'Wife of ISIS leader Baghdadi captured by Turkey' says Erdogan. Watch video to know more.

'Wife of ISIS leader Baghdadi captured by Turkey' says Erdogan

Considerable attention has been paid to the Turkish invasion of Syria that took place in the first week of October. While Turkey entered into a ceasefire in a separate agreement with the USA, as well as, Russia since October 15-16, there remain serious international concerns about de-stabilisation of the already war-torn region and its implication for giving a flip to international terrorism. 
 
However, not much analysis has come out with regards to its security implications for India, which has the third-largest Muslim population in the world.&nbsp;

An analysis of the security implication of the Turkish invasion of Syria for India requires an understanding of the Turkish motives behind this illegal invasion. The fact that Turkish invasion took place on the eve of ‘official declaration of defeat of ISIS’ and withdrawal of American troops from Syria on the pretext of fighting YPG, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, which played crucial role in the defeat of ISIS speaks volume about the mal-intentions of the Erdogan regime: (A) Erdogan’s grip over his countrymen is declining as evident from the loss of Istanbul mayor election in view of rising economic&nbsp;crisis, as well as, growing level of sectarian conflict within the country. This invasion was meant to divert people’s attention from this internal mess; B) This invasion is linked with his personal ambition to showcase himself as emerging Caliph of the Muslim world; C) The Erdogan regime derives its strength from the ‘politics of blackmailing’; A perennial destabilised Syria with a potential to ‘export refugee’ allows the Erdogan regime to bargain with Europe in particular and the West in general, (D) To bring a demographic change by transferring the millions of Syrian refugees, who are living inside Turkey, into the autonomous Kurdish region along the Syrian-Turkish border so that the issue of Kurdistan ceased to pose a threat to Turkish territorial integrity. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;

In the light of the above motives, the Turkish invasion of Syrian territory raises the following security implications for India : (A) By all account, the invasion led to freeing up the jailed ISIS terrorists, which were being controlled by YPG Kurdish forces ; the freeing of ISIS terrorists has serious implication for coordinating the global terrorist activities, particularly in the AfPak area which runs into the troubled Kashmir; (B) Erdogan himself has emerged as source of Islamicist radicalism; (C) The global ambition of Erdogan of assuming the mantles of Caliph has led him to hold every year an international conference on Muslim minority population. Indian Muslims often figure in this conference as an oppressed entity; (D) Erdogan’s utterances on Kashmir in his UN speech and his blind support to Pakistan on the issue raised a prospect of ‘Islamic alliance’ against India.

India needs to be vigilant and must not allow Turkish nefarious design to affect its peace and stability.

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp;

&nbsp;

Considerable attention has been paid to the Turkish invasion of Syria that took place in the first week of October. While Turkey entered into a ceasefire in a separate agreement with the USA, as well as, Russia since October 15-16, there remain serious international concerns about de-stabilisation of the already war-torn region and its implication for giving a flip to international terrorism.

Considerable attention has been paid to the Turkish invasion of Syria that took place in the first week of October. While Turkey entered into a ceasefire in a separate agreement with the USA, as well as, Russia since October 15-16, there remain serious international concerns about de-stabilisation of the already war-torn region and its implication for giving a flip to international terrorism. However, not much analysis has come out with regards to its security implications for India, which has the third-largest Muslim population in the world. An analysis of the security implication of the Turkish invasion of Syria for India requires an understanding of the Turkish motives behind this illegal invasion. The fact that Turkish invasion took place on the eve of ‘official declaration of defeat of ISIS’ and withdrawal of American troops from Syria on the pretext of fighting YPG, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, which played crucial role in the defeat of ISIS speaks volume about the mal-intentions of the Erdogan regime: (A) Erdogan’s grip over his countrymen is declining as evident from the loss of Istanbul mayor election in view of rising economic crisis, as well as, growing level of sectarian conflict within the country. This invasion was meant to divert people’s attention from this internal mess; B) This invasion is linked with his personal ambition to showcase himself as emerging Caliph of the Muslim world; C) The Erdogan regime derives its strength from the ‘politics of blackmailing’; A perennial destabilised Syria with a potential to ‘export refugee’ allows the Erdogan regime to bargain with Europe in particular and the West in general, (D) To bring a demographic change by transferring the millions of Syrian refugees, who are living inside Turkey, into the autonomous Kurdish region along the Syrian-Turkish border so that the issue of Kurdistan ceased to pose a threat to Turkish territorial integrity. In the light of the above motives, the Turkish invasion of Syrian territory raises the following security implications for India : (A) By all account, the invasion led to freeing up the jailed ISIS terrorists, which were being controlled by YPG Kurdish forces ; the freeing of ISIS terrorists has serious implication for coordinating the global terrorist activities, particularly in the AfPak area which runs into the troubled Kashmir; (B) Erdogan himself has emerged as source of Islamicist radicalism; (C) The global ambition of Erdogan of assuming the mantles of Caliph has led him to hold every year an international conference on Muslim minority population. Indian Muslims often figure in this conference as an oppressed entity; (D) Erdogan’s utterances on Kashmir in his UN speech and his blind support to Pakistan on the issue raised a prospect of ‘Islamic alliance’ against India. India needs to be vigilant and must not allow Turkish nefarious design to affect its peace and stability. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Examining security implications of Turkish invasion of Syria

Sister of killed Isis leader captured, says Turkish official. Watch video to know more.

Sister of killed Isis leader captured, says Turkish official

US President Donald Trump on Friday has said that the US &nbsp;knows who is the new leader of the terrorist group ISIS after the terror group named <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/islamic-state-names-al-quraishi-as-baghdadi-successor-threatens-united-states-report-259118">Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi </a>as the successor to <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/us-releases-baghdadi-raid-video-warns-of-likely-retribution-attack-258906">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a>.&nbsp;

"ISIS has a new leader. We know exactly who he is!" Trump tweeted. US officials did not give any more details.

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ISIS has a new leader. We know exactly who he is!
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1190261874371244032?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">November 1, 2019</a></blockquote>
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Yesterday, ISIS announced on the messaging service Telegram that Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurashi is the group's new leader and "caliph".The terror group also acknowledged the death of former 'caliph' Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a US special forces raid last weekend.

Watch - Trump: Other countries need to take up fight against Islamic State militants

<div class="videoWrapper trancodeVideo"><iframe allowfullscreen="" autoplay="1" class="includeVideo" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.wionews.com/videos/trump-other-countries-need-to-take-up-fight-against-islamic-state-militants-244719/embed" style="width:100%;max-width:560px;" width="560"></iframe></div>

However, little is known about Hashimi, whose name was seldom mentioned as a possible successor the multiple times that Baghdadi was falsely reported killed in recent years.

Baghdadi, who led IS since 2014 and was the world's most wanted man, died in a US special forces raid in Syria's northwestern province of Idlib on Sunday.

Islamic State also confirmed the killing in another raid the following day of the group's previous spokesman, Abu Hassan al-Muhajir.

The statement said the jihadist group's legislative and consultative body convened after the 48-year-old Iraqi-born jihadist chief's death and "agreed" on a replacement.

(With inputs from AFP)

US President Donald Trump on Friday has said that the US knows who is the new leader of the terrorist group ISIS after the terror group named Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi as the successor to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

US President Donald Trump on Friday has said that the US knows who is the new leader of the terrorist group ISIS after the terror group named Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi as the successor to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. "ISIS has a new leader. We know exactly who he is!" Trump tweeted. US officials did not give any more details. ISIS has a new leader. We know exactly who he is! — Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) November 1, 2019 × Yesterday, ISIS announced on the messaging service Telegram that Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurashi is the group's new leader and "caliph".The terror group also acknowledged the death of former 'caliph' Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a US special forces raid last weekend. Watch - Trump: Other countries need to take up fight against Islamic State militants However, little is known about Hashimi, whose name was seldom mentioned as a possible successor the multiple times that Baghdadi was falsely reported killed in recent years. Baghdadi, who led IS since 2014 and was the world's most wanted man, died in a US special forces raid in Syria's northwestern province of Idlib on Sunday. Islamic State also confirmed the killing in another raid the following day of the group's previous spokesman, Abu Hassan al-Muhajir. The statement said the jihadist group's legislative and consultative body convened after the 48-year-old Iraqi-born jihadist chief's death and "agreed" on a replacement. (With inputs from AFP)

ISIS has a new leader, we know exactly who he is: Donald Trump

This segment of WION brings to you top stories of the morning from across the globe. Watch this video to get updated with the latest information.

WION Speed News: Watch top national and international news of the morning - October 31st, 2019

The Pentagon on Wednesday released its first images from<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/trump-says-baghdadis-top-replacement-also-terminated-258678"> last weekend's commando raid in Syria</a> that led to the death of Islamic State leader <a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions/al-baghdadis-death-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-leader-of-islamic-state-258617">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a> and warned the militant group may attempt to stage a "retribution attack."

The declassified, grainy, black-and-white aerial videos from Saturday's raid showed US special operations forces closing in on the compound and US aircraft firing on militants nearby.

The most dramatic video showed a massive, black plume of smoke rising from the ground after US military bombs leveled Baghdadi's compound.

"It looks pretty much like a parking lot, with large potholes," said Marine General Kenneth McKenzie, the commander of US Central Command, which oversees American forces in the Middle East.

McKenzie, briefing Pentagon reporters, said the idea of destroying the compound was at least in part "to ensure that it would not be a shrine or otherwise memorable in any way.

"It's just another piece of ground," he said.
<img alt=" Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi raid" data-caption="The compound of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is seen moments before an air strike." data-entity-type="file" data-entity-uuid="beb6be6a-eb5a-4827-9b29-7abece3e328c" src="//cdn.wionews.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/Untitled%20design%20%283%29_25.jpg" />
[The compound of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is seen moments before an air strike. (Image courtesy: Reuters)]
<img alt=" Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi raid" data-caption="A smoke cloud rises moments after an air strike." data-entity-type="file" data-entity-uuid="4b5f6fba-7020-48d7-9bb2-293af4152e36" src="//cdn.wionews.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/Untitled%20design%20%282%29_23.jpg" />
[US special forces move towards the compound of Baghdadi. (Image courtesy: Reuters)]
<img alt="US special forces move towards the compound." data-caption="US special forces move towards the compound." data-entity-type="file" data-entity-uuid="392bae60-93c6-4f79-919c-6dfd928a39b3" src="//cdn.wionews.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/Untitled%20design%20%281%29_33.jpg" />
[US special forces move towards the compound.(Image courtesy: Reuters)]

Baghdadi, an Iraqi jihadist who rose from obscurity to declare himself "caliph" of all Muslims as the leader of Islamic State, died by detonating a suicide vest as he fled into a dead-end tunnel as elite US special forces closed in.

McKenzie said he brought two young children into the tunnel with him - not three, as had been the US government estimate. Both children were believed to be under the age of 12 and both were killed, he said.

Watch: US releases Baghdadi raid video

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He portrayed Baghdadi as isolated at his Syrian compound, just four miles from the Turkish border, saying fighters from other militant groups nearby probably did not even know he was there. McKenzie suggested it was unlikely that Baghdadi used the Internet or had digital connections to the outside world.

"I think you'd find (he was using) probably a messenger system that allows you to put something on a floppy or on a bit of electronics and have someone physically move it somewhere," he said.

McKenzie said Islamic State would likely try to stage some kind of retaliatory attack.

"We suspect they will try some form of retribution attack. And we are postured and prepared for that," he said.

Whimpering and crying?

McKenzie did not back up or knock down Trump's dramatic account of Baghdadi's final moments, which the president delivered during a televised address to the nation on Sunday. Trump said Baghdadi "died a coward — crying, whimpering, screaming."

Asked about Trump's account, McKenzie said: "About Baghdadi's last moments, I can tell you this: He crawled into a hole with two small children and blew himself up as his people stayed on the ground."

"So you can deduce what kind of person he is based on that activity... I'm not able to confirm anything else about his last seconds. I just can't confirm that one way or another."

On Monday, Army General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also declined to confirm Trump's account, saying he presumed Trump got that information from his direct conversations with members of the elite unit that conducted the operation. Milley had not yet spoken with them, he said.

McKenzie suggested the US military had secured a large amount of intelligence about Islamic State's activities during the raid.

"While the assault force was securing the remains, they also secured whatever documentation and electronics we could find, which was substantial," McKenzie said, declining to provide further details.

McKenzie said Turkey's incursion into Syria this month, and the US pullback from the border, was not a factor in deciding the timing of the raid. Instead, McKenzie pointed to a host of other factors, including the amount of moonlight.

"We struck because the time is about right to do it then, given the totality of the intelligence and the other factors that would affect the raid force going into and coming out," McKenzie said.

The Pentagon on Wednesday released its first images from last weekend's commando raid in Syria that led to the death of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and warned the militant group may attempt to stage a "retribution attack.

The Pentagon on Wednesday released its first images from last weekend's commando raid in Syria that led to the death of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and warned the militant group may attempt to stage a "retribution attack." The declassified, grainy, black-and-white aerial videos from Saturday's raid showed US special operations forces closing in on the compound and US aircraft firing on militants nearby. The most dramatic video showed a massive, black plume of smoke rising from the ground after US military bombs leveled Baghdadi's compound. "It looks pretty much like a parking lot, with large potholes," said Marine General Kenneth McKenzie, the commander of US Central Command, which oversees American forces in the Middle East. McKenzie, briefing Pentagon reporters, said the idea of destroying the compound was at least in part "to ensure that it would not be a shrine or otherwise memorable in any way. "It's just another piece of ground," he said. [The compound of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is seen moments before an air strike. (Image courtesy: Reuters)] [US special forces move towards the compound of Baghdadi. (Image courtesy: Reuters)] [US special forces move towards the compound.(Image courtesy: Reuters)] Baghdadi, an Iraqi jihadist who rose from obscurity to declare himself "caliph" of all Muslims as the leader of Islamic State, died by detonating a suicide vest as he fled into a dead-end tunnel as elite US special forces closed in. McKenzie said he brought two young children into the tunnel with him - not three, as had been the US government estimate. Both children were believed to be under the age of 12 and both were killed, he said. Watch: US releases Baghdadi raid video × He portrayed Baghdadi as isolated at his Syrian compound, just four miles from the Turkish border, saying fighters from other militant groups nearby probably did not even know he was there. McKenzie suggested it was unlikely that Baghdadi used the Internet or had digital connections to the outside world. "I think you'd find (he was using) probably a messenger system that allows you to put something on a floppy or on a bit of electronics and have someone physically move it somewhere," he said. McKenzie said Islamic State would likely try to stage some kind of retaliatory attack. "We suspect they will try some form of retribution attack. And we are postured and prepared for that," he said. Whimpering and crying? McKenzie did not back up or knock down Trump's dramatic account of Baghdadi's final moments, which the president delivered during a televised address to the nation on Sunday. Trump said Baghdadi "died a coward — crying, whimpering, screaming." Asked about Trump's account, McKenzie said: "About Baghdadi's last moments, I can tell you this: He crawled into a hole with two small children and blew himself up as his people stayed on the ground." "So you can deduce what kind of person he is based on that activity... I'm not able to confirm anything else about his last seconds. I just can't confirm that one way or another." On Monday, Army General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also declined to confirm Trump's account, saying he presumed Trump got that information from his direct conversations with members of the elite unit that conducted the operation. Milley had not yet spoken with them, he said. McKenzie suggested the US military had secured a large amount of intelligence about Islamic State's activities during the raid. "While the assault force was securing the remains, they also secured whatever documentation and electronics we could find, which was substantial," McKenzie said, declining to provide further details. McKenzie said Turkey's incursion into Syria this month, and the US pullback from the border, was not a factor in deciding the timing of the raid. Instead, McKenzie pointed to a host of other factors, including the amount of moonlight. "We struck because the time is about right to do it then, given the totality of the intelligence and the other factors that would affect the raid force going into and coming out," McKenzie said.

US releases Baghdadi raid video, warns of likely retribution attack

The Pentagon released details and graphic footage Wednesday of the secret raid that killed ISIS founder Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

U.S. releases Baghdadi raid video

By John A Tures

After former Islamic State Group leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a US military action, speculation began on whether or not President Donald Trump would get a boost in public opinion surveys as a result.

My political science research with my students shows that presidents do enjoy a short-term poll boost after foreign policy raids and capital city captures.

However, that’s often followed by a long-term decline.

A closer look at the polls 
 
Supporters of the diversionary theory of war, known in the media as the “Wag the Dog” effect, contend that presidents can boost their approval ratings in the polls by fighting a war abroad.

In other words, they benefit from a burst of patriotism during the conflict.

But international relations scholars Bradley Lian and John R. Oneal tested this theory by looking at conflicts from 1950 through 1984 and found scant empirical support for this hypothesis.

My students and I considered 12 cases to determine whether presidents benefit at the polls from conducting raids involving the capture of a leader, seizure of a capital city or an attempt to rescue hostages, and how long that support can be expected to last.

The events we looked at included the surrender of Manuel Noriega in January of 1990; the apprehension of Saddam Hussein in 2003; and the killing of Moammar Gaddafi in 2011.

We looked at polls conducted by the Gallup Polling Presidential Job Approval Center, calculating an average of three presidential approval polls taken before the foreign policy event, and the mean of the first three polls issued after the case.

We also analysed polls taken by the end of the year, or six months later if the raid took place near the end of the year, to see how presidents fared long after the event.

Our results show that in 75 per cent of cases, the US President received a boost in the polls shortly after a foreign policy raid or capital capture.

But the jump is short lived. In 83 per cent of cases, presidential approval declined over the next several months. In seven cases, it fell by more than five percentage points from the initial poll boost.

For example, President Donald Trump insisted that al-Baghdadi’s death was a bigger deal than the raid that killed Osama Bin-Laden. That May 2011 event was widely credited with sealing President Barack Obama’s reelection the following year.

That credit may have been misplaced. Our evidence shows that Obama’s approval ratings had declined to 45 per cent by December of 2011. Thus, if history is any guide, I expect that Trump may have higher approval ratings in the coming days but shouldn’t count on better polls over the next several months.

(John A Tures is Professor of Political Science, LaGrange College)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-killing-al-baghdadi-give-trump-a-boost-in-the-polls-probably-but-it-wont-last-125987"> original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp;

 
&nbsp;

By John A Tures After former Islamic State Group leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a US military action, speculation began on whether or not President Donald Trump would get a boost in public opinion surveys as a result.

By John A Tures After former Islamic State Group leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a US military action, speculation began on whether or not President Donald Trump would get a boost in public opinion surveys as a result. My political science research with my students shows that presidents do enjoy a short-term poll boost after foreign policy raids and capital city captures. However, that’s often followed by a long-term decline. A closer look at the polls Supporters of the diversionary theory of war, known in the media as the “Wag the Dog” effect, contend that presidents can boost their approval ratings in the polls by fighting a war abroad. In other words, they benefit from a burst of patriotism during the conflict. But international relations scholars Bradley Lian and John R. Oneal tested this theory by looking at conflicts from 1950 through 1984 and found scant empirical support for this hypothesis. My students and I considered 12 cases to determine whether presidents benefit at the polls from conducting raids involving the capture of a leader, seizure of a capital city or an attempt to rescue hostages, and how long that support can be expected to last. The events we looked at included the surrender of Manuel Noriega in January of 1990; the apprehension of Saddam Hussein in 2003; and the killing of Moammar Gaddafi in 2011. We looked at polls conducted by the Gallup Polling Presidential Job Approval Center, calculating an average of three presidential approval polls taken before the foreign policy event, and the mean of the first three polls issued after the case. We also analysed polls taken by the end of the year, or six months later if the raid took place near the end of the year, to see how presidents fared long after the event. Our results show that in 75 per cent of cases, the US President received a boost in the polls shortly after a foreign policy raid or capital capture. But the jump is short lived. In 83 per cent of cases, presidential approval declined over the next several months. In seven cases, it fell by more than five percentage points from the initial poll boost. For example, President Donald Trump insisted that al-Baghdadi’s death was a bigger deal than the raid that killed Osama Bin-Laden. That May 2011 event was widely credited with sealing President Barack Obama’s reelection the following year. That credit may have been misplaced. Our evidence shows that Obama’s approval ratings had declined to 45 per cent by December of 2011. Thus, if history is any guide, I expect that Trump may have higher approval ratings in the coming days but shouldn’t count on better polls over the next several months. (John A Tures is Professor of Political Science, LaGrange College) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Will killing Al-Baghdadi give Donald Trump a boost in the polls?

Global collaboration is the key to conducting counter-terrorism in the Middle East following the reported death of the leader of the Islamic State (IS) group, while finding a coordinated international approach to combating terrorism which avoids the errors made in previous policy decisions of Western countries is crucial to addressing the issue, according to a China Media Group (CMG) commentary published on Tuesday.

Collaboration is the key to counter-terrorism work in the Middle East

By Natasha Lindstaedt

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State (IS), is dead. After US special forces raided his safe house in Idlib province in north-west Syria, Baghdadi reportedly fled and detonated a suicide vest, killing himself and three of his children. Over the past several years, there have been constant reports of his death but up until now, none of these reports have been verified.

The death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 did not lead to the end of Al-Qaeda, but what does al-Baghdadi’s death mean for IS?

Al-Baghdadi was most likely born in the Iraqi city of Samarra in 1971. Though he was a poor student with bad eyesight, he rose to command al-Qaeda’s Iraqi division. He was captured by US forces in a raid in 2004 in Falluja, Iraq, but was not considered to be particularly important at the time. Few would predict that Al-Baghdadi would rise to such a position of power. He was not noted for being particularly charismatic or memorable.

By 2010, al-Baghdadi took control of the group that would be eventually called the Islamic State, a group whose predecessor was Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI had been led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until he was killed in 2006. Under the helm of al-Zarqawi, AQI had become one of the region’s most brutal and effective insurgent groups, controlling the flow of resources and foreign fighters into Iraq. By 2007, the group had almost faded away, but by 2009 it was gaining support in Sunni tribal areas now known as the Islamic State in Iraq.

Split with Al-Qaeda

By the time al-Baghdadi took over, a rift had grown between the wider al-Qaeda group and IS, which had been simmering since al-Zarqawi led AQI. To al-Qaeda, Baghdadi was excessively violent and counter-productive to al-Qaeda’s objectives. Extravagant brutality such as beheading Muslims would alienate most Muslims. Al-Qaeda was also alarmed at IS’s predatory strategy of taking territory and resources from other rebel groups.

Al-Baghdadi, for his part, had no interest in subsuming IS under the wider leadership of al-Qaeda. He sent delegates (who were mostly of Syrian descent) into Syria after the Syrian war began in March 2011, a decision which al-Qaeda rejected. After repeated attempts by al-Qaeda to convince al-Baghdadi to move out of Syria, it officially cut its ties with him in February 2014.

Al-Baghdadi believed that al-Qaeda was ineffective, and had failed to set up an actual state.

Declaration of the caliphate

In June 2014, al-Baghdadi made his first public appearance delivering a sermon from a mosque in the recently captured city of Mosul, where he claimed to come from the same tribe as the prophet Muhammad. He also brazenly declared himself to be the caliph – or the political and religious leader of the Muslim community. Though this declaration was universally rejected by Islamic authorities, his plan of setting up a caliphate attracted thousands of foreign fighters to his cause.

At the height of al-Baghdadi’s power, IS had set up organisational structures across multiple countries and created a de facto state, the size of Belgium with 8m people living under its control. He established a brutal justice system, legalised slavery, collected taxes and provided a handful of public services.

While Bin Laden was more concerned with overthrowing modern Arab dictators, eliminating Israel and knocking over Western symbols of power, al-Baghdadi focused more on reviving the glory of the past. His dramatic vision for IS attracted those that wanted to be considered to be part of a line of warriors that extended back to the Prophet Muhammad.

Fall from power

By 2017, IS’s fortunes started to turn. It had inspired or helped to plan a series of terrorist attacks in Belgium, the US, France and Turkey that drew increasing resolve from the West to step up efforts to eliminate the group. Iraq’s forces also became more effective against IS, eventually retaking Mosul in 2017.

By March of 2019, IS surrendered its final territorial stronghold in Baghouz, Syria after extensive fighting with the mostly Kurdish, Syrian Democratic Forces. IS no longer had territory that it could lay claim to, and without territory, it could not claim to be a valid caliphate.

In an attempt to strengthen his standing, al-Baghdadi appeared in a video in April to demonstrate that the group could still exist, even if it lacked territory. He tried to energise his fighters to redouble their efforts. This would be only the second time that he would appear to the public.

His decision not to appear in person was about ensuring his own safety. Airstrikes had already caused a series of injuries. To avoid being caught, he never used mobile phones and frequently changed safe houses.

This makes his presence in Idlib province in Syria where he died somewhat surprising. The province is controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an Islamist militia fiercely opposed to IS. The region is also currently under siege by Russian and Syrian forces.

What’s next for IS?

As I’ve argued in my own research, for most terrorist groups which are hierarchically organised, the death of a leader signals its demise. In fact most terrorist groups fall apart within a year of forming once the group has been decapitated. Terrorist groups that are larger and more cellular in structure, such as Al-Qaeda, have been able to weather the deaths of leaders, helping to explain the group’s longevity.

IS will likely name a successor to lead the group, and al-Baghdadi tried to prepare his followers that he would not live forever. But it could now start to operate in a way similar to Al-Qaeda with a cell-like structure, where it may attempt to plan terrorist attacks to signal its continued relevance to its followers. It needs to attract new numbers as it has seen its membership dwindle since its territory has disappeared.

The US decision to pull out of Syria has compromised the Kurds, who were managing detention centres holding captured IS fighters. The Turkish advance into Kurdish held territory in north-eastern Syria has led to the escape of several hundreds of IS fighters. The US, however, already claims it has gathered further intelligence from al-Baghdadi’s compound that will continue to weaken IS.

Studies of terrorist groups that have managed succession raise concerns that when one leader dies, the leadership that follows can be less disciplined, more violent and determined to exact revenge. Given Baghdadi’s penchant for brutality, it’s hard to imagine how that’s possible.

(Natasha Lindstaedt is Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/al-baghdadis-death-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-leader-of-islamic-state-125947">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp; 
&nbsp;

By Natasha Lindstaedt Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State (IS), is dead. After US special forces raided his safe house in Idlib province in north-west Syria, Baghdadi reportedly fled and detonated a suicide vest, killing himself and three of his children.

By Natasha Lindstaedt Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State (IS), is dead. After US special forces raided his safe house in Idlib province in north-west Syria, Baghdadi reportedly fled and detonated a suicide vest, killing himself and three of his children. Over the past several years, there have been constant reports of his death but up until now, none of these reports have been verified. The death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 did not lead to the end of Al-Qaeda, but what does al-Baghdadi’s death mean for IS? Al-Baghdadi was most likely born in the Iraqi city of Samarra in 1971. Though he was a poor student with bad eyesight, he rose to command al-Qaeda’s Iraqi division. He was captured by US forces in a raid in 2004 in Falluja, Iraq, but was not considered to be particularly important at the time. Few would predict that Al-Baghdadi would rise to such a position of power. He was not noted for being particularly charismatic or memorable. By 2010, al-Baghdadi took control of the group that would be eventually called the Islamic State, a group whose predecessor was Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI had been led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until he was killed in 2006. Under the helm of al-Zarqawi, AQI had become one of the region’s most brutal and effective insurgent groups, controlling the flow of resources and foreign fighters into Iraq. By 2007, the group had almost faded away, but by 2009 it was gaining support in Sunni tribal areas now known as the Islamic State in Iraq. Split with Al-Qaeda By the time al-Baghdadi took over, a rift had grown between the wider al-Qaeda group and IS, which had been simmering since al-Zarqawi led AQI. To al-Qaeda, Baghdadi was excessively violent and counter-productive to al-Qaeda’s objectives. Extravagant brutality such as beheading Muslims would alienate most Muslims. Al-Qaeda was also alarmed at IS’s predatory strategy of taking territory and resources from other rebel groups. Al-Baghdadi, for his part, had no interest in subsuming IS under the wider leadership of al-Qaeda. He sent delegates (who were mostly of Syrian descent) into Syria after the Syrian war began in March 2011, a decision which al-Qaeda rejected. After repeated attempts by al-Qaeda to convince al-Baghdadi to move out of Syria, it officially cut its ties with him in February 2014. Al-Baghdadi believed that al-Qaeda was ineffective, and had failed to set up an actual state. Declaration of the caliphate In June 2014, al-Baghdadi made his first public appearance delivering a sermon from a mosque in the recently captured city of Mosul, where he claimed to come from the same tribe as the prophet Muhammad. He also brazenly declared himself to be the caliph – or the political and religious leader of the Muslim community. Though this declaration was universally rejected by Islamic authorities, his plan of setting up a caliphate attracted thousands of foreign fighters to his cause. At the height of al-Baghdadi’s power, IS had set up organisational structures across multiple countries and created a de facto state, the size of Belgium with 8m people living under its control. He established a brutal justice system, legalised slavery, collected taxes and provided a handful of public services. While Bin Laden was more concerned with overthrowing modern Arab dictators, eliminating Israel and knocking over Western symbols of power, al-Baghdadi focused more on reviving the glory of the past. His dramatic vision for IS attracted those that wanted to be considered to be part of a line of warriors that extended back to the Prophet Muhammad. Fall from power By 2017, IS’s fortunes started to turn. It had inspired or helped to plan a series of terrorist attacks in Belgium, the US, France and Turkey that drew increasing resolve from the West to step up efforts to eliminate the group. Iraq’s forces also became more effective against IS, eventually retaking Mosul in 2017. By March of 2019, IS surrendered its final territorial stronghold in Baghouz, Syria after extensive fighting with the mostly Kurdish, Syrian Democratic Forces. IS no longer had territory that it could lay claim to, and without territory, it could not claim to be a valid caliphate. In an attempt to strengthen his standing, al-Baghdadi appeared in a video in April to demonstrate that the group could still exist, even if it lacked territory. He tried to energise his fighters to redouble their efforts. This would be only the second time that he would appear to the public. His decision not to appear in person was about ensuring his own safety. Airstrikes had already caused a series of injuries. To avoid being caught, he never used mobile phones and frequently changed safe houses. This makes his presence in Idlib province in Syria where he died somewhat surprising. The province is controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an Islamist militia fiercely opposed to IS. The region is also currently under siege by Russian and Syrian forces. What’s next for IS? As I’ve argued in my own research, for most terrorist groups which are hierarchically organised, the death of a leader signals its demise. In fact most terrorist groups fall apart within a year of forming once the group has been decapitated. Terrorist groups that are larger and more cellular in structure, such as Al-Qaeda, have been able to weather the deaths of leaders, helping to explain the group’s longevity. IS will likely name a successor to lead the group, and al-Baghdadi tried to prepare his followers that he would not live forever. But it could now start to operate in a way similar to Al-Qaeda with a cell-like structure, where it may attempt to plan terrorist attacks to signal its continued relevance to its followers. It needs to attract new numbers as it has seen its membership dwindle since its territory has disappeared. The US decision to pull out of Syria has compromised the Kurds, who were managing detention centres holding captured IS fighters. The Turkish advance into Kurdish held territory in north-eastern Syria has led to the escape of several hundreds of IS fighters. The US, however, already claims it has gathered further intelligence from al-Baghdadi’s compound that will continue to weaken IS. Studies of terrorist groups that have managed succession raise concerns that when one leader dies, the leadership that follows can be less disciplined, more violent and determined to exact revenge. Given Baghdadi’s penchant for brutality, it’s hard to imagine how that’s possible. (Natasha Lindstaedt is Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Al-Baghdadi’s death: The rise and fall of the leader of Islamic State

Elimination of 2 terrorists: Watch the difference in approaches of Trump and Obama. Watch video to know more.

Elimination of 2 terrorists: Watch the difference in approaches of Trump and Obama

Trump shares image of hero dog injured in Baghdadi raid. Watch video to know more.

Trump shares image of hero dog injured in Baghdadi raid

A Step-By-Step Account Of The U.S. Operation That Killed Terrorist Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Gravitas: US kills Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Here's how it unfolded

U.S. President Donald Trump shares a picture of a heroic dog who played the major role in the killing of ISIS chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Watch this video to find out more.

U.S. President shares picture of heroic dog played major role in Baghdadi's killing

Trump Tells The World That He Wants Syrian Oil For The U.S. The death of terrorist al-Baghdadi is a big blow for the ISIS. But the U.S. engagement in the region is not only about eliminating terrorism but also to secure its own interests.

Gravitas: U.S. Spills The Beans: Trump Wants To 'seize' Syrian Oil

Exposing The 'Woke' Washington Post, Its Definition Dilemma & Its Three Headlines On al-Baghdadi's Death

Gravitas: Washington Post's Al-baghdadi Headline: The Death Of Reason?

Wionedit: Does Al-Baghdadi's Death Mean The End Of Isis?

WION Edit: Does Al-baghdadi's Death Mean The End Of Isis?

World leaders put out their reactions on eventual death of ISIS chief Baghdadi. Government of Iraq reacted by tweeting on this, 'U.S. killed its own creature'.

World leaders put out their reactions on eventual death of ISIS chief Baghdadi

In an official statement by Donald Trump, He said, ''ISIS Chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is dead''. He said that Baghdadi and his companions are killed with him. Watch this video to know more.

'ISIS Chief Baghdadi died crying, screaming like a coward by U.S. soldiers': Trump

Iran said on Sunday that the death of Islamic State group leader <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/baghdadi-died-whimpering-and-crying-after-running-into-a-dead-end-tunnel-says-trump-258391">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi </a>does not mean the end of the fight against the group or its ideology.

"Baghdadi's death is not the end of fighting Deash (Arabic acronym for IS) terrorism but just the end of a chapter," government spokesman Ali Rabiei said in a tweet.

"(IS terrorism) is still growing and evident. Growing via American policies and regional petrodollars, and evident in takfiri (Sunni Muslim extremist) ideology. These three sources must be extinguished," he added.

US President Donald Trump announced Baghdadi's death on Sunday during a nighttime raid by US special forces deep outside the village of Barisha in Idlib province, northwestern Syria.

He said that US forces killed a "large number" of IS militants during the raid which culminated in cornerning Baghdadi in a tunnel, where he set off a suicide vest.

The raid -- which required flying more than an hour by helicopter in both directions from an undisclosed base -- had been accomplished by help from Russia, Syria, Turkey and Iraq, according to Trump.

In 2014, Iran sent the commander of the elite Quds Force of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Major General Qasem Soleimani and "military advisers" to Iraq to help it in <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/iraq-says-it-provided-baghdadis-location-to-us-for-raid-258398">the fight against IS</a>.

Meanwhile, the Islamic State group's spokesman was killed Sunday in northern Syria, a top Kurdish official said, hours after the jihadists' leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was announced dead.

The official with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces -- who asked not to be named because he is not authorised to speak on the issue -- said IS spokesman Abu Hassan al-Muhajir had been killed, after SDF chief Mazloum Abdi said he had been "targeted" in a fresh raid.

Iran said on Sunday that the death of Islamic State group leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi does not mean the end of the fight against the group or its ideology. "Baghdadi's death is not the end of fighting Deash (Arabic acronym for IS) terrorism but just the end of a chapter," government spokesman Ali Rabiei said in a tweet.

Iran said on Sunday that the death of Islamic State group leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi does not mean the end of the fight against the group or its ideology. "Baghdadi's death is not the end of fighting Deash (Arabic acronym for IS) terrorism but just the end of a chapter," government spokesman Ali Rabiei said in a tweet. "(IS terrorism) is still growing and evident. Growing via American policies and regional petrodollars, and evident in takfiri (Sunni Muslim extremist) ideology. These three sources must be extinguished," he added. US President Donald Trump announced Baghdadi's death on Sunday during a nighttime raid by US special forces deep outside the village of Barisha in Idlib province, northwestern Syria. He said that US forces killed a "large number" of IS militants during the raid which culminated in cornerning Baghdadi in a tunnel, where he set off a suicide vest. The raid -- which required flying more than an hour by helicopter in both directions from an undisclosed base -- had been accomplished by help from Russia, Syria, Turkey and Iraq, according to Trump. In 2014, Iran sent the commander of the elite Quds Force of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Major General Qasem Soleimani and "military advisers" to Iraq to help it in the fight against IS. Meanwhile, the Islamic State group's spokesman was killed Sunday in northern Syria, a top Kurdish official said, hours after the jihadists' leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was announced dead. The official with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces -- who asked not to be named because he is not authorised to speak on the issue -- said IS spokesman Abu Hassan al-Muhajir had been killed, after SDF chief Mazloum Abdi said he had been "targeted" in a fresh raid.

Baghdadi's death not the end of Islamic State: Iran

President Donald Trump on Monday said he could release segments of video from the dramatic <a href="https://www.wionews.com/photos/how-us-planned-operation-to-kill-islamic-state-leader-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-258512">US raid to kill Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a> in Syria.

"We may take certain parts of it and release it," Trump said on departure from Washington to Chicago, where he was due to address a police officers' convention.

The attack by US special forces deep into Syria took place Saturday, culminating in the death of the fugitive leader who at his peak headed an organization that attempted to set up a hardline Islamic state across a huge area of Iraq and Syria.

Trump described the raid in unusually colorful and detailed terms on Sunday, saying that Baghdadi died when he exploded a suicide vest after being cornered by US soldiers in a tunnel, together with three children.

Also read-&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/baghdadis-death-not-the-end-of-islamic-state-iran-258406">Baghdadi's death not the end of Islamic State: Iran</a>

He died "like a dog," Trump said in his comments, which differed sharply in tone from similar announcements by presidents in the past.

A report in The New York Times, quoting military and intelligence officials, cast doubt on some of Trump's descriptions, including his repeated claim that Baghdadi was "whimpering and crying" in the tunnel.

Trump said his account was based on having watched the whole raid in real time, like "a movie."

According to the report, Trump would not have had access to audio of the events at the time, or have been able to see footage from inside the tunnel.

President Donald Trump on Monday said he could release segments of video from the dramatic US raid to kill Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Syria. "We may take certain parts of it and release it," Trump said on departure from Washington to Chicago, where he was due to address a police officers' convention.

President Donald Trump on Monday said he could release segments of video from the dramatic US raid to kill Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Syria. "We may take certain parts of it and release it," Trump said on departure from Washington to Chicago, where he was due to address a police officers' convention. The attack by US special forces deep into Syria took place Saturday, culminating in the death of the fugitive leader who at his peak headed an organization that attempted to set up a hardline Islamic state across a huge area of Iraq and Syria. Trump described the raid in unusually colorful and detailed terms on Sunday, saying that Baghdadi died when he exploded a suicide vest after being cornered by US soldiers in a tunnel, together with three children. Also read- Baghdadi's death not the end of Islamic State: Iran He died "like a dog," Trump said in his comments, which differed sharply in tone from similar announcements by presidents in the past. A report in The New York Times, quoting military and intelligence officials, cast doubt on some of Trump's descriptions, including his repeated claim that Baghdadi was "whimpering and crying" in the tunnel. Trump said his account was based on having watched the whole raid in real time, like "a movie." According to the report, Trump would not have had access to audio of the events at the time, or have been able to see footage from inside the tunnel.

A day after confirming ISIS leader Baghdadi's death, Trump says he may release partial video of raid

In an official statement by Donald Trump, He said, ''ISIS Chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is dead''. He said that 'Baghdadi died like a dog and his companions are also killed with him'. Watch this video to know more.

Donald Trump: 'ISIS Chief Baghdadi died like a dog'

In Syria and Iraq, the ex-prisoners and those who were victims of ISIS are doing celebrations after the death announcement of ISIS chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's death. Let's listen to it by yourself.

ISIS victims rejoice at announcement of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's death

ISIS chief Baghdadi dead in US raid in northwest Syria said, Donald Trump.

Breaking News: Baghdadi killed in US operation in Syria

ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is believed to have been killed in a raid conducted by the US military in northwest Syria

Trump's Major announcement; Baghdadi killed in U.S raid?

By Greg Barton

“Remaining and expanding”. The propaganda tagline of Islamic State (IS) has rung hollow since the collapse of the physical caliphate. But recent developments in northeastern Syria threaten to give it fresh legitimacy.

US President Donald Trump lifted sanctions on Turkey after he announced the Turkish government agreed to a permanent ceasefire in northern Syria.

In a televised speech, he pushed back against criticisms of his decision to remove 1,000 troops from Syria, abandoning their Kurdish allies.

This decision allowed Turkish forces – a hybrid of Turkish military and Free Syrian Army rebels, including jihadi extremists – to surge across the Turkish border and begin intense bombardment of towns and cities liberated from IS.

Just how quickly and how far IS will rise from now remains unclear. One thing that’s certain, however, is that IS and the al-Qaeda movement that spawned it, plan and act for the long-term. They believe in their divine destiny and are prepared to sacrifice anything to achieve it.

In speaking about the resurgence of IS, we risk talking up the IS brand, the very thing it cares so very much about. But the greater risk is underestimating the capacity for reinvention, resilience and enduring appeal of IS.

And complacency and short-sighted politics threaten to lead us to repeat the mistakes of a decade ago that saw a decimated Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) insurgency roar back to life.

From violent beginnings

In 2006, Sunni tribes in northwestern Iraq killed or arrested the majority of ISI fighters with US support, reducing their strength from many thousands to a few hundred.

But with no backing for the Sunni tribes from the poorly functioning, Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, the outbreak of civil war in Syria, and the draw-down of US troops, ISI launched an insurgency in Syria before rising triumphant as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

ISIS quickly became the most potent terrorist group in history, drawing more than 40,000 fighters from around the world, and seizing control of northeastern Syria and northwestern Iraq.

The final defeat of the IS caliphate in northeastern Syria came after five hard years of fighting and 11,000 lives from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), largely composed of members of the Kurdish YPG.

To the US, the SDF fighters were local partners and boots-on-the-ground after multiple false starts and expensive mistakes from allying with rebel groups in the Free Syrian Army. Without this SDF alliance, the IS caliphate could not be toppled.

Trump’s betrayal could open up ISIS recruitment

Donald Trump’s betrayal of the SDF in recent weeks is disastrous on several levels. It ignores the threat IS represents and validates ISIS’s central narrative.

What’s more, it contributes to the very circumstances of neglect, cynical short-term thinking and governance failures that lead to giving the IS insurgency an open pathway for recruiting.

Trump’s reckless move to withdraw 1,000 special forces troops from Syria comes from an impatience to end an 18-year long “Global War on Terrorism” military campaign of unprecedented expense.

This is somewhat understandable. After almost $6 trillion of US Federal expenditure and two decades of fighting, surely enough is enough.

But the inconvenient truth is IS and al-Qaeda jihadi fighters around the world have increased, in some estimates nearly four-fold, since September 11.

Still, betraying the SDF and pulling out of Syria for small short-term savings risks jeopardising all that has been achieved in defeating the IS caliphate in northwestern Iraq.

IS hardliners in overcrowded camps

IS will never return to its days of power as a physical caliphate, but all the evidence points to it tipping past an inflection point and beginning a long, steady resurgence.

IS has thousands of terrorist fighters still active in the field in northern Iraq. They’re attacking by night and rebuilding strength from disgruntled Sunni communities, as well as having thousands of fighters lying low in Syria.

But in recent months, the tempo of IS attacks has shifted from Iraq to Syria with the previously hidden insurgency reemerging.

As many as 12,000 terrorist fighters, including 2,000 foreigners, are detained in prisons run, at least until this week, by the SDF. Many are located in the border region now being overrun by the Turkish military and the Syrian jihadi it counts as loyal instruments.

Elsewhere, in poorly secured overcrowded camps for internally displaced peoples (IDPs), tens of thousands of women, many fiercely loyal to IS, and children are held in precarious circumstances.

In the Al Hawl camp alone there are more than 60,000 women and children linked to IS, including 11 Australian women and their 44 children, along with 10,000 IDPs.

The IS hardliners not only enforce a reign of terror within the camps, but are in regular communication with IS insurgents. They confidently await their liberation by the IS insurgent forces.

Liberated ISIS fighters

The hope of being freed is neither naive nor remote. Already, hundreds of fighters and IDPs have escaped the prisons and camps since the Turkish offensive began.

From mid-2012 until mid-2013, IS ran an insurgent campaign called “Breaking the Walls”. It saw thousands of hardened senior ISIS leaders, and many other militants who would later join the movement, broken out of half a dozen prisons surrounding Baghdad.

Suicide squads were used to blast holes in prison walls. Heavily armed assault teams moved rapidly through the prisons, blasting open cells and rushing the hundreds of liberated terrorist fighters into tactical four-wheel-drives. They were to be driven away in the desert through the night to rebuild the senior ranks of ISIS.

The liberated fighters were not only more valuable to ISIS after their time in prison, with many switching allegiances to join the movement, they were better educated and more deeply radicalised graduating for what they refer to as their terrorist universities.

It would appear the same cycle is now being repeated in northeastern Syria.

(Greg Barton is Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-retreat-from-syria-could-see-islamic-state-roar-back-to-life-125311">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp; 
&nbsp;

By Greg Barton “Remaining and expanding”. The propaganda tagline of Islamic State (IS) has rung hollow since the collapse of the physical caliphate. But recent developments in northeastern Syria threaten to give it fresh legitimacy.

By Greg Barton “Remaining and expanding”. The propaganda tagline of Islamic State (IS) has rung hollow since the collapse of the physical caliphate. But recent developments in northeastern Syria threaten to give it fresh legitimacy. US President Donald Trump lifted sanctions on Turkey after he announced the Turkish government agreed to a permanent ceasefire in northern Syria. In a televised speech, he pushed back against criticisms of his decision to remove 1,000 troops from Syria, abandoning their Kurdish allies. This decision allowed Turkish forces – a hybrid of Turkish military and Free Syrian Army rebels, including jihadi extremists – to surge across the Turkish border and begin intense bombardment of towns and cities liberated from IS. Just how quickly and how far IS will rise from now remains unclear. One thing that’s certain, however, is that IS and the al-Qaeda movement that spawned it, plan and act for the long-term. They believe in their divine destiny and are prepared to sacrifice anything to achieve it. In speaking about the resurgence of IS, we risk talking up the IS brand, the very thing it cares so very much about. But the greater risk is underestimating the capacity for reinvention, resilience and enduring appeal of IS. And complacency and short-sighted politics threaten to lead us to repeat the mistakes of a decade ago that saw a decimated Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) insurgency roar back to life. From violent beginnings In 2006, Sunni tribes in northwestern Iraq killed or arrested the majority of ISI fighters with US support, reducing their strength from many thousands to a few hundred. But with no backing for the Sunni tribes from the poorly functioning, Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, the outbreak of civil war in Syria, and the draw-down of US troops, ISI launched an insurgency in Syria before rising triumphant as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS quickly became the most potent terrorist group in history, drawing more than 40,000 fighters from around the world, and seizing control of northeastern Syria and northwestern Iraq. The final defeat of the IS caliphate in northeastern Syria came after five hard years of fighting and 11,000 lives from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), largely composed of members of the Kurdish YPG. To the US, the SDF fighters were local partners and boots-on-the-ground after multiple false starts and expensive mistakes from allying with rebel groups in the Free Syrian Army. Without this SDF alliance, the IS caliphate could not be toppled. Trump’s betrayal could open up ISIS recruitment Donald Trump’s betrayal of the SDF in recent weeks is disastrous on several levels. It ignores the threat IS represents and validates ISIS’s central narrative. What’s more, it contributes to the very circumstances of neglect, cynical short-term thinking and governance failures that lead to giving the IS insurgency an open pathway for recruiting. Trump’s reckless move to withdraw 1,000 special forces troops from Syria comes from an impatience to end an 18-year long “Global War on Terrorism” military campaign of unprecedented expense. This is somewhat understandable. After almost $6 trillion of US Federal expenditure and two decades of fighting, surely enough is enough. But the inconvenient truth is IS and al-Qaeda jihadi fighters around the world have increased, in some estimates nearly four-fold, since September 11. Still, betraying the SDF and pulling out of Syria for small short-term savings risks jeopardising all that has been achieved in defeating the IS caliphate in northwestern Iraq. IS hardliners in overcrowded camps IS will never return to its days of power as a physical caliphate, but all the evidence points to it tipping past an inflection point and beginning a long, steady resurgence. IS has thousands of terrorist fighters still active in the field in northern Iraq. They’re attacking by night and rebuilding strength from disgruntled Sunni communities, as well as having thousands of fighters lying low in Syria. But in recent months, the tempo of IS attacks has shifted from Iraq to Syria with the previously hidden insurgency reemerging. As many as 12,000 terrorist fighters, including 2,000 foreigners, are detained in prisons run, at least until this week, by the SDF. Many are located in the border region now being overrun by the Turkish military and the Syrian jihadi it counts as loyal instruments. Elsewhere, in poorly secured overcrowded camps for internally displaced peoples (IDPs), tens of thousands of women, many fiercely loyal to IS, and children are held in precarious circumstances. In the Al Hawl camp alone there are more than 60,000 women and children linked to IS, including 11 Australian women and their 44 children, along with 10,000 IDPs. The IS hardliners not only enforce a reign of terror within the camps, but are in regular communication with IS insurgents. They confidently await their liberation by the IS insurgent forces. Liberated ISIS fighters The hope of being freed is neither naive nor remote. Already, hundreds of fighters and IDPs have escaped the prisons and camps since the Turkish offensive began. From mid-2012 until mid-2013, IS ran an insurgent campaign called “Breaking the Walls”. It saw thousands of hardened senior ISIS leaders, and many other militants who would later join the movement, broken out of half a dozen prisons surrounding Baghdad. Suicide squads were used to blast holes in prison walls. Heavily armed assault teams moved rapidly through the prisons, blasting open cells and rushing the hundreds of liberated terrorist fighters into tactical four-wheel-drives. They were to be driven away in the desert through the night to rebuild the senior ranks of ISIS. The liberated fighters were not only more valuable to ISIS after their time in prison, with many switching allegiances to join the movement, they were better educated and more deeply radicalised graduating for what they refer to as their terrorist universities. It would appear the same cycle is now being repeated in northeastern Syria. (Greg Barton is Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

US retreat from Syria could see Islamic State roar back to life

More than 100 prisoners of the <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/we-have-taken-most-dangerous-isis-fighters-in-syria-trump-254848">Islamic State</a> extremist movement have escaped in Syria in the chaos since <a href="https://www.wionews.com/photos/key-developments-in-turkeys-offensive-in-syria-256638">Turkey's incursion</a>, a senior US official said Wednesday.

"We would say the number is now over 100. We do not know where they are," James Jeffrey, the State Department pointman on Syria, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee when asked about the detainees.

Turkey launched a military operation in Syria after President Donald Trump agreed to pull US troops who were allied with the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish-led group that bore the brunt of the fight against the Islamic State group.

Jeffrey said that the Kurdish fighters were still guarding prisoners from the extremist group, despite their warnings that they will need to devote resources to fight Turkey instead.

"Almost all of the prisons that the SDF were guarding are still secured. The SDF still has people there," Jeffrey said.

"We are monitoring that as best we can. We still have people in Syria working with the SDF and one of those priorities is these prisons," he said.

The Kurdish fighters have pulled out of a key border area as part of a US-brokered agreement with Turkey to end the offensive.

Turkey links the Syrian Kurdish fighters to PKK separatists at home, who are considered a terrorist group by the United States and the European Union.

 
&nbsp;

More than 100 prisoners of the Islamic State extremist movement have escaped in Syria in the chaos since Turkey's incursion, a senior US official said Wednesday.

More than 100 prisoners of the Islamic State extremist movement have escaped in Syria in the chaos since Turkey's incursion, a senior US official said Wednesday. "We would say the number is now over 100. We do not know where they are," James Jeffrey, the State Department pointman on Syria, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee when asked about the detainees. Turkey launched a military operation in Syria after President Donald Trump agreed to pull US troops who were allied with the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish-led group that bore the brunt of the fight against the Islamic State group. Jeffrey said that the Kurdish fighters were still guarding prisoners from the extremist group, despite their warnings that they will need to devote resources to fight Turkey instead. "Almost all of the prisons that the SDF were guarding are still secured. The SDF still has people there," Jeffrey said. "We are monitoring that as best we can. We still have people in Syria working with the SDF and one of those priorities is these prisons," he said. The Kurdish fighters have pulled out of a key border area as part of a US-brokered agreement with Turkey to end the offensive. Turkey links the Syrian Kurdish fighters to PKK separatists at home, who are considered a terrorist group by the United States and the European Union.

More than 100 Islamic State prisoners have escaped in Syria: US envoy

Turkey’s ambassador to China, Emin Onen, didn’t mince his words this week when he took his Chinese hosts to task for failing to support Turkey’s military campaign against a Kurdish militia in Syria.

Speaking in Turkish through a translator at a news conference at his Beijing embassy, Onen implicitly put China on the spot by calling on it to stand with Turkey in its fight against political violence.

In doing so, Onen was laying bare long-standing strains in Turkish-Chinese relations as well as contradictions that link Turkey’s long-standing refusal to fully recognise Kurdish rights to China’s brutal crackdown in its troubled, north-western province of Xinjiang.

Chinese officials have long sought to prevent Turkey from speaking out on the crackdown by privately arguing in discussions with their Turkish counterparts that China’s massive effort to fundamentally alter the belief system of Turkic Muslims, packaged as a fight against political violence, was no different from Turkish attitudes towards the Kurds.

Turkey has justified its decades-old policy in predominantly Kurdish southeastern Turkey and its more recent interventions in Syria as a struggle against the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) that has been designated a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the United States and the European Union, and its Syrian affiliate, the People's Protection Units (YPG).

The PKK has waged an insurgency in south-eastern Turkey for more than three decades. Tens of thousands have been killed in PKK attacks and Turkish military operations.

The YPG, which has not been designated by either the US or the EU, served in recent years as the United States’ ground troops in the battle to defeat the Islamic State’s Syria-based Caliphate.

“What we hope for is that China, whether internally or externally, is an anti-terrorist nation. They are a member of the (United Nations) Security Council, so they should understand our present situation,” Onen said.

“Certainly, we know that China is a country that is fighting against terror ... We are also fighting against ... (political violence) and it’s one of the most important issues,” Onen went on to say.

Onen was responding to what amounted to a Chinese condemnation of the Turkish incursion into Syria when Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang, urged “Turkey to halt military action and to return to the right track, resolving the issue with political solutions.”

China had earlier called on Turkey to “exercise restraint,” insisting that Syria’s “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity must be respected and upheld.”

The stakes for both Turkey and China are high.

Both are likely hoping that Russian execution of an enhanced ceasefire initially negotiated by US Vice president Mike Pence on a visit to Ankara last week will enable them to avoid a further deterioration in relations. Russia took ownership of the Syrian process during talks on Tuesday between presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Turkey, home to the largest Chinese Turkic Muslim exile community, and long a supporter of political and cultural rights for Uighurs, has on occasion breached the Muslim’s world’s wall of silence about the Chinese crackdown.

If Turkey, one of the Islamic world’s most powerful nations that compete with Saudi Arabia and Iran for leadership, were to revert to sustained criticism of the Chinese crackdown, it would make it more difficult for other Muslim states to maintain their silence or, in some cases, endorsement of Chinese policy.

It would ironically align Turkey with the United States, which last week imposed sanctions in a bid to force Turkey to halt its Syrian military campaign. The US, unlike the Muslim world, has been vocal in its condemnation of the Chinese crackdown in Xinjiang.

Taking China to task on Xinjiang is risky business, certainly for a country that has seen its economy falter. Turkey has been counting on China to help it resolve its economic problems.

China, transferred in June on the eve of Turkish elections, $1 billion to Turkey as part of a Turkish lira-Chinese yuan currency swap. China, which sees Turkey as a key node in its Belt and Road initiative, has further pledged $3.6 billion in funding for energy and telecommunications infrastructure projects.

Deng Li, China’s ambassador to Turkey, warned in March that public Turkish criticism of China’s Xinjiang policy “will negatively affect mutual trust and understanding and will be reflected in commercial and economic relations.”

Li issued his threat after Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and his ministry spokesman, Hami Aksoy, in a rare expression of anti-Chinese sentiment used harsh language to condemn events in Xinjiang where some one million Turkic Muslims are believed to have been incarcerated in re-education camps and/or pushed into force labour.

Calling the crackdown an “embarrassment to humanity,” Aksoy demanded that Chinese authorities respect human rights of the Uighurs and close what he termed “concentration camps.”

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on Turkey two months later to support China’s policy in Xinjiang in a bid to “safeguard the overall situation of the strategic cooperation between the two countries.”

The strains in Turkish-Chinese relations were put on public display in July when China’s state news agency Xinhua quoted visiting Erdogan as saying that people in Xinjiang “live happily.”

Turkish officials insisted that Erdogan had expressed the hope that people in China would “live happily in peace and prosperity,” not that they were living happily.

Chinese foreign ministry spokeswomen Hua Chunying, clearly believing that this time around it would be Turkey rather than China that blinks first, insisted on Tuesday, “We called on Turkey many times to stop its military action. We hope all sides will form a synergy to combat terrorism, advance the political settlement process of the Syrian issue, and jointly safeguard peace and tranquillity in the region.”

It’s a synergy built on sand as long as Turkey and China cloak their refusal to come to grips with minority rights in counterterrorism terms that are opportunistically called into question whenever they contradict their geopolitical ambitions. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp;

Turkey’s ambassador to China, Emin Onen, didn’t mince his words this week when he took his Chinese hosts to task for failing to support Turkey’s military campaign against a Kurdish militia in Syria.

Turkey’s ambassador to China, Emin Onen, didn’t mince his words this week when he took his Chinese hosts to task for failing to support Turkey’s military campaign against a Kurdish militia in Syria. Speaking in Turkish through a translator at a news conference at his Beijing embassy, Onen implicitly put China on the spot by calling on it to stand with Turkey in its fight against political violence. In doing so, Onen was laying bare long-standing strains in Turkish-Chinese relations as well as contradictions that link Turkey’s long-standing refusal to fully recognise Kurdish rights to China’s brutal crackdown in its troubled, north-western province of Xinjiang. Chinese officials have long sought to prevent Turkey from speaking out on the crackdown by privately arguing in discussions with their Turkish counterparts that China’s massive effort to fundamentally alter the belief system of Turkic Muslims, packaged as a fight against political violence, was no different from Turkish attitudes towards the Kurds. Turkey has justified its decades-old policy in predominantly Kurdish southeastern Turkey and its more recent interventions in Syria as a struggle against the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) that has been designated a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the United States and the European Union, and its Syrian affiliate, the People's Protection Units (YPG). The PKK has waged an insurgency in south-eastern Turkey for more than three decades. Tens of thousands have been killed in PKK attacks and Turkish military operations. The YPG, which has not been designated by either the US or the EU, served in recent years as the United States’ ground troops in the battle to defeat the Islamic State’s Syria-based Caliphate. “What we hope for is that China, whether internally or externally, is an anti-terrorist nation. They are a member of the (United Nations) Security Council, so they should understand our present situation,” Onen said. “Certainly, we know that China is a country that is fighting against terror ... We are also fighting against ... (political violence) and it’s one of the most important issues,” Onen went on to say. Onen was responding to what amounted to a Chinese condemnation of the Turkish incursion into Syria when Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang, urged “Turkey to halt military action and to return to the right track, resolving the issue with political solutions.” China had earlier called on Turkey to “exercise restraint,” insisting that Syria’s “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity must be respected and upheld.” The stakes for both Turkey and China are high. Both are likely hoping that Russian execution of an enhanced ceasefire initially negotiated by US Vice president Mike Pence on a visit to Ankara last week will enable them to avoid a further deterioration in relations. Russia took ownership of the Syrian process during talks on Tuesday between presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Turkey, home to the largest Chinese Turkic Muslim exile community, and long a supporter of political and cultural rights for Uighurs, has on occasion breached the Muslim’s world’s wall of silence about the Chinese crackdown. If Turkey, one of the Islamic world’s most powerful nations that compete with Saudi Arabia and Iran for leadership, were to revert to sustained criticism of the Chinese crackdown, it would make it more difficult for other Muslim states to maintain their silence or, in some cases, endorsement of Chinese policy. It would ironically align Turkey with the United States, which last week imposed sanctions in a bid to force Turkey to halt its Syrian military campaign. The US, unlike the Muslim world, has been vocal in its condemnation of the Chinese crackdown in Xinjiang. Taking China to task on Xinjiang is risky business, certainly for a country that has seen its economy falter. Turkey has been counting on China to help it resolve its economic problems. China, transferred in June on the eve of Turkish elections, $1 billion to Turkey as part of a Turkish lira-Chinese yuan currency swap. China, which sees Turkey as a key node in its Belt and Road initiative, has further pledged $3.6 billion in funding for energy and telecommunications infrastructure projects. Deng Li, China’s ambassador to Turkey, warned in March that public Turkish criticism of China’s Xinjiang policy “will negatively affect mutual trust and understanding and will be reflected in commercial and economic relations.” Li issued his threat after Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and his ministry spokesman, Hami Aksoy, in a rare expression of anti-Chinese sentiment used harsh language to condemn events in Xinjiang where some one million Turkic Muslims are believed to have been incarcerated in re-education camps and/or pushed into force labour. Calling the crackdown an “embarrassment to humanity,” Aksoy demanded that Chinese authorities respect human rights of the Uighurs and close what he termed “concentration camps.” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on Turkey two months later to support China’s policy in Xinjiang in a bid to “safeguard the overall situation of the strategic cooperation between the two countries.” The strains in Turkish-Chinese relations were put on public display in July when China’s state news agency Xinhua quoted visiting Erdogan as saying that people in Xinjiang “live happily.” Turkish officials insisted that Erdogan had expressed the hope that people in China would “live happily in peace and prosperity,” not that they were living happily. Chinese foreign ministry spokeswomen Hua Chunying, clearly believing that this time around it would be Turkey rather than China that blinks first, insisted on Tuesday, “We called on Turkey many times to stop its military action. We hope all sides will form a synergy to combat terrorism, advance the political settlement process of the Syrian issue, and jointly safeguard peace and tranquillity in the region.” It’s a synergy built on sand as long as Turkey and China cloak their refusal to come to grips with minority rights in counterterrorism terms that are opportunistically called into question whenever they contradict their geopolitical ambitions. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Turkey and China tie themselves in knots over Syria and Xinjiang

By Recep Onursal

The ramifications of Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw US troops from the Turkish-Syrian border continues to have a seismic effect on the situation in northern Syria.

Faced with the Turkish invasion of northern Syria, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who controlled the area were forced to make compromises. On October 13, they announced a deal with the Syrian army, which began moving troops towards the Turkish border. A five-day ceasefire was brokered by the US on October 18, during which Turkey agreed to pause its offensive to allow Kurdish forces to withdraw.

For many, the SDF proved itself to be the most effective force in the fight against Islamic State (IS). Turkey, however, considers the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it, the US and EU label as a terrorist organisation.

But behind this lies a long history of Turkey denying the very existence of the Kurdish conflict, and the political and cultural rights of its Kurdish population. Understanding this history helps explain why the conflict is so intractable, and the impact it continues to have on Turkey’s foreign policy choices.

No room in the nation-state

The Kurdish conflict cannot be understood without considering the question of power and exclusion. Its origins go back to the mid-19th century when the Ottomans attempted to end the 300-year-old autonomy of the Kurdish principalities in Kurdistan. This struggle for autonomy wasn’t resolved during the rule of the Ottoman era, and when it collapsed, all of the new nation-states that eventually emerged – Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran – inherited their own Kurdish conflict.

The Turks and the Kurds fought a successful war of independence together in 1919 against the Allied forces. Nevertheless, when the new Republic of Turkey was established in 1923, Turkish identity was presented as its unifying force, at the expense of the society’s political, social and cultural differences.

Not only was political power further centralised in Ankara, but the domination of the ethnic, Turkish and Sunni majority became the norm. The decision to create a centralised and homogeneous nation-state was implemented in a top-down and violent fashion. The seeds of the long-term problems that Turkish and Kurdish communities confront today were created by this decision.

Various Kurdish groups challenged this new social and political order with different revolts, uprisings, and resistance, but these were violently suppressed. Repressive policies of assimilation were later implemented to transform the Kurds into civilised and secular Turks.

A conflict buried

The Kurdish conflict laid buried for many years. Then, the most serious challenge to Turkey’s nation-state project was initiated by the PKK in 1984, which embraced a political agenda called democratic autonomy. The violent struggle between Ankara and the PKK has resulted in a huge economic and human cost.

Peace talks which began in 2013 with the PKK’s jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan were widely considered to be the best chance for ending the conflict, but these collapsed in 2015. This led to increasing violence in the form of destructive armed conflict in southeastern Turkey and a wave of bombings, including in Ankara and Istanbul.

The resolution of intractable conflicts is only possible when conflicted parties can confront their past and learn from it. In 2015, amid attempts by Turkish opposition parties to reopen peace negotiations with the Kurds, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insisted: “There is no Kurdish conflict”. Such positioning, which continues today, keeps the political dimension of the conflict in the background.

The state carefully controls what can and cannot be said about the conflict. Typically, words such as “terror” and “traitor” are used to criminalise those who criticise government policy towards the Kurds. A group of academics who signed a petition in 2016 calling for the resumption of peace talks were charged with making “terrorism propaganda”. The non-violent wing of the Kurdish movement – activists, politicians, political parties – has also been criminalised.

Blame game

Instead of confronting their failure to bring about peace, Turkish political elites have tried to apportion blame elsewhere. Erdoğan, for example, repeatedly refers to an invisible “mastermind” who orchestrates the PKK. Such rhetoric is deployed to play on the collective fear and anxiety about national security felt by parts of Turkish society.

Some have called this the “Sèvres syndrome” – referring to the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres that marked the end of the Ottoman empire and proposed to divide it into small states and occupation zones. The treaty was never implemented and superseded by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty which recognised the Republic of Turkey.

This syndrome – also referred to as “Sèvres Paranoia” – in essence reflects the collective fear that the Treaty of Sèvres will be revived and that the Turkish state is encircled by enemies who want to divide and weaken the country.

Today, this line of thinking is an integral part of Turkish political life and continues to influence public perception towards the external world. In a 2006 public opinion survey, for example, 78% of participants agreed that “the West wants to divide and break up Turkey like they broke up the Ottoman Empire”.

In this way, the Kurdish conflict has been used to mobilise Turkish society to act against its own collective interest: a peaceful and just society. Policies aimed at managing the conflict have been implemented mostly within a state of emergency, in ways that continue to undermine Turkish democracy. Not only has the tremendous economic and human cost of the conflict become a “normal” part of Turkish life, but the state has also been successful in actively keeping the political dimension of the conflict at bay.

For a long time, Turkey refrained from talking about the Kurdish issue by assuming that it would eventually fade away. But it didn’t and instead, the conflict has become more deeply entrenched. Time will tell whether the Turkish state will ultimately gain or lose by its latest military intervention in Syria. However, what’s clear is that the Kurdish conflict will get more complicated with this latest move, and both the Turkish state and Turkish society will no longer be able to ignore it.

 
(Recep Onursal is Assistant Lecturer and PhD candidate in International Conflict Analysis, University of Kent)

&nbsp;(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-kurdish-conflict-in-turkey-is-so-intractable-125101">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp;

By Recep Onursal The ramifications of Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw US troops from the Turkish-Syrian border continues to have a seismic effect on the situation in northern Syria.

By Recep Onursal The ramifications of Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw US troops from the Turkish-Syrian border continues to have a seismic effect on the situation in northern Syria. Faced with the Turkish invasion of northern Syria, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who controlled the area were forced to make compromises. On October 13, they announced a deal with the Syrian army, which began moving troops towards the Turkish border. A five-day ceasefire was brokered by the US on October 18, during which Turkey agreed to pause its offensive to allow Kurdish forces to withdraw. For many, the SDF proved itself to be the most effective force in the fight against Islamic State (IS). Turkey, however, considers the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it, the US and EU label as a terrorist organisation. But behind this lies a long history of Turkey denying the very existence of the Kurdish conflict, and the political and cultural rights of its Kurdish population. Understanding this history helps explain why the conflict is so intractable, and the impact it continues to have on Turkey’s foreign policy choices. No room in the nation-state The Kurdish conflict cannot be understood without considering the question of power and exclusion. Its origins go back to the mid-19th century when the Ottomans attempted to end the 300-year-old autonomy of the Kurdish principalities in Kurdistan. This struggle for autonomy wasn’t resolved during the rule of the Ottoman era, and when it collapsed, all of the new nation-states that eventually emerged – Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran – inherited their own Kurdish conflict. The Turks and the Kurds fought a successful war of independence together in 1919 against the Allied forces. Nevertheless, when the new Republic of Turkey was established in 1923, Turkish identity was presented as its unifying force, at the expense of the society’s political, social and cultural differences. Not only was political power further centralised in Ankara, but the domination of the ethnic, Turkish and Sunni majority became the norm. The decision to create a centralised and homogeneous nation-state was implemented in a top-down and violent fashion. The seeds of the long-term problems that Turkish and Kurdish communities confront today were created by this decision. Various Kurdish groups challenged this new social and political order with different revolts, uprisings, and resistance, but these were violently suppressed. Repressive policies of assimilation were later implemented to transform the Kurds into civilised and secular Turks. A conflict buried The Kurdish conflict laid buried for many years. Then, the most serious challenge to Turkey’s nation-state project was initiated by the PKK in 1984, which embraced a political agenda called democratic autonomy. The violent struggle between Ankara and the PKK has resulted in a huge economic and human cost. Peace talks which began in 2013 with the PKK’s jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan were widely considered to be the best chance for ending the conflict, but these collapsed in 2015. This led to increasing violence in the form of destructive armed conflict in southeastern Turkey and a wave of bombings, including in Ankara and Istanbul. The resolution of intractable conflicts is only possible when conflicted parties can confront their past and learn from it. In 2015, amid attempts by Turkish opposition parties to reopen peace negotiations with the Kurds, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insisted: “There is no Kurdish conflict”. Such positioning, which continues today, keeps the political dimension of the conflict in the background. The state carefully controls what can and cannot be said about the conflict. Typically, words such as “terror” and “traitor” are used to criminalise those who criticise government policy towards the Kurds. A group of academics who signed a petition in 2016 calling for the resumption of peace talks were charged with making “terrorism propaganda”. The non-violent wing of the Kurdish movement – activists, politicians, political parties – has also been criminalised. Blame game Instead of confronting their failure to bring about peace, Turkish political elites have tried to apportion blame elsewhere. Erdoğan, for example, repeatedly refers to an invisible “mastermind” who orchestrates the PKK. Such rhetoric is deployed to play on the collective fear and anxiety about national security felt by parts of Turkish society. Some have called this the “Sèvres syndrome” – referring to the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres that marked the end of the Ottoman empire and proposed to divide it into small states and occupation zones. The treaty was never implemented and superseded by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty which recognised the Republic of Turkey. This syndrome – also referred to as “Sèvres Paranoia” – in essence reflects the collective fear that the Treaty of Sèvres will be revived and that the Turkish state is encircled by enemies who want to divide and weaken the country. Today, this line of thinking is an integral part of Turkish political life and continues to influence public perception towards the external world. In a 2006 public opinion survey, for example, 78% of participants agreed that “the West wants to divide and break up Turkey like they broke up the Ottoman Empire”. In this way, the Kurdish conflict has been used to mobilise Turkish society to act against its own collective interest: a peaceful and just society. Policies aimed at managing the conflict have been implemented mostly within a state of emergency, in ways that continue to undermine Turkish democracy. Not only has the tremendous economic and human cost of the conflict become a “normal” part of Turkish life, but the state has also been successful in actively keeping the political dimension of the conflict at bay. For a long time, Turkey refrained from talking about the Kurdish issue by assuming that it would eventually fade away. But it didn’t and instead, the conflict has become more deeply entrenched. Time will tell whether the Turkish state will ultimately gain or lose by its latest military intervention in Syria. However, what’s clear is that the Kurdish conflict will get more complicated with this latest move, and both the Turkish state and Turkish society will no longer be able to ignore it. (Recep Onursal is Assistant Lecturer and PhD candidate in International Conflict Analysis, University of Kent) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Why the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is so intractable

By Kerstin Carlson

For more than a year, European powers have dallied over the question of what to do with the tens of thousands of Islamic State (IS) fighters and adherents captured following the fall of the so-called caliphate in Syria and Iraq.

Now the US decision to withdraw troops and Turkey’s subsequent invasion of northern Syria on October 9 means the West has lost the luxury of inaction.

Since IS’s territorial defeat in March 2019, camps housing “IS families” and other displaced persons have swollen far in excess of their capacity. In Syria, the largest camp, Al-Hawl, exceeds 70,000 people.

The Turkish offensive has drawn the resources of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces away from guarding the camps. Predictably, detainees have been escaping. On October 14, more than 700 IS adherents (men, women, and children, although reportedly no fighters) escaped the Ain Issa camp in Syria. The US had attempted to move 60 “high value” IS prisoners before its troops withdrew, but failed. Expect more escapes, including of IS fighters, in the days and weeks to come.

Repatriation

Prior to the Turkish invasion, European nations had been wringing their hands, but doing little else, regarding the problem of foreign and other citizens in detention in Syria and Iraq. It’s estimated that 40,000 foreign fighters, including 6,000 western Europeans, travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the group.

The two options most hotly debated regarding European citizens were repatriation and trials on site, where the detainees are being held. What to do with Iraqi and Syrian citizens was to be left to Iraq and Syria.

Of the two options, repatriation of nationals is the right choice. European countries, however, have equivocated. Europe does not want these citizens, understood as traitorous at best, dangerous at worst. The notion of danger includes even very small children, who some argue should be understood as “radicalised” or “cubs of the caliphate,” irreparably marked by the violence and indoctrination they have experienced.

This narrative has taken precedence over the reports regarding the inhumane conditions in the camps in Syria: overflowing sewage leaking into tents, worms in the water, extreme weather conditions resulting in death, particularly for babies and young children. The case of Shamima Begum, who left the UK as a 15-year-old to join IS and whose citizenship was later revoked by the British government, is a stark example of this. Her baby died a few weeks after he was born in the al-Roj camp in March 2019.

Britain is not alone: Most European countries refuse to repatriate citizens picked up in Syria and Iraq, or even, in fact, to count or identify them. Only a few exceptional repatriation instances exist, including a handful of French and Dutch orphans and a large mixed group of people including children to Germany. Kosovo and Kazakstan have been open to repatriation and Turkey and Russia have taken some orphans. In June, the Kurds released 800 detainees back to their families in Syria.

Repatriated IS fighters and adherents would stand trial in their home countries under domestic criminal law.

IS tribunals

A second option, trials on site for IS adherents regardless of citizenship, was gaining momentum prior to the Turkish invasion, with several countries promoting the idea of an international tribunal. The idea of constructing an ad hoc tribunal in the region promised to solve the detainee impasse for Western countries and the SDF.

But there are several problems with such an option. First, because the SDF is not an official government but rather provisionally in charge of territory in Syria, an ad hoc court with international support could not be set up in the Kurdish area of northern Syria. This leaves Iraq as the likely site. Constructing such an international tribunal in Iraq for IS adherents was the topic of a meeting held between Britain, France, Germany and three other countries in Copenhagen on October 11. On the table is a hybrid structure, involving both international and Iraqi judges.

But an ad hoc tribunal in Iraq would need to contend with Iraqi law, which allows the death penalty, as well as the deeply problematic Iraqi trials already underway of IS affiliates. For the past several years, the Iraqi government has been subjecting IS fighters and affiliates to what can only be called sham trials. Trials average ten minutes, and many defendants will not have met their defence attorney – who is paid $25 per case – before the trial.

Punishment for IS affiliation includes life in prison when judges are lenient, but can also bring death by hanging. Iraqi courts have issued hundreds of death sentences, including against foreign nationals, although it’s not clear if any have yet been carried out.

What kind of justice? 
 
Internationally financed courts will not hand out death sentences – even life imprisonment is a sentence rarely pronounced by international or hybrid criminal courts. Gross violations of procedural rights are also unpalatable for Western-run institutions. But the numbers of detainees in prison prior to the Turkish offensive as well as the dearth of information regarding what crimes they have committed beyond affiliation with IS mean that rights-respecting court processes will take huge resources and could be inconclusive.

Any just tribunal would release most of the convicted prisoners within, at most, a few years if jail terms are to conform to widely accepted humanitarian standards. This would simply defer by a few years the question of what in fact should be done with IS affiliates – where should they live and where do they belong?

In early 2019, the Kurds set up trials for IS adherents in Kurdish-administered areas of Iraq and Syria, as an antidote to flawed Iraqi justice. Defence counsel was provided and sentences were capped at 20 years: rehabilitation, not revenge, was the goal, one judge told a journalist for NPR. This promising development may be one more casualty of the changed circumstances on the ground.

The first, still best, option – repatriation of foreign nationals – is arguably a quickly closing window. Even then, questions would remain about what should happen to Iraqi and Syrian nationals, and what role the West should play in resolving their situation. But European powers must avoid taking the third option they’d been exercising by default – doing nothing, and waiting for circumstances to change.

(Kerstin Carlson is Associate Professor International Law, University of Southern Denmark) 
 
(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/western-states-must-repatriate-is-fighters-and-their-families-before-more-break-free-from-syrian-camps-125168">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp; 
&nbsp;

&nbsp;

By Kerstin Carlson For more than a year, European powers have dallied over the question of what to do with the tens of thousands of Islamic State (IS) fighters and adherents captured following the fall of the so-called caliphate in Syria and Iraq.

By Kerstin Carlson For more than a year, European powers have dallied over the question of what to do with the tens of thousands of Islamic State (IS) fighters and adherents captured following the fall of the so-called caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Now the US decision to withdraw troops and Turkey’s subsequent invasion of northern Syria on October 9 means the West has lost the luxury of inaction. Since IS’s territorial defeat in March 2019, camps housing “IS families” and other displaced persons have swollen far in excess of their capacity. In Syria, the largest camp, Al-Hawl, exceeds 70,000 people. The Turkish offensive has drawn the resources of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces away from guarding the camps. Predictably, detainees have been escaping. On October 14, more than 700 IS adherents (men, women, and children, although reportedly no fighters) escaped the Ain Issa camp in Syria. The US had attempted to move 60 “high value” IS prisoners before its troops withdrew, but failed. Expect more escapes, including of IS fighters, in the days and weeks to come. Repatriation Prior to the Turkish invasion, European nations had been wringing their hands, but doing little else, regarding the problem of foreign and other citizens in detention in Syria and Iraq. It’s estimated that 40,000 foreign fighters, including 6,000 western Europeans, travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the group. The two options most hotly debated regarding European citizens were repatriation and trials on site, where the detainees are being held. What to do with Iraqi and Syrian citizens was to be left to Iraq and Syria. Of the two options, repatriation of nationals is the right choice. European countries, however, have equivocated. Europe does not want these citizens, understood as traitorous at best, dangerous at worst. The notion of danger includes even very small children, who some argue should be understood as “radicalised” or “cubs of the caliphate,” irreparably marked by the violence and indoctrination they have experienced. This narrative has taken precedence over the reports regarding the inhumane conditions in the camps in Syria: overflowing sewage leaking into tents, worms in the water, extreme weather conditions resulting in death, particularly for babies and young children. The case of Shamima Begum, who left the UK as a 15-year-old to join IS and whose citizenship was later revoked by the British government, is a stark example of this. Her baby died a few weeks after he was born in the al-Roj camp in March 2019. Britain is not alone: Most European countries refuse to repatriate citizens picked up in Syria and Iraq, or even, in fact, to count or identify them. Only a few exceptional repatriation instances exist, including a handful of French and Dutch orphans and a large mixed group of people including children to Germany. Kosovo and Kazakstan have been open to repatriation and Turkey and Russia have taken some orphans. In June, the Kurds released 800 detainees back to their families in Syria. Repatriated IS fighters and adherents would stand trial in their home countries under domestic criminal law. IS tribunals A second option, trials on site for IS adherents regardless of citizenship, was gaining momentum prior to the Turkish invasion, with several countries promoting the idea of an international tribunal. The idea of constructing an ad hoc tribunal in the region promised to solve the detainee impasse for Western countries and the SDF. But there are several problems with such an option. First, because the SDF is not an official government but rather provisionally in charge of territory in Syria, an ad hoc court with international support could not be set up in the Kurdish area of northern Syria. This leaves Iraq as the likely site. Constructing such an international tribunal in Iraq for IS adherents was the topic of a meeting held between Britain, France, Germany and three other countries in Copenhagen on October 11. On the table is a hybrid structure, involving both international and Iraqi judges. But an ad hoc tribunal in Iraq would need to contend with Iraqi law, which allows the death penalty, as well as the deeply problematic Iraqi trials already underway of IS affiliates. For the past several years, the Iraqi government has been subjecting IS fighters and affiliates to what can only be called sham trials. Trials average ten minutes, and many defendants will not have met their defence attorney – who is paid $25 per case – before the trial. Punishment for IS affiliation includes life in prison when judges are lenient, but can also bring death by hanging. Iraqi courts have issued hundreds of death sentences, including against foreign nationals, although it’s not clear if any have yet been carried out. What kind of justice? Internationally financed courts will not hand out death sentences – even life imprisonment is a sentence rarely pronounced by international or hybrid criminal courts. Gross violations of procedural rights are also unpalatable for Western-run institutions. But the numbers of detainees in prison prior to the Turkish offensive as well as the dearth of information regarding what crimes they have committed beyond affiliation with IS mean that rights-respecting court processes will take huge resources and could be inconclusive. Any just tribunal would release most of the convicted prisoners within, at most, a few years if jail terms are to conform to widely accepted humanitarian standards. This would simply defer by a few years the question of what in fact should be done with IS affiliates – where should they live and where do they belong? In early 2019, the Kurds set up trials for IS adherents in Kurdish-administered areas of Iraq and Syria, as an antidote to flawed Iraqi justice. Defence counsel was provided and sentences were capped at 20 years: rehabilitation, not revenge, was the goal, one judge told a journalist for NPR. This promising development may be one more casualty of the changed circumstances on the ground. The first, still best, option – repatriation of foreign nationals – is arguably a quickly closing window. Even then, questions would remain about what should happen to Iraqi and Syrian nationals, and what role the West should play in resolving their situation. But European powers must avoid taking the third option they’d been exercising by default – doing nothing, and waiting for circumstances to change. (Kerstin Carlson is Associate Professor International Law, University of Southern Denmark) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Western states must repatriate IS fighters before more break free from Syrian camps

By Haidar Khezri

Kurdish fighters under attack by Turkey have described President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw US troops from northern Syria as a “stab in the back.”

Since the bombing began on October 9, Turkish military operations against the Syrian Democratic Forces in northern Syria, Washington’s staunchest and most effective allies in the war against the Islamic State, has killed at least 11 civilians and an unconfirmed number of Kurdish fighters, with estimates ranging from dozens to hundreds.

Kurdish fighters are key partners to the US in the Middle East. From 2003 to 2017, they helped overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein, battled al-Qaida and pushed the Islamic State out of northern Iraq and Syria.

Kurdish women have fought on the front lines in all these battles, as they have done since the 19th-century Kurdish commander Kara Fatma led an Ottoman battalion of 700 men and 43 women against the Russian Empire.

That was unusual for the period – but, then again, Kurdish women have long been exceptions in the mostly conservative Middle East.

Who are the Kurds?

Kurdistan, where I was born, is among the largest nations in the world without a state. Around 35 million Kurds inhabit a mountainous zone straddling Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Armenia.

The Kurds were first split up politically in the 17th century when their territory was divided between the Ottoman and Safavid empires. Back then, the Roman scholar Pietro Della Valle travelled to the region and was surprised to find “Kurdish women commuting freely without hijab.” He noted in his 1667 travelogue that “they engage with Kurdish men and foreigners without any problems.”

After World War I, a treaty between Britain and France, called the Sykes-Picot Agreement, drew arbitrary borders across the Middle East, creating colonial protectorate states. The partition again fragmented the Kurds, this time across four countries: modern-day Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

The Kurds have been fighting for their sovereignty ever since. In recent decades, they have succeeded in establishing autonomously governed regions within Iraq and Syria.

But in Iran and Turkey, the Kurds continue their armed struggle. Both countries to view this ethnic minority as a terrorist threat and legally repress Kurdish populations.

This setup has put Kurdistan – domestically a rather peaceable, prosperous place with significant oil reserves – squarely in the center of a geopolitical quagmire.

Until Trump’s recent turnaround, the US had backed the Kurds in Syria, Iraq and Iran, where they were critical to defeating the Islamic State and served as jailers to about 11,000 captured IS fighters.

But Turkey – a US ally – sees the armed Kurds in Syria as an extension of the rebel Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which has been fighting for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey since the 1980s.

In May 2018, over 250 people were killed when Turkey bombed the Kurdish-majority Syrian city of Afrin, which Turkish armed forces consider a “terrorist corridor.”

The feminists of the PKK

The Marxist-Leninist PKK, founded in 1978, may be an enemy of the Turkish state, but it is also one of the most feminist movements in the Middle East.

The group held its first congress on women’s rights in 1987, in which PKK co-founder Sakine Cansiz – who was assassinated in 2013 – proposed that its “liberation for all” rhetoric must include women’s liberation, too.

Today the party’s political agenda explicitly recognises religious minorities, dissidents and women as the crux of democracy.

In the autonomous Kurdish regions of Iraq and Syria, women have the same legal rights as men. Indeed, the Iraqi Kurdish regional government has a higher proportion of women than the United Kingdom – 30 per cent versus 20 per cent.

The charter of the semi-autonomous Syrian Federation of Kurdistan, founded in 2012, requires that women must hold a minimum of 40 per cent of all government posts. Every Kurdish Syrian public institution must also have two co-presidents, one male and one female.

Women also make up 30 per cent of Kurdish fighters deployed across the Middle East. More than 25,000 Kurdish women are deployed in Syria as the Women’s Protection Units, an all-female militia inspired by the KPP’s feminist liberation ideology.

In contrast, about 14 per cent of US military service members are women.

Female Kurdish troops rescued thousands of Yazidis trapped by the Islamic State on Iraq’s Mount Sinjar in 2014 and helped liberate the city of Raqqa from the Islamic State in 2017.

Equal in battle but not everywhere else

Despite the relative freedom of women in Kurdistan compared to elsewhere in the Middle East, Kurdish society is not entirely gender equal.

In 2014, only 12 of 250 judges in Iraqi Kurdistan were female, and just one of 21 government ministers was. Female genital mutilation, child marriage and honour killings – in which male family members murder women who are alleged to have disgraced their families – persist, particularly in rural areas of Kurdistan.

And, in my experience, feminist debates like equal pay for women and #MeToo aren’t yet a topic of conversation in Kurdistan.

Historically, too, it’s noteworthy that many famous female Kurdish leaders succeeded only because their empowerment did not challenge the male establishment.

During World War I, Lady Adela Khanum, leader of the Kurdish region of Halabja, saved the lives of numerous British army officers on the battlefield, earning her the nickname “Princess of the Brave.”

But she originally rose to power because she inherited the position when her husband died. While ruling Halabja from 1909 to 1924, she did not push a women’s rights agenda.

The hard labour of freedom

Kurdish women who were seen as threats to male authority have often been punished, sometimes with death.

That’s what happened to the very first woman to fight in the Kurdish army. Margaret George Malik quickly rose up among the all-male ranks in the 1960s to lead troops in the Kurdish war for independence from Iraq.

She was murdered in 1969 under mysterious circumstances. Some historians believe that Malik was killed by her lover because she rejected his marriage proposal. Others say she was assassinated by the Kurdish leadership, which feared her growing influence.

Either way, Malik’s murder speaks to the battles Kurdish women still fight today.

It’s meaningful that in the Kurdish language, the word for woman – “jin” – shares a root with the word for life: “jiyan.” And both jin and jiyan are related to the word “jan,” or labour pains.

In a region surrounded by threats – from Turkey’s attacks and Islamic State terrorism and patriarchy at home – the women of Kurdistan are fighting for their life and liberty. And the cost is hard, dangerous labour.

 
(Haidar Khezri is Assistant Professor, University of Central Florida)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the<a href="https://theconversation.com/kurds-targeted-in-turkish-attack-include-thousands-of-female-fighters-who-battled-islamic-state-125100"> original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp;

By Haidar Khezri Kurdish fighters under attack by Turkey have described President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw US troops from northern Syria as a “stab in the back.

By Haidar Khezri Kurdish fighters under attack by Turkey have described President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw US troops from northern Syria as a “stab in the back.” Since the bombing began on October 9, Turkish military operations against the Syrian Democratic Forces in northern Syria, Washington’s staunchest and most effective allies in the war against the Islamic State, has killed at least 11 civilians and an unconfirmed number of Kurdish fighters, with estimates ranging from dozens to hundreds. Kurdish fighters are key partners to the US in the Middle East. From 2003 to 2017, they helped overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein, battled al-Qaida and pushed the Islamic State out of northern Iraq and Syria. Kurdish women have fought on the front lines in all these battles, as they have done since the 19th-century Kurdish commander Kara Fatma led an Ottoman battalion of 700 men and 43 women against the Russian Empire. That was unusual for the period – but, then again, Kurdish women have long been exceptions in the mostly conservative Middle East. Who are the Kurds? Kurdistan, where I was born, is among the largest nations in the world without a state. Around 35 million Kurds inhabit a mountainous zone straddling Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Armenia. The Kurds were first split up politically in the 17th century when their territory was divided between the Ottoman and Safavid empires. Back then, the Roman scholar Pietro Della Valle travelled to the region and was surprised to find “Kurdish women commuting freely without hijab.” He noted in his 1667 travelogue that “they engage with Kurdish men and foreigners without any problems.” After World War I, a treaty between Britain and France, called the Sykes-Picot Agreement, drew arbitrary borders across the Middle East, creating colonial protectorate states. The partition again fragmented the Kurds, this time across four countries: modern-day Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The Kurds have been fighting for their sovereignty ever since. In recent decades, they have succeeded in establishing autonomously governed regions within Iraq and Syria. But in Iran and Turkey, the Kurds continue their armed struggle. Both countries to view this ethnic minority as a terrorist threat and legally repress Kurdish populations. This setup has put Kurdistan – domestically a rather peaceable, prosperous place with significant oil reserves – squarely in the center of a geopolitical quagmire. Until Trump’s recent turnaround, the US had backed the Kurds in Syria, Iraq and Iran, where they were critical to defeating the Islamic State and served as jailers to about 11,000 captured IS fighters. But Turkey – a US ally – sees the armed Kurds in Syria as an extension of the rebel Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which has been fighting for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey since the 1980s. In May 2018, over 250 people were killed when Turkey bombed the Kurdish-majority Syrian city of Afrin, which Turkish armed forces consider a “terrorist corridor.” The feminists of the PKK The Marxist-Leninist PKK, founded in 1978, may be an enemy of the Turkish state, but it is also one of the most feminist movements in the Middle East. The group held its first congress on women’s rights in 1987, in which PKK co-founder Sakine Cansiz – who was assassinated in 2013 – proposed that its “liberation for all” rhetoric must include women’s liberation, too. Today the party’s political agenda explicitly recognises religious minorities, dissidents and women as the crux of democracy. In the autonomous Kurdish regions of Iraq and Syria, women have the same legal rights as men. Indeed, the Iraqi Kurdish regional government has a higher proportion of women than the United Kingdom – 30 per cent versus 20 per cent. The charter of the semi-autonomous Syrian Federation of Kurdistan, founded in 2012, requires that women must hold a minimum of 40 per cent of all government posts. Every Kurdish Syrian public institution must also have two co-presidents, one male and one female. Women also make up 30 per cent of Kurdish fighters deployed across the Middle East. More than 25,000 Kurdish women are deployed in Syria as the Women’s Protection Units, an all-female militia inspired by the KPP’s feminist liberation ideology. In contrast, about 14 per cent of US military service members are women. Female Kurdish troops rescued thousands of Yazidis trapped by the Islamic State on Iraq’s Mount Sinjar in 2014 and helped liberate the city of Raqqa from the Islamic State in 2017. Equal in battle but not everywhere else Despite the relative freedom of women in Kurdistan compared to elsewhere in the Middle East, Kurdish society is not entirely gender equal. In 2014, only 12 of 250 judges in Iraqi Kurdistan were female, and just one of 21 government ministers was. Female genital mutilation, child marriage and honour killings – in which male family members murder women who are alleged to have disgraced their families – persist, particularly in rural areas of Kurdistan. And, in my experience, feminist debates like equal pay for women and #MeToo aren’t yet a topic of conversation in Kurdistan. Historically, too, it’s noteworthy that many famous female Kurdish leaders succeeded only because their empowerment did not challenge the male establishment. During World War I, Lady Adela Khanum, leader of the Kurdish region of Halabja, saved the lives of numerous British army officers on the battlefield, earning her the nickname “Princess of the Brave.” But she originally rose to power because she inherited the position when her husband died. While ruling Halabja from 1909 to 1924, she did not push a women’s rights agenda. The hard labour of freedom Kurdish women who were seen as threats to male authority have often been punished, sometimes with death. That’s what happened to the very first woman to fight in the Kurdish army. Margaret George Malik quickly rose up among the all-male ranks in the 1960s to lead troops in the Kurdish war for independence from Iraq. She was murdered in 1969 under mysterious circumstances. Some historians believe that Malik was killed by her lover because she rejected his marriage proposal. Others say she was assassinated by the Kurdish leadership, which feared her growing influence. Either way, Malik’s murder speaks to the battles Kurdish women still fight today. It’s meaningful that in the Kurdish language, the word for woman – “jin” – shares a root with the word for life: “jiyan.” And both jin and jiyan are related to the word “jan,” or labour pains. In a region surrounded by threats – from Turkey’s attacks and Islamic State terrorism and patriarchy at home – the women of Kurdistan are fighting for their life and liberty. And the cost is hard, dangerous labour. (Haidar Khezri is Assistant Professor, University of Central Florida) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Kurdish women have been exceptions in mostly conservative Middle East

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