It was on the soccer pitch that 2022 World Cup host Qatar definitively shrugged off the UAE-Saudi-led economic and diplomatic boycott of the Gulf state as the crisis entered its third year with no prospect of resolution.

World soccer body FIFA’s abandonment of Saudi-United Arab Emirates-backed plans to expand the 2022 World Cup from 32 to 48 teams just days before the boycott’s June 5 second anniversary could not have come at a more opportune moment.

The FIFA decision came on the heels of Qatar’s unexpected winning of the Asian Cup and was followed by reports that the Gulf state’s sovereign wealth fund was negotiating the acquisition of British club Leeds United.

The acquisition would give Qatar a second top European team after Paris Saint-Germain and potentially take the soccer aspects of the rift to the English Premier League, home to UAE-owned Manchester City, at a time that soccer has emerged as a battlefield in the Gulf rift. So would a possible Saudi acquisition of Manchester United.

The soccer pitch has been one venue on which Qatar has been scoring points. Three years into the boycott, Qatar’s detractors – Saud Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt -- have failed to either force Qatar to accept demands that would have undermined its independence and sovereignty or convince the international community of the legitimacy of their approach.

On the contrary. Qatar is thriving economically, having with the help of Oman, Turkey and Iran compensated for the rupture in logistics caused by the breaking off of air links with its detractors and the closure of its only land border with Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, rather than being internationally isolated, Qatar has succeeded in deepening relations with the world’s major powers – the United States, China, Europe, Russia and India – and reinforced its position as a mediator or key player in conflicts ranging from Afghanistan to Gaza.

Ironically, Qatar has been able to turn the Gulf crisis into one of the few issues that the world’s rivalling powers agree on and fortify the cul de sac (dead end) in which its detractors find themselves. Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Brussels and Delhi all want the Gulf crisis resolved but have failed to convince Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that everyone would be best served by a resolution that allows all parties to save face even if it falls far short of the boycotters’ demands.

Those demands reflected a broader Saudi and UAE policy that aims to shape the greater Middle East, stretching from Central Asia to the Horn of Africa, in their mould and aims to force governments to tow a Saudi-UAE line that promotes autocracy, rejects political participation, opposes political Islam and violates human rights.

They boycotters demand that Qatar align its military, political, social and economic policies with those of other Gulf states, shutter its Al Jazeera television network and other Qatar-funded media outlets, end military cooperation with Turkey and close down Turkish military bases in the country.

In a rebuke of the boycotters who also demanded that Qatar revoke citizenship granted to political refugees from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain, the Gulf state, on the third anniversary of the boycott, issued the region’s first asylum law.

The law applies explicitly to human rights defenders; journalists, writers and researchers; political, religious and ethnic minority activists; and former or current officials opposed to their government’s policies who are threatened by persecution.

To be sure, Qatar’s positioning of itself as a defender of human rights has holes in it that make it look like Emmenthaler cheese. Domestically, press freedom is non-existent. The government abruptly in May closed the Doha Centre for Media Freedom after firing its first two directors for taking the organisation’s goal literal. As free-wheeling and hard-hitting as Al Jazeera can be in its regional and international reporting, as careful it is not to cover Qatar’s warts or take reporting to wherever the chips fall when it touches on Qatari interests.

It took widespread criticism for Al Jazeera to suspend two journalists and pull a recent seven-minute, Arabic language video it posted to its social media channels that claimed Jews exploit the Holocaust and that Israel is the genocide's "greatest beneficiary."

To be fair, the network said the video "contravened its editorial standards" and mandated that all staff participate in a bias and sensitivity training.

The contradiction between Qatar’s advocacy of political change everywhere but at home is rooted on the one hand in the recognition that transition is inevitable, and that Qatar is best served by being in front of the cart rather than behind it and on the other the seemingly naïve belief that the Gulf state itself can remain immune.

And that’s what explains the crisis and the boycotting alliance’s demands.

If Saudi Arabia and the UAE strive to maintain region’s autocratic status quo to the degree possible by suppressing dissent and activism and projecting military as well as soft power, Qatar’s strategy embraces degrees of change but is wholly built on soft power.

It is a strategy that is built on diversified gas sales; maintaining relations with all parties to position Qatar as a go-to-mediator; projecting the Gulf state as a global, cutting-edge sports hub; situating Qatar as a transportation hub connecting continents with a world-class airline; turning the Gulf state into a cultural hub with dazzling museums and arts acquisitions; and investing in Western blue chips and high-profile real estate.

Alongside diplomacy, economics, media and football, gas is increasingly emerging not only as a battlefield but also as a driver of the Gulf crisis. Gas may also prove to be a gauge for the timeframe that Saudi Arabia supported by the UAE has in mind and one reason why they have so far refused to contemplate unconditional negotiations and compromise.

The significance of gas was highlighted when The Wall Street Journal recently disclosed that US officials had prevented Saudi Arabia prior to the declaration of the boycott from invading the Gulf states and seizing Qatar’s operations in the world’s largest gas field.

Taking control of Qatari fields would have not only forced Qatar, the world’s largest liquified natural gas (LNG) exporter, to effectively surrender but also turned Saudi Arabia into the world’s second-biggest exporter overnight.

If gas proves to be a major driver of the rift, then recently announced Saudi plans to become a major gas player suggest that the dispute could take at least another six years, if not a decade, to resolve.

Amin Nasser, the chief executive of Saudi national oil company Aramco said during the World Economic Forum in January that he expected $150 billion to be invested in the Saudi gas sector over the next ten years. Nasser envisioned gas production increasing from 14 billion standard cubic feet to 23 billion by 2030.

Saudi energy minister Khalid al-Falih said in April following the disclosure of recently discovered major reserves in the Red Sea that the kingdom may achieve its goal in five to six years.

In the meantime, Saudi Arabia is pushing to become a major gas trader and marketer, primarily in the spot and short-term markets, by partnering with producers across the globe, including in the Russian Artic.

The kingdom has expressed an interest in acquiring a 30 per cent stake in Russia’s Novatek Arctic LNG project. Access to the project’s gas would allow Saudi Arabia to negotiate long-term deals and/or sell cargoes on the spot market or increase domestic supply.

Aramco agreed in May to a buy a 25 per cent stake in Sempra Energy’s Texas liquefied natural gas terminal in one of the biggest gas deals ever. The deal involves a 20-year agreement under which Saudi Arabia would buy 5 million tons of gas annually from Sempra’s Port Arthur plant, due to begin operations in 2023.

Qatar has partnered with Exxon Mobil Corp. in a $10 billion LNG plant in Texas and has plans to pour a total of US$20 billion into US oil and gas fields.

The Saudi Qatari gas rivalry is also playing out elsewhere.

An Aramco delegation visited Pakistan in April to discuss gas sales as a way of addressing the South Asian country’s energy shortage as it opens its multiple gas fields to foreign investors. Qatar responded by lowering the price of its offering in a move that appeared to give it an advantage despite the kingdom’s increasingly hefty investment in Pakistan.

The prospect that Saudi Arabia and the UAE may only be willing to seek an end to the Gulf crisis once the kingdom has secured its position as a major gas exporter would mean that their boycott of Qatar would still be in place when the Gulf state hosts the World Cup in 2022.

That, more than FIFA president Gianni Infantino’s unsuccessful ploy to persuade Qatar to agree to an expansion of the 2022 tournament from 32 to 48 teams, could prove to be a potential icebreaker.

The tournament puts Qatar’s detractors in a bind. It will be the first time that the world’s foremost mega sporting event is held in the Arab world, a soccer crazy region and even more poignantly, in the boycotting Gulf states’ backyard.

Yet, the boycott bans nationals of the boycotting states from travel to Qatar. Even if fans were to defy the boycott, they would have to go to greater expense and accept more complicated logistics because of the rupture in air and land links.

As a result, boycotting states, in a bid to cater to domestic demand and stave off potential protests, could be forced to breach their own embargo and potentially create an opportunity to put an end to the boycott.

For now, that may seem a long shot and much can change in the coming three years. But if the status quo remains unchanged, soccer could emerge as the Gulf’s best hope.

&nbsp;(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

&nbsp;

It was on the soccer pitch that 2022 World Cup host Qatar definitively shrugged off the UAE-Saudi-led economic and diplomatic boycott of the Gulf state as the crisis entered its third year with no prospect of resolution.

It was on the soccer pitch that 2022 World Cup host Qatar definitively shrugged off the UAE-Saudi-led economic and diplomatic boycott of the Gulf state as the crisis entered its third year with no prospect of resolution. World soccer body FIFA’s abandonment of Saudi-United Arab Emirates-backed plans to expand the 2022 World Cup from 32 to 48 teams just days before the boycott’s June 5 second anniversary could not have come at a more opportune moment. The FIFA decision came on the heels of Qatar’s unexpected winning of the Asian Cup and was followed by reports that the Gulf state’s sovereign wealth fund was negotiating the acquisition of British club Leeds United. The acquisition would give Qatar a second top European team after Paris Saint-Germain and potentially take the soccer aspects of the rift to the English Premier League, home to UAE-owned Manchester City, at a time that soccer has emerged as a battlefield in the Gulf rift. So would a possible Saudi acquisition of Manchester United. The soccer pitch has been one venue on which Qatar has been scoring points. Three years into the boycott, Qatar’s detractors – Saud Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt -- have failed to either force Qatar to accept demands that would have undermined its independence and sovereignty or convince the international community of the legitimacy of their approach. On the contrary. Qatar is thriving economically, having with the help of Oman, Turkey and Iran compensated for the rupture in logistics caused by the breaking off of air links with its detractors and the closure of its only land border with Saudi Arabia. Moreover, rather than being internationally isolated, Qatar has succeeded in deepening relations with the world’s major powers – the United States, China, Europe, Russia and India – and reinforced its position as a mediator or key player in conflicts ranging from Afghanistan to Gaza. Ironically, Qatar has been able to turn the Gulf crisis into one of the few issues that the world’s rivalling powers agree on and fortify the cul de sac (dead end) in which its detractors find themselves. Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Brussels and Delhi all want the Gulf crisis resolved but have failed to convince Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that everyone would be best served by a resolution that allows all parties to save face even if it falls far short of the boycotters’ demands. Those demands reflected a broader Saudi and UAE policy that aims to shape the greater Middle East, stretching from Central Asia to the Horn of Africa, in their mould and aims to force governments to tow a Saudi-UAE line that promotes autocracy, rejects political participation, opposes political Islam and violates human rights. They boycotters demand that Qatar align its military, political, social and economic policies with those of other Gulf states, shutter its Al Jazeera television network and other Qatar-funded media outlets, end military cooperation with Turkey and close down Turkish military bases in the country. In a rebuke of the boycotters who also demanded that Qatar revoke citizenship granted to political refugees from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain, the Gulf state, on the third anniversary of the boycott, issued the region’s first asylum law. The law applies explicitly to human rights defenders; journalists, writers and researchers; political, religious and ethnic minority activists; and former or current officials opposed to their government’s policies who are threatened by persecution. To be sure, Qatar’s positioning of itself as a defender of human rights has holes in it that make it look like Emmenthaler cheese. Domestically, press freedom is non-existent. The government abruptly in May closed the Doha Centre for Media Freedom after firing its first two directors for taking the organisation’s goal literal. As free-wheeling and hard-hitting as Al Jazeera can be in its regional and international reporting, as careful it is not to cover Qatar’s warts or take reporting to wherever the chips fall when it touches on Qatari interests. It took widespread criticism for Al Jazeera to suspend two journalists and pull a recent seven-minute, Arabic language video it posted to its social media channels that claimed Jews exploit the Holocaust and that Israel is the genocide's "greatest beneficiary." To be fair, the network said the video "contravened its editorial standards" and mandated that all staff participate in a bias and sensitivity training. The contradiction between Qatar’s advocacy of political change everywhere but at home is rooted on the one hand in the recognition that transition is inevitable, and that Qatar is best served by being in front of the cart rather than behind it and on the other the seemingly naïve belief that the Gulf state itself can remain immune. And that’s what explains the crisis and the boycotting alliance’s demands. If Saudi Arabia and the UAE strive to maintain region’s autocratic status quo to the degree possible by suppressing dissent and activism and projecting military as well as soft power, Qatar’s strategy embraces degrees of change but is wholly built on soft power. It is a strategy that is built on diversified gas sales; maintaining relations with all parties to position Qatar as a go-to-mediator; projecting the Gulf state as a global, cutting-edge sports hub; situating Qatar as a transportation hub connecting continents with a world-class airline; turning the Gulf state into a cultural hub with dazzling museums and arts acquisitions; and investing in Western blue chips and high-profile real estate. Alongside diplomacy, economics, media and football, gas is increasingly emerging not only as a battlefield but also as a driver of the Gulf crisis. Gas may also prove to be a gauge for the timeframe that Saudi Arabia supported by the UAE has in mind and one reason why they have so far refused to contemplate unconditional negotiations and compromise. The significance of gas was highlighted when The Wall Street Journal recently disclosed that US officials had prevented Saudi Arabia prior to the declaration of the boycott from invading the Gulf states and seizing Qatar’s operations in the world’s largest gas field. Taking control of Qatari fields would have not only forced Qatar, the world’s largest liquified natural gas (LNG) exporter, to effectively surrender but also turned Saudi Arabia into the world’s second-biggest exporter overnight. If gas proves to be a major driver of the rift, then recently announced Saudi plans to become a major gas player suggest that the dispute could take at least another six years, if not a decade, to resolve. Amin Nasser, the chief executive of Saudi national oil company Aramco said during the World Economic Forum in January that he expected $150 billion to be invested in the Saudi gas sector over the next ten years. Nasser envisioned gas production increasing from 14 billion standard cubic feet to 23 billion by 2030. Saudi energy minister Khalid al-Falih said in April following the disclosure of recently discovered major reserves in the Red Sea that the kingdom may achieve its goal in five to six years. In the meantime, Saudi Arabia is pushing to become a major gas trader and marketer, primarily in the spot and short-term markets, by partnering with producers across the globe, including in the Russian Artic. The kingdom has expressed an interest in acquiring a 30 per cent stake in Russia’s Novatek Arctic LNG project. Access to the project’s gas would allow Saudi Arabia to negotiate long-term deals and/or sell cargoes on the spot market or increase domestic supply. Aramco agreed in May to a buy a 25 per cent stake in Sempra Energy’s Texas liquefied natural gas terminal in one of the biggest gas deals ever. The deal involves a 20-year agreement under which Saudi Arabia would buy 5 million tons of gas annually from Sempra’s Port Arthur plant, due to begin operations in 2023. Qatar has partnered with Exxon Mobil Corp. in a $10 billion LNG plant in Texas and has plans to pour a total of US$20 billion into US oil and gas fields. The Saudi Qatari gas rivalry is also playing out elsewhere. An Aramco delegation visited Pakistan in April to discuss gas sales as a way of addressing the South Asian country’s energy shortage as it opens its multiple gas fields to foreign investors. Qatar responded by lowering the price of its offering in a move that appeared to give it an advantage despite the kingdom’s increasingly hefty investment in Pakistan. The prospect that Saudi Arabia and the UAE may only be willing to seek an end to the Gulf crisis once the kingdom has secured its position as a major gas exporter would mean that their boycott of Qatar would still be in place when the Gulf state hosts the World Cup in 2022. That, more than FIFA president Gianni Infantino’s unsuccessful ploy to persuade Qatar to agree to an expansion of the 2022 tournament from 32 to 48 teams, could prove to be a potential icebreaker. The tournament puts Qatar’s detractors in a bind. It will be the first time that the world’s foremost mega sporting event is held in the Arab world, a soccer crazy region and even more poignantly, in the boycotting Gulf states’ backyard. Yet, the boycott bans nationals of the boycotting states from travel to Qatar. Even if fans were to defy the boycott, they would have to go to greater expense and accept more complicated logistics because of the rupture in air and land links. As a result, boycotting states, in a bid to cater to domestic demand and stave off potential protests, could be forced to breach their own embargo and potentially create an opportunity to put an end to the boycott. For now, that may seem a long shot and much can change in the coming three years. But if the status quo remains unchanged, soccer could emerge as the Gulf’s best hope. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Soccer emerges as a potential icebreaker in the Gulf crisis

A car bomb exploded in a north Syrian town held by Turkey-backed rebels on Sunday (June 2), killing at least 10 people, rescue workers and medics said, after a war monitor had reported blasts hitting other insurgent-held areas in the northwest.

Car blast hits rebel-held north Syria

Growing numbers of&nbsp;Danish&nbsp;Muslims&nbsp;say they have faced verbal abuse, exclusion and hate crimes since mainstream political parties began adopting anti-immigrant policies previously the preserve of the far right.

The ruling centre-right Liberal Party and the opposition Social Democrats both say a tough stance on&nbsp;immigration&nbsp;is needed to protect Denmark's cherished welfare system and to integrate the migrants and refugees already in the country.

But Manilla Ghafuri, 26, who came to Denmark from Afghanistan in 2001 as a refugee, fears that anti-Muslim attitudes could harden further as the&nbsp;immigration&nbsp;debate heats up ahead of a general&nbsp;election&nbsp;on June 5.

"In 2015 I thought: 'Wow, what's happening?' and I think it has got a lot worse over the last few years," she told Reuters.

Ghafuri, who has more than once been told to go back to her "own country", said she has been kicked out of a supermarket while shopping with her family. While she was working at a bakery a male customer refused to be served by her.

"I asked if I could help him, but he didn't look at me at all. He just stood and waited for another girl who is an ethnic&nbsp;Danish&nbsp;girl," said Ghafuri, who also works as a teacher and has a degree in&nbsp;Danish.

The number of immigrants from non-Western countries and their descendants who have experienced discrimination because of their ethnic background rose to 48% last year from 43% two years earlier, according to the National Integration Barometer.

"If people are ready and willing to be part of&nbsp;Danish&nbsp;society and want to contribute to it, then we invite them to become part of one of the best-functioning societies in the world," said Mads Fuglede, the Liberal Party's&nbsp;immigration&nbsp;spokesman.

"But we need to be able to discuss openly if there are problems with groups of people," he said, citing a large number of immigrant women from the Middle East who have not found work in Denmark.

He did not see any connection between racist incidents and the tone of the&nbsp;immigration&nbsp;debate.

Tarek Ziad Hussein, 26, a&nbsp;Danish-born Muslim of Palestinian origin, has written a book about being Muslim in Denmark. He told Reuters he has received death threats.

"An environment has been created where you can say crazy things without too many people even raising an eyebrow," said Hussein, who works as a lawyer.

"I and a lot of others from my generation&nbsp;feel&nbsp;that no matter what we do, we are not good enough in the eyes of society," he added. "No matter how educated we are or how integrated we become, we are not good enough because of our skin colour or our religion."

The number of racially or religiously motivated hate crimes registered by&nbsp;Danish&nbsp;police jumped to 365 in 2017 from 228 the year before. That could be higher as not all cases are reported.

The&nbsp;Danish&nbsp;Institute For Human Rights has urged politicians to draw up plans to combat racism and hate crimes, especially against&nbsp;Muslims&nbsp;and Jews.

"The politicians are moving very close to the boundaries of human rights," said Louise Holck, the institute's deputy director.

Denmark's 320,000&nbsp;Muslims&nbsp;are about 5.5 per cent of the population, a slightly higher proportion than in the rest of Europe, according to&nbsp;Danish&nbsp;and US estimates.

The shift to the right by Denmark's mainstream parties runs counter to outsiders' traditional views of liberal Scandinavia, but has its parallels elsewhere in Europe, particularly since large numbers of migrants arrived there in 2015.

CAKE

The&nbsp;immigration&nbsp;minister, Inger Stojberg, has meanwhile been criticised for celebrating her 50th piece of legislation tightening&nbsp;immigration&nbsp;laws with a big cake. A tracker http://uim.dk on the ministry's website shows&nbsp;immigration&nbsp;law has been tightened 114 times under the present government.

Earlier this year, the government passed a law that would mean more refugees could be repatriated, the latest move to discourage non-western&nbsp;immigration.

The law was passed with support from the anti-immigration&nbsp;Danish&nbsp;People's Party, a key ally of the minority government, and the Social Democrats, the country's biggest party, which has hitherto had a softer stance on&nbsp;immigration.

It means residence permits for refugees will be temporary, there will be a limit on the number of family reunifications, and a cut in benefits for immigrants.

The law has been criticised by the&nbsp;Danish&nbsp;Institute for Human Rights and the United Nations refugee agency. Trade organisations and unions have warned that tight immigration policies could worsen labour shortages and put a brake on growth.

Fuglede of the Liberal Party said lower benefits would encourage people to work.

Around 43% of refugees who have lived in Denmark for more than 3 years were employed by the end of 2018, up from just 20% by the end of 2015. However, only 19% of women had jobs compared to 57% of men.

But while employment has risen, assimilation of immigrants has not always kept pace. More young men descended from non-western immigrants commit crimes than Danes, official figures show.

HISTORY BOOKS

The Social Democrats declined to comment for this article because of a tight pre-election&nbsp;schedule, but they have repeatedly said they want to limit the number refugees.

"You are not a bad person, just because you are worried about&nbsp;immigration," party leader Mette Frederiksen said earlier this month.

With the mainstream parties toughening up on&nbsp;immigration, Denmark's biggest populist group, The&nbsp;Danish&nbsp;People's Party (DF) has lost some of its appeal and opinion polls show it is likely to shed almost half of its voters in the&nbsp;election.

This is partly because voters are moving to the Social Democrats. DF also faces competition from far-right parties the New Right and Hard Line, the latter a new grouping that wants Islam banned and&nbsp;Muslims&nbsp;deported.

But even though the DF is losing voters fast, its impact on&nbsp;Danish&nbsp;politics is undeniable.

"They have completely changed the discussion and politics in Denmark over the past 20 years," according to Rune Stubager, professor of political science at Aarhus University. "For the history books, this is definitely a big victory for them."

Growing numbers of Danish Muslims say they have faced verbal abuse, exclusion and hate crimes since mainstream political parties began adopting anti-immigrant policies previously the preserve of the far right.

Growing numbers of Danish Muslims say they have faced verbal abuse, exclusion and hate crimes since mainstream political parties began adopting anti-immigrant policies previously the preserve of the far right. The ruling centre-right Liberal Party and the opposition Social Democrats both say a tough stance on immigration is needed to protect Denmark's cherished welfare system and to integrate the migrants and refugees already in the country. But Manilla Ghafuri, 26, who came to Denmark from Afghanistan in 2001 as a refugee, fears that anti-Muslim attitudes could harden further as the immigration debate heats up ahead of a general election on June 5. "In 2015 I thought: 'Wow, what's happening?' and I think it has got a lot worse over the last few years," she told Reuters. Ghafuri, who has more than once been told to go back to her "own country", said she has been kicked out of a supermarket while shopping with her family. While she was working at a bakery a male customer refused to be served by her. "I asked if I could help him, but he didn't look at me at all. He just stood and waited for another girl who is an ethnic Danish girl," said Ghafuri, who also works as a teacher and has a degree in Danish. The number of immigrants from non-Western countries and their descendants who have experienced discrimination because of their ethnic background rose to 48% last year from 43% two years earlier, according to the National Integration Barometer. "If people are ready and willing to be part of Danish society and want to contribute to it, then we invite them to become part of one of the best-functioning societies in the world," said Mads Fuglede, the Liberal Party's immigration spokesman. "But we need to be able to discuss openly if there are problems with groups of people," he said, citing a large number of immigrant women from the Middle East who have not found work in Denmark. He did not see any connection between racist incidents and the tone of the immigration debate. Tarek Ziad Hussein, 26, a Danish-born Muslim of Palestinian origin, has written a book about being Muslim in Denmark. He told Reuters he has received death threats. "An environment has been created where you can say crazy things without too many people even raising an eyebrow," said Hussein, who works as a lawyer. "I and a lot of others from my generation feel that no matter what we do, we are not good enough in the eyes of society," he added. "No matter how educated we are or how integrated we become, we are not good enough because of our skin colour or our religion." The number of racially or religiously motivated hate crimes registered by Danish police jumped to 365 in 2017 from 228 the year before. That could be higher as not all cases are reported. The Danish Institute For Human Rights has urged politicians to draw up plans to combat racism and hate crimes, especially against Muslims and Jews. "The politicians are moving very close to the boundaries of human rights," said Louise Holck, the institute's deputy director. Denmark's 320,000 Muslims are about 5.5 per cent of the population, a slightly higher proportion than in the rest of Europe, according to Danish and US estimates. The shift to the right by Denmark's mainstream parties runs counter to outsiders' traditional views of liberal Scandinavia, but has its parallels elsewhere in Europe, particularly since large numbers of migrants arrived there in 2015. CAKE The immigration minister, Inger Stojberg, has meanwhile been criticised for celebrating her 50th piece of legislation tightening immigration laws with a big cake. A tracker http://uim.dk on the ministry's website shows immigration law has been tightened 114 times under the present government. Earlier this year, the government passed a law that would mean more refugees could be repatriated, the latest move to discourage non-western immigration. The law was passed with support from the anti-immigration Danish People's Party, a key ally of the minority government, and the Social Democrats, the country's biggest party, which has hitherto had a softer stance on immigration. It means residence permits for refugees will be temporary, there will be a limit on the number of family reunifications, and a cut in benefits for immigrants. The law has been criticised by the Danish Institute for Human Rights and the United Nations refugee agency. Trade organisations and unions have warned that tight immigration policies could worsen labour shortages and put a brake on growth. Fuglede of the Liberal Party said lower benefits would encourage people to work. Around 43% of refugees who have lived in Denmark for more than 3 years were employed by the end of 2018, up from just 20% by the end of 2015. However, only 19% of women had jobs compared to 57% of men. But while employment has risen, assimilation of immigrants has not always kept pace. More young men descended from non-western immigrants commit crimes than Danes, official figures show. HISTORY BOOKS The Social Democrats declined to comment for this article because of a tight pre-election schedule, but they have repeatedly said they want to limit the number refugees. "You are not a bad person, just because you are worried about immigration," party leader Mette Frederiksen said earlier this month. With the mainstream parties toughening up on immigration, Denmark's biggest populist group, The Danish People's Party (DF) has lost some of its appeal and opinion polls show it is likely to shed almost half of its voters in the election. This is partly because voters are moving to the Social Democrats. DF also faces competition from far-right parties the New Right and Hard Line, the latter a new grouping that wants Islam banned and Muslims deported. But even though the DF is losing voters fast, its impact on Danish politics is undeniable. "They have completely changed the discussion and politics in Denmark over the past 20 years," according to Rune Stubager, professor of political science at Aarhus University. "For the history books, this is definitely a big victory for them."

Danish Muslims feel backlash as immigration becomes election issue

US President Donald Trump announced Friday that some 1,500 additional US troops would be deployed in the Middle East against a backdrop of soaring tensions with Iran.

"We want to have protection in the Middle East," Trump told reporters as he prepared to set off on a trip to Japan.

"We're going to be sending a relatively small number of troops, mostly protective," Trump added. &nbsp;"It'll be about 1,500 people."

The deployment includes reconnaissance aircraft, fighter jets, engineers, and the extension of the presence of a Patriot missile defence battalion that accounts for 600 of the personnel.

"This is a prudent response to credible threats from Iran," said Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan.

Pentagon officials said the 1,500 additional troops were in response to recent incidents in the region that US intelligence had tied to Iran's leadership.

Those have included a rocket attack on the Green Zone in Baghdad, explosive devices that damaged four tankers in Fujairah at the entrance to the Gulf, and a Houthi drone attack against a Saudi oil installation.

"We view this as a campaign," said Rear Admiral Michael Gilday, director of the Pentagon's Joint Staff.

Gilday stressed that the expanded US military presence in the region, including an aircraft carrier task force, B-52 bombers, and an amphibious attack vessel deployed earlier this month, are defensive and meant to address an alleged ongoing threat from Iran.

"We think that through a combination of a very measured deployment of assets as well as public messaging, we are again trying to underscore that we are not seeking hostilities with Iran."

US President Donald Trump announced Friday that some 1,500 additional US troops would be deployed in the Middle East against a backdrop of soaring tensions with Iran.

US President Donald Trump announced Friday that some 1,500 additional US troops would be deployed in the Middle East against a backdrop of soaring tensions with Iran. "We want to have protection in the Middle East," Trump told reporters as he prepared to set off on a trip to Japan. "We're going to be sending a relatively small number of troops, mostly protective," Trump added. "It'll be about 1,500 people." The deployment includes reconnaissance aircraft, fighter jets, engineers, and the extension of the presence of a Patriot missile defence battalion that accounts for 600 of the personnel. "This is a prudent response to credible threats from Iran," said Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan. Pentagon officials said the 1,500 additional troops were in response to recent incidents in the region that US intelligence had tied to Iran's leadership. Those have included a rocket attack on the Green Zone in Baghdad, explosive devices that damaged four tankers in Fujairah at the entrance to the Gulf, and a Houthi drone attack against a Saudi oil installation. "We view this as a campaign," said Rear Admiral Michael Gilday, director of the Pentagon's Joint Staff. Gilday stressed that the expanded US military presence in the region, including an aircraft carrier task force, B-52 bombers, and an amphibious attack vessel deployed earlier this month, are defensive and meant to address an alleged ongoing threat from Iran. "We think that through a combination of a very measured deployment of assets as well as public messaging, we are again trying to underscore that we are not seeking hostilities with Iran."

US President Trump orders 1,500 troops to Middle East amid soaring tensions with Iran

The&nbsp;US&nbsp;Department of Defense is considering a&nbsp;US&nbsp;military&nbsp;request to&nbsp;send&nbsp;about&nbsp;5,000&nbsp;additional troops to the&nbsp;Middle&nbsp;East&nbsp;amid increasing tensions with Iran, two&nbsp;US&nbsp;officials&nbsp;told Reuters on Wednesday.

Tehran and Washington have this month been escalating rhetoric against each other, following&nbsp;US&nbsp;President Donald Trump's decision to try to cut Iran's oil exports to zero and beef up the&nbsp;US&nbsp;military&nbsp;presence in the Gulf in response to what he said were Iranian threats.

The&nbsp;officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the request had been made by&nbsp;US&nbsp;Central Command, but added that it was not clear whether the&nbsp;Pentagon&nbsp;would approve the request.

The<a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/pentagon-seeks-to-use-funds-to-transport-lodge-taliban-members-in-search-of-ceasefires-219334">&nbsp;Pentagon&nbsp;</a>regularly receives - and declines - requests for additional resources from&nbsp;US&nbsp;combatant commands throughout the world.

One of the&nbsp;officials&nbsp;said the requested&nbsp;troops&nbsp;would be defensive in nature.

It is unclear if any specific request will ultimately be presented to the White House. The request for&nbsp;5,000&nbsp;additional&nbsp;troops&nbsp;was first reported by Reuters.

This appeared to be the latest request for additional resources in the face of what&nbsp;US officials&nbsp;have said are credible threats from Iran against&nbsp;US forces and American interests in the&nbsp;Middle&nbsp;East.

The United States has not publicly shown any evidence of what the specific intelligence on the Iranian threat is.

The&nbsp;Pentagon&nbsp;declined to comment.

"As a matter of longstanding policy, we are not going to discuss&nbsp;or speculate on potential future plans and requests for forces," Commander Rebecca Rebarich, a&nbsp;Pentagon&nbsp;spokeswoman, said on Wednesday.

Acting&nbsp;US Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan said on Tuesday that while threats from Iran in the&nbsp;Middle&nbsp;East&nbsp;remained high, deterrence measures taken by the&nbsp;Pentagon&nbsp;had "put on hold" the potential for attacks on Americans.

The&nbsp;US military&nbsp;accelerated the deployment of a carrier strike group to the&nbsp;Middle&nbsp;East and sent bombers and Patriot missiles to the region earlier this month in response to what Washington said were troubling indications of possible preparations for an attack by Iran.

The US&nbsp;government sources told Reuters last week they believe Iran encouraged Houthi militants or Iraq-based Shi'ite militias to carry out attacks on tanker ships off the United Arab Emirates.

Trump has warned that Iran would be met with "great force" if it attacked&nbsp;US&nbsp;interests in the&nbsp;Middle&nbsp;East.

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Wednesday that Iran's youth will witness the demise of Israel and American civilization.

The US Department of Defense is considering a US military request to send about 5,000 additional troops to the Middle East amid increasing tensions with Iran, two US officials told Reuters on Wednesday.

The US Department of Defense is considering a US military request to send about 5,000 additional troops to the Middle East amid increasing tensions with Iran, two US officials told Reuters on Wednesday. Tehran and Washington have this month been escalating rhetoric against each other, following US President Donald Trump's decision to try to cut Iran's oil exports to zero and beef up the US military presence in the Gulf in response to what he said were Iranian threats. The officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the request had been made by US Central Command, but added that it was not clear whether the Pentagon would approve the request. The Pentagon regularly receives - and declines - requests for additional resources from US combatant commands throughout the world. One of the officials said the requested troops would be defensive in nature. It is unclear if any specific request will ultimately be presented to the White House. The request for 5,000 additional troops was first reported by Reuters. This appeared to be the latest request for additional resources in the face of what US officials have said are credible threats from Iran against US forces and American interests in the Middle East. The United States has not publicly shown any evidence of what the specific intelligence on the Iranian threat is. The Pentagon declined to comment. "As a matter of longstanding policy, we are not going to discuss or speculate on potential future plans and requests for forces," Commander Rebecca Rebarich, a Pentagon spokeswoman, said on Wednesday. Acting US Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan said on Tuesday that while threats from Iran in the Middle East remained high, deterrence measures taken by the Pentagon had "put on hold" the potential for attacks on Americans. The US military accelerated the deployment of a carrier strike group to the Middle East and sent bombers and Patriot missiles to the region earlier this month in response to what Washington said were troubling indications of possible preparations for an attack by Iran. The US government sources told Reuters last week they believe Iran encouraged Houthi militants or Iraq-based Shi'ite militias to carry out attacks on tanker ships off the United Arab Emirates. Trump has warned that Iran would be met with "great force" if it attacked US interests in the Middle East. Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Wednesday that Iran's youth will witness the demise of Israel and American civilization.

Pentagon mulling US military request to send 5,000 troops to Middle East: Officials

U.S. Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Joseph Dunford briefed Congress on Iran. U.S. Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan said that while threats from Iran in the Middle East remained high, deterrence measures taken by the Pentagon had deterred attacks on Americans. Watch this video to know more.

Donald Trump officials brief a divided Congress

Oil prices edged up on Tuesday on signs that producer club OPEC will continue withholding supply this year and as tensions between the United States and Iran escalated.

Brent crude futures, the international benchmark for oil prices, were at $72.07 per barrel at 0033 GMT, up 10 cents, or 0.1 per cent, from their last close.

US West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude futures were up by 14 cents, or 0.2 per cent, at $63.24 per barrel.

"Oil prices opened higher, after OPEC held onto its production cut deal," said ANZ on Tuesday.

The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Russia and other non-member producers have been withholding production since the start of the year to prop up the market.

A meeting has been scheduled for June 25-26 to discuss the policy, but the cartel is now considering moving the event to July 3-4, according to OPEC sources on Monday, with its de-facto leader Saudi Arabia signalling a willingness to continue withholding output.

Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump on Monday threatened Iran with "great force" if it attacked US interests in the Middle East. This came after a rocket attack in Iraq's capital Baghdad, which Washington suspects to have been organised by militia with ties to Iran.

ANZ bank said the rising tension in the Middle East meant a "risk premium is reflected in the price" of crude oil.

Oil prices edged up on Tuesday on signs that producer club OPEC will continue withholding supply this year and as tensions between the United States and Iran escalated.

Oil prices edged up on Tuesday on signs that producer club OPEC will continue withholding supply this year and as tensions between the United States and Iran escalated. Brent crude futures, the international benchmark for oil prices, were at $72.07 per barrel at 0033 GMT, up 10 cents, or 0.1 per cent, from their last close. US West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude futures were up by 14 cents, or 0.2 per cent, at $63.24 per barrel. "Oil prices opened higher, after OPEC held onto its production cut deal," said ANZ on Tuesday. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Russia and other non-member producers have been withholding production since the start of the year to prop up the market. A meeting has been scheduled for June 25-26 to discuss the policy, but the cartel is now considering moving the event to July 3-4, according to OPEC sources on Monday, with its de-facto leader Saudi Arabia signalling a willingness to continue withholding output. Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump on Monday threatened Iran with "great force" if it attacked US interests in the Middle East. This came after a rocket attack in Iraq's capital Baghdad, which Washington suspects to have been organised by militia with ties to Iran. ANZ bank said the rising tension in the Middle East meant a "risk premium is reflected in the price" of crude oil.

Oil prices rise on rising Middle East tension, ongoing OPEC supply cut

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said he would be willing for talks with the US but not under the current situation, local media IRNA reported on Monday.

"Today's situation is not suitable for talks and our choice is resistance only" IRNA quoted Rouhani as saying.

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/americas/us-will-respond-with-great-force-if-iran-attacks-interests-donald-trump-220247">Trump on Monday warned Iran</a> would be met with "great force" if it attacked US interests in the Middle East.

''I think Iran would be making a very big mistake if they did anything,''&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/us-not-trying-to-set-up-negotiation-with-iran-trump-220237">Trump told reporters</a> as he left the White House yesterday evening for an event in Pennsylvania. ''If they do something, it will be met with great force but we have no indication that they will.''

Trump also said that he was willing to have talks with Iran "when they're ready."

<iframe allowfullscreen="" autoplay="1" class="includeVideo" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.wionews.com/videos/trump-threatens-iran-in-tweet-as-tension-between-two-countries-escalate-220208/embed" style="width:100%;max-width:560px;" width="560"></iframe>

Trump's comments came as two US government sources said the United States strongly suspects Shi'ite militias with ties to, and possibly encouragement from, Iran fired a rocket on Sunday into Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone.

The sources, who are familiar with US national security assessments and spoke on condition of anonymity, said the United States was still trying to establish which militia fired the Katyusha rocket on Sunday and the extent, if any, of Iranian involvement.

The rocket fell in the Green Zone which houses government buildings and embassies and caused no casualties, the latest in a series of regional attacks the United States believes may have been inspired by Iran.&nbsp;

Iran has rejected allegations of its possible involvement in attacks last week and Iran's Iraqi allies rushed to condemn Sunday's rocket blast.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said he would be willing for talks with the US but not under the current situation, local media IRNA reported on Monday. "Today's situation is not suitable for talks and our choice is resistance only" IRNA quoted Rouhani as saying.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said he would be willing for talks with the US but not under the current situation, local media IRNA reported on Monday. "Today's situation is not suitable for talks and our choice is resistance only" IRNA quoted Rouhani as saying. Trump on Monday warned Iran would be met with "great force" if it attacked US interests in the Middle East. ''I think Iran would be making a very big mistake if they did anything,'' Trump told reporters as he left the White House yesterday evening for an event in Pennsylvania. ''If they do something, it will be met with great force but we have no indication that they will.'' Trump also said that he was willing to have talks with Iran "when they're ready." Trump's comments came as two US government sources said the United States strongly suspects Shi'ite militias with ties to, and possibly encouragement from, Iran fired a rocket on Sunday into Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone. The sources, who are familiar with US national security assessments and spoke on condition of anonymity, said the United States was still trying to establish which militia fired the Katyusha rocket on Sunday and the extent, if any, of Iranian involvement. The rocket fell in the Green Zone which houses government buildings and embassies and caused no casualties, the latest in a series of regional attacks the United States believes may have been inspired by Iran. Iran has rejected allegations of its possible involvement in attacks last week and Iran's Iraqi allies rushed to condemn Sunday's rocket blast.

Today's situation not suitable for talks, choice is resistance only: Iran's Rouhani

The new government at the Centre, after May 23, will soon be called to address the emerging challenges in the Gulf. The Trump administration has tightened sanctions against Iran, moved its military naval ship from Cairo to the Gulf and kept its military base in Qatar and navy in the Arabian Sea on the high alert to meet any threatening contingencies from Iran.&nbsp;

The USA has further withdrawn the sanction waiver to India, China and Turkey, which had allowed them to import the oil from Iran.&nbsp;

This has prompted Iranian Foreign Minister to visit the capital of India, Turkey, China and Japan to elicit assurance from these countries to continue to import the Iranian oil despite the US withdrawal of sanction waiver. These countries are the biggest buyers of Iranian oıl and the sudden drop in the export of oil to these countries would adversely affect the already fragile economy of Iran.&nbsp;

Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz with a warning. If Iran is not allowed to sell its oil, ıt will not allow other countries in the region to sell their oils. This was followed by an attack on the UAE and Saudi oil tankers; both of them have accused Iran. As a result, a real war situation has emerged in the Gulf. &nbsp;

Traditionally, India has played the role of the bystander in Gulf Conflicts; mostly appealing them to resolve the issue peacefully and kept equip distance with party in conflict-whether Iran-Iraq War or the cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However this time India cannot remain a distant spectator to the emerging conflicts in the Gulf. In terms of investment, remittances, oil, gas, the flow of FDI, its diaspora, India has a greater stake in relations with Saudi-Arabia- UAE than Iran.&nbsp;

Also, India needs the USA and Israel to outset the influence of China-Pakistan axis. Given this precarious situation, India must try hard first to resolve the issues amicably and work for the stability of the Gulf. However, if the diplomacy failed, India needs to closely align with the Saudi- UAE Axis against Iran.&nbsp; 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

The new government at the Centre, after May 23, will soon be called to address the emerging challenges in the Gulf. The Trump administration has tightened sanctions against Iran, moved its military naval ship from Cairo to the Gulf and kept its military base in Qatar and navy in the Arabian Sea on the high alert to meet any threatening contingencies from Iran.

The new government at the Centre, after May 23, will soon be called to address the emerging challenges in the Gulf. The Trump administration has tightened sanctions against Iran, moved its military naval ship from Cairo to the Gulf and kept its military base in Qatar and navy in the Arabian Sea on the high alert to meet any threatening contingencies from Iran. The USA has further withdrawn the sanction waiver to India, China and Turkey, which had allowed them to import the oil from Iran. This has prompted Iranian Foreign Minister to visit the capital of India, Turkey, China and Japan to elicit assurance from these countries to continue to import the Iranian oil despite the US withdrawal of sanction waiver. These countries are the biggest buyers of Iranian oıl and the sudden drop in the export of oil to these countries would adversely affect the already fragile economy of Iran. Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz with a warning. If Iran is not allowed to sell its oil, ıt will not allow other countries in the region to sell their oils. This was followed by an attack on the UAE and Saudi oil tankers; both of them have accused Iran. As a result, a real war situation has emerged in the Gulf. Traditionally, India has played the role of the bystander in Gulf Conflicts; mostly appealing them to resolve the issue peacefully and kept equip distance with party in conflict-whether Iran-Iraq War or the cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However this time India cannot remain a distant spectator to the emerging conflicts in the Gulf. In terms of investment, remittances, oil, gas, the flow of FDI, its diaspora, India has a greater stake in relations with Saudi-Arabia- UAE than Iran. Also, India needs the USA and Israel to outset the influence of China-Pakistan axis. Given this precarious situation, India must try hard first to resolve the issues amicably and work for the stability of the Gulf. However, if the diplomacy failed, India needs to closely align with the Saudi- UAE Axis against Iran. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

How India should address emerging challenges in the Gulf

Proposal by Pentagon officials suggests deployment nearing Gulf War levels if Iran were to expedite nuclear program or targets US forces.

White House said to review plan to send up to 120,000 troops to Middle East

Saudi Arabia said two of its oil tankers were attacked while sailing toward the Persian Gulf, adding to regional tensions as the US increases pressure on Iran.

Saudi Arabia Says Oil Tankers Damaged In "Sabotage Attack" as Middle East Tensions Rise

The United States' military presence in the Gulf used to be a serious threat but now it is an opportunity, a senior commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guards said on Sunday, according to the Iranian Students' News Agency (ISNA).

The US military has sent forces, including an aircraft carrier and<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/b-52-bombers-to-be-part-of-us-forces-sent-to-middle-east-over-iran-concerns-216934"> B-52 bombers, to the Middle East</a> to counter what US officials have said are “clear indications” of threats from Iran to its forces there.

The USS Abraham Lincoln is replacing another carrier rotated out of the Gulf last month.

"An aircraft carrier that has at least 40 to 50 planes on it and 6,000 forces gathered within it was a serious threat for us in the past but now...the threats have switched to opportunities," Amirali Hajizadeh, head of the Guards' aerospace division said.

He added, "If (the Americans) make a move we will hit them in the head."

The commander of the Guards, Major General Hossein Salami, said in a parliament session on Sunday that the United States has started a psychological war in the region, according to a parliamentary spokesman.

"Commander Salami, with attention to the situation in the region, presented an analysis that the Americans have started a psychological war because the comings and goings of their military is a normal matter,” said Behrouz Nemati in a summary of the Salami's comments, according to parliament's ICANA news site.

Salami was appointed head of the Guards last month.

Separately, Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said in a tweet on Sunday that US&nbsp;national security adviser John Bolton had made plans for the United States to withdraw from a landmark 2015 nuclear deal and take a more aggressive posture toward the Islamic Republic even before he took up his current post.

Zarif tweeted a link to a 2017 National Review article written by Bolton with the headline "How to Get Out of the Iran Nuclear Deal."

"A detailed blueprint for #FakeIntelligence, #ForeverWar and even empty offers for talks—only phone numbers were not included," Zarif wrote in the tweet.

CNN reported on Friday that the White House had passed a telephone number to the Swiss for contacting US President Donald Trump in case Iranian officials want to hold talks.

The Swiss embassy in Tehran represents US interests in the Islamic Republic.

The United States' military presence in the Gulf used to be a serious threat but now it is an opportunity, a senior commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guards said on Sunday, according to the Iranian Students' News Agency (ISNA).

The United States' military presence in the Gulf used to be a serious threat but now it is an opportunity, a senior commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guards said on Sunday, according to the Iranian Students' News Agency (ISNA). The US military has sent forces, including an aircraft carrier and B-52 bombers, to the Middle East to counter what US officials have said are “clear indications” of threats from Iran to its forces there. The USS Abraham Lincoln is replacing another carrier rotated out of the Gulf last month. "An aircraft carrier that has at least 40 to 50 planes on it and 6,000 forces gathered within it was a serious threat for us in the past but now...the threats have switched to opportunities," Amirali Hajizadeh, head of the Guards' aerospace division said. He added, "If (the Americans) make a move we will hit them in the head." The commander of the Guards, Major General Hossein Salami, said in a parliament session on Sunday that the United States has started a psychological war in the region, according to a parliamentary spokesman. "Commander Salami, with attention to the situation in the region, presented an analysis that the Americans have started a psychological war because the comings and goings of their military is a normal matter,” said Behrouz Nemati in a summary of the Salami's comments, according to parliament's ICANA news site. Salami was appointed head of the Guards last month. Separately, Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said in a tweet on Sunday that US national security adviser John Bolton had made plans for the United States to withdraw from a landmark 2015 nuclear deal and take a more aggressive posture toward the Islamic Republic even before he took up his current post. Zarif tweeted a link to a 2017 National Review article written by Bolton with the headline "How to Get Out of the Iran Nuclear Deal." "A detailed blueprint for #FakeIntelligence, #ForeverWar and even empty offers for talks—only phone numbers were not included," Zarif wrote in the tweet. CNN reported on Friday that the White House had passed a telephone number to the Swiss for contacting US President Donald Trump in case Iranian officials want to hold talks. The Swiss embassy in Tehran represents US interests in the Islamic Republic.

US military presence in Gulf is 'an opportunity': Iran Revolutionary Guards' commander

The Pentagon announced Friday that it is deploying an amphibious assault ship and a Patriot missile battery to the Middle East to bolster an aircraft carrier force sent to counter alleged threats from Iran.

The USS Arlington, which transports marines, amphibious vehicles, conventional landing craft and rotary aircraft, and the Patriot air defence system will join the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and a<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/b-52-bombers-to-be-part-of-us-forces-sent-to-middle-east-over-iran-concerns-216934"> B-52 bomber task force</a> headed toward the Gulf after intelligence reports suggested Iran was planning some sort of attack in the region.

The deployment is "in response to indications of heightened Iranian readiness to conduct offensive operations against US forces and our interests," the Pentagon said in a statement.

"The Department of Defense continues to closely monitor the activities of the Iranian regime, their military and proxies," it said.

"The United States does not seek conflict with Iran, but we are postured and ready to defend US forces and interests in the region."

On Sunday US President Donald Trump's national security advisor John Bolton announced the deployment of the Lincoln group and bombers saying he wanted to send a "clear and unmistakable" message to Iran about any attack against the US or its partners in the region.&nbsp;

Washington though has not elaborated on the alleged threat, drawing criticism that it is overreacting and unnecessarily driving up tensions in the region.

Iran dismissed the deployment of the Lincoln as old news but followed it with an announcement that it would suspend some of its commitments under the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with major powers abandoned by Washington last year.

Amid the rising tensions, Trump said Thursday he is open to talks with Tehran's leadership.

"What I would like to see with Iran, I would like to see them call me," Trump told reporters at the White House.

The Pentagon announced Friday that it is deploying an amphibious assault ship and a Patriot missile battery to the Middle East to bolster an aircraft carrier force sent to counter alleged threats from Iran.

The Pentagon announced Friday that it is deploying an amphibious assault ship and a Patriot missile battery to the Middle East to bolster an aircraft carrier force sent to counter alleged threats from Iran. The USS Arlington, which transports marines, amphibious vehicles, conventional landing craft and rotary aircraft, and the Patriot air defence system will join the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and a B-52 bomber task force headed toward the Gulf after intelligence reports suggested Iran was planning some sort of attack in the region. The deployment is "in response to indications of heightened Iranian readiness to conduct offensive operations against US forces and our interests," the Pentagon said in a statement. "The Department of Defense continues to closely monitor the activities of the Iranian regime, their military and proxies," it said. "The United States does not seek conflict with Iran, but we are postured and ready to defend US forces and interests in the region." On Sunday US President Donald Trump's national security advisor John Bolton announced the deployment of the Lincoln group and bombers saying he wanted to send a "clear and unmistakable" message to Iran about any attack against the US or its partners in the region. Washington though has not elaborated on the alleged threat, drawing criticism that it is overreacting and unnecessarily driving up tensions in the region. Iran dismissed the deployment of the Lincoln as old news but followed it with an announcement that it would suspend some of its commitments under the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with major powers abandoned by Washington last year. Amid the rising tensions, Trump said Thursday he is open to talks with Tehran's leadership. "What I would like to see with Iran, I would like to see them call me," Trump told reporters at the White House.

US builds deterrent force against possible Iranian attack; sends assault ship, missiles to Mideast

Deciphering The U.S.-Iran Tensions That Is Threatening To Disrupt Global Peace Are the U.S. and Iran on the brink of the fourth gulf war? Is non-compliance of the 2015 deal in the best interests of Iran? Can Europe do anything more than mere posturing? Can India, China save the deal? Palki speaks to Adnan Tabatabai, Expert of Iranian affairs to understand the implications of the rising tensions

Gravitas: Understand U.S.-Iran tensions: In conversation with Adnan Tabatabai, expert on Iranian affairs

The US&nbsp;military said on Tuesday that B-52&nbsp;bombers&nbsp;will be&nbsp;part&nbsp;of additional&nbsp;forces&nbsp;being&nbsp;sent&nbsp;to the Middle&nbsp;East&nbsp;to counter what the Trump administration says are "clear indications" of threats from&nbsp;Iran&nbsp;to US&nbsp;forces&nbsp;there.

White House national security adviser John Bolton said on Sunday that the United States was deploying a carrier strike group and a bomber task force to the&nbsp;Middle&nbsp;East.

Captain Bill Urban, a spokesman for US&nbsp;Central Command, said that the bomber task force would consist of B-52&nbsp;bombers.

The US&nbsp;officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said four B-52s would be deployed, though that number could change. The United States has regularly maintained a bomber presence in the region, and B-1&nbsp;bombers&nbsp;were there as recently as last month. The B-52&nbsp;is a long-range, nuclear-capable bomber.

The military also confirmed that the Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group had already been scheduled to go to the&nbsp;Middle&nbsp;East, but that its movement was "expedited" due to heightened tension with&nbsp;Iran. Iran's top security body dismissed the U.S. plan to send&nbsp;forces&nbsp;to the region as "psychological warfare."

Announcing details of the force on Tuesday, the US&nbsp;military did not provide specific details of intelligence it may have about an&nbsp;Iranian threat.

US Central Command, which is responsible for US&nbsp;military operations in the&nbsp;Middle&nbsp;East&nbsp;and Afghanistan, requested additional forces following "recent and clear indications" that&nbsp;Iranian and proxy&nbsp;forces&nbsp;were making preparations to possibly attack U.S.&nbsp;forces&nbsp;in the region, Urban said.

He said the credibility of those threats was based on sources and methods through which the information was obtained, something the US&nbsp;military was not able to discuss. The military has said the threat to US&nbsp;forces&nbsp;was on land and at sea but declined to provide further details.

"US&nbsp;Central Command continues to track the number of credible threat streams emanating from the regime in&nbsp;Iran&nbsp;throughout the CENTCOM area of responsibility," Urban said. US&nbsp;officials have told Reuters that the intelligence was based on specific and "credible" threats to US&nbsp;forces&nbsp;in Iraq, Syria and the broader region.

One US&nbsp;official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said there were indications that&nbsp;Iran&nbsp;appeared to be moving short-range ballistic missiles on boats in the&nbsp;Middle&nbsp;East. The United States has previously accused&nbsp;Iran&nbsp;of providing&nbsp;parts of such missiles to Houthi rebels in Yemen fighting a Saudi-led coalition backed by the United States. It is unclear how this intelligence was different.

The US military said on Tuesday that B-52 bombers will be part of additional forces being sent to the Middle East to counter what the Trump administration says are "clear indications" of threats from Iran to US forces there.

The US military said on Tuesday that B-52 bombers will be part of additional forces being sent to the Middle East to counter what the Trump administration says are "clear indications" of threats from Iran to US forces there. White House national security adviser John Bolton said on Sunday that the United States was deploying a carrier strike group and a bomber task force to the Middle East. Captain Bill Urban, a spokesman for US Central Command, said that the bomber task force would consist of B-52 bombers. The US officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said four B-52s would be deployed, though that number could change. The United States has regularly maintained a bomber presence in the region, and B-1 bombers were there as recently as last month. The B-52 is a long-range, nuclear-capable bomber. The military also confirmed that the Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group had already been scheduled to go to the Middle East, but that its movement was "expedited" due to heightened tension with Iran. Iran's top security body dismissed the U.S. plan to send forces to the region as "psychological warfare." Announcing details of the force on Tuesday, the US military did not provide specific details of intelligence it may have about an Iranian threat. US Central Command, which is responsible for US military operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan, requested additional forces following "recent and clear indications" that Iranian and proxy forces were making preparations to possibly attack U.S. forces in the region, Urban said. He said the credibility of those threats was based on sources and methods through which the information was obtained, something the US military was not able to discuss. The military has said the threat to US forces was on land and at sea but declined to provide further details. "US Central Command continues to track the number of credible threat streams emanating from the regime in Iran throughout the CENTCOM area of responsibility," Urban said. US officials have told Reuters that the intelligence was based on specific and "credible" threats to US forces in Iraq, Syria and the broader region. One US official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said there were indications that Iran appeared to be moving short-range ballistic missiles on boats in the Middle East. The United States has previously accused Iran of providing parts of such missiles to Houthi rebels in Yemen fighting a Saudi-led coalition backed by the United States. It is unclear how this intelligence was different.

B-52 bombers to be part of US forces sent to Middle East over Iran concerns

American B-52 Stratofortress bombers sent to the Middle East over what <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/us-commander-says-he-could-send-carrier-into-strait-of-hormuz-despite-iran-tensions-217422">Washington describes as threats from Iran</a> have arrived at a US base in Qatar, US Central Command (CENTCOM) said.

The US military said on Tuesday that a number of B-52 bombers would be part of additional forces being sent to the Middle East to counter what the Trump administration says are <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/us-threatens-swift-decisive-response-to-any-iran-attack-217396">"clear indications" of threats</a> from Iran to US forces there.

Iran has dismissed the new US deployments, including of an aircraft carrier, as old news announced now to intimidate it through "psychological warfare", at a time when Washington is also tightening financial sanctions. The USS Abraham Lincoln is replacing another carrier rotated out of the Gulf last month.

<div class="videoWrapper trancodeVideo"><iframe allowfullscreen="" autoplay="1" class="includeVideo" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.wionews.com/videos/iran-us-tensions-escalate-as-trump-imposes-new-sanctions-217272/embed" style="width:100%;max-width:560px;" width="560"></iframe></div>

A picture taken by US Air Force personnel stationed in Al Udaid air base and posted on the CENTCOM website showed two aircraft. The caption said: "B-52 Arrival. US B-52H Stratofortress aircraft assigned to the 20th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron are parked on a flight line May 8, 2019."

The media officer at Al Udaid, near Doha, did not immediately respond to a phone call and email requesting comment and details. CENTCOM is responsible for US military operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Washington has tightened sanctions on Iran this month, eliminating waivers that had allowed some countries to buy its oil, with a goal of reducing Tehran's crude exports to zero. Iran has responded by scaling back some curbs on its nuclear programme, although it remains compliant with a deal to restrict its nuclear activity which Washington abandoned a year ago.

American B-52 Stratofortress bombers sent to the Middle East over what Washington describes as threats from Iran have arrived at a US base in Qatar, US Central Command (CENTCOM) said.

American B-52 Stratofortress bombers sent to the Middle East over what Washington describes as threats from Iran have arrived at a US base in Qatar, US Central Command (CENTCOM) said. The US military said on Tuesday that a number of B-52 bombers would be part of additional forces being sent to the Middle East to counter what the Trump administration says are "clear indications" of threats from Iran to US forces there. Iran has dismissed the new US deployments, including of an aircraft carrier, as old news announced now to intimidate it through "psychological warfare", at a time when Washington is also tightening financial sanctions. The USS Abraham Lincoln is replacing another carrier rotated out of the Gulf last month. A picture taken by US Air Force personnel stationed in Al Udaid air base and posted on the CENTCOM website showed two aircraft. The caption said: "B-52 Arrival. US B-52H Stratofortress aircraft assigned to the 20th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron are parked on a flight line May 8, 2019." The media officer at Al Udaid, near Doha, did not immediately respond to a phone call and email requesting comment and details. CENTCOM is responsible for US military operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Washington has tightened sanctions on Iran this month, eliminating waivers that had allowed some countries to buy its oil, with a goal of reducing Tehran's crude exports to zero. Iran has responded by scaling back some curbs on its nuclear programme, although it remains compliant with a deal to restrict its nuclear activity which Washington abandoned a year ago.

US B-52 bombers arrive in Qatar amid threats from Iran

The United States is deploying a carrier strike group and a bomber task force to the Middle East to send a clear message to Iran that any attack on US interests or its allies will be met with "unrelenting force," US national security adviser John Bolton said on Sunday. Amid rising tensions between the United States and Iran, Bolton said the decision was "in response to a number of troubling and escalatory indications and warnings."

US deploying carrier, bombers to Middle East in warning to Iran -Bolton

All you need to know about China's Belt and Road Initiative

Momentous developments across North and East Africa suggest the long-drawn-out process of political transition in the region — as well as the Middle East — is still in its infancy. So too does popular discontent in Syria, despite eight years of war, as well as in Egypt, notwithstanding a 2013 military coup that rolled back the advances of protests in 2011 that toppled President Hosni Mubarak.

What developments across North Africa and the Middle East demonstrate is that the drivers of the 2011 Arab Spring that swept the region and forced the leaders of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen to resign not only still exist, but constitute black swans that can upset the apple cart at any moment. The situation also suggests that the regional struggle between forces of change and ancient régimes and militaries backed by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia is far from decided. 
 
Algeria and Sudan

If anything, protesters in Algeria and Sudan have learned something from the failed 2011 results: Don’t trust militaries, even if they seemingly align themselves with demonstrators, and don’t surrender the street until protester demands have been met. Distrust of the military has prompted an increasing number of Sudanese protesters to question whether chanting “the people and the army are one” is still appropriate. Slogans such as “freedom, freedom” and “revolution, revolution” alongside calls on the military to protect the protesters have become more frequent.

The protests in Algeria and Sudan have entered a critical phase in which protesters and militaries — worried that they could be held accountable for decades of economic mismanagement, corruption and repression — are tapping in the dark. With protesters emboldened by their initial successes in forcing leaders to resign, both the demonstrators and the militaries, including officers with close ties to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are internally divided about how to proceed. Moreover, neither side has any real experience in managing the crossroads at which they find themselves, while it is dawning on the militaries that their tired playbooks are not producing results.

In a telling sign, Sudan’s interim leader, Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan, praised his country’s “special relationship” with Saudi Arabia and the UAE as he recently met with a Saudi-Emirati delegation at the military compound in Khartoum, a focal point of the protests. Saudi Arabia has expressed support for the protests, in what many suspect is part of an effort to ensure that Sudan does not become a symbol of the power of popular sovereignty and its ability to defeat autocracy.

Syria

The ultimate outcome of the dramatic developments in Algeria and Sudan and how the parties maneuver is likely to have far-reaching consequences in a region pockmarked by powder kegs ready to explode. Mounting anger as fuel shortages caused by Western sanctions against Syria and Iran bring life to a halt have sparked rare and widespread public criticism of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government. The anger is fueled by reports that government officials cut in line at petrol stations to fill up their tanks and buy rationed cooking gas and take more than is allowed.

Syria is Here, an anonymous Facebook page that reports on economics in government-controlled areas, took officials to task after state-run television showed the oil minister, Suleiman al-Abbas, touring petrol stations that showed no signs of shortage. “Is it so difficult to be transparent and forward? Would that undermine anyone’s prestige? We are a country facing sanctions and boycotted. The public knows and is aware,” the Facebook page charged.

The manager of Hashtag Syria, another Facebook page, was arrested when the site demanded that the oil ministry respond to reports of anticipated price hikes with comments rather than threats. The site charged that the ministry was punishing the manager “instead of dealing with the real problem.” Syrian journalist Danny Makki said, “It [Syria] is a pressure cooker.”

Egypt and Libya 
 
Similarly, authorities in Egypt, despite blocking its website, have been unable to stop an online petition against proposed constitutional amendments that could extend the rule of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi until 2034. The petition, entitled Batel (meaning “void” in Arabic), is, according to Netblocks — a group that maps web freedom — one of an estimated 34,000 websites blocked by Egyptian internet providers in a bid to stymie opposition to the amendments.

President Sisi is a reminder of how far Arab militaries and their Gulf backers are willing to go in defense of their vested interests in a bid to oppose popular sovereignty. Libyan renegade Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar is another. General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) is attacking the capital Tripoli, the seat of the UN-recognised Libyan government that he and his Emirati, Saudi and Egyptian backers accuse of being dominated by Islamist terrorists.

The three Arab states’ military and financial support of Haftar is but the tip of the iceberg. 
 
The general has modeled his control of much of Libya on Sisi’s example of a military that not only dominates politics, but also the economy. As a result, the LNA is engaged in businesses ranging from waste management, metal scrap and waste export, and agricultural mega projects to the registration of migrant labor workers and control of ports, airports and other infrastructure. The LNA is also eyeing a role in the reconstruction of Benghazi and other war-devastated or underdeveloped regions.

What for now makes 2019 different from 2011 is that both sides of the divide realise that success depends on commitment to be in it for the long haul. Protesters also understand that trust in military assertions of support for the people can be self-defeating. They further grasp that they are up against a regional counterrevolution that has no scruples.

All of that gives today’s protesters a leg up on their counterparts from the Arab Spring of 2011. The jury is out on whether that will prove sufficient to succeed where the people of eight years ago failed. 
&nbsp;

(This article was originally published on The Fair Observer. Read the <a href="https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/arab-world-algeria-sudan-protests-arab-spring-khalifa-haftar-libya-39083/">original article)</a>

 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

Momentous developments across North and East Africa suggest the long-drawn-out process of political transition in the region — as well as the Middle East — is still in its infancy.

Momentous developments across North and East Africa suggest the long-drawn-out process of political transition in the region — as well as the Middle East — is still in its infancy. So too does popular discontent in Syria, despite eight years of war, as well as in Egypt, notwithstanding a 2013 military coup that rolled back the advances of protests in 2011 that toppled President Hosni Mubarak. What developments across North Africa and the Middle East demonstrate is that the drivers of the 2011 Arab Spring that swept the region and forced the leaders of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen to resign not only still exist, but constitute black swans that can upset the apple cart at any moment. The situation also suggests that the regional struggle between forces of change and ancient régimes and militaries backed by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia is far from decided. Algeria and Sudan If anything, protesters in Algeria and Sudan have learned something from the failed 2011 results: Don’t trust militaries, even if they seemingly align themselves with demonstrators, and don’t surrender the street until protester demands have been met. Distrust of the military has prompted an increasing number of Sudanese protesters to question whether chanting “the people and the army are one” is still appropriate. Slogans such as “freedom, freedom” and “revolution, revolution” alongside calls on the military to protect the protesters have become more frequent. The protests in Algeria and Sudan have entered a critical phase in which protesters and militaries — worried that they could be held accountable for decades of economic mismanagement, corruption and repression — are tapping in the dark. With protesters emboldened by their initial successes in forcing leaders to resign, both the demonstrators and the militaries, including officers with close ties to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are internally divided about how to proceed. Moreover, neither side has any real experience in managing the crossroads at which they find themselves, while it is dawning on the militaries that their tired playbooks are not producing results. In a telling sign, Sudan’s interim leader, Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan, praised his country’s “special relationship” with Saudi Arabia and the UAE as he recently met with a Saudi-Emirati delegation at the military compound in Khartoum, a focal point of the protests. Saudi Arabia has expressed support for the protests, in what many suspect is part of an effort to ensure that Sudan does not become a symbol of the power of popular sovereignty and its ability to defeat autocracy. Syria The ultimate outcome of the dramatic developments in Algeria and Sudan and how the parties maneuver is likely to have far-reaching consequences in a region pockmarked by powder kegs ready to explode. Mounting anger as fuel shortages caused by Western sanctions against Syria and Iran bring life to a halt have sparked rare and widespread public criticism of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government. The anger is fueled by reports that government officials cut in line at petrol stations to fill up their tanks and buy rationed cooking gas and take more than is allowed. Syria is Here, an anonymous Facebook page that reports on economics in government-controlled areas, took officials to task after state-run television showed the oil minister, Suleiman al-Abbas, touring petrol stations that showed no signs of shortage. “Is it so difficult to be transparent and forward? Would that undermine anyone’s prestige? We are a country facing sanctions and boycotted. The public knows and is aware,” the Facebook page charged. The manager of Hashtag Syria, another Facebook page, was arrested when the site demanded that the oil ministry respond to reports of anticipated price hikes with comments rather than threats. The site charged that the ministry was punishing the manager “instead of dealing with the real problem.” Syrian journalist Danny Makki said, “It [Syria] is a pressure cooker.” Egypt and Libya Similarly, authorities in Egypt, despite blocking its website, have been unable to stop an online petition against proposed constitutional amendments that could extend the rule of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi until 2034. The petition, entitled Batel (meaning “void” in Arabic), is, according to Netblocks — a group that maps web freedom — one of an estimated 34,000 websites blocked by Egyptian internet providers in a bid to stymie opposition to the amendments. President Sisi is a reminder of how far Arab militaries and their Gulf backers are willing to go in defense of their vested interests in a bid to oppose popular sovereignty. Libyan renegade Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar is another. General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) is attacking the capital Tripoli, the seat of the UN-recognised Libyan government that he and his Emirati, Saudi and Egyptian backers accuse of being dominated by Islamist terrorists. The three Arab states’ military and financial support of Haftar is but the tip of the iceberg. The general has modeled his control of much of Libya on Sisi’s example of a military that not only dominates politics, but also the economy. As a result, the LNA is engaged in businesses ranging from waste management, metal scrap and waste export, and agricultural mega projects to the registration of migrant labor workers and control of ports, airports and other infrastructure. The LNA is also eyeing a role in the reconstruction of Benghazi and other war-devastated or underdeveloped regions. What for now makes 2019 different from 2011 is that both sides of the divide realise that success depends on commitment to be in it for the long haul. Protesters also understand that trust in military assertions of support for the people can be self-defeating. They further grasp that they are up against a regional counterrevolution that has no scruples. All of that gives today’s protesters a leg up on their counterparts from the Arab Spring of 2011. The jury is out on whether that will prove sufficient to succeed where the people of eight years ago failed. (This article was originally published on The Fair Observer. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

The Battle for the future of the Arab World

By Jonathan Hall

Involved in armed conflicts on two fronts, in eastern Ukraine and Syria, the Russian Federation’s dual campaigns are often closely associated with one another. Experts looking at Russia’s ongoing operations in the Syrian Civil War often attempt to link them to the conflict in Ukraine. In doing so, analysts and policymakers may inadvertently fail to see the full range of consequences the renewed Russian presence in the Middle East brings. This in no way implies a lack of relationship between the two, but rather that the economic and political benefits Moscow is reaping should be appreciated before such a causal relationship can be understood.

Two main factors of Russia’s intervention in Syria will affect future calculi between interlocutors attempting to resolve the war in the Donbas region and the illegal annexation of Crimea. The first factor that needs addressing is the near-term consequences. Because of its military cooperation with Bashar al-Assad’s regime and other regional players, Moscow has managed to secure billions of dollars from states in the Middle East such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Along with rising global oil prices, Russia has further insulated itself against Western sanctions.

The second implication is the geopolitical importance of Russia’s growing presence in the region, which it is utilising to cast influence throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Its significance comes in the shape of a favorable bargaining position within and without the Minsk framework (for the resolution of the conflict in eastern Ukraine) for two reasons: geoeconomic clout vis-à-vis the energy market and political leverage over the European Union as it attempts to manage issues related to immigration flows from the MENA region.&nbsp;

Inextricably Linked

September 30, 2015, marked the beginning of Russia’s official involvement in Syria at the request of President Assad, opening with airstrikes around the cities of Homs and Hama in western Syria against the mainstream opposition forces. With the war in eastern Ukraine already being waged for over a year at that point, the two conflicts have since been inextricably linked. Some analysts posit that Russia’s incursion into Syria serves the same purpose as prior aggressions in Ukraine, namely dismantling the current Western-led world order that has been in place since World War II.

Concerning this link, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin likely knew he would be able to use any gains in the Middle East in his favour concerning Ukraine. However, these gains, when seen through a wider lens than just the regional context of Ukraine, provide a clearer analysis of the economically and geopolitically revitalised bargaining position given to the Kremlin on issues with transatlantic partners writ large and, therefore, certainly concerning Donbas and Crimea.

Throughout 2014, as US and EU sanctions began to accumulate, the ruble was at one point devalued by roughly 50 per cent. While Moscow has reclaimed some economic stability, the strength of the Russian currency, which is currently priced at 65 against the US dollar, is no where near its former status of around 35 rubles against the dollar.

While sanctions have certainly hurt Russia’s economy, the drop in the global oil prices had a much more significant effect. Russia’s long-term budget projections placed oil above $100 per barrel; however, at certain points in 2016, the price fell below $30. Moscow’s economic difficulties were further compounded by the budgetary pressures self-imposed by its activities in Ukraine, as well as the economic shock experienced during the 2008-09 global financial crisis that drained central reserves. Even if the sanctions were never imposed, some suggest the Kremlin would still have found itself in a difficult position.

Irrespective of sanctions staying in place, last year the State Duma reviewed the federal budget and projected a surplus of 0.5 per cent of GDP, equating to around $7.7 billion. This was the first expected surplus since 2011, which displays the preponderant effect of oil over Western sanctions given that 2012 marked the beginning of a drop in global oil prices. The World Bank confirmed such reports, forecasting 1.5 per cent&nbsp;GDP growth in 2018, followed by an increase of 1.8 per cent&nbsp;from 2019-20.

Entering Syria

Although the financial losses due to sanctions have not had the same effect as declining oil prices, they have certainly taken their toll. Resumed business with the EU and the US would be the best-case scenario for Russia. However, this would only begin to be a possibility after the Kremlin put forth a concerted effort to work with the international community to bring about peace in the region.

Moscow, however, understands that an abrupt end to the fighting in Donbas, in which it has only marginally admitted involvement, would be highly unlikely, especially while trying to save face on both the international stage as well as in front of domestic audiences. Given this reality, Russia appears fully committed to increasing relations in the Middle East not only militarily, but also economically, as part of its eastward pivot toward the MENA region and Asia. 
 
Important to note is that on the list of sanctioned individuals and entities is Vnesheconombank (VEB), of which Russia’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), is a fully owned subsidiary. Put simply, SWFs serve as state-owned instruments in public finance. Largely funded by revenues from commodity exports or from foreign exchange reserves in a state’s central bank, SWFs may be used to invest globally. As such, Russia has begun to circumvent the economic hardship of sanctions and severed business partnerships in the West by contractually binding itself to other sovereign wealth funds in the Middle East.

While not an exhaustive list of SWF partnerships, the following are the most lucrative of contracts set up through the RDIF, which represent short-term financial reprieve and long-term economic bargaining power for the Kremlin: the Qatari Investment Authority has committed over $2.5 billion in assets to Russia, mostly within Russia’s oil giant Rosneft; Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund invested $10 billion, mostly focused on technology and energy; and Abu Dhabi, for its part, has set up a $3 billion fund with the RDIF, focused on developing Russia’s southern infrastructure and agricultural sectors. 
 
Arms Sales

Apart from direct SWF investment, Russia’s arms industry has also received a huge boon since Russia commenced military operations in Syria. The importance of this can be seen from former deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin, stating that “arms sales are the most important element of Moscow’s relations with other countries.” For example, in 2009 Moscow sold roughly $9 billion in arms to the MENA region. In 2016, that number rose to $21.4 billion. With the MENA region quickly becoming Russia’s most profitable destination in terms of exporting arms, behind Asia, the correlation of foreign policy interests is clear.

The Kremlin has used the war as effective advertising from the very beginning. In early October, shortly after Russia officially entered the war on behalf of Assad’s regime, Moscow fired 26 cruise missiles from its Caspian Sea flotilla, hitting various targets in Syria. Although it could be argued that the same objective could have been carried out through military capabilities already in-country, Russia was able to broadcast its new technology on a global scale.

Shortly after, customers from the Middle East and abroad began to line up to buy various weapons systems. The key example of this success would be Tehran resuming its position as a top-tier client following the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (and Russia’s assistance in the process) placing weapon orders to the sum of $10 billion.

For the near future, any economic gains achieved by the Russian Federation may directly affect its position moving forward concerning Ukraine. The Kremlin has been hemorrhaging money in backing separatist activities and financing its own operations in Donbas and Crimea. Arms sales and economic partnerships in the Middle East and North Africa will provide the monetary reprieve Russia needs to shield itself from the financial backlash currently being sustained. 
 
Longterm Benefits

While economic deals amongst SWFs and recent increases in arms sales provide Russia assistance in the near-term to face the previous shock to global oil prices as well as Western sanctions, the mid to long-term implications of Russia’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War are the most important to analyze. In terms of bilateral cooperation in the Middle East, relations with Iran are the most important for Russia. A major consumer of Russian arms, Moscow sees Tehran as a “regional superpower” given Iran’s extensive involvement in the war in Syria, its support for Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as the question of its future nuclear capabilities.

Russia also views Tehran as a reliable partner with whom it can successfully counter the US presence in the Black Sea, the Caspian region and the Middle East, in addition to controlling Sunni extremism within Russia’s near-abroad — the North Caucasus and Central Asia. While the war in Syria will eventually come to an end, Russia has now successfully locked itself into the region through its access to the Syrian port of Tartus and the Khmeimim airbase, which it will maintain for at least the next 48 years.

The geopolitical importance of Russia’s permanent military presence in the region, in concert with growing forms of economic cooperation, may be better realized through discussion of the north-south corridor. Introduced by President Putin in 2007, this strategic initiative is based upon a mixture of financial planning and political enterprise. Moscow’s goal with the so-called north-south corridor is to utilize its partnerships in the Middle East and create a staging ground for further economic and political cooperation in Africa and the “global south.”

One example of this is a deal likely brokered thanks to SWF investments in Abu Dhabi’s defense sector for Moscow to create an air hub in the UAE. Through this hub, Russia will be able to deliver infrastructure projects and humanitarian aid.

Should Russia continue to gain political clout throughout the MENA region, the European Union may find itself dealing with Russia as its main interlocutor for issues such as the ongoing refugee crisis. In many European countries, issues concerning migration flows are dominating the discourse in the media and political spheres. Domestic political concerns will likely take precedence over the war in Ukraine. Therefore, Russia’s ability to provide concessions — for example through growing its influence in Libya — to work with the EU in dealing with migration may, in turn, lead to unfavorable tradeoffs for Ukraine.&nbsp;

The trends regarding military and economic cooperation between Russia and its Middle Eastern partners may have begun well before the annexation of Crimea. However, it is apparent that Western sanctions and political pressure have since driven the Kremlin farther east, accelerating its efforts. This divergence does not appear to be coming solely out of desperation after the loss of Western investment, but rather because of the real promise Moscow sees in its increasingly eastward-leaning strategic focus.

Russia’s enlarged presence in the Middle East, particularly as it relates to renewed ties with Iran and the potential access this will give the Kremlin to developments in Africa, clearly displays the war in Syria as just the beginning.

Any increased influence in these regions will come at the expense of transatlantic partners and will shift bargaining positions when it comes to its dealings with Russia, namely as it pertains to Ukraine. If these trends persist, in addition to rising oil prices, some rethinking will be required when it comes to countering Russia in Ukraine as sanctions may become less and less relevant. If this is the case, expect the Russian Federation to become economically more viable, geographically more influential and, as a result, perhaps more aggressive in eastern Ukraine.

 
(Jonathan Hall is a security and political risk analyst focused on Eurasian geopolitics, military affairs, and emerging technologies)

(This article was originally published on The Fair Observer. Read the <a href="https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/western-sanctions-russia-economy-syria-ukraine-middle-east-news-00171/">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.) &nbsp;

 
&nbsp;

By Jonathan Hall Involved in armed conflicts on two fronts, in eastern Ukraine and Syria, the Russian Federation’s dual campaigns are often closely associated with one another.

By Jonathan Hall Involved in armed conflicts on two fronts, in eastern Ukraine and Syria, the Russian Federation’s dual campaigns are often closely associated with one another. Experts looking at Russia’s ongoing operations in the Syrian Civil War often attempt to link them to the conflict in Ukraine. In doing so, analysts and policymakers may inadvertently fail to see the full range of consequences the renewed Russian presence in the Middle East brings. This in no way implies a lack of relationship between the two, but rather that the economic and political benefits Moscow is reaping should be appreciated before such a causal relationship can be understood. Two main factors of Russia’s intervention in Syria will affect future calculi between interlocutors attempting to resolve the war in the Donbas region and the illegal annexation of Crimea. The first factor that needs addressing is the near-term consequences. Because of its military cooperation with Bashar al-Assad’s regime and other regional players, Moscow has managed to secure billions of dollars from states in the Middle East such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Along with rising global oil prices, Russia has further insulated itself against Western sanctions. The second implication is the geopolitical importance of Russia’s growing presence in the region, which it is utilising to cast influence throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Its significance comes in the shape of a favorable bargaining position within and without the Minsk framework (for the resolution of the conflict in eastern Ukraine) for two reasons: geoeconomic clout vis-à-vis the energy market and political leverage over the European Union as it attempts to manage issues related to immigration flows from the MENA region. Inextricably Linked September 30, 2015, marked the beginning of Russia’s official involvement in Syria at the request of President Assad, opening with airstrikes around the cities of Homs and Hama in western Syria against the mainstream opposition forces. With the war in eastern Ukraine already being waged for over a year at that point, the two conflicts have since been inextricably linked. Some analysts posit that Russia’s incursion into Syria serves the same purpose as prior aggressions in Ukraine, namely dismantling the current Western-led world order that has been in place since World War II. Concerning this link, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin likely knew he would be able to use any gains in the Middle East in his favour concerning Ukraine. However, these gains, when seen through a wider lens than just the regional context of Ukraine, provide a clearer analysis of the economically and geopolitically revitalised bargaining position given to the Kremlin on issues with transatlantic partners writ large and, therefore, certainly concerning Donbas and Crimea. Throughout 2014, as US and EU sanctions began to accumulate, the ruble was at one point devalued by roughly 50 per cent. While Moscow has reclaimed some economic stability, the strength of the Russian currency, which is currently priced at 65 against the US dollar, is no where near its former status of around 35 rubles against the dollar. While sanctions have certainly hurt Russia’s economy, the drop in the global oil prices had a much more significant effect. Russia’s long-term budget projections placed oil above $100 per barrel; however, at certain points in 2016, the price fell below $30. Moscow’s economic difficulties were further compounded by the budgetary pressures self-imposed by its activities in Ukraine, as well as the economic shock experienced during the 2008-09 global financial crisis that drained central reserves. Even if the sanctions were never imposed, some suggest the Kremlin would still have found itself in a difficult position. Irrespective of sanctions staying in place, last year the State Duma reviewed the federal budget and projected a surplus of 0.5 per cent of GDP, equating to around $7.7 billion. This was the first expected surplus since 2011, which displays the preponderant effect of oil over Western sanctions given that 2012 marked the beginning of a drop in global oil prices. The World Bank confirmed such reports, forecasting 1.5 per cent GDP growth in 2018, followed by an increase of 1.8 per cent from 2019-20. Entering Syria Although the financial losses due to sanctions have not had the same effect as declining oil prices, they have certainly taken their toll. Resumed business with the EU and the US would be the best-case scenario for Russia. However, this would only begin to be a possibility after the Kremlin put forth a concerted effort to work with the international community to bring about peace in the region. Moscow, however, understands that an abrupt end to the fighting in Donbas, in which it has only marginally admitted involvement, would be highly unlikely, especially while trying to save face on both the international stage as well as in front of domestic audiences. Given this reality, Russia appears fully committed to increasing relations in the Middle East not only militarily, but also economically, as part of its eastward pivot toward the MENA region and Asia. Important to note is that on the list of sanctioned individuals and entities is Vnesheconombank (VEB), of which Russia’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), is a fully owned subsidiary. Put simply, SWFs serve as state-owned instruments in public finance. Largely funded by revenues from commodity exports or from foreign exchange reserves in a state’s central bank, SWFs may be used to invest globally. As such, Russia has begun to circumvent the economic hardship of sanctions and severed business partnerships in the West by contractually binding itself to other sovereign wealth funds in the Middle East. While not an exhaustive list of SWF partnerships, the following are the most lucrative of contracts set up through the RDIF, which represent short-term financial reprieve and long-term economic bargaining power for the Kremlin: the Qatari Investment Authority has committed over $2.5 billion in assets to Russia, mostly within Russia’s oil giant Rosneft; Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund invested $10 billion, mostly focused on technology and energy; and Abu Dhabi, for its part, has set up a $3 billion fund with the RDIF, focused on developing Russia’s southern infrastructure and agricultural sectors. Arms Sales Apart from direct SWF investment, Russia’s arms industry has also received a huge boon since Russia commenced military operations in Syria. The importance of this can be seen from former deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin, stating that “arms sales are the most important element of Moscow’s relations with other countries.” For example, in 2009 Moscow sold roughly $9 billion in arms to the MENA region. In 2016, that number rose to $21.4 billion. With the MENA region quickly becoming Russia’s most profitable destination in terms of exporting arms, behind Asia, the correlation of foreign policy interests is clear. The Kremlin has used the war as effective advertising from the very beginning. In early October, shortly after Russia officially entered the war on behalf of Assad’s regime, Moscow fired 26 cruise missiles from its Caspian Sea flotilla, hitting various targets in Syria. Although it could be argued that the same objective could have been carried out through military capabilities already in-country, Russia was able to broadcast its new technology on a global scale. Shortly after, customers from the Middle East and abroad began to line up to buy various weapons systems. The key example of this success would be Tehran resuming its position as a top-tier client following the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (and Russia’s assistance in the process) placing weapon orders to the sum of $10 billion. For the near future, any economic gains achieved by the Russian Federation may directly affect its position moving forward concerning Ukraine. The Kremlin has been hemorrhaging money in backing separatist activities and financing its own operations in Donbas and Crimea. Arms sales and economic partnerships in the Middle East and North Africa will provide the monetary reprieve Russia needs to shield itself from the financial backlash currently being sustained. Longterm Benefits While economic deals amongst SWFs and recent increases in arms sales provide Russia assistance in the near-term to face the previous shock to global oil prices as well as Western sanctions, the mid to long-term implications of Russia’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War are the most important to analyze. In terms of bilateral cooperation in the Middle East, relations with Iran are the most important for Russia. A major consumer of Russian arms, Moscow sees Tehran as a “regional superpower” given Iran’s extensive involvement in the war in Syria, its support for Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as the question of its future nuclear capabilities. Russia also views Tehran as a reliable partner with whom it can successfully counter the US presence in the Black Sea, the Caspian region and the Middle East, in addition to controlling Sunni extremism within Russia’s near-abroad — the North Caucasus and Central Asia. While the war in Syria will eventually come to an end, Russia has now successfully locked itself into the region through its access to the Syrian port of Tartus and the Khmeimim airbase, which it will maintain for at least the next 48 years. The geopolitical importance of Russia’s permanent military presence in the region, in concert with growing forms of economic cooperation, may be better realized through discussion of the north-south corridor. Introduced by President Putin in 2007, this strategic initiative is based upon a mixture of financial planning and political enterprise. Moscow’s goal with the so-called north-south corridor is to utilize its partnerships in the Middle East and create a staging ground for further economic and political cooperation in Africa and the “global south.” One example of this is a deal likely brokered thanks to SWF investments in Abu Dhabi’s defense sector for Moscow to create an air hub in the UAE. Through this hub, Russia will be able to deliver infrastructure projects and humanitarian aid. Should Russia continue to gain political clout throughout the MENA region, the European Union may find itself dealing with Russia as its main interlocutor for issues such as the ongoing refugee crisis. In many European countries, issues concerning migration flows are dominating the discourse in the media and political spheres. Domestic political concerns will likely take precedence over the war in Ukraine. Therefore, Russia’s ability to provide concessions — for example through growing its influence in Libya — to work with the EU in dealing with migration may, in turn, lead to unfavorable tradeoffs for Ukraine. The trends regarding military and economic cooperation between Russia and its Middle Eastern partners may have begun well before the annexation of Crimea. However, it is apparent that Western sanctions and political pressure have since driven the Kremlin farther east, accelerating its efforts. This divergence does not appear to be coming solely out of desperation after the loss of Western investment, but rather because of the real promise Moscow sees in its increasingly eastward-leaning strategic focus. Russia’s enlarged presence in the Middle East, particularly as it relates to renewed ties with Iran and the potential access this will give the Kremlin to developments in Africa, clearly displays the war in Syria as just the beginning. Any increased influence in these regions will come at the expense of transatlantic partners and will shift bargaining positions when it comes to its dealings with Russia, namely as it pertains to Ukraine. If these trends persist, in addition to rising oil prices, some rethinking will be required when it comes to countering Russia in Ukraine as sanctions may become less and less relevant. If this is the case, expect the Russian Federation to become economically more viable, geographically more influential and, as a result, perhaps more aggressive in eastern Ukraine. (Jonathan Hall is a security and political risk analyst focused on Eurasian geopolitics, military affairs, and emerging technologies) (This article was originally published on The Fair Observer. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Western sanctions are driving Russia’s focus on the Middle East

Much of the Middle East’s recent turmoil stems from internecine Middle Eastern rivalries spilling onto third country battlefields and Saudi and United Arab Emirates-led efforts to roll back the achievements of the 2011 popular Arab revolts and pre-empt further uprisings.

This week’s successful toppling of ailing Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and months of anti-government demonstrations that have put Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir on the defensive suggest that the Saudi-UAE effort may be faltering.

So does the record of the past eight years. The counterrevolution’s one success, Egypt, has produced some of the harshest repression in the country’s history.

Saudi and UAE intervention in Yemen has sparked one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, tarnished the image of the two Gulf states, and provided an opportunity to Iran to expand its network of regional proxies.

In a twist of irony, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, who justify the Yemen war by pointing to an invitation by the internationally recognised exile government of &nbsp;President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, support the rebel forces of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Libya.

Haftar’s forces are poised to march on Tripoli, the seat of the United Nations-recognised government of Libya, two weeks after the field marshal met with King Salman in Saudi Arabia. The fighting in Libya has turned into a proxy war between Gulf rivals with Qatar supporting the Islamist-dominated Tripoli government.

In Syria, rivals Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, who exasperated the country’s eight-year-long devastating civil war by backing rival rebel forces, are back to square one: the man they wanted to remove from office, president Bashar al-Assad, has gained the upper hand with the support of Russia and Iran.

The protests in Algeria and Sudan suggest that the social, economic and political grievances that fuelled the 2011 protests continue to hover just below the surface in a swath of land that stretches from the Atlantic coast of Africa to the Gulf.

Like in 2011, protests in the Middle East are not isolated incidents but the most dramatic part of a more global wave prompted by a loss of public confidence in leaders and political systems that have sparked anti-government demonstrations in countries as far-flung as Zimbabwe and Haiti.

The Algerian and Sudanese protests come on the back of a wave of smaller, political and socio-economic protests since 2011 that suggested that the Middle Eastern counterrevolution amounted to putting a lid on a pot that could boil over at any moment. Protests have erupted in recent years in a host of countries, including Iraq, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia.

The protests also suggest the fragility of hopes of Middle Eastern autocrats that China’s model of successfully growing the economy, creating jobs and opportunity, and delivering public goods coupled with increased political control and suppression of rights would prove to be a sustainable model in their own backyard.

The fragility of the model is enhanced by the tendency of autocrats to overreach in ways that either distract from their core goals or pursue objectives like the creation of a ‘new man’ that ultimately have failed in countries like Turkey.

Turkey’s Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been in power for the better part of two decades. Its success suggests that the effort to create a secular New Turk by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the visionary who carved modern Turkey out of the ruins of the Ottoman empire almost a century ago, has stumbled.

Egyptian general-turned president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping have taken control and civilisationalism to new extremes by seeking not only absolute political power but also the ability to shape culture and dictate personal behaviour.

Al-Sisi recently ordered his officials to dictate the themes and scripts of Egyptian soap operas, a popular regional staple, particularly during the holy month of Ramadan. A military-linked production company has taken charge of some of Egypt’s biggest and most successful shows.

Film directors have been instructed to focus on shows that praise the military and law enforcement and demonize the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that has been brutally targeted by Al-Sisi as well as the UAE that together with Saudi Arabia backed his 2013 military coup. The coup toppled Mohammed Morsi, a Brother and Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president.

Xi’s hopes to promote ‘core socialist values’ such as patriotism, harmony and civility amounts to an effort to counter individualism, materialism and hedonism. The campaign involves blurring piercings and jewellery worn by male pop stars during performances on television and the Internet, obliging soccer players to wear long sleeves to cover their tattoos, and ensuring that women conference hosts raise their necklines and rappers restrict their lyrics to the promotion of peace and harmony.

Saudi Arabia has argued that journalist Jamal Khashoggi was killed in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul six months ago by rogue government operatives who are currently standing trial in a process that lacks transparency and has called into question the kingdom’s version of events.

The overreach suggests that Middle Eastern autocrats are unlikely to respond to the protests in Algeria and Sudan any differently than they did in 2011.

Analyst Giorgio Cafiero predicts that in the wake of Bouteflika’s resignation, Saudi Arabia is likely to support efforts to maintain control by what Algerians call Le Pouvoir (The Power) or the deep state, a cabal of military and security officials and business tycoons, The same is likely to be true for the UAE.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia and the UAE alongside Egypt continue to back Al-Bashir although he is on the defensive after months of protests that have rocked the East African state.

Whether Algeria’s ancient regime backed by Gulf states is able to retain power may well be dependent on what conclusions protesters draw from the experience of the 2011 revolts.

Like the protesters then, Algerian demonstrators need to decide whether Bouteflika’s resignation is a sufficient enough success to justify the surrender of their street power and return to a structured political process.

Indications are that the protesters have learnt their lesson.

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)&nbsp;

Much of the Middle East’s recent turmoil stems from internecine Middle Eastern rivalries spilling onto third country battlefields and Saudi and United Arab Emirates-led efforts to roll back the achievements of the 2011 popular Arab revolts and pre-empt further uprisings.

Much of the Middle East’s recent turmoil stems from internecine Middle Eastern rivalries spilling onto third country battlefields and Saudi and United Arab Emirates-led efforts to roll back the achievements of the 2011 popular Arab revolts and pre-empt further uprisings. This week’s successful toppling of ailing Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and months of anti-government demonstrations that have put Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir on the defensive suggest that the Saudi-UAE effort may be faltering. So does the record of the past eight years. The counterrevolution’s one success, Egypt, has produced some of the harshest repression in the country’s history. Saudi and UAE intervention in Yemen has sparked one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, tarnished the image of the two Gulf states, and provided an opportunity to Iran to expand its network of regional proxies. In a twist of irony, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, who justify the Yemen war by pointing to an invitation by the internationally recognised exile government of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, support the rebel forces of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Libya. Haftar’s forces are poised to march on Tripoli, the seat of the United Nations-recognised government of Libya, two weeks after the field marshal met with King Salman in Saudi Arabia. The fighting in Libya has turned into a proxy war between Gulf rivals with Qatar supporting the Islamist-dominated Tripoli government. In Syria, rivals Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, who exasperated the country’s eight-year-long devastating civil war by backing rival rebel forces, are back to square one: the man they wanted to remove from office, president Bashar al-Assad, has gained the upper hand with the support of Russia and Iran. The protests in Algeria and Sudan suggest that the social, economic and political grievances that fuelled the 2011 protests continue to hover just below the surface in a swath of land that stretches from the Atlantic coast of Africa to the Gulf. Like in 2011, protests in the Middle East are not isolated incidents but the most dramatic part of a more global wave prompted by a loss of public confidence in leaders and political systems that have sparked anti-government demonstrations in countries as far-flung as Zimbabwe and Haiti. The Algerian and Sudanese protests come on the back of a wave of smaller, political and socio-economic protests since 2011 that suggested that the Middle Eastern counterrevolution amounted to putting a lid on a pot that could boil over at any moment. Protests have erupted in recent years in a host of countries, including Iraq, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia. The protests also suggest the fragility of hopes of Middle Eastern autocrats that China’s model of successfully growing the economy, creating jobs and opportunity, and delivering public goods coupled with increased political control and suppression of rights would prove to be a sustainable model in their own backyard. The fragility of the model is enhanced by the tendency of autocrats to overreach in ways that either distract from their core goals or pursue objectives like the creation of a ‘new man’ that ultimately have failed in countries like Turkey. Turkey’s Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been in power for the better part of two decades. Its success suggests that the effort to create a secular New Turk by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the visionary who carved modern Turkey out of the ruins of the Ottoman empire almost a century ago, has stumbled. Egyptian general-turned president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping have taken control and civilisationalism to new extremes by seeking not only absolute political power but also the ability to shape culture and dictate personal behaviour. Al-Sisi recently ordered his officials to dictate the themes and scripts of Egyptian soap operas, a popular regional staple, particularly during the holy month of Ramadan. A military-linked production company has taken charge of some of Egypt’s biggest and most successful shows. Film directors have been instructed to focus on shows that praise the military and law enforcement and demonize the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that has been brutally targeted by Al-Sisi as well as the UAE that together with Saudi Arabia backed his 2013 military coup. The coup toppled Mohammed Morsi, a Brother and Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president. Xi’s hopes to promote ‘core socialist values’ such as patriotism, harmony and civility amounts to an effort to counter individualism, materialism and hedonism. The campaign involves blurring piercings and jewellery worn by male pop stars during performances on television and the Internet, obliging soccer players to wear long sleeves to cover their tattoos, and ensuring that women conference hosts raise their necklines and rappers restrict their lyrics to the promotion of peace and harmony. Saudi Arabia has argued that journalist Jamal Khashoggi was killed in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul six months ago by rogue government operatives who are currently standing trial in a process that lacks transparency and has called into question the kingdom’s version of events. The overreach suggests that Middle Eastern autocrats are unlikely to respond to the protests in Algeria and Sudan any differently than they did in 2011. Analyst Giorgio Cafiero predicts that in the wake of Bouteflika’s resignation, Saudi Arabia is likely to support efforts to maintain control by what Algerians call Le Pouvoir (The Power) or the deep state, a cabal of military and security officials and business tycoons, The same is likely to be true for the UAE. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and the UAE alongside Egypt continue to back Al-Bashir although he is on the defensive after months of protests that have rocked the East African state. Whether Algeria’s ancient regime backed by Gulf states is able to retain power may well be dependent on what conclusions protesters draw from the experience of the 2011 revolts. Like the protesters then, Algerian demonstrators need to decide whether Bouteflika’s resignation is a sufficient enough success to justify the surrender of their street power and return to a structured political process. Indications are that the protesters have learnt their lesson. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Middle Eastern rivalries spilling on the battlefields

Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservatives and their Social Democrat (SPD) coalition partners have agreed a plan to strip some Germans who fight for the Islamic State militant group of their citizenship, an Interior Ministry spokeswoman said on Monday.

More than 1,000 Germans have left their country for war zones in the Middle East since 2013 and the government has been debating how to deal with them as US-backed forces are poised to take the last patch of territory from Islamic State in Syria.

About a third have returned to Germany, another third are believed to have died and the rest are believed to be still in Iraq and Syria, including some detained by Iraqi forces and US-backed fighters in Syria.

An Interior Ministry spokeswoman told a news conference that three criteria must be met to allow the government to denaturalise Germans who take up arms for the Islamist group.

Such individuals must have second citizenship and be adults. They would be stripped of their citizenship should they fight for Islamic State after the new rules come into effect.

The compromise ended a dispute over the issue between conservative Interior Minister Horst Seehofer and SPD Justice Minister Katarina Barley.

US President Donald Trump last month urged Britain, France and Germany to take back more than 800 captured Islamic State fighters and put them on trial.

Germany said it would take back fighters only if the suspects have consular access.

Britain last month revoked the citizenship of a teenager who had left London when she was aged 15 to join Islamic State in Syria.

The case of Shamima Begum highlighted the security, legal and ethical dilemmas facing European governments dealing with citizens who had sworn allegiance to a group determined to destroy the West.

Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservatives and their Social Democrat (SPD) coalition partners have agreed a plan to strip some Germans who fight for the Islamic State militant group of their citizenship, an Interior Ministry spokeswoman said on Monday.

Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservatives and their Social Democrat (SPD) coalition partners have agreed a plan to strip some Germans who fight for the Islamic State militant group of their citizenship, an Interior Ministry spokeswoman said on Monday. More than 1,000 Germans have left their country for war zones in the Middle East since 2013 and the government has been debating how to deal with them as US-backed forces are poised to take the last patch of territory from Islamic State in Syria. About a third have returned to Germany, another third are believed to have died and the rest are believed to be still in Iraq and Syria, including some detained by Iraqi forces and US-backed fighters in Syria. An Interior Ministry spokeswoman told a news conference that three criteria must be met to allow the government to denaturalise Germans who take up arms for the Islamist group. Such individuals must have second citizenship and be adults. They would be stripped of their citizenship should they fight for Islamic State after the new rules come into effect. The compromise ended a dispute over the issue between conservative Interior Minister Horst Seehofer and SPD Justice Minister Katarina Barley. US President Donald Trump last month urged Britain, France and Germany to take back more than 800 captured Islamic State fighters and put them on trial. Germany said it would take back fighters only if the suspects have consular access. Britain last month revoked the citizenship of a teenager who had left London when she was aged 15 to join Islamic State in Syria. The case of Shamima Begum highlighted the security, legal and ethical dilemmas facing European governments dealing with citizens who had sworn allegiance to a group determined to destroy the West.

Germany to strip Islamic State fighters of citizenship

US allies in the Middle East risk an uprising by their "humiliated citizens" if they continue to rely on Washington, a top Iranian security official warned Sunday in comments carried by state media.

"(US President) <a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/death-to-america-aimed-at-trump-not-american-nation-iran-leader-says-196148">Trump and even his </a><a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/death-to-america-aimed-at-trump-not-american-nation-iran-leader-says-196148">underlings</a><a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/death-to-america-aimed-at-trump-not-american-nation-iran-leader-says-196148"> ridicule and humiliate Saudi Arabia and the (United Arab) Emirates day and night</a>, saying that you're nothing without us and cannot last a day without America's support," said Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council.

Back in October, Trump said that Saudi Arabia's 83-year-old King Salman "might not be there for two weeks" without US military support. The comments were mostly shrugged off by Riyadh.

"Our prediction about America's allies in the region is that if they continue the policy of relying on Islam's enemies, they will face the uprising of their humiliated citizens," said Shamkhani, whose comments were published by the official IRNA news agency.

Iran's relations with its Gulf neighbours have soured in recent years and tensions escalated last month when the Islamic Republic accused Riyadh and Abu Dhabi of being complicit in a suicide bombing that killed 27 Iranian troops.

The Islamic Republic's Revolutionary Guards blasted the "traitorous governments of Saudi Arabia and (the) Emirates" and said Iran will no longer tolerate their "hidden support for anti-Islam thugs and Takfiri (Sunni extremist) groups."

The February 13 bombing targeted a busload of Guards in the volatile southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchistan and was claimed by Jaish al-Adl, a Pakistan-based extremist group blacklisted by Iran as terrorists.

US allies in the Middle East risk an uprising by their "humiliated citizens" if they continue to rely on Washington, a top Iranian security official warned Sunday in comments carried by state media.

US allies in the Middle East risk an uprising by their "humiliated citizens" if they continue to rely on Washington, a top Iranian security official warned Sunday in comments carried by state media. "(US President) Trump and even his underlings ridicule and humiliate Saudi Arabia and the (United Arab) Emirates day and night, saying that you're nothing without us and cannot last a day without America's support," said Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council. Back in October, Trump said that Saudi Arabia's 83-year-old King Salman "might not be there for two weeks" without US military support. The comments were mostly shrugged off by Riyadh. "Our prediction about America's allies in the region is that if they continue the policy of relying on Islam's enemies, they will face the uprising of their humiliated citizens," said Shamkhani, whose comments were published by the official IRNA news agency. Iran's relations with its Gulf neighbours have soured in recent years and tensions escalated last month when the Islamic Republic accused Riyadh and Abu Dhabi of being complicit in a suicide bombing that killed 27 Iranian troops. The Islamic Republic's Revolutionary Guards blasted the "traitorous governments of Saudi Arabia and (the) Emirates" and said Iran will no longer tolerate their "hidden support for anti-Islam thugs and Takfiri (Sunni extremist) groups." The February 13 bombing targeted a busload of Guards in the volatile southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchistan and was claimed by Jaish al-Adl, a Pakistan-based extremist group blacklisted by Iran as terrorists.

US allies in Middle East risk uprisings by 'humiliated citizens': Iran

Pope Francis held a <a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/pope-francis-makes-history-with-muslim-dialogue-in-uae-195068">historic public mass</a> for an estimated 170,000 Catholics at a stadium in the capital of the&nbsp;<a href="http://www.wionews.com/opinions/pope-visit-boosts-uae-efforts-to-redefine-concepts-of-tolerance-195001">United Arab Emirates</a>&nbsp;on Tuesday, capping the first ever papal visit to the Gulf where Islam was born.

The pontiff waved at the enthusiastic crowd carrying yellow Vatican flags and banners as he rode in an open-top Popemobile into Zayed Sports City Stadium, where an altar with a large cross was set up for the unprecedented open-air service in a country that normally restricts worship to inside churches.

The UAE borders Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam, but unlike its larger neighbour, which outlaws all non-Muslim places of worship, Abu Dhabi allows Christians among its large migrant workforce to practise their faith discreetly.

Francis, who has made outreach to Muslim communities a cornerstone of his papacy, wrapped up his historic three-day visit with the mass.

The pope's public comments in Abu Dhabi have centred on calls to&nbsp;<a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/pope-arrives-in-uae-for-historic-gulf-visit-condemns-yemen-war-194933">end wars across the Middle East</a>&nbsp;and protect the rights of all citizens. In a homily on Tuesday, he turned to the tens of thousands of migrant workers living in the Emirates.&nbsp;

"It is most certainly not easy for you to live far from home, missing the affection of your loved ones, and perhaps also feeling uncertainty about the future," the pope said. "But the Lord is faithful and does not abandon his people."

More than 135,000 &nbsp;

Pope Francis' trip has been warmly welcomed by Filipino and Indian Catholics among the UAE's huge migrant workforce. About one million Catholics live in the country, or about one in 10 of UAE residents.

Asian nationals make up some 65 per cent of the population and are crucial to all sectors in the oil-rich Gulf state, from construction to services and hotels.

The son of Italian immigrants who was raised in Argentina, Jorge Bergoglio — or Pope Francis — has paid particular attention to migrants and refugees during his papacy.

Inside the stadium on Tuesday, 50,000 Catholics with tickets to the mass cheered the pope on, with one small group hoisting a pink posterboard which read, "We the Catholics of Yemen love you".

Another 120,000 gathered outside, watching via video link on large screens.&nbsp;

Parishes across the UAE said 135,000 tickets to the pope's mass were distributed to parishioners. Some 4,000 tickets had been given to Muslims to attend the mass, according to the local churches.&nbsp;

A choir sang hymns as the pope, joined by priests of different nationalities, began the service at around 10:30 (0630 GMT), broadcast live on Emirati television.

The UAE invited the pope to visit as part of its 2019 "Year of Tolerance" which has its own designated ministry. Tolerance Minister Sheikh Nahyan bin Mubarak greeted the crowd at the stadium.&nbsp;

Yemen war&nbsp;

On Monday, the pope called for an end to wars in the turbulent Middle East, including in Yemen and Syria, at a meeting with a top sheikh and rabbi in the UAE.

All religious leaders had a "duty to reject every nuance of approval from the world war", he told the interfaith meeting.

"I am thinking in particular of Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya," he said.

Yemen is in the grip of what the UN calls the world's worst humanitarian crisis, triggered by the intervention of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and their allies in a civil war between the government and Shiite Muslim rebels.

While the pope did not openly discuss politics, he called for "the full recognition" of the rights of people across the Middle East, a potential reference to Christian minorities and communities including Shiites in Saudi Arabia, refugees, migrants and stateless peoples.

"I look forward to societies where people of different beliefs have the same right of citizenship and where only in the case of violence in any of its forms is that right removed," he said.

At their meeting, Monday, the pope and Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb, the imam of Cairo's Al-Azhar, Sunni Islam's prestigious seat of learning, signed a document on "human fraternity for world peace", hailed by the Vatican as an "important step forward in the dialogue between Christians and Muslims".

It called for "freedom of belief", the "promotion of a culture of tolerance", the "protection of places of worship" and "full citizenship" rights for minorities.

Pope Francis held a historic public mass for an estimated 170,000 Catholics at a stadium in the capital of the United Arab Emirates on Tuesday, capping the first ever papal visit to the Gulf where Islam was born.

Pope Francis held a historic public mass for an estimated 170,000 Catholics at a stadium in the capital of the United Arab Emirates on Tuesday, capping the first ever papal visit to the Gulf where Islam was born. The pontiff waved at the enthusiastic crowd carrying yellow Vatican flags and banners as he rode in an open-top Popemobile into Zayed Sports City Stadium, where an altar with a large cross was set up for the unprecedented open-air service in a country that normally restricts worship to inside churches. The UAE borders Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam, but unlike its larger neighbour, which outlaws all non-Muslim places of worship, Abu Dhabi allows Christians among its large migrant workforce to practise their faith discreetly. Francis, who has made outreach to Muslim communities a cornerstone of his papacy, wrapped up his historic three-day visit with the mass. The pope's public comments in Abu Dhabi have centred on calls to end wars across the Middle East and protect the rights of all citizens. In a homily on Tuesday, he turned to the tens of thousands of migrant workers living in the Emirates. "It is most certainly not easy for you to live far from home, missing the affection of your loved ones, and perhaps also feeling uncertainty about the future," the pope said. "But the Lord is faithful and does not abandon his people." More than 135,000 Pope Francis' trip has been warmly welcomed by Filipino and Indian Catholics among the UAE's huge migrant workforce. About one million Catholics live in the country, or about one in 10 of UAE residents. Asian nationals make up some 65 per cent of the population and are crucial to all sectors in the oil-rich Gulf state, from construction to services and hotels. The son of Italian immigrants who was raised in Argentina, Jorge Bergoglio — or Pope Francis — has paid particular attention to migrants and refugees during his papacy. Inside the stadium on Tuesday, 50,000 Catholics with tickets to the mass cheered the pope on, with one small group hoisting a pink posterboard which read, "We the Catholics of Yemen love you". Another 120,000 gathered outside, watching via video link on large screens. Parishes across the UAE said 135,000 tickets to the pope's mass were distributed to parishioners. Some 4,000 tickets had been given to Muslims to attend the mass, according to the local churches. A choir sang hymns as the pope, joined by priests of different nationalities, began the service at around 10:30 (0630 GMT), broadcast live on Emirati television. The UAE invited the pope to visit as part of its 2019 "Year of Tolerance" which has its own designated ministry. Tolerance Minister Sheikh Nahyan bin Mubarak greeted the crowd at the stadium. Yemen war On Monday, the pope called for an end to wars in the turbulent Middle East, including in Yemen and Syria, at a meeting with a top sheikh and rabbi in the UAE. All religious leaders had a "duty to reject every nuance of approval from the world war", he told the interfaith meeting. "I am thinking in particular of Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya," he said. Yemen is in the grip of what the UN calls the world's worst humanitarian crisis, triggered by the intervention of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and their allies in a civil war between the government and Shiite Muslim rebels. While the pope did not openly discuss politics, he called for "the full recognition" of the rights of people across the Middle East, a potential reference to Christian minorities and communities including Shiites in Saudi Arabia, refugees, migrants and stateless peoples. "I look forward to societies where people of different beliefs have the same right of citizenship and where only in the case of violence in any of its forms is that right removed," he said. At their meeting, Monday, the pope and Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb, the imam of Cairo's Al-Azhar, Sunni Islam's prestigious seat of learning, signed a document on "human fraternity for world peace", hailed by the Vatican as an "important step forward in the dialogue between Christians and Muslims". It called for "freedom of belief", the "promotion of a culture of tolerance", the "protection of places of worship" and "full citizenship" rights for minorities.

Francis holds first mass by pope on Arabian peninsula

Pope Francis on Monday called for <a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/venezuelas-maduro-writes-to-pope-francis-for-help-195155">an end to wars in the Middle East</a> during the first visit by the head of the Catholic church to the birthplace of Islam -- the Arabian Peninsula.

Francis, who has made outreach to Muslim communities a cornerstone of his papacy, is on a historic three-day visit to the United Arab Emirates.

He is scheduled to hold an open-air mass on Tuesday for 135,000 of the Muslim country's million Catholic residents, set to be the largest ever public gathering in the Gulf state.

On Monday, the pope held talks in Abu Dhabi with Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb -- imam of Cairo's Al-Azhar, Sunni Islam's prestigious seat of learning -- before delivering an address at an interfaith meeting.

In his address, the pontiff pushed the need for justice, equality of citizens' rights and an end to all wars, including in Yemen.

The United Arab Emirates and neighbouring Saudi Arabia are key allies of the Yemeni government, which is locked in a war against Iran-backed rebels that has pushed Yemen to the brink of famine.

The pope said all religious leaders had a "duty to reject every nuance of approval from the world war".

"I am thinking in particular of Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya," he said at the interfaith meeting attended by Sheikh Ahmed and UAE leaders.

Yemen is the scene of what the UN calls the world's worst humanitarian crisis, triggered by the intervention of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and their allies in a war between the government and Huthi rebels.

More than 10 million Yemenis now risk imminent starvation.

The UAE, which prides itself on its religious diversity in the Gulf, is also a member of the US-led coalition battling the Islamic State group in both Syria and Iraq.

Sheikh Ahmed, who stressed in a speech that religion must never be used to justify violence, and the pope signed on Monday a document that Al-Azhar and the Vatican will work together to fight extremism.

Citizenship rights&nbsp;

Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, one of the most powerful rulers in the seven emirates, on Monday gifted the pope a deed for the plot of land on which the first church in the UAE was built.

Pope Francis, in turn, gave the crown prince a framed medallion of the meeting between St. Francis Assisi -- the pope's namesake -- and the Sultan of Egypt Malek al-Kamel, in 1219.

While the pope did not openly discuss politics, he called for "the full recognition" of rights for people across the Middle East, a potential reference to communities including Shiites in Saudi Arabia, refugees and migrants, stateless peoples and other minorities.

The pontiff called for "concrete opportunities for (interfaith) meeting, not only here but in the entire beloved region, a focal point of the Middle East".

"I look forward to societies where people of different beliefs have the same right of citizenship and where only in the case of violence in any of its forms is that right removed," he said.

'Year of tolerance'&nbsp;

The UAE has dubbed 2019 it's "year of tolerance", but rights groups have criticised the country for its role in Yemen, where an estimated 10,000 people have been killed since the Saudi-led alliance including the UAE joined the government's fight against the Huthis in 2015.

Rights groups, which have slammed the UAE over its intolerance of dissent, have also urged the pope to raise the issue of Ahmed Mansoor, an Emirati activist serving a 10-year prison term.

Muslims make up nearly four-fifths of the UAE's population, but the country is also home to nearly a million Catholics, according to the Apostolic Vicariate of Southern Arabia.

Migrants from Asian countries make up about 65 per cent of the population.

The UAE has pushed itself as an open society in a conservative region. The country is home to churches, Hindu temples and a place of prayer that serves as a synagogue.

Bahrain, the only Gulf state with a Shiite majority, has been gripped by protests demanding an elected government. It has been ruled for more than two centuries by the Sunni Al-Khalifa dynasty.

Hundreds of protestors have been arrested, jailed and had their citizenship revoked over what the government says is "terrorism" linked to Iran.

Bahrain and Qatar are home to one Catholic church each while Oman, Kuwait and Yemen each have four and the UAE has eight Catholic churches.

Ultra-conservative Sunni powerhouse Saudi Arabia bans all non-Muslim places of worship.

Pope Francis on Monday called for an end to wars in the Middle East during the first visit by the head of the Catholic church to the birthplace of Islam -- the Arabian Peninsula.

Pope Francis on Monday called for an end to wars in the Middle East during the first visit by the head of the Catholic church to the birthplace of Islam -- the Arabian Peninsula. Francis, who has made outreach to Muslim communities a cornerstone of his papacy, is on a historic three-day visit to the United Arab Emirates. He is scheduled to hold an open-air mass on Tuesday for 135,000 of the Muslim country's million Catholic residents, set to be the largest ever public gathering in the Gulf state. On Monday, the pope held talks in Abu Dhabi with Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb -- imam of Cairo's Al-Azhar, Sunni Islam's prestigious seat of learning -- before delivering an address at an interfaith meeting. In his address, the pontiff pushed the need for justice, equality of citizens' rights and an end to all wars, including in Yemen. The United Arab Emirates and neighbouring Saudi Arabia are key allies of the Yemeni government, which is locked in a war against Iran-backed rebels that has pushed Yemen to the brink of famine. The pope said all religious leaders had a "duty to reject every nuance of approval from the world war". "I am thinking in particular of Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya," he said at the interfaith meeting attended by Sheikh Ahmed and UAE leaders. Yemen is the scene of what the UN calls the world's worst humanitarian crisis, triggered by the intervention of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and their allies in a war between the government and Huthi rebels. More than 10 million Yemenis now risk imminent starvation. The UAE, which prides itself on its religious diversity in the Gulf, is also a member of the US-led coalition battling the Islamic State group in both Syria and Iraq. Sheikh Ahmed, who stressed in a speech that religion must never be used to justify violence, and the pope signed on Monday a document that Al-Azhar and the Vatican will work together to fight extremism. Citizenship rights Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, one of the most powerful rulers in the seven emirates, on Monday gifted the pope a deed for the plot of land on which the first church in the UAE was built. Pope Francis, in turn, gave the crown prince a framed medallion of the meeting between St. Francis Assisi -- the pope's namesake -- and the Sultan of Egypt Malek al-Kamel, in 1219. While the pope did not openly discuss politics, he called for "the full recognition" of rights for people across the Middle East, a potential reference to communities including Shiites in Saudi Arabia, refugees and migrants, stateless peoples and other minorities. The pontiff called for "concrete opportunities for (interfaith) meeting, not only here but in the entire beloved region, a focal point of the Middle East". "I look forward to societies where people of different beliefs have the same right of citizenship and where only in the case of violence in any of its forms is that right removed," he said. 'Year of tolerance' The UAE has dubbed 2019 it's "year of tolerance", but rights groups have criticised the country for its role in Yemen, where an estimated 10,000 people have been killed since the Saudi-led alliance including the UAE joined the government's fight against the Huthis in 2015. Rights groups, which have slammed the UAE over its intolerance of dissent, have also urged the pope to raise the issue of Ahmed Mansoor, an Emirati activist serving a 10-year prison term. Muslims make up nearly four-fifths of the UAE's population, but the country is also home to nearly a million Catholics, according to the Apostolic Vicariate of Southern Arabia. Migrants from Asian countries make up about 65 per cent of the population. The UAE has pushed itself as an open society in a conservative region. The country is home to churches, Hindu temples and a place of prayer that serves as a synagogue. Bahrain, the only Gulf state with a Shiite majority, has been gripped by protests demanding an elected government. It has been ruled for more than two centuries by the Sunni Al-Khalifa dynasty. Hundreds of protestors have been arrested, jailed and had their citizenship revoked over what the government says is "terrorism" linked to Iran. Bahrain and Qatar are home to one Catholic church each while Oman, Kuwait and Yemen each have four and the UAE has eight Catholic churches. Ultra-conservative Sunni powerhouse Saudi Arabia bans all non-Muslim places of worship.

Pope Francis, on trip to Gulf, calls for end to wars in Middle East

The Euphrates emerges where the Karasu and Murat rivers merge in northeastern Turkey and flows to join the Tigris near Basra in Iraq.&nbsp;

Historically, Mesopotamia the region lying between the Euphrates and Tigris, was the heartland of the Babylonian and Assyrian empires. It is today the territory of modern-day Turkey, Syria and Iraq and the centre of a conflict that has engulfed the Middle East.&nbsp;

Where it crosses Syria, a state torn in the conflict between President Assad and a plethora of anti-regime groups, the Euphrates today marks the rough dividing line between forces backed by Iran and the United States.&nbsp;

The area to the river’s east is controlled by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) backed by the United States, while pro-regime forces backed by Iran control the western banks.&nbsp;

This unstated yet clearly demarcated balance was disturbed when President Donald Trump tweeted on December 19 about the immediate and unconditional US retreat from the area east of the Euphrates river.&nbsp;

This was not significant in terms of the numbers of troops that will be withdrawn, but of the deterrence that the US provided through air power and its commitment as the global superpower.&nbsp;

Should this deterrence be removed, the SDF whose backbone is the Kurdish Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG), would feel the pressure from multiple actors in the region, including Russia, Turkey and Iran as well as the Syrian regime that is increasingly gaining ground.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (in an opinion piece on January 7 in the New York Times) reacted to the planned withdrawal by positing Turkey as the regional alternative who could ‘get the job done’.&nbsp;

Proposing a comprehensive strategy to eliminate the root causes of extremism, President Erdogan has called for a stabilisation force featuring fighters from all parts of Syria (except those with links to terrorist organisations), adequate representation of all communities in popularly elected councils and most importantly, a willingness to shoulder the responsibility of transition to stable governance.&nbsp;

Implicit in the offer is the stipulation for the liquidation of the YPG, which is the chief US ally in Syria, but which Ankara identifies as a terrorist affiliate of the banned Turkish group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the establishment of Turkish control in the east of Euphrates, a region covering about 27 per cent of Syrian territory.&nbsp;

This is not the first time Turkey has suggested a ‘zone of influence’ as a surrogate buffer zone. Similar offers of a ‘buffer zone’, signalling its initial intentions of a serious involvement, had been made by Turkey earlier as a measure to protect refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria. What is significant this time is President Trump’s tweet giving Turkey the green signal for actually setting up a 20-mile-wide buffer zone within Syria.

The proposed buffer zone under Turkish control has been rejected by the Syrian Kurds, who have called for the deployment of UN forces along the line separating Kurdish fighters from Turkish troops.&nbsp;

Identifying Turkey as one of the parties to the ongoing dispute, senior political leader Aldar Khalil has argued that as one of the players involved, Turkey cannot guarantee stability.&nbsp;

Complicated ethnic overlaps mean that the Kurdish population in the region now live across Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq with varying levels of autonomy.&nbsp;

While Turkey has accepted northern Iraq’s autonomous status over time, the dilemma is about the future of the Syrian Kurdish areas, adjoining southeastern Turkey, and the precedence that the autonomous status of the Kurds would create for the Kurdish population in Syria and Turkey.&nbsp;

Turkey has battled domestic Kurdish insurgency for decades and has only recently begun negotiations for conciliation. It, therefore, fears the domestic consequences of the creation of a contiguous area under Kurdish control in northern Syria.&nbsp;

When the Syrian crisis started in March 2011, Syria’s Kurds adopted an ambivalent position. However, in July 2012 they took control of several cities in the north where Kurds are in a majority.&nbsp;

The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), which governs this region bordering Turkey, is affiliated to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and has clearly expressed its interest to form an autonomous zone in Syria comparable to Iraqi Kurdistan, a move Ankara opposes.&nbsp;

Turkey’s Syrian policy, in which President Erdogan had sought President Assad’s overthrow, therefore became counterproductive when it contributed to bringing Syrian Kurds into the fray.

The grandiose Turkish rhetoric faces challenges on a number of fronts. The Turkish plan outlined in the New York Times piece would test Turkish military, administrative and financial capabilities unless supported by US military commitments.&nbsp;

In that case, it would face opposition from Russia, which supports the return of the Kurdish-held regions to the Assad regime and the Astana process of which it is a part.&nbsp;

It would also affect its position in western Syria where it has made inroads into Idlib with Russian support. Syrian Kurds are reportedly in favour of allowing the Assad regime jurisdiction over their areas, rather than surrender control to the Turkish. And most significantly, the January 16 attack on a US military convoy in the northern city of Manbij has raised questions about the practicality of the withdrawal of American ground presence in Syria.&nbsp;

This was the sixth major attack by the Islamic State in less than a month and has raised questions about rhetoric centered around the ‘defeat of the Islamic State’ and reconstruction in a post-Islamic State era. Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan show that any such premature assumptions should be avoided.&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

(This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-middle-east-s-melting-pot-2710965">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

The Euphrates emerges where the Karasu and Murat rivers merge in northeastern Turkey and flows to join the Tigris near Basra in Iraq. Historically, Mesopotamia the region lying between the Euphrates and Tigris, was the heartland of the Babylonian and Assyrian empires.

The Euphrates emerges where the Karasu and Murat rivers merge in northeastern Turkey and flows to join the Tigris near Basra in Iraq. Historically, Mesopotamia the region lying between the Euphrates and Tigris, was the heartland of the Babylonian and Assyrian empires. It is today the territory of modern-day Turkey, Syria and Iraq and the centre of a conflict that has engulfed the Middle East. Where it crosses Syria, a state torn in the conflict between President Assad and a plethora of anti-regime groups, the Euphrates today marks the rough dividing line between forces backed by Iran and the United States. The area to the river’s east is controlled by the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) backed by the United States, while pro-regime forces backed by Iran control the western banks. This unstated yet clearly demarcated balance was disturbed when President Donald Trump tweeted on December 19 about the immediate and unconditional US retreat from the area east of the Euphrates river. This was not significant in terms of the numbers of troops that will be withdrawn, but of the deterrence that the US provided through air power and its commitment as the global superpower. Should this deterrence be removed, the SDF whose backbone is the Kurdish Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG), would feel the pressure from multiple actors in the region, including Russia, Turkey and Iran as well as the Syrian regime that is increasingly gaining ground. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (in an opinion piece on January 7 in the New York Times) reacted to the planned withdrawal by positing Turkey as the regional alternative who could ‘get the job done’. Proposing a comprehensive strategy to eliminate the root causes of extremism, President Erdogan has called for a stabilisation force featuring fighters from all parts of Syria (except those with links to terrorist organisations), adequate representation of all communities in popularly elected councils and most importantly, a willingness to shoulder the responsibility of transition to stable governance. Implicit in the offer is the stipulation for the liquidation of the YPG, which is the chief US ally in Syria, but which Ankara identifies as a terrorist affiliate of the banned Turkish group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the establishment of Turkish control in the east of Euphrates, a region covering about 27 per cent of Syrian territory. This is not the first time Turkey has suggested a ‘zone of influence’ as a surrogate buffer zone. Similar offers of a ‘buffer zone’, signalling its initial intentions of a serious involvement, had been made by Turkey earlier as a measure to protect refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria. What is significant this time is President Trump’s tweet giving Turkey the green signal for actually setting up a 20-mile-wide buffer zone within Syria. The proposed buffer zone under Turkish control has been rejected by the Syrian Kurds, who have called for the deployment of UN forces along the line separating Kurdish fighters from Turkish troops. Identifying Turkey as one of the parties to the ongoing dispute, senior political leader Aldar Khalil has argued that as one of the players involved, Turkey cannot guarantee stability. Complicated ethnic overlaps mean that the Kurdish population in the region now live across Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq with varying levels of autonomy. While Turkey has accepted northern Iraq’s autonomous status over time, the dilemma is about the future of the Syrian Kurdish areas, adjoining southeastern Turkey, and the precedence that the autonomous status of the Kurds would create for the Kurdish population in Syria and Turkey. Turkey has battled domestic Kurdish insurgency for decades and has only recently begun negotiations for conciliation. It, therefore, fears the domestic consequences of the creation of a contiguous area under Kurdish control in northern Syria. When the Syrian crisis started in March 2011, Syria’s Kurds adopted an ambivalent position. However, in July 2012 they took control of several cities in the north where Kurds are in a majority. The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), which governs this region bordering Turkey, is affiliated to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and has clearly expressed its interest to form an autonomous zone in Syria comparable to Iraqi Kurdistan, a move Ankara opposes. Turkey’s Syrian policy, in which President Erdogan had sought President Assad’s overthrow, therefore became counterproductive when it contributed to bringing Syrian Kurds into the fray. The grandiose Turkish rhetoric faces challenges on a number of fronts. The Turkish plan outlined in the New York Times piece would test Turkish military, administrative and financial capabilities unless supported by US military commitments. In that case, it would face opposition from Russia, which supports the return of the Kurdish-held regions to the Assad regime and the Astana process of which it is a part. It would also affect its position in western Syria where it has made inroads into Idlib with Russian support. Syrian Kurds are reportedly in favour of allowing the Assad regime jurisdiction over their areas, rather than surrender control to the Turkish. And most significantly, the January 16 attack on a US military convoy in the northern city of Manbij has raised questions about the practicality of the withdrawal of American ground presence in Syria. This was the sixth major attack by the Islamic State in less than a month and has raised questions about rhetoric centered around the ‘defeat of the Islamic State’ and reconstruction in a post-Islamic State era. Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan show that any such premature assumptions should be avoided. (This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Middle East’s melting pot

By John Feffer

Donald Trump wants to pull US troops out of Syria as quickly as possible. Well, that’s what the president wants now. Tomorrow, who knows, maybe he’ll insist that Syria pay for the pullout. Maybe Trump will decide to hold a summit with Bashar al-Assad after deciding that the Syrian leader’s not such a bad guy after all, since he also doesn’t like the Islamic State and owes his position to Russian support. Maybe Trump will team up with Turkey to build a wall around Syria because “if we stop them over there, we won’t fight them over here.”

With Trump, all options seem to be in play, and it all depends on what Fox News covers, what the last autocrat or three-star general whispered in his ear, and whether the president’s spleen is acting up or not. The opinions of his own advisors or the foreign policy commissariat seem to matter little. If anything, Trump delights in confounding the experts. After all, he believes himself to be the expert-in-chief.

Foreign policymaking in the Trump era is a lot like curling. Trump lets loose the stone and then the other members of the team start sweeping at the ice in an attempt to alter the trajectory. Sometimes Trump throws in the general direction of the target. Sometimes his aim is so errant that there’s nothing the sweepers can do.

So, after Trump tweeted his new Syria policy, National Security Adviser John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo went into action to alter its trajectory. In an attempt to placate allies aghast at Trump’s decision, Bolton put so many conditions on the pull-out as to seem to render the announcement null and void. Pompeo similarly tried to assure Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and the Gulf States that US policy remains steady: defeat the Islamic State, shut out Iran.

This cavalcade of caveats accomplished little more than to confuse allies and mystify observers. Bolton angered Recep Tayyip Erdoğan so much with his remarks about continued US support for Syrian Kurds that the Turkish president refused to meet with the national security adviser when he visited Ankara this month. A prominent pro-government newspaper decried Bolton’s “soft coup against Trump.”

Trump has subsequently changed his mind about Syria, somewhat, but it wasn’t at the behest of Bolton or Pompeo. The president was persuaded to go slow on the withdrawal when he received a briefing in Iraq from a lieutenant general who explained that the military needed more time to wrap up operations in Syria. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis had probably said the same thing to Trump. He resigned when the president ignored his advice. Mattis had disagreed one too many times with the president and thus undermined his authority. With Trump, proximity breeds contempt. 
 
Trump originally demanded that troops withdraw in 30 days. Now, the Pentagon has four months to redeploy the couple thousand troops. The rush to the exit will be more like a covert crawl. And they won’t likely be going very far. The latest reports suggest that the redeployed soldiers are heading for Iraq, to bases in Kirkuk and Anbar.

A history of ambivalence

Trump has been roundly criticised for the incoherence of his policy toward Syria. But let’s face it, Washington has never figured out how to deal with the country — its ruthless leader, its fragmented opposition, its breakaway Kurds, its covetous neighbours — since the Arab Spring protests broke out in 2011. At the very outset, the Obama administration hesitated to throw its support behind pro-democracy demonstrators and was even more ambivalent about intervening militarily when the demonstrators chose to take up arms. 
 
This was not surprising. Obama had been slow to withdraw support from Hosni Mubarak in Egypt earlier that year when crowds gathered in Tahrir Square. When civil strife broke out in Libya, Obama was equally reluctant to get involved, finally opting to “lead from behind” in the international effort to oust Muammar Gaddafi. The situation in Syria promised to be even more complicated and volatile.

Eventually, the Obama administration dipped its toe in the water with two principal programs, one run by the Pentagon, the other covertly by the CIA. The Pentagon’s program was a spectacular failure, with graduates either exiting the program to fight for radical groups the United States disdained or going on to ignominious defeat on the battlefield. This initiative ended in 2015. The CIA program, Timber Sycamore, funnelled billions of dollars of arms and equipment to fighters on the ground in Syria, thanks to Saudi financing and Turkish logistics. This program, too, encountered many difficulties. For instance, arms ended up in the hands of al-Qaeda sympathisers. The United States was also reluctant to go all in for fear of provoking Russia. In 2017, Trump cancelled the program.

Trump or no Trump, the United States faces myriad problems in Syria. Assad has consolidated his position, with the help of Russia and Iran. The Islamic State has been reduced to a beleaguered fiefdom, but religious extremism hasn’t disappeared and a pretty unsavoury group remains in control of Idlib province. The Kurds in the north have established an autonomous region, with US assistance, but the Turkish government considers them a mere extension of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) that it is fighting within its own borders.

The United States can’t expect to influence this state of play in Syria, and certainly not with only 2,000 troops. So, it makes a lot of sense to pull them out. Let the Israelis and Saudis get angry, and let the Russians, Iranians and Turks rejoice. US involvement in Syria — hesitant, misguided, quixotic — has been benighted from the beginning.

Trump recently tweeted in support of his action that the United States must “stop the endless wars.” That makes eminent sense. But don’t be fooled into thinking that Trump actually believes what he tweets. Even as he was making his withdrawal announcement, the president was directing the Pentagon to increase its air strikes on targets in Syria. 
 
More war, not less

It’s ludicrous to paint Donald Trump as a peace president. The man is only selectively anti-war. He just doesn’t like the wars that other presidents started. Trump threatened to use nuclear weapons against North Korea. He considered military options in Venezuela and discussed the potential of a coup with dissident army officers.

But it’s Iran that’s served as the focus of Trump’s most hawkish ambitions. The president hasn’t been content just to unravel the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the nuclear agreement that the Obama administration, alongside representatives of several other countries, negotiated with Iran. Nor does Trump want to stop at simply applying another round of economic sanctions against the country. In September, John Bolton asked the Pentagon for military options to strike Iran. “It definitely rattled people,” a former senior White House official said. “People were shocked. It was mind-boggling how cavalier they were about hitting Iran.”

But Trump’s confrontational approach to Iran preceded the brashness of Bolton, who has openly advocated regime change in Iran. Shortly after entering the White House, Trump began pushing for the Pentagon to blow up Iranian boats in the Persian Gulf. Mattis, who’d been fired from the Obama administration for his anti-Iranian obsession, thought the plan was ludicrous and never provided the plans Trump wanted.

Countering Iran has been an organising principle of the administration’s foreign policy, from helping the Saudis in Yemen to pressuring countries worldwide not to trade with Tehran. In his recent speech in Cairo, Secretary Pompeo made clear that even with the Syria pullout the administration remains focused on countering Iran, which “has spread its cancerous influence to Yemen, to Iraq, to Syria, and further into Lebanon.”

With Bolton and Pompeo by his side and Mattis departed, Trump may well go with his gut and attack Iran militarily. He’ll be encouraged in this delusion by Israel and Saudi Arabia. He’ll be looking for some way to distract the media and the American public from his disastrous record as president and the multiple investigations into his affairs and policies. He won’t care about the consequences. The forever war in the Middle East is far from over.

 
(John Feffer is the director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies.)

(This article was originally published on The Fair Observer. Read the <a href="https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/trump-us-withdrawal-syria-kurds-isis-middle-east-security-news-51621/">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

By John Feffer Donald Trump wants to pull US troops out of Syria as quickly as possible. Well, that’s what the president wants now. Tomorrow, who knows, maybe he’ll insist that Syria pay for the pullout.

By John Feffer Donald Trump wants to pull US troops out of Syria as quickly as possible. Well, that’s what the president wants now. Tomorrow, who knows, maybe he’ll insist that Syria pay for the pullout. Maybe Trump will decide to hold a summit with Bashar al-Assad after deciding that the Syrian leader’s not such a bad guy after all, since he also doesn’t like the Islamic State and owes his position to Russian support. Maybe Trump will team up with Turkey to build a wall around Syria because “if we stop them over there, we won’t fight them over here.” With Trump, all options seem to be in play, and it all depends on what Fox News covers, what the last autocrat or three-star general whispered in his ear, and whether the president’s spleen is acting up or not. The opinions of his own advisors or the foreign policy commissariat seem to matter little. If anything, Trump delights in confounding the experts. After all, he believes himself to be the expert-in-chief. Foreign policymaking in the Trump era is a lot like curling. Trump lets loose the stone and then the other members of the team start sweeping at the ice in an attempt to alter the trajectory. Sometimes Trump throws in the general direction of the target. Sometimes his aim is so errant that there’s nothing the sweepers can do. So, after Trump tweeted his new Syria policy, National Security Adviser John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo went into action to alter its trajectory. In an attempt to placate allies aghast at Trump’s decision, Bolton put so many conditions on the pull-out as to seem to render the announcement null and void. Pompeo similarly tried to assure Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and the Gulf States that US policy remains steady: defeat the Islamic State, shut out Iran. This cavalcade of caveats accomplished little more than to confuse allies and mystify observers. Bolton angered Recep Tayyip Erdoğan so much with his remarks about continued US support for Syrian Kurds that the Turkish president refused to meet with the national security adviser when he visited Ankara this month. A prominent pro-government newspaper decried Bolton’s “soft coup against Trump.” Trump has subsequently changed his mind about Syria, somewhat, but it wasn’t at the behest of Bolton or Pompeo. The president was persuaded to go slow on the withdrawal when he received a briefing in Iraq from a lieutenant general who explained that the military needed more time to wrap up operations in Syria. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis had probably said the same thing to Trump. He resigned when the president ignored his advice. Mattis had disagreed one too many times with the president and thus undermined his authority. With Trump, proximity breeds contempt. Trump originally demanded that troops withdraw in 30 days. Now, the Pentagon has four months to redeploy the couple thousand troops. The rush to the exit will be more like a covert crawl. And they won’t likely be going very far. The latest reports suggest that the redeployed soldiers are heading for Iraq, to bases in Kirkuk and Anbar. A history of ambivalence Trump has been roundly criticised for the incoherence of his policy toward Syria. But let’s face it, Washington has never figured out how to deal with the country — its ruthless leader, its fragmented opposition, its breakaway Kurds, its covetous neighbours — since the Arab Spring protests broke out in 2011. At the very outset, the Obama administration hesitated to throw its support behind pro-democracy demonstrators and was even more ambivalent about intervening militarily when the demonstrators chose to take up arms. This was not surprising. Obama had been slow to withdraw support from Hosni Mubarak in Egypt earlier that year when crowds gathered in Tahrir Square. When civil strife broke out in Libya, Obama was equally reluctant to get involved, finally opting to “lead from behind” in the international effort to oust Muammar Gaddafi. The situation in Syria promised to be even more complicated and volatile. Eventually, the Obama administration dipped its toe in the water with two principal programs, one run by the Pentagon, the other covertly by the CIA. The Pentagon’s program was a spectacular failure, with graduates either exiting the program to fight for radical groups the United States disdained or going on to ignominious defeat on the battlefield. This initiative ended in 2015. The CIA program, Timber Sycamore, funnelled billions of dollars of arms and equipment to fighters on the ground in Syria, thanks to Saudi financing and Turkish logistics. This program, too, encountered many difficulties. For instance, arms ended up in the hands of al-Qaeda sympathisers. The United States was also reluctant to go all in for fear of provoking Russia. In 2017, Trump cancelled the program. Trump or no Trump, the United States faces myriad problems in Syria. Assad has consolidated his position, with the help of Russia and Iran. The Islamic State has been reduced to a beleaguered fiefdom, but religious extremism hasn’t disappeared and a pretty unsavoury group remains in control of Idlib province. The Kurds in the north have established an autonomous region, with US assistance, but the Turkish government considers them a mere extension of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) that it is fighting within its own borders. The United States can’t expect to influence this state of play in Syria, and certainly not with only 2,000 troops. So, it makes a lot of sense to pull them out. Let the Israelis and Saudis get angry, and let the Russians, Iranians and Turks rejoice. US involvement in Syria — hesitant, misguided, quixotic — has been benighted from the beginning. Trump recently tweeted in support of his action that the United States must “stop the endless wars.” That makes eminent sense. But don’t be fooled into thinking that Trump actually believes what he tweets. Even as he was making his withdrawal announcement, the president was directing the Pentagon to increase its air strikes on targets in Syria. More war, not less It’s ludicrous to paint Donald Trump as a peace president. The man is only selectively anti-war. He just doesn’t like the wars that other presidents started. Trump threatened to use nuclear weapons against North Korea. He considered military options in Venezuela and discussed the potential of a coup with dissident army officers. But it’s Iran that’s served as the focus of Trump’s most hawkish ambitions. The president hasn’t been content just to unravel the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the nuclear agreement that the Obama administration, alongside representatives of several other countries, negotiated with Iran. Nor does Trump want to stop at simply applying another round of economic sanctions against the country. In September, John Bolton asked the Pentagon for military options to strike Iran. “It definitely rattled people,” a former senior White House official said. “People were shocked. It was mind-boggling how cavalier they were about hitting Iran.” But Trump’s confrontational approach to Iran preceded the brashness of Bolton, who has openly advocated regime change in Iran. Shortly after entering the White House, Trump began pushing for the Pentagon to blow up Iranian boats in the Persian Gulf. Mattis, who’d been fired from the Obama administration for his anti-Iranian obsession, thought the plan was ludicrous and never provided the plans Trump wanted. Countering Iran has been an organising principle of the administration’s foreign policy, from helping the Saudis in Yemen to pressuring countries worldwide not to trade with Tehran. In his recent speech in Cairo, Secretary Pompeo made clear that even with the Syria pullout the administration remains focused on countering Iran, which “has spread its cancerous influence to Yemen, to Iraq, to Syria, and further into Lebanon.” With Bolton and Pompeo by his side and Mattis departed, Trump may well go with his gut and attack Iran militarily. He’ll be encouraged in this delusion by Israel and Saudi Arabia. He’ll be looking for some way to distract the media and the American public from his disastrous record as president and the multiple investigations into his affairs and policies. He won’t care about the consequences. The forever war in the Middle East is far from over. (John Feffer is the director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies.) (This article was originally published on The Fair Observer. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

The forever war in the Middle East is far from over

Noting the recent attack by the Islamic State (ISIS) in northern Syria that <a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/four-us-troops-reported-among-16-dead-in-north-syria-attack-190816">claimed 16 lives</a>, French President Emmanuel Macron on Thursday said that Paris would continue to remain "militarily engaged" in the Middle East region throughout the entire year.

At a time when the <a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/how-trump-slowed-rush-for-syria-exits-after-huddling-in-iraq-190676">US is getting ready to withdraw its troops from Syria</a>, Macron underlined that France would retain its military forces in Syria and Iraq, Anadolu News Agency reported.

"The announced withdrawal of our American ally should not deflect us from our strategic objective to eradicate Daesh," Macron said while referring ISIS to its Arabic name.

On Wednesday, 16 people, including two US service members and two American civilians were killed in a suicide attack in Manbij in northern Syria.&nbsp; 
The ISIS later claimed responsibility for the attack.

Last December, Trump had announced that the US would withdraw around 2,000 troops from Syria, asserting that its forces had "fully destroyed" the ISIS.&nbsp; 
This decision created a rift between him and the US military.

Earlier this week, an administration official told CNN that the first US <a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/will-keep-military-forces-in-syria-despite-israeli-threats-says-iran-190763">military </a>ground equipment has been withdrawn from the war-torn country.&nbsp;

Noting the recent attack by the Islamic State (ISIS) in northern Syria that claimed 16 lives, French President Emmanuel Macron on Thursday said that Paris would continue to remain "militarily engaged" in the Middle East region throughout the entire year.

Noting the recent attack by the Islamic State (ISIS) in northern Syria that claimed 16 lives, French President Emmanuel Macron on Thursday said that Paris would continue to remain "militarily engaged" in the Middle East region throughout the entire year. At a time when the US is getting ready to withdraw its troops from Syria, Macron underlined that France would retain its military forces in Syria and Iraq, Anadolu News Agency reported. "The announced withdrawal of our American ally should not deflect us from our strategic objective to eradicate Daesh," Macron said while referring ISIS to its Arabic name. On Wednesday, 16 people, including two US service members and two American civilians were killed in a suicide attack in Manbij in northern Syria. The ISIS later claimed responsibility for the attack. Last December, Trump had announced that the US would withdraw around 2,000 troops from Syria, asserting that its forces had "fully destroyed" the ISIS. This decision created a rift between him and the US military. Earlier this week, an administration official told CNN that the first US military ground equipment has been withdrawn from the war-torn country.

France to remain 'militarily engaged' in Middle East: President Emmanuel Macron

<a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/pompeo-hopes-for-imminent-end-to-us-government-shutdown-190082">US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo</a> faced a tough balancing act Monday as he pressed Saudi Arabia's crown prince <a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/saudi-arabia-must-hold-khashoggis-killers-accountable-uss-pompeo-190073">over critic Jamal Khashoggi's murder</a> while seeking to shore up strategic ties with Riyadh.

The top US diplomat, on an extensive Middle East tour, held talks with King Salman and his son Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who faces international opprobrium over the journalist's murder inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

Pompeo walked a diplomatic tightrope on his second politically sensitive visit to Saudi Arabia since the grisly killing, amid pressure from American lawmakers for a tough response.

The king and crown prince "both acknowledge that this accountability needs to take place", Pompeo said in Riyadh following talks with the two men.

"They reiterated their commitment," he added.

Khashoggi, a Washington Post contributor, was murdered on October 2 in what Saudi Arabia called a "rogue" operation, tipping the kingdom into one of its worst diplomatic crises and subsequently straining ties between Riyadh and Washington.

Pompeo was pushing for Saudi Arabia to "ascertain facts, assess information, and hold those responsible accountable" for the murder, the State Department said Sunday.

US President Donald Trump has brushed aside international outrage — and calls for an independent probe — to stand by Prince Mohammed over the murder of Khashoggi, whose corpse was dismembered at the consulate.

His support has come despite the US Central Intelligence Agency's reported conclusion that Prince Mohammed very likely ordered the murder. A bipartisan resolution approved by the US Senate last month also held the crown prince responsible for the killing.

Riyadh prosecutors have announced indictments against 11 people and are seeking the death penalty against five of them. But they have exonerated Prince Mohammed, whose right-hand aides were allegedly involved in the murder.

Yemen truce&nbsp;

Khashoggi's murder has cast a renewed spotlight on Saudi Arabia's US-backed military campaign against Huthi rebels in Yemen, gripped by what the UN calls the world's worst humanitarian crisis.

Backing the Saudi position, Pompeo accused the rebels of failing to comply with a truce agreement for the lifeline port city of Hodeida reached last month at UN-sponsored talks in Sweden.

"The work that was done in Sweden on Yemen was good, but both sides (need) to honour those commitments," Pompeo said.

"Today, the Iranian-backed Huthis have chosen not to do that."

On a previous visit to Riyadh at the height of the Khashoggi affair, Pompeo's broad smiles with the crown prince outraged some Americans.

However, Trump has said Washington wants to preserve the alliance with the oil-rich kingdom, which he sees as a bulwark against common foe Iran and a lucrative buyer of US arms.

Rights groups called on Pompeo to also press Prince Mohammed over the jailing of women activists in the kingdom, amid claims that some of them faced sexual harassment and torture during interrogation.

"I am struck by what is not included in Pompeo's itinerary: the brave women activists of Saudi Arabia, who are being held in the kingdom's prisons for seeking rights and dignity," Alia al-Hathloul wrote in The New York Times Sunday.

Hathloul's sister, Loujain, is among more than a dozen activists arrested last May — just before the historic lifting of Saudi Arabia's decades-long ban on women drivers.

Pompeo on Monday said that he discussed human rights issues with the Saudis, including the plight of women activists, without giving any details.

Gulf crisis&nbsp;

Pompeo was in Riyadh as part of an extensive week-long trip to the Middle East, which included stops in Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Manama, Abu Dhabi, and Doha.

He was earlier scheduled to end his tour with a stopover in Kuwait. But he will be cutting short his tour and returning home early to attend a family funeral after he visits Muscat later Monday, the State Department said.

Pompeo met Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani Sunday during his visit to Doha, where he refused to comment on reports Washington had recently considered military action against Tehran.

He also called on Qatar and other Gulf Arab countries to end their worst political rift in years, which has seen Doha diplomatically and economically isolated by neighbouring former allies for the past 19 months.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt — all US allies— cut ties with Qatar in June 2017, accusing it of supporting terrorist groups and seeking closer ties to Saudi arch-rival Iran.

Qatar — also a US ally — denies the allegations and accuses the countries of seeking regime change.

"As for the GCC... we are all more powerful when we're working together when we have common challenges in the region and around the world," Pompeo said, referring to the six member nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

He added that "President Trump and I both believe the ongoing dispute in the region has gone on too long".

Mediation efforts by the United States, which at first appeared to back the boycott of Qatar, have stalled, as highlighted by the recent resignation of US envoy Anthony Zinni.

For Washington, turning the page on the crisis is essential for the successful launch of the Strategic Alliance of the Middle East (MESA), a NATO-style security pact that includes Gulf countries as well as Egypt and Jordan.

The top US diplomat, on an extensive Middle East tour, held talks with King Salman and his son Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who faces international opprobrium over the journalist's murder inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo faced a tough balancing act Monday as he pressed Saudi Arabia's crown prince over critic Jamal Khashoggi's murder while seeking to shore up strategic ties with Riyadh. The top US diplomat, on an extensive Middle East tour, held talks with King Salman and his son Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who faces international opprobrium over the journalist's murder inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Pompeo walked a diplomatic tightrope on his second politically sensitive visit to Saudi Arabia since the grisly killing, amid pressure from American lawmakers for a tough response. The king and crown prince "both acknowledge that this accountability needs to take place", Pompeo said in Riyadh following talks with the two men. "They reiterated their commitment," he added. Khashoggi, a Washington Post contributor, was murdered on October 2 in what Saudi Arabia called a "rogue" operation, tipping the kingdom into one of its worst diplomatic crises and subsequently straining ties between Riyadh and Washington. Pompeo was pushing for Saudi Arabia to "ascertain facts, assess information, and hold those responsible accountable" for the murder, the State Department said Sunday. US President Donald Trump has brushed aside international outrage — and calls for an independent probe — to stand by Prince Mohammed over the murder of Khashoggi, whose corpse was dismembered at the consulate. His support has come despite the US Central Intelligence Agency's reported conclusion that Prince Mohammed very likely ordered the murder. A bipartisan resolution approved by the US Senate last month also held the crown prince responsible for the killing. Riyadh prosecutors have announced indictments against 11 people and are seeking the death penalty against five of them. But they have exonerated Prince Mohammed, whose right-hand aides were allegedly involved in the murder. Yemen truce Khashoggi's murder has cast a renewed spotlight on Saudi Arabia's US-backed military campaign against Huthi rebels in Yemen, gripped by what the UN calls the world's worst humanitarian crisis. Backing the Saudi position, Pompeo accused the rebels of failing to comply with a truce agreement for the lifeline port city of Hodeida reached last month at UN-sponsored talks in Sweden. "The work that was done in Sweden on Yemen was good, but both sides (need) to honour those commitments," Pompeo said. "Today, the Iranian-backed Huthis have chosen not to do that." On a previous visit to Riyadh at the height of the Khashoggi affair, Pompeo's broad smiles with the crown prince outraged some Americans. However, Trump has said Washington wants to preserve the alliance with the oil-rich kingdom, which he sees as a bulwark against common foe Iran and a lucrative buyer of US arms. Rights groups called on Pompeo to also press Prince Mohammed over the jailing of women activists in the kingdom, amid claims that some of them faced sexual harassment and torture during interrogation. "I am struck by what is not included in Pompeo's itinerary: the brave women activists of Saudi Arabia, who are being held in the kingdom's prisons for seeking rights and dignity," Alia al-Hathloul wrote in The New York Times Sunday. Hathloul's sister, Loujain, is among more than a dozen activists arrested last May — just before the historic lifting of Saudi Arabia's decades-long ban on women drivers. Pompeo on Monday said that he discussed human rights issues with the Saudis, including the plight of women activists, without giving any details. Gulf crisis Pompeo was in Riyadh as part of an extensive week-long trip to the Middle East, which included stops in Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Manama, Abu Dhabi, and Doha. He was earlier scheduled to end his tour with a stopover in Kuwait. But he will be cutting short his tour and returning home early to attend a family funeral after he visits Muscat later Monday, the State Department said. Pompeo met Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani Sunday during his visit to Doha, where he refused to comment on reports Washington had recently considered military action against Tehran. He also called on Qatar and other Gulf Arab countries to end their worst political rift in years, which has seen Doha diplomatically and economically isolated by neighbouring former allies for the past 19 months. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt — all US allies— cut ties with Qatar in June 2017, accusing it of supporting terrorist groups and seeking closer ties to Saudi arch-rival Iran. Qatar — also a US ally — denies the allegations and accuses the countries of seeking regime change. "As for the GCC... we are all more powerful when we're working together when we have common challenges in the region and around the world," Pompeo said, referring to the six member nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council. He added that "President Trump and I both believe the ongoing dispute in the region has gone on too long". Mediation efforts by the United States, which at first appeared to back the boycott of Qatar, have stalled, as highlighted by the recent resignation of US envoy Anthony Zinni. For Washington, turning the page on the crisis is essential for the successful launch of the Strategic Alliance of the Middle East (MESA), a NATO-style security pact that includes Gulf countries as well as Egypt and Jordan.

Mike Pompeo on diplomatic tightrope in Saudi talks over Khashoggi murder

The shifting constellations of power and politics in the Middle East conform and correspond to the adage that, “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. This is perhaps best reflected in Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu’s, assertion that “Israel is Arabs’ best ally against Iran”. That this statement is an egregious and an outrageous lie is to state the obvious but the realm of international relations and geopolitics is defined by surprise, even of the outrageous variety. &nbsp; 
&nbsp; 
Stripped of accretions, Israel which has always claimed to be a “western outpost” in a “sea of oriental despotism” has defined itself against Arab Muslims and the post-colonial states that constitute the Middle East’s firmament. In fact, the wars between Israel and these states have often been referred to as the “Arab Israeli wars. What then explains Netanyahu’s assertions? Do these constitute a change in heart in the nature of a fundamental departure from the past? And, does this, in turn, mean that the Middle East is on the cusp of far-reaching change and peace?

No. 
&nbsp; 
The Middle East is more fluid and, to some degree, more anarchic than before. The real reasons that account for the Israeli Prime Minister’s assertions pertaining to the evolving dynamics, permutations, combinations and configurations in the region.

The most important of these is the prominence and salience of the sectarian conflicts (or schisms). The reference here is to the Shia Sunni divide which has emerged as the major fault line that divides the Middle East. In the schemata of this divide, the major protagonists or players are Saudi Arabia and Iran and the attendant rivalry, in its modern avatar has taken the clash or battle for hegemony in the region. 
&nbsp; 
Post the second Gulf War, Iran’s influence and clout in the Middle East grew substantially. Be it Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or even Yemen, Iran asserted itself and attempted to morph into a pole of power and influence. Its alleged quest for nukes was perhaps an attempt to amplify its power and develop a security paradigm for state and regime survival. The name of the game for the country appeared to have been to be a hegemon in the region.

But, this quest would naturally rile the Saudis who have their own fears and goals. However, it was and is Israel that feared Iran’s rise the most. If the balance of power would shift to Iran in the Middle East, then the country would have to contend with Iran’s power and influence, and perhaps even have to deal with its dispute with the Palestinians in a different and a novel combination. 
&nbsp; 
Against this backdrop, the “natural” reflex of Israel would be to undercut and undermine Iran. Here, Trump came to the rescue of the country by putting Iran in the crosshairs of the United States.

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<h5>The Israeli Prime Minister (plagued by corruption scandals), has no love lost for the Arabs but is piggybacking on the elemental and fundamental faultline of Shia Sunni antagonisms and the age-old divide thereof, all of which correspond to sheer raison d’etat and not a change of heart or new found love for the Arabs.</h5>
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The overall thrust of Trump’s strategy appears to have been to put intense pressure on Iran to the extent of “regime change”. In this, primarily because of the Shia Sunni divide and the attendant clash of hegemonies in the Middle East, the Arab states rallied around the United States and even appear to have made implicit or tacit overtures to Israel. 
&nbsp; 
It is here that Netanyahu’s remarks assume significance. 
&nbsp; 
The Israeli Prime Minister (plagued by corruption scandals), has no love lost for the Arabs but is piggybacking on the elemental and fundamental faultline of Shia Sunni antagonisms and the age-old divide thereof, all of which correspond to sheer raison d’etat and not a change of heart or new found love for the Arabs. 
&nbsp; 
But, the sands of geopolitics are shifting in the Middle East. Against these changes, as ephemeral they might be, what can be said about peace in the region? 
&nbsp; 
The answer is bleak and takes us into the domain of domestic politics in the United States and Israel. As Trump becomes more isolated in the United States and as his visceral reflexes crowd out rationality, he might take recourse to extreme measures.

One such kind would be to attack Iran toward the tether end of his presidency. This would gel with Netanyahu’s insecurities in the wake of corruption charges against him and the permutations and combinations of Israeli politics. What might ensue is a “meeting of minds” between Trump and Netanyahu which might make war against Iran almost imminent.

The sad denouement of all this would be an even more unstable and anarchic the Middle East which, in the final analysis, and obviously would not amplify but actually decrease security for all. This, more than anything, else could be the legacy that Trump and Netanyahu will bequeath upon the region.

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

The shifting constellations of power and politics in the Middle East conform and correspond to the adage that, “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. This is perhaps best reflected in Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu’s, assertion that “Israel is Arabs’ best ally against Iran”.

The shifting constellations of power and politics in the Middle East conform and correspond to the adage that, “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. This is perhaps best reflected in Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu’s, assertion that “Israel is Arabs’ best ally against Iran”. That this statement is an egregious and an outrageous lie is to state the obvious but the realm of international relations and geopolitics is defined by surprise, even of the outrageous variety. Stripped of accretions, Israel which has always claimed to be a “western outpost” in a “sea of oriental despotism” has defined itself against Arab Muslims and the post-colonial states that constitute the Middle East’s firmament. In fact, the wars between Israel and these states have often been referred to as the “Arab Israeli wars. What then explains Netanyahu’s assertions? Do these constitute a change in heart in the nature of a fundamental departure from the past? And, does this, in turn, mean that the Middle East is on the cusp of far-reaching change and peace? No. The Middle East is more fluid and, to some degree, more anarchic than before. The real reasons that account for the Israeli Prime Minister’s assertions pertaining to the evolving dynamics, permutations, combinations and configurations in the region. The most important of these is the prominence and salience of the sectarian conflicts (or schisms). The reference here is to the Shia Sunni divide which has emerged as the major fault line that divides the Middle East. In the schemata of this divide, the major protagonists or players are Saudi Arabia and Iran and the attendant rivalry, in its modern avatar has taken the clash or battle for hegemony in the region. Post the second Gulf War, Iran’s influence and clout in the Middle East grew substantially. Be it Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or even Yemen, Iran asserted itself and attempted to morph into a pole of power and influence. Its alleged quest for nukes was perhaps an attempt to amplify its power and develop a security paradigm for state and regime survival. The name of the game for the country appeared to have been to be a hegemon in the region. But, this quest would naturally rile the Saudis who have their own fears and goals. However, it was and is Israel that feared Iran’s rise the most. If the balance of power would shift to Iran in the Middle East, then the country would have to contend with Iran’s power and influence, and perhaps even have to deal with its dispute with the Palestinians in a different and a novel combination. Against this backdrop, the “natural” reflex of Israel would be to undercut and undermine Iran. Here, Trump came to the rescue of the country by putting Iran in the crosshairs of the United States. The Israeli Prime Minister (plagued by corruption scandals), has no love lost for the Arabs but is piggybacking on the elemental and fundamental faultline of Shia Sunni antagonisms and the age-old divide thereof, all of which correspond to sheer raison d’etat and not a change of heart or new found love for the Arabs. × The overall thrust of Trump’s strategy appears to have been to put intense pressure on Iran to the extent of “regime change”. In this, primarily because of the Shia Sunni divide and the attendant clash of hegemonies in the Middle East, the Arab states rallied around the United States and even appear to have made implicit or tacit overtures to Israel. It is here that Netanyahu’s remarks assume significance. The Israeli Prime Minister (plagued by corruption scandals), has no love lost for the Arabs but is piggybacking on the elemental and fundamental faultline of Shia Sunni antagonisms and the age-old divide thereof, all of which correspond to sheer raison d’etat and not a change of heart or new found love for the Arabs. But, the sands of geopolitics are shifting in the Middle East. Against these changes, as ephemeral they might be, what can be said about peace in the region? The answer is bleak and takes us into the domain of domestic politics in the United States and Israel. As Trump becomes more isolated in the United States and as his visceral reflexes crowd out rationality, he might take recourse to extreme measures. One such kind would be to attack Iran toward the tether end of his presidency. This would gel with Netanyahu’s insecurities in the wake of corruption charges against him and the permutations and combinations of Israeli politics. What might ensue is a “meeting of minds” between Trump and Netanyahu which might make war against Iran almost imminent. The sad denouement of all this would be an even more unstable and anarchic the Middle East which, in the final analysis, and obviously would not amplify but actually decrease security for all. This, more than anything, else could be the legacy that Trump and Netanyahu will bequeath upon the region. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

The Middle East is on the cusp of deep uncertainty, volatility and insecurity

As far as Gulf leaders are concerned, President Donald J Trump demonstrated with his announced US troop withdrawals from Syria and Afghanistan that his insistence that the “world is a dangerous place” has never been truer.

The troop withdrawals coupled with Trump’s praising of Saudi Arabia’s alleged willingness to foot the reconstruction bill in Syria emphasised his lack of geopolitical interest in the Middle East.

If former US president Barak Obama’s seeming unwillingness to wholeheartedly support embattled Arab leaders during the 2011 Arab popular revolts that toppled the heads of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, was at the root of at times reckless greater assertiveness displayed since then by the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Trump’s moves literally threaten to leave them hanging in the air.

A similar conclusion can be drawn for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who appears to have successfully persuaded Trump to postpone publication of his Israeli-Palestinian peace plan until after Israel’s April 9 early elections because it portends to be less favourable to Israel than expected.

Despite Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the plan reportedly sees the city as the capital of both the Jewish and a Palestinian state.

The troop withdrawals and the peace plan confirm Middle Eastern leaders’, particularly those in the Gulf, worst fears: they are left without a reliable ally that will unconditionally protect their interests and they have no one to turn to who could fully replace the United States as their unquestioned protector.

The resignation of US defence secretary Jim Mattis deepens the crisis for Gulf leaders. “Mattis’ departure means the loss of a key interlocutor at the Department of Defense, the Cabinet-level agency with which the Gulf countries deal most. It also means losing a senior figure who views Middle Eastern strategic realities in terms very similar to their own. The fact that Mattis resigned over policy disagreements with the president does not bode well for future trends in Washington from a Gulf Arab perspective,” said Middle East scholar Hussein Ibish.

Trump has proven to be unreliable. His granting of waivers to Iran’s major oil buyers as well as for Indian investment in the Iranian port of Chabahar, viewed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE as a threat to their geopolitical and economic interests, was the writing on the wall despite the harsh sanctions imposed on Iran by the president. Syria and Afghanistan cement the fact that Trump is both unpredictable and unreliable.

The world’s other three major powers, Europe, Russia and China, have at best aspects of what the United States has to offer but lack the ability and/or interest to fully replace the United States as the Gulf leaders’ protector in the way that Trump seemed to do at the outset of his presidency.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE already have fundamental differences over Iran with the three powers who oppose US sanctions and want to salvage the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic republic’s nuclear program. Similarly, the three world powers have refused to back the 18-month old Saudi-UAE-led economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar and call for a speedy resolution of the crisis.

Russia, moreover, is keen to sell weaponry to the Gulf, who are among the world’s biggest buyers, exploit vacuums created by US policy, and capitalise as a non-OPEC producer in enabling Gulf efforts to manipulate production and world oil prices but is not eager to inherit the US defence umbrella for the region.

Said Russia and energy expert Li-Chen Sim: “The Gulf is not a key focus of Russian foreign policy… I don’t see the Russians taking any advantage of the problems between the Saudis and the Americans to play a larger security role.” Sim was referring to US Congressional blaming of Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman for the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and condemnation of Saudi conduct of the war in Yemen.

By the same token, China has neither the ability nor the appetite to replace the United States in the Gulf. On the contrary, China has preferred to benefit from US regional protection, prompting US assertions that the Chinese were free-riders. As is evident across Eurasia in projects related to China’s infrastructure and energy-driven Belt and Road initiative, Chinese support does not come without strings. The same is true for Europe.

China’s brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims that is expanding to other Muslim groups in the country, moreover, represents a potential black swan in China-Gulf relations.

The impact of Saudi and UAE uncertainty with no one world power available to cater to all their needs is reflected in apparent efforts to rebuild bridges with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad whose ouster they sought for much of the Syrian civil war.

A recent visit to Damascus by embattled Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, the first by an Arab leader since the civil war erupted in 2011, was widely seen as the beginning of a thaw in Syrian-Arab relations.

Ali Mamlouk, the head of Syrian air force intelligence and a close associate of Al-Assad, met in Cairo days later with Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel.

The UAE is, according to unconfirmed reports, refurbishing its embassy in Damascus that has been empty since Gulf states broke off relations with Syria early on in the civil war.

Adding to Gulf leaders’ uncertainty, Trump left many guessing when he this week thanked Saudi Arabia on Twitter for agreeing to “to spend the necessary money needed to help rebuild Syria, instead of the United States.”

With Saudi Arabia refraining from comment, it was not clear what Trump was referring to. Saudi Arabia transferred in October in the immediate wake of the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi $100 million to the US to help stabilise parts of Syria.

The vacuum created by Trump risks fuelling greater Gulf assertiveness with potentially messy consequences.

A close associate of Tunisian president Beji Caid Essebsi asserted earlier this year that the UAE had offered Tunisia financial assistance if Essebsi followed the example of Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, who imposed a brutal autocracy after staging in 2013 a military coup to topple Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s only democratically elected president.&nbsp;

Saudi Arabia this month pledged $830 million in aid for Tunisia following Prince Mohammed’s controversial visit last month as part of a tour designed to demonstrate that his position remained strong despite Khashoggi’s killing.

Trump described the world as a dangerous place in shrugging off allegations that Prince Mohammed may have been responsible for the killing of Jamal Khashoggi. Gulf leaders are likely to share that perception in response to the president’s seeming unwillingness to fully take their interests into account.

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

As far as Gulf leaders are concerned, President Donald J Trump demonstrated with his announced US troop withdrawals from Syria and Afghanistan that his insistence that the “world is a dangerous place” has never been truer.

As far as Gulf leaders are concerned, President Donald J Trump demonstrated with his announced US troop withdrawals from Syria and Afghanistan that his insistence that the “world is a dangerous place” has never been truer. The troop withdrawals coupled with Trump’s praising of Saudi Arabia’s alleged willingness to foot the reconstruction bill in Syria emphasised his lack of geopolitical interest in the Middle East. If former US president Barak Obama’s seeming unwillingness to wholeheartedly support embattled Arab leaders during the 2011 Arab popular revolts that toppled the heads of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, was at the root of at times reckless greater assertiveness displayed since then by the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Trump’s moves literally threaten to leave them hanging in the air. A similar conclusion can be drawn for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who appears to have successfully persuaded Trump to postpone publication of his Israeli-Palestinian peace plan until after Israel’s April 9 early elections because it portends to be less favourable to Israel than expected. Despite Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the plan reportedly sees the city as the capital of both the Jewish and a Palestinian state. The troop withdrawals and the peace plan confirm Middle Eastern leaders’, particularly those in the Gulf, worst fears: they are left without a reliable ally that will unconditionally protect their interests and they have no one to turn to who could fully replace the United States as their unquestioned protector. The resignation of US defence secretary Jim Mattis deepens the crisis for Gulf leaders. “Mattis’ departure means the loss of a key interlocutor at the Department of Defense, the Cabinet-level agency with which the Gulf countries deal most. It also means losing a senior figure who views Middle Eastern strategic realities in terms very similar to their own. The fact that Mattis resigned over policy disagreements with the president does not bode well for future trends in Washington from a Gulf Arab perspective,” said Middle East scholar Hussein Ibish. Trump has proven to be unreliable. His granting of waivers to Iran’s major oil buyers as well as for Indian investment in the Iranian port of Chabahar, viewed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE as a threat to their geopolitical and economic interests, was the writing on the wall despite the harsh sanctions imposed on Iran by the president. Syria and Afghanistan cement the fact that Trump is both unpredictable and unreliable. The world’s other three major powers, Europe, Russia and China, have at best aspects of what the United States has to offer but lack the ability and/or interest to fully replace the United States as the Gulf leaders’ protector in the way that Trump seemed to do at the outset of his presidency. Saudi Arabia and the UAE already have fundamental differences over Iran with the three powers who oppose US sanctions and want to salvage the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic republic’s nuclear program. Similarly, the three world powers have refused to back the 18-month old Saudi-UAE-led economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar and call for a speedy resolution of the crisis. Russia, moreover, is keen to sell weaponry to the Gulf, who are among the world’s biggest buyers, exploit vacuums created by US policy, and capitalise as a non-OPEC producer in enabling Gulf efforts to manipulate production and world oil prices but is not eager to inherit the US defence umbrella for the region. Said Russia and energy expert Li-Chen Sim: “The Gulf is not a key focus of Russian foreign policy… I don’t see the Russians taking any advantage of the problems between the Saudis and the Americans to play a larger security role.” Sim was referring to US Congressional blaming of Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman for the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and condemnation of Saudi conduct of the war in Yemen. By the same token, China has neither the ability nor the appetite to replace the United States in the Gulf. On the contrary, China has preferred to benefit from US regional protection, prompting US assertions that the Chinese were free-riders. As is evident across Eurasia in projects related to China’s infrastructure and energy-driven Belt and Road initiative, Chinese support does not come without strings. The same is true for Europe. China’s brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims that is expanding to other Muslim groups in the country, moreover, represents a potential black swan in China-Gulf relations. The impact of Saudi and UAE uncertainty with no one world power available to cater to all their needs is reflected in apparent efforts to rebuild bridges with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad whose ouster they sought for much of the Syrian civil war. A recent visit to Damascus by embattled Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, the first by an Arab leader since the civil war erupted in 2011, was widely seen as the beginning of a thaw in Syrian-Arab relations. Ali Mamlouk, the head of Syrian air force intelligence and a close associate of Al-Assad, met in Cairo days later with Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel. The UAE is, according to unconfirmed reports, refurbishing its embassy in Damascus that has been empty since Gulf states broke off relations with Syria early on in the civil war. Adding to Gulf leaders’ uncertainty, Trump left many guessing when he this week thanked Saudi Arabia on Twitter for agreeing to “to spend the necessary money needed to help rebuild Syria, instead of the United States.” With Saudi Arabia refraining from comment, it was not clear what Trump was referring to. Saudi Arabia transferred in October in the immediate wake of the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi $100 million to the US to help stabilise parts of Syria. The vacuum created by Trump risks fuelling greater Gulf assertiveness with potentially messy consequences. A close associate of Tunisian president Beji Caid Essebsi asserted earlier this year that the UAE had offered Tunisia financial assistance if Essebsi followed the example of Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, who imposed a brutal autocracy after staging in 2013 a military coup to topple Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s only democratically elected president. Saudi Arabia this month pledged $830 million in aid for Tunisia following Prince Mohammed’s controversial visit last month as part of a tour designed to demonstrate that his position remained strong despite Khashoggi’s killing. Trump described the world as a dangerous place in shrugging off allegations that Prince Mohammed may have been responsible for the killing of Jamal Khashoggi. Gulf leaders are likely to share that perception in response to the president’s seeming unwillingness to fully take their interests into account. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

US withdrawal of troops: Middle Eastern leaders left without a reliable ally

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