A United States&nbsp;official is expected to arrive in Belgrade on Friday to discuss the purchase of advanced Russian anti-aircraft missile systems which could expose Serbia to US&nbsp;sanctions.

Serbia's military depends heavily on Russian and former Soviet weapons technology, but Russia's arms sales have been hit by US&nbsp;sanctions over its role in the conflict in east Ukraine.

Serbian news agency Beta said Thomas Zarzecki, an envoy for the US&nbsp;State Department's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, would discuss compliance with the sanctions during a visit that has not been announced by the US&nbsp;embassy.

Embassy officials could not be reached for comment and the US&nbsp;State Department did not reply to emailed questions.

Serbia has recently purchased Pantsir anti-aircraft missile launchers from Russia and deliveries are expected in the next few months. In recent years, Belgrade has also bought Russian MiG-29 jets, helicopters, tanks and armoured personnel carriers.

US&nbsp;concerns grew last month when Russia sent its S-400 missile defence system and Pantsir launchers to Serbia for a military drill. The move underlined Moscow's wish to keep a traditional Slavic ally on the side as Belgrade pursues links with NATO and tries to join the European Union.

Matthew Palmer, a US&nbsp;envoy for the Balkans, said last week that Serbia could risk sanctions over its arms deals with Russia. Under the sanctions, Serbia could face punishments ranging from visa bans to denial of export licences.

Late on Thursday, President Aleksandar Vucic urged Serbs not to fear broad sanctions would be imposed on Serbia similar to those of the 1990s during the Balkan wars.

"When the US&nbsp;is deciding about such sanctions ... they are imposing it against a company or an individual, not against an entire nation," he said.

Serbia declared military neutrality in 2006 and joined NATO's Partnership for Peace programme in 2015, though it is not seeking full membership of the US-led alliance.

Serbia has also relied on Russia for support in its refusal to recognise the independence of its former southern province of Kosovo, which seceded in 2008 after a guerrilla uprising. NATO peacekeepers remain in Kosovo.

A United States official is expected to arrive in Belgrade on Friday to discuss the purchase of advanced Russian anti-aircraft missile systems which could expose Serbia to US sanctions.

A United States official is expected to arrive in Belgrade on Friday to discuss the purchase of advanced Russian anti-aircraft missile systems which could expose Serbia to US sanctions. Serbia's military depends heavily on Russian and former Soviet weapons technology, but Russia's arms sales have been hit by US sanctions over its role in the conflict in east Ukraine. Serbian news agency Beta said Thomas Zarzecki, an envoy for the US State Department's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, would discuss compliance with the sanctions during a visit that has not been announced by the US embassy. Embassy officials could not be reached for comment and the US State Department did not reply to emailed questions. Serbia has recently purchased Pantsir anti-aircraft missile launchers from Russia and deliveries are expected in the next few months. In recent years, Belgrade has also bought Russian MiG-29 jets, helicopters, tanks and armoured personnel carriers. US concerns grew last month when Russia sent its S-400 missile defence system and Pantsir launchers to Serbia for a military drill. The move underlined Moscow's wish to keep a traditional Slavic ally on the side as Belgrade pursues links with NATO and tries to join the European Union. Matthew Palmer, a US envoy for the Balkans, said last week that Serbia could risk sanctions over its arms deals with Russia. Under the sanctions, Serbia could face punishments ranging from visa bans to denial of export licences. Late on Thursday, President Aleksandar Vucic urged Serbs not to fear broad sanctions would be imposed on Serbia similar to those of the 1990s during the Balkan wars. "When the US is deciding about such sanctions ... they are imposing it against a company or an individual, not against an entire nation," he said. Serbia declared military neutrality in 2006 and joined NATO's Partnership for Peace programme in 2015, though it is not seeking full membership of the US-led alliance. Serbia has also relied on Russia for support in its refusal to recognise the independence of its former southern province of Kosovo, which seceded in 2008 after a guerrilla uprising. NATO peacekeepers remain in Kosovo.

Serbia faces risk of United States sanctions over Russian arms deal

This segment of WION brings to you top stories of the morning from across the globe. Watch this video to get updated with the latest information.

WION Speed News: Watch top national and international news of the morning - November 7th, 2019

It seems as if the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement has effectively ended. Is Iran using the nuclear programme to blackmail the world? Or did US sanctions force Iran to violate the deal? What's the impact on India?

On WION Edit, we explore the situation.

First, look at the nuclear agreement called the JCPOA and Iran's compliance record.

It was not a perfect deal but it was working. The deal did not have a clear way to stop Iran from developing nukes or to curb Iran's terror-sponsoring. Then they imposed sanctions and Iran's economy took a serious hit.

In 2015, when the deal was signed, when sanctions were lifted, Iran had hoped for a growth surge. That did not happen.

Then in 2018, when the deal collapsed and sanctions were back, Iran's economy suffered more. So, it started enriching uranium and even now, Iran says it will stop if America returns to the deal.

The country is bleeding. Inflation is touching 40 per cent. The government is paying the price. Hardliners are putting pressure on reformists. President Hassan Rouhani has been cornered. Iran is an oil-producing country, oil is its most profitable commodity and Iran is being banned for selling oil.

At a time when it desperately needs the money, a textbook case of being pushed to the wall.

Plus, US President Donald Trump remains evasive. He doesn't spell out what exactly he wants from Iran, what will it take to lift the sanctions.

And this should bother everyone. Because if Iran revives its nuclear ambitions, it's bad news for the whole world.

In any case, American sanctions on Iran are hurting other countries too. India is a case in point. Iran's tradition oil buyer and an old strategic and cultural ally.

America's actions impact India in many ways. First, the Chabahar port which is crucial for India's strategic interests.&nbsp;Chabahar brings India, Afghanistan, and Iran together.

India has invested a lot in the Chabahar special economic zone and Hajigak iron and steel mining project. If Iran's economy deteriorates, it hurts India's investments - both strategic and monetary.

Aspect number 2,&nbsp; oil prices. India has diversified its oil sources. So, no supply disruptions. But if sanctions on Iran continue, prices might go up for a country that imports more than 80 per cent of its oil.

Aspect number 3, impact on India-Iran ties.

Yes, there are no permanent friends or foes in global politics. But India and Iran share historical ties.

Delhi is risking all this because of Washington.

India took a six-month grace period after US sanctions. Since May 2019, India has not bought oil from Iran. Now China has done the same. It was Iran's biggest buyer. More than 8 lakh barrels per day. It has stopped buying.

Both India and China have 'communicated' to the US about the strategic importance of Iran. Look at it, the US unilaterally walks out of a multi-lateral deal, which the US negotiated. Then it imposes sanctions on Iran.

And then it forces other countries to stop doing business with Iran. And what do these countries do? They comply.

So, who's the victim and who's the villain in this game?

The primary victims are the people of Iran. The secondary victims are developing countries like India and China.

The tertiary victim is regional peace. Who's the villain? An oppressive regime in Iran that wants to use this to blackmail the world and a president in Washington who views the world through the tinted glass of tariffs and sanctions. Both. 
 
(Disclaimer: WION Edit is the channel's take on the big events of the world)

It seems as if the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement has effectively ended. Is Iran using the nuclear programme to blackmail the world? Or did US sanctions force Iran to violate the deal?

It seems as if the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement has effectively ended. Is Iran using the nuclear programme to blackmail the world? Or did US sanctions force Iran to violate the deal? What's the impact on India? On WION Edit, we explore the situation. First, look at the nuclear agreement called the JCPOA and Iran's compliance record. It was not a perfect deal but it was working. The deal did not have a clear way to stop Iran from developing nukes or to curb Iran's terror-sponsoring. Then they imposed sanctions and Iran's economy took a serious hit. In 2015, when the deal was signed, when sanctions were lifted, Iran had hoped for a growth surge. That did not happen. Then in 2018, when the deal collapsed and sanctions were back, Iran's economy suffered more. So, it started enriching uranium and even now, Iran says it will stop if America returns to the deal. The country is bleeding. Inflation is touching 40 per cent. The government is paying the price. Hardliners are putting pressure on reformists. President Hassan Rouhani has been cornered. Iran is an oil-producing country, oil is its most profitable commodity and Iran is being banned for selling oil. At a time when it desperately needs the money, a textbook case of being pushed to the wall. Plus, US President Donald Trump remains evasive. He doesn't spell out what exactly he wants from Iran, what will it take to lift the sanctions. And this should bother everyone. Because if Iran revives its nuclear ambitions, it's bad news for the whole world. In any case, American sanctions on Iran are hurting other countries too. India is a case in point. Iran's tradition oil buyer and an old strategic and cultural ally. America's actions impact India in many ways. First, the Chabahar port which is crucial for India's strategic interests. Chabahar brings India, Afghanistan, and Iran together. India has invested a lot in the Chabahar special economic zone and Hajigak iron and steel mining project. If Iran's economy deteriorates, it hurts India's investments - both strategic and monetary. Aspect number 2, oil prices. India has diversified its oil sources. So, no supply disruptions. But if sanctions on Iran continue, prices might go up for a country that imports more than 80 per cent of its oil. Aspect number 3, impact on India-Iran ties. Yes, there are no permanent friends or foes in global politics. But India and Iran share historical ties. Delhi is risking all this because of Washington. India took a six-month grace period after US sanctions. Since May 2019, India has not bought oil from Iran. Now China has done the same. It was Iran's biggest buyer. More than 8 lakh barrels per day. It has stopped buying. Both India and China have 'communicated' to the US about the strategic importance of Iran. Look at it, the US unilaterally walks out of a multi-lateral deal, which the US negotiated. Then it imposes sanctions on Iran. And then it forces other countries to stop doing business with Iran. And what do these countries do? They comply. So, who's the victim and who's the villain in this game? The primary victims are the people of Iran. The secondary victims are developing countries like India and China. The tertiary victim is regional peace. Who's the villain? An oppressive regime in Iran that wants to use this to blackmail the world and a president in Washington who views the world through the tinted glass of tariffs and sanctions. Both. (Disclaimer: WION Edit is the channel's take on the big events of the world)

WION Edit: Nuclear deal crumbles - Is Iran a victim or a villain?

By John Broich

Since US troops left their region, roughly 180,000 Kurds of northeastern Syria have been displaced, and over 200 have been killed.

Those Kurds, soldiers who’d battled the Islamic State and families, had hoped to secure a future Kurdistan state in areas now targeted by Turkish warplanes and patrolled by Russian mercenaries.

This is only the latest reversal for the Kurds, a group of around 40 million who identify with a regional homeland and common historical background, but are now divided between four countries. Despite their many attempts, there’ve never won and kept a Kurdish nation.

Drawing borders after WWI

The most decisive reversal came at the end of the first World War. That’s when the Allies, victors over Germany and the Ottoman Empire, divided their geographical spoils of war.

In a series of conferences in a succession of European palaces, Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau of France, Woodrow Wilson and dozens of other leaders conspired, harangued and horse-traded from 1919 to 1921. Under clouds of cigar smoke, between servings of foie gras and champagne, they redrew a large swath of the globe’s map.

Besides doling out spoils to themselves, such as far-flung German imperial holdings, their aims were to replace the Austro-Hungarian Empire, punish Germany in Europe and – the biggest task – fill the vacuum left by the demise of the sprawling Ottoman Empire, which before the war covered territory from the edge of Bulgaria to Yemen.

Their guiding principle for redrawing the map, at least in most cases, was the reigning concept of race nationalism, what’s often called today ethno-nationalism.

Simply put, the Allies’ delegates assumed that nation states should be composed as much as possible by single “races,” single ethnic and linguistic populations. So, they defined, in some ways created, new races – like, for example, Hungarians or Austrians – and drew borders around them.

Who should receive an ethno-state?

What to do in the big, central zone of the defeated Ottoman Empire, stretching between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf?

Should there be one big, Greater Arabia or Arab federation, as some British officials promised their Arab allies who revolted against the Ottomans? Should there be many little nations, with borders around Christian Arabs, Muslim Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, Kurds? (Following their race-nation instinct, the British did support what they called a new “National Home for the Jewish people” in former Ottoman Palestine.)

That, too, is what President Woodrow Wilson’s call for self-determination dictated. Wilson himself was explicit in calling for a new, broadly encompassing Kurdistan.

They took for granted that Kurds were a race and that Kurdistan was a place. In fact, it was already depicted in pre-WWI atlases. The problem of drawing its borders fell, British Parliamentarians told themselves, to them in immediate postwar years. And it’s what some powerful people in British officialdom assumed would happen.

Not only did it fit British race thinking to create Kurdistan – to be heavily staffed by British “advisers” like the other new states, of course – but they believed the Kurds truculent and independent, unlikely to accede to domination by a neighbour.

They would “never accept an Arab ruler,” in the words of one British Colonial Office official, if they were embedded in an Arab nation.

A missed opportunity

But the Allies and the League of Nations never created Kurdistan. Why not?

British imperial self-interest, in this case, overruled ethnonational thinking. By the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement, the secret French and British understanding of roughly who would get what after the war, the French claimed dominance of the northern Levant, what’s today Lebanon and Syria.

The British wanted a big geographical bloc in the region to match that of the French, to act as a counterweight. They formalized this by inventing a large country soon dubbed “Iraq.”

The line dividing Sykes-Picot’s French sphere and British sphere already cut straight through Kurdish areas. That partition was part of the reason why the British could not simply carve out a new, large Kurdistan (that they’d dominate like Iraq).

For another, British colonial officials, like the famous writer-turned-colonial administrator Gertrude Bell, wanted a Kurdish population retained in the new Iraq as a counterbalance to its large Shiite population, which was deemed seditious.

This represented classic British imperial thinking long employed in places like India: divide and conquer. The Kurds might not be particularly docile or loyal to the British, but they could be counted on not to unite with the Arabs or Assyrians, either, and throw off British meddling.

The British, too, suspected there were large oilfields under the important Kurdish capital of Mosul. Better to keep the Mosul region securely within Iraq, some leaders judged.

That colonial-era behavior had a recent analog, when President Donald Trump said that the Kurds could be allowed to remain near oilfields in far eastern Syria to protect them against the Islamic State. They’re still useful, it seems, for maintaining order above oil.

The roots of the trouble with Turkey 
 
The Allies’ last, half-hearted attempt to create at least a small Kurdistan took place during yet another conference of the Allies in the Paris suburb of Sèvres in 1920.

Planned for eastern Anatolia, or Asia Minor, squeezed into borders to which the Kurds objected as too little, this Kurdistan came to naught. The new, revolutionary nationalists in Turkey wanted their own race-nation of Turks. And they did not want Anatolia chopped up for the sake of Kurds or Armenians. They’d simply have to become Turks, too, or face the consequences.

From 1920, the new Turkish Army occupied what was to become the little Kurdistan, and the Allies had no will to challenge them. The last hope that WWI’s victors would create even a fractional Kurdistan disappeared without fanfare.

But the Kurds didn’t stop – have never stopped – resisting. When the British lumped them into their invented country of Iraq, the Kurds naturally revolted in 1919. When a delegation of British colonial authorities arrived to parley with the Kurdish leader, Sheikh Mahmoud Barzinji, the man calmly quoted Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, with its call for the “autonomous development” of the peoples formerly dominated by the Ottoman Empire. The British responded with two brigades.

Now, as then, it seems world powers support Kurd’s self-determination only until it’s no longer expedient.

(John Broich is Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-there-is-no-kurdish-nation-126243">original article)</a>

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp;

 
&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

By John Broich Since US troops left their region, roughly 180,000 Kurds of northeastern Syria have been displaced, and over 200 have been killed. Those Kurds, soldiers who’d battled the Islamic State and families, had hoped to secure a future Kurdistan state in areas now targeted by Turkish warplanes and patrolled by Russian mercenaries.

By John Broich Since US troops left their region, roughly 180,000 Kurds of northeastern Syria have been displaced, and over 200 have been killed. Those Kurds, soldiers who’d battled the Islamic State and families, had hoped to secure a future Kurdistan state in areas now targeted by Turkish warplanes and patrolled by Russian mercenaries. This is only the latest reversal for the Kurds, a group of around 40 million who identify with a regional homeland and common historical background, but are now divided between four countries. Despite their many attempts, there’ve never won and kept a Kurdish nation. Drawing borders after WWI The most decisive reversal came at the end of the first World War. That’s when the Allies, victors over Germany and the Ottoman Empire, divided their geographical spoils of war. In a series of conferences in a succession of European palaces, Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau of France, Woodrow Wilson and dozens of other leaders conspired, harangued and horse-traded from 1919 to 1921. Under clouds of cigar smoke, between servings of foie gras and champagne, they redrew a large swath of the globe’s map. Besides doling out spoils to themselves, such as far-flung German imperial holdings, their aims were to replace the Austro-Hungarian Empire, punish Germany in Europe and – the biggest task – fill the vacuum left by the demise of the sprawling Ottoman Empire, which before the war covered territory from the edge of Bulgaria to Yemen. Their guiding principle for redrawing the map, at least in most cases, was the reigning concept of race nationalism, what’s often called today ethno-nationalism. Simply put, the Allies’ delegates assumed that nation states should be composed as much as possible by single “races,” single ethnic and linguistic populations. So, they defined, in some ways created, new races – like, for example, Hungarians or Austrians – and drew borders around them. Who should receive an ethno-state? What to do in the big, central zone of the defeated Ottoman Empire, stretching between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf? Should there be one big, Greater Arabia or Arab federation, as some British officials promised their Arab allies who revolted against the Ottomans? Should there be many little nations, with borders around Christian Arabs, Muslim Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, Kurds? (Following their race-nation instinct, the British did support what they called a new “National Home for the Jewish people” in former Ottoman Palestine.) That, too, is what President Woodrow Wilson’s call for self-determination dictated. Wilson himself was explicit in calling for a new, broadly encompassing Kurdistan. They took for granted that Kurds were a race and that Kurdistan was a place. In fact, it was already depicted in pre-WWI atlases. The problem of drawing its borders fell, British Parliamentarians told themselves, to them in immediate postwar years. And it’s what some powerful people in British officialdom assumed would happen. Not only did it fit British race thinking to create Kurdistan – to be heavily staffed by British “advisers” like the other new states, of course – but they believed the Kurds truculent and independent, unlikely to accede to domination by a neighbour. They would “never accept an Arab ruler,” in the words of one British Colonial Office official, if they were embedded in an Arab nation. A missed opportunity But the Allies and the League of Nations never created Kurdistan. Why not? British imperial self-interest, in this case, overruled ethnonational thinking. By the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement, the secret French and British understanding of roughly who would get what after the war, the French claimed dominance of the northern Levant, what’s today Lebanon and Syria. The British wanted a big geographical bloc in the region to match that of the French, to act as a counterweight. They formalized this by inventing a large country soon dubbed “Iraq.” The line dividing Sykes-Picot’s French sphere and British sphere already cut straight through Kurdish areas. That partition was part of the reason why the British could not simply carve out a new, large Kurdistan (that they’d dominate like Iraq). For another, British colonial officials, like the famous writer-turned-colonial administrator Gertrude Bell, wanted a Kurdish population retained in the new Iraq as a counterbalance to its large Shiite population, which was deemed seditious. This represented classic British imperial thinking long employed in places like India: divide and conquer. The Kurds might not be particularly docile or loyal to the British, but they could be counted on not to unite with the Arabs or Assyrians, either, and throw off British meddling. The British, too, suspected there were large oilfields under the important Kurdish capital of Mosul. Better to keep the Mosul region securely within Iraq, some leaders judged. That colonial-era behavior had a recent analog, when President Donald Trump said that the Kurds could be allowed to remain near oilfields in far eastern Syria to protect them against the Islamic State. They’re still useful, it seems, for maintaining order above oil. The roots of the trouble with Turkey The Allies’ last, half-hearted attempt to create at least a small Kurdistan took place during yet another conference of the Allies in the Paris suburb of Sèvres in 1920. Planned for eastern Anatolia, or Asia Minor, squeezed into borders to which the Kurds objected as too little, this Kurdistan came to naught. The new, revolutionary nationalists in Turkey wanted their own race-nation of Turks. And they did not want Anatolia chopped up for the sake of Kurds or Armenians. They’d simply have to become Turks, too, or face the consequences. From 1920, the new Turkish Army occupied what was to become the little Kurdistan, and the Allies had no will to challenge them. The last hope that WWI’s victors would create even a fractional Kurdistan disappeared without fanfare. But the Kurds didn’t stop – have never stopped – resisting. When the British lumped them into their invented country of Iraq, the Kurds naturally revolted in 1919. When a delegation of British colonial authorities arrived to parley with the Kurdish leader, Sheikh Mahmoud Barzinji, the man calmly quoted Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, with its call for the “autonomous development” of the peoples formerly dominated by the Ottoman Empire. The British responded with two brigades. Now, as then, it seems world powers support Kurd’s self-determination only until it’s no longer expedient. (John Broich is Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Why there is no Kurdish nation

9 US Citizens Were Killed in an Ambush in Mexico. Watch video to know more.

9 US Citizens Were Killed in an Ambush in Mexico

As the Trump administration on Monday began the process of formally pulling out of the<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/11000-scientists-caution-against-climate-emergency-warn-of-unavoidable-human-suffering-260246"> Paris climate agreement</a>, French President Emmanuel Macron and Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed their strong support for the global accord.&nbsp;

"Both sides attach high importance to measures responding to climate change and protection of ecological diversity, and we agree to cooperate over next year's 15th Biodiversity Convention on Biodiversity held in Kunming to push forth the Paris Climate Accords in response to climate change," Chinese President Xi Jinping said during his meeting with President Macron in Beijing.

Xi added that the international community should "jointly protect <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/paris-climate-agreement-us-should-take-more-responsibility-says-china-260120">our homeland planet Earth</a>", adding "we are against the attempt to place national interests above the common interests of humanity".

Macron too a swipe at the US, decalaring: "I deplore the choices made by some others, but I want to see them as marginal choices, because when China, the European Union, Russia, which ratified the Paris agreements a few weeks ago, engage with firmness, the isolated choice of one or another (country) is not enough to change the course of the world, it will only lead to them being edged out."

Both leaders also issued a joint statement reaffirming their committment towards the climate agreement. In a joint statement, Xi and Macron reaffirmed "their firm support for the Paris accord which they consider as an irreversible&nbsp;process and a compass for strong action on climate".&nbsp;

Xi and Macron expressed determination to improve international cooperation to "ensure a complete and efficient implementation of the Paris accord" while pledgeing to restore almost a third of degraded land as well as eliminating fossil fuel subsidies in the medium term.

The US had presented its withdrawal letter to the United Nations on Monday which was negotiated by the Obama administration.

As the Trump administration on Monday began the process of formally pulling out of the Paris climate agreement, French President Emmanuel Macron and Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed their strong support for the global accord.

As the Trump administration on Monday began the process of formally pulling out of the Paris climate agreement, French President Emmanuel Macron and Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed their strong support for the global accord. "Both sides attach high importance to measures responding to climate change and protection of ecological diversity, and we agree to cooperate over next year's 15th Biodiversity Convention on Biodiversity held in Kunming to push forth the Paris Climate Accords in response to climate change," Chinese President Xi Jinping said during his meeting with President Macron in Beijing. Xi added that the international community should "jointly protect our homeland planet Earth", adding "we are against the attempt to place national interests above the common interests of humanity". Macron too a swipe at the US, decalaring: "I deplore the choices made by some others, but I want to see them as marginal choices, because when China, the European Union, Russia, which ratified the Paris agreements a few weeks ago, engage with firmness, the isolated choice of one or another (country) is not enough to change the course of the world, it will only lead to them being edged out." Both leaders also issued a joint statement reaffirming their committment towards the climate agreement. In a joint statement, Xi and Macron reaffirmed "their firm support for the Paris accord which they consider as an irreversible process and a compass for strong action on climate". Xi and Macron expressed determination to improve international cooperation to "ensure a complete and efficient implementation of the Paris accord" while pledgeing to restore almost a third of degraded land as well as eliminating fossil fuel subsidies in the medium term. The US had presented its withdrawal letter to the United Nations on Monday which was negotiated by the Obama administration.

Macron, Xi declare Paris climate accord 'irreversible process'

A page from Iran's history: 40th anniversary of US embassy takeover. Watch video to know more.

A page from Iran's history: 40th anniversary of US embassy takeover

The rise of the civilisational state and of civilisational rather than national leaders is calling into question the concept of sovereign nation-states.

That is evident in the consequences of the civilizational assault on minorities ranging from the Kurds in Syria and Turkey to Muslims in China, India and Myanmar to Islamophobia and mounting anti-Semitism in the United States, France and Hungary as well as sectarianism in the Middle East.

Democracies legally enshrined yardsticks of non-discrimination and equality irrespective of creed, ethnicity, colour, gender and religion but never succeeded in truly enforcing those principles.

As a result, civilisationalism’s assault spotlights the long-standing failure of the nation-state, evident from the moment it was conceptualised by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, to give true meaning to guarantee the security, safety and rights of all its inhabitants irrespective of creed, colour, race, ethnicity, faith or gender.

The rise of a critical mass of civilizational leaders, including China’s Xi Jinping, Myanmar’s Win Myint, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Hungary’s Victor Orban and US President Donald J Trump makes a rethink inevitable not only of the functioning of democracy but also of the concepts of the nation state and sovereignty that have structured world orders for close to 500 years.

Many of these leaders conceive of their societies and/or states as defined by civilization and its reach into akin Diaspora communities rather than by legally recognized borders, population within those borders, and language.

Civilisationalism has allowed China to extend its reach in the South China Sea beyond internationally recognised borders at the expense of other littoral states as well as to Diaspora communities across the globe.

It also provided the basis on which China has so far successfully imposed its views on others whether its acceptance of its one-China policy or silence, if not acquiescence, in repression in Xinjiang.

Civilisationalism has further enabled Russia to recognise breakaway states in Georgia, annexe Crimea, and spark violent conflict in eastern Ukraine.

In some ways, the nation state, designed to put an end to religious wars in Europe, paved the way for a revival of civilisationalism by godfathering exclusionary politics that were based on a determination of who belonged and who did not belong to a nation, a question which civilisationalism answers by legitimizing supremacism, racism and prejudice.

From the outset, newly conceived European nation-states sought to build nations by not fully embracing those it believed were not truly part of their nation.

The nation state’s exclusivity, rather than as a result of the Westphalia treaty pulling the curtain on an era of European wars, sparked another round of armed conflict intended to fortify newly found national identities.

Today, the reconceptualisation of nation-state and the notion of sovereignty has become an imperative with civilisationalism adopting exclusivity as its battle cry and the nation state’s centuries-long inability and unwillingness to negotiate mutually workable arrangements that take account of aspirations and identities of societal groups that feel excluded.

Reconceptualisation would need to be geared towards guaranteeing individual and minority rights based on an international legal framework that is enforceable.&nbsp;

Failure to do so would likely usher in an era of disruptive societal tension, marginalisation and disenfranchisement of minorities, flows of mass migration, radicalisation and increased political violence.

A recent International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) report concluded that China was advising countries confronting political and economic instability, sometimes sparked in part by Chinese project-related corruption, to adopt its model of brutally cracking down on any expression of dissent like in Xinjiang.

China, according to the report, is also advocating implementation of its system of social control, involving the use of invasive Chinese artificial intelligence-based surveillance technology, reducing media to parrots of government policy, and firewalling the Internet. China is further training governments in ways of disrupting opposition activity.

China’s view of economic development as a way of countering what it sees as cultural drivers of extremism underlies its effort to Sinicize Turkic Muslim Islam in Xinjiang and is implicit in Chinese aid to countries in the Middle East.

Xi announced in July of last year $20billion in loans to Middle Eastern nations as well as $106 million in financial aid for Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen on the back of Chinese assertions that finance would help resolve the region’s political, religious and cultural tensions.

“China is increasingly proactive in its response to instability in developing countries. It is now more forthright in its advice to partner countries and is proactive in promoting Chinese solutions to other countries’ problems,” said Nicholas Crawford, the IISS report’s author.

China’s policy prescriptions, elements of which are being adopted across the globe, is likely to perpetuate problems inherent to exclusivism propagated by both civilisationalists and nation-states that are more concerned about perceived threats to their territorial integrity or constructed collective identities than aspirations of groups that are part of their societal fabric.

The rise of civilisationalists, autocrats, authoritarians and illiberals, including Xi, does not bode well for Eurasia, a region pockmarked by groups whose rights have been repeatedly violated by various civilizationalist leaders as well as exclusionary nation-states concerned about challenges to their territorial integrity or constructed collective identities.

“Geopolitics is no longer simply about the economy or security… The non-Western world, led by Beijing and Moscow, is pushing back against the Western claim to embody universal values… The rejection of Western universalism by the elites in Russia and China challenges the idea of the nation state as the international norm for political organisation… The new pivot of geopolitics is civilisation,” said political scientist Adrian Pabst.

A tour of the world’s flashpoints proves the point.

The flashpoints include predominantly Kurdish south-eastern Turkey, what is left of the Kurdish enclave in northern Syria, Rohingya rotting away in Bangladeshi refugee camps after fleeing ethnic cleansing in Myanmar; the plight of Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang and Catalan efforts to democratically decide whether they want to remain part of Spain.

They illustrate the fact that the failure of the nation-state to build truly inclusive and cohesive societies coupled with the rise of the civilizational state and civilizationalist leaders portends a new world order that is likely to be characterized by individual and collective rights abuse that heightens societal tensions and aggravates disputes and conflicts.

“The global order provides more mechanisms for states to deal diplomatically with each other than with the people inside them,” noted scholar and author Malka Older.

The civilizationalist threat to individual and minority rights is enhanced by its insistence on collective adherence to an overriding ideology whether that is the Chinese communist party’s concept of absolute control of anything and everything cloaked in ultra-nationalism and concepts of unique Chinese characteristics; Russian Orthodoxy cemented in the alliance between church and state; or Victor Orban’s conceptualization of a Hungarian nation that is homogenously white and Christian.

In a recent study of religion and tolerance in the Middle East, widely viewed as perhaps the religiously most intolerant part of the world, political scientist Michael Hoffman concluded that it is not religion that in and of itself breeds intolerance and prejudice.

Instead, Hoffman suggested that Muslim attitudes towards the other differ sharply between believers who pray collectively in a mosque and those who worship in private.

Private prayer “does not contain the same sectarian content as communal prayer,” Hoffman noted, implicitly pointing a finger at autocratic authorities who in the Middle East often exercise tight control of what is said in the mosque.

“The group identification mechanism is not present for private prayer; since private prayer is fundamentally a personal phenomenon, it does not cause believers to distinguish more sharply between their own sect and others and therefore does not produce the intolerant outcomes associated with communal worship,” Hoffman went on to say.

Hoffman’s research, despite its focus on the Middle East, spotlighted in an era of rising civilisationalism the risks to universal basic human dignity as well as individual and minorities rights in directly or indirectly imposing collectivist beliefs that drown out the political, ethnic or religious other.

The silver lining in what are bleak prospects may be Pabst’s conclusion that “neither the Western cult of private freedom without social solidarity nor the totalitarian tendencies among China’s and Russia’s elites can nurture resilient societies against the disruptive forces of technology and implacable economic globalisation… (Yet) across different civilisations there is an inchoate sense that the purpose of politics is the free association of people around common interests and shared social virtues of generosity, loyalty, courage, sacrifice and gratitude. The practice of such virtues can bind us together as citizens, nations and cultures beyond colour, class or creed.” 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp; 
&nbsp;

The rise of the civilisational state and of civilisational rather than national leaders is calling into question the concept of sovereign nation-states. That is evident in the consequences of the civilizational assault on minorities ranging from the Kurds in Syria and Turkey to Muslims in China, India and Myanmar to Islamophobia and mounting anti-Semitism in the United States, France and Hungary as well as sectarianism in the Middle East.

The rise of the civilisational state and of civilisational rather than national leaders is calling into question the concept of sovereign nation-states. That is evident in the consequences of the civilizational assault on minorities ranging from the Kurds in Syria and Turkey to Muslims in China, India and Myanmar to Islamophobia and mounting anti-Semitism in the United States, France and Hungary as well as sectarianism in the Middle East. Democracies legally enshrined yardsticks of non-discrimination and equality irrespective of creed, ethnicity, colour, gender and religion but never succeeded in truly enforcing those principles. As a result, civilisationalism’s assault spotlights the long-standing failure of the nation-state, evident from the moment it was conceptualised by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, to give true meaning to guarantee the security, safety and rights of all its inhabitants irrespective of creed, colour, race, ethnicity, faith or gender. The rise of a critical mass of civilizational leaders, including China’s Xi Jinping, Myanmar’s Win Myint, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Hungary’s Victor Orban and US President Donald J Trump makes a rethink inevitable not only of the functioning of democracy but also of the concepts of the nation state and sovereignty that have structured world orders for close to 500 years. Many of these leaders conceive of their societies and/or states as defined by civilization and its reach into akin Diaspora communities rather than by legally recognized borders, population within those borders, and language. Civilisationalism has allowed China to extend its reach in the South China Sea beyond internationally recognised borders at the expense of other littoral states as well as to Diaspora communities across the globe. It also provided the basis on which China has so far successfully imposed its views on others whether its acceptance of its one-China policy or silence, if not acquiescence, in repression in Xinjiang. Civilisationalism has further enabled Russia to recognise breakaway states in Georgia, annexe Crimea, and spark violent conflict in eastern Ukraine. In some ways, the nation state, designed to put an end to religious wars in Europe, paved the way for a revival of civilisationalism by godfathering exclusionary politics that were based on a determination of who belonged and who did not belong to a nation, a question which civilisationalism answers by legitimizing supremacism, racism and prejudice. From the outset, newly conceived European nation-states sought to build nations by not fully embracing those it believed were not truly part of their nation. The nation state’s exclusivity, rather than as a result of the Westphalia treaty pulling the curtain on an era of European wars, sparked another round of armed conflict intended to fortify newly found national identities. Today, the reconceptualisation of nation-state and the notion of sovereignty has become an imperative with civilisationalism adopting exclusivity as its battle cry and the nation state’s centuries-long inability and unwillingness to negotiate mutually workable arrangements that take account of aspirations and identities of societal groups that feel excluded. Reconceptualisation would need to be geared towards guaranteeing individual and minority rights based on an international legal framework that is enforceable. Failure to do so would likely usher in an era of disruptive societal tension, marginalisation and disenfranchisement of minorities, flows of mass migration, radicalisation and increased political violence. A recent International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) report concluded that China was advising countries confronting political and economic instability, sometimes sparked in part by Chinese project-related corruption, to adopt its model of brutally cracking down on any expression of dissent like in Xinjiang. China, according to the report, is also advocating implementation of its system of social control, involving the use of invasive Chinese artificial intelligence-based surveillance technology, reducing media to parrots of government policy, and firewalling the Internet. China is further training governments in ways of disrupting opposition activity. China’s view of economic development as a way of countering what it sees as cultural drivers of extremism underlies its effort to Sinicize Turkic Muslim Islam in Xinjiang and is implicit in Chinese aid to countries in the Middle East. Xi announced in July of last year $20billion in loans to Middle Eastern nations as well as $106 million in financial aid for Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen on the back of Chinese assertions that finance would help resolve the region’s political, religious and cultural tensions. “China is increasingly proactive in its response to instability in developing countries. It is now more forthright in its advice to partner countries and is proactive in promoting Chinese solutions to other countries’ problems,” said Nicholas Crawford, the IISS report’s author. China’s policy prescriptions, elements of which are being adopted across the globe, is likely to perpetuate problems inherent to exclusivism propagated by both civilisationalists and nation-states that are more concerned about perceived threats to their territorial integrity or constructed collective identities than aspirations of groups that are part of their societal fabric. The rise of civilisationalists, autocrats, authoritarians and illiberals, including Xi, does not bode well for Eurasia, a region pockmarked by groups whose rights have been repeatedly violated by various civilizationalist leaders as well as exclusionary nation-states concerned about challenges to their territorial integrity or constructed collective identities. “Geopolitics is no longer simply about the economy or security… The non-Western world, led by Beijing and Moscow, is pushing back against the Western claim to embody universal values… The rejection of Western universalism by the elites in Russia and China challenges the idea of the nation state as the international norm for political organisation… The new pivot of geopolitics is civilisation,” said political scientist Adrian Pabst. A tour of the world’s flashpoints proves the point. The flashpoints include predominantly Kurdish south-eastern Turkey, what is left of the Kurdish enclave in northern Syria, Rohingya rotting away in Bangladeshi refugee camps after fleeing ethnic cleansing in Myanmar; the plight of Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang and Catalan efforts to democratically decide whether they want to remain part of Spain. They illustrate the fact that the failure of the nation-state to build truly inclusive and cohesive societies coupled with the rise of the civilizational state and civilizationalist leaders portends a new world order that is likely to be characterized by individual and collective rights abuse that heightens societal tensions and aggravates disputes and conflicts. “The global order provides more mechanisms for states to deal diplomatically with each other than with the people inside them,” noted scholar and author Malka Older. The civilizationalist threat to individual and minority rights is enhanced by its insistence on collective adherence to an overriding ideology whether that is the Chinese communist party’s concept of absolute control of anything and everything cloaked in ultra-nationalism and concepts of unique Chinese characteristics; Russian Orthodoxy cemented in the alliance between church and state; or Victor Orban’s conceptualization of a Hungarian nation that is homogenously white and Christian. In a recent study of religion and tolerance in the Middle East, widely viewed as perhaps the religiously most intolerant part of the world, political scientist Michael Hoffman concluded that it is not religion that in and of itself breeds intolerance and prejudice. Instead, Hoffman suggested that Muslim attitudes towards the other differ sharply between believers who pray collectively in a mosque and those who worship in private. Private prayer “does not contain the same sectarian content as communal prayer,” Hoffman noted, implicitly pointing a finger at autocratic authorities who in the Middle East often exercise tight control of what is said in the mosque. “The group identification mechanism is not present for private prayer; since private prayer is fundamentally a personal phenomenon, it does not cause believers to distinguish more sharply between their own sect and others and therefore does not produce the intolerant outcomes associated with communal worship,” Hoffman went on to say. Hoffman’s research, despite its focus on the Middle East, spotlighted in an era of rising civilisationalism the risks to universal basic human dignity as well as individual and minorities rights in directly or indirectly imposing collectivist beliefs that drown out the political, ethnic or religious other. The silver lining in what are bleak prospects may be Pabst’s conclusion that “neither the Western cult of private freedom without social solidarity nor the totalitarian tendencies among China’s and Russia’s elites can nurture resilient societies against the disruptive forces of technology and implacable economic globalisation… (Yet) across different civilisations there is an inchoate sense that the purpose of politics is the free association of people around common interests and shared social virtues of generosity, loyalty, courage, sacrifice and gratitude. The practice of such virtues can bind us together as citizens, nations and cultures beyond colour, class or creed.” (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Adjusting to the new world order

40th Anniversary of beginning of Iran hostage crisis. Watch video to know more

40th Anniversary of beginning of Iran hostage crisis

A US appeals court ruled on Monday that <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/white-house-witnesses-are-no-shows-in-impeachment-probe-259947">President Donald Trump</a> must release eight years of tax returns, dealing a blow to his attempts to keep his personal earnings private.

The decision is the latest development in a years-long effort to obtain copies of Trump's taxes, which he promised during the campaign to make public after an audit but has since refused to share.

A three-judge panel in Manhattan rejected an appeal by the president's lawyers challenging a subpoena by New York prosecutors that demanded that his accounting firm hand over the records.

The federal judges, however, refused to take a position on claims by Trump's attorneys that as America's leader he is immune from any criminal investigation.

"We emphasize again the narrowness of the issue before us," they wrote in their decision.

"This appeal does not require us to consider whether the president is immune from indictment and prosecution while in office, nor to consider whether the president may lawfully be ordered to produce documents for use in a state criminal proceeding," the judges added.

The president's legal team did not immediately respond to a request for comment but it is likely that the case will end up in the Supreme Court.

Trump had filed suit against Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance Jr, a Democrat who had subpoenaed the accounting firm Mazars USA, seeking access to the president's returns dating back to 2011.

Vance is investigating payments made by Michael Cohen, Trump's former personal attorney, to Stormy Daniels, an adult film actress who claimed to have had a sexual liaison with Trump before he ran for president in 2016.

Cohen is currently serving three years in prison after admitting paying hush money,&nbsp;in violation of campaign finance laws,&nbsp;to Daniels and another woman, tax fraud, and lying to Congress.

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/donald-trump-threatens-to-withhold-emergency-aid-from-fire-hit-california-259805">Trump's lawyers</a> claimed in court that their client doesn't need to abide by Vance's injunction because as president of the United States he cannot be prosecuted for an offence.

But the judges ruled that presidential immunity was not an issue here because it was the accounting firm that had been subpoenaed for the documents.

Trump broke with a long-established norm during the 2016 presidential election by refusing to release his tax returns as most presidents have done since the 1970s even though it is not required by law.

He has claimed that they are under audit by the Internal Revenue Service, and there have been various attempts to obtain them, including by the Democratic-led House of Representatives.

A US appeals court ruled on Monday that President Donald Trump must release eight years of tax returns, dealing a blow to his attempts to keep his personal earnings private.

A US appeals court ruled on Monday that President Donald Trump must release eight years of tax returns, dealing a blow to his attempts to keep his personal earnings private. The decision is the latest development in a years-long effort to obtain copies of Trump's taxes, which he promised during the campaign to make public after an audit but has since refused to share. A three-judge panel in Manhattan rejected an appeal by the president's lawyers challenging a subpoena by New York prosecutors that demanded that his accounting firm hand over the records. The federal judges, however, refused to take a position on claims by Trump's attorneys that as America's leader he is immune from any criminal investigation. "We emphasize again the narrowness of the issue before us," they wrote in their decision. "This appeal does not require us to consider whether the president is immune from indictment and prosecution while in office, nor to consider whether the president may lawfully be ordered to produce documents for use in a state criminal proceeding," the judges added. The president's legal team did not immediately respond to a request for comment but it is likely that the case will end up in the Supreme Court. Trump had filed suit against Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance Jr, a Democrat who had subpoenaed the accounting firm Mazars USA, seeking access to the president's returns dating back to 2011. Vance is investigating payments made by Michael Cohen, Trump's former personal attorney, to Stormy Daniels, an adult film actress who claimed to have had a sexual liaison with Trump before he ran for president in 2016. Cohen is currently serving three years in prison after admitting paying hush money, in violation of campaign finance laws, to Daniels and another woman, tax fraud, and lying to Congress. Trump's lawyers claimed in court that their client doesn't need to abide by Vance's injunction because as president of the United States he cannot be prosecuted for an offence. But the judges ruled that presidential immunity was not an issue here because it was the accounting firm that had been subpoenaed for the documents. Trump broke with a long-established norm during the 2016 presidential election by refusing to release his tax returns as most presidents have done since the 1970s even though it is not required by law. He has claimed that they are under audit by the Internal Revenue Service, and there have been various attempts to obtain them, including by the Democratic-led House of Representatives.

United States judges reject Trump appeal over tax returns

North Korea and the United States could hold another round of working-level talks as soon as mid-November to expedite progress before a year-end deadline set by Pyongyang, a South Korean lawmaker said on Monday.

North Korean and US officials met for the first time last month in Stockholm since US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met and agreed in June to reopen denuclearisation talks that stalled after their failed summit in Vietnam in February.

But that meeting also collapsed as the North's envoy said the United States was not ready and failed to show flexibility.

Both sides are expected to meet again no later than early December to kick-start negotiations before a year-end deadline set by Kim, South Korean lawmaker Lee Eun-jae said after attending a briefing by the National Intelligence Service (NIS).

"The NIS expected the talks would resume this month or early December at the latest," Lee told reporters.

"It's time for them to enter negotiations in earnest after checking each other's stance in Stockholm, and there's a deadline given by Chairman Kim."

Kim is eyeing another summit with Trump in December, Lee said.

North Korea and the United States could hold another round of working-level talks as soon as mid-November to expedite progress before a year-end deadline set by Pyongyang, a South Korean lawmaker said on Monday.

North Korea and the United States could hold another round of working-level talks as soon as mid-November to expedite progress before a year-end deadline set by Pyongyang, a South Korean lawmaker said on Monday. North Korean and US officials met for the first time last month in Stockholm since US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met and agreed in June to reopen denuclearisation talks that stalled after their failed summit in Vietnam in February. But that meeting also collapsed as the North's envoy said the United States was not ready and failed to show flexibility. Both sides are expected to meet again no later than early December to kick-start negotiations before a year-end deadline set by Kim, South Korean lawmaker Lee Eun-jae said after attending a briefing by the National Intelligence Service (NIS). "The NIS expected the talks would resume this month or early December at the latest," Lee told reporters. "It's time for them to enter negotiations in earnest after checking each other's stance in Stockholm, and there's a deadline given by Chairman Kim." Kim is eyeing another summit with Trump in December, Lee said.

North Korea, US could hold talks in mid-November: South Korean lawmaker

Apple Inc&nbsp;asked the Trump administration to waive tariffs on Chinese-made Apple Watches, iPhone components, and other consumer products, according to company filings with the US Trade Representative's Office.

The company on Thursday sought tariff exclusions from 11 products, including HomePod speakers, iMac computers, parts for use in repairing iPhones, iPhone smart battery cases, AirPods and others. The public has until November&nbsp;14 to submit comments on the requests.

Apple told the U.S. Trade Representative's Office the products were consumer electronic devices and "not strategically important or related to 'Made in China 2025' or other Chinese industrial programs."

The exclusions seek relief from 15 per cent&nbsp;tariffs that took effect on September&nbsp;1.

FitBit Inc&nbsp;asked the administration to waive tariffs on its fitness trackers. The company told the administration "the vast majority of global production capacity for wrist-wearable communications devices is in China."

The company added that "while Fitbit is aware of facilities currently producing such devices in Taiwan and South Korea, these facilities are fully owned by, or otherwise contracted to, Fitbit competitors that use them for their own branded production, rendering them unavailable to Fitbit." Alphabet Inc&nbsp;announced Friday it has reached a deal to acquire Fitbit.

Apple submitted the requests on the first day the Trump administration began accepting them. An Apple spokesman did not immediately comment.

Apple's wearables and accessories&nbsp;business,&nbsp;which includes the Apple Watch, AirPods and HomePod - brought in $24.5 billion&nbsp;in its fiscal 2019 ended in September, or about 9.4 per cent&nbsp;of Apple's revenue. Sales in the segment were up 41% versus the prior year, and the devices have become an important driver of Apple's&nbsp;business&nbsp;as iPhone sales declined for the past four straight quarters.

Apple chief executive Tim Cook said Wednesday on the company's earnings call the company is paying "some tariffs today, as you know, some that went into effect pre-September and some others that went into effect in September. So we are paying some."

Christie's Inc has asked the administration waive tariffs on Chinese sculptures, statues, paintings, antique furniture and silverware, and other collectible items.

Sea Eagle Boats Inc submitted requests to waive tariffs on inflatable stand up paddleboards.

Apple Inc asked the Trump administration to waive tariffs on Chinese-made Apple Watches, iPhone components, and other consumer products, according to company filings with the US Trade Representative's Office.

Apple Inc asked the Trump administration to waive tariffs on Chinese-made Apple Watches, iPhone components, and other consumer products, according to company filings with the US Trade Representative's Office. The company on Thursday sought tariff exclusions from 11 products, including HomePod speakers, iMac computers, parts for use in repairing iPhones, iPhone smart battery cases, AirPods and others. The public has until November 14 to submit comments on the requests. Apple told the U.S. Trade Representative's Office the products were consumer electronic devices and "not strategically important or related to 'Made in China 2025' or other Chinese industrial programs." The exclusions seek relief from 15 per cent tariffs that took effect on September 1. FitBit Inc asked the administration to waive tariffs on its fitness trackers. The company told the administration "the vast majority of global production capacity for wrist-wearable communications devices is in China." The company added that "while Fitbit is aware of facilities currently producing such devices in Taiwan and South Korea, these facilities are fully owned by, or otherwise contracted to, Fitbit competitors that use them for their own branded production, rendering them unavailable to Fitbit." Alphabet Inc announced Friday it has reached a deal to acquire Fitbit. Apple submitted the requests on the first day the Trump administration began accepting them. An Apple spokesman did not immediately comment. Apple's wearables and accessories business, which includes the Apple Watch, AirPods and HomePod - brought in $24.5 billion in its fiscal 2019 ended in September, or about 9.4 per cent of Apple's revenue. Sales in the segment were up 41% versus the prior year, and the devices have become an important driver of Apple's business as iPhone sales declined for the past four straight quarters. Apple chief executive Tim Cook said Wednesday on the company's earnings call the company is paying "some tariffs today, as you know, some that went into effect pre-September and some others that went into effect in September. So we are paying some." Christie's Inc has asked the administration waive tariffs on Chinese sculptures, statues, paintings, antique furniture and silverware, and other collectible items. Sea Eagle Boats Inc submitted requests to waive tariffs on inflatable stand up paddleboards.

Apple asks United States to waive tariffs on Chinese-made watches, iPhone parts, AirPods

U.S. Releases Footage Of The Operation That Killed Terrorist Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Gravitas: How the Baghdadi operation unfolded

WION Speed News: Watch top national and international news of the morning - November 1st, 2019

House to formalise Trump impeachment investigation. Watch video to know more.

House to formalise Trump impeachment investigation

WION Speed News: Watch top national and international news of the morning - October 31st, 2019

Beijing slammed US Secretary of State <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/pompeo-says-us-must-confront-chinas-communist-party-259032">Mike Pompeo</a> on Thursday for a speech it said had "viciously attacked" China.

In the latest hawkish take on China by President Donald Trump's administration, Pompeo Wednesday called Beijing "truly hostile" to the United States, and vowed to ramp up pressure on China on multiple fronts.

In response, Beijing rounded on his comments Thursday, which it said revealed "arrogance and fear."

"This deliberate distortion of the facts and slandering of China's domestic and foreign policies fully exposes the deep political bias and anti-communist mindset of a small number of US politicians," said foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang at a press briefing.

"Pompeo's speech viciously attacked the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government," added Geng.

In his talk at the conservative Hudson Institute in New York, <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/united-states-mike-pence-and-mike-pompeo-head-to-turkey-seeking-ceasefire-256457">Pompeo</a> highlighted China's clampdown on Hong Kong protests and incarceration of Uighur Muslims, and said Beijing was seeking international domination.

Watch: Is Pompeo justifying Turkey's invasion?

<div class="videoWrapper trancodeVideo"><iframe allowfullscreen="" autoplay="1" class="includeVideo" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.wionews.com/videos/pompeo-justifying-turkeys-invasion-257605/embed" style="width:100%;max-width:560px;" width="560"></iframe></div>

Rights groups say more than one million Uighurs and other mostly Muslim ethnic minorities have been rounded up in internment camps in Xinjiang.

After initially denying their existence, Beijing now defends the camps as "vocational education centres" that counter religious extremism and terrorism.

"The Chinese Communist Party is offering its people and the world an entirely different model of governance, it's one in which a Leninist party rules and everyone must think and act according to the will of the Communist elites," Pompeo said.

"That's not a future that I want... and it's not a future that the freedom-loving people of China" want, he said.

At a dinner attended by Henry Kissinger, the apostle of realpolitik who negotiated the US normalisation of ties with Beijing, Pompeo said Washington had long been too easy on China in hopes that it would transform.

"Today we're finally realising the degree to which the Chinese Communist Party is truly hostile to the United States and our values," Pompeo said.

Pompeo nonetheless said that the United States did not seek confrontation but rather still wanted to encourage a more "liberalised" China.

His remarks come amid a simmering trade war between the two countries, which Trump has voiced hope of resolving.

Beijing slammed US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Thursday for a speech it said had "viciously attacked" China. In the latest hawkish take on China by President Donald Trump's administration, Pompeo Wednesday called Beijing "truly hostile" to the United States, and vowed to ramp up pressure on China on multiple fronts.

Beijing slammed US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Thursday for a speech it said had "viciously attacked" China. In the latest hawkish take on China by President Donald Trump's administration, Pompeo Wednesday called Beijing "truly hostile" to the United States, and vowed to ramp up pressure on China on multiple fronts. In response, Beijing rounded on his comments Thursday, which it said revealed "arrogance and fear." "This deliberate distortion of the facts and slandering of China's domestic and foreign policies fully exposes the deep political bias and anti-communist mindset of a small number of US politicians," said foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang at a press briefing. "Pompeo's speech viciously attacked the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government," added Geng. In his talk at the conservative Hudson Institute in New York, Pompeo highlighted China's clampdown on Hong Kong protests and incarceration of Uighur Muslims, and said Beijing was seeking international domination. Watch: Is Pompeo justifying Turkey's invasion? Rights groups say more than one million Uighurs and other mostly Muslim ethnic minorities have been rounded up in internment camps in Xinjiang. After initially denying their existence, Beijing now defends the camps as "vocational education centres" that counter religious extremism and terrorism. "The Chinese Communist Party is offering its people and the world an entirely different model of governance, it's one in which a Leninist party rules and everyone must think and act according to the will of the Communist elites," Pompeo said. "That's not a future that I want... and it's not a future that the freedom-loving people of China" want, he said. At a dinner attended by Henry Kissinger, the apostle of realpolitik who negotiated the US normalisation of ties with Beijing, Pompeo said Washington had long been too easy on China in hopes that it would transform. "Today we're finally realising the degree to which the Chinese Communist Party is truly hostile to the United States and our values," Pompeo said. Pompeo nonetheless said that the United States did not seek confrontation but rather still wanted to encourage a more "liberalised" China. His remarks come amid a simmering trade war between the two countries, which Trump has voiced hope of resolving.

China blasts Pompeo for 'vicious' speech against Beijing

By John A Tures

After former Islamic State Group leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a US military action, speculation began on whether or not President Donald Trump would get a boost in public opinion surveys as a result.

My political science research with my students shows that presidents do enjoy a short-term poll boost after foreign policy raids and capital city captures.

However, that’s often followed by a long-term decline.

A closer look at the polls 
 
Supporters of the diversionary theory of war, known in the media as the “Wag the Dog” effect, contend that presidents can boost their approval ratings in the polls by fighting a war abroad.

In other words, they benefit from a burst of patriotism during the conflict.

But international relations scholars Bradley Lian and John R. Oneal tested this theory by looking at conflicts from 1950 through 1984 and found scant empirical support for this hypothesis.

My students and I considered 12 cases to determine whether presidents benefit at the polls from conducting raids involving the capture of a leader, seizure of a capital city or an attempt to rescue hostages, and how long that support can be expected to last.

The events we looked at included the surrender of Manuel Noriega in January of 1990; the apprehension of Saddam Hussein in 2003; and the killing of Moammar Gaddafi in 2011.

We looked at polls conducted by the Gallup Polling Presidential Job Approval Center, calculating an average of three presidential approval polls taken before the foreign policy event, and the mean of the first three polls issued after the case.

We also analysed polls taken by the end of the year, or six months later if the raid took place near the end of the year, to see how presidents fared long after the event.

Our results show that in 75 per cent of cases, the US President received a boost in the polls shortly after a foreign policy raid or capital capture.

But the jump is short lived. In 83 per cent of cases, presidential approval declined over the next several months. In seven cases, it fell by more than five percentage points from the initial poll boost.

For example, President Donald Trump insisted that al-Baghdadi’s death was a bigger deal than the raid that killed Osama Bin-Laden. That May 2011 event was widely credited with sealing President Barack Obama’s reelection the following year.

That credit may have been misplaced. Our evidence shows that Obama’s approval ratings had declined to 45 per cent by December of 2011. Thus, if history is any guide, I expect that Trump may have higher approval ratings in the coming days but shouldn’t count on better polls over the next several months.

(John A Tures is Professor of Political Science, LaGrange College)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-killing-al-baghdadi-give-trump-a-boost-in-the-polls-probably-but-it-wont-last-125987"> original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp;

 
&nbsp;

By John A Tures After former Islamic State Group leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a US military action, speculation began on whether or not President Donald Trump would get a boost in public opinion surveys as a result.

By John A Tures After former Islamic State Group leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a US military action, speculation began on whether or not President Donald Trump would get a boost in public opinion surveys as a result. My political science research with my students shows that presidents do enjoy a short-term poll boost after foreign policy raids and capital city captures. However, that’s often followed by a long-term decline. A closer look at the polls Supporters of the diversionary theory of war, known in the media as the “Wag the Dog” effect, contend that presidents can boost their approval ratings in the polls by fighting a war abroad. In other words, they benefit from a burst of patriotism during the conflict. But international relations scholars Bradley Lian and John R. Oneal tested this theory by looking at conflicts from 1950 through 1984 and found scant empirical support for this hypothesis. My students and I considered 12 cases to determine whether presidents benefit at the polls from conducting raids involving the capture of a leader, seizure of a capital city or an attempt to rescue hostages, and how long that support can be expected to last. The events we looked at included the surrender of Manuel Noriega in January of 1990; the apprehension of Saddam Hussein in 2003; and the killing of Moammar Gaddafi in 2011. We looked at polls conducted by the Gallup Polling Presidential Job Approval Center, calculating an average of three presidential approval polls taken before the foreign policy event, and the mean of the first three polls issued after the case. We also analysed polls taken by the end of the year, or six months later if the raid took place near the end of the year, to see how presidents fared long after the event. Our results show that in 75 per cent of cases, the US President received a boost in the polls shortly after a foreign policy raid or capital capture. But the jump is short lived. In 83 per cent of cases, presidential approval declined over the next several months. In seven cases, it fell by more than five percentage points from the initial poll boost. For example, President Donald Trump insisted that al-Baghdadi’s death was a bigger deal than the raid that killed Osama Bin-Laden. That May 2011 event was widely credited with sealing President Barack Obama’s reelection the following year. That credit may have been misplaced. Our evidence shows that Obama’s approval ratings had declined to 45 per cent by December of 2011. Thus, if history is any guide, I expect that Trump may have higher approval ratings in the coming days but shouldn’t count on better polls over the next several months. (John A Tures is Professor of Political Science, LaGrange College) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Will killing Al-Baghdadi give Donald Trump a boost in the polls?

President Donald Trump still hopes to sign a trade deal with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in coming weeks, despite Chile's cancellation of the APEC summit where they had been scheduled to meet, the White House said Wednesday.

"We look forward to finalizing Phase One of the historic trade deal with China within the same time frame, and when we have an announcement, we'll let you know," spokesman Hogan Gidley said in a statement.

President Sebastian Pinera announced earlier that Chile could no longer hold the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit and later Cop 25 climate change conference in Santiago, due to violent unrest in the city.

Gidley said as of now there was no replacement location.

"It's our understanding the organisation does not currently have a secondary site prepared. We’re awaiting potential information regarding another location," he said.

Trump and Xi had been targeting an encounter on the sidelines of the APEC event to sign an initial agreement aimed at resolving an 18-month trade war between the world's two biggest economies.

President Donald Trump still hopes to sign a trade deal with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in coming weeks, despite Chile's cancellation of the APEC summit where they had been scheduled to meet, the White House said Wednesday.

President Donald Trump still hopes to sign a trade deal with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in coming weeks, despite Chile's cancellation of the APEC summit where they had been scheduled to meet, the White House said Wednesday. "We look forward to finalizing Phase One of the historic trade deal with China within the same time frame, and when we have an announcement, we'll let you know," spokesman Hogan Gidley said in a statement. President Sebastian Pinera announced earlier that Chile could no longer hold the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit and later Cop 25 climate change conference in Santiago, due to violent unrest in the city. Gidley said as of now there was no replacement location. "It's our understanding the organisation does not currently have a secondary site prepared. We’re awaiting potential information regarding another location," he said. Trump and Xi had been targeting an encounter on the sidelines of the APEC event to sign an initial agreement aimed at resolving an 18-month trade war between the world's two biggest economies.

United States wants China trade deal in 'same time frame' despite APEC summit cancellation

By James Johnson

The US government, long a proponent of advancing technology for military purposes, sees artificial intelligence as key to the next generation of fighting tools.

Several recent investments and Pentagon initiatives show that military leaders are concerned about keeping up with – and ahead of – China and Russia, two countries that have made big gains in developing artificial-intelligence systems. AI-powered weapons include target recognition systems, weapons guided by AI, and cyberattack and cyberdefense software that runs without human intervention.

The US defence community is coming to understand that AI will significantly transform, if not completely reinvent, the world’s military power balance. The concern is more than the military. As Chinese and Russian technologies become more sophisticated, they threaten US domination of technological innovation and development, as well as global economic power and influence.

Military leaders see the threat to US technological leadership coming from two main sources: A&nbsp;rising and ambitious China and a mischievous and declining Russia. Taken together, these forces challenge global stability.

The nature of the threat

A 2018 Pentagon report noted that technological developments could change the types of threats facing the US, which might include space-based weapons, long-range ballistic missiles and cyberweapons.

A February 2019 analysis warned that China’s investments in its military’s AI systems – in particular, those supporting robotics, autonomy, precision munitions and cyber warfare – threaten to overtake the United States. Chinese government agencies are working closely with the country’s civilian businesses to keep on top of fast-changing technological developments.

In addition, some Chinese and Russian projects have developed military AI systems specifically aimed at what they perceive as US technological weaknesses. For instance, swarms of armed AI-enhanced drones might locate and attack the secure computer systems countries rely on to control and launch their nuclear weapons.

Pentagon’s response

So far the Pentagon’s actions have been largely bureaucratic, rather than concrete. It has released a Defense Department-wide strategy document that articulates broad principles for the development and use of AI in future warfare. The military has established a Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, which is tasked with accelerating the delivery and adoption of AI.

But projects with names like “the Third Offset,” “Project Maven” and the “AI Next Campaign” have minimal funding. Leaders have released few details about what they will actually do.

Working with Silicon Valley

The Pentagon has also established the Defense Innovation Unit, with permission to circumvent the cumbersome military purchasing process, to coordinate with Silicon Valley and bring new technologies into military use relatively quickly.

That unit has sparked discussions about the potential for the Chinese military to acquire and use US-designed technologies, which led to the US&nbsp;bans on doing business with many Chinese technology firms.

Many experts consider it possible for China to surpass the US&nbsp;in the development and use of AI. However, China trails the US in several ways. The United States has the world’s largest intelligence budget; the most popular hardware, software and technology companies; and the most advanced cyberwarfare capabilities, both offensive and defensive. I and other experts expect these advantages to preserve US&nbsp;technological leadership for now, at least – but perhaps not forever.

(James Johnson is Postdoctoral Fellow in Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-us-losing-the-artificial-intelligence-arms-race-124969">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp; 
&nbsp;

&nbsp;

By James Johnson The US government, long a proponent of advancing technology for military purposes, sees artificial intelligence as key to the next generation of fighting tools.

By James Johnson The US government, long a proponent of advancing technology for military purposes, sees artificial intelligence as key to the next generation of fighting tools. Several recent investments and Pentagon initiatives show that military leaders are concerned about keeping up with – and ahead of – China and Russia, two countries that have made big gains in developing artificial-intelligence systems. AI-powered weapons include target recognition systems, weapons guided by AI, and cyberattack and cyberdefense software that runs without human intervention. The US defence community is coming to understand that AI will significantly transform, if not completely reinvent, the world’s military power balance. The concern is more than the military. As Chinese and Russian technologies become more sophisticated, they threaten US domination of technological innovation and development, as well as global economic power and influence. Military leaders see the threat to US technological leadership coming from two main sources: A rising and ambitious China and a mischievous and declining Russia. Taken together, these forces challenge global stability. The nature of the threat A 2018 Pentagon report noted that technological developments could change the types of threats facing the US, which might include space-based weapons, long-range ballistic missiles and cyberweapons. A February 2019 analysis warned that China’s investments in its military’s AI systems – in particular, those supporting robotics, autonomy, precision munitions and cyber warfare – threaten to overtake the United States. Chinese government agencies are working closely with the country’s civilian businesses to keep on top of fast-changing technological developments. In addition, some Chinese and Russian projects have developed military AI systems specifically aimed at what they perceive as US technological weaknesses. For instance, swarms of armed AI-enhanced drones might locate and attack the secure computer systems countries rely on to control and launch their nuclear weapons. Pentagon’s response So far the Pentagon’s actions have been largely bureaucratic, rather than concrete. It has released a Defense Department-wide strategy document that articulates broad principles for the development and use of AI in future warfare. The military has established a Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, which is tasked with accelerating the delivery and adoption of AI. But projects with names like “the Third Offset,” “Project Maven” and the “AI Next Campaign” have minimal funding. Leaders have released few details about what they will actually do. Working with Silicon Valley The Pentagon has also established the Defense Innovation Unit, with permission to circumvent the cumbersome military purchasing process, to coordinate with Silicon Valley and bring new technologies into military use relatively quickly. That unit has sparked discussions about the potential for the Chinese military to acquire and use US-designed technologies, which led to the US bans on doing business with many Chinese technology firms. Many experts consider it possible for China to surpass the US in the development and use of AI. However, China trails the US in several ways. The United States has the world’s largest intelligence budget; the most popular hardware, software and technology companies; and the most advanced cyberwarfare capabilities, both offensive and defensive. I and other experts expect these advantages to preserve US technological leadership for now, at least – but perhaps not forever. (James Johnson is Postdoctoral Fellow in Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Is the US losing the artificial intelligence arms race?

By Natasha Lindstaedt

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State (IS), is dead. After US special forces raided his safe house in Idlib province in north-west Syria, Baghdadi reportedly fled and detonated a suicide vest, killing himself and three of his children. Over the past several years, there have been constant reports of his death but up until now, none of these reports have been verified.

The death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 did not lead to the end of Al-Qaeda, but what does al-Baghdadi’s death mean for IS?

Al-Baghdadi was most likely born in the Iraqi city of Samarra in 1971. Though he was a poor student with bad eyesight, he rose to command al-Qaeda’s Iraqi division. He was captured by US forces in a raid in 2004 in Falluja, Iraq, but was not considered to be particularly important at the time. Few would predict that Al-Baghdadi would rise to such a position of power. He was not noted for being particularly charismatic or memorable.

By 2010, al-Baghdadi took control of the group that would be eventually called the Islamic State, a group whose predecessor was Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI had been led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until he was killed in 2006. Under the helm of al-Zarqawi, AQI had become one of the region’s most brutal and effective insurgent groups, controlling the flow of resources and foreign fighters into Iraq. By 2007, the group had almost faded away, but by 2009 it was gaining support in Sunni tribal areas now known as the Islamic State in Iraq.

Split with Al-Qaeda

By the time al-Baghdadi took over, a rift had grown between the wider al-Qaeda group and IS, which had been simmering since al-Zarqawi led AQI. To al-Qaeda, Baghdadi was excessively violent and counter-productive to al-Qaeda’s objectives. Extravagant brutality such as beheading Muslims would alienate most Muslims. Al-Qaeda was also alarmed at IS’s predatory strategy of taking territory and resources from other rebel groups.

Al-Baghdadi, for his part, had no interest in subsuming IS under the wider leadership of al-Qaeda. He sent delegates (who were mostly of Syrian descent) into Syria after the Syrian war began in March 2011, a decision which al-Qaeda rejected. After repeated attempts by al-Qaeda to convince al-Baghdadi to move out of Syria, it officially cut its ties with him in February 2014.

Al-Baghdadi believed that al-Qaeda was ineffective, and had failed to set up an actual state.

Declaration of the caliphate

In June 2014, al-Baghdadi made his first public appearance delivering a sermon from a mosque in the recently captured city of Mosul, where he claimed to come from the same tribe as the prophet Muhammad. He also brazenly declared himself to be the caliph – or the political and religious leader of the Muslim community. Though this declaration was universally rejected by Islamic authorities, his plan of setting up a caliphate attracted thousands of foreign fighters to his cause.

At the height of al-Baghdadi’s power, IS had set up organisational structures across multiple countries and created a de facto state, the size of Belgium with 8m people living under its control. He established a brutal justice system, legalised slavery, collected taxes and provided a handful of public services.

While Bin Laden was more concerned with overthrowing modern Arab dictators, eliminating Israel and knocking over Western symbols of power, al-Baghdadi focused more on reviving the glory of the past. His dramatic vision for IS attracted those that wanted to be considered to be part of a line of warriors that extended back to the Prophet Muhammad.

Fall from power

By 2017, IS’s fortunes started to turn. It had inspired or helped to plan a series of terrorist attacks in Belgium, the US, France and Turkey that drew increasing resolve from the West to step up efforts to eliminate the group. Iraq’s forces also became more effective against IS, eventually retaking Mosul in 2017.

By March of 2019, IS surrendered its final territorial stronghold in Baghouz, Syria after extensive fighting with the mostly Kurdish, Syrian Democratic Forces. IS no longer had territory that it could lay claim to, and without territory, it could not claim to be a valid caliphate.

In an attempt to strengthen his standing, al-Baghdadi appeared in a video in April to demonstrate that the group could still exist, even if it lacked territory. He tried to energise his fighters to redouble their efforts. This would be only the second time that he would appear to the public.

His decision not to appear in person was about ensuring his own safety. Airstrikes had already caused a series of injuries. To avoid being caught, he never used mobile phones and frequently changed safe houses.

This makes his presence in Idlib province in Syria where he died somewhat surprising. The province is controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an Islamist militia fiercely opposed to IS. The region is also currently under siege by Russian and Syrian forces.

What’s next for IS?

As I’ve argued in my own research, for most terrorist groups which are hierarchically organised, the death of a leader signals its demise. In fact most terrorist groups fall apart within a year of forming once the group has been decapitated. Terrorist groups that are larger and more cellular in structure, such as Al-Qaeda, have been able to weather the deaths of leaders, helping to explain the group’s longevity.

IS will likely name a successor to lead the group, and al-Baghdadi tried to prepare his followers that he would not live forever. But it could now start to operate in a way similar to Al-Qaeda with a cell-like structure, where it may attempt to plan terrorist attacks to signal its continued relevance to its followers. It needs to attract new numbers as it has seen its membership dwindle since its territory has disappeared.

The US decision to pull out of Syria has compromised the Kurds, who were managing detention centres holding captured IS fighters. The Turkish advance into Kurdish held territory in north-eastern Syria has led to the escape of several hundreds of IS fighters. The US, however, already claims it has gathered further intelligence from al-Baghdadi’s compound that will continue to weaken IS.

Studies of terrorist groups that have managed succession raise concerns that when one leader dies, the leadership that follows can be less disciplined, more violent and determined to exact revenge. Given Baghdadi’s penchant for brutality, it’s hard to imagine how that’s possible.

(Natasha Lindstaedt is Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/al-baghdadis-death-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-leader-of-islamic-state-125947">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp; 
&nbsp;

By Natasha Lindstaedt Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State (IS), is dead. After US special forces raided his safe house in Idlib province in north-west Syria, Baghdadi reportedly fled and detonated a suicide vest, killing himself and three of his children.

By Natasha Lindstaedt Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State (IS), is dead. After US special forces raided his safe house in Idlib province in north-west Syria, Baghdadi reportedly fled and detonated a suicide vest, killing himself and three of his children. Over the past several years, there have been constant reports of his death but up until now, none of these reports have been verified. The death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 did not lead to the end of Al-Qaeda, but what does al-Baghdadi’s death mean for IS? Al-Baghdadi was most likely born in the Iraqi city of Samarra in 1971. Though he was a poor student with bad eyesight, he rose to command al-Qaeda’s Iraqi division. He was captured by US forces in a raid in 2004 in Falluja, Iraq, but was not considered to be particularly important at the time. Few would predict that Al-Baghdadi would rise to such a position of power. He was not noted for being particularly charismatic or memorable. By 2010, al-Baghdadi took control of the group that would be eventually called the Islamic State, a group whose predecessor was Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI had been led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until he was killed in 2006. Under the helm of al-Zarqawi, AQI had become one of the region’s most brutal and effective insurgent groups, controlling the flow of resources and foreign fighters into Iraq. By 2007, the group had almost faded away, but by 2009 it was gaining support in Sunni tribal areas now known as the Islamic State in Iraq. Split with Al-Qaeda By the time al-Baghdadi took over, a rift had grown between the wider al-Qaeda group and IS, which had been simmering since al-Zarqawi led AQI. To al-Qaeda, Baghdadi was excessively violent and counter-productive to al-Qaeda’s objectives. Extravagant brutality such as beheading Muslims would alienate most Muslims. Al-Qaeda was also alarmed at IS’s predatory strategy of taking territory and resources from other rebel groups. Al-Baghdadi, for his part, had no interest in subsuming IS under the wider leadership of al-Qaeda. He sent delegates (who were mostly of Syrian descent) into Syria after the Syrian war began in March 2011, a decision which al-Qaeda rejected. After repeated attempts by al-Qaeda to convince al-Baghdadi to move out of Syria, it officially cut its ties with him in February 2014. Al-Baghdadi believed that al-Qaeda was ineffective, and had failed to set up an actual state. Declaration of the caliphate In June 2014, al-Baghdadi made his first public appearance delivering a sermon from a mosque in the recently captured city of Mosul, where he claimed to come from the same tribe as the prophet Muhammad. He also brazenly declared himself to be the caliph – or the political and religious leader of the Muslim community. Though this declaration was universally rejected by Islamic authorities, his plan of setting up a caliphate attracted thousands of foreign fighters to his cause. At the height of al-Baghdadi’s power, IS had set up organisational structures across multiple countries and created a de facto state, the size of Belgium with 8m people living under its control. He established a brutal justice system, legalised slavery, collected taxes and provided a handful of public services. While Bin Laden was more concerned with overthrowing modern Arab dictators, eliminating Israel and knocking over Western symbols of power, al-Baghdadi focused more on reviving the glory of the past. His dramatic vision for IS attracted those that wanted to be considered to be part of a line of warriors that extended back to the Prophet Muhammad. Fall from power By 2017, IS’s fortunes started to turn. It had inspired or helped to plan a series of terrorist attacks in Belgium, the US, France and Turkey that drew increasing resolve from the West to step up efforts to eliminate the group. Iraq’s forces also became more effective against IS, eventually retaking Mosul in 2017. By March of 2019, IS surrendered its final territorial stronghold in Baghouz, Syria after extensive fighting with the mostly Kurdish, Syrian Democratic Forces. IS no longer had territory that it could lay claim to, and without territory, it could not claim to be a valid caliphate. In an attempt to strengthen his standing, al-Baghdadi appeared in a video in April to demonstrate that the group could still exist, even if it lacked territory. He tried to energise his fighters to redouble their efforts. This would be only the second time that he would appear to the public. His decision not to appear in person was about ensuring his own safety. Airstrikes had already caused a series of injuries. To avoid being caught, he never used mobile phones and frequently changed safe houses. This makes his presence in Idlib province in Syria where he died somewhat surprising. The province is controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an Islamist militia fiercely opposed to IS. The region is also currently under siege by Russian and Syrian forces. What’s next for IS? As I’ve argued in my own research, for most terrorist groups which are hierarchically organised, the death of a leader signals its demise. In fact most terrorist groups fall apart within a year of forming once the group has been decapitated. Terrorist groups that are larger and more cellular in structure, such as Al-Qaeda, have been able to weather the deaths of leaders, helping to explain the group’s longevity. IS will likely name a successor to lead the group, and al-Baghdadi tried to prepare his followers that he would not live forever. But it could now start to operate in a way similar to Al-Qaeda with a cell-like structure, where it may attempt to plan terrorist attacks to signal its continued relevance to its followers. It needs to attract new numbers as it has seen its membership dwindle since its territory has disappeared. The US decision to pull out of Syria has compromised the Kurds, who were managing detention centres holding captured IS fighters. The Turkish advance into Kurdish held territory in north-eastern Syria has led to the escape of several hundreds of IS fighters. The US, however, already claims it has gathered further intelligence from al-Baghdadi’s compound that will continue to weaken IS. Studies of terrorist groups that have managed succession raise concerns that when one leader dies, the leadership that follows can be less disciplined, more violent and determined to exact revenge. Given Baghdadi’s penchant for brutality, it’s hard to imagine how that’s possible. (Natasha Lindstaedt is Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Al-Baghdadi’s death: The rise and fall of the leader of Islamic State

Trump shares image of hero dog injured in Baghdadi raid. Watch video to know more.

Trump shares image of hero dog injured in Baghdadi raid

A Step-By-Step Account Of The U.S. Operation That Killed Terrorist Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Gravitas: US kills Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Here's how it unfolded

By Vahid Niayesh

Did President Donald Trump’s travel ban – in place now for more than 22 months – become, in practice, a Muslim ban?

The third version of President Donald Trump’s travel ban went into full effect on December 8, 2017.

The list of countries whose citizens are banned from entering the United States include Muslim-majority countries Iran, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Somalia, as well as North Korea and Venezuela.

Now that time has passed, policymakers, political scientists like myself and all Americans can start to understand the ban’s effects.

Was it actually a Muslim ban, as it was called at the time it was introduced? Or was that just an anti-Trump label? What percentage of people from those banned countries did pass the “enhanced vetting” and get an actual visa to enter the United States?

I looked through the government’s data to find answers.

Sharp decline

The US Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs regularly provides data on the number of visas issued for all countries.

Based on the data the agency provides for the fiscal year, the number of immigrant visas issued for the country of Iran decreased by 78 per cent between 2017 and 2018.

However, the fiscal year data for the year 2018 included the last three months of 2017, when the travel ban wasn’t still implemented. I broke the data down by months to understand how travel ban changed the number of visas issued from calendar year to calendar year. This offered a more accurate picture of the travel ban.

This analysis shows that only 537 immigrant visas were issued in 2018 for the 12 months after the travel ban went into effect for individuals born in Iran. Compare that to 6,643 visas issued in the previous year. That is a 92 per cent decrease in number of visas issued.

Other Muslim countries in the ban were similarly affected.

For instance, Somalia experienced 86 per cent decrease in number of immigrant visas issued during the 12 months after the travel ban went into effect. Yemen’s visas reduced by 83 per cent.

Libya and Syria had the smallest change among the Muslim countries in the ban, decreasing by 80 per cent and 77 per cent respectively.

Muslim vs non-Muslim countries

Many critics of the new travel rules argued that they were effectively a “Muslim ban.”

The Trump administration countered that there are Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan that are not included in the travel ban, and there are non-Muslim countries like Venezuela and North Korea that are included.

However, US Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs data shows that there was a significant decrease in the number of immigrant visas issued to Muslim countries affected by the travel ban. Meanwhile, the number of immigrant visas issued per month to the non-Muslim countries in the ban virtually remained unchanged.

In fact, there was a 40 per cent increase in the number of visas issued to North Koreans per calendar-year data, relative to the prior year, when the travel ban was blocked by federal courts.

Country of chargeability

There are some questions that government data cannot answer.

For example, rather than providing data on where each visa recipient lives, the U.S. Department of State by report if the Visa Office only offers information on the country of chargeability, which basically means where the applicant was born.

There were five fiancé visas issued to Iranians in calendar year 2018, compared to 358 fiancé visas issued in 2017. But even that low number does not tell us whether these five visas were given to Iranians that actually lived inside Iran. These visas may have been given to Iranians who had been living in Canada or Europe for many years but were born in Iran.

The actual impact of the Trump travel ban, in other words, could be even bigger than what the data shows.

Visas and waivers

Waivers are another important issue that is hard to study.

The vast majority people from the seven restricted countries who applied for a visa after the implementation of the ban were rejected outright.

However, US officials may grant a waiver to someone if there is evidence that the applicant is facing so much undue hardship that they need to be united with their loved ones in the US.

This could happen, for example, if a family member in the United States is dying and a person from a restricted nation wants to see them one last time, like the Yemeni mother who got a chance to see her baby boy just two days before he died.

In the first six months after the full implementation of the ban, such waivers were only given to around 2 per cent of individuals from banned countries. This gradually increased to 6 per cent after one year.

Being considered for a waiver is not the same as getting a visa. A person who is being considered for a waiver still cannot enter the US. They must wait under “administrative processing” status until they are cleared for a visa. It could take several years before applicants find out the results of their application. During this period, they cannot enter the U.S.

One recent lawsuit against the travel ban claims that some of their 14 clients have been under consideration for a waiver for 18 months at least, with no visa being granted to any of them yet.

What’s next

The first congressional hearing on the travel ban, held on September 24, established a need to reassess the impacts of the policy.

From what I see, looking at 18 months of government-provided data, the current travel ban is in effect a Muslim ban. I think that policymakers should take a deeper look into travel ban statistics and hold the Trump administration accountable for its visa policy for the restricted countries.

(Vahid Niayesh is Lecturer in Political Science, California State University, Long Beach)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-trumps-travel-ban-really-looks-like-almost-two-years-in-123564"> original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp;

By Vahid Niayesh Did President Donald Trump’s travel ban – in place now for more than 22 months – become, in practice, a Muslim ban? The third version of President Donald Trump’s travel ban went into full effect on December 8, 2017.

By Vahid Niayesh Did President Donald Trump’s travel ban – in place now for more than 22 months – become, in practice, a Muslim ban? The third version of President Donald Trump’s travel ban went into full effect on December 8, 2017. The list of countries whose citizens are banned from entering the United States include Muslim-majority countries Iran, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Somalia, as well as North Korea and Venezuela. Now that time has passed, policymakers, political scientists like myself and all Americans can start to understand the ban’s effects. Was it actually a Muslim ban, as it was called at the time it was introduced? Or was that just an anti-Trump label? What percentage of people from those banned countries did pass the “enhanced vetting” and get an actual visa to enter the United States? I looked through the government’s data to find answers. Sharp decline The US Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs regularly provides data on the number of visas issued for all countries. Based on the data the agency provides for the fiscal year, the number of immigrant visas issued for the country of Iran decreased by 78 per cent between 2017 and 2018. However, the fiscal year data for the year 2018 included the last three months of 2017, when the travel ban wasn’t still implemented. I broke the data down by months to understand how travel ban changed the number of visas issued from calendar year to calendar year. This offered a more accurate picture of the travel ban. This analysis shows that only 537 immigrant visas were issued in 2018 for the 12 months after the travel ban went into effect for individuals born in Iran. Compare that to 6,643 visas issued in the previous year. That is a 92 per cent decrease in number of visas issued. Other Muslim countries in the ban were similarly affected. For instance, Somalia experienced 86 per cent decrease in number of immigrant visas issued during the 12 months after the travel ban went into effect. Yemen’s visas reduced by 83 per cent. Libya and Syria had the smallest change among the Muslim countries in the ban, decreasing by 80 per cent and 77 per cent respectively. Muslim vs non-Muslim countries Many critics of the new travel rules argued that they were effectively a “Muslim ban.” The Trump administration countered that there are Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan that are not included in the travel ban, and there are non-Muslim countries like Venezuela and North Korea that are included. However, US Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs data shows that there was a significant decrease in the number of immigrant visas issued to Muslim countries affected by the travel ban. Meanwhile, the number of immigrant visas issued per month to the non-Muslim countries in the ban virtually remained unchanged. In fact, there was a 40 per cent increase in the number of visas issued to North Koreans per calendar-year data, relative to the prior year, when the travel ban was blocked by federal courts. Country of chargeability There are some questions that government data cannot answer. For example, rather than providing data on where each visa recipient lives, the U.S. Department of State by report if the Visa Office only offers information on the country of chargeability, which basically means where the applicant was born. There were five fiancé visas issued to Iranians in calendar year 2018, compared to 358 fiancé visas issued in 2017. But even that low number does not tell us whether these five visas were given to Iranians that actually lived inside Iran. These visas may have been given to Iranians who had been living in Canada or Europe for many years but were born in Iran. The actual impact of the Trump travel ban, in other words, could be even bigger than what the data shows. Visas and waivers Waivers are another important issue that is hard to study. The vast majority people from the seven restricted countries who applied for a visa after the implementation of the ban were rejected outright. However, US officials may grant a waiver to someone if there is evidence that the applicant is facing so much undue hardship that they need to be united with their loved ones in the US. This could happen, for example, if a family member in the United States is dying and a person from a restricted nation wants to see them one last time, like the Yemeni mother who got a chance to see her baby boy just two days before he died. In the first six months after the full implementation of the ban, such waivers were only given to around 2 per cent of individuals from banned countries. This gradually increased to 6 per cent after one year. Being considered for a waiver is not the same as getting a visa. A person who is being considered for a waiver still cannot enter the US. They must wait under “administrative processing” status until they are cleared for a visa. It could take several years before applicants find out the results of their application. During this period, they cannot enter the U.S. One recent lawsuit against the travel ban claims that some of their 14 clients have been under consideration for a waiver for 18 months at least, with no visa being granted to any of them yet. What’s next The first congressional hearing on the travel ban, held on September 24, established a need to reassess the impacts of the policy. From what I see, looking at 18 months of government-provided data, the current travel ban is in effect a Muslim ban. I think that policymakers should take a deeper look into travel ban statistics and hold the Trump administration accountable for its visa policy for the restricted countries. (Vahid Niayesh is Lecturer in Political Science, California State University, Long Beach) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

What Donald Trump’s travel ban really looks like, almost two years in

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