For years India's ties with the Gulf have been anchored on oil. It's time to go beyond it and focus on numerous untapped avenues. As India's External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar Tours West India, WION's Molly Gambhir tells you about the various areas where India and The Gulf can expand cooperation.

Gravitas: Untapped avenues in India, Gulf ties

PM Narendra Modi has been accorded with State Honours by leading Gulf Nations. The partnership has yielded diplomatic and political gains for the Indian Prime Minister. WION's Molly Gambhir tells you how India can help the Gulf, as the region tries to reinvent itself.

Gravitas: How Prime Minister Modi built an alliance with the Gulf

From cries of “betrayal” to fears about “falling dominoes”, the deal making the United Arab Emirates the third Arab state to forge ties with Israel stirred anger and dismay around the Middle East, but a cautious welcome from the UAE’s Gulf allies.

The mixed response highlighted new fault lines in a region where fear and distrust of Iran - shared by Israel and some Arab states - has challenged a decades-old allegiance to the Palestinian issue as a major driver of Arab policy.

Palestinians, who want to establish a state on West Bank territory captured by Israel in 1967, denounced the agreement as a betrayal of the long-held Arab stance that peace should be conditional on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory.

The agreement, which is set to make the UAE only the third Arab state after Egypt and Jordan to make peace with Israel, calls for a temporary suspension of Israel’s planned annexation of occupied West Bank territory, but not withdrawal.

The deal, which U.S. President Donald Trump helped to broker with support from senior adviser Jared Kushner, forms a new axis with the UAE aligning itself with Israel in confronting Shi’ite Muslim Iran and Sunni Islamist radicals in the region.

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/gravitas-israel-uae-deal-can-trump-ensure-peace-in-west-asia-320609">Also watch|&nbsp;Gravitas: Israel-UAE deal: Can Trump ensure peace in West Asia?</a>

This is likely to heighten tensions in the Gulf, which has in the past two years seen attacks on tankers and energy assets that the United States and Saudi Arabia have blamed on Iran, a charge Tehran denies.

Iran’s foreign minister said the deal aimed to hand Trump a win ahead of U.S. elections in November, a view echoed by the leader of Lebanon’s Iranian-backed Hezbollah movement.

“It’s shameful what Abu Dhabi did ... They don’t see the Zionist regime as an enemy, but an ally and what’s happening now is to help Trump in the elections,” Iran’s Mohammad Javad Zarif told Al Mayadeen TV.

Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, in a televised speech, described the UAE move as an “election favour” for both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and said more Arab states would follow suit to “satisfy” Washington.

“It is good, though painful, that the masks have fallen,” he said, describing the deal as a betrayal of Islam and Arabs.

'Fall like dominoes'

Some worshippers at Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, where Palestinians want to establish the capital of a future state, carried pictures of UAE Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed with the word “traitor” underneath his image.

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/videos/israel-uae-peace-deal-netanyahu-hails-new-era-for-israel-320345">Also watch|&nbsp;Israel -UAE peace deal: Netanyahu hails new era for Israel</a>

“Just like Egypt, Jordan and now Abu Dhabi, the whole Arab world will start to fall like dominoes,” said Mohammad al-Sharif, 45, a member of Israel’s Arab minority. “That Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed and his dirty dogs look out for themselves and their interests and the rest of us can go to hell.”

Palestine Liberation Organization Secretary General Saeb Erekat spelled out the potential consequences for his people if a united Arab front splintered.

“The whole thing that we based our strategy on as Arabs is that the (2002) Arab peace initiative specified that once Israel withdraws, there will be peace between Arabs and Israelis.

“Netanyahu came determined, with Kushner, Trump... to change the formula, that they want Arab recognition of Israel while they continue with the occupation, and the United Arab Emirates yesterday stamped the green light for this,” Erekat said.

Turkey may shut embassy

Turkey, a powerful regional rival of the UAE, said history would not forgive the Gulf country for making a deal which undercut the 2002 Arab peace plan, which had proposed peace in return for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory.

“We may also take a step in the direction of suspending diplomatic ties with the Abu Dhabi leadership or pulling back our ambassador,” President Tayyip Erdogan said after Friday prayers, adding that he could close Turkey’s embassy.

But, in a region beset with other challenges including civil wars, poverty and economic crisis, some people appeared to have other concerns.

At Istanbul’s landmark Hagia Sophia, converted by Erdogan to a mosque last month in a move which he portrayed as a step towards restoring “freedom” to Al Aqsa in Jerusalem, worshippers who spoke to Reuters were unaware of the announcement.

Incentive for peace

Egypt and Jordan, which signed peace deals with Israel in 1979 and 1994 respectively and enjoy close ties with the UAE, both welcomed the agreement. Jordan said the pact could make a beneficial impact if it spurred Israel to accept a Palestinian state on land it took in the 1967 Middle East war.

“If Israel deals with it as an incentive to end occupation..., it will move the region towards a just peace,” Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi said.

Oman and Bahrain praised the accord but Saudi Arabia, which has in the past led Arab policy towards Israel and hosts Islam’s two holiest sites, has remained silent, as have Kuwait and Qatar.

Jordan’s former foreign minister, Marwan al-Muasher, said it was possible other Gulf states could follow Abu Dhabi’s lead. But none of those could address the root problem.

“In the end it’s not the Gulf states who are living under occupation, it’s the Palestinians. And until you reach a solution with the Palestinians, it does not matter how many peace deals you make with Arab states,” he told Reuters.

From cries of “betrayal” to fears about “falling dominoes”, the deal making the United Arab Emirates the third Arab state to forge ties with Israel stirred anger and dismay around the Middle East, but a cautious welcome from the UAE’s Gulf allies.

From cries of “betrayal” to fears about “falling dominoes”, the deal making the United Arab Emirates the third Arab state to forge ties with Israel stirred anger and dismay around the Middle East, but a cautious welcome from the UAE’s Gulf allies. The mixed response highlighted new fault lines in a region where fear and distrust of Iran - shared by Israel and some Arab states - has challenged a decades-old allegiance to the Palestinian issue as a major driver of Arab policy. Palestinians, who want to establish a state on West Bank territory captured by Israel in 1967, denounced the agreement as a betrayal of the long-held Arab stance that peace should be conditional on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory. The agreement, which is set to make the UAE only the third Arab state after Egypt and Jordan to make peace with Israel, calls for a temporary suspension of Israel’s planned annexation of occupied West Bank territory, but not withdrawal. The deal, which U.S. President Donald Trump helped to broker with support from senior adviser Jared Kushner, forms a new axis with the UAE aligning itself with Israel in confronting Shi’ite Muslim Iran and Sunni Islamist radicals in the region. Also watch| Gravitas: Israel-UAE deal: Can Trump ensure peace in West Asia? This is likely to heighten tensions in the Gulf, which has in the past two years seen attacks on tankers and energy assets that the United States and Saudi Arabia have blamed on Iran, a charge Tehran denies. Iran’s foreign minister said the deal aimed to hand Trump a win ahead of U.S. elections in November, a view echoed by the leader of Lebanon’s Iranian-backed Hezbollah movement. “It’s shameful what Abu Dhabi did ... They don’t see the Zionist regime as an enemy, but an ally and what’s happening now is to help Trump in the elections,” Iran’s Mohammad Javad Zarif told Al Mayadeen TV. Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, in a televised speech, described the UAE move as an “election favour” for both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and said more Arab states would follow suit to “satisfy” Washington. “It is good, though painful, that the masks have fallen,” he said, describing the deal as a betrayal of Islam and Arabs. 'Fall like dominoes' Some worshippers at Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, where Palestinians want to establish the capital of a future state, carried pictures of UAE Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed with the word “traitor” underneath his image. Also watch| Israel -UAE peace deal: Netanyahu hails new era for Israel “Just like Egypt, Jordan and now Abu Dhabi, the whole Arab world will start to fall like dominoes,” said Mohammad al-Sharif, 45, a member of Israel’s Arab minority. “That Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed and his dirty dogs look out for themselves and their interests and the rest of us can go to hell.” Palestine Liberation Organization Secretary General Saeb Erekat spelled out the potential consequences for his people if a united Arab front splintered. “The whole thing that we based our strategy on as Arabs is that the (2002) Arab peace initiative specified that once Israel withdraws, there will be peace between Arabs and Israelis. “Netanyahu came determined, with Kushner, Trump... to change the formula, that they want Arab recognition of Israel while they continue with the occupation, and the United Arab Emirates yesterday stamped the green light for this,” Erekat said. Turkey may shut embassy Turkey, a powerful regional rival of the UAE, said history would not forgive the Gulf country for making a deal which undercut the 2002 Arab peace plan, which had proposed peace in return for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory. “We may also take a step in the direction of suspending diplomatic ties with the Abu Dhabi leadership or pulling back our ambassador,” President Tayyip Erdogan said after Friday prayers, adding that he could close Turkey’s embassy. But, in a region beset with other challenges including civil wars, poverty and economic crisis, some people appeared to have other concerns. At Istanbul’s landmark Hagia Sophia, converted by Erdogan to a mosque last month in a move which he portrayed as a step towards restoring “freedom” to Al Aqsa in Jerusalem, worshippers who spoke to Reuters were unaware of the announcement. Incentive for peace Egypt and Jordan, which signed peace deals with Israel in 1979 and 1994 respectively and enjoy close ties with the UAE, both welcomed the agreement. Jordan said the pact could make a beneficial impact if it spurred Israel to accept a Palestinian state on land it took in the 1967 Middle East war. “If Israel deals with it as an incentive to end occupation..., it will move the region towards a just peace,” Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi said. Oman and Bahrain praised the accord but Saudi Arabia, which has in the past led Arab policy towards Israel and hosts Islam’s two holiest sites, has remained silent, as have Kuwait and Qatar. Jordan’s former foreign minister, Marwan al-Muasher, said it was possible other Gulf states could follow Abu Dhabi’s lead. But none of those could address the root problem. “In the end it’s not the Gulf states who are living under occupation, it’s the Palestinians. And until you reach a solution with the Palestinians, it does not matter how many peace deals you make with Arab states,” he told Reuters.

UAE's Israel deal met with Arab dismay but quiet welcome in Gulf

When Kapil left his Nepali village for an airport job packing cargo in the United Arab Emirates, he thought he was securing a future for himself and his family. 
 
<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/uae-to-test-two-million-people-for-covid-19-in-next-two-months-as-cases-rise-311294">Also read: UAE to test two million people for COVID-19 in next two months as cases rise</a> 
 
But less than a year after arriving in the Middle East trade and tourism hub, he questions whether it was the right decision after learning there would be no work this month.

"I'm totally hopeless," said 29-year-old Kapil, whose wife and five-year-old son are in Nepal.

The coronavirus crisis has taken a heavy toll on the economies of the oil-rich Gulf, heavily reliant on low-paid foreign workers.

They are the backbone of the Gulf economies, taking jobs in construction, services and transport, and are now facing the realities of the pandemic.

Reuters spoke to over 30 workers like Kapil in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Sharjah, who all said they are now enduring hardship due to coronavirus.

Many have racked up debt and would go hungry without the help of charities as they wait for work and to be paid.

Some said they found little reason to stay without work and wanted to return to their home countries despite being owed months of wages; hundreds of thousands have already left.

The treatment of migrant workers in the Gulf has come under greater scrutiny, with human rights groups saying conditions have deteriorated because of the pandemic.

In the UAE, most attractive because of the economic opportunities it offers, there is no social safety net for foreigners, who make up about 90 per cent of the population.

A laundry service worker from Cameroon told Reuters he had not been paid in months and was now selling fruit and vegetables on the street earning 30 to 40 dirhams a day ($8-$11).

The UAE government communication office did not respond to emailed questions about migrant worker welfare.

In May, the UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan said the Gulf state was committed to protecting the rights of all workers, state news agency WAM reported.

DEBTS

Those in blue collar jobs are the most vulnerable. They are paid low wages, work long hours and often live in cramped dormitories that have been coronavirus hotbeds.

Many also pay fees to recruiters in their home country, a practice common for low paying jobs in the Gulf.

Kapil, who said he paid a recruiter 175,000 Nepali rupees ($1,450) for his UAE job, is not sure when he will work again.

His employer told staff they would only be paid when they worked and it was unclear whether there would be any work next month, he said.

Kapil said he had been earning around $600 a month - six times more than his teacher salary in Nepal - working up to 12 hours a day, six days a week at the airport.

He said not working had left him stressed and unable to provide for his wife, child and elderly parents in Nepal.

Kapil, who showed his employment contract and other documents to Reuters, asked that his full name not be published and his employer not identified over fears he could face repercussions.

&nbsp;Arriving in the UAE last October, Kapil thought he would work at the airport for a few years before finding a better job, possibly using his teaching skills.

Now he just hopes to work until the end of the year to pay back his loans.

"The global economy is getting worse and it's affecting each and every business ... I think during this time it's hard to find any other job."

UNPAID WAGES

No official statistics of how many people have left the UAE are available. But at least 200,000 workers, mostly from India but also from Pakistan, the Philippines and Nepal, have left, according to their diplomatic missions.

Sectors like construction and retail were struggling even before the crisis, which exacerbated hardship for workers already exposed to payment delays.

Mohammed Mubarak has not been paid for around 11 months for security work at a Dubai theme park.

"The company doesn't know when they'll be able to pay us, and we are suffering," the Ghanaian said.

Government coronavirus restrictions that forced many businesses to shutter for weeks began to ease in May. Shopping centres, water parks, bars and restaurants - all staffed by migrant workers - are once again open, raising hopes.

Zulfiqar, a Pakistani in Dubai for 12 years, sent his family home early in the outbreak but stayed on hoping for work, sharing a room and what cash he has with a dozen other unemployed men.

"Things in Pakistan are also not good," he said.

When Kapil left his Nepali village for an airport job packing cargo in the United Arab Emirates, he thought he was securing a future for himself and his family. Also read: UAE to test two million people for COVID-19 in next two months as cases rise But less than a year after arriving in the Middle East trade and tourism hub, he questions whether it was the right decision after learning there would be no work this month.

When Kapil left his Nepali village for an airport job packing cargo in the United Arab Emirates, he thought he was securing a future for himself and his family. Also read: UAE to test two million people for COVID-19 in next two months as cases rise But less than a year after arriving in the Middle East trade and tourism hub, he questions whether it was the right decision after learning there would be no work this month. "I'm totally hopeless," said 29-year-old Kapil, whose wife and five-year-old son are in Nepal. The coronavirus crisis has taken a heavy toll on the economies of the oil-rich Gulf, heavily reliant on low-paid foreign workers. They are the backbone of the Gulf economies, taking jobs in construction, services and transport, and are now facing the realities of the pandemic. Reuters spoke to over 30 workers like Kapil in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Sharjah, who all said they are now enduring hardship due to coronavirus. Many have racked up debt and would go hungry without the help of charities as they wait for work and to be paid. Some said they found little reason to stay without work and wanted to return to their home countries despite being owed months of wages; hundreds of thousands have already left. The treatment of migrant workers in the Gulf has come under greater scrutiny, with human rights groups saying conditions have deteriorated because of the pandemic. In the UAE, most attractive because of the economic opportunities it offers, there is no social safety net for foreigners, who make up about 90 per cent of the population. A laundry service worker from Cameroon told Reuters he had not been paid in months and was now selling fruit and vegetables on the street earning 30 to 40 dirhams a day ($8-$11). The UAE government communication office did not respond to emailed questions about migrant worker welfare. In May, the UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan said the Gulf state was committed to protecting the rights of all workers, state news agency WAM reported. DEBTS Those in blue collar jobs are the most vulnerable. They are paid low wages, work long hours and often live in cramped dormitories that have been coronavirus hotbeds. Many also pay fees to recruiters in their home country, a practice common for low paying jobs in the Gulf. Kapil, who said he paid a recruiter 175,000 Nepali rupees ($1,450) for his UAE job, is not sure when he will work again. His employer told staff they would only be paid when they worked and it was unclear whether there would be any work next month, he said. Kapil said he had been earning around $600 a month - six times more than his teacher salary in Nepal - working up to 12 hours a day, six days a week at the airport. He said not working had left him stressed and unable to provide for his wife, child and elderly parents in Nepal. Kapil, who showed his employment contract and other documents to Reuters, asked that his full name not be published and his employer not identified over fears he could face repercussions. Arriving in the UAE last October, Kapil thought he would work at the airport for a few years before finding a better job, possibly using his teaching skills. Now he just hopes to work until the end of the year to pay back his loans. "The global economy is getting worse and it's affecting each and every business ... I think during this time it's hard to find any other job." UNPAID WAGES No official statistics of how many people have left the UAE are available. But at least 200,000 workers, mostly from India but also from Pakistan, the Philippines and Nepal, have left, according to their diplomatic missions. Sectors like construction and retail were struggling even before the crisis, which exacerbated hardship for workers already exposed to payment delays. Mohammed Mubarak has not been paid for around 11 months for security work at a Dubai theme park. "The company doesn't know when they'll be able to pay us, and we are suffering," the Ghanaian said. Government coronavirus restrictions that forced many businesses to shutter for weeks began to ease in May. Shopping centres, water parks, bars and restaurants - all staffed by migrant workers - are once again open, raising hopes. Zulfiqar, a Pakistani in Dubai for 12 years, sent his family home early in the outbreak but stayed on hoping for work, sharing a room and what cash he has with a dozen other unemployed men. "Things in Pakistan are also not good," he said.

Migrant workers from India, Nepal 'totally hopeless' as UAE economy buckles

The Gulf countries are also hit by the coronavirus pandemic and the global growth is likely to slow down further. Watch report.

Coronavirus Pandemic: Middle East, Central Asia growth slows, Lower oil prices

Like many paradigms across the globe, the coronavirus pandemic and its associated economic downturn have changed the paradigm shaping debates about Gulf security that was inevitably set to gradually migrate from a unipolar US defence umbrella that shielded energy-rich monarchies against Iran to an architecture that was more multilateral. In many ways, the pandemic’s fallout has levelled the playing field and not necessarily in ways that favour current policies of Gulf states.

Saudi Arabia’s relations with the West are increasingly being called into question, with the Saudi–Russian oil price war in March potentially having broken the camel’s back. The Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) stand to lose at least some of the financial clout that allowed them to punch above their weight even if they are likely to exclude arms purchases from their austerity measures.

Weakened financial clout comes at a moment when the Gulf states and Iran are gearing up towards an arms race in the wake of Iran’s recent satellite launch and the unveiling of an unmanned underwater vehicle against the backdrop of the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme inching towards collapse. The unmanned underwater vehicle puts Iran in an elite club, of which the only other members capable of producing them are the United States, Britain and China.[1] The satellite adds Iran to a group of only about a dozen countries able to do launches of their own. [2]

Add to this the fact that none of the regional players — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Iran, Turkey, and Israel — feel secure that any of the external powers — the United States, China, and Russia — are reliable security and geopolitical partners.

Gulf states have, for years going back to the era of Barak Obama if not Bill Clinton, increasingly perceived the United States as unfortunately their only option on the premise that they are not willing to change their policies, particularly towards Iran, but one that is demonstrably unreliable, unwilling to defend Gulf states at whatever cost, and at times at odds with them in terms of policy objectives.

The Gulf states’ problem is that neither Russia nor China offers real alternatives at least not on terms that all Gulf states are willing to accept. Russia is neither interested nor capable of replacing the United States. Moreover, its Gulf security plan is at odds with at least the policy of Saudi Arabia.

The plan calls for a security arrangement modelled on that of Europe under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It would be an arrangement that, unlike the US defence umbrella in the Gulf, includes Iran, not directed against it. It would have to involve some kind of regional agreement on non-aggression.[3]

Saudi Arabia, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has made clear that it is not interested, as is evident in the pandemic where it has refrained, in contrast to other Gulf states, from reaching out to Iran with humanitarian aid even though it last year engaged in an indirect exchange with the Islamic Republic. That exchange died with the killing by the United States in January of Iranian general Qassim Soleimani.

The Elephant in the Room

China is obviously the elephant in the room.

Logically, China and the Gulf states are in the same boat as they grapple with uncertainty about current regional security arrangements. Like the Gulf states, China has long relied on the US defence umbrella to ensure the security of the flow of energy and other goods through waters surrounding the Gulf in what the United States has termed free-riding.

In anticipation of the day when China can no longer depend on security provided by the United States free of charge, China has gradually adjusted its defence strategy and built its first foreign military facility in Djibouti facing the Gulf from the Horn of Africa. With the People’s Liberation Army Navy tasked with protecting China’s sea lines of communication and safeguarding its overseas interests, strategic planners have signalled that Djibouti is a first step in the likely establishment of further bases that would allow it to project long-range capability and shorten the time needed to resupply.

But like with the Russians, Chinese strategic planners and their Gulf counterparts may part ways when it comes to what would be acceptable geopolitical parameters for a rejuvenated regional security architecture, particularly with regard to Iran. Any new architecture would break the mould of Chinese engagement in the Middle East that is designed to shield the People’s Republic from being sucked into the region’s myriad conflicts.

The assumption has long been that China could at best postpone the execution, but that ultimately, it would have no choice but to engage in the politics of the region. More recently, influential Chinese analysts are suggesting that China has another option: turn its back on the region. That may seem incredulous given China’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy resources as well as its significant investments in the region.

These analysts argue, however, that China is able to diversify its energy sources and that Chinese investment in the Middle East is but a small percentage of overall Chinese overseas investment. They describe Chinese Middle Eastern economic relations as past their heyday with economies of both in decline and the prospects of the situation in the Middle East getting worse before it becomes better.

“China–Middle East countries is not a political strategic logic, it’s an economic logic. For China, the Middle East is always on the very distant backburner of China’s strategic global strategies … Covid-19, combined with the oil price crisis, will dramatically change the Middle East. (This) will change China’s investment model in the Middle East … The good times of China and the Middle East are already gone… Both China and the Middle Eastern economies have been slowing down … In the future, the pandemic, combined with the oil price problem, will make the Middle East situation worse. So, the China economic relationship with the Middle East will be affected very deeply,” said Niu Xinchun, director of Middle East studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), widely viewed as China’s most influential think tank.[4]

Pessimistic forecasts of economic prospects in the Middle East bolster Niu’s prediction. Data and analytics company GlobalData predicted in an email that depressed oil markets and prices in the Middle East and North Africa would lead to a contraction in non-oil sectors, including construction. “Construction activity for the remainder of 2020 is set to see poor performance … In addition, public investment is likely to be moderate, which will translate into fewer prospects for private sector businesses to grow — especially within sectors such as infrastructure. Expected increase in taxes, selected subsidy cuts and the introduction of several public sector service charges will influence households’ purchasing power, having a knock-on effect on future commercial investments,” said GlobalData economist Yasmine Ghozzi.

Moreover, the downplaying of Chinese economic interest in the Middle East fits a pattern of reduced Chinese capital outflows. “What we may not have seen is how much China has retreated financially already for the past four years … Especially since 2016, China’s outflows have come down dramatically in both lending and investment. Foreign direct investment is now at about 30 per cent of what it was in 2016,” said Agatha Kratz, associate director of Rhodium Group, an independent research provider.[5]

To be sure, Chinese officials and analysts have consistently maintained that the Middle East is not a Chinese priority, that any future battles with the United States will be fought in the Asia Pacific, not in the Gulf. Their assertions are backed up by the fact that China has yet to articulate a comprehensive policy towards the region and in 2016 issued its one and only white paper on policy towards the Arab world that essentially was an elaboration of its basic foreign and defense policy principles.

More likely than China seriously entertaining turning its back on the Middle East is the probability that it is sending the region a message that is not dissimilar from what Russia is saying: get your act together and find a way to dial down the tension. It is a message that appears to varying degrees to have been heard in the smaller Gulf states but has yet to resonate in Riyadh. It is also a message that has not been rejected out of hand by Iran.

Discussing a possible extension of a United Nations arms embargo against Iran, Saudi Ambassador Abdallah Al Mouallimi, arguing in favour of a prolongation, suggested that it would serve Russian and Chinese interests even though they would not agree with that assessment. “They have their views, we respect their views, but their interests would be better served and promoted with the embargo extended,” said Al Mouallimi.[6]

A Chinese Communist Party newspaper made days later a first reference in the People’s Republic’s state-controlled media to reports of an alleged secret 25-year multi-billion-dollar co-operation agreement in Iran amid controversy in the Islamic Republic. Chinese officials and media have largely remained silent about Iranian reports of an agreement worth anywhere between $120 billion and $400 billion that seemingly was proposed by Iran, but has yet to be accepted by China.[7]

Writing in the Shanghai Observer, a subsidiary of Liberation Daily, the official newspaper of the Shanghai Committee of the Communist Party of China, Middle East scholar Fan Hongda argued that the agreement, though nowhere close to implementation, highlighted “an important moment of development” at a time that US–Chinese tensions allowed Beijing to pay less heed to American policies.[8] Fan’s suggestion that the US–Chinese divide gave China more room to develop its relations with Iran will not have gone unnoticed in Riyadh and other Gulf capitals.

An Emerging Tug of War

How all of this may shake out could be determined by the emerging tug of war in the Middle East between China and the US. Israel has already been caught up in it and has made it's choice clear, even if it still attempting to maintain some wiggle room. Nonetheless, Israel, in the ultimate analysis, knows where its bread is buttered, particularly at a moment where the United States is the only backer of its annexationist policies. In contrast to Israel, the US is likely to find the going tougher when it comes to persuading Gulf states to limit their engagement with China, including telecom giant Huawei, which already has significant operations in the region.

Like Israel, UAE officials have sought to convey to the US that they see relations with the United States as indispensable even though that has yet to be put to a test when it comes to China. Gulf officials’ stress on the importance of ties will, however, not shield them from American demands that they review and limit their relations with China, nor its warnings that involvement of Huawei could jeopardise sensitive communications, particularly given the multiple US bases in the region, including the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and the forward headquarters of the US military’s Central Command, or Centcom, in Qatar.

The US Embassy in Abu Dhabi, in a shot across the Gulf’s bow, last month rejected a UAE offer to donate hundreds of coronavirus tests for screening of its staff. The snub was designed to put a dent in China’s health “Silk Road” diplomacy centered on its experience with the pandemic and ability to manufacture personal protective and medical equipment.

A US official said the tests were rejected because they were either Chinese-made or involved BGI Genomics, a Chinese company active in the Gulf, which raised concerns about patient privacy. The US softened the blow when the prestigious Ohio-based Cleveland Clinic sent 40 nurses and doctor to its Abu Dhabi subsidiary. The Abu Dhabi facility was tasked with treating the UAE’s most severe cases of coronavirus.[9]

The problem for the US is that it is not only Trump’s policy or lack thereof towards the Middle East that undermines confidence but it is also policies that, on the surface, have nothing to do with the Middle East. The United States has been asking its partners including Gulf states to give it time to develop an alternative to Huawei’s 5G network. Yet at the same time, it is barring the kind of people entry that technology companies need to develop systems.

A Silver Lining

No matter how the tug of war in the Middle East evolves, the silver lining is that, like China, the United States despite its desire to reduce its commitment cannot afford a power void in the region. That is what may create the basis for breaking the mould.

It will require a backing away from approaches that treat conflicts as zero-sum games not only on the part of regional players but also of external players, like in the case of the US versus Iran, and it will require engagement by all regional and external players. To achieve that, players would have to recognise that in many ways, perceptions on both sides of the Gulf divide are mirror images of one another: all parties see each other as existential threats.

Failure to break the stalemate risks conflicts becoming further entrenched and threatening to spin out of control. The opportunity is that confidence-building measures and a willingness to engage open a door towards mutually acceptable regional security arrangements and conflict resolution. However, for that to happen, major powers would have to invest political will and energy at a time when they feel they have bigger fish to fry and prioritise geopolitical jockeying.

In a twist of irony, geopolitical jockeying may prove to be an icebreaker in a world, and certainly, a region, where everything is interconnected. Increasingly, security in the Gulf is not just about security in the Gulf. It is not even just about security in the Middle East. It is about security in the Mediterranean, whether one looks at Libya on the sea’s southern shores, Syria in the east, or growing tension in the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean. And it does not stop there with regional rivalries reaching into the Black and Caspian Seas and into Central Asia.

Finally, there are the grey and black swans built into partnerships and alliances that are either becoming more fragile like those of the United States or ones that have fragility built into their DNA like the ties between Iran, Turkey, China, and Russia. Those swans could at any moment swing the pendulum one way or another.

To be sure, contrary to Western perceptions, relations between Iran, Turkey, Russia and China are not just opportunistic and driven by short-term common interests but also grounded in a degree of shared values. The fact of the matter is that men like presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei find common ground in a view of a new world order that rejects democracy and the rule of law; disregards human and minority rights; flaunts, at least for now, violations of international law; and operates on the principle of might is right.

That glue, however, is insufficient, to prevent Turkey and Russia from ending up on opposite sides of conflicts in Libya and Syria. It is also unlikely to halt the gradual erosion of a presumed division of labour in Central Asia with Russia ensuring security and China focusing on economic development. And it is doubtful it would alter the simmering rivalry between Iran and Russia in the Caspian Sea and long-standing Russian reluctance to sell Iran a desperately needed anti-missile defense system.

In short, fasten your seat belt. Gulf and broader regional security could prove to be a bumpy ride with unexpected speed bumps.

<h6>[1] “Iran’s UUV to add new dimension to its warfare capability: Forbes”, Tehran Times, 30 May 2020, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/448370/Iran-s-UUV-to-add-new-dimension-to-its-warfare-capability-Forbes. 
[2] Mike Wall, “Iran launches its 1st military satellite into orbit: reports”, Space.com, 22 April 2020, https://www.space.com/iran-launches-first-military-satellite.html. 
[3] Theodore Karasik, “Is Russia’s ‘old’ Gulf security plan the best it can do?”, Arab News, 20 July 2019, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1533096. 
[4] Niu Xinchun speaking on “How are China’s Relations with the Middle East Evolving During the COVID-19 Pandemic?”, Chatham House, 19 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2721841274725780. 
[5] Agatha Kratz speaking on “China and the Mediterranean Region in and Beyond the Pandemic, German Marshal Fund”, 3 July 2020, https://www.gmfus.org/events/china-and-mediterranean-region-and-beyond-pandemic. 
[6] Joyce Karam, “Russian and Chinese interests ‘better served’ if Iran arms embargo is extended, says Saudi official”, The National, 2 July 2020, https://www.thenational.ae/world/the-americas/russian-and-chinese-interests-better-served-if-iran-arms-embargo-is-extended-says-saudi-official-1.1042822. 
[7] Seth J Frantzman, “Iran media discuss 25-year deal between Iran and China”, The Jerusalem Post, 3 July 2020, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-media-discuss-25-year-deal-between-iran-and-china-633739. 
[8] Fan Hongda, “Iran announced a 25-year comprehensive cooperation plan with China, can Sino-Iranian relations get closer?” [观察家 | 伊朗宣布与华25年全面合作计划，中伊关系能否进一步走近？], Shanghai Observer, 20 June 2020, https://www.shobserver.com/news/detail?id=264494. 
[9] Interview with the author, 8 June 2020.</h6>

Like many paradigms across the globe, the coronavirus pandemic and its associated economic downturn have changed the paradigm shaping debates about Gulf security that was inevitably set to gradually migrate from a unipolar US defence umbrella that shielded energy-rich monarchies against Iran to an architecture that was more multilateral.

Like many paradigms across the globe, the coronavirus pandemic and its associated economic downturn have changed the paradigm shaping debates about Gulf security that was inevitably set to gradually migrate from a unipolar US defence umbrella that shielded energy-rich monarchies against Iran to an architecture that was more multilateral. In many ways, the pandemic’s fallout has levelled the playing field and not necessarily in ways that favour current policies of Gulf states. Saudi Arabia’s relations with the West are increasingly being called into question, with the Saudi–Russian oil price war in March potentially having broken the camel’s back. The Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) stand to lose at least some of the financial clout that allowed them to punch above their weight even if they are likely to exclude arms purchases from their austerity measures. Weakened financial clout comes at a moment when the Gulf states and Iran are gearing up towards an arms race in the wake of Iran’s recent satellite launch and the unveiling of an unmanned underwater vehicle against the backdrop of the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme inching towards collapse. The unmanned underwater vehicle puts Iran in an elite club, of which the only other members capable of producing them are the United States, Britain and China.[1] The satellite adds Iran to a group of only about a dozen countries able to do launches of their own. [2] Add to this the fact that none of the regional players — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Iran, Turkey, and Israel — feel secure that any of the external powers — the United States, China, and Russia — are reliable security and geopolitical partners. Gulf states have, for years going back to the era of Barak Obama if not Bill Clinton, increasingly perceived the United States as unfortunately their only option on the premise that they are not willing to change their policies, particularly towards Iran, but one that is demonstrably unreliable, unwilling to defend Gulf states at whatever cost, and at times at odds with them in terms of policy objectives. The Gulf states’ problem is that neither Russia nor China offers real alternatives at least not on terms that all Gulf states are willing to accept. Russia is neither interested nor capable of replacing the United States. Moreover, its Gulf security plan is at odds with at least the policy of Saudi Arabia. The plan calls for a security arrangement modelled on that of Europe under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It would be an arrangement that, unlike the US defence umbrella in the Gulf, includes Iran, not directed against it. It would have to involve some kind of regional agreement on non-aggression.[3] Saudi Arabia, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has made clear that it is not interested, as is evident in the pandemic where it has refrained, in contrast to other Gulf states, from reaching out to Iran with humanitarian aid even though it last year engaged in an indirect exchange with the Islamic Republic. That exchange died with the killing by the United States in January of Iranian general Qassim Soleimani. The Elephant in the Room China is obviously the elephant in the room. Logically, China and the Gulf states are in the same boat as they grapple with uncertainty about current regional security arrangements. Like the Gulf states, China has long relied on the US defence umbrella to ensure the security of the flow of energy and other goods through waters surrounding the Gulf in what the United States has termed free-riding. In anticipation of the day when China can no longer depend on security provided by the United States free of charge, China has gradually adjusted its defence strategy and built its first foreign military facility in Djibouti facing the Gulf from the Horn of Africa. With the People’s Liberation Army Navy tasked with protecting China’s sea lines of communication and safeguarding its overseas interests, strategic planners have signalled that Djibouti is a first step in the likely establishment of further bases that would allow it to project long-range capability and shorten the time needed to resupply. But like with the Russians, Chinese strategic planners and their Gulf counterparts may part ways when it comes to what would be acceptable geopolitical parameters for a rejuvenated regional security architecture, particularly with regard to Iran. Any new architecture would break the mould of Chinese engagement in the Middle East that is designed to shield the People’s Republic from being sucked into the region’s myriad conflicts. The assumption has long been that China could at best postpone the execution, but that ultimately, it would have no choice but to engage in the politics of the region. More recently, influential Chinese analysts are suggesting that China has another option: turn its back on the region. That may seem incredulous given China’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy resources as well as its significant investments in the region. These analysts argue, however, that China is able to diversify its energy sources and that Chinese investment in the Middle East is but a small percentage of overall Chinese overseas investment. They describe Chinese Middle Eastern economic relations as past their heyday with economies of both in decline and the prospects of the situation in the Middle East getting worse before it becomes better. “China–Middle East countries is not a political strategic logic, it’s an economic logic. For China, the Middle East is always on the very distant backburner of China’s strategic global strategies … Covid-19, combined with the oil price crisis, will dramatically change the Middle East. (This) will change China’s investment model in the Middle East … The good times of China and the Middle East are already gone… Both China and the Middle Eastern economies have been slowing down … In the future, the pandemic, combined with the oil price problem, will make the Middle East situation worse. So, the China economic relationship with the Middle East will be affected very deeply,” said Niu Xinchun, director of Middle East studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), widely viewed as China’s most influential think tank.[4] Pessimistic forecasts of economic prospects in the Middle East bolster Niu’s prediction. Data and analytics company GlobalData predicted in an email that depressed oil markets and prices in the Middle East and North Africa would lead to a contraction in non-oil sectors, including construction. “Construction activity for the remainder of 2020 is set to see poor performance … In addition, public investment is likely to be moderate, which will translate into fewer prospects for private sector businesses to grow — especially within sectors such as infrastructure. Expected increase in taxes, selected subsidy cuts and the introduction of several public sector service charges will influence households’ purchasing power, having a knock-on effect on future commercial investments,” said GlobalData economist Yasmine Ghozzi. Moreover, the downplaying of Chinese economic interest in the Middle East fits a pattern of reduced Chinese capital outflows. “What we may not have seen is how much China has retreated financially already for the past four years … Especially since 2016, China’s outflows have come down dramatically in both lending and investment. Foreign direct investment is now at about 30 per cent of what it was in 2016,” said Agatha Kratz, associate director of Rhodium Group, an independent research provider.[5] To be sure, Chinese officials and analysts have consistently maintained that the Middle East is not a Chinese priority, that any future battles with the United States will be fought in the Asia Pacific, not in the Gulf. Their assertions are backed up by the fact that China has yet to articulate a comprehensive policy towards the region and in 2016 issued its one and only white paper on policy towards the Arab world that essentially was an elaboration of its basic foreign and defense policy principles. More likely than China seriously entertaining turning its back on the Middle East is the probability that it is sending the region a message that is not dissimilar from what Russia is saying: get your act together and find a way to dial down the tension. It is a message that appears to varying degrees to have been heard in the smaller Gulf states but has yet to resonate in Riyadh. It is also a message that has not been rejected out of hand by Iran. Discussing a possible extension of a United Nations arms embargo against Iran, Saudi Ambassador Abdallah Al Mouallimi, arguing in favour of a prolongation, suggested that it would serve Russian and Chinese interests even though they would not agree with that assessment. “They have their views, we respect their views, but their interests would be better served and promoted with the embargo extended,” said Al Mouallimi.[6] A Chinese Communist Party newspaper made days later a first reference in the People’s Republic’s state-controlled media to reports of an alleged secret 25-year multi-billion-dollar co-operation agreement in Iran amid controversy in the Islamic Republic. Chinese officials and media have largely remained silent about Iranian reports of an agreement worth anywhere between $120 billion and $400 billion that seemingly was proposed by Iran, but has yet to be accepted by China.[7] Writing in the Shanghai Observer, a subsidiary of Liberation Daily, the official newspaper of the Shanghai Committee of the Communist Party of China, Middle East scholar Fan Hongda argued that the agreement, though nowhere close to implementation, highlighted “an important moment of development” at a time that US–Chinese tensions allowed Beijing to pay less heed to American policies.[8] Fan’s suggestion that the US–Chinese divide gave China more room to develop its relations with Iran will not have gone unnoticed in Riyadh and other Gulf capitals. An Emerging Tug of War How all of this may shake out could be determined by the emerging tug of war in the Middle East between China and the US. Israel has already been caught up in it and has made it's choice clear, even if it still attempting to maintain some wiggle room. Nonetheless, Israel, in the ultimate analysis, knows where its bread is buttered, particularly at a moment where the United States is the only backer of its annexationist policies. In contrast to Israel, the US is likely to find the going tougher when it comes to persuading Gulf states to limit their engagement with China, including telecom giant Huawei, which already has significant operations in the region. Like Israel, UAE officials have sought to convey to the US that they see relations with the United States as indispensable even though that has yet to be put to a test when it comes to China. Gulf officials’ stress on the importance of ties will, however, not shield them from American demands that they review and limit their relations with China, nor its warnings that involvement of Huawei could jeopardise sensitive communications, particularly given the multiple US bases in the region, including the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and the forward headquarters of the US military’s Central Command, or Centcom, in Qatar. The US Embassy in Abu Dhabi, in a shot across the Gulf’s bow, last month rejected a UAE offer to donate hundreds of coronavirus tests for screening of its staff. The snub was designed to put a dent in China’s health “Silk Road” diplomacy centered on its experience with the pandemic and ability to manufacture personal protective and medical equipment. A US official said the tests were rejected because they were either Chinese-made or involved BGI Genomics, a Chinese company active in the Gulf, which raised concerns about patient privacy. The US softened the blow when the prestigious Ohio-based Cleveland Clinic sent 40 nurses and doctor to its Abu Dhabi subsidiary. The Abu Dhabi facility was tasked with treating the UAE’s most severe cases of coronavirus.[9] The problem for the US is that it is not only Trump’s policy or lack thereof towards the Middle East that undermines confidence but it is also policies that, on the surface, have nothing to do with the Middle East. The United States has been asking its partners including Gulf states to give it time to develop an alternative to Huawei’s 5G network. Yet at the same time, it is barring the kind of people entry that technology companies need to develop systems. A Silver Lining No matter how the tug of war in the Middle East evolves, the silver lining is that, like China, the United States despite its desire to reduce its commitment cannot afford a power void in the region. That is what may create the basis for breaking the mould. It will require a backing away from approaches that treat conflicts as zero-sum games not only on the part of regional players but also of external players, like in the case of the US versus Iran, and it will require engagement by all regional and external players. To achieve that, players would have to recognise that in many ways, perceptions on both sides of the Gulf divide are mirror images of one another: all parties see each other as existential threats. Failure to break the stalemate risks conflicts becoming further entrenched and threatening to spin out of control. The opportunity is that confidence-building measures and a willingness to engage open a door towards mutually acceptable regional security arrangements and conflict resolution. However, for that to happen, major powers would have to invest political will and energy at a time when they feel they have bigger fish to fry and prioritise geopolitical jockeying. In a twist of irony, geopolitical jockeying may prove to be an icebreaker in a world, and certainly, a region, where everything is interconnected. Increasingly, security in the Gulf is not just about security in the Gulf. It is not even just about security in the Middle East. It is about security in the Mediterranean, whether one looks at Libya on the sea’s southern shores, Syria in the east, or growing tension in the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean. And it does not stop there with regional rivalries reaching into the Black and Caspian Seas and into Central Asia. Finally, there are the grey and black swans built into partnerships and alliances that are either becoming more fragile like those of the United States or ones that have fragility built into their DNA like the ties between Iran, Turkey, China, and Russia. Those swans could at any moment swing the pendulum one way or another. To be sure, contrary to Western perceptions, relations between Iran, Turkey, Russia and China are not just opportunistic and driven by short-term common interests but also grounded in a degree of shared values. The fact of the matter is that men like presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei find common ground in a view of a new world order that rejects democracy and the rule of law; disregards human and minority rights; flaunts, at least for now, violations of international law; and operates on the principle of might is right. That glue, however, is insufficient, to prevent Turkey and Russia from ending up on opposite sides of conflicts in Libya and Syria. It is also unlikely to halt the gradual erosion of a presumed division of labour in Central Asia with Russia ensuring security and China focusing on economic development. And it is doubtful it would alter the simmering rivalry between Iran and Russia in the Caspian Sea and long-standing Russian reluctance to sell Iran a desperately needed anti-missile defense system. In short, fasten your seat belt. Gulf and broader regional security could prove to be a bumpy ride with unexpected speed bumps. [1] “Iran’s UUV to add new dimension to its warfare capability: Forbes”, Tehran Times, 30 May 2020, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/448370/Iran-s-UUV-to-add-new-dimension-to-its-warfare-capability-Forbes. [2] Mike Wall, “Iran launches its 1st military satellite into orbit: reports”, Space.com, 22 April 2020, https://www.space.com/iran-launches-first-military-satellite.html. [3] Theodore Karasik, “Is Russia’s ‘old’ Gulf security plan the best it can do?”, Arab News, 20 July 2019, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1533096. [4] Niu Xinchun speaking on “How are China’s Relations with the Middle East Evolving During the COVID-19 Pandemic?”, Chatham House, 19 May 2019, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2721841274725780. [5] Agatha Kratz speaking on “China and the Mediterranean Region in and Beyond the Pandemic, German Marshal Fund”, 3 July 2020, https://www.gmfus.org/events/china-and-mediterranean-region-and-beyond-pandemic. [6] Joyce Karam, “Russian and Chinese interests ‘better served’ if Iran arms embargo is extended, says Saudi official”, The National, 2 July 2020, https://www.thenational.ae/world/the-americas/russian-and-chinese-interests-better-served-if-iran-arms-embargo-is-extended-says-saudi-official-1.1042822. [7] Seth J Frantzman, “Iran media discuss 25-year deal between Iran and China”, The Jerusalem Post, 3 July 2020, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-media-discuss-25-year-deal-between-iran-and-china-633739. [8] Fan Hongda, “Iran announced a 25-year comprehensive cooperation plan with China, can Sino-Iranian relations get closer?” [观察家 | 伊朗宣布与华25年全面合作计划，中伊关系能否进一步走近？], Shanghai Observer, 20 June 2020, https://www.shobserver.com/news/detail?id=264494. [9] Interview with the author, 8 June 2020.

Resolving the tug of war in the Middle East amid coronavirus crisis

While much of the focus in recent weeks has been on Israel’s relations with China, the real litmus test of the United States’ ability to counter the People’s Republic’s growing footprint in the Middle East is likely to be in the Gulf.

In talks last month with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Israeli leaders made clear that while wanting to maintain close relations with China they would not risk jeopardising their long-standing ties to the United States, their closest ally and supporter of their controversial annexationist policies.

Within days of Pompeo’s visit, Israel awarded a tender for the world’s largest desalination to an Israeli company rather than a competing Chinese firm.

Similarly, Israeli officials say that Israel is unlikely to buy Chinese telecommunication giant Huawei’s 5G offering because of security considerations of its own. The US has been campaigning against the integration of Huawei components into networks of its allies.

The real Israeli test may come next year when China takes over the management of Haifa port that is often frequented by ships of the US Sixth Fleet. US officials have suggested that Chinese control of the port could impact the US Navy’s willingness to use Haifa’s facilities.

In contrast to Israel, the US is likely to find the going tougher in persuading Gulf states to limit their engagement with China, including with Huawei, which already has significant operations in the region.

Like Israel, United Arab Emirates officials have sought to convey to the US that they see relations with the United States as indispensable even though that has yet to be put to a test when it comes to China.

“The United States is our single most important strategic partnership. Sometimes people, when they think of our relationship with the US, they just look at the political/military angle. But this relationship is really much, much wider,” said UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash. &nbsp;Such a relationship, he added, is to be found in “IT, in business, investment, in soft power, in the presence of institutions such as NYU Abu Dhabi, in people like me who spent some of the best years of their lives in America.”

Gargash was speaking after Pompeo’s visit to Israel and after a senior official issued a direct warning to Gulf states.

“These states have to weigh the value of their partnership with the United States. We want our partner nations to do due diligence,” said US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker.

Describing Chinese aid as “predatory,” Schenker warned that Huawei’s participation in 5G infrastructure in the Gulf would make it difficult for American and Gulf forces to communicate. Huawei has signed agreements with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.

“Huawei’s participation in 5G infrastructure in the Gulf would make it difficult for American and Gulf forces to communicate.”

“We’re not forcing countries to choose between the United States and the PRC,” Schenker said, referring to the People’s Republic of China. “Countries can and should maintain healthy relationships with both, but we want to highlight the costs” that come with certain engagements with China.

Earlier, an unidentified senior US official warned that Gulf states “risk rupturing the long-term strategic relationship they have with the US.”

The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet operates out of Bahrain while Qatar hosts the forward headquarters of the US military’s Central Command (CENTCOM).

In a message to Israel that was also intended for the Gulf, US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman laid out US concerns.

“For two countries as close to each other as Israel and the US, when they cooperate and exchange intelligence and other secrets for their mutual protection on such a robust level, both countries need to be really careful about exposing that level of cooperation to a foreign power that may have a different agenda,” he said.

Friedman asserted that China uses investments and infrastructure projects to “infiltrate” countries. “These [Chinese] companies have the ability to flick various switches and gain access to the most sensitive communications.”

US Ambassador David Friedman asserted that China uses investments and infrastructure projects to “infiltrate” countries.

The US Embassy in Abu Dhabi, in a shot across the Gulf’s bow, last month rejected a UAE offer to donate hundreds of coronavirus tests for screening of its staff.

The snub was designed to put a dent in China’s health silk road diplomacy centered on its experience with the pandemic and ability to manufacture personal protective and medical equipment.

A US official said the tests were rejected because they were either Chinese-made or involved BGI, a Chinese genomics company active in the Gulf, which raised concerns about patient privacy.

The US softened the blow when the prestigious Ohio-based Cleveland Clinic sent 40 nurses and doctor to its Abu Dhabi subsidiary. The Abu Dhabi facility was tasked with treating the UAE’s most severe cases of coronavirus.

The seemingly escalating US effort to box in China is hampered by the fact that no US company produces a 5G alternative. “5G is the future. To reconsider Huawei, the US has to offer an alternative. So far, it hasn’t done so,” a Gulf official said.

The same dilemma applies to the United States’ desire to reduce its commitments in the Middle East. In its global rivalry with China, the US cannot afford to create the kind of void that China and Russia would not be able or willing to fill in the short-term.

“It’s a toss-up,” a Gulf analyst said. “The US can’t compete on 5G and China and Russia can’t compete on security. This is a situation and a set of relationships that requires careful management. The problem is that big power leaders show little inclination to find a middle ground. That leaves Gulf states grappling for ways to hedge their bets.” 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

While much of the focus in recent weeks has been on Israel’s relations with China, the real litmus test of the United States’ ability to counter the People’s Republic’s growing footprint in the Middle East is likely to be in the Gulf.

While much of the focus in recent weeks has been on Israel’s relations with China, the real litmus test of the United States’ ability to counter the People’s Republic’s growing footprint in the Middle East is likely to be in the Gulf. In talks last month with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Israeli leaders made clear that while wanting to maintain close relations with China they would not risk jeopardising their long-standing ties to the United States, their closest ally and supporter of their controversial annexationist policies. Within days of Pompeo’s visit, Israel awarded a tender for the world’s largest desalination to an Israeli company rather than a competing Chinese firm. Similarly, Israeli officials say that Israel is unlikely to buy Chinese telecommunication giant Huawei’s 5G offering because of security considerations of its own. The US has been campaigning against the integration of Huawei components into networks of its allies. The real Israeli test may come next year when China takes over the management of Haifa port that is often frequented by ships of the US Sixth Fleet. US officials have suggested that Chinese control of the port could impact the US Navy’s willingness to use Haifa’s facilities. In contrast to Israel, the US is likely to find the going tougher in persuading Gulf states to limit their engagement with China, including with Huawei, which already has significant operations in the region. Like Israel, United Arab Emirates officials have sought to convey to the US that they see relations with the United States as indispensable even though that has yet to be put to a test when it comes to China. “The United States is our single most important strategic partnership. Sometimes people, when they think of our relationship with the US, they just look at the political/military angle. But this relationship is really much, much wider,” said UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash. Such a relationship, he added, is to be found in “IT, in business, investment, in soft power, in the presence of institutions such as NYU Abu Dhabi, in people like me who spent some of the best years of their lives in America.” Gargash was speaking after Pompeo’s visit to Israel and after a senior official issued a direct warning to Gulf states. “These states have to weigh the value of their partnership with the United States. We want our partner nations to do due diligence,” said US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker. Describing Chinese aid as “predatory,” Schenker warned that Huawei’s participation in 5G infrastructure in the Gulf would make it difficult for American and Gulf forces to communicate. Huawei has signed agreements with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. “Huawei’s participation in 5G infrastructure in the Gulf would make it difficult for American and Gulf forces to communicate.” “We’re not forcing countries to choose between the United States and the PRC,” Schenker said, referring to the People’s Republic of China. “Countries can and should maintain healthy relationships with both, but we want to highlight the costs” that come with certain engagements with China. Earlier, an unidentified senior US official warned that Gulf states “risk rupturing the long-term strategic relationship they have with the US.” The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet operates out of Bahrain while Qatar hosts the forward headquarters of the US military’s Central Command (CENTCOM). In a message to Israel that was also intended for the Gulf, US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman laid out US concerns. “For two countries as close to each other as Israel and the US, when they cooperate and exchange intelligence and other secrets for their mutual protection on such a robust level, both countries need to be really careful about exposing that level of cooperation to a foreign power that may have a different agenda,” he said. Friedman asserted that China uses investments and infrastructure projects to “infiltrate” countries. “These [Chinese] companies have the ability to flick various switches and gain access to the most sensitive communications.” US Ambassador David Friedman asserted that China uses investments and infrastructure projects to “infiltrate” countries. The US Embassy in Abu Dhabi, in a shot across the Gulf’s bow, last month rejected a UAE offer to donate hundreds of coronavirus tests for screening of its staff. The snub was designed to put a dent in China’s health silk road diplomacy centered on its experience with the pandemic and ability to manufacture personal protective and medical equipment. A US official said the tests were rejected because they were either Chinese-made or involved BGI, a Chinese genomics company active in the Gulf, which raised concerns about patient privacy. The US softened the blow when the prestigious Ohio-based Cleveland Clinic sent 40 nurses and doctor to its Abu Dhabi subsidiary. The Abu Dhabi facility was tasked with treating the UAE’s most severe cases of coronavirus. The seemingly escalating US effort to box in China is hampered by the fact that no US company produces a 5G alternative. “5G is the future. To reconsider Huawei, the US has to offer an alternative. So far, it hasn’t done so,” a Gulf official said. The same dilemma applies to the United States’ desire to reduce its commitments in the Middle East. In its global rivalry with China, the US cannot afford to create the kind of void that China and Russia would not be able or willing to fill in the short-term. “It’s a toss-up,” a Gulf analyst said. “The US can’t compete on 5G and China and Russia can’t compete on security. This is a situation and a set of relationships that requires careful management. The problem is that big power leaders show little inclination to find a middle ground. That leaves Gulf states grappling for ways to hedge their bets.” (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

How big power rivalry is likely to unfold in the Gulf region

A second wave of the coronavirus pandemic is raising its ugly head. It is putting Middle Eastern leaders at a crossroads as they struggle to contain the disease and tackle its economic fallout.

The question is whether they are getting the message: neither containing and controlling the virus nor economic recovery is a straight shot. Both are likely to involve a process of two steps forward, one step backwards, and no state can successfully tackle the multiples crises on its own.

The Middle East is a part of the world in which conflicts and problems are not just complex but inherently interconnected. The pandemic poses not only political, economic, and social challenges. It also calls into question regional security arrangements that reinforce fault lines rather than create an environment that allows rivals to collectively manage disputes as well as diseases whose spread is not halted by physical and other boundaries.

At stake is not just regional but also global security. Focused on their own healthcare and economic crises, Western nations ignore Middle Eastern and North African instability at their peril. They risk waking up to threats that could have been anticipated.

Suspected Russian hopes that an end to the Libyan war would allow for the creation of a Russian military base on the southern shore of the Mediterranean that would complement facilities in Syria would be one such impending threat.

“Russia wants a foothold in Libya, and that’s a fact,” said Pavel Felgenhauer, a Russian military analyst at the Jamestown Foundation. US officials warned that a permanent Russian presence would enhance Russia’s efforts to weaken the already strained trans-Atlantic alliance.

The prospect of increased Russian influence in the Mediterranean coupled with China’s expanding sway over ports in the Eastern Mediterranean raises the spectre of emboldening Turkey as it aggressively seeks to grow its control of energy-rich waters in the region in violation of international law.

“To avoid the worst outcomes for an already fraught region, there is no substitute and frankly no alternative to some form of cooperation among regional actors. . . . With the Middle East likely to emerge from the COVID-19 crisis more fragile and potentially explosive than before, a cooperative architecture that can build regional resilience is an imperative,” said strategist Steven Kenney and international relations scholar Ross Harrison in a just-released Washington-based Middle East Institute report.

The economic part of the message is already evident: Putting an end to the pandemic and economic recovery will be a painful and long-drawn-out process.

Countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon, and Israel are witnessing first signs of the pandemic’s second wave.

Increasing the likelihood of a cancellation of this year’s Muslim pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca scheduled for late July, Saudi Arabia re-imposed a lockdown in the Red Sea port of Jeddah, the haj’s major gateway, after a spike in coronavirus infections. The lockdown involves a two-week, 15-hour curfew from 15:00 PM to 06:00 PM

A dramatic surge in infections in Iran, averaging 3,000 new cases a day, has rekindled the Middle East’s largest outbreak, weeks after the country appeared to have tamed the virus.

Israel closed dozens of schools and ordered any school reporting a virus case to shut down following a surge in coronavirus cases that swept through classrooms two weeks after they were allowed to reopen.

Mass social and economic protests in Lebanon, a country on the brink of financial collapse, have heightened the risk of a second wave of the pandemic.

The surge bodes ill for economic recovery.

Based on a survey of 1,228 CEOs, the Dubai Chamber of Commerce warned that a &nbsp;staggering 70 per cent of businesses in the emirate expects to close their doors within the next six months.

The warning came as the UAE government extended a nightly curfew following a doubling of infections after it eased lockdown restrictions.

Government-backed UAE carriers Emirates and Etihad Airways have since extended reduced pay for staff until September as they try to preserve cash.

Austerity measures threaten to bring the social unrest that has swept the Middle East and North Africa for the past decade closer to the Gulf.

“If it’s temporary, one or two years, I can adapt. My concern is that more taxes will be permanent — and that will be an issue,” said Mohammed, a Saudi government worker after his $266 USD a month cost of living allowance was cancelled and sales taxes were tripled as part of painful austerity measures announced by Finance Minister Mohammed Al-Jadaan.

Mohammed’s words were echoed in a rare pushback against the government by columnist Khalid Al-Sulaiman, writing in the Okaz daily, one of the kingdom’s tightly controlled media outlets.

“I was hoping [the minister] would say [the tax hike] would be reviewed after the coronavirus crisis is gone or contained, or when oil prices improve, but he did not say that. Citizens are feeling concerned that pressure on their living standards will last longer than the current crisis,” Al-Sulaiman said.

The challenges Gulf states face of an ongoing healthcare crisis and a painful, protracted, and complex road toward economic recovery, coupled with debilitating regional conflicts that not only fester but appear to be expanding, are almost insurmountable obstacles.

Kuwaiti efforts to resolve the rift in the Gulf and pressure by US President Donald J. Trump on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to lift their three-year-old air embargo of Qatar have raised, perhaps prematurely, the hope of an end to the conflict. Although there is no public indication that the parties are willing to seriously engage.

The proxy war in Libya, in which the UAE-backed forces of rebel commander Khalifa Haftar are on the defensive, is extending into the Eastern Mediterranean as Turkey claims rights in energy-rich territorial waters in violation of international law.

Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi-based English language newspaper The National, despite UAE efforts to reduce tension with Iran, seemed, to stop just short of inviting Israel to attack an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ command and control center on the outskirts of the main airport of Damascus, the capital of Syria.

“For now, the Glass House remains unshattered,” The National said in a detailed expose of the centre dubbed The Glass House.

Middle Eastern leaders are confronting the worst pandemic of crises since independence.

Addressing those predicaments requires regional and global leadership which looks beyond immediate survival and ideological and geopolitical rivalries; a leadership which recognises that stability and solutions to shared threats must be vested in longer-term managing and cooperation in tackling common challenges rather than maintaining conflict.

The problem is that few leaders seem willing or able to step up to the plate. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

A second wave of the coronavirus pandemic is raising its ugly head. It is putting Middle Eastern leaders at a crossroads as they struggle to contain the disease and tackle its economic fallout.

A second wave of the coronavirus pandemic is raising its ugly head. It is putting Middle Eastern leaders at a crossroads as they struggle to contain the disease and tackle its economic fallout. The question is whether they are getting the message: neither containing and controlling the virus nor economic recovery is a straight shot. Both are likely to involve a process of two steps forward, one step backwards, and no state can successfully tackle the multiples crises on its own. The Middle East is a part of the world in which conflicts and problems are not just complex but inherently interconnected. The pandemic poses not only political, economic, and social challenges. It also calls into question regional security arrangements that reinforce fault lines rather than create an environment that allows rivals to collectively manage disputes as well as diseases whose spread is not halted by physical and other boundaries. At stake is not just regional but also global security. Focused on their own healthcare and economic crises, Western nations ignore Middle Eastern and North African instability at their peril. They risk waking up to threats that could have been anticipated. Suspected Russian hopes that an end to the Libyan war would allow for the creation of a Russian military base on the southern shore of the Mediterranean that would complement facilities in Syria would be one such impending threat. “Russia wants a foothold in Libya, and that’s a fact,” said Pavel Felgenhauer, a Russian military analyst at the Jamestown Foundation. US officials warned that a permanent Russian presence would enhance Russia’s efforts to weaken the already strained trans-Atlantic alliance. The prospect of increased Russian influence in the Mediterranean coupled with China’s expanding sway over ports in the Eastern Mediterranean raises the spectre of emboldening Turkey as it aggressively seeks to grow its control of energy-rich waters in the region in violation of international law. “To avoid the worst outcomes for an already fraught region, there is no substitute and frankly no alternative to some form of cooperation among regional actors. . . . With the Middle East likely to emerge from the COVID-19 crisis more fragile and potentially explosive than before, a cooperative architecture that can build regional resilience is an imperative,” said strategist Steven Kenney and international relations scholar Ross Harrison in a just-released Washington-based Middle East Institute report. The economic part of the message is already evident: Putting an end to the pandemic and economic recovery will be a painful and long-drawn-out process. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon, and Israel are witnessing first signs of the pandemic’s second wave. Increasing the likelihood of a cancellation of this year’s Muslim pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca scheduled for late July, Saudi Arabia re-imposed a lockdown in the Red Sea port of Jeddah, the haj’s major gateway, after a spike in coronavirus infections. The lockdown involves a two-week, 15-hour curfew from 15:00 PM to 06:00 PM A dramatic surge in infections in Iran, averaging 3,000 new cases a day, has rekindled the Middle East’s largest outbreak, weeks after the country appeared to have tamed the virus. Israel closed dozens of schools and ordered any school reporting a virus case to shut down following a surge in coronavirus cases that swept through classrooms two weeks after they were allowed to reopen. Mass social and economic protests in Lebanon, a country on the brink of financial collapse, have heightened the risk of a second wave of the pandemic. The surge bodes ill for economic recovery. Based on a survey of 1,228 CEOs, the Dubai Chamber of Commerce warned that a staggering 70 per cent of businesses in the emirate expects to close their doors within the next six months. The warning came as the UAE government extended a nightly curfew following a doubling of infections after it eased lockdown restrictions. Government-backed UAE carriers Emirates and Etihad Airways have since extended reduced pay for staff until September as they try to preserve cash. Austerity measures threaten to bring the social unrest that has swept the Middle East and North Africa for the past decade closer to the Gulf. “If it’s temporary, one or two years, I can adapt. My concern is that more taxes will be permanent — and that will be an issue,” said Mohammed, a Saudi government worker after his $266 USD a month cost of living allowance was cancelled and sales taxes were tripled as part of painful austerity measures announced by Finance Minister Mohammed Al-Jadaan. Mohammed’s words were echoed in a rare pushback against the government by columnist Khalid Al-Sulaiman, writing in the Okaz daily, one of the kingdom’s tightly controlled media outlets. “I was hoping [the minister] would say [the tax hike] would be reviewed after the coronavirus crisis is gone or contained, or when oil prices improve, but he did not say that. Citizens are feeling concerned that pressure on their living standards will last longer than the current crisis,” Al-Sulaiman said. The challenges Gulf states face of an ongoing healthcare crisis and a painful, protracted, and complex road toward economic recovery, coupled with debilitating regional conflicts that not only fester but appear to be expanding, are almost insurmountable obstacles. Kuwaiti efforts to resolve the rift in the Gulf and pressure by US President Donald J. Trump on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to lift their three-year-old air embargo of Qatar have raised, perhaps prematurely, the hope of an end to the conflict. Although there is no public indication that the parties are willing to seriously engage. The proxy war in Libya, in which the UAE-backed forces of rebel commander Khalifa Haftar are on the defensive, is extending into the Eastern Mediterranean as Turkey claims rights in energy-rich territorial waters in violation of international law. Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi-based English language newspaper The National, despite UAE efforts to reduce tension with Iran, seemed, to stop just short of inviting Israel to attack an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ command and control center on the outskirts of the main airport of Damascus, the capital of Syria. “For now, the Glass House remains unshattered,” The National said in a detailed expose of the centre dubbed The Glass House. Middle Eastern leaders are confronting the worst pandemic of crises since independence. Addressing those predicaments requires regional and global leadership which looks beyond immediate survival and ideological and geopolitical rivalries; a leadership which recognises that stability and solutions to shared threats must be vested in longer-term managing and cooperation in tackling common challenges rather than maintaining conflict. The problem is that few leaders seem willing or able to step up to the plate. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Middle East struggles to contain coronavirus spread and tackle its economic fallout

Iranian naval activity in the Gulf and Turkish maritime expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean have hogged the limelight, but Russian and Gulf policymakers are also watching with Argus eyes moves by the Islamic Republic in the Caspian Sea.

Iran’s navy is no match for its Russian counterpart and Iran’s naval presence in the Caspian is miniscule.

Yet, recent Iranian posturing and statements, coupled with visits by senior commanders to naval facilities and a shipyard on Iran’s Caspian coast where a destroyer is being repaired and modernised, and diplomatic efforts to tighten relations with former Soviet littoral states, have raised eyebrows in Moscow as well as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

Senior military officials, including Iranian navy commander Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi, his deputy, Admiral Habibullah Sayari, and Admiral Amir Rastegari, who oversees naval construction, stressed the importance to Iranian national security of the Caspian on tours of facilities on the coast.

They also suggested closer cooperation and joint naval exercises with countries like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

“The Caspian Sea is the sea of peace and friendship and we can share our military tactics with our neighbours in this region. We are fully ready to expand ties with neighbouring and friendly countries,” Admiral Khanzadi said in April.

The Iranian moves are about more than only strengthening its military presence in a basin that it shares with Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.

A 2018 agreement among the littoral states, made necessary by the collapse of the Soviet Union, barred entry to the basin by military vessels of non-littoral states but failed to regulate the divvying up of the sea’s abundant resources.

Closer naval ties with Caspian Sea states would allow Iran to leverage its position at a time that Central Asians worry about greater Chinese security engagement in their part of the world that undermines a tacit understanding in which Russia shouldered responsibility for regional security while China focussed on economic development.

Increased Chinese engagement raises the spectre of the export of aspects of the People’s Republic’s 21st century, Orwellian surveillance state amid widespread anti-Chinese sentiment as a result of China’s brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims in the troubled north-western province of Xinjiang.

Hard hit by the economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic, Central Asians are torn between wanting to benefit from Chinese willingness to revive Belt and Road-related projects and their concerns that enhanced Chinese influence could impact their lives.

Popular sentiment forced Kyrgyzstan early on in the pandemic to cancel a $275 million logistics project. The Kazakh foreign ministry summoned the Chinese ambassador to explain an article published on a Chinese website that asserted that the Central Asian country wanted to return to Chinese rule.

Kazakh media called for China and the US to leave Kazakhstan alone after the Chinese foreign ministry claimed that the coronavirus had originated in US-funded laboratories in the country.

Iranian efforts, boosted by the Indian-funded deep seaport of Chabahar that serves as a conduit for Indian exports to Central Asia, to benefit in the margin from big Asian power rivalry, has opened the region, including the Caspian basin, to greater competition with the Islamic Republic’s Gulf opponents, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Iran hopes that geography and Central Asian distrust of past Saudi promotion of its ultra-conservative strand of Islam will work to its advantage.

That hope may not be in vain. Tajik foreign minister Sirodjidin Muhriddin, despite past troubled relations with the Islamic Republic, opted a year ago to ignore a Saudi invitation to attend an Organization of Islamic Cooperation (ICO) conference in the kingdom and visit Iran instead.

Iran has since agreed to invest $4 billion in the completion of a five kilometre-long tunnel that will link the Tajik capital of Dushanbe with the country’s second-largest city, Khujand.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have fared somewhat better in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan.

Saudi utility developer ACWA Power, in which China’s state-owned Silk Road Fund has a 49 percent stake, and the UAE’s Masdar or Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company agreed to invest in Azerbaijani renewable energy projects.

ACWA Power also recently signed agreements in Uzbekistan worth $ 2.5 billion for the construction of a power plant and a wind farm.

Perhaps Iran’s strongest trump card is that by linking the Caspian to the Arabian Sea it can provide what the Gulf states cannot: cheap and short access to the Indo-Pacific.

Already, Iran is written all over Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev’s transportation infrastructure plans. A decree issued in late 2017 identified various corridors as key to his plans, including the extension of a rail line that connects Uzbekistan’s Termez to Afghanistan’s Mazar-i-Sharif to the Afghan city of Herat from where it would branch out to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port, Chabahar; and Bazargan on the Iranian-Turkish border.

“As Tashkent seeks to diversify its economic relations, Iran continues to loom large in these calculations. For Uzbekistan, not only do Iranian ports offer the shortest and cheapest route to the sea, but several future rail projects cannot be accomplished without Tehran’s active participation,” said Central Asia analyst Umida Hashimova. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

Iranian naval activity in the Gulf and Turkish maritime expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean have hogged the limelight, but Russian and Gulf policymakers are also watching with Argus eyes moves by the Islamic Republic in the Caspian Sea.

Iranian naval activity in the Gulf and Turkish maritime expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean have hogged the limelight, but Russian and Gulf policymakers are also watching with Argus eyes moves by the Islamic Republic in the Caspian Sea. Iran’s navy is no match for its Russian counterpart and Iran’s naval presence in the Caspian is miniscule. Yet, recent Iranian posturing and statements, coupled with visits by senior commanders to naval facilities and a shipyard on Iran’s Caspian coast where a destroyer is being repaired and modernised, and diplomatic efforts to tighten relations with former Soviet littoral states, have raised eyebrows in Moscow as well as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Senior military officials, including Iranian navy commander Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi, his deputy, Admiral Habibullah Sayari, and Admiral Amir Rastegari, who oversees naval construction, stressed the importance to Iranian national security of the Caspian on tours of facilities on the coast. They also suggested closer cooperation and joint naval exercises with countries like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. “The Caspian Sea is the sea of peace and friendship and we can share our military tactics with our neighbours in this region. We are fully ready to expand ties with neighbouring and friendly countries,” Admiral Khanzadi said in April. The Iranian moves are about more than only strengthening its military presence in a basin that it shares with Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. A 2018 agreement among the littoral states, made necessary by the collapse of the Soviet Union, barred entry to the basin by military vessels of non-littoral states but failed to regulate the divvying up of the sea’s abundant resources. Closer naval ties with Caspian Sea states would allow Iran to leverage its position at a time that Central Asians worry about greater Chinese security engagement in their part of the world that undermines a tacit understanding in which Russia shouldered responsibility for regional security while China focussed on economic development. Increased Chinese engagement raises the spectre of the export of aspects of the People’s Republic’s 21st century, Orwellian surveillance state amid widespread anti-Chinese sentiment as a result of China’s brutal crackdown on Turkic Muslims in the troubled north-western province of Xinjiang. Hard hit by the economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic, Central Asians are torn between wanting to benefit from Chinese willingness to revive Belt and Road-related projects and their concerns that enhanced Chinese influence could impact their lives. Popular sentiment forced Kyrgyzstan early on in the pandemic to cancel a $275 million logistics project. The Kazakh foreign ministry summoned the Chinese ambassador to explain an article published on a Chinese website that asserted that the Central Asian country wanted to return to Chinese rule. Kazakh media called for China and the US to leave Kazakhstan alone after the Chinese foreign ministry claimed that the coronavirus had originated in US-funded laboratories in the country. Iranian efforts, boosted by the Indian-funded deep seaport of Chabahar that serves as a conduit for Indian exports to Central Asia, to benefit in the margin from big Asian power rivalry, has opened the region, including the Caspian basin, to greater competition with the Islamic Republic’s Gulf opponents, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Iran hopes that geography and Central Asian distrust of past Saudi promotion of its ultra-conservative strand of Islam will work to its advantage. That hope may not be in vain. Tajik foreign minister Sirodjidin Muhriddin, despite past troubled relations with the Islamic Republic, opted a year ago to ignore a Saudi invitation to attend an Organization of Islamic Cooperation (ICO) conference in the kingdom and visit Iran instead. Iran has since agreed to invest $4 billion in the completion of a five kilometre-long tunnel that will link the Tajik capital of Dushanbe with the country’s second-largest city, Khujand. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have fared somewhat better in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. Saudi utility developer ACWA Power, in which China’s state-owned Silk Road Fund has a 49 percent stake, and the UAE’s Masdar or Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company agreed to invest in Azerbaijani renewable energy projects. ACWA Power also recently signed agreements in Uzbekistan worth $ 2.5 billion for the construction of a power plant and a wind farm. Perhaps Iran’s strongest trump card is that by linking the Caspian to the Arabian Sea it can provide what the Gulf states cannot: cheap and short access to the Indo-Pacific. Already, Iran is written all over Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev’s transportation infrastructure plans. A decree issued in late 2017 identified various corridors as key to his plans, including the extension of a rail line that connects Uzbekistan’s Termez to Afghanistan’s Mazar-i-Sharif to the Afghan city of Herat from where it would branch out to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port, Chabahar; and Bazargan on the Iranian-Turkish border. “As Tashkent seeks to diversify its economic relations, Iran continues to loom large in these calculations. For Uzbekistan, not only do Iranian ports offer the shortest and cheapest route to the sea, but several future rail projects cannot be accomplished without Tehran’s active participation,” said Central Asia analyst Umida Hashimova. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Iran's expanding naval presence in Caspian Sea puts spotlight on great power rivalry

China and the Gulf states are in the same boat as they grapple with uncertainty about regional security against the backdrop of doubts about the United States’ commitment to the region.

Like the Gulf states, China has long relied on the US defence umbrella to ensure the security of the flow of energy and other goods through waters surrounding the Gulf.

In anticipation of the day when China can no longer depend on security provided by the United States free of charge, China has gradually adjusted its defence strategy and built its first foreign military facility in Djibouti facing the Gulf from the Horn of Africa.

With the People’s Liberation Army Navy tasked with protecting China’s sea lines of communication and safeguarding its overseas interests, strategic planners have signalled that Djibouti is a first step in the likely establishment of further bases that would allow it to project long-range capability and shorten the time needed to resupply.

But Chinese strategic planners and their Gulf counterparts may part ways when it comes to what would be acceptable geopolitical parameters for a rejuvenated regional security architecture.

A rejiggered architecture would likely embed rather than exclude the US defence umbrella primarily designed to protect conservative energy-rich monarchies against Iran and counter militancy.

In contrast to China and Russia, Gulf states, as a matter of principle, favour identifying Iran as the enemy and have cold-shouldered proposals for a non-aggression agreement. But for that they need the United States to be a reliable partner that would unconditionally come to their defence at whatever cost.

For its part, China goes to great lengths to avoid being sucked into the Middle East’s myriad conflicts. Adopting a different approach, Russia has put forward a plan for a multilateral security structure based on a non-aggression understanding that would include Iran.

No doubt, China, unlike Russia, wants to postpone the moment in which it has no choice but to become involved in Gulf security. However, China could find itself under pressure sooner rather than later depending on how Gulf perceptions of risk in the continued reliance on the United States evolve.

One factor that could propel things would be a change of guard in the White House as a result of the US election in November.

Democratic presumptive candidate Joe Biden, as president, may strike a more internationalist tone than Donald Trump, though Biden administration’s relations with Saudi Arabia could prove to be more strained. Similarly, Biden’s focus, like that of Trump, is likely to be China rather than the Middle East.

By the same token, China’s appraisal of its ability to rely on the US in the Gulf could change depending on how mounting tensions with the US and potential decoupling of the world’s two largest economies unfolds.

China’s increased security engagement in Central Asia may well be an indication of how it hopes to proceed in the Gulf and the broader Middle East. China has stepped up joint military exercises with various Central Asian nations while its share of the Central Asian arms market has increased from 1.5 per cent in 2014 to 18 per cent today.

Founded in 2001 as a Central Asian security grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has expanded its relationships in South Asia and the Caucasus and admitted Iran as an observer.

Referring to China’s infrastructure, telecommunications, and energy-driven Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that seeks to link the Eurasian landmass to the People’s Republic, China and Central Asia scholar Raffaello Pantucci explained that: “China is expanding its security role in Central Asia to protect its interests in the region and is increasingly unwilling to abrogate security entirely to either local security forces or Russia.”

“By doing so, Beijing is demonstrating an approach that could be read as a blueprint for how China might advance its security relations in other BRI countries,” Pantucci wrote.

Central Asia may find it easier than the Gulf to accommodate the Chinese approach.

The problem for most of the Gulf states is that taking Chinese and Russian concerns into account in any new security arrangement would have to entail paradigm shifts in their attitudes toward Iran.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – which has recently made overtures to Iran, insist that any real détente has to involve a halt to Iranian support for proxies in various Middle Eastern countries as well as a return to a renegotiated agreement that would curb not only the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program but also its development of ballistic missiles.

Caught between the rock of perceived US unreliability and the hard place of Chinese and Russian geopolitical imperatives, smaller Gulf states, including the UAE, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, are hedging their bets by cautiously reaching out to Iran in different ways.

They hope that the overtures will take them out of the firing line should either Iran or the United States, by accident or deliberately, heighten tensions and/or spark a wider military confrontation.

To be sure, various Gulf states have different calculations. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have adopted the most hardline position toward Iran. Oman and Qatar have long maintained normal relations, while the UAE and Kuwait have made limited overtures.

In the short run, Gulf states’ realisation of China and Russia’s parameters could persuade them to maintain their levels of expenditure on weapons acquisitions. And, in the case of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to pursue the development of domestic defence industry, despite the economic fallout of the pandemic, the drop of oil and gas prices, and the shrinking of energy markets.

Probably, so will recent Iranian military advances. Iran last week publicly displayed what is believed to be an unmanned underwater vehicle that would allow the Revolutionary Guards’ navy to project greater power – because of its long-range, better-integrated weapons systems – and more efficiently lay underwater mines.

The vehicle put Iran in an even more elite club than the one it joined in April when it successfully launched a military satellite, a capability only a dozen countries have. When it comes to unmanned underwater vehicles, Iran rubs shoulder with only three countries: the United States, Britain, and China.

Iran’s advances serve two purposes: they highlight the failure of the United States’ two-year-old sanctions-driven maximum pressure campaign to force Iran’s economy on its knees, and, together with massive US arms sales to Gulf countries, they fuel a regional arms race.

To be sure, Russia and China benefit from the race to a limited degree too.

In the ultimate analysis, however, the race could contribute to heightened tensions that risk putting one more nail in the coffin of a US-dominated regional architecture. That, in turn, could force external powers like China to engage whether they want to or not.

“China is quickly learning that you can’t trade and invest in an unstable place like the Middle East if you don’t have the means to protect your interests,” said Israeli journalist David Rosenberg. “Where business executives come, warships and commando units follow, and they will follow big. 
 
&nbsp;(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

China and the Gulf states are in the same boat as they grapple with uncertainty about regional security against the backdrop of doubts about the United States’ commitment to the region.

China and the Gulf states are in the same boat as they grapple with uncertainty about regional security against the backdrop of doubts about the United States’ commitment to the region. Like the Gulf states, China has long relied on the US defence umbrella to ensure the security of the flow of energy and other goods through waters surrounding the Gulf. In anticipation of the day when China can no longer depend on security provided by the United States free of charge, China has gradually adjusted its defence strategy and built its first foreign military facility in Djibouti facing the Gulf from the Horn of Africa. With the People’s Liberation Army Navy tasked with protecting China’s sea lines of communication and safeguarding its overseas interests, strategic planners have signalled that Djibouti is a first step in the likely establishment of further bases that would allow it to project long-range capability and shorten the time needed to resupply. But Chinese strategic planners and their Gulf counterparts may part ways when it comes to what would be acceptable geopolitical parameters for a rejuvenated regional security architecture. A rejiggered architecture would likely embed rather than exclude the US defence umbrella primarily designed to protect conservative energy-rich monarchies against Iran and counter militancy. In contrast to China and Russia, Gulf states, as a matter of principle, favour identifying Iran as the enemy and have cold-shouldered proposals for a non-aggression agreement. But for that they need the United States to be a reliable partner that would unconditionally come to their defence at whatever cost. For its part, China goes to great lengths to avoid being sucked into the Middle East’s myriad conflicts. Adopting a different approach, Russia has put forward a plan for a multilateral security structure based on a non-aggression understanding that would include Iran. No doubt, China, unlike Russia, wants to postpone the moment in which it has no choice but to become involved in Gulf security. However, China could find itself under pressure sooner rather than later depending on how Gulf perceptions of risk in the continued reliance on the United States evolve. One factor that could propel things would be a change of guard in the White House as a result of the US election in November. Democratic presumptive candidate Joe Biden, as president, may strike a more internationalist tone than Donald Trump, though Biden administration’s relations with Saudi Arabia could prove to be more strained. Similarly, Biden’s focus, like that of Trump, is likely to be China rather than the Middle East. By the same token, China’s appraisal of its ability to rely on the US in the Gulf could change depending on how mounting tensions with the US and potential decoupling of the world’s two largest economies unfolds. China’s increased security engagement in Central Asia may well be an indication of how it hopes to proceed in the Gulf and the broader Middle East. China has stepped up joint military exercises with various Central Asian nations while its share of the Central Asian arms market has increased from 1.5 per cent in 2014 to 18 per cent today. Founded in 2001 as a Central Asian security grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has expanded its relationships in South Asia and the Caucasus and admitted Iran as an observer. Referring to China’s infrastructure, telecommunications, and energy-driven Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that seeks to link the Eurasian landmass to the People’s Republic, China and Central Asia scholar Raffaello Pantucci explained that: “China is expanding its security role in Central Asia to protect its interests in the region and is increasingly unwilling to abrogate security entirely to either local security forces or Russia.” “By doing so, Beijing is demonstrating an approach that could be read as a blueprint for how China might advance its security relations in other BRI countries,” Pantucci wrote. Central Asia may find it easier than the Gulf to accommodate the Chinese approach. The problem for most of the Gulf states is that taking Chinese and Russian concerns into account in any new security arrangement would have to entail paradigm shifts in their attitudes toward Iran. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – which has recently made overtures to Iran, insist that any real détente has to involve a halt to Iranian support for proxies in various Middle Eastern countries as well as a return to a renegotiated agreement that would curb not only the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program but also its development of ballistic missiles. Caught between the rock of perceived US unreliability and the hard place of Chinese and Russian geopolitical imperatives, smaller Gulf states, including the UAE, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, are hedging their bets by cautiously reaching out to Iran in different ways. They hope that the overtures will take them out of the firing line should either Iran or the United States, by accident or deliberately, heighten tensions and/or spark a wider military confrontation. To be sure, various Gulf states have different calculations. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have adopted the most hardline position toward Iran. Oman and Qatar have long maintained normal relations, while the UAE and Kuwait have made limited overtures. In the short run, Gulf states’ realisation of China and Russia’s parameters could persuade them to maintain their levels of expenditure on weapons acquisitions. And, in the case of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to pursue the development of domestic defence industry, despite the economic fallout of the pandemic, the drop of oil and gas prices, and the shrinking of energy markets. Probably, so will recent Iranian military advances. Iran last week publicly displayed what is believed to be an unmanned underwater vehicle that would allow the Revolutionary Guards’ navy to project greater power – because of its long-range, better-integrated weapons systems – and more efficiently lay underwater mines. The vehicle put Iran in an even more elite club than the one it joined in April when it successfully launched a military satellite, a capability only a dozen countries have. When it comes to unmanned underwater vehicles, Iran rubs shoulder with only three countries: the United States, Britain, and China. Iran’s advances serve two purposes: they highlight the failure of the United States’ two-year-old sanctions-driven maximum pressure campaign to force Iran’s economy on its knees, and, together with massive US arms sales to Gulf countries, they fuel a regional arms race. To be sure, Russia and China benefit from the race to a limited degree too. In the ultimate analysis, however, the race could contribute to heightened tensions that risk putting one more nail in the coffin of a US-dominated regional architecture. That, in turn, could force external powers like China to engage whether they want to or not. “China is quickly learning that you can’t trade and invest in an unstable place like the Middle East if you don’t have the means to protect your interests,” said Israeli journalist David Rosenberg. “Where business executives come, warships and commando units follow, and they will follow big. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

China can no longer rely on US defence umbrella for security in the Gulf region

The Firefly, an Israeli-built loitering kamikaze drone, part of the Spike family of missiles that the Jewish state has sold to various European nations, may be one reason why Gulf states, and particularly Saudi Arabia, have cosied up to Israel in a seeming reversal of their past support of Palestinian rights.

If there is one lesson that Gulf states have learned from the United States’ reduced commitment to the region and the strains in US-Saudi relations, it is that putting one’s eggs in one basket is risky business.

That has not prevented the United States from continuing to secure its place as the region’s foremost arms supplier as this month’s arms and related commercial deals prove.

The US Defence Department announced a $2.6 billion Saudi deal to acquire 1,000 air-to-surface and anti-ship missiles from Boeing. Within days, Saudi Arabia’s Al Tadrea Manufacturing Company tweeted that it had reached an agreement with Oshkosh Defence to establish a joint venture to manufacture armed vehicles in the kingdom.

The Public Investment Fund, Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, disclosed separately that it had recently taken a $ 713.7 million stake in Boeing at a time when the company, already suffering major setbacks because of its 737-Max fiasco, took a significant hit as a result of a collapse of the civilian aviation industry.

The continued Saudi arms focus on the United States has not deprived China of opportunities. China has stepped in to help Saudi Arabia produce unmanned military vehicles after the United States refused to sell its MQ-9 Reaper killer drone to the kingdom. Saudi Arabia expects production to start next year.

Like China, Russia has been urging Saudi Arabia to purchase its acclaimed S-400 anti-missile defence system. So far, the kingdom, having watched the United States cancel NATO-member Turkey’s purchase of US F-35 fighter jets and its co-production agreement of some of the plane’s components after it acquired the Russian system, has been reticent to take the Russians up on their offer.

The limitations of Saudi-Russian cooperation have since become obvious with April’s price war between the two major oil producers that sent oil markets into a tailspin from which they are unlikely to recover any time soon.

Israel, like China and Russia and unlike the United States, puts no problematic restrictions such as adherence to human rights and use of weaponry in accordance with international law on its arms sales.

But Israel has one leg up on its Chinese and Russian competitors who maintain close ties to Iran. Israel shares with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) a perception of Iran as an existential threat and a destabilising force in the Middle East that at the very least needs to be contained.

To be sure, that is a perception that Saudi Arabia and the UAE see reflected in the United States’ maximum pressure policy towards Iran which aims to force the Islamic Republic to “change its behaviour,” if not change its regime.

The problem is that maximum pressure two years into the imposition of harsh US economic sanctions has produced little result.

Add to that the fact that the United States has proven to be an unreliable ally when the chips are down, persuading the UAE and other smaller Gulf states to reach out to Iran to ensure that their critical national infrastructure does not become a target in any future major US-Iranian military conflagration.

The watershed moment for the Gulf states was when the United States failed to respond forcefully last spring and summer to alleged Iranian attacks on key Saudi oil facilities as well as oil tankers off the coast of the UAE.

The Trump administration, in a bid to reassure Gulf states, weeks later sent troops and Patriot anti-missile defence systems to Saudi Arabia to help it protect its oil installations, although the United States withdrew two of those systems earlier this month.

It took the killing of a US military contractor in December 2019 for the United States to respond to tens of Iranian-backed attacks on American targets in Iraq. And when it did, with the killing in January of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, Gulf states privately celebrated the demise of their nemesis but also feared that it was overkill, bringing the Middle East to the brink of an all-out war.

Gulf states are likely to find that cooperation with Israel has its limits too. Israel may be eager to sell weaponry and have the capability to push back at Iran in Syria. If need be, Israel can also severely damaged, if not take out, Iranian nuclear and missile facilities in military strikes that Gulf states would be unable to carry out.

But ties to Israel remain a sensitive issue in the Gulf and elsewhere in the Arab world. And Israel has so far restricted sales to non-lethal equipment and technology. That could change with a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations.

Public opinion, however, may be one reason Gulf states have refused to turn unofficial relations into diplomatic recognition, suggesting that there may be greater public empathy for Palestinians than Gulf rulers wish to admit.

That could count for more with Gulf rulers finding it increasingly difficult to provide public goods and services, among which first and foremost jobs, as a result of the global economic crisis and the collapse of oil prices. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

The Firefly, an Israeli-built loitering kamikaze drone, part of the Spike family of missiles that the Jewish state has sold to various European nations, may be one reason why Gulf states, and particularly Saudi Arabia, have cosied up to Israel in a seeming reversal of their past support of Palestinian rights.

The Firefly, an Israeli-built loitering kamikaze drone, part of the Spike family of missiles that the Jewish state has sold to various European nations, may be one reason why Gulf states, and particularly Saudi Arabia, have cosied up to Israel in a seeming reversal of their past support of Palestinian rights. If there is one lesson that Gulf states have learned from the United States’ reduced commitment to the region and the strains in US-Saudi relations, it is that putting one’s eggs in one basket is risky business. That has not prevented the United States from continuing to secure its place as the region’s foremost arms supplier as this month’s arms and related commercial deals prove. The US Defence Department announced a $2.6 billion Saudi deal to acquire 1,000 air-to-surface and anti-ship missiles from Boeing. Within days, Saudi Arabia’s Al Tadrea Manufacturing Company tweeted that it had reached an agreement with Oshkosh Defence to establish a joint venture to manufacture armed vehicles in the kingdom. The Public Investment Fund, Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, disclosed separately that it had recently taken a $ 713.7 million stake in Boeing at a time when the company, already suffering major setbacks because of its 737-Max fiasco, took a significant hit as a result of a collapse of the civilian aviation industry. The continued Saudi arms focus on the United States has not deprived China of opportunities. China has stepped in to help Saudi Arabia produce unmanned military vehicles after the United States refused to sell its MQ-9 Reaper killer drone to the kingdom. Saudi Arabia expects production to start next year. Like China, Russia has been urging Saudi Arabia to purchase its acclaimed S-400 anti-missile defence system. So far, the kingdom, having watched the United States cancel NATO-member Turkey’s purchase of US F-35 fighter jets and its co-production agreement of some of the plane’s components after it acquired the Russian system, has been reticent to take the Russians up on their offer. The limitations of Saudi-Russian cooperation have since become obvious with April’s price war between the two major oil producers that sent oil markets into a tailspin from which they are unlikely to recover any time soon. Israel, like China and Russia and unlike the United States, puts no problematic restrictions such as adherence to human rights and use of weaponry in accordance with international law on its arms sales. But Israel has one leg up on its Chinese and Russian competitors who maintain close ties to Iran. Israel shares with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) a perception of Iran as an existential threat and a destabilising force in the Middle East that at the very least needs to be contained. To be sure, that is a perception that Saudi Arabia and the UAE see reflected in the United States’ maximum pressure policy towards Iran which aims to force the Islamic Republic to “change its behaviour,” if not change its regime. The problem is that maximum pressure two years into the imposition of harsh US economic sanctions has produced little result. Add to that the fact that the United States has proven to be an unreliable ally when the chips are down, persuading the UAE and other smaller Gulf states to reach out to Iran to ensure that their critical national infrastructure does not become a target in any future major US-Iranian military conflagration. The watershed moment for the Gulf states was when the United States failed to respond forcefully last spring and summer to alleged Iranian attacks on key Saudi oil facilities as well as oil tankers off the coast of the UAE. The Trump administration, in a bid to reassure Gulf states, weeks later sent troops and Patriot anti-missile defence systems to Saudi Arabia to help it protect its oil installations, although the United States withdrew two of those systems earlier this month. It took the killing of a US military contractor in December 2019 for the United States to respond to tens of Iranian-backed attacks on American targets in Iraq. And when it did, with the killing in January of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, Gulf states privately celebrated the demise of their nemesis but also feared that it was overkill, bringing the Middle East to the brink of an all-out war. Gulf states are likely to find that cooperation with Israel has its limits too. Israel may be eager to sell weaponry and have the capability to push back at Iran in Syria. If need be, Israel can also severely damaged, if not take out, Iranian nuclear and missile facilities in military strikes that Gulf states would be unable to carry out. But ties to Israel remain a sensitive issue in the Gulf and elsewhere in the Arab world. And Israel has so far restricted sales to non-lethal equipment and technology. That could change with a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. Public opinion, however, may be one reason Gulf states have refused to turn unofficial relations into diplomatic recognition, suggesting that there may be greater public empathy for Palestinians than Gulf rulers wish to admit. That could count for more with Gulf rulers finding it increasingly difficult to provide public goods and services, among which first and foremost jobs, as a result of the global economic crisis and the collapse of oil prices. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Israel a more reliable partner to Gulf states

The coronavirus pandemic’s economic fallout calls into question Gulf states’ ability to fund a brewing, costly regional arms race. That, in turn, could not only reshape their geopolitical posture but also efforts to make the military a pillar of a new national identity at a time that they are forced to renegotiate outdated social contracts.

A significant drop in revenues, as a result of the collapse of oil and gas prices and vastly reduced global demand, raises the question whether countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, can maintain huge military expenditures that rank them among the world’s foremost arms buyers.

Saudi and UAE expenditure was driven by a perceived need to counter Iranian advances in the development of ballistic missiles and drones as well as a potential nuclear military capability and Iranian-backed Arab proxies. Qatar joined the race more recently in response to the three-year-old, Saudi-UAE-led economic and diplomatic boycott of the Gulf state.

The expenditure positioned the military as a driver of an identity grounded in nationalism rather than religion or tribal heritage and was intended to help lay the groundwork for eventual, potentially painful, transitions to more diversified and streamlined post-oil economies.

Male conscription introduced in the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait and a Saudi decision to open volunteering for military service to women over the last decade served that purpose, as well as, government efforts to expand citizen participation in the workforce at the expense of migrant and expatriate labour, including in the armed forces.

The moves constituted a break with a past in which Arab rulers largely distrusted their militaries and employed multiple ways to shield themselves against feared military-backed attempts to remove them from power.

Saudi and Emirati rulers expected that their military intervention in Yemen and the UAE’s involvement in the Libyan war would boost the military’s prestige with quick and decisive victories.

Five years later, the ill-conceived intervention in Yemen has produced at best-mixed results. So has the more recent effort to topple the internationally recognised, Islamist Libyan Government of National Accord.

The UAE, dubbed Little Sparta by former US Defence Secretary Jim Mattis, withdrew partially from Yemen in a bid to cut its losses. UAE forces, moreover, suffered the deaths of tens of Emirati citizens, a high number for a population of only 1.4 million nationals. As a result, the UAE relies increasingly on proxies and mercenaries.

Nonetheless, the UAE may have fared better than the Saudi military whose image, at least internationally, has been severely tarnished.

Recently, the kingdom appears to implicitly acknowledge that it cannot win the Yemen war militarily. Media reports suggested that the Saudi government was cutting back on funding of the internationally recognised, largely Saudi-based Yemeni government headed by Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi.

Saudi conduct of the war has involved multiple attacks on civilian targets, devastated the country’s economic and civilian infrastructure and turned it into one of the world’s greatest humanitarian catastrophes.

Similarly, UAE-backed Libyan rebels led by self-appointed Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar have suffered a similar fate. Haftar’s promise more than a year ago to launch a blitz conquest of the Libyan capital Tripoli has not only proven to be an illusion. Turkish-backed government troops have put his rebels on the defensive.

Saudi and UAE rulers are betting that their emphasis on values associated with nationalism and armed forces such as patriotism, sacrifice, discipline, duty and concepts of heroic model citizens will reinforce public appreciation of the military despite its chequered track record. For now, that appears to be a winning bet.

Saudi Arabia has successfully garnered popular support for the armed forces and the Yemen war, despite widespread international criticism, by eulogizing patriotic sacrifices of Saudi military casualties, generously compensating families of permanently disabled or fallen soldiers and creating multiple institutions to ensure veterans’ rights. The UAE has institutionalised the honouring of military martyrs.

Ultimately, however, the Saudi and UAE military’s mixed track record raises questions about the degree to which they can be unqualified standard-bearers of new national identities.

It also begs the question whether populations in countries such as Saudi Arabia that were forced to introduce painful social spending cutbacks with no indication that elites are sharing the burden will continue to endorse massive military expenditure at a time of austerity.

If social media are anything to go by, many Saudis praise the government for ensuring the return to the kingdom of Saudi nationals abroad at the beginning of the pandemic, funding their quarantining to prevent the coronavirus from spreading, and subsidizing private-sector salaries impacted by a lockdown for up to 60 per cent.

A fair number, however, expressed concern that the middle and lower classes would shoulder the brunt of the economic fallout of the pandemic and questioned continued investment in trophies like English soccer club Newcastle United by the Public Investment Fund, the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund. Military expenditure has so far not been called into question.

Potentially complicating issues is the fact that a majority of Emirati and Saudi casualties in Yemen hailed from less privileged emirates in the UAE and provinces in the kingdom, some of which are home to religious minorities with a history of feeling disadvantaged, As a result, it remains to be seen whether military service will ultimately narrow or broaden social gaps.

“Militarisation bolsters regime security, thereby serving national security twice over. However, rising nationalist feelings are likely to enhance regional polarization,” warned Gulf scholar Eleonora Ardemagni.

Ardemagni’s caution focused on the risk of militarisation entrenching differences among Gulf states. The question is whether militarisation’s so far successful boosting of domestic cohesion could have a flip side that in more dire circumstances polarises rather than unites. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

The coronavirus pandemic’s economic fallout calls into question Gulf states’ ability to fund a brewing, costly regional arms race. That, in turn, could not only reshape their geopolitical posture but also efforts to make the military a pillar of a new national identity at a time that they are forced to renegotiate outdated social contracts.

The coronavirus pandemic’s economic fallout calls into question Gulf states’ ability to fund a brewing, costly regional arms race. That, in turn, could not only reshape their geopolitical posture but also efforts to make the military a pillar of a new national identity at a time that they are forced to renegotiate outdated social contracts. A significant drop in revenues, as a result of the collapse of oil and gas prices and vastly reduced global demand, raises the question whether countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, can maintain huge military expenditures that rank them among the world’s foremost arms buyers. Saudi and UAE expenditure was driven by a perceived need to counter Iranian advances in the development of ballistic missiles and drones as well as a potential nuclear military capability and Iranian-backed Arab proxies. Qatar joined the race more recently in response to the three-year-old, Saudi-UAE-led economic and diplomatic boycott of the Gulf state. The expenditure positioned the military as a driver of an identity grounded in nationalism rather than religion or tribal heritage and was intended to help lay the groundwork for eventual, potentially painful, transitions to more diversified and streamlined post-oil economies. Male conscription introduced in the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait and a Saudi decision to open volunteering for military service to women over the last decade served that purpose, as well as, government efforts to expand citizen participation in the workforce at the expense of migrant and expatriate labour, including in the armed forces. The moves constituted a break with a past in which Arab rulers largely distrusted their militaries and employed multiple ways to shield themselves against feared military-backed attempts to remove them from power. Saudi and Emirati rulers expected that their military intervention in Yemen and the UAE’s involvement in the Libyan war would boost the military’s prestige with quick and decisive victories. Five years later, the ill-conceived intervention in Yemen has produced at best-mixed results. So has the more recent effort to topple the internationally recognised, Islamist Libyan Government of National Accord. The UAE, dubbed Little Sparta by former US Defence Secretary Jim Mattis, withdrew partially from Yemen in a bid to cut its losses. UAE forces, moreover, suffered the deaths of tens of Emirati citizens, a high number for a population of only 1.4 million nationals. As a result, the UAE relies increasingly on proxies and mercenaries. Nonetheless, the UAE may have fared better than the Saudi military whose image, at least internationally, has been severely tarnished. Recently, the kingdom appears to implicitly acknowledge that it cannot win the Yemen war militarily. Media reports suggested that the Saudi government was cutting back on funding of the internationally recognised, largely Saudi-based Yemeni government headed by Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. Saudi conduct of the war has involved multiple attacks on civilian targets, devastated the country’s economic and civilian infrastructure and turned it into one of the world’s greatest humanitarian catastrophes. Similarly, UAE-backed Libyan rebels led by self-appointed Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar have suffered a similar fate. Haftar’s promise more than a year ago to launch a blitz conquest of the Libyan capital Tripoli has not only proven to be an illusion. Turkish-backed government troops have put his rebels on the defensive. Saudi and UAE rulers are betting that their emphasis on values associated with nationalism and armed forces such as patriotism, sacrifice, discipline, duty and concepts of heroic model citizens will reinforce public appreciation of the military despite its chequered track record. For now, that appears to be a winning bet. Saudi Arabia has successfully garnered popular support for the armed forces and the Yemen war, despite widespread international criticism, by eulogizing patriotic sacrifices of Saudi military casualties, generously compensating families of permanently disabled or fallen soldiers and creating multiple institutions to ensure veterans’ rights. The UAE has institutionalised the honouring of military martyrs. Ultimately, however, the Saudi and UAE military’s mixed track record raises questions about the degree to which they can be unqualified standard-bearers of new national identities. It also begs the question whether populations in countries such as Saudi Arabia that were forced to introduce painful social spending cutbacks with no indication that elites are sharing the burden will continue to endorse massive military expenditure at a time of austerity. If social media are anything to go by, many Saudis praise the government for ensuring the return to the kingdom of Saudi nationals abroad at the beginning of the pandemic, funding their quarantining to prevent the coronavirus from spreading, and subsidizing private-sector salaries impacted by a lockdown for up to 60 per cent. A fair number, however, expressed concern that the middle and lower classes would shoulder the brunt of the economic fallout of the pandemic and questioned continued investment in trophies like English soccer club Newcastle United by the Public Investment Fund, the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund. Military expenditure has so far not been called into question. Potentially complicating issues is the fact that a majority of Emirati and Saudi casualties in Yemen hailed from less privileged emirates in the UAE and provinces in the kingdom, some of which are home to religious minorities with a history of feeling disadvantaged, As a result, it remains to be seen whether military service will ultimately narrow or broaden social gaps. “Militarisation bolsters regime security, thereby serving national security twice over. However, rising nationalist feelings are likely to enhance regional polarization,” warned Gulf scholar Eleonora Ardemagni. Ardemagni’s caution focused on the risk of militarisation entrenching differences among Gulf states. The question is whether militarisation’s so far successful boosting of domestic cohesion could have a flip side that in more dire circumstances polarises rather than unites. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

The potential dark side of the militarisation of Gulf societies

Air India's first repatriation flight took off from Kochi for Abu Dhabi on Thursday afternoon. The flight will be bringing back Indian nationals to the country soon.

Air India Express IX419 is being used for the biggest repatriation operation of the Indian government to bring back the&nbsp;Indian nationals stranded in the Gulf countries due to the coronavirus pandemic.

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/operation-samudra-setu-ins-jalashwa-set-to-evacuate-stranded-indians-from-maldives-297209">Also read:&nbsp;Operation Samudra Setu: INS Jalashwa set to evacuate stranded Indians from Maldives</a>

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1st flight with 175 stranded Indians from abroad will land in Kochi from Abu Dhabi at around 2140 hrs. The second flight will also be to Kerala, having 175 stranded Indians. 
 
Location of pic: India's operation room, Dubai<a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/COVID?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#COVID</a> <a href="https://t.co/jbaDRQ31de">https://t.co/jbaDRQ31de</a> <a href="https://t.co/ARJTc71i3u">pic.twitter.com/ARJTc71i3u</a>
— Sidhant Sibal (@sidhant) <a href="https://twitter.com/sidhant/status/1258342149373952001?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">May 7, 2020</a></blockquote>
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The first flight will land in Kerala&nbsp;around 9:40pm. The Kochi flight is bringing back 175 Indian nationals from Abu Dhabi.&nbsp;The second flight will also bring 175 stranded Indians from Dubai to Kozhikode, and will land around 10:30pm.

Air India will continue the rescue operation for Indians stranded in&nbsp;Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Kuwait, Muscat, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Malaysia, Philippines, UAE, Bangladesh, the US and the UK.

However, the focus remains on the Gulf countries, where around 3 lakh people are stranded, according to reports.

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Repatriation of Indian nationals begins from UAE<a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Covid?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#Covid</a> <a href="https://t.co/rrbouSfDfo">https://t.co/rrbouSfDfo</a> <a href="https://t.co/rKCuADft7E">pic.twitter.com/rKCuADft7E</a>
— Sidhant Sibal (@sidhant) <a href="https://twitter.com/sidhant/status/1258360615246200832?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">May 7, 2020</a></blockquote>
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<a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/shramik-trains-over-163-run-so-far-more-than-160-lakh-migrants-ferried-297207">Also read:&nbsp;Shramik Trains: Over 163 run so far, more than 1.60 lakh migrants ferried</a>

Around 14,600 citizens are expected to be brought back to the country in 64 flights within the first week of the operation.

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United Arab Emirates: 177 Indians, including 4 infants have boarded their flight from Abu Dhabi for Kochi, Kerala. <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/VandeBharatMission?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#VandeBharatMission</a> <a href="https://t.co/8d5a4OrYO9">pic.twitter.com/8d5a4OrYO9</a>
— ANI (@ANI) <a href="https://twitter.com/ANI/status/1258382635497209859?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">May 7, 2020</a></blockquote>
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Around 60 pilots and 120 cabin crew members are providing their services in the&nbsp;operation. All the staff members and the workers have been asked to practice precaution and wear PPE suits during the flight.

Before take-off, passengers will be provided with two face masks, one 100ml sanitiser bottle, a snack box and a bottle of water at their respective seats. &nbsp;

(With inputs from ANI)

Air India's first repatriation flight took off from Kochi for Abu Dhabi on Thursday afternoon. The flight will be bringing back Indian nationals to the country soon.

Air India's first repatriation flight took off from Kochi for Abu Dhabi on Thursday afternoon. The flight will be bringing back Indian nationals to the country soon. Air India Express IX419 is being used for the biggest repatriation operation of the Indian government to bring back the Indian nationals stranded in the Gulf countries due to the coronavirus pandemic. Also read: Operation Samudra Setu: INS Jalashwa set to evacuate stranded Indians from Maldives 1st flight with 175 stranded Indians from abroad will land in Kochi from Abu Dhabi at around 2140 hrs. The second flight will also be to Kerala, having 175 stranded Indians. Location of pic: India's operation room, Dubai#COVID https://t.co/jbaDRQ31de pic.twitter.com/ARJTc71i3u — Sidhant Sibal (@sidhant) May 7, 2020 × The first flight will land in Kerala around 9:40pm. The Kochi flight is bringing back 175 Indian nationals from Abu Dhabi. The second flight will also bring 175 stranded Indians from Dubai to Kozhikode, and will land around 10:30pm. Air India will continue the rescue operation for Indians stranded in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Kuwait, Muscat, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Malaysia, Philippines, UAE, Bangladesh, the US and the UK. However, the focus remains on the Gulf countries, where around 3 lakh people are stranded, according to reports. Repatriation of Indian nationals begins from UAE#Covid https://t.co/rrbouSfDfo pic.twitter.com/rKCuADft7E — Sidhant Sibal (@sidhant) May 7, 2020 × Also read: Shramik Trains: Over 163 run so far, more than 1.60 lakh migrants ferried Around 14,600 citizens are expected to be brought back to the country in 64 flights within the first week of the operation. United Arab Emirates: 177 Indians, including 4 infants have boarded their flight from Abu Dhabi for Kochi, Kerala. #VandeBharatMission pic.twitter.com/8d5a4OrYO9 — ANI (@ANI) May 7, 2020 × Around 60 pilots and 120 cabin crew members are providing their services in the operation. All the staff members and the workers have been asked to practice precaution and wear PPE suits during the flight. Before take-off, passengers will be provided with two face masks, one 100ml sanitiser bottle, a snack box and a bottle of water at their respective seats. (With inputs from ANI)

India's biggest repatriation operation begins; Air India flight to land in Kochi tonight

India's relationship with the Arab world was impacted in the last few weeks and one of the major reasons was fake Twitter handles used from Pakistan to defame India. However, the Indian administration has started to use diplomatic channels to reset the ties.&nbsp;

Prime Minister Narendra Modi earlier had telephonic conservations with his counterparts from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman, where he stressed on India's "Think West" foreign policy. He reportedly also highlighted the need for a collaborative and coordinated strategy to tackle the COVID-19 crisis.&nbsp;

Also read |&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/wont-let-fake-tweets-create-discord-gulf-countries-assure-india-294638">Won't let fake tweets create discord, Gulf countries assure India</a>

The Minister of External Affairs (MEA) S Jaishankar also extended his greetings on the holy month of Ramzan to the foreign ministers of the Middle East countries and thanked them for supporting the Indian diaspora. The foreign ministers of Gulf nations also lauded the contribution of the Indian community during the coronavirus outbreak and promised to support them.&nbsp;

Also read |&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/twitter-suspends-isis-fake-account-being-used-to-spread-fake-news-against-india-in-gulf-countries-294510">Twitter suspends ISI's fake account being used to spread fake news against India in Gulf countries</a>

India is also supplying drugs, including hydroxychloroquine and paracetamol to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar.&nbsp;

After Kuwait's request, India has also sent a specialised team of medical professionals for training purposes related to coronavirus.&nbsp;

The Indo-Gulf talks also touched upon the negative social media campaign and the two sides agreed to have a zero-tolerance policy towards such incidents.&nbsp;

This comes after a number of parody accounts on Twitter spread fake information which strained the ties between both the regions.&nbsp;

India also vowed that it will help in the evacuation at the earliest of the medical personnel from the Gulf who are stranded in India.&nbsp;

The recovery plan post-COVID-19 was also discussed, along with talks on energy and volatility in the oil market.&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

India's relationship with the Arab world was impacted in the last few weeks and one of the major reasons was fake Twitter handles used from Pakistan to defame India.

India's relationship with the Arab world was impacted in the last few weeks and one of the major reasons was fake Twitter handles used from Pakistan to defame India. However, the Indian administration has started to use diplomatic channels to reset the ties. Prime Minister Narendra Modi earlier had telephonic conservations with his counterparts from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman, where he stressed on India's "Think West" foreign policy. He reportedly also highlighted the need for a collaborative and coordinated strategy to tackle the COVID-19 crisis. Also read | Won't let fake tweets create discord, Gulf countries assure India The Minister of External Affairs (MEA) S Jaishankar also extended his greetings on the holy month of Ramzan to the foreign ministers of the Middle East countries and thanked them for supporting the Indian diaspora. The foreign ministers of Gulf nations also lauded the contribution of the Indian community during the coronavirus outbreak and promised to support them. Also read | Twitter suspends ISI's fake account being used to spread fake news against India in Gulf countries India is also supplying drugs, including hydroxychloroquine and paracetamol to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar. After Kuwait's request, India has also sent a specialised team of medical professionals for training purposes related to coronavirus. The Indo-Gulf talks also touched upon the negative social media campaign and the two sides agreed to have a zero-tolerance policy towards such incidents. This comes after a number of parody accounts on Twitter spread fake information which strained the ties between both the regions. India also vowed that it will help in the evacuation at the earliest of the medical personnel from the Gulf who are stranded in India. The recovery plan post-COVID-19 was also discussed, along with talks on energy and volatility in the oil market.

Diplomacy at work to ease off straining Indo-Arab ties

Kerala chief minister Pinarayi Vijayan wrote to Prime Minister Narendra Modi&nbsp;to intervene in bringing back bodies of the Keralites who died in Gulf countries of reasons other than COVID-19 infection.

"I would like to draw your attention to the grievances received from Non-resident Keralites Associations (NRKs) in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries on the delay caused in bringing home the mortal remains of NRKs who had expired due to reasons other than the COVID-19 infection," read the letter by the CM.

"It is learnt that a clearance certificate&nbsp;from the Indian Embassies is required to process the application of bringing home the mortal remains of the dead. The Embassies are insisting on the production of a no-objection certificate from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), New Delhi," it read.

The letter also pointed out that according to a notification by the government, no such certificate is needed to bring back&nbsp;the mortal remains of the deceased who died due to reasons other than coronavirus.

"To enable to bring back the bodies of the NRIs whose deaths occurred due to reasons other than COVID-19 infection, without necessary procedural hassles, I request your kind intervention," read the letter further.&nbsp;

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/kerala-government-takes-30-per-cent-cut-in-salary-to-overcome-covid-19-induced-financial-crisis-294132">Also read:&nbsp;Kerala government takes 30 per cent cut in salary to overcome COVID-19-induced financial crisis</a>

The bodies are now being brought back to the country in cargo planes as passenger flights have been halted due to lockdown restrictions.

"They are already under tremendous stress and anxiety due to the lockdown imposed in those countries and the consequent stoppage of international flights", he said.

Meanwhile, 324 out of a total of 447 coronavirus cases have recovered, with only three reported deaths. The chief minister has asked the health officials to conduct more tests in the state.

Kerala chief minister Pinarayi Vijayan wrote to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to intervene in bringing back bodies of the Keralites who died in Gulf countries of reasons other than COVID-19 infection.

Kerala chief minister Pinarayi Vijayan wrote to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to intervene in bringing back bodies of the Keralites who died in Gulf countries of reasons other than COVID-19 infection. "I would like to draw your attention to the grievances received from Non-resident Keralites Associations (NRKs) in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries on the delay caused in bringing home the mortal remains of NRKs who had expired due to reasons other than the COVID-19 infection," read the letter by the CM. "It is learnt that a clearance certificate from the Indian Embassies is required to process the application of bringing home the mortal remains of the dead. The Embassies are insisting on the production of a no-objection certificate from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), New Delhi," it read. The letter also pointed out that according to a notification by the government, no such certificate is needed to bring back the mortal remains of the deceased who died due to reasons other than coronavirus. "To enable to bring back the bodies of the NRIs whose deaths occurred due to reasons other than COVID-19 infection, without necessary procedural hassles, I request your kind intervention," read the letter further. Also read: Kerala government takes 30 per cent cut in salary to overcome COVID-19-induced financial crisis The bodies are now being brought back to the country in cargo planes as passenger flights have been halted due to lockdown restrictions. "They are already under tremendous stress and anxiety due to the lockdown imposed in those countries and the consequent stoppage of international flights", he said. Meanwhile, 324 out of a total of 447 coronavirus cases have recovered, with only three reported deaths. The chief minister has asked the health officials to conduct more tests in the state.

Kerala CM requests PM to help bring back the remains of NKRs who died due to non-COVID reasons in Gulf countries

Twitter has suspended a fake account which was used by Pakistan's spy agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to spread false news about India in the Gulf states. The suspended Twitter account is @idanialusaf, it was impersonating Noura bint Faisal, a princess of Saudi Arabia by creating a fake ID named @NouraAlSaud and was involved in anti-India propaganda operated from Pakistan.

Twitter suspends an account if it has been reported as violating the micro-blogging platform's rules surrounding abuse. The account can be suspended on it is indulges in abusive behaviour, like sending threats to others or impersonating other accounts.

Indian security agencies say ISI has been spreading hatred against India and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Gulf countries by using several fake accounts on social media platforms. The intelligence agencies have prepared a dossier of Pakistan's involvement in activities of spreading anti-India messages through fake or hacked accounts on social media.

Investigators revealed that fake accounts are being created in the name of royal family members of Gulf countries to spread hatred about India.

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/50-terrorists-gunned-down-in-jammu-and-kashmir-this-year-18-eliminated-during-lockdown-294459">Also read:&nbsp;50 terrorists gunned down in Jammu and Kashmir this year; 18 eliminated during lockdown</a>

This revelation comes after another twitter account ID @pak_fauj was found to have changed its name to Mona bint Fahd al Said @SayyidaMona a member of the Oman royal family. This account has also been used to spread anti-India propaganda.

Several anti-India tweets on ties between India and the Gulf were made from this twitter handle which was retweeted by many including Pakistani media personnel.

The dossier prepared by security agencies and accessed by Zee News reveals that hundreds of such Twitter accounts have been used to spread hatred against India and are being operated from Pakistan, but have assumed identities of persons from Gulf nations to push the narrative that there is a backlash against Indian government in Gulf.

An Indian security official said, "How ISI executed the fake news campaign; it first dug out old tweets put out by Indians in Gulf with negative references to Muslims and through ISI handles popularised it. It adopted two methods for popularising- fake handles purportedly belonging to high profile people in Gulf like royal family and journalists."

A cyber expert Jiten Jain said, "Interesting aspect was that those ISI handles that were claiming that they were India or Pakistan based, started showing themselves to be Gulf based to push the narrative that there is a backlash against Indian govt in Gulf. ISI is using name of royal families to spread hatred against India."

The Gulf nations have been very appreciative of PM Modi’s efforts to reduce tension and bring stability in the region, especially during the COVID-19 crisis, and the Pakistani spy agency is trying to create a divide.

Omani Princess Mona bint Fahd whose identity was used to create the fake profile issued a statement saying, "Friends, first of all I thank you for your concern to verify the offensive post published through an account impersonating me, which you are sure that I have no connection with it."

She confirmed that her social media presence is restricted to two accounts. "With full trust in all of you in strengthening awareness among all regarding such activities, which are not acceptable to the Omani society, I confirm again that my presence in social media is restricted on the following accounts: @hhmonaalsaid &nbsp; and @MonaFahad 13," she said.

On Twitter, one can change their name, username and description but its history is not managed publicly. A handle, Pak Army (@pak_fauj) took advantage of this and changed its profile’s identity to that of a fake profile of Oman’s Princess. Many prominent people started retweeting its messages thinking it to be a genuine profile. It is likely that this profile was reported to Twitter, and to save itself from getting blocked the account added the word ‘parody’ in its bio. Twitter does not block parody accounts.

The Indian security agencies suspect that the ISI was behind the two hashtags - #ShameOnModi and #ChaosInIndia that was trending on Tuesday and Wednesday. A Pakistan-managed Twitter account had changed its handle name to pose as an Omani princess and tweeted anti-India material on Tuesday.

Interestingly, several old anti-India tweets from the same account, which has now been deleted, were also detected which indicated that the two Pakistani agencies - ISI and Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) - were operating it.

The ISI is alleged to be behind the propaganda running on social media platforms claiming that Muslims are not safe in India. It may be recalled that the ISI’s cyber cell used the same tactics during the Delhi riots to spread fear and hatred among the Indian Muslims and instigated them to join the jihad against India.

Twitter has suspended a fake account which was used by Pakistan's spy agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to spread false news about India in the Gulf states.

Twitter has suspended a fake account which was used by Pakistan's spy agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to spread false news about India in the Gulf states. The suspended Twitter account is @idanialusaf, it was impersonating Noura bint Faisal, a princess of Saudi Arabia by creating a fake ID named @NouraAlSaud and was involved in anti-India propaganda operated from Pakistan. Twitter suspends an account if it has been reported as violating the micro-blogging platform's rules surrounding abuse. The account can be suspended on it is indulges in abusive behaviour, like sending threats to others or impersonating other accounts. Indian security agencies say ISI has been spreading hatred against India and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Gulf countries by using several fake accounts on social media platforms. The intelligence agencies have prepared a dossier of Pakistan's involvement in activities of spreading anti-India messages through fake or hacked accounts on social media. Investigators revealed that fake accounts are being created in the name of royal family members of Gulf countries to spread hatred about India. Also read: 50 terrorists gunned down in Jammu and Kashmir this year; 18 eliminated during lockdown This revelation comes after another twitter account ID @pak_fauj was found to have changed its name to Mona bint Fahd al Said @SayyidaMona a member of the Oman royal family. This account has also been used to spread anti-India propaganda. Several anti-India tweets on ties between India and the Gulf were made from this twitter handle which was retweeted by many including Pakistani media personnel. The dossier prepared by security agencies and accessed by Zee News reveals that hundreds of such Twitter accounts have been used to spread hatred against India and are being operated from Pakistan, but have assumed identities of persons from Gulf nations to push the narrative that there is a backlash against Indian government in Gulf. An Indian security official said, "How ISI executed the fake news campaign; it first dug out old tweets put out by Indians in Gulf with negative references to Muslims and through ISI handles popularised it. It adopted two methods for popularising- fake handles purportedly belonging to high profile people in Gulf like royal family and journalists." A cyber expert Jiten Jain said, "Interesting aspect was that those ISI handles that were claiming that they were India or Pakistan based, started showing themselves to be Gulf based to push the narrative that there is a backlash against Indian govt in Gulf. ISI is using name of royal families to spread hatred against India." The Gulf nations have been very appreciative of PM Modi’s efforts to reduce tension and bring stability in the region, especially during the COVID-19 crisis, and the Pakistani spy agency is trying to create a divide. Omani Princess Mona bint Fahd whose identity was used to create the fake profile issued a statement saying, "Friends, first of all I thank you for your concern to verify the offensive post published through an account impersonating me, which you are sure that I have no connection with it." She confirmed that her social media presence is restricted to two accounts. "With full trust in all of you in strengthening awareness among all regarding such activities, which are not acceptable to the Omani society, I confirm again that my presence in social media is restricted on the following accounts: @hhmonaalsaid and @MonaFahad 13," she said. On Twitter, one can change their name, username and description but its history is not managed publicly. A handle, Pak Army (@pak_fauj) took advantage of this and changed its profile’s identity to that of a fake profile of Oman’s Princess. Many prominent people started retweeting its messages thinking it to be a genuine profile. It is likely that this profile was reported to Twitter, and to save itself from getting blocked the account added the word ‘parody’ in its bio. Twitter does not block parody accounts. The Indian security agencies suspect that the ISI was behind the two hashtags - #ShameOnModi and #ChaosInIndia that was trending on Tuesday and Wednesday. A Pakistan-managed Twitter account had changed its handle name to pose as an Omani princess and tweeted anti-India material on Tuesday. Interestingly, several old anti-India tweets from the same account, which has now been deleted, were also detected which indicated that the two Pakistani agencies - ISI and Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) - were operating it. The ISI is alleged to be behind the propaganda running on social media platforms claiming that Muslims are not safe in India. It may be recalled that the ISI’s cyber cell used the same tactics during the Delhi riots to spread fear and hatred among the Indian Muslims and instigated them to join the jihad against India.

Twitter suspends ISI's fake account being used to spread fake news against India in Gulf countries

There is little indication that Middle-Eastern rulers are learning the lessons of the Coronavirus’ devastating effect.

Nor is there any suggestion that they are willing to see the pandemic as an opportunity to negotiate new social contracts at a time that the virus has temporarily taken the sails out of mass anti-government protests in various countries and discontent continues to simmer in others.

On the contrary, Iran has become the poster child of what happens when the public distrusts a government that has a track record of being untransparent from the outset of a crisis, limits freedom of expression that often creates early warning systems that could enable authorities to take timely, pre-emptive measures to avert or limit the damage, and is perceived as corrupt.

Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei saw himself forced last week to bring in the military to clear the streets after Iranians, already struggling under the impact of harsh US economic sanctions, refused to adhere to public health warnings regarding large gatherings, social distancing and advice to stay at home.

Khamenei assigned the task to the regular armed forces after the Revolutionary Guards Corps failed to persuade Iranians to heed government advice regarding the epidemic that as of this writing has infected some 14,000 people and caused 724 deaths and turned Iran into one of the world’s hardest-hit countries.

The distrust has fuelled reports and rumours that casualties exceed by far government figures and that mass graves were being prepared to cope with a much higher than stated death toll.

The Coronavirus-hit Iran, that was slow to acknowledge the severity of the crisis, only weeks after large numbers took to the streets of Iranian cities denouncing Khamenei and the Guards in protest against the government’s initial reluctance to live up to its responsibility for the mistaken downing of a Ukrainian airliner that killed 176 people.

Multiple Middle-Eastern states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and Israel have ordered closures of educational facilities, quarantines and taken steps to curtail, if not halt travel to and from Asian and European nations badly affected by the virus or temporarily interrupt all travel to their countries.

Nonetheless, an exponential spread of the virus could stress test the national health systems in both energy-rich countries that have invested in state-of-the-art medical facilities as well as war-ravaged nations like Syria, Yemen and Libya where hospitals have been prime targets of devastating airstrikes.

Potential stress tests that fail could prove risky.

Countries like Iraq, which is particularly exposed with its close ties to neighbouring Iran, Algeria and Lebanon, where many like in Iran defy advice to stay at home, have witnessed months of sustained mass anti-government protests demanding a complete overhaul of a political system perceived as corrupt and incapable of delivering public goods such as jobs, proper healthcare and other services.

Governments have, however, shown little incentive to capitalise on the temporary dwindling of protests to forge new social contracts using the need to confront the virus threat nationally as a wedge.

Fear of the virus coupled with government repression has seen the numbers of protesters in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, where demonstrators initially insisted that Iraq’s political elite was a virus worse than Corona, drop from the thousands to several hundred at best.

The same is true for Algeria and Lebanon, hit not only by the virus but also a financial crisis that is forcing it to default on its ballooning debt.

"You won't be of much help to Algeria if you're dead," quipped one person on Twitter.

Embattled governments see opportunity in the virus, just not one that will prevent the temporary lid on what is a boiling pot from exploding again once the crisis is over, possibly with a greater vengeance if Corona exposes the authorities’ and the health system’s inability to cope.

"In Algeria, the government's calls for cancelling the protests are not motivated by sanitary concerns as it is the case in France, the US or elsewhere,” said Riad Kaced, a US-based activist who flew to Algiers almost every second week to take part in the protests.

“The Algerian regime wants to seize this opportunity to strangle the Hirak and kill it off," Kaced said, referring to the protest movement by its Arabic name.

In that mould, the virus, which has so far infected 62 people in Saudi Arabia did not stop Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman from rounding up potential opponents whom he suspected of plotting against him and launching an oil war with Russia that has wreaked havoc at a time that the global economy can least afford it.

Another clear indication that Middle Eastern autocrats and discredited elites see no reason to use the virus crisis as a monkey wrench to reduce regional tensions and create political and social structures that would make their societies more resilient is their failure to crack down on opinion makers, influencers and rumour mongers that seek to weaponise Corona on tightly controlled mainstream and new media.

The Saudi and United Arab Emirates governments remained silent while pro-government voices came to the defence of Saudi-based journalist Noura al-Moteari who tweeted that the virus and its spread had been funded by Qatar in order to undermine Prince Mohammed’s plans for social and economic reform and the UAE's upcoming Expo 2020.

They also looked the other way, despite a Saudi government warning that rumour-mongers could face jail terms of up to five years and a fine of up to $800,000, after analyst Zayed al-Amri claimed on Saudi television that Turkey and Iran were using the virus to target Arab tourists and attack countries across the globe.

Said social media scholar Marc Owen Jones: 'Coronavirus is being opportunistically weaponised through disinformation and propaganda tactics aimed at demonising political opponents while exposing latent prejudices.”

The Coronavirus crisis is taking its toll, including the lives of many that good and transparent governance possibly could have saved. Ultimately, authorities will get a grip on it.

However, Corona wasn’t the first such crisis and won’t be the last. The risk is that weaponisation serves rulers’ short-term interests but contributes little to building the kind of national and regional resilience and cohesion needed to confront the next one. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) 
&nbsp;

There is little indication that Middle-Eastern rulers are learning the lessons of the Coronavirus’ devastating effect. Nor is there any suggestion that they are willing to see the pandemic as an opportunity to negotiate new social contracts at a time that the virus has temporarily taken the sails out of mass anti-government protests in various countries and discontent continues to simmer in others.

There is little indication that Middle-Eastern rulers are learning the lessons of the Coronavirus’ devastating effect. Nor is there any suggestion that they are willing to see the pandemic as an opportunity to negotiate new social contracts at a time that the virus has temporarily taken the sails out of mass anti-government protests in various countries and discontent continues to simmer in others. On the contrary, Iran has become the poster child of what happens when the public distrusts a government that has a track record of being untransparent from the outset of a crisis, limits freedom of expression that often creates early warning systems that could enable authorities to take timely, pre-emptive measures to avert or limit the damage, and is perceived as corrupt. Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei saw himself forced last week to bring in the military to clear the streets after Iranians, already struggling under the impact of harsh US economic sanctions, refused to adhere to public health warnings regarding large gatherings, social distancing and advice to stay at home. Khamenei assigned the task to the regular armed forces after the Revolutionary Guards Corps failed to persuade Iranians to heed government advice regarding the epidemic that as of this writing has infected some 14,000 people and caused 724 deaths and turned Iran into one of the world’s hardest-hit countries. The distrust has fuelled reports and rumours that casualties exceed by far government figures and that mass graves were being prepared to cope with a much higher than stated death toll. The Coronavirus-hit Iran, that was slow to acknowledge the severity of the crisis, only weeks after large numbers took to the streets of Iranian cities denouncing Khamenei and the Guards in protest against the government’s initial reluctance to live up to its responsibility for the mistaken downing of a Ukrainian airliner that killed 176 people. Multiple Middle-Eastern states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and Israel have ordered closures of educational facilities, quarantines and taken steps to curtail, if not halt travel to and from Asian and European nations badly affected by the virus or temporarily interrupt all travel to their countries. Nonetheless, an exponential spread of the virus could stress test the national health systems in both energy-rich countries that have invested in state-of-the-art medical facilities as well as war-ravaged nations like Syria, Yemen and Libya where hospitals have been prime targets of devastating airstrikes. Potential stress tests that fail could prove risky. Countries like Iraq, which is particularly exposed with its close ties to neighbouring Iran, Algeria and Lebanon, where many like in Iran defy advice to stay at home, have witnessed months of sustained mass anti-government protests demanding a complete overhaul of a political system perceived as corrupt and incapable of delivering public goods such as jobs, proper healthcare and other services. Governments have, however, shown little incentive to capitalise on the temporary dwindling of protests to forge new social contracts using the need to confront the virus threat nationally as a wedge. Fear of the virus coupled with government repression has seen the numbers of protesters in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, where demonstrators initially insisted that Iraq’s political elite was a virus worse than Corona, drop from the thousands to several hundred at best. The same is true for Algeria and Lebanon, hit not only by the virus but also a financial crisis that is forcing it to default on its ballooning debt. "You won't be of much help to Algeria if you're dead," quipped one person on Twitter. Embattled governments see opportunity in the virus, just not one that will prevent the temporary lid on what is a boiling pot from exploding again once the crisis is over, possibly with a greater vengeance if Corona exposes the authorities’ and the health system’s inability to cope. "In Algeria, the government's calls for cancelling the protests are not motivated by sanitary concerns as it is the case in France, the US or elsewhere,” said Riad Kaced, a US-based activist who flew to Algiers almost every second week to take part in the protests. “The Algerian regime wants to seize this opportunity to strangle the Hirak and kill it off," Kaced said, referring to the protest movement by its Arabic name. In that mould, the virus, which has so far infected 62 people in Saudi Arabia did not stop Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman from rounding up potential opponents whom he suspected of plotting against him and launching an oil war with Russia that has wreaked havoc at a time that the global economy can least afford it. Another clear indication that Middle Eastern autocrats and discredited elites see no reason to use the virus crisis as a monkey wrench to reduce regional tensions and create political and social structures that would make their societies more resilient is their failure to crack down on opinion makers, influencers and rumour mongers that seek to weaponise Corona on tightly controlled mainstream and new media. The Saudi and United Arab Emirates governments remained silent while pro-government voices came to the defence of Saudi-based journalist Noura al-Moteari who tweeted that the virus and its spread had been funded by Qatar in order to undermine Prince Mohammed’s plans for social and economic reform and the UAE's upcoming Expo 2020. They also looked the other way, despite a Saudi government warning that rumour-mongers could face jail terms of up to five years and a fine of up to $800,000, after analyst Zayed al-Amri claimed on Saudi television that Turkey and Iran were using the virus to target Arab tourists and attack countries across the globe. Said social media scholar Marc Owen Jones: 'Coronavirus is being opportunistically weaponised through disinformation and propaganda tactics aimed at demonising political opponents while exposing latent prejudices.” The Coronavirus crisis is taking its toll, including the lives of many that good and transparent governance possibly could have saved. Ultimately, authorities will get a grip on it. However, Corona wasn’t the first such crisis and won’t be the last. The risk is that weaponisation serves rulers’ short-term interests but contributes little to building the kind of national and regional resilience and cohesion needed to confront the next one. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Coronavirus outbreak: How Middle-East is dealing with the global pandemic

The Eastern Mediterranean has become a flash-point for the meshing of geopolitics, the struggle for regional hegemony, battles for control of resources, religious soft power rivalry, and blatant interference in the politics of others.

The complex and dangerous juxtaposition of multiple conflicting interests broadens the focus beyond Russia when it comes to meddling in elections, to include countries like Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. It blurs the lines between multiple conflicts such as the wars in Syria and Libya and the struggle for control of the Eastern Mediterranean’s newly found gas deposits. And it positions contested waters as the latest venue in which Russia and the West battle for influence.

Laying bare the multiple disputes being fought on the back of the Eastern Mediterranean with its natural gas reserves of 122 trillion cubic feet resembles peeling an onion.&nbsp;

Lining up on opposing sides are Middle Eastern, North African, and Eastern Mediterranean nations, Gulf states, Turkey, Russia, and Europe.

Perhaps, most fundamental is the degree to which Europe going forward will be able to reduce its dependence on Russian gas imports. Russia currently satisfies approximately 40 per cent of the European Union’s gas needs.

The ability to reduce Russian imports with gas from the Eastern Mediterranean potentially would allow Europe to adopt a more forceful stand in the struggle between Western liberalism and Russian civilisationalism that is likely to shape new world order.

EU dependence has so far prompted European nations to temper their defence of Western values against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s civilizational policies that include territory grabs in the Caucasus and Ukraine, intimidation of Central Asian nations, and support for Western far-right, neo-Nazi, and anti-immigration forces designed to weaken liberal democracy and strengthen groups more empathetic to the Russian leader’s worldview.

“The bad news is that the Moscow-Washington confrontation will continue; the good news is that there will be some guardrails built around it. . . .The Eastern Mediterranean, however, is emerging as an area where Russia, again, is competing with the West,” said Dmitri Trenin, head of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Trenin argued that it was the Eastern Mediterranean rather than Ukraine, Crimea, the Baltics, the Arctic, or south-eastern Europe where the tension could flare the most.

If for some nations like Greece, Cyprus, and Lebanon the struggle to control the Eastern Mediterranean’s resources is primarily about economics, for others, including Egypt and Israel it’s about projecting power. That is no truer than for Russia and Turkey, even if their interests against the backdrop of recently diverging positions on the battlefields of Libya and Syria, may differ rather than converge.

Turkey raised the stakes with its military backing of Libya’s internationally recognised Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) against the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi, Egyptian, and Russian-backed rebel leader Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA).

A GNA-Turkish maritime agreement that created an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean favouring expansive Turkish claims and the building of relations between Khalifa Haftar and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad link the war in Syria to the Eastern Mediterranean and the fighting in Libya. All at a time when Turkey and Russia manoeuvre to avoid a direct military clash in Idlib, the last stronghold of the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (SNA) rebels against Russian-backed Syrian government forces.

The economic zone, or EEZ, would block a planned pipeline that would link the EU to Israeli and Cypriot gas supplies.

If successfully enforced, the zone, coupled with Turkey’s military performance in Syria with the downing of three Syrian warplanes in as many days, would signal to regional hegemonic hopefuls, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE, that financial muscle may not be enough to impose their will.

Ironically, one key to accommodation that could have reduced the risk of the ideological and geopolitical fuse blowing up and may have contributed to creating an environment of cooperation rather than confrontation lies on the divided island of Cyprus.

Turkey, beyond insisting that Turkish participation is a sine-qua-non for any successful exploitation of Eastern Mediterranean gas, has opposed a role for predominantly Greek-Cypriot Cyprus without the inclusion of the island’s self-declared independent Turkish Cypriot north.

Turkey, which has troops in the north ever since it invaded the island in 1974, is the only country to have recognised the region as an independent state.

The idea of including northern Cyprus may be a pie in the sky in an environment in which geopolitics is a zero-sum game with civilizationalists, nationalists, and autocrats leaving little space for power-sharing. And Europe is too preoccupied with internal problems, and most recently with a new looming Syrian refugee crisis, to project a cohesive and inclusive policy approach.

Scholar and commentator Hussein Ibish cautioned that “All the elements that have compelled the parties to the eastern Mediterranean natural gas competition to develop local alliances that are increasingly melding with other strategic, diplomatic, and political contests appears likely to continue.”

Ibish blamed tension in the Eastern Mediterranean on the “strongly pro-Islamist orientation” of Turkey as “a budding would-be regional economic and political hegemon” rather than on multiple would-be hegemons.

Nonetheless, his conclusion stands that in the Eastern Mediterranean “disputes arising over narrow issues such as natural gas reserves will continue to take on far broader significance.”

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

The Eastern Mediterranean has become a flash-point for the meshing of geopolitics, the struggle for regional hegemony, battles for control of resources, religious soft power rivalry, and blatant interference in the politics of others.

The Eastern Mediterranean has become a flash-point for the meshing of geopolitics, the struggle for regional hegemony, battles for control of resources, religious soft power rivalry, and blatant interference in the politics of others. The complex and dangerous juxtaposition of multiple conflicting interests broadens the focus beyond Russia when it comes to meddling in elections, to include countries like Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. It blurs the lines between multiple conflicts such as the wars in Syria and Libya and the struggle for control of the Eastern Mediterranean’s newly found gas deposits. And it positions contested waters as the latest venue in which Russia and the West battle for influence. Laying bare the multiple disputes being fought on the back of the Eastern Mediterranean with its natural gas reserves of 122 trillion cubic feet resembles peeling an onion. Lining up on opposing sides are Middle Eastern, North African, and Eastern Mediterranean nations, Gulf states, Turkey, Russia, and Europe. Perhaps, most fundamental is the degree to which Europe going forward will be able to reduce its dependence on Russian gas imports. Russia currently satisfies approximately 40 per cent of the European Union’s gas needs. The ability to reduce Russian imports with gas from the Eastern Mediterranean potentially would allow Europe to adopt a more forceful stand in the struggle between Western liberalism and Russian civilisationalism that is likely to shape new world order. EU dependence has so far prompted European nations to temper their defence of Western values against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s civilizational policies that include territory grabs in the Caucasus and Ukraine, intimidation of Central Asian nations, and support for Western far-right, neo-Nazi, and anti-immigration forces designed to weaken liberal democracy and strengthen groups more empathetic to the Russian leader’s worldview. “The bad news is that the Moscow-Washington confrontation will continue; the good news is that there will be some guardrails built around it. . . .The Eastern Mediterranean, however, is emerging as an area where Russia, again, is competing with the West,” said Dmitri Trenin, head of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Trenin argued that it was the Eastern Mediterranean rather than Ukraine, Crimea, the Baltics, the Arctic, or south-eastern Europe where the tension could flare the most. If for some nations like Greece, Cyprus, and Lebanon the struggle to control the Eastern Mediterranean’s resources is primarily about economics, for others, including Egypt and Israel it’s about projecting power. That is no truer than for Russia and Turkey, even if their interests against the backdrop of recently diverging positions on the battlefields of Libya and Syria, may differ rather than converge. Turkey raised the stakes with its military backing of Libya’s internationally recognised Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) against the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi, Egyptian, and Russian-backed rebel leader Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA). A GNA-Turkish maritime agreement that created an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean favouring expansive Turkish claims and the building of relations between Khalifa Haftar and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad link the war in Syria to the Eastern Mediterranean and the fighting in Libya. All at a time when Turkey and Russia manoeuvre to avoid a direct military clash in Idlib, the last stronghold of the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (SNA) rebels against Russian-backed Syrian government forces. The economic zone, or EEZ, would block a planned pipeline that would link the EU to Israeli and Cypriot gas supplies. If successfully enforced, the zone, coupled with Turkey’s military performance in Syria with the downing of three Syrian warplanes in as many days, would signal to regional hegemonic hopefuls, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE, that financial muscle may not be enough to impose their will. Ironically, one key to accommodation that could have reduced the risk of the ideological and geopolitical fuse blowing up and may have contributed to creating an environment of cooperation rather than confrontation lies on the divided island of Cyprus. Turkey, beyond insisting that Turkish participation is a sine-qua-non for any successful exploitation of Eastern Mediterranean gas, has opposed a role for predominantly Greek-Cypriot Cyprus without the inclusion of the island’s self-declared independent Turkish Cypriot north. Turkey, which has troops in the north ever since it invaded the island in 1974, is the only country to have recognised the region as an independent state. The idea of including northern Cyprus may be a pie in the sky in an environment in which geopolitics is a zero-sum game with civilizationalists, nationalists, and autocrats leaving little space for power-sharing. And Europe is too preoccupied with internal problems, and most recently with a new looming Syrian refugee crisis, to project a cohesive and inclusive policy approach. Scholar and commentator Hussein Ibish cautioned that “All the elements that have compelled the parties to the eastern Mediterranean natural gas competition to develop local alliances that are increasingly melding with other strategic, diplomatic, and political contests appears likely to continue.” Ibish blamed tension in the Eastern Mediterranean on the “strongly pro-Islamist orientation” of Turkey as “a budding would-be regional economic and political hegemon” rather than on multiple would-be hegemons. Nonetheless, his conclusion stands that in the Eastern Mediterranean “disputes arising over narrow issues such as natural gas reserves will continue to take on far broader significance.” (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Eastern Mediterranean region: A microcosm of regional and global battles

Saudi&nbsp;Arabia this week hosts the world's richest&nbsp;horse&nbsp;race, &nbsp;with $20 million in cash prizes on offer in the latest international sports extravaganza designed to boost its battered global image.

The ultra-conservative kingdom has in recent years invested heavily in sporting events, in a soft power push designed to project a more moderate image and jettison a reputation for rights abuses and the export of hardline ideology.

The&nbsp;Saudi&nbsp;Cup, expected to attract about 10,000 spectators, takes place at the King Abdulaziz Racetrack on February 29 with the main race run over 1,800m on a dirt track with a maximum field of 14.&nbsp;

The winner will walk away with $10 million, second place with $3.5 million and even the 10th place finisher will go away with something.&nbsp;

The&nbsp;Saudi&nbsp;Cup includes another seven races on dirt and turf with prizes worth $9.2 million up for grabs.

"We are taking the first steps on a journey to bring the domestic racing product on a par with our international counterparts," said Tom Ryan, director of the strategy and international racing at the Jockey Club of&nbsp;Saudi&nbsp;Arabia.

The event will "increase the&nbsp;sport's following inside&nbsp;Saudi&nbsp;Arabia, as well as opening up the industry to international&nbsp;horses and connections to make our mark on global racing," he said.

Saudi&nbsp;journalist Mugbel al-Zabni, who writes for Arriyadiyah sports daily, said the event plays to&nbsp;Saudi&nbsp;culture, in a kingdom where the&nbsp;horse&nbsp;is considered a symbol of its heritage.

The&nbsp;Saudi&nbsp;Cup is set to take place in between its two predecessors as the world's richest race -- the Pegasus World Cup in the United States and the Dubai World Cup which are scheduled one month either side.

The Pegasus World Cup was the richest in the world in 2018 worth $16 million surpassing the $12 million Dubai World Cup, but it was only worth $9 million this year.

The big-name jockeys at the&nbsp;Saudi&nbsp;Cup include Italian legend Frankie Dettori and Britain's Ryan Moore.

The Racing Post said that Nicola Currie is one of seven international female jockeys who will make history by becoming the first women to ride in a competitive race in&nbsp;Saudi&nbsp;Arabia.

Currie and her fellow female riders are to compete on Friday in a &nbsp;four-race points-based challenge with seven male riders led by Dettori.

"We're delighted to welcome some of the best jockeys in the business to compete," the Post quoted Prince Bandar bin Khalid Al Faisal, chairman of the Jockey Club of&nbsp;Saudi&nbsp;Arabia, as saying.

"Racing routinely sees male and female riders compete on a level playing field and we are proud to continue this great tradition at King Abdulaziz Racecourse during&nbsp;Saudi&nbsp;Cup weekend."

The&nbsp;Saudi&nbsp;Cup field is weighted more towards the United States entrants, who race on dirt more often&nbsp;than European racehorses.

A top contender is McKinzie, which was runner-up in the prestigious Breeder's Cup Classic last year, and trained by Bob Baffert who has an excellent record in the Dubai World Cup with three victories in total.

Another American runner Maximum Security won the Kentucky Derby last year but was then disqualified and has not shown much since.

Saudi&nbsp;Arabia's de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's sports push is designed to lure international tourists and boost domestic spending as the OPEC kingpin seeks to diversify its oil-reliant economy.

The kingdom also hosted the Dakar Rally, one of motor racing's most gruelling adventure rallies, earlier this year as well as the Italian and Spanish super cup finals last year -- with the added attraction of football superstars Cristiano Ronaldo and Lionel Messi.

Activists accuse&nbsp;Saudi&nbsp;rulers of "sports washing" -- using such events as a tool to soften their international image.

And in a country where two-thirds of the population is under 30, critics say the sporting drive is aimed at blunting public frustration over an economic downturn and soaring youth unemployment.

While&nbsp;Saudi&nbsp;women now have the right to drive, campaigners say jailed activists who spearheaded the push for a ban on the long-standing restriction have faced sexual harassment and torture in detention.&nbsp;

The brutal murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul in 2018, the&nbsp;Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen and a sweeping crackdown on dissent have also dented the kingdom's reputation.

"The amount of money spent on those events is... an investment in&nbsp;Saudi&nbsp;Arabia's PR campaign to improve its image that was tarnished by a number of policy missteps," said Yasmine Farouk, a Middle East expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.&nbsp;

Saudi Arabia this week hosts the world's richest horse race, with $20 million in cash prizes on offer in the latest international sports extravaganza designed to boost its battered global image.

Saudi Arabia this week hosts the world's richest horse race, with $20 million in cash prizes on offer in the latest international sports extravaganza designed to boost its battered global image. The ultra-conservative kingdom has in recent years invested heavily in sporting events, in a soft power push designed to project a more moderate image and jettison a reputation for rights abuses and the export of hardline ideology. The Saudi Cup, expected to attract about 10,000 spectators, takes place at the King Abdulaziz Racetrack on February 29 with the main race run over 1,800m on a dirt track with a maximum field of 14. The winner will walk away with $10 million, second place with $3.5 million and even the 10th place finisher will go away with something. The Saudi Cup includes another seven races on dirt and turf with prizes worth $9.2 million up for grabs. "We are taking the first steps on a journey to bring the domestic racing product on a par with our international counterparts," said Tom Ryan, director of the strategy and international racing at the Jockey Club of Saudi Arabia. The event will "increase the sport's following inside Saudi Arabia, as well as opening up the industry to international horses and connections to make our mark on global racing," he said. Saudi journalist Mugbel al-Zabni, who writes for Arriyadiyah sports daily, said the event plays to Saudi culture, in a kingdom where the horse is considered a symbol of its heritage. The Saudi Cup is set to take place in between its two predecessors as the world's richest race -- the Pegasus World Cup in the United States and the Dubai World Cup which are scheduled one month either side. The Pegasus World Cup was the richest in the world in 2018 worth $16 million surpassing the $12 million Dubai World Cup, but it was only worth $9 million this year. The big-name jockeys at the Saudi Cup include Italian legend Frankie Dettori and Britain's Ryan Moore. The Racing Post said that Nicola Currie is one of seven international female jockeys who will make history by becoming the first women to ride in a competitive race in Saudi Arabia. Currie and her fellow female riders are to compete on Friday in a four-race points-based challenge with seven male riders led by Dettori. "We're delighted to welcome some of the best jockeys in the business to compete," the Post quoted Prince Bandar bin Khalid Al Faisal, chairman of the Jockey Club of Saudi Arabia, as saying. "Racing routinely sees male and female riders compete on a level playing field and we are proud to continue this great tradition at King Abdulaziz Racecourse during Saudi Cup weekend." The Saudi Cup field is weighted more towards the United States entrants, who race on dirt more often than European racehorses. A top contender is McKinzie, which was runner-up in the prestigious Breeder's Cup Classic last year, and trained by Bob Baffert who has an excellent record in the Dubai World Cup with three victories in total. Another American runner Maximum Security won the Kentucky Derby last year but was then disqualified and has not shown much since. Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's sports push is designed to lure international tourists and boost domestic spending as the OPEC kingpin seeks to diversify its oil-reliant economy. The kingdom also hosted the Dakar Rally, one of motor racing's most gruelling adventure rallies, earlier this year as well as the Italian and Spanish super cup finals last year -- with the added attraction of football superstars Cristiano Ronaldo and Lionel Messi. Activists accuse Saudi rulers of "sports washing" -- using such events as a tool to soften their international image. And in a country where two-thirds of the population is under 30, critics say the sporting drive is aimed at blunting public frustration over an economic downturn and soaring youth unemployment. While Saudi women now have the right to drive, campaigners say jailed activists who spearheaded the push for a ban on the long-standing restriction have faced sexual harassment and torture in detention. The brutal murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul in 2018, the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen and a sweeping crackdown on dissent have also dented the kingdom's reputation. "The amount of money spent on those events is... an investment in Saudi Arabia's PR campaign to improve its image that was tarnished by a number of policy missteps," said Yasmine Farouk, a Middle East expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Saudi Arabia to host world's richest horse race

By Alainna Liloia

Arab women, long relegated to the private sphere by law and social custom, are gaining new access to public life.

All countries of the Arab Gulf now have workforce “nationalisation policies” that aim to reduce dependency on migrant labour by getting more women into the workforce. Saudi Arabia set a goal of 30 per cent female labour participation by 2030. In Kuwait, female citizens outnumber male citizens in the workforce. And across the Gulf, women outnumber men in higher education enrollment.

Women are making political inroads in the region, too. In Qatar, four women have been appointed to ministerial positions since 2003. Eleven women have held cabinet positions in Kuwait since 2005, including the health minister, transportation minister and finance minister.

Even Saudi Arabia, which notoriously restricts women’s rights, reformed the guardianship system that grants authority over women to their male relatives. Since August 2019, women may obtain passports, travel abroad and register marriages and births on their own.

These changes have real-world benefits for Arab women, giving them greater economic independence and a voice in domestic and international affairs.

But Arab Muslim women in the Middle East still face substantial social and legal inequalities. Even as governments in the region tout female advancement abroad, my research on women in the Arab Gulf finds, at home, they still enforce traditional gender roles.

Women as symbols of Islam

The discovery of oil in the Arab Gulf in the 1930s turned these Islamic monarchies into global players. One result of this globalisation was that Western leaders put pressure on the region to “modernise” their laws and customs.

Championing women’s advancement is one way Gulf rulers can present a positive international image. This helps maintain good political, military and trade relationships with Europe and the United States and allays criticisms of human rights violations.

In recent years, Arab Gulf women have also fought hard for their rights. Saudi women successfully campaigned for the right to drive, which was granted in 2018. In Kuwait, activists are now pushing for better protection against domestic violence.

But Gulf rulers still need the support of conservative citizens and influential religious leaders, too. And these sectors of the population have repeatedly raised fears of Westernisation threatening local language, dress styles, food and cultural traditions.

One way Gulf rulers manage this tension, I’ve found, is by promoting Quranic interpretations that relegate women to traditional roles like bearing and raising children and caring for their families. Celebrating women’s domesticity is an easy way to signal their government’s commitment to what they consider Islamic values.

In Qatar, for example, the National Vision 2030 – an economic and social development blueprint – states that “Qatar has maintained its cultural and traditional values as an Arab and Islamic nation that considers the family to be the main pillar of society.”

And the Qataris propping up this pillar are women.

“Through their nurturing of language, codes of ethics, behavioural patterns, value systems and religious beliefs, women play an indispensable role in upholding traditional familial and cultural values,” reads a government document building on the proposals laid out in the National Vision 2030.

Religion and gender 
 
There are, of course, more gender-equal interpretations of the Quran. Islam itself does not require repressing women.

But throughout history male leaders in the Gulf have associated patriarchal gender roles with religious purity. And clerics, who have significant social and political influence in the region, enforce conservative readings of Islamic law that subordinate women.

For example, women in all of the Gulf states must receive the approval of a male guardian to marry. In Qatar, single women under 25 require permission to travel abroad, and Qatari men can argue in court to stop their wives from traveling. In Saudi Arabia, men can file a “disobedience” complaint against female relatives for leaving the house without permission.

In Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, a man can stop his wife from working if he feels her employment interferes with her domestic responsibilities or religious conduct.

As a result, women in Gulf countries find themselves caught between two contradictory agendas for the 21st century.

What women want

Many Qatari women I’ve interviewed say they struggle to balance the conflicting expectations between domestic responsibilities and emerging professional opportunities.

Sheikha, an unmarried Qatari in her late 20s who works as an academic adviser, told me she often wonders: “I have a job and future plans. Why should I marry?”

“I don’t want to say that marriage erases the dreams,” she said, “but sometimes with the family commitment you can’t do it.”

Qatari women like Sheikha tend to face significant social pressure to settle down and have children by a certain age and to make sure their education and career goals do not get in the way of domestic responsibilities.

Not all the pressure is external. Many women I met hold conservative views on marriage and the family, too.

“I started work when my last daughter got married,” Amina Al-Ansari, an associate professor at Qatar University, told me. “Before that, I took care of the house and kids.”

Al-Ansari, like all 15 Qatari women I interviewed, believes caring for the family is a woman’s religious duty.

Still can’t have it all

Conservative Qataris also view women working or studying in a gender-mixed environment as a violation of Islamic values and a sign of Westernisation.

That’s why Amal Al-Shammari, a 32-year-old Qatari who now runs a cultural association for expatriates and tourists called Embrace Doha, attended Qatar University – the country’s only gender-segregated university.

“My parents wanted me to go there to keep a good reputation. Guys assume you have lots of relationships if you go to gender-mixed universities,” she told me. “My parents wanted me to stay with the conservative way.”

As political and religious leaders in the Gulf push their national agendas, women must find their own ways to balance newfound freedoms with existing social and religious pressures.

“There is always development, improvement, but always tradition, religion, and culture,” the professor, Al-Ansari, told me, summing up these tensions.

“We are living under the umbrella of religion.”

(Alainna Liloia is PhD Student, University of Arizona)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/women-in-arab-countries-find-themselves-torn-between-opportunity-and-tradition-130460">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

&nbsp;

By Alainna Liloia Arab women, long relegated to the private sphere by law and social custom, are gaining new access to public life. All countries of the Arab Gulf now have workforce “nationalisation policies” that aim to reduce dependency on migrant labour by getting more women into the workforce.

By Alainna Liloia Arab women, long relegated to the private sphere by law and social custom, are gaining new access to public life. All countries of the Arab Gulf now have workforce “nationalisation policies” that aim to reduce dependency on migrant labour by getting more women into the workforce. Saudi Arabia set a goal of 30 per cent female labour participation by 2030. In Kuwait, female citizens outnumber male citizens in the workforce. And across the Gulf, women outnumber men in higher education enrollment. Women are making political inroads in the region, too. In Qatar, four women have been appointed to ministerial positions since 2003. Eleven women have held cabinet positions in Kuwait since 2005, including the health minister, transportation minister and finance minister. Even Saudi Arabia, which notoriously restricts women’s rights, reformed the guardianship system that grants authority over women to their male relatives. Since August 2019, women may obtain passports, travel abroad and register marriages and births on their own. These changes have real-world benefits for Arab women, giving them greater economic independence and a voice in domestic and international affairs. But Arab Muslim women in the Middle East still face substantial social and legal inequalities. Even as governments in the region tout female advancement abroad, my research on women in the Arab Gulf finds, at home, they still enforce traditional gender roles. Women as symbols of Islam The discovery of oil in the Arab Gulf in the 1930s turned these Islamic monarchies into global players. One result of this globalisation was that Western leaders put pressure on the region to “modernise” their laws and customs. Championing women’s advancement is one way Gulf rulers can present a positive international image. This helps maintain good political, military and trade relationships with Europe and the United States and allays criticisms of human rights violations. In recent years, Arab Gulf women have also fought hard for their rights. Saudi women successfully campaigned for the right to drive, which was granted in 2018. In Kuwait, activists are now pushing for better protection against domestic violence. But Gulf rulers still need the support of conservative citizens and influential religious leaders, too. And these sectors of the population have repeatedly raised fears of Westernisation threatening local language, dress styles, food and cultural traditions. One way Gulf rulers manage this tension, I’ve found, is by promoting Quranic interpretations that relegate women to traditional roles like bearing and raising children and caring for their families. Celebrating women’s domesticity is an easy way to signal their government’s commitment to what they consider Islamic values. In Qatar, for example, the National Vision 2030 – an economic and social development blueprint – states that “Qatar has maintained its cultural and traditional values as an Arab and Islamic nation that considers the family to be the main pillar of society.” And the Qataris propping up this pillar are women. “Through their nurturing of language, codes of ethics, behavioural patterns, value systems and religious beliefs, women play an indispensable role in upholding traditional familial and cultural values,” reads a government document building on the proposals laid out in the National Vision 2030. Religion and gender There are, of course, more gender-equal interpretations of the Quran. Islam itself does not require repressing women. But throughout history male leaders in the Gulf have associated patriarchal gender roles with religious purity. And clerics, who have significant social and political influence in the region, enforce conservative readings of Islamic law that subordinate women. For example, women in all of the Gulf states must receive the approval of a male guardian to marry. In Qatar, single women under 25 require permission to travel abroad, and Qatari men can argue in court to stop their wives from traveling. In Saudi Arabia, men can file a “disobedience” complaint against female relatives for leaving the house without permission. In Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, a man can stop his wife from working if he feels her employment interferes with her domestic responsibilities or religious conduct. As a result, women in Gulf countries find themselves caught between two contradictory agendas for the 21st century. What women want Many Qatari women I’ve interviewed say they struggle to balance the conflicting expectations between domestic responsibilities and emerging professional opportunities. Sheikha, an unmarried Qatari in her late 20s who works as an academic adviser, told me she often wonders: “I have a job and future plans. Why should I marry?” “I don’t want to say that marriage erases the dreams,” she said, “but sometimes with the family commitment you can’t do it.” Qatari women like Sheikha tend to face significant social pressure to settle down and have children by a certain age and to make sure their education and career goals do not get in the way of domestic responsibilities. Not all the pressure is external. Many women I met hold conservative views on marriage and the family, too. “I started work when my last daughter got married,” Amina Al-Ansari, an associate professor at Qatar University, told me. “Before that, I took care of the house and kids.” Al-Ansari, like all 15 Qatari women I interviewed, believes caring for the family is a woman’s religious duty. Still can’t have it all Conservative Qataris also view women working or studying in a gender-mixed environment as a violation of Islamic values and a sign of Westernisation. That’s why Amal Al-Shammari, a 32-year-old Qatari who now runs a cultural association for expatriates and tourists called Embrace Doha, attended Qatar University – the country’s only gender-segregated university. “My parents wanted me to go there to keep a good reputation. Guys assume you have lots of relationships if you go to gender-mixed universities,” she told me. “My parents wanted me to stay with the conservative way.” As political and religious leaders in the Gulf push their national agendas, women must find their own ways to balance newfound freedoms with existing social and religious pressures. “There is always development, improvement, but always tradition, religion, and culture,” the professor, Al-Ansari, told me, summing up these tensions. “We are living under the umbrella of religion.” (Alainna Liloia is PhD Student, University of Arizona) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Women in Arab countries find themselves torn between opportunity and tradition

The optics seem evident: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is at odds with just about everybody.

Erdogan is on opposite sides of Russia in Syria, with Turkish and Syrian troops poised for an all-out fight in the north of the war-torn country, as well as, in Libya. He didn’t do himself any favours by coming out swinging against his supposed Russian ally during a visit to Ukraine earlier this month.

On all three flashpoints, Turkey and Russia are testing the limits of what was always at best an opportunistic, fragile partnership aimed at capitalising on a seemingly diminishing US interest in the Middle East, evident already under President Barak Obama, and in Donald Trump’s haphazard redefinition of what he sees as America’s national interests.

If that were not already a plate full, Erdogan’s relations with his US and European allies are strained over unilateral Turkish moves in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey’s acquisition of a Russian S-400 anti-missile system and/or Turkey’s military intervention in Syria as well as refugees and much more.

Turkey has threatened to close Incirlik Air Base and a critical radar station in Kurecik if the United States and the European Union fail to recognise what Turkey views as its national interests.

At the same time, Erdogan frets about his alliance with Qatar in the wake of suggestions that the Gulf state and Saudi Arabia are searching for a way to end a Saudi-led 2.5-year-old economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar.

Reports that the talks between the Kingdom and Qatar have failed may not put Erdogan’s concerns to bed with the United Arab Emirates, Qatar’s most hardline detractor, restoring postal services with the Gulf state.

The restoration, mediated by the United Nation’s Universal Postal Union, was the first time that a third-party succeeded in negotiating any easing of the boycott.

Piling it on, Erdogan’s powerful navy, imitating Chinese tactics in the South China Sea, has significantly raised tensions in the eastern Mediterranean by sending naval forces to escort Turkish drillships into contested waters and to block Greek and Cypriot petrochemical exploration vessels in waters recognised as theirs under international law.

Turkey has warned Israel that it needs Turkish approval to build together with Greece and Turkey an undersea natural gas pipeline to Europe.

As he battles on multiple regional fronts, Erdogan is walking a finely calibrated tightrope, rather than hitting out blindly at everyone, in the assumption that neither Russia nor the United States or, for that matter, Qatar, can afford to lose Turkey. By the same token, neither can Turkey risk jeopardising its relationships.

As a result, Erdogan’s confrontational moves constitute a high stakes gamble, particularly with Turkey’s military build-up in northern Syria, an area in which Erdogan does not enjoy air superiority.

The Turkish leader is betting on Russia blinking first by reigning in Syrian forces and pressing for a negotiated resolution of the crisis.

Erdogan’s provocative visit to Kyiv and backing for Ukraine in its conflict with Russia was about far more than differences over the Russian-backed Syrian assault in Idlib, the last rebel outpost in the country.

Concerned that Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 has put a halt to Turkey’s maritime dominance of the Black Sea and turned it into a Russian lake, Erdogan sought in Kyiv to play both sides against the middle.

The International Crisis Group has warned that in the Black Sea “Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea has enabled it to expand its naval capability, project power south and shift the strategic balance in its favour.”

Russia’s de facto coastline grew from 475 to 1,200 kilometres or about 25 per cent of the sea’s total shorefront since the annexation.

Add to that 300 kilometres of coastline belonging to Abkhazia, a Russian-backed breakaway region of Georgia.

In a bid to counter Russian advances, Erdogan’s gamble also constitutes a bid to persuade NATO to back Turkey in the Black Sea, reversing a decades-old policy of keeping the alliance out of the region.

With 13 Turkish soldiers being killed in the last week in two Syrian attacks on Turkish targets and Turkey claiming to have killed more than 100 Syrian soldiers in retaliation, Erdogan’s gambit appears to have produced initial dividends with the Trump administration backing the Turkish leader in his high-stakes Syrian bid.

One key joker is the degree to which Erdogan may feel that he has no choice but to escalate further than he would like to in response to far-right nationalists who resonate with a part of his voter base and are pressuring him to go for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s jugular.

"What are you waiting for? Don't beat around the bush while Turkish soldiers are being martyred in attacks carried out by soldiers of another state," said Meral Aksener, leader of the Iyi or Good Party.

Added Devlet Bahceli, head of Erdogan’s coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP): “Assad is a murderer, a criminal and the source of hostility. There will be no peace in Turkey until Assad is brought down from his throne. Turkey must start plans to enter Damascus now, and annihilate the cruel ones." 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

The optics seem evident: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is at odds with just about everybody. Erdogan is on opposite sides of Russia in Syria, with Turkish and Syrian troops poised for an all-out fight in the north of the war-torn country, as well as, in Libya.

The optics seem evident: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is at odds with just about everybody. Erdogan is on opposite sides of Russia in Syria, with Turkish and Syrian troops poised for an all-out fight in the north of the war-torn country, as well as, in Libya. He didn’t do himself any favours by coming out swinging against his supposed Russian ally during a visit to Ukraine earlier this month. On all three flashpoints, Turkey and Russia are testing the limits of what was always at best an opportunistic, fragile partnership aimed at capitalising on a seemingly diminishing US interest in the Middle East, evident already under President Barak Obama, and in Donald Trump’s haphazard redefinition of what he sees as America’s national interests. If that were not already a plate full, Erdogan’s relations with his US and European allies are strained over unilateral Turkish moves in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey’s acquisition of a Russian S-400 anti-missile system and/or Turkey’s military intervention in Syria as well as refugees and much more. Turkey has threatened to close Incirlik Air Base and a critical radar station in Kurecik if the United States and the European Union fail to recognise what Turkey views as its national interests. At the same time, Erdogan frets about his alliance with Qatar in the wake of suggestions that the Gulf state and Saudi Arabia are searching for a way to end a Saudi-led 2.5-year-old economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar. Reports that the talks between the Kingdom and Qatar have failed may not put Erdogan’s concerns to bed with the United Arab Emirates, Qatar’s most hardline detractor, restoring postal services with the Gulf state. The restoration, mediated by the United Nation’s Universal Postal Union, was the first time that a third-party succeeded in negotiating any easing of the boycott. Piling it on, Erdogan’s powerful navy, imitating Chinese tactics in the South China Sea, has significantly raised tensions in the eastern Mediterranean by sending naval forces to escort Turkish drillships into contested waters and to block Greek and Cypriot petrochemical exploration vessels in waters recognised as theirs under international law. Turkey has warned Israel that it needs Turkish approval to build together with Greece and Turkey an undersea natural gas pipeline to Europe. As he battles on multiple regional fronts, Erdogan is walking a finely calibrated tightrope, rather than hitting out blindly at everyone, in the assumption that neither Russia nor the United States or, for that matter, Qatar, can afford to lose Turkey. By the same token, neither can Turkey risk jeopardising its relationships. As a result, Erdogan’s confrontational moves constitute a high stakes gamble, particularly with Turkey’s military build-up in northern Syria, an area in which Erdogan does not enjoy air superiority. The Turkish leader is betting on Russia blinking first by reigning in Syrian forces and pressing for a negotiated resolution of the crisis. Erdogan’s provocative visit to Kyiv and backing for Ukraine in its conflict with Russia was about far more than differences over the Russian-backed Syrian assault in Idlib, the last rebel outpost in the country. Concerned that Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 has put a halt to Turkey’s maritime dominance of the Black Sea and turned it into a Russian lake, Erdogan sought in Kyiv to play both sides against the middle. The International Crisis Group has warned that in the Black Sea “Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea has enabled it to expand its naval capability, project power south and shift the strategic balance in its favour.” Russia’s de facto coastline grew from 475 to 1,200 kilometres or about 25 per cent of the sea’s total shorefront since the annexation. Add to that 300 kilometres of coastline belonging to Abkhazia, a Russian-backed breakaway region of Georgia. In a bid to counter Russian advances, Erdogan’s gamble also constitutes a bid to persuade NATO to back Turkey in the Black Sea, reversing a decades-old policy of keeping the alliance out of the region. With 13 Turkish soldiers being killed in the last week in two Syrian attacks on Turkish targets and Turkey claiming to have killed more than 100 Syrian soldiers in retaliation, Erdogan’s gambit appears to have produced initial dividends with the Trump administration backing the Turkish leader in his high-stakes Syrian bid. One key joker is the degree to which Erdogan may feel that he has no choice but to escalate further than he would like to in response to far-right nationalists who resonate with a part of his voter base and are pressuring him to go for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s jugular. "What are you waiting for? Don't beat around the bush while Turkish soldiers are being martyred in attacks carried out by soldiers of another state," said Meral Aksener, leader of the Iyi or Good Party. Added Devlet Bahceli, head of Erdogan’s coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP): “Assad is a murderer, a criminal and the source of hostility. There will be no peace in Turkey until Assad is brought down from his throne. Turkey must start plans to enter Damascus now, and annihilate the cruel ones." (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Erdogan battles on multiple fronts in risky regional power bid

A decade of anti-government protests in the Arab world have thrown popular trust in the military into the garbage bin and undermined the military’s position as one of the most trusted institutions.

Long gone are the days when protesters on Cairo’s Tahrir Square chanted 'The military and the people are one.'

In 2011 it was the barriers of fear that protesters broke. Created by autocratic rulers, fear was what long kept disgruntled from taking their grievances to the street.

In 2019 and 2020 those barriers have been further reduced with protesters refusing to back down despite the use of brutal force by law enforcement and security forces in Lebanon and Iraq and occasional violence elsewhere in the Arab world.

Changed popular perceptions of the military are the result. Increasingly, the military is seen at best as positioning itself to salvage what can be salvaged of an ancien regime and at worst the enforcer of a hated regime.

“Iraqis broke the shackles of fear and reached the point of no return. The movement will not stop, and the Iraqi people will never be silent,” said Ali Hashim, a protester in Baghdad, speaking only a week after one night of mass killings in December.

In increasingly violent clashes in Beirut earlier this month, protesters unsuccessfully sought to persuade the security forces they were attacking that their demands for a complete break with Lebanon’s political elite was also in the interest of men in uniform.

“Among the most important lessons cited by Sudanese and Algerian protesters so far are…(that) transition plans designed by the military—particularly proposals for quick elections—can be a trap,” said Middle East scholar Michele Dunne.

Algeria’s newly elected president Abdelmadjid Tebboune is struggling to garner legitimacy with mass protests continuing nine months after the toppling of Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Voters voted with their feet in last month’s presidential poll with 60 per cent abstaining.

Algeria was railroaded into the election by its powerful military in a bid to outflank protesters by holding the poll before they had an opportunity to prepare for it.

A crucial nail was driven into the coffin of the notion of a unity of purpose between protesters and armed forces with the 2013 military coup in Egypt that produced one of the Arab world’s most repressive regimes under general-turned-president Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi.

Protesters realise almost a decade after the 2011 protests in which demonstrators declared victory once leaders like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had resigned, that their only chance of success is to retain their street power until elites, including the military, agree as appears to be the case in Sudan to a truly transformational process.

In Sudan, unlike in Egypt in 2011, this meant protesters and/or civil society groups ensuring that they had a seat at the table before they surrendered the street.

In Lebanon, protests escalated as a result of the elite’s attempt to address the crisis with the appointment as prime minister of Hassan Diab, widely seen as beholden to Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed militia and political group.

Mounting violence on the streets of Lebanon and Iraq in which hundreds of protesters have been killed or wounded will do little to rebuild confidence in the military and allied security forces.

If Lebanon and Iraq are anything to go by, clashes are likely to escalate and leave deep-seated scars.

“Our backs are against the wall. We have nothing more to lose. We are fighting a regime with a history of 40 years of corruption and their armed defenders,” said a masked protester on the streets of Beirut.

Taking journalist and scholar Rami Khouri’s analysis of what he terms ‘revolutions’ that are pitted against the decades-old ‘resistance’ of hard-line Arab states, Iran and its non-state Arab allies who opposed the US, Israel and conservative Gulf states Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as a starting point, militaries become outposts of a political system that has produced brutal autocracies and/or economic and environmental mismanagement.

“Arab and Iranian ruling elites and their own citizens now openly fight and resist each other, seeking to define their countries' identities and policies. This is probably the most consequential ideological battle in the Middle East since its state system was established a century ago,” Khouri said.

It’s an epic battle that has turned the once-revered military into yet another institution that finds itself on the wrong side of history.

While Arab protesters have made that clear on the streets of Khartoum, Algiers, Beirut and Baghdad, Iranian students demanded the departure and demise of the Revolutionary Guards in anti-government demonstrations prior to and after the recent killing of Iranian general Qassim Soleimani.

"The only way out of our current predicament is the simultaneous rejection of both domestic despotism and imperial arrogance. We need a politics that doesn't merely claim security, freedom, and equality for a select group or class, but that understands these rights as inalienable and for all people," said a statement by Iranian students demanding an end to all foreign interference in the affairs of the region, be it by the United States, Iran or the conservative Gulf states. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

A decade of anti-government protests in the Arab world have thrown popular trust in the military into the garbage bin and undermined the military’s position as one of the most trusted institutions.

A decade of anti-government protests in the Arab world have thrown popular trust in the military into the garbage bin and undermined the military’s position as one of the most trusted institutions. Long gone are the days when protesters on Cairo’s Tahrir Square chanted 'The military and the people are one.' In 2011 it was the barriers of fear that protesters broke. Created by autocratic rulers, fear was what long kept disgruntled from taking their grievances to the street. In 2019 and 2020 those barriers have been further reduced with protesters refusing to back down despite the use of brutal force by law enforcement and security forces in Lebanon and Iraq and occasional violence elsewhere in the Arab world. Changed popular perceptions of the military are the result. Increasingly, the military is seen at best as positioning itself to salvage what can be salvaged of an ancien regime and at worst the enforcer of a hated regime. “Iraqis broke the shackles of fear and reached the point of no return. The movement will not stop, and the Iraqi people will never be silent,” said Ali Hashim, a protester in Baghdad, speaking only a week after one night of mass killings in December. In increasingly violent clashes in Beirut earlier this month, protesters unsuccessfully sought to persuade the security forces they were attacking that their demands for a complete break with Lebanon’s political elite was also in the interest of men in uniform. “Among the most important lessons cited by Sudanese and Algerian protesters so far are…(that) transition plans designed by the military—particularly proposals for quick elections—can be a trap,” said Middle East scholar Michele Dunne. Algeria’s newly elected president Abdelmadjid Tebboune is struggling to garner legitimacy with mass protests continuing nine months after the toppling of Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Voters voted with their feet in last month’s presidential poll with 60 per cent abstaining. Algeria was railroaded into the election by its powerful military in a bid to outflank protesters by holding the poll before they had an opportunity to prepare for it. A crucial nail was driven into the coffin of the notion of a unity of purpose between protesters and armed forces with the 2013 military coup in Egypt that produced one of the Arab world’s most repressive regimes under general-turned-president Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi. Protesters realise almost a decade after the 2011 protests in which demonstrators declared victory once leaders like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had resigned, that their only chance of success is to retain their street power until elites, including the military, agree as appears to be the case in Sudan to a truly transformational process. In Sudan, unlike in Egypt in 2011, this meant protesters and/or civil society groups ensuring that they had a seat at the table before they surrendered the street. In Lebanon, protests escalated as a result of the elite’s attempt to address the crisis with the appointment as prime minister of Hassan Diab, widely seen as beholden to Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed militia and political group. Mounting violence on the streets of Lebanon and Iraq in which hundreds of protesters have been killed or wounded will do little to rebuild confidence in the military and allied security forces. If Lebanon and Iraq are anything to go by, clashes are likely to escalate and leave deep-seated scars. “Our backs are against the wall. We have nothing more to lose. We are fighting a regime with a history of 40 years of corruption and their armed defenders,” said a masked protester on the streets of Beirut. Taking journalist and scholar Rami Khouri’s analysis of what he terms ‘revolutions’ that are pitted against the decades-old ‘resistance’ of hard-line Arab states, Iran and its non-state Arab allies who opposed the US, Israel and conservative Gulf states Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as a starting point, militaries become outposts of a political system that has produced brutal autocracies and/or economic and environmental mismanagement. “Arab and Iranian ruling elites and their own citizens now openly fight and resist each other, seeking to define their countries' identities and policies. This is probably the most consequential ideological battle in the Middle East since its state system was established a century ago,” Khouri said. It’s an epic battle that has turned the once-revered military into yet another institution that finds itself on the wrong side of history. While Arab protesters have made that clear on the streets of Khartoum, Algiers, Beirut and Baghdad, Iranian students demanded the departure and demise of the Revolutionary Guards in anti-government demonstrations prior to and after the recent killing of Iranian general Qassim Soleimani. "The only way out of our current predicament is the simultaneous rejection of both domestic despotism and imperial arrogance. We need a politics that doesn't merely claim security, freedom, and equality for a select group or class, but that understands these rights as inalienable and for all people," said a statement by Iranian students demanding an end to all foreign interference in the affairs of the region, be it by the United States, Iran or the conservative Gulf states. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Protesters push Arab militaries off their pedestal

The Ministry of External Affairs on Wednesday said that it has advised all Indian nationals to avoid all non-essential travel to Iraq until further notice.&nbsp;

According to government sources, Indian airlines have been told to avoid the airspace of Iran, Iraq and the Gulf region due to the escalating tension in the said areas.&nbsp;

"Indian nationals residing in Iraq are advised to be alert and may avoid travel within Iraq," MEA said as reported by news agency ANI.&nbsp;

"Our Embassy in Baghdad and Consulate in Erbil will continue to function normally to provide all services to Indians residing in Iraq," it stated.&nbsp;

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MEA: Our Embassy in Baghdad and Consulate in Erbil will continue to function normally to provide all services to Indians residing in Iraq <a href="https://t.co/Ol0SxgWnQC">https://t.co/Ol0SxgWnQC</a>
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Singapore Airlines has also issued a statement communicating that all its flights to and from Europe will not fly over the Iranian airspace in the view of the latest developments in the region. The United States has also restricted all its civilian carriers from flying over the Gulf airspace.&nbsp;

Iran on Wednesday fired over <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/iran-fires-missiles-at-us-bases-in-iraq-272811">a dozen ballistic missiles at US bases in Iraq</a>&nbsp;in retaliation to the US strikes at Baghdad International Airport that killed Iran's top military commander Qasem Soleimani on January 3.&nbsp;

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Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif said that Tehran does not seek escalation or war but will defend itself against any form of aggression.&nbsp;

"Iran took and concluded proportionate measures in self-defence&nbsp;under Article 51 of UN Charter targeting base from which cowardly armed attack against our citizens &amp; senior officials were launched," Zarif said today.

Meanwhile, a <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/iran-all-passengers-aboard-ukrainian-airplane-killed-in-crash-272841">Ukranian airplane - a Boeing 737 plane</a>, today crashed near Tehran's primary airport shortly after taking off for Kiev.&nbsp;

The plane, which belonged to Ukraine International Airlines, crashed shortly after taking off Iran's capital city's Imam Khomeini airport due to some technical snag. All passengers on board, as many as 170, have been killed in the air crash. &nbsp; 
&nbsp;

The Ministry of External Affairs on Wednesday said that it has advised all Indian nationals to avoid all non-essential travel to Iraq until further notice. According to government sources, Indian airlines have been told to avoid the airspace of Iran, Iraq and the Gulf region due to the escalating tension in the said areas.

The Ministry of External Affairs on Wednesday said that it has advised all Indian nationals to avoid all non-essential travel to Iraq until further notice. According to government sources, Indian airlines have been told to avoid the airspace of Iran, Iraq and the Gulf region due to the escalating tension in the said areas. "Indian nationals residing in Iraq are advised to be alert and may avoid travel within Iraq," MEA said as reported by news agency ANI. "Our Embassy in Baghdad and Consulate in Erbil will continue to function normally to provide all services to Indians residing in Iraq," it stated. MEA: Our Embassy in Baghdad and Consulate in Erbil will continue to function normally to provide all services to Indians residing in Iraq https://t.co/Ol0SxgWnQC — ANI (@ANI) January 8, 2020 × Singapore Airlines has also issued a statement communicating that all its flights to and from Europe will not fly over the Iranian airspace in the view of the latest developments in the region. The United States has also restricted all its civilian carriers from flying over the Gulf airspace. Iran on Wednesday fired over a dozen ballistic missiles at US bases in Iraq in retaliation to the US strikes at Baghdad International Airport that killed Iran's top military commander Qasem Soleimani on January 3. Directorate General of Civil Aviation: We had held meetings with the concerned Airlines and have sensitized them to remain vigilant and take all precautions https://t.co/8g91GFYBI8 — ANI (@ANI) January 8, 2020 × Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif said that Tehran does not seek escalation or war but will defend itself against any form of aggression. "Iran took and concluded proportionate measures in self-defence under Article 51 of UN Charter targeting base from which cowardly armed attack against our citizens & senior officials were launched," Zarif said today. Meanwhile, a Ukranian airplane - a Boeing 737 plane, today crashed near Tehran's primary airport shortly after taking off for Kiev. The plane, which belonged to Ukraine International Airlines, crashed shortly after taking off Iran's capital city's Imam Khomeini airport due to some technical snag. All passengers on board, as many as 170, have been killed in the air crash.

Amid escalating tension, Indian air carriers told to avoid airspace of Iran, Iran and Gulf region

At least 50 people were killed in a stampede as tens of thousands of mourners packed streets for the funeral of a slain Iranian military commander in his hometown on Tuesday, forcing his burial to be delayed by several hours, state media said.

General Qasem Soleimani's burial began in the late afternoon in the southeastern Iranian city of Kerman, four days after his killing in a US&nbsp;drone strike in Iraq that plunged the region into a new crisis and raised fears of a broader conflict.

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/iran-will-never-have-a-nuclear-weapon-says-trump-as-tehran-mourns-suleimani-272585">Also Read:&nbsp;Iran will never have a nuclear weapon, says Trump as Tehran mourns Suleimani</a>

"A few minutes ago his body was transferred to the martyrs' section of Kerman cemetery," the semi-official news agency ISNA reported, adding that Soleimani's internment had begun.

Watch:&nbsp;

<div class="videoWrapper trancodeVideo"><iframe allowfullscreen="" autoplay="1" class="includeVideo" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.wionews.com/videos/wion-dispatch-iran-designates-pentagon-as-terrorist-272776/embed" style="width:100%;max-width:560px;" width="560"></iframe></div>

A senior Iranian official said Tehran was considering several scenarios to avenge his killing. Other senior figures have said Iran will match the scale of Soleimani's killing when it responds, but that it will choose the time and place.

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/photos/crazy-trump-dont-think-that-everything-is-over-with-my-fathers-martyrdom-zeinab-soleimani-daughter-of-qassem-soleimani-272535">In Pics: Crazy Trump, don't think that everything is over, says Zeinab, daughter of Qasem Soleimani</a>

Tuesday's stampede broke out amid the crush of mourners, killing 50 people, Iran's ISNA news agency said, quoting the chief coroner for Kerman province, Abbas Amian. About 213 people were injured, an emergency services official told the semi-official Fars news agency.

"Today because of the heavy congestion of the crowd, unfortunately, a number of our fellow citizens who were mourning were injured and a number were killed," emergency medical services chief Pir Hossein Kolivand told state television.

Watch:&nbsp;

<div class="videoWrapper trancodeVideo"><iframe allowfullscreen="" autoplay="1" class="includeVideo" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.wionews.com/videos/gravitas-soleimani-killed-thousands-mourn-the-generals-death-in-tehran-272594/embed" style="width:100%;max-width:560px;" width="560"></iframe></div>

The body of Soleimani, a national hero to many Iranians but viewed as a dangerous villain by Western governments opposed to the Islamic Republic, had been taken to Iraqi and Iranian cities before arriving in Kerman for burial.

In each place, huge numbers of people filled thoroughfares, chanting "Death to America" and weeping with emotion. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei shed tears when leading prayers in Tehran.

Soleimani, who commanded the elite Quds Force, was responsible for building up Tehran's network of proxy armies across the Middle East. He was a key figure in orchestrating Iran's long-standing campaign to drive US forces out of Iraq.

Iran's opponents say its proxies have fuelled conflicts, killing and displacing people in Iraq, Syria and beyond. Tehran says any operations abroad are at the request of governments and that it offers "advisory support".

The US defence secretary denied reports the U.S. military was preparing to withdraw from Iraq, where Tehran has vied with Washington for influence since the 2003 US invasion.

Revenge

"We will take revenge, hard and definitive revenge," the head of Iran's Revolutionary Guards, General Hossein Salami, told the crowds in Kerman before the stampede.

Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, said 13 "revenge scenarios" were being considered, Fars news agency reported. Even the weakest option would prove "a historic nightmare for the Americans," he said.

Iran, whose coastline runs along a Gulf oil shipping route that includes the narrow Strait of Hormuz, has allied forces across the Middle East through which it can act. Representatives from those groups, including the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanon's Hezbollah movement, attended funeral events in Tehran.

Despite its strident rhetoric, analysts say Iran will want to avoid any conventional conflict with the United States and is likely to focus on asymmetric strikes, such as sabotage or other military action via proxies.

Trump has promised to target 52 Iranian sites if Iran retaliates.

Reuters and other media reported on Monday that the US military had sent a letter to Iraqi officials informing them US troops were preparing to leave. But US Defense Secretary Mark Esper denied there had been any decision to pull out.

About 5,000 US troops are still in Iraq, where there has been a US military presence since Saddam Hussein was toppled in 2003.

Friction

Iraq's parliament, dominated by lawmakers representing Muslim Shi'ite groups who have been united by the killing of Soleimani alongside an Iraqi militia leader, passed a resolution on Sunday calling for all foreign troops to leave.

Iraq's caretaker Prime Minister Abdel Abdul Mahdi told the US ambassador to Baghdad the resolution must be implemented.

Friction between Iran and the United States has risen since Washington withdrew in 2018 from a nuclear deal between Tehran and world powers.

The United States has imposed new economic sanctions on Iran, slashing Iranian oil exports, and Tehran said on Sunday it was dropping limitations on uranium enrichment, in its latest step back from commitments to the deal.

Washington denied a visa to Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to allow him to attend a UN Security Council meeting in New York on Thursday, a US official said.

Trump's US political rivals have challenged his decision to order the killing of Soleimani and questioned its timing in a US election year. His administration said Soleimani was planning new attacks on US interests without giving evidence.

US general Milley said the threat from Soleimani was imminent. "We would have been culpably negligent to the American people had we not made the decision we made," he said.

Trump administration officials will provide a classified briefing for US senators on Wednesday on events in Iraq after some lawmakers accused the White House of risking a broad conflict without a strategy.

At least 50 people were killed in a stampede as tens of thousands of mourners packed streets for the funeral of a slain Iranian military commander in his hometown on Tuesday, forcing his burial to be delayed by several hours, state media said.

At least 50 people were killed in a stampede as tens of thousands of mourners packed streets for the funeral of a slain Iranian military commander in his hometown on Tuesday, forcing his burial to be delayed by several hours, state media said. General Qasem Soleimani's burial began in the late afternoon in the southeastern Iranian city of Kerman, four days after his killing in a US drone strike in Iraq that plunged the region into a new crisis and raised fears of a broader conflict. Also Read: Iran will never have a nuclear weapon, says Trump as Tehran mourns Suleimani "A few minutes ago his body was transferred to the martyrs' section of Kerman cemetery," the semi-official news agency ISNA reported, adding that Soleimani's internment had begun. Watch: A senior Iranian official said Tehran was considering several scenarios to avenge his killing. Other senior figures have said Iran will match the scale of Soleimani's killing when it responds, but that it will choose the time and place. In Pics: Crazy Trump, don't think that everything is over, says Zeinab, daughter of Qasem Soleimani Tuesday's stampede broke out amid the crush of mourners, killing 50 people, Iran's ISNA news agency said, quoting the chief coroner for Kerman province, Abbas Amian. About 213 people were injured, an emergency services official told the semi-official Fars news agency. "Today because of the heavy congestion of the crowd, unfortunately, a number of our fellow citizens who were mourning were injured and a number were killed," emergency medical services chief Pir Hossein Kolivand told state television. Watch: The body of Soleimani, a national hero to many Iranians but viewed as a dangerous villain by Western governments opposed to the Islamic Republic, had been taken to Iraqi and Iranian cities before arriving in Kerman for burial. In each place, huge numbers of people filled thoroughfares, chanting "Death to America" and weeping with emotion. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei shed tears when leading prayers in Tehran. Soleimani, who commanded the elite Quds Force, was responsible for building up Tehran's network of proxy armies across the Middle East. He was a key figure in orchestrating Iran's long-standing campaign to drive US forces out of Iraq. Iran's opponents say its proxies have fuelled conflicts, killing and displacing people in Iraq, Syria and beyond. Tehran says any operations abroad are at the request of governments and that it offers "advisory support". The US defence secretary denied reports the U.S. military was preparing to withdraw from Iraq, where Tehran has vied with Washington for influence since the 2003 US invasion. Revenge "We will take revenge, hard and definitive revenge," the head of Iran's Revolutionary Guards, General Hossein Salami, told the crowds in Kerman before the stampede. Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, said 13 "revenge scenarios" were being considered, Fars news agency reported. Even the weakest option would prove "a historic nightmare for the Americans," he said. Iran, whose coastline runs along a Gulf oil shipping route that includes the narrow Strait of Hormuz, has allied forces across the Middle East through which it can act. Representatives from those groups, including the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanon's Hezbollah movement, attended funeral events in Tehran. Despite its strident rhetoric, analysts say Iran will want to avoid any conventional conflict with the United States and is likely to focus on asymmetric strikes, such as sabotage or other military action via proxies. Trump has promised to target 52 Iranian sites if Iran retaliates. Reuters and other media reported on Monday that the US military had sent a letter to Iraqi officials informing them US troops were preparing to leave. But US Defense Secretary Mark Esper denied there had been any decision to pull out. About 5,000 US troops are still in Iraq, where there has been a US military presence since Saddam Hussein was toppled in 2003. Friction Iraq's parliament, dominated by lawmakers representing Muslim Shi'ite groups who have been united by the killing of Soleimani alongside an Iraqi militia leader, passed a resolution on Sunday calling for all foreign troops to leave. Iraq's caretaker Prime Minister Abdel Abdul Mahdi told the US ambassador to Baghdad the resolution must be implemented. Friction between Iran and the United States has risen since Washington withdrew in 2018 from a nuclear deal between Tehran and world powers. The United States has imposed new economic sanctions on Iran, slashing Iranian oil exports, and Tehran said on Sunday it was dropping limitations on uranium enrichment, in its latest step back from commitments to the deal. Washington denied a visa to Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to allow him to attend a UN Security Council meeting in New York on Thursday, a US official said. Trump's US political rivals have challenged his decision to order the killing of Soleimani and questioned its timing in a US election year. His administration said Soleimani was planning new attacks on US interests without giving evidence. US general Milley said the threat from Soleimani was imminent. "We would have been culpably negligent to the American people had we not made the decision we made," he said. Trump administration officials will provide a classified briefing for US senators on Wednesday on events in Iraq after some lawmakers accused the White House of risking a broad conflict without a strategy.

At least 50 killed in stampede at Iranian general's funeral, burial postponed

A deadly stampede erupted on Tuesday at the funeral procession for a top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, killing 35 people and injuring 48 others.

The procession was being held in Soleimani's hometown of Kerman, where he will be laid to rest later in the day, according to state media.

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/iran-will-never-have-a-nuclear-weapon-says-trump-as-tehran-mourns-suleimani-272585">Also Read:&nbsp;Iran will never have a nuclear weapon, says Trump as Tehran mourns Suleimani</a>

"Unfortunately because of overcrowding 32 of our citizens lost their lives in the procession... and 190 were injured," the head of the country's emergency services, Pirhossein Koolivand, told the channel.

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/photos/crazy-trump-dont-think-that-everything-is-over-with-my-fathers-martyrdom-zeinab-soleimani-daughter-of-qassem-soleimani-272535">In Pics: Crazy Trump, don't think that everything is over, says Zeinab, daughter of Qasem Soleimani</a>

The injured were immediately transferred to hospital, he added.

Watch:&nbsp;

<div class="videoWrapper trancodeVideo"><iframe allowfullscreen="" autoplay="1" class="includeVideo" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.wionews.com/videos/gravitas-soleimani-killed-thousands-mourn-the-generals-death-in-tehran-272594/embed" style="width:100%;max-width:560px;" width="560"></iframe></div>

AFP correspondents in Kerman said the streets of the southeastern city were packed with mourners for the funeral of Revolutionary Guards commander Qasem Soleimani in his hometown.

People were seen taking refuge on hillsides around the city on state television.

Soleimani, the hugely popular head of the Guards' Quds Force, was assassinated on Friday in a US drone strike near Baghdad international airport, an operation that shocked the Islamic republic.

Tuesday's funeral comes after days of processions through the southwestern city of Ahvaz and the shrine cities of Qom and Mashhad as well as the capital Tehran.

(With inputs from AFP)

A deadly stampede erupted on Tuesday at the funeral procession for a top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, killing 35 people and injuring 48 others. The procession was being held in Soleimani's hometown of Kerman, where he will be laid to rest later in the day, according to state media.

A deadly stampede erupted on Tuesday at the funeral procession for a top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, killing 35 people and injuring 48 others. The procession was being held in Soleimani's hometown of Kerman, where he will be laid to rest later in the day, according to state media. Also Read: Iran will never have a nuclear weapon, says Trump as Tehran mourns Suleimani "Unfortunately because of overcrowding 32 of our citizens lost their lives in the procession... and 190 were injured," the head of the country's emergency services, Pirhossein Koolivand, told the channel. In Pics: Crazy Trump, don't think that everything is over, says Zeinab, daughter of Qasem Soleimani The injured were immediately transferred to hospital, he added. Watch: AFP correspondents in Kerman said the streets of the southeastern city were packed with mourners for the funeral of Revolutionary Guards commander Qasem Soleimani in his hometown. People were seen taking refuge on hillsides around the city on state television. Soleimani, the hugely popular head of the Guards' Quds Force, was assassinated on Friday in a US drone strike near Baghdad international airport, an operation that shocked the Islamic republic. Tuesday's funeral comes after days of processions through the southwestern city of Ahvaz and the shrine cities of Qom and Mashhad as well as the capital Tehran. (With inputs from AFP)

Stampede kills 35 at slain Iranian general Qasem Soleimani's funeral

The killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani has further opened the door to a potential restructuring of the Gulf’s security architecture.

In line with an Iranian plan launched at last year’s United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) by President Hassan Rouhani that calls for a security architecture that would exclude external forces, cooler heads in Tehran argue that expulsion of all US troops from the Middle East would constitute revenge for Soleimani’s assassination.

While it likely would be a drawn-out process, Iraq’s parliament took a first step by unanimously asking the government in the absence of Kurdish and Sunni Muslim deputies to expel US forces from the country.

Ultimately, Iran may at best get only part of its wants.

Iraqi prime minister Adel Abdul Mahdi has dialled back his initial support of Parliament’s demand, saying that any withdrawal would involve only US combat forces and not training and logistical support for the Iraqi military.

Similarly, Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar are unlikely to expel US forces and bases.

That does not mean that the foundation for the Gulf’s security architecture, grounded in a US defence umbrella primarily to shield the region’s energy-rich monarchies from potential Iranian aggression, is not shifting.

In fact, it was already shifting prior to the killing of Soleimani.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE that long supported US President Donald J Trump’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran, involving the US withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program and the imposition of harsh economic sanctions, began hedging their bets in the second half of last year.

The Gulf may have on an emotive level privately celebrated the death of Soleimani, an architect of Iran’s use of proxies across the Middle East, but in a more rational analysis fear that his killing may have opened a Pandora’s box that could lead the region to all-out war.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE called for a de-escalation in the wake of the killing as Khalid bin Salman, the kingdom’s deputy defence minister and brother of crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, travelled to Washington and London to urge restraint.

Ironically, the killing of Soleimani rather than strategically pleasing Gulf leaders may have reinforced concerns that they no longer can fully rely on the United States as their sole security guarantor.

If the United States’ refusal last year to respond forcefully to a string of Iranian provocations sparked Gulf doubts, Solemani’s killing raises the spectre of US overreach when it does.

Trump’s threat to attack Iranian cultural sites, despite animosity towards Iran and anti-Shiite sentiment in some Gulf quarters, is likely to have reinforced that concern.

The Gulf states’ hedging of their bets will not make Rouhani’s proposal any more attractive but it has already led to direct and indirect diplomacy by the UAE and Saudi Arabia to reduce tension with Iran.

Solemani was killed on the morning that he reportedly was to deliver to Abdul Mahdi, the Iraqi Prime Minister, an Iranian response to a Saudi initiative to defuse tension.

While Rouhani’s proposal is a non-starter, it contains one element that could prove to have legs: some form of non-aggression agreement or understanding between the Gulf states and Iran.

The notion of an understanding on non-aggression would stroke with a Russian proposal for an alternative multilateral arrangement that calls for a regional security conference along the lines of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE.

Unlike Rouhani’s proposition, the Russian proposal would involve multiple external powers, including Russia, China and India, but, in the knowledge that no country can as of now replace the United States militarily, be centred on US military muscle.

The proposal, endorsed by China, potentially could cater to Trump’s demand for burden-sharing and financial compensation for a continued US role in security across the globe.

Russian officials and surrogates for the Kremlin stress that the proposal seeks to capitalize on the United States’ mushrooming predicament in the Middle East but does not mean that Russia was willing to make the kind of commitment that would position it as an alternative to the US.

Similarly, the nature of China’s participation in last month’s first-ever joint Chinese-Russian-Iranian naval exercise signalled that closer Chinese military ties with a host of Middle Eastern nations did not translate into Chinese aspirations for a greater role in regional security any time soon.

China contributed elements of its anti-piracy fleet that were already in Somali waters to protect commercial vessels as well as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief personnel rather than combat troops.

As they hedge their bets, Gulf states may want to take their time in thinking about a more multilateral security arrangement that includes but goes beyond the United States.

The Gulf states’ problem is&nbsp;fast-moving and to some degree, unpredictable developments in the Middle East could change their calculus.

That is also true for Russia and particularly China that has long maintained that its security interests in the region, based on the ability to freeride on the US defence umbrella, were best served by mutually beneficial economic and trade relations.

Increasingly that approach could prove unsustainable.

Said Jiang Xudong, a Middle East scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences: “Economic investment will not solve all other problems when there are religious and ethnic conflicts.”

Xudong could just as well have included power struggles and regional rivalries in his analysis. 
 
(Views expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

The killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani has further opened the door to a potential restructuring of the Gulf’s security architecture. In line with an Iranian plan launched at last year’s United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) by President Hassan Rouhani that calls for a security architecture that would exclude external forces, cooler heads in Tehran argue that expulsion of all US troops from the Middle East would constitute revenge for Soleimani’s assassination.

The killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani has further opened the door to a potential restructuring of the Gulf’s security architecture. In line with an Iranian plan launched at last year’s United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) by President Hassan Rouhani that calls for a security architecture that would exclude external forces, cooler heads in Tehran argue that expulsion of all US troops from the Middle East would constitute revenge for Soleimani’s assassination. While it likely would be a drawn-out process, Iraq’s parliament took a first step by unanimously asking the government in the absence of Kurdish and Sunni Muslim deputies to expel US forces from the country. Ultimately, Iran may at best get only part of its wants. Iraqi prime minister Adel Abdul Mahdi has dialled back his initial support of Parliament’s demand, saying that any withdrawal would involve only US combat forces and not training and logistical support for the Iraqi military. Similarly, Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar are unlikely to expel US forces and bases. That does not mean that the foundation for the Gulf’s security architecture, grounded in a US defence umbrella primarily to shield the region’s energy-rich monarchies from potential Iranian aggression, is not shifting. In fact, it was already shifting prior to the killing of Soleimani. Saudi Arabia and the UAE that long supported US President Donald J Trump’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran, involving the US withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program and the imposition of harsh economic sanctions, began hedging their bets in the second half of last year. The Gulf may have on an emotive level privately celebrated the death of Soleimani, an architect of Iran’s use of proxies across the Middle East, but in a more rational analysis fear that his killing may have opened a Pandora’s box that could lead the region to all-out war. Saudi Arabia and the UAE called for a de-escalation in the wake of the killing as Khalid bin Salman, the kingdom’s deputy defence minister and brother of crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, travelled to Washington and London to urge restraint. Ironically, the killing of Soleimani rather than strategically pleasing Gulf leaders may have reinforced concerns that they no longer can fully rely on the United States as their sole security guarantor. If the United States’ refusal last year to respond forcefully to a string of Iranian provocations sparked Gulf doubts, Solemani’s killing raises the spectre of US overreach when it does. Trump’s threat to attack Iranian cultural sites, despite animosity towards Iran and anti-Shiite sentiment in some Gulf quarters, is likely to have reinforced that concern. The Gulf states’ hedging of their bets will not make Rouhani’s proposal any more attractive but it has already led to direct and indirect diplomacy by the UAE and Saudi Arabia to reduce tension with Iran. Solemani was killed on the morning that he reportedly was to deliver to Abdul Mahdi, the Iraqi Prime Minister, an Iranian response to a Saudi initiative to defuse tension. While Rouhani’s proposal is a non-starter, it contains one element that could prove to have legs: some form of non-aggression agreement or understanding between the Gulf states and Iran. The notion of an understanding on non-aggression would stroke with a Russian proposal for an alternative multilateral arrangement that calls for a regional security conference along the lines of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE. Unlike Rouhani’s proposition, the Russian proposal would involve multiple external powers, including Russia, China and India, but, in the knowledge that no country can as of now replace the United States militarily, be centred on US military muscle. The proposal, endorsed by China, potentially could cater to Trump’s demand for burden-sharing and financial compensation for a continued US role in security across the globe. Russian officials and surrogates for the Kremlin stress that the proposal seeks to capitalize on the United States’ mushrooming predicament in the Middle East but does not mean that Russia was willing to make the kind of commitment that would position it as an alternative to the US. Similarly, the nature of China’s participation in last month’s first-ever joint Chinese-Russian-Iranian naval exercise signalled that closer Chinese military ties with a host of Middle Eastern nations did not translate into Chinese aspirations for a greater role in regional security any time soon. China contributed elements of its anti-piracy fleet that were already in Somali waters to protect commercial vessels as well as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief personnel rather than combat troops. As they hedge their bets, Gulf states may want to take their time in thinking about a more multilateral security arrangement that includes but goes beyond the United States. The Gulf states’ problem is fast-moving and to some degree, unpredictable developments in the Middle East could change their calculus. That is also true for Russia and particularly China that has long maintained that its security interests in the region, based on the ability to freeride on the US defence umbrella, were best served by mutually beneficial economic and trade relations. Increasingly that approach could prove unsustainable. Said Jiang Xudong, a Middle East scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences: “Economic investment will not solve all other problems when there are religious and ethnic conflicts.” Xudong could just as well have included power struggles and regional rivalries in his analysis. (Views expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Qasem Soleimani’s death opens a door to alternative security arrangements in the Gulf

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/royal-jordanian-gulf-air-suspend-flights-to-baghdad-after-us-strikes-kill-top-iran-commander-qasem-soleimani-272050">Gulf</a>&nbsp;stocks fell sharply in early trade on Sunday, led by&nbsp;Kuwaiti shares, on escalating&nbsp;tensions&nbsp;between the United States and&nbsp;Iran.

Iranian military commander <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/iran-will-respond-to-soleimani-killing-any-time-in-any-manner-foreign-minister-zarif-272013">Qassem Soleimani</a>, the architect of Tehran's overseas clandestine and military operations was killed on Friday in a&nbsp;US&nbsp;drone strike on his convoy at Baghdad airport.

The killing is seen by Tehran as an act of war that risks regional conflagration.

The&nbsp;Kuwaiti index, the best performer in the region in 2019, was down nearly 3.8 per cent&nbsp;in early trade, Dubai stocks were down 1.8 per cent&nbsp;and the Abu Dhabi index fell 1.1 per cent.

The Saudi market&nbsp;plunged 2 per cent&nbsp;at the market open, with shares of in oil giant <a href="https://www.wionews.com/business-economy/global-markets-oil-gold-safe-haven-assets-gains-as-us-strike-kills-iranian-commander-271901">Saudi Aramco</a> down 0.7 per cent.

"A <a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions/us-iran-tensions-and-why-india-should-care-271967">US-Iran</a>&nbsp;war could shave 0.5 percentage points or more off global GDP, mainly due to a collapse in&nbsp;Iran’s economy but also due to the impact from a surge in oil prices," Jason Tuvey, senior emerging&nbsp;markets&nbsp;economist at Capital Economics, said in a note last week.

He said while a&nbsp;US-Iran&nbsp;conflict would probably pressure equity and bond&nbsp;markets&nbsp;in the Middle East,&nbsp;Gulf&nbsp;countries' currency pegs to the&nbsp;US <a href="https://www.wionews.com/business-economy/safe-haven-yen-lifted-us-dollar-hits-in-grim-data-after-qassem-soleimani-strike-272054">dollar</a> would likely remain intact.

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/business-economy/us-oil-workers-leave-iraq-air-strike-on-iranian-leader-qassem-soleimani-272049">Oil prices</a> jumped to $63.05 a barrel on Friday, their highest level in more than three months, after Soleimani's killing sparked fears that conflict in the region could disrupt global oil supplies.&nbsp;

Gulf stocks fell sharply in early trade on Sunday, led by Kuwaiti shares, on escalating tensions between the United States and Iran. Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani, the architect of Tehran's overseas clandestine and military operations was killed on Friday in a US drone strike on his convoy at Baghdad airport.

Gulf stocks fell sharply in early trade on Sunday, led by Kuwaiti shares, on escalating tensions between the United States and Iran. Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani, the architect of Tehran's overseas clandestine and military operations was killed on Friday in a US drone strike on his convoy at Baghdad airport. The killing is seen by Tehran as an act of war that risks regional conflagration. The Kuwaiti index, the best performer in the region in 2019, was down nearly 3.8 per cent in early trade, Dubai stocks were down 1.8 per cent and the Abu Dhabi index fell 1.1 per cent. The Saudi market plunged 2 per cent at the market open, with shares of in oil giant Saudi Aramco down 0.7 per cent. "A US-Iran war could shave 0.5 percentage points or more off global GDP, mainly due to a collapse in Iran’s economy but also due to the impact from a surge in oil prices," Jason Tuvey, senior emerging markets economist at Capital Economics, said in a note last week. He said while a US-Iran conflict would probably pressure equity and bond markets in the Middle East, Gulf countries' currency pegs to the US dollar would likely remain intact. Oil prices jumped to $63.05 a barrel on Friday, their highest level in more than three months, after Soleimani's killing sparked fears that conflict in the region could disrupt global oil supplies.

Gulf markets plunge on US-Iran tensions, Kuwait lead fall

A first-ever joint Chinese-Russian-Iranian naval exercise signals that closer Chinese military ties with a host of Middle Eastern nations does not translate into Chinese aspirations for a greater role in regional security any time soon.

If anything, the exercise, coupled with notional Chinese support for proposals for a multilateral security approach in the Gulf, suggests that China envisions a continued US lead in Gulf security despite the mounting rivalry between the world’s two largest economies.

That is the message China is sending by playing down the significance of the exercise and hinting that it would only contribute non-combat forces.

China’s participation is expected to involve its anti-piracy fleet that is already in Somali waters to protect commercial vessels as well as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief personnel rather than specially dispatched units of the People’s Liberation Army.

China’s preference for a continued US lead in maintaining Gulf security, even if it favours a more multilateral approach, was evident earlier this year in its willingness to consider participating in the US-led maritime alliance that escorts commercial vessels in the Gulf and seeks to secure shipping lanes and was created in response to several attacks on tankers in the Gulf of Oman.

So far, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Britain and Australia have joined the alliance that started operations last month.

Despite favouring a continued US lead, China sees a broadening of security arrangements that would embed rather than replace the US defence umbrella in the Gulf as a way to reduce regional tensions.

China also believes that a multilateral arrangement would allow it to continue steering clear of being sucked into conflicts and disputes in the Middle East, particularly the Saudi-Iranian rivalry.

A multilateral arrangement in which the US would remain the key military player would fit the pattern of China’s gradual projection beyond the borders of its growing military power.

With the exception of a military facility in Djibouti, China’s projection becomes less hardcore the further away one gets from the People’s Republic borders.

Proposals for a multilateral security architecture could also cater to US President Donald J Trump’s transactionalism as well as his insistence on burden-sharing.

Getting from A to B is, however, easier said than done.

If the US security umbrella was geared towards defence again Iran, a multi-lateral approach would have to involve Iran.

Such involvement could be based on some kind of agreement on non-aggression, a proposal put forward by Iran and implicit in Russia’s call for a regional security conference along the lines of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE.

To get there, however, the United States and Saudi Arabia would have to reduce tensions with Iran, credibly signal that they have no intention of toppling or destabilising the Iranian regime, and resolve the crisis stemming from the US withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program.

That would seem a tall order even if Saudi Arabia and Iran have not closed the door on stalled contacts aimed at dialling down tensions.

Chinese support has, moreover, so far lacked enthusiasm for a Russian proposal that calls the United States, Russia, China and India to be involved in a multilateral approach.

While backing Russia’s proposal in general terms, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang stopped short of specifically endorsing it. Geng welcomed, “All proposals and diplomatic efforts conducive to de-escalating the situation in the Gulf region.”

China’s refraining to more wholeheartedly endorse the Russian proposal is rooted in differing approaches towards multilateralism in general and alliances in particular. China shies away from alliances emphasising geo-economics rather than geopolitics while Russia still operates in terms of alliances.

Looming in the background is the fact that in the ultimate analysis China is likely to view security in South and Central Asia as interlinked with security in the Gulf, which in turn raises questions about the sustainability of the Chinese security approach.

The geographic layering of China’s approach is evident not only in China’s robust posture in the South China Sea, but also in countries like Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

China has recently made progress on the construction of a road through Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor. The road serves multiple geo-political goals.

It will facilitate the movement of troops, together with a military base in Tajikistan and Chinese cross border operations in the corridor.

The question is whether the Chinese moves will jeopardise the presumed division of labour between Russia and China under which Russia shoulders responsibility for security in Central Asia while China concentrates on economic development and if it does what impact that would have on Chinese reliance on a potential Russian role in the Gulf.

There is little doubt that the Gulf is gradually moving from a unilateral security arrangement to a multilateral one driven by Gulf concerns following the September attacks on Saudi oil facilities and a US response that has reinforced nagging doubts about the reliability of US security guarantees.

The doubts are further fed by the direction of US policy starting with the Obama administration and now with the Trump administration that suggests a re-evaluation of US national security interests in the Middle East.

China’s belief that economics rather than geopolitics is the key to solving disputes has so far allowed it to remain above the breach but has yet to prove its sustainability.

China’s approach is unlikely to shield it from the Middle East’s penchant of ensuring that it is at the heart of concerns of major external parties.

Said Jiang Xudong, a Middle East scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences: “Economic investment will not solve all other problems when there are religious and ethnic conflicts.” 
 
 
(Views expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

A first-ever joint Chinese-Russian-Iranian naval exercise signals that closer Chinese military ties with a host of Middle Eastern nations does not translate into Chinese aspirations for a greater role in regional security any time soon.

A first-ever joint Chinese-Russian-Iranian naval exercise signals that closer Chinese military ties with a host of Middle Eastern nations does not translate into Chinese aspirations for a greater role in regional security any time soon. If anything, the exercise, coupled with notional Chinese support for proposals for a multilateral security approach in the Gulf, suggests that China envisions a continued US lead in Gulf security despite the mounting rivalry between the world’s two largest economies. That is the message China is sending by playing down the significance of the exercise and hinting that it would only contribute non-combat forces. China’s participation is expected to involve its anti-piracy fleet that is already in Somali waters to protect commercial vessels as well as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief personnel rather than specially dispatched units of the People’s Liberation Army. China’s preference for a continued US lead in maintaining Gulf security, even if it favours a more multilateral approach, was evident earlier this year in its willingness to consider participating in the US-led maritime alliance that escorts commercial vessels in the Gulf and seeks to secure shipping lanes and was created in response to several attacks on tankers in the Gulf of Oman. So far, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Britain and Australia have joined the alliance that started operations last month. Despite favouring a continued US lead, China sees a broadening of security arrangements that would embed rather than replace the US defence umbrella in the Gulf as a way to reduce regional tensions. China also believes that a multilateral arrangement would allow it to continue steering clear of being sucked into conflicts and disputes in the Middle East, particularly the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. A multilateral arrangement in which the US would remain the key military player would fit the pattern of China’s gradual projection beyond the borders of its growing military power. With the exception of a military facility in Djibouti, China’s projection becomes less hardcore the further away one gets from the People’s Republic borders. Proposals for a multilateral security architecture could also cater to US President Donald J Trump’s transactionalism as well as his insistence on burden-sharing. Getting from A to B is, however, easier said than done. If the US security umbrella was geared towards defence again Iran, a multi-lateral approach would have to involve Iran. Such involvement could be based on some kind of agreement on non-aggression, a proposal put forward by Iran and implicit in Russia’s call for a regional security conference along the lines of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE. To get there, however, the United States and Saudi Arabia would have to reduce tensions with Iran, credibly signal that they have no intention of toppling or destabilising the Iranian regime, and resolve the crisis stemming from the US withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program. That would seem a tall order even if Saudi Arabia and Iran have not closed the door on stalled contacts aimed at dialling down tensions. Chinese support has, moreover, so far lacked enthusiasm for a Russian proposal that calls the United States, Russia, China and India to be involved in a multilateral approach. While backing Russia’s proposal in general terms, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang stopped short of specifically endorsing it. Geng welcomed, “All proposals and diplomatic efforts conducive to de-escalating the situation in the Gulf region.” China’s refraining to more wholeheartedly endorse the Russian proposal is rooted in differing approaches towards multilateralism in general and alliances in particular. China shies away from alliances emphasising geo-economics rather than geopolitics while Russia still operates in terms of alliances. Looming in the background is the fact that in the ultimate analysis China is likely to view security in South and Central Asia as interlinked with security in the Gulf, which in turn raises questions about the sustainability of the Chinese security approach. The geographic layering of China’s approach is evident not only in China’s robust posture in the South China Sea, but also in countries like Tajikistan and Afghanistan. China has recently made progress on the construction of a road through Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor. The road serves multiple geo-political goals. It will facilitate the movement of troops, together with a military base in Tajikistan and Chinese cross border operations in the corridor. The question is whether the Chinese moves will jeopardise the presumed division of labour between Russia and China under which Russia shoulders responsibility for security in Central Asia while China concentrates on economic development and if it does what impact that would have on Chinese reliance on a potential Russian role in the Gulf. There is little doubt that the Gulf is gradually moving from a unilateral security arrangement to a multilateral one driven by Gulf concerns following the September attacks on Saudi oil facilities and a US response that has reinforced nagging doubts about the reliability of US security guarantees. The doubts are further fed by the direction of US policy starting with the Obama administration and now with the Trump administration that suggests a re-evaluation of US national security interests in the Middle East. China’s belief that economics rather than geopolitics is the key to solving disputes has so far allowed it to remain above the breach but has yet to prove its sustainability. China’s approach is unlikely to shield it from the Middle East’s penchant of ensuring that it is at the heart of concerns of major external parties. Said Jiang Xudong, a Middle East scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences: “Economic investment will not solve all other problems when there are religious and ethnic conflicts.” (Views expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Gulf security: Here's why China wants the US to remain the key military player

Saudi efforts to negotiate an end to the Yemen war in a bid to open a dialogue with Iran could call into question continued Gulf support for US President Donald J. Trump’s maximum pressure campaign against the Islamic republic.

Saudi officials hope that talks mediated by Oman and Britain between the kingdom and Houthi rebels will lead to a revival of stalled talks between the Yemeni insurgents and the Saudi-backed, internationally recognized government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.

Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman has tasked his younger brother and Saudi deputy defense minister, Khalid bin Salman, with engineering an end to the Yemeni war as part of a broader revamp of Saudi foreign policy.

The revamp involves a return to a more cautious foreign and defense policy that embraces multilateralism after several years in which the kingdom adopted an assertive and robust go-it alone approach that produced several fiascos, including the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen 4.5 years ago.

The revamp was prompted by attacks in September on two of the kingdom’s key oil facilities as well as doubts about the reliability of the US defense commitment to the Gulf.

The kingdom’s return to a more cautious approach is also intended to allow Saudi Arabia to project itself in 2020 as president of the Group of 20 (G20) and repair its image tarnished by the Yemen War, the killing last year of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and a domestic crackdown on dissent. The G20 groups the world’s twenty largest economies.

Mr. Trump’s response to the September drone and missile attacks for which the Houthis claimed responsibility was the latest, and in some ways clearest indication, that Gulf states may not be able to count on the United States in times of crisis even though the Trump administration insisted that Iran rather than the rebels was to blame for the incident.

“That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that wasn’t an attack on us. But we would certainly help them. If we decide to do something, they’ll be very much involved, and that includes payment. And they understand that fully,” Mr. Trump said at the time, adopting a transactional attitude towards Gulf security.

A US official involved in Gulf policy said more recently that “the attacks made the Saudis and other Gulf states realize that escalation of US-Iranian tensions would make them targets in an environment in which the United States may not wholeheartedly come to their rescue.”

Another US official suggested that the Saudis’ “prime objective now is to lessen their involvement in Yemen, to get the Houthis to stop being some version of a proxy, so they (the Saudis) can deal directly with Iran.”

United Nations Yemen envoy Martin Griffiths told the UN Security Council this week that the number of air attacks by the Saudi-led coalition had dropped by nearly 80 percent in the last two weeks.

“We call this de-escalation, a reduction in the tempo of the war, and perhaps a move towards an overall ceasefire in Yemen," Mr. Griffiths said. He held out the hope that a negotiated end to the war could be achieved early next year.

Saudi efforts to end the war as well as gestures towards Iran in recent months by the United Arab Emirates did not stop senior Saudi and UAE officials from adopting a hard line at this week’s Manama Dialogue.

“Appeasement simply cannot work with Iran. We hold Iran responsible for the attack on Abqaiq. We do not want war, but Iran needs to be held accountable. The question is whether Iran can abandon its ambition to propagate the revolution and respect sovereignty,” Saudi minister of state for foreign affairs Adel al-Jubeir told the Bahrain gathering. By mentioning Abqaiq, Mr. Al-Jubeir was referring to one of the two Saudi oil facilities targeted in September.

Mr. Al-Jubeir’s UAE counterpart, Anwar Gargash, added: “Germany under Hitler, the Soviet Union, Iran today: revisionist states threaten international order. The key to stability is deterrence, and steadfast resolve by the international community that Iran must change. If not, sanctions must be increased, not loosened.”

The US Treasury, expanding harsh sanctions that aim to force Iran to re-negotiate on American terms the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic republic’s nuclear program, sanctioned this week Iranian communications minister Mohammad Javad Azari-Jahromi for blocking access to the Internet as part of a bid to squash anti-government protests.

The blockage made it difficult for protesters to post videos on social media, generate support for their rejection of recent fuel price hikes, and obtain reliable reports on the extent of the unrest. Amnesty International said more than 100 protesters had so far been killed by security forces.

Mr. Al-Jubeir and Mr. Gargash’s tough remarks notwithstanding, winds in the Gulf appear to be blowing in the direction of reduced tension on all fronts, including the 2.5-year old Saudi-UAE-led boycott of Qatar.

Inevitably, reducing tension will only prove sustainable if US-Iranian friction is dialled back.

Sustainability moreover will depend on some sort of regional understanding on non-aggression that would involve Iran and create the basis for a more multilateral security architecture that would embed rather than replace the regional US defence umbrella.

Bahraini foreign minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa appeared to anticipate a more multilateral approach in his remarks at the Manama Dialogue. Rejecting an Iranian call for a security architecture that would exclusively involve regional states, Mr. Al Khalifa asserted that “Iran's regional security proposals are fundamentally flawed, especially because they do not include external powers.”

A series of Saudi and UAE gestures in recent months, beyond the Saudi-Houthi talks, signal moves towards reducing tensions not only on the Yemeni but also the Iranian and Qatari fronts.

In the latest indication, Khaled Al Jarallah, deputy foreign minister of Kuwait, the official mediator in the dispute with Qatar, said a decision this month by the Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini national soccer teams to compete in the Gulf Cup in Qatar, despite their boycott of the Gulf state, “provides a clear indication that a breakthrough has taken place.”

Similarly, a Saudi official, in a rare gesture, told reporters in Washington earlier this month that Qatar had taken a step towards resolving the crisis by passing an anti-terrorism funding law, a key demand of the boycotting countries.

Besides withdrawing forces from Yemen, the UAE refrained from blaming Iran for the attacks on the Saudi installations and earlier explosions on vessels off the Emirati coast and sent officials to Iran to discuss maritime security.

Saudi and UAE support for the US’ maximum pressure campaign is certain to weaken if Gulf efforts to reduce tensions progress, particularly with regards to Iran. A peace process in Yemen and a Gulf dialogue with Iran would be significant steps in that direction.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, an adjunct senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

&nbsp;

Saudi efforts to negotiate an end to the Yemen war in a bid to open a dialogue with Iran could call into question continued Gulf support for US President Donald J.

Saudi efforts to negotiate an end to the Yemen war in a bid to open a dialogue with Iran could call into question continued Gulf support for US President Donald J. Trump’s maximum pressure campaign against the Islamic republic. Saudi officials hope that talks mediated by Oman and Britain between the kingdom and Houthi rebels will lead to a revival of stalled talks between the Yemeni insurgents and the Saudi-backed, internationally recognized government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman has tasked his younger brother and Saudi deputy defense minister, Khalid bin Salman, with engineering an end to the Yemeni war as part of a broader revamp of Saudi foreign policy. The revamp involves a return to a more cautious foreign and defense policy that embraces multilateralism after several years in which the kingdom adopted an assertive and robust go-it alone approach that produced several fiascos, including the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen 4.5 years ago. The revamp was prompted by attacks in September on two of the kingdom’s key oil facilities as well as doubts about the reliability of the US defense commitment to the Gulf. The kingdom’s return to a more cautious approach is also intended to allow Saudi Arabia to project itself in 2020 as president of the Group of 20 (G20) and repair its image tarnished by the Yemen War, the killing last year of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and a domestic crackdown on dissent. The G20 groups the world’s twenty largest economies. Mr. Trump’s response to the September drone and missile attacks for which the Houthis claimed responsibility was the latest, and in some ways clearest indication, that Gulf states may not be able to count on the United States in times of crisis even though the Trump administration insisted that Iran rather than the rebels was to blame for the incident. “That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that wasn’t an attack on us. But we would certainly help them. If we decide to do something, they’ll be very much involved, and that includes payment. And they understand that fully,” Mr. Trump said at the time, adopting a transactional attitude towards Gulf security. A US official involved in Gulf policy said more recently that “the attacks made the Saudis and other Gulf states realize that escalation of US-Iranian tensions would make them targets in an environment in which the United States may not wholeheartedly come to their rescue.” Another US official suggested that the Saudis’ “prime objective now is to lessen their involvement in Yemen, to get the Houthis to stop being some version of a proxy, so they (the Saudis) can deal directly with Iran.” United Nations Yemen envoy Martin Griffiths told the UN Security Council this week that the number of air attacks by the Saudi-led coalition had dropped by nearly 80 percent in the last two weeks. “We call this de-escalation, a reduction in the tempo of the war, and perhaps a move towards an overall ceasefire in Yemen," Mr. Griffiths said. He held out the hope that a negotiated end to the war could be achieved early next year. Saudi efforts to end the war as well as gestures towards Iran in recent months by the United Arab Emirates did not stop senior Saudi and UAE officials from adopting a hard line at this week’s Manama Dialogue. “Appeasement simply cannot work with Iran. We hold Iran responsible for the attack on Abqaiq. We do not want war, but Iran needs to be held accountable. The question is whether Iran can abandon its ambition to propagate the revolution and respect sovereignty,” Saudi minister of state for foreign affairs Adel al-Jubeir told the Bahrain gathering. By mentioning Abqaiq, Mr. Al-Jubeir was referring to one of the two Saudi oil facilities targeted in September. Mr. Al-Jubeir’s UAE counterpart, Anwar Gargash, added: “Germany under Hitler, the Soviet Union, Iran today: revisionist states threaten international order. The key to stability is deterrence, and steadfast resolve by the international community that Iran must change. If not, sanctions must be increased, not loosened.” The US Treasury, expanding harsh sanctions that aim to force Iran to re-negotiate on American terms the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic republic’s nuclear program, sanctioned this week Iranian communications minister Mohammad Javad Azari-Jahromi for blocking access to the Internet as part of a bid to squash anti-government protests. The blockage made it difficult for protesters to post videos on social media, generate support for their rejection of recent fuel price hikes, and obtain reliable reports on the extent of the unrest. Amnesty International said more than 100 protesters had so far been killed by security forces. Mr. Al-Jubeir and Mr. Gargash’s tough remarks notwithstanding, winds in the Gulf appear to be blowing in the direction of reduced tension on all fronts, including the 2.5-year old Saudi-UAE-led boycott of Qatar. Inevitably, reducing tension will only prove sustainable if US-Iranian friction is dialled back. Sustainability moreover will depend on some sort of regional understanding on non-aggression that would involve Iran and create the basis for a more multilateral security architecture that would embed rather than replace the regional US defence umbrella. Bahraini foreign minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa appeared to anticipate a more multilateral approach in his remarks at the Manama Dialogue. Rejecting an Iranian call for a security architecture that would exclusively involve regional states, Mr. Al Khalifa asserted that “Iran's regional security proposals are fundamentally flawed, especially because they do not include external powers.” A series of Saudi and UAE gestures in recent months, beyond the Saudi-Houthi talks, signal moves towards reducing tensions not only on the Yemeni but also the Iranian and Qatari fronts. In the latest indication, Khaled Al Jarallah, deputy foreign minister of Kuwait, the official mediator in the dispute with Qatar, said a decision this month by the Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini national soccer teams to compete in the Gulf Cup in Qatar, despite their boycott of the Gulf state, “provides a clear indication that a breakthrough has taken place.” Similarly, a Saudi official, in a rare gesture, told reporters in Washington earlier this month that Qatar had taken a step towards resolving the crisis by passing an anti-terrorism funding law, a key demand of the boycotting countries. Besides withdrawing forces from Yemen, the UAE refrained from blaming Iran for the attacks on the Saudi installations and earlier explosions on vessels off the Emirati coast and sent officials to Iran to discuss maritime security. Saudi and UAE support for the US’ maximum pressure campaign is certain to weaken if Gulf efforts to reduce tensions progress, particularly with regards to Iran. A peace process in Yemen and a Gulf dialogue with Iran would be significant steps in that direction. Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, an adjunct senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Mending Gulf fences could weaken support for US sanctions against Iran

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/pakistan-supports-turkeys-syria-offensive-255446">Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan</a> was heading to Iran Sunday following a request from the United States and Saudi Arabia for him to try to defuse rising tensions in the Gulf.&nbsp;

Khan's office said his visit was part of an initiative "to promote peace and security in the region", and that he will hold talks with Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani.

It will be his second visit this year to Iran, which shares a border of around 1,000 kilometres with Pakistan.&nbsp;

In a press briefing last week, a spokesman for Pakistan's foreign office said Khan was expected to visit Saudi Arabia, without providing further details.

Khan said last month that both the United States and Saudi Arabia had asked him to mediate with Iran to defuse tensions in the Gulf.

There has been a spate of still unexplained attacks on shipping in and around the vital seaway involving Iran and Western powers, as well as drone attacks on Saudi oil installations.

Washington accused Tehran of attacking the vessels with mines and to be behind the drone assault, something Tehran strongly denies.

Pakistan has strong relations with Saudi Arabia -- over 2.5 million of its nationals live and work in the kingdom -- but also maintains good relations with Iran and represents Tehran's consular interests in the United States.

Khan met both US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani at the United Nations last month, shortly after he visited Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan was heading to Iran Sunday following a request from the United States and Saudi Arabia for him to try to defuse rising tensions in the Gulf.

Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan was heading to Iran Sunday following a request from the United States and Saudi Arabia for him to try to defuse rising tensions in the Gulf. Khan's office said his visit was part of an initiative "to promote peace and security in the region", and that he will hold talks with Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani. It will be his second visit this year to Iran, which shares a border of around 1,000 kilometres with Pakistan. In a press briefing last week, a spokesman for Pakistan's foreign office said Khan was expected to visit Saudi Arabia, without providing further details. Khan said last month that both the United States and Saudi Arabia had asked him to mediate with Iran to defuse tensions in the Gulf. There has been a spate of still unexplained attacks on shipping in and around the vital seaway involving Iran and Western powers, as well as drone attacks on Saudi oil installations. Washington accused Tehran of attacking the vessels with mines and to be behind the drone assault, something Tehran strongly denies. Pakistan has strong relations with Saudi Arabia -- over 2.5 million of its nationals live and work in the kingdom -- but also maintains good relations with Iran and represents Tehran's consular interests in the United States. Khan met both US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani at the United Nations last month, shortly after he visited Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan heads to Iran as tensions rise in Gulf

Saudi and Iranian leaders are this week walking back from the brink, signalling that they want to avoid outright military confrontation and manage rather than resolve differences.

In fact, there is every reason to believe that neither Riyadh nor Tehran has a vested interest in a definitive solution of the Middle East and North Africa’s multiple problems.

The trick for men like Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is to find a controllable way of maintaining their potentially existential bitter rivalry without fighting what could be a devastating regional war.

To do so, both men appear to be making the right noises against the backdrop of an evolving US policy that is forcing Saudi Arabia to rethink its almost decade-long, often reckless and assertive go-it-alone foreign and defence policy and Iran to seek ways to level the playing field.

“The Anti-Iran Alliance is not just faltering, it’s crumbling. Bolton is gone; Bibi is going; MBZ has struck his deal with Iran; MBS is not far behind,” tweeted Council on Foreign Relations distinguished fellow and former US Middle East negotiator Martin S Indyk.

Indyk was referring to former US national security advisor John Bolton and embattled Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu while identifying United Arab Emirates crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed and his Saudi counterpart and namesake, Prince Mohammed, by their initials.

Signalling a change in tone, Saudi Arabia has gone quiet on its investigation into responsibility for last month's attacks on key Saudi oil facilities after earlier stopping just short of blaming Iran.

Prince Mohammed has, meanwhile, welcomed potential face-to-face talks between US President Donald J Trump and Rouhani, saying “absolutely... This is what we all ask for.”

Prince Mohammed’s remarks were tempered by Saudi minister of state for foreign affairs Adel al-Jubeir who spelled out the kingdom’s demands.

Without clarifying whether these were a pre-condition for talks or issues to be discussed, Al-Jubeir’s demands included “ending Iran’s involvement in the affairs of other countries; stopping support for terrorist organisations; abandoning the policy of destruction and sowing conflict; and freezing the plan to develop nuclear weapons and the ballistic-missile program.”

In response, Iran insisted that Saudi Arabia freeze its multibillion-dollar arms purchases from the United States, stop its intervention in Yemen and end discrimination against the Shiite Muslim minority in Saudi Arabia.

The chances of the two countries accepting the other’s conditions are virtually nil.

Nonetheless, Rouhani, with France, Iraq and Pakistan seeking to mediate, has kept the door open for talks with the United States which withdrew last year from the 2015 international agreement that curbs the Islamic republic's nuclear program and has since imposed harsh economic sanctions on Iran.

Addressing the Iranian cabinet this week, Rouhani termed a four-point plan put forward by French President Emmanuel Macron “acceptable.”

The plan calls for the United States to lift sanctions on Iran and allow it to freely export its oil and collect revenue in return for an Iranian commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons and help ensure Gulf security.

Macron’s proposal includes a $15 billion credit line that would enable Iran to export oil and would also restore the P5+1 framework of signatories of the nuclear accord, France, Britain, Russia, China, Germany and the US.

Like with Al Jubeir’s demands, the question is what comes first, the chicken or the egg.

Trump sees lifting of sanctions as the outcome of talks while Rouhani has insisted that sanctions be removed prior to negotiations.

To step up the pressure, Iran has been gradually breaching the terms of the accord and increasing tensions that bring the region closer to the brink of war in a bid to position negotiations as the only alternative.

Iranian oil minister Bijan Zanganeh put the changing mood on public display at a Russian energy conference chaired by President Vladimir Putin when he described his Saudi counterpart, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, a son of King Salman, the Saudi monarch, as “a friend.”

“Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman has been a friend for over 22 years,” Zanganeh said.

The two men were later seen holding hands together with Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Mohammed Barkindo and speaking on the sidelines of the conference in the first such encounter since the attack on the oil facilities.

The new mood could over time, against the backdrop of mounting Gulf doubts about the reliability of the United States’ regional defence umbrella, make a Chinese-backed Russian proposal for a multilateral security architecture more attractive.

The Russian proposal is built on the notion that security in the Gulf would be better served by an architecture that downplays regional rivalries rather than accentuating them as part of the US umbrella that is rooted in the Saudi-Iranian divide and designed to protect the conservative Arab monarchies against the Islamic republic.

The Russian approach theoretically could accommodate the survival strategies of both the Iranian regime and the Saudi ruling family.

Upholding Iran’s revolutionary façade requires the existence of an imperialist foreign threat that also gives a lease on life to the vested economic interests of hardliners grouped around the country’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

Saudi Arabia, figuring that it needs at least six years to develop its natural gas potential to the degree that it can compete with Iran, home to the world’s second-largest reserves, may want to see an Iranian regime that is weakened and possibly destabilised, but not on the verge of collapse. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp;

&nbsp;

Saudi and Iranian leaders are this week walking back from the brink, signalling that they want to avoid outright military confrontation and manage rather than resolve differences.

Saudi and Iranian leaders are this week walking back from the brink, signalling that they want to avoid outright military confrontation and manage rather than resolve differences. In fact, there is every reason to believe that neither Riyadh nor Tehran has a vested interest in a definitive solution of the Middle East and North Africa’s multiple problems. The trick for men like Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is to find a controllable way of maintaining their potentially existential bitter rivalry without fighting what could be a devastating regional war. To do so, both men appear to be making the right noises against the backdrop of an evolving US policy that is forcing Saudi Arabia to rethink its almost decade-long, often reckless and assertive go-it-alone foreign and defence policy and Iran to seek ways to level the playing field. “The Anti-Iran Alliance is not just faltering, it’s crumbling. Bolton is gone; Bibi is going; MBZ has struck his deal with Iran; MBS is not far behind,” tweeted Council on Foreign Relations distinguished fellow and former US Middle East negotiator Martin S Indyk. Indyk was referring to former US national security advisor John Bolton and embattled Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu while identifying United Arab Emirates crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed and his Saudi counterpart and namesake, Prince Mohammed, by their initials. Signalling a change in tone, Saudi Arabia has gone quiet on its investigation into responsibility for last month's attacks on key Saudi oil facilities after earlier stopping just short of blaming Iran. Prince Mohammed has, meanwhile, welcomed potential face-to-face talks between US President Donald J Trump and Rouhani, saying “absolutely... This is what we all ask for.” Prince Mohammed’s remarks were tempered by Saudi minister of state for foreign affairs Adel al-Jubeir who spelled out the kingdom’s demands. Without clarifying whether these were a pre-condition for talks or issues to be discussed, Al-Jubeir’s demands included “ending Iran’s involvement in the affairs of other countries; stopping support for terrorist organisations; abandoning the policy of destruction and sowing conflict; and freezing the plan to develop nuclear weapons and the ballistic-missile program.” In response, Iran insisted that Saudi Arabia freeze its multibillion-dollar arms purchases from the United States, stop its intervention in Yemen and end discrimination against the Shiite Muslim minority in Saudi Arabia. The chances of the two countries accepting the other’s conditions are virtually nil. Nonetheless, Rouhani, with France, Iraq and Pakistan seeking to mediate, has kept the door open for talks with the United States which withdrew last year from the 2015 international agreement that curbs the Islamic republic's nuclear program and has since imposed harsh economic sanctions on Iran. Addressing the Iranian cabinet this week, Rouhani termed a four-point plan put forward by French President Emmanuel Macron “acceptable.” The plan calls for the United States to lift sanctions on Iran and allow it to freely export its oil and collect revenue in return for an Iranian commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons and help ensure Gulf security. Macron’s proposal includes a $15 billion credit line that would enable Iran to export oil and would also restore the P5+1 framework of signatories of the nuclear accord, France, Britain, Russia, China, Germany and the US. Like with Al Jubeir’s demands, the question is what comes first, the chicken or the egg. Trump sees lifting of sanctions as the outcome of talks while Rouhani has insisted that sanctions be removed prior to negotiations. To step up the pressure, Iran has been gradually breaching the terms of the accord and increasing tensions that bring the region closer to the brink of war in a bid to position negotiations as the only alternative. Iranian oil minister Bijan Zanganeh put the changing mood on public display at a Russian energy conference chaired by President Vladimir Putin when he described his Saudi counterpart, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, a son of King Salman, the Saudi monarch, as “a friend.” “Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman has been a friend for over 22 years,” Zanganeh said. The two men were later seen holding hands together with Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Mohammed Barkindo and speaking on the sidelines of the conference in the first such encounter since the attack on the oil facilities. The new mood could over time, against the backdrop of mounting Gulf doubts about the reliability of the United States’ regional defence umbrella, make a Chinese-backed Russian proposal for a multilateral security architecture more attractive. The Russian proposal is built on the notion that security in the Gulf would be better served by an architecture that downplays regional rivalries rather than accentuating them as part of the US umbrella that is rooted in the Saudi-Iranian divide and designed to protect the conservative Arab monarchies against the Islamic republic. The Russian approach theoretically could accommodate the survival strategies of both the Iranian regime and the Saudi ruling family. Upholding Iran’s revolutionary façade requires the existence of an imperialist foreign threat that also gives a lease on life to the vested economic interests of hardliners grouped around the country’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Saudi Arabia, figuring that it needs at least six years to develop its natural gas potential to the degree that it can compete with Iran, home to the world’s second-largest reserves, may want to see an Iranian regime that is weakened and possibly destabilised, but not on the verge of collapse. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Gulf straddles the edge of war and peace

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