Redline against Iran? Why China needs 'Strait of Hormuz' open more than any other country

No global superpower is more exposed to a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz than China. Beijing relies on this narrow waterway for approximately 40% of its crude oil imports and 30% of its liquefied natural gas (LNG). While the US and its Western allies are utilising robust strategic petroleum reserves and alternative supply lines, China's massive industrial engine is uniquely vulnerable to a Middle Eastern supply shock.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi recently stated that the Strait remains open to all countries except "enemies" of the state. However, the reality on the water tells a different story. The waterway has become a highly militarized zone plagued by GPS jamming, sea drone strikes, and soaring war-risk insurance premiums. Ship-tracking data reveals that maritime traffic has plummeted by over 90%; since March 1, only a tiny fraction of Chinese-flagged ships have successfully navigated the strait.

There are desperate, behind-the-scenes negotiations to keep China's oil flowing. Recent reports indicate Iran may quietly permit restricted numbers of tankers to pass if the shipments are traded in Chinese yuan. Furthermore, some non-Chinese commercial vessels are actively broadcasting "CHINA OWNER_ALL CREW" on their automatic identification systems (AIS) in a desperate bid to deter IRGC strikes. But these ad-hoc workarounds are highly unreliable. China's massive energy demands cannot be sustained by midnight runs and unofficial exemptions in an active combat zone.

The US is actively weaponizing China's vulnerability. President Donald Trump has publicly called on nations that rely heavily on the Strait, specifically naming China, alongside France and Japan, to send their own warships to secure the passage. By refusing to unilaterally shoulder the burden of keeping the Strait open for global trade, Washington is forcing Beijing into a corner: either suffer massive domestic economic damage or actively deploy military assets to counter Iran's blockade.

China and Iran share a highly touted strategic partnership, but Beijing's foreign policy is ruthlessly pragmatic. Chinese domestic stability depends entirely on steady economic growth, which requires cheap, uninterrupted energy. If the conflict drags on, Beijing may be forced to deploy its People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) from its base in Djibouti to escort its tankers. Doing so would effectively break Iran's primary point of leverage, proving that when forced to choose, China will always prioritize its own economy over its alliance with Tehran.

Some analysts argue that China’s aggressive stockpiling of discounted Russian oil protects it from a Middle East crisis. That is a dangerous miscalculation. While overland pipelines (like the ESPO) and shipments from Russia’s eastern seaports are flowing at maximum capacity, the physical infrastructure simply cannot compensate for the sudden loss of the millions of barrels that flow daily from the Persian Gulf. China’s massive refineries are heavily calibrated for Middle Eastern crude, meaning a pivot away from Hormuz is mathematically and logistically impossible in the short term.

For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), regime survival is predicated on one thing above all else: consistent economic growth. China is already grappling with a fragile real estate sector and a sluggish post-pandemic recovery. A prolonged closure of the Strait guarantees soaring energy inflation, manufacturing shutdowns, and a spiraling cost of living for the average Chinese citizen. If Iran's military blockade threatens to spark massive domestic economic unrest inside China, Beijing will view Tehran not as an ally, but as a direct threat to the CCP's grip on power.