gives Palestinians a path to limited statehood, but only after ceding on the core issues of Israeli settlements, refugees and control of much of Jerusalem. The plan was successfully kept behind the curtains while being drafted, but it now steps out onto a complicated stage. Relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank have for some years been in utter political stalemate, even as the two have maintained working-level security cooperation. In Hamas-run Gaza, Israel has been in a long war of attrition, mixing ongoing less-than-total violence with tacit mutual understandings aimed at managing the conflict. Meanwhile, Israel’s ties with several Sunni Arab states, especially in the Gulf, have been deepening, united by a desire to ward off Iran and its Shia proxies in Lebanon and what remains of Syria. Jordan, structurally weak but strategically important due to its location and links to Arab and Islamic actors, balances contending forces with skill and jitters. Internal Palestinian politics are riven by the bitter rivalry between the nationalist Palestinian Authority and the Islamist group Hamas and by discontent with the Palestinian Authority’s President Mahmoud Abbas’ hold on power amid claims of corruption and mismanagement in the Palestinian semi-government. Israeli politics is stalemated, too, and headed for its third round of parliamentary elections in less than a year, spurred by fallout from Netanyahu’s corruption scandals and fragmented opposition. Many Israelis are alienated by Netanyahu’s endless legal troubles and divisive politics, but others are kindled by his attacks on political opponents. Meanwhile the Israeli left has failed to recover the credibility it lost on security issues following the collapse of 2000’s Camp David talks and the ensuing Second Intifada. As for Trump, he remains popular in Israel – including among centrists, who don’t necessarily follow day-to-day US politics and look unfavourably on former President Barack Obama’s handling of the Middle East. At home, Trump’s policies on Israel do not reflect that of the majority of American Jews, who tend to be politically liberal and supportive of a mutually negotiated two-state solution. Rather, Trump’s views chime with that of the smaller but more fervent American Jewish right, and above all with the millions of evangelicals who are a key plank of the president’s base. Into all this drops the 180-page peace plan – whose heart is creating a legally recognized but geographically tiny and fragmented Palestinian state without full military powers – something that falls way short of Palestinian aspirations. Some parts of the plan are not unreasonable, and the many failed attempts at peacemaking to date call for fresh thinking. But the problems in this plan are very real. It stakes out strong positions on the three hard issues that have bedevilled negotiations time and again: Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. The Trump plan leaves all Israeli settlements in place and proposes a network of roads and tunnels to help Palestinian move around the cantons that would make up their state. It also freezes Jerusalem’s status quo and makes permanent Israel’s security barrier between the city’s east and west. As for the Palestinians who fled or were forced out of their homes in the 1948 war and their descendants, the plan says they are to be financially compensated. A few will be absorbed into Israel, but most will be integrated into either the envisioned Palestinian state or their current country of residence – which includes the Arab states that have refused to absorb them to date. These stances will be politically helpful to Netanyahu and congenial to many Israelis, who want to end the country’s occupation of the Palestinians, if their own personal security can be assured. To the Palestinians, they represent bitter pills, each of which would be hard enough to swallow on its own. Reaction to the plan has led to talk of a possible reconciliation between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, something Israel has been trying to avoid – and put security forces on alert for further violence. Another problem is in the thinking that is evident in the plan’s title, “Peace to Prosperity.” Blueprints for economic development are woven throughout. The ideas are laudable. But the notion that the most fervently committed Jews and Arabs will trade away their deepest convictions for financial gain is as unlikely to take hold now as it did in the Oslo Accords of the 1990s. And red lines all over So what happens now? Netanyahu has announced he will begin to annex territory, in a move his main political challenger, former Army Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, described as “reckless and irresponsible,” even as he says he accepts the plan’s broad outlines for an eventual settlement. The Palestinians for their part have rejected the proposals and taken to the streets in protest. The plan raises some serious, immediate questions: How much unilateral action will Netanyahu take without paying a domestic price – especially with Israelis returning to the polls in March? And what responses are open to the Palestinians, other than the tried-and-failed turns to violence and appeals to the UN – neither of which will move Israeli public opinion in their direction? Above all, the questions we should be asking are: What does this or any plan do concretely to improve the lives of people in the region? What practical steps could be taken to make viable coexistence – peace is too strong a word – further down the line possible or at least avert new violence triggered by thwarted expectations? There is no easy solution to the bitter Israel-Palestinian conflict. Unilateral annexation by Israel will only further Palestinian resentment and rejectionism. Too many people, in Washington as well as the Middle East, view the conflict in terms of ideological dreams and agendas, paying little heed to the real needs of people on the ground, Israeli and Palestinian alike. Should this plan become, like so many of its predecessors, a political football on both sides of the ocean, the people who make their homes and live their lives on politicians’ playing fields will lose. (Yehudah Mirsky is Professor of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies, Brandeis University) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

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