In Nicaragua, the country's strong man Daniel Ortega has been sworn in as the president for a fourth consecutive year alongside him, first lady Rosario Murillo has also been sworn in for a second time as the vice president.

EU and United States widen sanctions as Daniel Ortega begins new term

Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro has written to Indian PM Modi over <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/brazils-coronavirus-cases-much-higher-than-being-reported-study-finds-292472">COVID-19</a> crisis in which he has raised the issue of US sanctions impacting relief measures in the country. The letter was sent to PM Modi via diplomatic channels on March 29.

The letter said, “During the pandemic, the US government instead of focusing on policies of global cooperation in health and prevention, has increased unilateral coercive measures, has rejected the requests from the international community to lift or ease the illegal sanctions that prevent Venezuela from accessing medicines, medical equipment and food.”

President Maduro has written similar letters to other heads of governments. Venezuela has tested the maximum number of people at 2,03,108 till date. According to the government, 58 per cent of patients with COVID-19 have recovered in the country.

Last March, the US government had announced sanctions against Venezuelan officials including President Nicolás Maduro.

In early March, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani wrote to PM Modi seeking joint fight against COVID-19 crisis and also raised the issue of US sanctions impacting country's attempt to deal with the situation. Iran is one of the worst impacted countries in the world due to coronavirus.

Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro has written to Indian PM Modi over COVID-19 crisis in which he has raised the issue of US sanctions impacting relief measures in the country.

Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro has written to Indian PM Modi over COVID-19 crisis in which he has raised the issue of US sanctions impacting relief measures in the country. The letter was sent to PM Modi via diplomatic channels on March 29. The letter said, “During the pandemic, the US government instead of focusing on policies of global cooperation in health and prevention, has increased unilateral coercive measures, has rejected the requests from the international community to lift or ease the illegal sanctions that prevent Venezuela from accessing medicines, medical equipment and food.” President Maduro has written similar letters to other heads of governments. Venezuela has tested the maximum number of people at 2,03,108 till date. According to the government, 58 per cent of patients with COVID-19 have recovered in the country. Last March, the US government had announced sanctions against Venezuelan officials including President Nicolás Maduro. In early March, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani wrote to PM Modi seeking joint fight against COVID-19 crisis and also raised the issue of US sanctions impacting country's attempt to deal with the situation. Iran is one of the worst impacted countries in the world due to coronavirus.

Venezuela President Maduro writes to PM Modi over COVID-19 crisis; raises US sanctions issue

The United States <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/trump-administration-plans-to-divert-40-million-in-aid-to-venezuelas-opposition-236654">imposed sanctions on Thursday </a>on 10 people and 13 groups in a Venezuelan food subsidy scheme that lined the pockets of President Nicolas Maduro, his stepsons and others while ordinary Venezuelans suffer food shortages, the US&nbsp;Treasury said.

The department said Colombian national Alex Nain Saab orchestrated a vast corruption network for food imports and distribution in Venezuela. He profited from overvalued contracts, including the government's food subsidy program.

Saab bribed Maduro's <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/donald-trump-administration-targets-nicolas-maduros-son-nicolasito-with-sanctions-231342">three stepsons to win no-bid</a>, overvalued government contracts, said Sigal P. Mandelker, under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence.

"Alex Saab engaged with Maduro insiders to run a wide-scale corruption network they callously used to exploit Venezuela’s starving population," Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement.&nbsp;

"Treasury is targeting those behind Maduro's sophisticated corruption schemes, as well as the global network of shell companies that profit from" the country's military-controlled food distribution program, he said.

The department said Saab became involved with the food subsidy program in 2016, when he set up a corporate structure to acquire food outside the country and ship it to Venezuela.

Saab reaped profits and imported only a fraction of the food needed for the subsidy program, it said.

Treasury alleged the individuals hit by sanctions had enriched themselves through government contracts, including Maduro's stepsons Walter, Yosser and Yoswal Gavidia.

Saab also began in 2018 to help the Venezuelan government liquidate gold mined in Venezuela and convert it into foreign currency, Treasury said. The gold was then flown to destinations including Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, it said.

The United States imposed sanctions on the Venezuelan gold sector last year. U.S. envoy to Venezuela Elliott Abrams estimated on Wednesday that Maduro's government had sold roughly $1 billion in gold in 2019.

The United States imposed sanctions on Thursday on 10 people and 13 groups in a Venezuelan food subsidy scheme that lined the pockets of President Nicolas Maduro, his stepsons and others while ordinary Venezuelans suffer food shortages, the US Treasury said.

The United States imposed sanctions on Thursday on 10 people and 13 groups in a Venezuelan food subsidy scheme that lined the pockets of President Nicolas Maduro, his stepsons and others while ordinary Venezuelans suffer food shortages, the US Treasury said. The department said Colombian national Alex Nain Saab orchestrated a vast corruption network for food imports and distribution in Venezuela. He profited from overvalued contracts, including the government's food subsidy program. Saab bribed Maduro's three stepsons to win no-bid, overvalued government contracts, said Sigal P. Mandelker, under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence. "Alex Saab engaged with Maduro insiders to run a wide-scale corruption network they callously used to exploit Venezuela’s starving population," Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement. "Treasury is targeting those behind Maduro's sophisticated corruption schemes, as well as the global network of shell companies that profit from" the country's military-controlled food distribution program, he said. The department said Saab became involved with the food subsidy program in 2016, when he set up a corporate structure to acquire food outside the country and ship it to Venezuela. Saab reaped profits and imported only a fraction of the food needed for the subsidy program, it said. Treasury alleged the individuals hit by sanctions had enriched themselves through government contracts, including Maduro's stepsons Walter, Yosser and Yoswal Gavidia. Saab also began in 2018 to help the Venezuelan government liquidate gold mined in Venezuela and convert it into foreign currency, Treasury said. The gold was then flown to destinations including Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, it said. The United States imposed sanctions on the Venezuelan gold sector last year. U.S. envoy to Venezuela Elliott Abrams estimated on Wednesday that Maduro's government had sold roughly $1 billion in gold in 2019.

US imposes sanctions on people, groups linked to Venezuelan food subsidy scam

The United States on Friday imposed sanctions on the son of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro for serving in his father's "illegitimate regime."

"Maduro relies on his son Nicolasito and others close to his authoritarian regime to maintain a stranglehold on the economy and suppress the people of Venezuela," US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in announcing the action.

"Treasury will continue to target complicit relatives of illegitimate regime insiders profiting off of Maduro’s corruption," he said.

The action freezes any assets Nicolas Ernesto Maduro Guerra has in the United States and bars American individuals or institutions from doing business with him.

<div class="videoWrapper trancodeVideo"><iframe src="https://www.wionews.com/videos/charities-use-cryptocurrency-to-send-aid-to-venezuela-220620/embed" width="560" height="350" style="width:100%;max-width:560px;" class="includeVideo" frameborder="0" autoplay=1 allowfullscreen></iframe></div>

The latest US action comes as Maduro moves to consolidate his hold on power after a failed coup attempt by opposition leader Juan Guaido.

Guaido, the leader of the opposition-controlled National Assembly, is recognised by the United States and more than 50 other countries as Venezuela's acting president.

In targeting Maduro's son, the Treasury noted that he was a member of the pro-government Constituent Assembly, which Maduro has used to sideline the National Assembly.

It also said that Maduro Guerra "has profited from Venezuelan mines along with Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores," and engaged in propaganda and censorship efforts on behalf of his father's government.

The United States on Friday imposed sanctions on the son of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro for serving in his father's "illegitimate regime." "Maduro relies on his son Nicolasito and others close to his authoritarian regime to maintain a stranglehold on the economy and suppress the people of Venezuela," US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in announcing the action.

The United States on Friday imposed sanctions on the son of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro for serving in his father's "illegitimate regime." "Maduro relies on his son Nicolasito and others close to his authoritarian regime to maintain a stranglehold on the economy and suppress the people of Venezuela," US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in announcing the action. "Treasury will continue to target complicit relatives of illegitimate regime insiders profiting off of Maduro’s corruption," he said. The action freezes any assets Nicolas Ernesto Maduro Guerra has in the United States and bars American individuals or institutions from doing business with him. The latest US action comes as Maduro moves to consolidate his hold on power after a failed coup attempt by opposition leader Juan Guaido. Guaido, the leader of the opposition-controlled National Assembly, is recognised by the United States and more than 50 other countries as Venezuela's acting president. In targeting Maduro's son, the Treasury noted that he was a member of the pro-government Constituent Assembly, which Maduro has used to sideline the National Assembly. It also said that Maduro Guerra "has profited from Venezuelan mines along with Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores," and engaged in propaganda and censorship efforts on behalf of his father's government.

US imposes sanctions on Venezuelan President Maduro's son Nicolasito

By Ben Zissimos

Violence erupted at the Venezuela-Colombia border over the delivery of humanitarian aid to Venezuela, killing four people and injuring 24 on February 22.

US&nbsp;Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro that his “days are numbered,” and Trump officials reiterated that the US is considering all options, including military action, to address Venezuela’s crisis.

Almost 80 per cent of Venezuelans disapprove of Maduro, who was reinaugurated for a second six-year term in January after an election widely seen as fraudulent. Since taking power in 2013, he has led Venezuela into a deep economic crisis.

In late January, opposition leader Juan Guaidó declared Maduro a “usurper” and swore himself in as the country’s rightful president. More than 50 countries – including the United States, Europe and most of Latin America – want to replace Maduro’s regime with a Guaidó-led government.

Despite near global condemnation of Maduro, any US intervention in Venezuela would be controversial. The United States’ long history of interfering in Latin American politics suggests that its military operations generally usher in dictatorship and civil war – not democracy.

The Cuban-US Cold War

Cuba, the focus of my history research, is a prime example of this pattern.

US-Cuban relations have never recovered from President William McKinley’s intervention in Cuba’s war for independence over a century ago.

Before waging what in the US is known as the Spanish-American War in 1898, McKinley promised that “the people of the island of Cuba” would be “free and independent” from Spain and that his government had no “intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said Island.”

In the end, however, Cuba’s independence from Spain meant domination by the United States.

For 60 years after the Spanish-American War, the White House made repeated military and diplomatic interventions in Cuba, supporting politicians who protected US economic interests in sugar, utilities, banks or tourism and who backed American foreign policy in the Caribbean.

By 1952, when the US-backed Fulgencio Batista overthrew President Carlos Prío Socarrás, Cuba’s government had effectively become protectors of American businesses, according to my research. Batista had a warm relationship with both Washington, DC and the American organized crime groups that used to control Havana’s tourist industry.

A communist revolution led by Fidel Castro overthrew Batista’s military junta in 1959. Castro decried the “imperialist government of the United States” for turning Cuba into an “American colony.”

The Kennedy administration’s trade embargo against Cuba and the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion – in which the US military trained Cuban dissidents in an attempt to unseat Castro – only pushed Cuba further into the orbit of Soviet Russia.

For the past six decades, the US and Cuba have remained locked in a Cold War, with a brief thaw under President Barack Obama.

Anti-communist coups

Fearing that communism would spread across the hemisphere, the US government repeatedly interfered in the politics of Latin American nations during the Cold War.

In 1954 the CIA worked with elements of the Guatemalan military to overthrow elected President Jacobo Árbenz, whom US policymakers considered dangerously left-wing. Decades of dictatorship and civil war followed, killing an estimated 200,000 people.

A peace agreement in 1996 restored democracy, but Guatemala has yet to recover economically, politically or psychologically from the bloodshed.

Then there is Chile’s US-supported coup d'etat. In 1973, the US government covertly assisted right-wing elements of the Chilean military in overthrowing the socialist president Salvador Allende.

General Augusto Pinochet took power with the quiet financial and political support of the United States. His dictatorship, which lasted until 1990, killed tens of thousands of Chileans.

The Dominican Republic and Panama

US intervention in Latin America did not start or end with the Cold War.

During World War I, the United States was concerned that Germany could use the Dominican Republic as a base of military operations. So American troops occupied the Caribbean island from 1916 to 1924. 
 
Though the American-led administration improved the finances and infrastructure of the Dominican Republic, it also created the national guard that helped to propel Gen. Rafael Trujillo into power. His 30-year reign was savage.

President George H W Bush’s 1989 invasion of Panama is the rare exception when U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs actually created stability.

Most Panamanians appear to have supported the 1989 U.S. military operation to remove the corrupt and brutal military strongman Manuel Noriega.

In the years since, Panama has enjoyed comparatively peaceful elections and transfers of power.

Anti-Americanism in Latin America

On balance, though, US military operations in Latin America have rarely brought democracy.

But they have created strong anti-American sentiment in the region, which leftist leaders from Fidel Castro to Hugo Chávez have adeptly harnessed to vilify their political opponents as mere US puppets.

Support for the US government is lower now than it has been in decades. Just 35 per cent of Argentines, 39 per cent of Chileans and 45 percent of Venezuelans view the US favourably, according to the Pew Research Center.

President Maduro, too, has used anti-imperialist rhetoric. He denounces US sanctions and other efforts to isolate his regime as a “gringo plot.”

A safer way to restore democracy

This history explains why a US intervention in Venezuela would be viewed with skepticism. Though Maduro is unpopular, 65 per cent of Venezuelans oppose any foreign military operation to remove Maduro, according to recent polling.

Rather than plan yet another coup d'etat, I believe US&nbsp;efforts in Venezuela should support the work of the Lima Group, a coalition of 12 Latin American countries, including Mexico, Guatemala and Brazil, plus Canada.

The Lima Group has ruled out military force in Venezuela. Its pressure campaign to force him out peacefully has included diplomatically isolating his regime and asking Venezuela’s soldiers to pledge loyalty to Guaidó.

A negotiated settlement leading to Maduro’s voluntary departure from office is their ultimate goal.

Regional diplomacy is much slower than foreign intervention. But it avoids further bloodshed and reduces the role of anti-Americanism in Venezuela’s crisis.

It may also open a new chapter in the history of US-Latin American relations – one in which the US takes its lead from the region, and not the other way around.

(Joseph J Gonzalez is Associate Professor, Global Studies, Appalachian State University)

(This article was originally published on the Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-crisis-trump-threats-to-maduro-evoke-bloody-history-of-us-intervention-in-latin-america-111169">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

&nbsp;

By Ben Zissimos Violence erupted at the Venezuela-Colombia border over the delivery of humanitarian aid to Venezuela, killing four people and injuring 24 on February 22.

By Ben Zissimos Violence erupted at the Venezuela-Colombia border over the delivery of humanitarian aid to Venezuela, killing four people and injuring 24 on February 22. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro that his “days are numbered,” and Trump officials reiterated that the US is considering all options, including military action, to address Venezuela’s crisis. Almost 80 per cent of Venezuelans disapprove of Maduro, who was reinaugurated for a second six-year term in January after an election widely seen as fraudulent. Since taking power in 2013, he has led Venezuela into a deep economic crisis. In late January, opposition leader Juan Guaidó declared Maduro a “usurper” and swore himself in as the country’s rightful president. More than 50 countries – including the United States, Europe and most of Latin America – want to replace Maduro’s regime with a Guaidó-led government. Despite near global condemnation of Maduro, any US intervention in Venezuela would be controversial. The United States’ long history of interfering in Latin American politics suggests that its military operations generally usher in dictatorship and civil war – not democracy. The Cuban-US Cold War Cuba, the focus of my history research, is a prime example of this pattern. US-Cuban relations have never recovered from President William McKinley’s intervention in Cuba’s war for independence over a century ago. Before waging what in the US is known as the Spanish-American War in 1898, McKinley promised that “the people of the island of Cuba” would be “free and independent” from Spain and that his government had no “intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said Island.” In the end, however, Cuba’s independence from Spain meant domination by the United States. For 60 years after the Spanish-American War, the White House made repeated military and diplomatic interventions in Cuba, supporting politicians who protected US economic interests in sugar, utilities, banks or tourism and who backed American foreign policy in the Caribbean. By 1952, when the US-backed Fulgencio Batista overthrew President Carlos Prío Socarrás, Cuba’s government had effectively become protectors of American businesses, according to my research. Batista had a warm relationship with both Washington, DC and the American organized crime groups that used to control Havana’s tourist industry. A communist revolution led by Fidel Castro overthrew Batista’s military junta in 1959. Castro decried the “imperialist government of the United States” for turning Cuba into an “American colony.” The Kennedy administration’s trade embargo against Cuba and the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion – in which the US military trained Cuban dissidents in an attempt to unseat Castro – only pushed Cuba further into the orbit of Soviet Russia. For the past six decades, the US and Cuba have remained locked in a Cold War, with a brief thaw under President Barack Obama. Anti-communist coups Fearing that communism would spread across the hemisphere, the US government repeatedly interfered in the politics of Latin American nations during the Cold War. In 1954 the CIA worked with elements of the Guatemalan military to overthrow elected President Jacobo Árbenz, whom US policymakers considered dangerously left-wing. Decades of dictatorship and civil war followed, killing an estimated 200,000 people. A peace agreement in 1996 restored democracy, but Guatemala has yet to recover economically, politically or psychologically from the bloodshed. Then there is Chile’s US-supported coup d'etat. In 1973, the US government covertly assisted right-wing elements of the Chilean military in overthrowing the socialist president Salvador Allende. General Augusto Pinochet took power with the quiet financial and political support of the United States. His dictatorship, which lasted until 1990, killed tens of thousands of Chileans. The Dominican Republic and Panama US intervention in Latin America did not start or end with the Cold War. During World War I, the United States was concerned that Germany could use the Dominican Republic as a base of military operations. So American troops occupied the Caribbean island from 1916 to 1924. Though the American-led administration improved the finances and infrastructure of the Dominican Republic, it also created the national guard that helped to propel Gen. Rafael Trujillo into power. His 30-year reign was savage. President George H W Bush’s 1989 invasion of Panama is the rare exception when U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs actually created stability. Most Panamanians appear to have supported the 1989 U.S. military operation to remove the corrupt and brutal military strongman Manuel Noriega. In the years since, Panama has enjoyed comparatively peaceful elections and transfers of power. Anti-Americanism in Latin America On balance, though, US military operations in Latin America have rarely brought democracy. But they have created strong anti-American sentiment in the region, which leftist leaders from Fidel Castro to Hugo Chávez have adeptly harnessed to vilify their political opponents as mere US puppets. Support for the US government is lower now than it has been in decades. Just 35 per cent of Argentines, 39 per cent of Chileans and 45 percent of Venezuelans view the US favourably, according to the Pew Research Center. President Maduro, too, has used anti-imperialist rhetoric. He denounces US sanctions and other efforts to isolate his regime as a “gringo plot.” A safer way to restore democracy This history explains why a US intervention in Venezuela would be viewed with skepticism. Though Maduro is unpopular, 65 per cent of Venezuelans oppose any foreign military operation to remove Maduro, according to recent polling. Rather than plan yet another coup d'etat, I believe US efforts in Venezuela should support the work of the Lima Group, a coalition of 12 Latin American countries, including Mexico, Guatemala and Brazil, plus Canada. The Lima Group has ruled out military force in Venezuela. Its pressure campaign to force him out peacefully has included diplomatically isolating his regime and asking Venezuela’s soldiers to pledge loyalty to Guaidó. A negotiated settlement leading to Maduro’s voluntary departure from office is their ultimate goal. Regional diplomacy is much slower than foreign intervention. But it avoids further bloodshed and reduces the role of anti-Americanism in Venezuela’s crisis. It may also open a new chapter in the history of US-Latin American relations – one in which the US takes its lead from the region, and not the other way around. (Joseph J Gonzalez is Associate Professor, Global Studies, Appalachian State University) (This article was originally published on the Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Venezuela crisis: Donald Trump's threats to Nicolas Maduro evoke history of US intervention in Latin America

By Ben Zissimos

Venezuela stands close to the brink of another revolution. Acute shortages of food and medicine, along with quintuple-digit inflation, has led to an economic crisis.

With a large amount of much-needed humanitarian aid being held at Venezuela’s borders with Colombia and Brazil, things could turn very violent (some skirmishes have already taken place). The aid has been sent by the US and other international supporters of opposition leader Juan Guaidó. Together they brand President Nicolás Maduro a dictator, believing that he rigged his election in May 2018, and demand that he now stand down and restore democracy. But the army, so far, remains loyal to Maduro and troops have barricaded the border crossings to prevent aid from entering – something Maduro fears is a prelude to US invasion.

In applying my research to the situation in Venezuela, it’s clear that things could soon come to a head. My research shows how dictators can manipulate their trade policies to bolster their political survival, foreclosing democratisation in this process. Using an economic model, I strip these types of situations down to a few essential ingredients, simplifying an extremely complex set of circumstances to facilitate deeper insight into how they work. Using my model to think about Venezuela’s situation, we can see precisely the role that the world’s powerful countries play through their sanctions and aid in shaping Venezuela’s prospects for democracy. 
 
Keeping people happy

The basic logic of my model is that the Maduro regime, even as a dictatorship, has to keep the population happy just like any other political regime. After all, while democratic regimes worry about losing power at the ballot box, dictators fear revolution.

The model assumes that people have a sense of how life will be if they overthrew the Maduro regime, through a revolution, paving the way to democracy. Revolution is of course extremely costly and dangerous. But if life becomes so tough for ordinary people that they ultimately feel revolution is worth the costs, then Maduro has the threat of revolution on his hands.

Maduro’s options in the face of the threat of revolution include repression – something he has already experimented with. But, from his perspective, repressing his own people is extremely costly politically. It is also risky, especially when this entails turning against his own support base.

Plus, many members of the military are unwilling to turn their weapons on their own people. This elevates the danger that military repression will ultimately backfire and lead to Maduro’s downfall. More than 100 soldiers are said to have defected during the clashes over aid deliveries.

A better option for Maduro than military repression would be to try and improve the welfare of ordinary people, making them more prepared to live with the status quo of his rule and less inclined to spark a revolution. Adopting this approach is in line with Maduro’s claims that there isn’t any crisis in the country. This is where Venezuela’s vast oil reserves could help him.

One of the insights one gains from viewing this situation through the lens of my model is that dictators can stay in power by using commodities like oil to import food and hence placate the populace. Venezuela’s ability to produce oil has been badly curtailed by the economic chaos engulfing the country, but the oil it does still produce could help Maduro shore up his survival.

This is where international economic policy becomes critical. The EU and US have levied sanctions on Venezuela’s exports, which means they have committed not to buy Venezuela’s oil. This, in turn, hinders the regime’s ability to use its oil to buy the food that Maduro needs. Having food to offer to his population is what stands between Maduro and the threat of a full-blown revolution.

Seen through my model, the explicit purpose of sanctions is to deny Maduro that lifeline, pushing Venezuela to the brink of a revolution. Of course, China and Russia’s support for Venezuela works in precisely the opposite direction, turning Maduro’s survival into a tug of war between the world’s major powers.

Uncomfortable truths

The uncomfortable truth is that, although the purpose of sanctions is to put pressure on the Maduro regime, this glosses over an important aspect of how the pressure works. It works by pushing the Venezuelan people to the point of desperation where they are prepared to risk everything in a revolution rather than live with the status quo.

Yet a second uncomfortable truth arguably outweighs the first. Failing to push the Venezuelan people to the brink of revolution will probably lead to a longer period under the Maduro dictatorship, delaying democratisation in Venezuela and entrenching the current misery.

At first sight, US food aid seems to undermine the above rationale. If food is Maduro’s lifeline, and if the purpose of sanctions is to destabilise the Maduro regime by depriving it of food, why send food aid?

I don’t think there was ever any expectation that the Maduro regime would accept the aid. Its purpose was to draw Venezuelan troops to the Colombian border, away from the capital city Caracas, and that is exactly what it has done. This further reduces Maduro’s ability to use the military to repress an uprising in the capital Caracas, further heightening the risk of revolution. It also increases the Venezuelan people’s temptation to overthrow the Maduro regime, because then they could gain access to the food aid immediately.

Another revolution is neither inevitable nor desirable. But, in my view and following the logic of the model I have developed, Venezuela has to get to the brink of revolution before it has any hope of finding the path back to meaningful democracy.

(Ben Zissimos is Associate Professor of Economics, University of Exeter)

(This article was originally published on the Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/maduro-has-pushed-venezuela-to-the-brink-of-revolution-sanctions-and-aid-may-tip-it-over-the-edge-112324">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.) 
&nbsp;

&nbsp;

By Ben Zissimos Venezuela stands close to the brink of another revolution. Acute shortages of food and medicine, along with quintuple-digit inflation, has led to an economic crisis.

By Ben Zissimos Venezuela stands close to the brink of another revolution. Acute shortages of food and medicine, along with quintuple-digit inflation, has led to an economic crisis. With a large amount of much-needed humanitarian aid being held at Venezuela’s borders with Colombia and Brazil, things could turn very violent (some skirmishes have already taken place). The aid has been sent by the US and other international supporters of opposition leader Juan Guaidó. Together they brand President Nicolás Maduro a dictator, believing that he rigged his election in May 2018, and demand that he now stand down and restore democracy. But the army, so far, remains loyal to Maduro and troops have barricaded the border crossings to prevent aid from entering – something Maduro fears is a prelude to US invasion. In applying my research to the situation in Venezuela, it’s clear that things could soon come to a head. My research shows how dictators can manipulate their trade policies to bolster their political survival, foreclosing democratisation in this process. Using an economic model, I strip these types of situations down to a few essential ingredients, simplifying an extremely complex set of circumstances to facilitate deeper insight into how they work. Using my model to think about Venezuela’s situation, we can see precisely the role that the world’s powerful countries play through their sanctions and aid in shaping Venezuela’s prospects for democracy. Keeping people happy The basic logic of my model is that the Maduro regime, even as a dictatorship, has to keep the population happy just like any other political regime. After all, while democratic regimes worry about losing power at the ballot box, dictators fear revolution. The model assumes that people have a sense of how life will be if they overthrew the Maduro regime, through a revolution, paving the way to democracy. Revolution is of course extremely costly and dangerous. But if life becomes so tough for ordinary people that they ultimately feel revolution is worth the costs, then Maduro has the threat of revolution on his hands. Maduro’s options in the face of the threat of revolution include repression – something he has already experimented with. But, from his perspective, repressing his own people is extremely costly politically. It is also risky, especially when this entails turning against his own support base. Plus, many members of the military are unwilling to turn their weapons on their own people. This elevates the danger that military repression will ultimately backfire and lead to Maduro’s downfall. More than 100 soldiers are said to have defected during the clashes over aid deliveries. A better option for Maduro than military repression would be to try and improve the welfare of ordinary people, making them more prepared to live with the status quo of his rule and less inclined to spark a revolution. Adopting this approach is in line with Maduro’s claims that there isn’t any crisis in the country. This is where Venezuela’s vast oil reserves could help him. One of the insights one gains from viewing this situation through the lens of my model is that dictators can stay in power by using commodities like oil to import food and hence placate the populace. Venezuela’s ability to produce oil has been badly curtailed by the economic chaos engulfing the country, but the oil it does still produce could help Maduro shore up his survival. This is where international economic policy becomes critical. The EU and US have levied sanctions on Venezuela’s exports, which means they have committed not to buy Venezuela’s oil. This, in turn, hinders the regime’s ability to use its oil to buy the food that Maduro needs. Having food to offer to his population is what stands between Maduro and the threat of a full-blown revolution. Seen through my model, the explicit purpose of sanctions is to deny Maduro that lifeline, pushing Venezuela to the brink of a revolution. Of course, China and Russia’s support for Venezuela works in precisely the opposite direction, turning Maduro’s survival into a tug of war between the world’s major powers. Uncomfortable truths The uncomfortable truth is that, although the purpose of sanctions is to put pressure on the Maduro regime, this glosses over an important aspect of how the pressure works. It works by pushing the Venezuelan people to the point of desperation where they are prepared to risk everything in a revolution rather than live with the status quo. Yet a second uncomfortable truth arguably outweighs the first. Failing to push the Venezuelan people to the brink of revolution will probably lead to a longer period under the Maduro dictatorship, delaying democratisation in Venezuela and entrenching the current misery. At first sight, US food aid seems to undermine the above rationale. If food is Maduro’s lifeline, and if the purpose of sanctions is to destabilise the Maduro regime by depriving it of food, why send food aid? I don’t think there was ever any expectation that the Maduro regime would accept the aid. Its purpose was to draw Venezuelan troops to the Colombian border, away from the capital city Caracas, and that is exactly what it has done. This further reduces Maduro’s ability to use the military to repress an uprising in the capital Caracas, further heightening the risk of revolution. It also increases the Venezuelan people’s temptation to overthrow the Maduro regime, because then they could gain access to the food aid immediately. Another revolution is neither inevitable nor desirable. But, in my view and following the logic of the model I have developed, Venezuela has to get to the brink of revolution before it has any hope of finding the path back to meaningful democracy. (Ben Zissimos is Associate Professor of Economics, University of Exeter) (This article was originally published on the Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Venezuela stands close to the brink of another revolution

Relations between the United States and Venezuela have been strained since the late Hugo Chávez rose to power two decades ago. They got worse when the Trump administration recognised opposition leader Juan Guaidó as the South American country’s president instead of Chávez successor Nicolás Maduro in January 2019.

These tensions could become a full-blown crisis, as has become clear along the Venezuela-Colombia border, where Maduro is blocking the entry of US humanitarian aid. The United States says it is sending $20 million in food and medical supplies to alleviate suffering at a time when Venezuelans are experiencing widespread malnutrition and lack access to health care. Maduro contends that these shipments are a plot to meddle in his country’s internal affairs – a Trojan horse courtesy of Uncle Sam to undermine Venezuelan democracy.

Although there is no clear evidence of an ulterior motive, history does give Maduro reasons to be skeptical of US intentions. As a political scientist who studies both the political ramifications of international assistance and Venezuela’s growing instability, I find that humanitarian aid is rarely just about saving lives. In Venezuela, I believe that US-supplied aid may have substantial political consequences.

A foreign policy tool

USAID, the primary federal aid agency in the US, officially operates independently. However, in practice it has worked closely with the State Department, and the Trump administration discussed making it part of the department when Rex Tillerson served as secretary of state.

The US government generally considers aid and development assistance as part of their broader foreign policy. The State Department officially calls USAID an “important contributor to the objectives of the National Security Strategy of the United States.” In other words, USAID’s work abroad is at least partially intended to safeguard American security and promote US interests.

President Donald Trump recently told the UN General Assembly that the US is “only going to give foreign aid to those who respect us and, frankly, are our friends,” a statement that appeared to be a threat to cut off American assistance to Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador unless they curb the flow of US-bound asylum-seekers and other immigrants.

The US gives those three countries a total of about $450 million a year in foreign aid and the Trump administration has pledged additional funds to slow the flow of people across the border.

Using aid to advance the national interest is not new.

In 2001, when the war in Afghanistan got underway, the Bush administration used aid to complement the military effort to prevent terrorism. Because Afghanistan had harboured Osama bin Laden and others tied to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, USAID got a broad mandate and billions of dollars to help win the hearts and minds of Afghans. That policy was essentially a bet that once military intervention had defused the hostilities, Afghans would have a more favourable view of the US – reducing the risk that terrorists would use Afghanistan as a launching pad.

USAID has also played an explicit role in attempting to win hearts and minds in Iraq in the early 2000s, Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and elsewhere.

(Morten Wendelbo is Research Fellow, American University School of Public Affairs)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-maduro-is-blocking-venezuela-bound-humanitarian-aid-when-so-many-people-in-his-country-need-it-111585">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.) 
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Relations between the United States and Venezuela have been strained since the late Hugo Chávez rose to power two decades ago. They got worse when the Trump administration recognised opposition leader Juan Guaidó as the South American country’s president instead of Chávez successor Nicolás Maduro in January 2019.

Relations between the United States and Venezuela have been strained since the late Hugo Chávez rose to power two decades ago. They got worse when the Trump administration recognised opposition leader Juan Guaidó as the South American country’s president instead of Chávez successor Nicolás Maduro in January 2019. These tensions could become a full-blown crisis, as has become clear along the Venezuela-Colombia border, where Maduro is blocking the entry of US humanitarian aid. The United States says it is sending $20 million in food and medical supplies to alleviate suffering at a time when Venezuelans are experiencing widespread malnutrition and lack access to health care. Maduro contends that these shipments are a plot to meddle in his country’s internal affairs – a Trojan horse courtesy of Uncle Sam to undermine Venezuelan democracy. Although there is no clear evidence of an ulterior motive, history does give Maduro reasons to be skeptical of US intentions. As a political scientist who studies both the political ramifications of international assistance and Venezuela’s growing instability, I find that humanitarian aid is rarely just about saving lives. In Venezuela, I believe that US-supplied aid may have substantial political consequences. A foreign policy tool USAID, the primary federal aid agency in the US, officially operates independently. However, in practice it has worked closely with the State Department, and the Trump administration discussed making it part of the department when Rex Tillerson served as secretary of state. The US government generally considers aid and development assistance as part of their broader foreign policy. The State Department officially calls USAID an “important contributor to the objectives of the National Security Strategy of the United States.” In other words, USAID’s work abroad is at least partially intended to safeguard American security and promote US interests. President Donald Trump recently told the UN General Assembly that the US is “only going to give foreign aid to those who respect us and, frankly, are our friends,” a statement that appeared to be a threat to cut off American assistance to Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador unless they curb the flow of US-bound asylum-seekers and other immigrants. The US gives those three countries a total of about $450 million a year in foreign aid and the Trump administration has pledged additional funds to slow the flow of people across the border. Using aid to advance the national interest is not new. In 2001, when the war in Afghanistan got underway, the Bush administration used aid to complement the military effort to prevent terrorism. Because Afghanistan had harboured Osama bin Laden and others tied to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, USAID got a broad mandate and billions of dollars to help win the hearts and minds of Afghans. That policy was essentially a bet that once military intervention had defused the hostilities, Afghans would have a more favourable view of the US – reducing the risk that terrorists would use Afghanistan as a launching pad. USAID has also played an explicit role in attempting to win hearts and minds in Iraq in the early 2000s, Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and elsewhere. (Morten Wendelbo is Research Fellow, American University School of Public Affairs) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Venezuela crisis: US-supplied humanitarian aid may have a political motive

By Pia Riggirozzi 
 
Long before the current crisis in Venezuela, democracy in Latin America was a damaged project. Military coups d’etat and other violent seizures of power in the 1960s and 1970s were followed by weak attempts at redemocratisation. Efforts to institutionalise social rights, particularly those based on state intervention in the economy, provoked a hostile reaction from domestic and foreign markets.

Democratic attempts often faced hurdles caused by profound socio-economic restructuring and severe cuts in public spending – with national budgets linked closely to the global economy. Democracy was also highly dependent on markets.

During the 1980s, oil prices fell dramatically. In Venezuela, debt then skyrocketed, giving way to a dramatic political and economic crisis that was exacerbated by blatant corruption.

Then in 1998, Hugo Chávez was elected president – but with no fixed strategy of what an “anti-capitalist project” might entail. Instead, he took power at the end of a decade that had seen a catastrophic deterioration in living standards and the monopoly of conservative political parties.

Chávez was elected on his pledge to refound the republic in line with the vision of Simon Bolivar, who had liberated Venezuela from Spanish rule in the early 19th century. And for Chávez, over more than a decade his experiments seemed to work.

According to the World Bank, his social, political and economic reforms led to a spectacular 50 per cent reduction of poverty, and a 65 per cent drop in “extreme poverty” between 1998 and 2012.

These gains were mirrored by Venezuela’s neighbours, with Latin America successfully reducing poverty and promoting shared prosperity. The proportion of the region’s 600m people living in extreme poverty (defined as a daily income of less than $2.50) was cut in half between 2003 and 2012 to around 12 per cent.

In Venezuela, post-neoliberalism as a project (committed to the creation of non-market societies, economies and cultures) remained highly dependent on the oil bonanza, accumulating reserves which supported the use (and abuse) of social welfare regimes. Yet as it became increasingly caught in the international oil industry downturn, so too did the post-neoliberal project.

A state that failed the people

The halving of the oil price in 2014 sharply reversed the advances made in reducing poverty and inequality. Fatal food and medicines shortages, disease outbreaks and widespread social deprivation spiralled into an unprecedented social and economic crisis.

Now, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), nearly 90 per cent of Venezuelans live in poverty – a dramatic increase from an already alarming 48 per cent in 2014.

It would be politically naive to think that the promise of democracy in Venezuela was vulnerable purely because of an over-reliance on volatile oil industry. That was undoubtedly a fatal flaw, but Venezuela also failed to reconcile a deeply polarised society.

Since his election as president in 2013, Nicolás Maduro has failed to address chronic problems of economic mismanagement, poor planning, increasing social discontent, and corruption. His country has since undergone cycles of protest and repression that reinforced the social divide.

Human rights violations became systematic. There have been well-documented restrictions on social protest and freedom of expression, with extrajudicial detentions and arbitrary arrests of opponents. On top of this, a devastating humanitarian crisis has seen an exodus to neighbouring countries - Brazil and Colombia – in a scale never seen before. The number of arrivals from Venezuela to neighbouring countries has steadily increased, reaching 5,000 per day in early 2018.

To some, Venezuela had become a failed state, without the basic norms of democratic governance. Then on January 23 2019, Juan Guaidó, leader of the Venezuelan National Assembly, declared himself president of the republic.

Guaidó has long been an anti-government activist, but until recently was little known around the world – or even in Venezuela. Yet his move was quickly endorsed by several Latin American countries, as well as Canada and the United States. His self-claim to the presidency is quite problematic too: it draws legitimacy from “assertive politics” rather than from a direct democratic ballot. The end apparently justifies the means.

Power grab?

The argument seems to be that Maduro has ruined the Venezuelan economy, violated human rights of all sorts, repeatedly challenged the Venezuelan constitution himself, and was not freely or fairly re-elected in 2018.

Guaidó, therefore, alleges that Maduro “stole” power and the role of president has therefore been left vacant.

Meanwhile, the president of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, said the Venezuelan people have had “enough of the hunger and abuse suffered at the hands of Maduro”. And the Trump administration asserts that all countries must “pick a side” and back the “forces of freedom”.

But can an opposition leader – albeit with the support of foreign powers – simply state that the president of the country is not actually the president, and take power himself? If he can, how would Venezuelans be reassured that removing the “bad” president will not simply legitimise more politics of this “assertive” kind.

So for the moment, the country has been plunged into a situation whereby it has an internationally recognised government which has no democratic mandate from the people or control over state functions - yet it runs parallel to Maduro’s parliament, with a de facto presidential mandate yet a delusional and dangerous sense of authority.

This is not democracy. What Venezuela urgently needs is to reconstruct the foundations of political legitimacy beyond declarations. It requires electoral democracy and political consensus that can genuinely represent the people, deliver development, and reconstruct a sense of citizenship and belonging for its people.

 
(Pia Riggirozzi is Professor of Global Politics, University of Southampton)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-is-putting-democracy-and-its-legitimacy-to-test-111466">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

&nbsp;

By Pia Riggirozzi Long before the current crisis in Venezuela, democracy in Latin America was a damaged project. Military coups d’etat and other violent seizures of power in the 1960s and 1970s were followed by weak attempts at redemocratisation.

By Pia Riggirozzi Long before the current crisis in Venezuela, democracy in Latin America was a damaged project. Military coups d’etat and other violent seizures of power in the 1960s and 1970s were followed by weak attempts at redemocratisation. Efforts to institutionalise social rights, particularly those based on state intervention in the economy, provoked a hostile reaction from domestic and foreign markets. Democratic attempts often faced hurdles caused by profound socio-economic restructuring and severe cuts in public spending – with national budgets linked closely to the global economy. Democracy was also highly dependent on markets. During the 1980s, oil prices fell dramatically. In Venezuela, debt then skyrocketed, giving way to a dramatic political and economic crisis that was exacerbated by blatant corruption. Then in 1998, Hugo Chávez was elected president – but with no fixed strategy of what an “anti-capitalist project” might entail. Instead, he took power at the end of a decade that had seen a catastrophic deterioration in living standards and the monopoly of conservative political parties. Chávez was elected on his pledge to refound the republic in line with the vision of Simon Bolivar, who had liberated Venezuela from Spanish rule in the early 19th century. And for Chávez, over more than a decade his experiments seemed to work. According to the World Bank, his social, political and economic reforms led to a spectacular 50 per cent reduction of poverty, and a 65 per cent drop in “extreme poverty” between 1998 and 2012. These gains were mirrored by Venezuela’s neighbours, with Latin America successfully reducing poverty and promoting shared prosperity. The proportion of the region’s 600m people living in extreme poverty (defined as a daily income of less than $2.50) was cut in half between 2003 and 2012 to around 12 per cent. In Venezuela, post-neoliberalism as a project (committed to the creation of non-market societies, economies and cultures) remained highly dependent on the oil bonanza, accumulating reserves which supported the use (and abuse) of social welfare regimes. Yet as it became increasingly caught in the international oil industry downturn, so too did the post-neoliberal project. A state that failed the people The halving of the oil price in 2014 sharply reversed the advances made in reducing poverty and inequality. Fatal food and medicines shortages, disease outbreaks and widespread social deprivation spiralled into an unprecedented social and economic crisis. Now, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), nearly 90 per cent of Venezuelans live in poverty – a dramatic increase from an already alarming 48 per cent in 2014. It would be politically naive to think that the promise of democracy in Venezuela was vulnerable purely because of an over-reliance on volatile oil industry. That was undoubtedly a fatal flaw, but Venezuela also failed to reconcile a deeply polarised society. Since his election as president in 2013, Nicolás Maduro has failed to address chronic problems of economic mismanagement, poor planning, increasing social discontent, and corruption. His country has since undergone cycles of protest and repression that reinforced the social divide. Human rights violations became systematic. There have been well-documented restrictions on social protest and freedom of expression, with extrajudicial detentions and arbitrary arrests of opponents. On top of this, a devastating humanitarian crisis has seen an exodus to neighbouring countries - Brazil and Colombia – in a scale never seen before. The number of arrivals from Venezuela to neighbouring countries has steadily increased, reaching 5,000 per day in early 2018. To some, Venezuela had become a failed state, without the basic norms of democratic governance. Then on January 23 2019, Juan Guaidó, leader of the Venezuelan National Assembly, declared himself president of the republic. Guaidó has long been an anti-government activist, but until recently was little known around the world – or even in Venezuela. Yet his move was quickly endorsed by several Latin American countries, as well as Canada and the United States. His self-claim to the presidency is quite problematic too: it draws legitimacy from “assertive politics” rather than from a direct democratic ballot. The end apparently justifies the means. Power grab? The argument seems to be that Maduro has ruined the Venezuelan economy, violated human rights of all sorts, repeatedly challenged the Venezuelan constitution himself, and was not freely or fairly re-elected in 2018. Guaidó, therefore, alleges that Maduro “stole” power and the role of president has therefore been left vacant. Meanwhile, the president of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, said the Venezuelan people have had “enough of the hunger and abuse suffered at the hands of Maduro”. And the Trump administration asserts that all countries must “pick a side” and back the “forces of freedom”. But can an opposition leader – albeit with the support of foreign powers – simply state that the president of the country is not actually the president, and take power himself? If he can, how would Venezuelans be reassured that removing the “bad” president will not simply legitimise more politics of this “assertive” kind. So for the moment, the country has been plunged into a situation whereby it has an internationally recognised government which has no democratic mandate from the people or control over state functions - yet it runs parallel to Maduro’s parliament, with a de facto presidential mandate yet a delusional and dangerous sense of authority. This is not democracy. What Venezuela urgently needs is to reconstruct the foundations of political legitimacy beyond declarations. It requires electoral democracy and political consensus that can genuinely represent the people, deliver development, and reconstruct a sense of citizenship and belonging for its people. (Pia Riggirozzi is Professor of Global Politics, University of Southampton) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Venezuela crisis: Can Juan Guaido state that Nicolas Maduro is not the president, and seize power himself?

By Scott Morgenstern and John Polga–Hecimovich

As political and economic crises threaten to topple Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro, political scientists like us are not surprised that he has run into trouble.

Instead, we see Venezuela as another example of what scholars call the “resource curse.” That’s the unfortunate correlation first described by the British economic geographer Richard M. Auty between nations with vast wealth from oil or other natural resources and political instability.

Venezuela is a textbook case of the curse, since nearly 90 per cent of its people are now living in poverty in the country with the world’s largest oil reserves. After decades of leaders who failed to harness this commodity for peace and prosperity, it is questionable whether a new government can do a better job.

Only a few oil and natural gas-rich countries, such as the United States, Canada and Norway have avoided this curse – in part because they built solid institutions and diverse economies before their petroleum drilling began.

The resource curse

The resource curse has afflicted many Latin American countries with profligate and populist elected leaders who succumbed to the temptations of corruption and reckless spending when easy money poured in, followed by right-wing dictatorships imposing repressive technocracies. Oil and wealth from other commodities like gold and copper, and foreign aid, have also supported kleptocrats and dictatorships who have often used their fortunes to retain power in other regions.

The scholars Terry Karl and Thad Dunning have persuasively argued that oil export revenue helped sustain Venezuelan democracy from the 1950s to the early 1980s. The government, they explained, could buy support from the elite with lower taxes and from the poor with social programs.

Oil money, in short, can sustain whatever government is in power, be it dictatorship or democracy.

But when crude prices fall, the loss of revenue polarises politics as the wealthy and the poor fight over the reduced proceeds. And when these countries not only rely on one export but also very limited markets, that adds to their vulnerability.

Oil sales constituted 98 per cent of Venezuela’s export earnings in 2017, with the US buying nearly half of the country’s exported crude.

Boom and bust

After several decades of strong economic performance backed by comparatively impressive social programs, Venezuela’s economy started to sputter in the 1980s. The vast sums of money it had borrowed a decade earlier, backed by future oil revenues, were coming due by that time.

President Carlos Andrés Pérez, who had presided over strong economic growth between 1974 and 1979, returned to power in 1989. However, this time the country faced a weak currency, rising poverty rates, and increased foreign and public debt in combination with low oil prices.

To stabilize the economy, Pérez implemented austerity policies that deregulated capital markets and reduced-price controls on gasoline and other products.

These measures exacerbated economic hardships for the poor, and Venezuelans took to the streets to protest in deadly riots known as the Caracazo. Pérez survived two coup attempts in 1992 only to be impeached and forced out of office for embezzlement in 1993.

Popular anger against economic conditions and the dominant political class led voters to back more polarizing politicians. The first coup attempt against Pérez in 1992 was organized by Hugo Chávez, then a lieutenant-colonel, who famously exclaimed to the nation that he had failed “for now.”

He was right. Just six years later, in 1998, he ran for president and won an overwhelming victory.

Building support 
 
Luckily for Chávez, oil prices had started to rise again, eventually reaching record levels while he was in power. Aside from a brief downturn brought on by the Great Recession, those high oil prices raised enough revenue to help sustain his support.

He gained extra revenue by restructuring Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the country’s state-owned oil and natural gas company that now faces U.S. sanctions, to increase his control and to direct a bigger percentage of its export earnings into government coffers.

With that money, he built popular support by paying for dozens of safety net programs, such as the “Barrio Adentro” health initiative for the poor and the “Misión Robinson” literacy program, starting massive infrastructure projects, and continuing to subsidise the world’s cheapest gasoline.

When Chávez appointed allies to prominent posts at PDVSA in 2002, dissident members of the military and radicalized leaders of the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce staged a coup attempt that ultimately failed to oust him.

Meanwhile, the government invested too little in the oil industry and mismanaged it. At the same time, it did too little to prepare for the possibility of lower revenue from oil, to boost other exports or to stop depending on the United States as its biggest customer. Following a big decline, Venezuela remained America’s third-largest source of foreign oil as of October 2018.

Maduro’s staying power

Maduro arrived to power in 2013, after the 58-year-old Chávez died from cancer. By then, Venezuelan oil production had declined, and just one year later global oil prices began to collapse.

Maduro’s popularity collapsed too, although he did get re-elected in 2018 in a race without any independent international electoral observers that was marked by boycotts, accusations of repressing the opposition, and vote-rigging.

On top of his misfortune to be leading Venezuela during an oil price slump, Maduro has turned out to be even worse at managing the oil industry than Chávez. He installed military cronies as managers, led by Manuel Quevedo, a major general in Venezuela’s National Guard.

Since his rise, there have been more purges of PDVSA executives, and many reports that lower-level workers are staying home since they can no longer afford the commute on their wages. Adding even further to the commotion, corruption has run rampant.

The increased social and economic upheaval has even led many poor people to withdraw their allegiance to Maduro. Amid the turmoil, the U.S. and many other countries are recognizing opposition leader Juan Guaidó, as the nation’s legitimate president.

Whether or not Guaidó manages to dislodge Maduro’s grip on power, the country’s turbulent history suggests that long-term success will require much more than removing its current embattled leader. Any future leaders must also build the coalitions and institutions necessary to break the resource curse and thus empower Venezuela to finally draw social and economic stability from its oil wealth.

(Scott Morgenstern is Professor, University of Pittsburgh; John Polga–Hecimovich is Assistant Professor, United States Naval Academy)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) 
&nbsp;

By Scott Morgenstern and John Polga–Hecimovich As political and economic crises threaten to topple Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro, political scientists like us are not surprised that he has run into trouble.

By Scott Morgenstern and John Polga–Hecimovich As political and economic crises threaten to topple Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro, political scientists like us are not surprised that he has run into trouble. Instead, we see Venezuela as another example of what scholars call the “resource curse.” That’s the unfortunate correlation first described by the British economic geographer Richard M. Auty between nations with vast wealth from oil or other natural resources and political instability. Venezuela is a textbook case of the curse, since nearly 90 per cent of its people are now living in poverty in the country with the world’s largest oil reserves. After decades of leaders who failed to harness this commodity for peace and prosperity, it is questionable whether a new government can do a better job. Only a few oil and natural gas-rich countries, such as the United States, Canada and Norway have avoided this curse – in part because they built solid institutions and diverse economies before their petroleum drilling began. The resource curse The resource curse has afflicted many Latin American countries with profligate and populist elected leaders who succumbed to the temptations of corruption and reckless spending when easy money poured in, followed by right-wing dictatorships imposing repressive technocracies. Oil and wealth from other commodities like gold and copper, and foreign aid, have also supported kleptocrats and dictatorships who have often used their fortunes to retain power in other regions. The scholars Terry Karl and Thad Dunning have persuasively argued that oil export revenue helped sustain Venezuelan democracy from the 1950s to the early 1980s. The government, they explained, could buy support from the elite with lower taxes and from the poor with social programs. Oil money, in short, can sustain whatever government is in power, be it dictatorship or democracy. But when crude prices fall, the loss of revenue polarises politics as the wealthy and the poor fight over the reduced proceeds. And when these countries not only rely on one export but also very limited markets, that adds to their vulnerability. Oil sales constituted 98 per cent of Venezuela’s export earnings in 2017, with the US buying nearly half of the country’s exported crude. Boom and bust After several decades of strong economic performance backed by comparatively impressive social programs, Venezuela’s economy started to sputter in the 1980s. The vast sums of money it had borrowed a decade earlier, backed by future oil revenues, were coming due by that time. President Carlos Andrés Pérez, who had presided over strong economic growth between 1974 and 1979, returned to power in 1989. However, this time the country faced a weak currency, rising poverty rates, and increased foreign and public debt in combination with low oil prices. To stabilize the economy, Pérez implemented austerity policies that deregulated capital markets and reduced-price controls on gasoline and other products. These measures exacerbated economic hardships for the poor, and Venezuelans took to the streets to protest in deadly riots known as the Caracazo. Pérez survived two coup attempts in 1992 only to be impeached and forced out of office for embezzlement in 1993. Popular anger against economic conditions and the dominant political class led voters to back more polarizing politicians. The first coup attempt against Pérez in 1992 was organized by Hugo Chávez, then a lieutenant-colonel, who famously exclaimed to the nation that he had failed “for now.” He was right. Just six years later, in 1998, he ran for president and won an overwhelming victory. Building support Luckily for Chávez, oil prices had started to rise again, eventually reaching record levels while he was in power. Aside from a brief downturn brought on by the Great Recession, those high oil prices raised enough revenue to help sustain his support. He gained extra revenue by restructuring Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the country’s state-owned oil and natural gas company that now faces U.S. sanctions, to increase his control and to direct a bigger percentage of its export earnings into government coffers. With that money, he built popular support by paying for dozens of safety net programs, such as the “Barrio Adentro” health initiative for the poor and the “Misión Robinson” literacy program, starting massive infrastructure projects, and continuing to subsidise the world’s cheapest gasoline. When Chávez appointed allies to prominent posts at PDVSA in 2002, dissident members of the military and radicalized leaders of the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce staged a coup attempt that ultimately failed to oust him. Meanwhile, the government invested too little in the oil industry and mismanaged it. At the same time, it did too little to prepare for the possibility of lower revenue from oil, to boost other exports or to stop depending on the United States as its biggest customer. Following a big decline, Venezuela remained America’s third-largest source of foreign oil as of October 2018. Maduro’s staying power Maduro arrived to power in 2013, after the 58-year-old Chávez died from cancer. By then, Venezuelan oil production had declined, and just one year later global oil prices began to collapse. Maduro’s popularity collapsed too, although he did get re-elected in 2018 in a race without any independent international electoral observers that was marked by boycotts, accusations of repressing the opposition, and vote-rigging. On top of his misfortune to be leading Venezuela during an oil price slump, Maduro has turned out to be even worse at managing the oil industry than Chávez. He installed military cronies as managers, led by Manuel Quevedo, a major general in Venezuela’s National Guard. Since his rise, there have been more purges of PDVSA executives, and many reports that lower-level workers are staying home since they can no longer afford the commute on their wages. Adding even further to the commotion, corruption has run rampant. The increased social and economic upheaval has even led many poor people to withdraw their allegiance to Maduro. Amid the turmoil, the U.S. and many other countries are recognizing opposition leader Juan Guaidó, as the nation’s legitimate president. Whether or not Guaidó manages to dislodge Maduro’s grip on power, the country’s turbulent history suggests that long-term success will require much more than removing its current embattled leader. Any future leaders must also build the coalitions and institutions necessary to break the resource curse and thus empower Venezuela to finally draw social and economic stability from its oil wealth. (Scott Morgenstern is Professor, University of Pittsburgh; John Polga–Hecimovich is Assistant Professor, United States Naval Academy) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Why Venezuela’s oil money could keep undermining its economy and democracy

By Thomas Purcell

There appear to be two distinct responses to the current crisis in Venezuela. Either an authoritarian regime (led by Nicolás Maduro) is clinging to power against the wishes of popular forces arrayed around the new self-declared interim President Juan Guaidó. Or Venezuela is facing a coup backed by US imperialism with clear designs on the country’s huge oil reserves.

As with most complex situations, neither of these narratives fully captures what is going on. Indeed, for the majority of Venezuelans – thousands of whom have again taken to the streets across the country in peaceful demonstrations – ideological epithets pale in comparison to the economic impact they are experiencing in their daily lives.

Many face hunger, seeing family members flee the country (upwards of 3m have left the country) and rampant hyperinflation (predicted by the International Monetary Fund to reach an astronomical 10,000,000 per cent in 2019).

And make no mistake – despite the much publicised US sanctions, the economic crisis in Venezuela is homegrown. The government’s attempt to set prices for basic goods, maintain currency and exchange controls and regulate profits has decimated domestic production.

It has also strengthened black markets and encouraged the smuggling of everything from meat to nappies over the border with Colombia – a trade which has become an everyday survival strategy for thousands of Venezuelans.

Maduro’s government has been peddling the line of “economic war” for over four years. It even denies inflation actually exists, while printing more money to pay for increases in a minimum wage that doesn’t even cover the cost of a dozen eggs.

In a recent television interview, Maduro blamed the supposed economic war when asked about a rate of 3 per cent inflation per day in 2018. He also expressed a willingness to hold talks with his political rival Guaidó – while also somewhat ominously stating that 50,000 civilian militia members with access to weapons were on stand by to “defend the peace”.

Sanctions that have been in place since 2017 have exacerbated the economic crisis but were not successful in an attempt to force Maduro out of power. Yet, paradoxically, the very public US backing of Guaidó has increased the plausibility of Maduro’s claim – because with added sanctions now in place designed to restrict food supplies and oil equipment, that economic war has become very real.

The fact that this is a homegrown crisis is not lost on the people taking to the streets. So it can seem surprising that some angry Venezuelans don’t welcome internationally supported regime change. Still, others maintain steadfast supporters of “Chavismo” – the political movement named after the late president Hugo Chávez, Maduro’s predecessor. “Chavismo” still carries significant weight among activists anxious to defend “la patria” (the fatherland) from any external intervention.

Let’s take one salient example. The agricultural commune “El Maizal”, located between the states of Lara and Portuguesa, is perhaps the most successful worker-run cooperative still struggling for their vision of 21st-century socialism. While extremely critical of the “corruption, bureaucracy and clientelism” that pervades the government, the commune’s Twitter feed expresses the militant sentiment of a people prepared to rise up against the perceived threat of “Yankee imperialism”.

(Thomas Purcell is Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy, Leeds Beckett University)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-us-sanctions-hurt-but-the-economic-crisis-is-home-grown-111280">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

By Thomas Purcell There appear to be two distinct responses to the current crisis in Venezuela. Either an authoritarian regime (led by Nicolás Maduro) is clinging to power against the wishes of popular forces arrayed around the new self-declared interim President Juan Guaidó.

By Thomas Purcell There appear to be two distinct responses to the current crisis in Venezuela. Either an authoritarian regime (led by Nicolás Maduro) is clinging to power against the wishes of popular forces arrayed around the new self-declared interim President Juan Guaidó. Or Venezuela is facing a coup backed by US imperialism with clear designs on the country’s huge oil reserves. As with most complex situations, neither of these narratives fully captures what is going on. Indeed, for the majority of Venezuelans – thousands of whom have again taken to the streets across the country in peaceful demonstrations – ideological epithets pale in comparison to the economic impact they are experiencing in their daily lives. Many face hunger, seeing family members flee the country (upwards of 3m have left the country) and rampant hyperinflation (predicted by the International Monetary Fund to reach an astronomical 10,000,000 per cent in 2019). And make no mistake – despite the much publicised US sanctions, the economic crisis in Venezuela is homegrown. The government’s attempt to set prices for basic goods, maintain currency and exchange controls and regulate profits has decimated domestic production. It has also strengthened black markets and encouraged the smuggling of everything from meat to nappies over the border with Colombia – a trade which has become an everyday survival strategy for thousands of Venezuelans. Maduro’s government has been peddling the line of “economic war” for over four years. It even denies inflation actually exists, while printing more money to pay for increases in a minimum wage that doesn’t even cover the cost of a dozen eggs. In a recent television interview, Maduro blamed the supposed economic war when asked about a rate of 3 per cent inflation per day in 2018. He also expressed a willingness to hold talks with his political rival Guaidó – while also somewhat ominously stating that 50,000 civilian militia members with access to weapons were on stand by to “defend the peace”. Sanctions that have been in place since 2017 have exacerbated the economic crisis but were not successful in an attempt to force Maduro out of power. Yet, paradoxically, the very public US backing of Guaidó has increased the plausibility of Maduro’s claim – because with added sanctions now in place designed to restrict food supplies and oil equipment, that economic war has become very real. The fact that this is a homegrown crisis is not lost on the people taking to the streets. So it can seem surprising that some angry Venezuelans don’t welcome internationally supported regime change. Still, others maintain steadfast supporters of “Chavismo” – the political movement named after the late president Hugo Chávez, Maduro’s predecessor. “Chavismo” still carries significant weight among activists anxious to defend “la patria” (the fatherland) from any external intervention. Let’s take one salient example. The agricultural commune “El Maizal”, located between the states of Lara and Portuguesa, is perhaps the most successful worker-run cooperative still struggling for their vision of 21st-century socialism. While extremely critical of the “corruption, bureaucracy and clientelism” that pervades the government, the commune’s Twitter feed expresses the militant sentiment of a people prepared to rise up against the perceived threat of “Yankee imperialism”. (Thomas Purcell is Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy, Leeds Beckett University) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Venezuela: US sanctions hurt, but the economic crisis is homegrown

There are times when one is constrained to divert one’s gaze from proximate neighbourhood towards distant regions-home to countries that are closely tied to our national interest.&nbsp;

Recent political upheaval in Venezuela deserves more serious attention than it has received. Many Indians are not even aware of the fact that India is the third largest importer of Venezuelan oil after the US and China. It has assumed even greater significance in our energy security calculations after the US has imposed sanctions on it in the wake of the dramatic political coup that has taken place in Caracas. Many Indians have much too hastily started celebrating thinking that the US sanctions will create a glut in the market and Venezuela will be forced to sell its oil at reduced prices and against rupees. The issue is far more complex.&nbsp;

First of all, there is no reason to believe that the US shall not threaten countries that continue to deal with Venezuela with secondary sanctions like they did in the case of Iran. This would leave India on the wrong foot, and once again at the mercy of POTUS Trump to avail of some respite.&nbsp;

We have in recent years allowed our ‘special’ strategic relationship with the US to dominate our relationship with countries we import oil from. Those who think that the cut imposed on oil imports from besieged Iran would be compensated by additional imports from Venezuela are not being realistic at all.&nbsp; 
 
Then there is the ‘Chinese Complication’. Venezuelans can’t be expected to give priority to India over their number two buyer. China is not going to be deterred by US bullying in pursuit of its energy security. Trump has declared a trade war against China but it has refused to blink. It is confident that the US companies and consumers feeling the pinch harder will persuade their government to reconsider its policy. (Ironically, support for Trump hasn’t registered a sharp decline so and there has been no explosive deterioration as some analysts had predicted.)

The arrest of the daughter of the founder of Huewei, herself one of the highest place company executives, in Canada enraged the Chinese enough to retaliate swiftly by arresting a former Canadian diplomat and announcing that it will not commute the death sentence awarded to a Canadian national into imprisonment for life.&nbsp;

India would do well to remember that the US shall continue to tread more cautiously where China is concerned. It realises that India, always willing to please the new found Super Power ‘Friend’ will do its bidding without overt arm twisting.&nbsp;

It is in the larger geopolitical context that we should consider recent Chinese statement that there should be no double standards in case of admission to new members to the Nuclear Fuel Suppliers Group. This cartel has 48 members and only China’s stubborn resistance has blocked India’s entry. China would like its longtime ally and protege to be treated at par with India. There should be no need to point out that Pakistan has acquired nuclear weapons through piracy flouting the non-proliferation regime while India has behaved as a responsible nuclear weapon state ever since its Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (Implosion) in Pokhran.

Our much hyped special relationship with the US rests on the cornerstone of agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Not much progress has been made since the UPA years towards the realisation of rapid economic development through clean energy. Neither new found friend (US) nor time tested ally (Russia) has exerted enough to remove the Chinese obstacle. This issue too is entwined with our energy security. 
 
Only China and Russia along with Cuba and a handful of socialist countries have condemned US recognition of what many see as usurper propped up by the US-driven compulsive to change regimes. How long are we going to let others choose or friends and foes is the question.

China is next door and Venezuela very far across oceans but both of them underline the same dilemma.&nbsp; 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

&nbsp; &nbsp;

There are times when one is constrained to divert one’s gaze from proximate neighbourhood towards distant regions-home to countries that are closely tied to our national interest.

There are times when one is constrained to divert one’s gaze from proximate neighbourhood towards distant regions-home to countries that are closely tied to our national interest. Recent political upheaval in Venezuela deserves more serious attention than it has received. Many Indians are not even aware of the fact that India is the third largest importer of Venezuelan oil after the US and China. It has assumed even greater significance in our energy security calculations after the US has imposed sanctions on it in the wake of the dramatic political coup that has taken place in Caracas. Many Indians have much too hastily started celebrating thinking that the US sanctions will create a glut in the market and Venezuela will be forced to sell its oil at reduced prices and against rupees. The issue is far more complex. First of all, there is no reason to believe that the US shall not threaten countries that continue to deal with Venezuela with secondary sanctions like they did in the case of Iran. This would leave India on the wrong foot, and once again at the mercy of POTUS Trump to avail of some respite. We have in recent years allowed our ‘special’ strategic relationship with the US to dominate our relationship with countries we import oil from. Those who think that the cut imposed on oil imports from besieged Iran would be compensated by additional imports from Venezuela are not being realistic at all. Then there is the ‘Chinese Complication’. Venezuelans can’t be expected to give priority to India over their number two buyer. China is not going to be deterred by US bullying in pursuit of its energy security. Trump has declared a trade war against China but it has refused to blink. It is confident that the US companies and consumers feeling the pinch harder will persuade their government to reconsider its policy. (Ironically, support for Trump hasn’t registered a sharp decline so and there has been no explosive deterioration as some analysts had predicted.) The arrest of the daughter of the founder of Huewei, herself one of the highest place company executives, in Canada enraged the Chinese enough to retaliate swiftly by arresting a former Canadian diplomat and announcing that it will not commute the death sentence awarded to a Canadian national into imprisonment for life. India would do well to remember that the US shall continue to tread more cautiously where China is concerned. It realises that India, always willing to please the new found Super Power ‘Friend’ will do its bidding without overt arm twisting. It is in the larger geopolitical context that we should consider recent Chinese statement that there should be no double standards in case of admission to new members to the Nuclear Fuel Suppliers Group. This cartel has 48 members and only China’s stubborn resistance has blocked India’s entry. China would like its longtime ally and protege to be treated at par with India. There should be no need to point out that Pakistan has acquired nuclear weapons through piracy flouting the non-proliferation regime while India has behaved as a responsible nuclear weapon state ever since its Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (Implosion) in Pokhran. Our much hyped special relationship with the US rests on the cornerstone of agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Not much progress has been made since the UPA years towards the realisation of rapid economic development through clean energy. Neither new found friend (US) nor time tested ally (Russia) has exerted enough to remove the Chinese obstacle. This issue too is entwined with our energy security. Only China and Russia along with Cuba and a handful of socialist countries have condemned US recognition of what many see as usurper propped up by the US-driven compulsive to change regimes. How long are we going to let others choose or friends and foes is the question. China is next door and Venezuela very far across oceans but both of them underline the same dilemma. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

India should be wary of the US-sponsored crisis in Venezuela

United States sanctions on Venezuela will continue, Vice President Mike Pence said on Saturday, despite the <a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/american-wife-freed-from-venezuela-jail-arrive-in-us-senator-140044">release of an American and his wife from a Venezuelan jail</a>.

"Very glad that Josh Holt is now back home with his family – where he has always belonged. Sanctions continue until democracy returns to Venezuela," Pence said in a tweet.

He was commenting after Holt, 26, and his wife Thamara Caleno, landed in Washington after Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro ordered their release after two years.

It was a "gesture" aimed at promoting dialogue between Caracas and Washington, Venezuelan Communications Minister Jorge Rodriguez told reporters in Caracas.

Holt, a 26-year-old Mormon missionary from Utah, had traveled to Venezuela in June 2016 to marry Thamara, whom he had met on the internet.

Shortly after they wed, however, the couple was arrested by the Venezuelan intelligence service Sebin, and accused of possessing weapons and plotting to destabilize the Maduro government.

After a May 20 election which Washington rejected as a "sham," US President Donald Trump tightened pre-existing sanctions against Maduro's regime.

The White House action would complicate Venezuela's efforts to sell off financial IOUs known as "accounts receivable." Senior US administration officials said the instruments had been used to garner much-needed revenue for the cash-starved regime.

Washington has previously imposed sanctions on Maduro and his senior aides, and banned US entities from buying any more debt from Caracas or state oil company PDVSA.

Maduro has insisted Venezuela is the victim of an "economic war" waged by the conservative opposition and external powers including the United States aimed at toppling him.

Most economists attribute the oil-rich country's economic collapse to years of mismanagement, corruption and a period of sharply lower oil prices.

United States sanctions on Venezuela will continue, Vice President Mike Pence said on Saturday, despite the release of an American and his wife from a Venezuelan jail

United States sanctions on Venezuela will continue, Vice President Mike Pence said on Saturday, despite the release of an American and his wife from a Venezuelan jail. "Very glad that Josh Holt is now back home with his family – where he has always belonged. Sanctions continue until democracy returns to Venezuela," Pence said in a tweet. He was commenting after Holt, 26, and his wife Thamara Caleno, landed in Washington after Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro ordered their release after two years. It was a "gesture" aimed at promoting dialogue between Caracas and Washington, Venezuelan Communications Minister Jorge Rodriguez told reporters in Caracas. Holt, a 26-year-old Mormon missionary from Utah, had traveled to Venezuela in June 2016 to marry Thamara, whom he had met on the internet. Shortly after they wed, however, the couple was arrested by the Venezuelan intelligence service Sebin, and accused of possessing weapons and plotting to destabilize the Maduro government. After a May 20 election which Washington rejected as a "sham," US President Donald Trump tightened pre-existing sanctions against Maduro's regime. The White House action would complicate Venezuela's efforts to sell off financial IOUs known as "accounts receivable." Senior US administration officials said the instruments had been used to garner much-needed revenue for the cash-starved regime. Washington has previously imposed sanctions on Maduro and his senior aides, and banned US entities from buying any more debt from Caracas or state oil company PDVSA. Maduro has insisted Venezuela is the victim of an "economic war" waged by the conservative opposition and external powers including the United States aimed at toppling him. Most economists attribute the oil-rich country's economic collapse to years of mismanagement, corruption and a period of sharply lower oil prices.