The G20 countries are working towards finding ways to combat the coronavirus crisis. After the Indian PM Narendra Modi invited Saudi Arabia for a video conference. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has accepted the invitation. The G-20 leaders will be putting together a coordinated strategy to protect the people and safeguard the global economy. Watch report:

WION Dispatch: Saudi Prince accepts PM Modi's invitation to deal with Coronavirus crisis

There is little indication that Middle-Eastern rulers are learning the lessons of the Coronavirus’ devastating effect.

Nor is there any suggestion that they are willing to see the pandemic as an opportunity to negotiate new social contracts at a time that the virus has temporarily taken the sails out of mass anti-government protests in various countries and discontent continues to simmer in others.

On the contrary, Iran has become the poster child of what happens when the public distrusts a government that has a track record of being untransparent from the outset of a crisis, limits freedom of expression that often creates early warning systems that could enable authorities to take timely, pre-emptive measures to avert or limit the damage, and is perceived as corrupt.

Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei saw himself forced last week to bring in the military to clear the streets after Iranians, already struggling under the impact of harsh US economic sanctions, refused to adhere to public health warnings regarding large gatherings, social distancing and advice to stay at home.

Khamenei assigned the task to the regular armed forces after the Revolutionary Guards Corps failed to persuade Iranians to heed government advice regarding the epidemic that as of this writing has infected some 14,000 people and caused 724 deaths and turned Iran into one of the world’s hardest-hit countries.

The distrust has fuelled reports and rumours that casualties exceed by far government figures and that mass graves were being prepared to cope with a much higher than stated death toll.

The Coronavirus-hit Iran, that was slow to acknowledge the severity of the crisis, only weeks after large numbers took to the streets of Iranian cities denouncing Khamenei and the Guards in protest against the government’s initial reluctance to live up to its responsibility for the mistaken downing of a Ukrainian airliner that killed 176 people.

Multiple Middle-Eastern states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and Israel have ordered closures of educational facilities, quarantines and taken steps to curtail, if not halt travel to and from Asian and European nations badly affected by the virus or temporarily interrupt all travel to their countries.

Nonetheless, an exponential spread of the virus could stress test the national health systems in both energy-rich countries that have invested in state-of-the-art medical facilities as well as war-ravaged nations like Syria, Yemen and Libya where hospitals have been prime targets of devastating airstrikes.

Potential stress tests that fail could prove risky.

Countries like Iraq, which is particularly exposed with its close ties to neighbouring Iran, Algeria and Lebanon, where many like in Iran defy advice to stay at home, have witnessed months of sustained mass anti-government protests demanding a complete overhaul of a political system perceived as corrupt and incapable of delivering public goods such as jobs, proper healthcare and other services.

Governments have, however, shown little incentive to capitalise on the temporary dwindling of protests to forge new social contracts using the need to confront the virus threat nationally as a wedge.

Fear of the virus coupled with government repression has seen the numbers of protesters in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, where demonstrators initially insisted that Iraq’s political elite was a virus worse than Corona, drop from the thousands to several hundred at best.

The same is true for Algeria and Lebanon, hit not only by the virus but also a financial crisis that is forcing it to default on its ballooning debt.

"You won't be of much help to Algeria if you're dead," quipped one person on Twitter.

Embattled governments see opportunity in the virus, just not one that will prevent the temporary lid on what is a boiling pot from exploding again once the crisis is over, possibly with a greater vengeance if Corona exposes the authorities’ and the health system’s inability to cope.

"In Algeria, the government's calls for cancelling the protests are not motivated by sanitary concerns as it is the case in France, the US or elsewhere,” said Riad Kaced, a US-based activist who flew to Algiers almost every second week to take part in the protests.

“The Algerian regime wants to seize this opportunity to strangle the Hirak and kill it off," Kaced said, referring to the protest movement by its Arabic name.

In that mould, the virus, which has so far infected 62 people in Saudi Arabia did not stop Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman from rounding up potential opponents whom he suspected of plotting against him and launching an oil war with Russia that has wreaked havoc at a time that the global economy can least afford it.

Another clear indication that Middle Eastern autocrats and discredited elites see no reason to use the virus crisis as a monkey wrench to reduce regional tensions and create political and social structures that would make their societies more resilient is their failure to crack down on opinion makers, influencers and rumour mongers that seek to weaponise Corona on tightly controlled mainstream and new media.

The Saudi and United Arab Emirates governments remained silent while pro-government voices came to the defence of Saudi-based journalist Noura al-Moteari who tweeted that the virus and its spread had been funded by Qatar in order to undermine Prince Mohammed’s plans for social and economic reform and the UAE's upcoming Expo 2020.

They also looked the other way, despite a Saudi government warning that rumour-mongers could face jail terms of up to five years and a fine of up to $800,000, after analyst Zayed al-Amri claimed on Saudi television that Turkey and Iran were using the virus to target Arab tourists and attack countries across the globe.

Said social media scholar Marc Owen Jones: 'Coronavirus is being opportunistically weaponised through disinformation and propaganda tactics aimed at demonising political opponents while exposing latent prejudices.”

The Coronavirus crisis is taking its toll, including the lives of many that good and transparent governance possibly could have saved. Ultimately, authorities will get a grip on it.

However, Corona wasn’t the first such crisis and won’t be the last. The risk is that weaponisation serves rulers’ short-term interests but contributes little to building the kind of national and regional resilience and cohesion needed to confront the next one. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) 
&nbsp;

There is little indication that Middle-Eastern rulers are learning the lessons of the Coronavirus’ devastating effect. Nor is there any suggestion that they are willing to see the pandemic as an opportunity to negotiate new social contracts at a time that the virus has temporarily taken the sails out of mass anti-government protests in various countries and discontent continues to simmer in others.

There is little indication that Middle-Eastern rulers are learning the lessons of the Coronavirus’ devastating effect. Nor is there any suggestion that they are willing to see the pandemic as an opportunity to negotiate new social contracts at a time that the virus has temporarily taken the sails out of mass anti-government protests in various countries and discontent continues to simmer in others. On the contrary, Iran has become the poster child of what happens when the public distrusts a government that has a track record of being untransparent from the outset of a crisis, limits freedom of expression that often creates early warning systems that could enable authorities to take timely, pre-emptive measures to avert or limit the damage, and is perceived as corrupt. Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei saw himself forced last week to bring in the military to clear the streets after Iranians, already struggling under the impact of harsh US economic sanctions, refused to adhere to public health warnings regarding large gatherings, social distancing and advice to stay at home. Khamenei assigned the task to the regular armed forces after the Revolutionary Guards Corps failed to persuade Iranians to heed government advice regarding the epidemic that as of this writing has infected some 14,000 people and caused 724 deaths and turned Iran into one of the world’s hardest-hit countries. The distrust has fuelled reports and rumours that casualties exceed by far government figures and that mass graves were being prepared to cope with a much higher than stated death toll. The Coronavirus-hit Iran, that was slow to acknowledge the severity of the crisis, only weeks after large numbers took to the streets of Iranian cities denouncing Khamenei and the Guards in protest against the government’s initial reluctance to live up to its responsibility for the mistaken downing of a Ukrainian airliner that killed 176 people. Multiple Middle-Eastern states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and Israel have ordered closures of educational facilities, quarantines and taken steps to curtail, if not halt travel to and from Asian and European nations badly affected by the virus or temporarily interrupt all travel to their countries. Nonetheless, an exponential spread of the virus could stress test the national health systems in both energy-rich countries that have invested in state-of-the-art medical facilities as well as war-ravaged nations like Syria, Yemen and Libya where hospitals have been prime targets of devastating airstrikes. Potential stress tests that fail could prove risky. Countries like Iraq, which is particularly exposed with its close ties to neighbouring Iran, Algeria and Lebanon, where many like in Iran defy advice to stay at home, have witnessed months of sustained mass anti-government protests demanding a complete overhaul of a political system perceived as corrupt and incapable of delivering public goods such as jobs, proper healthcare and other services. Governments have, however, shown little incentive to capitalise on the temporary dwindling of protests to forge new social contracts using the need to confront the virus threat nationally as a wedge. Fear of the virus coupled with government repression has seen the numbers of protesters in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, where demonstrators initially insisted that Iraq’s political elite was a virus worse than Corona, drop from the thousands to several hundred at best. The same is true for Algeria and Lebanon, hit not only by the virus but also a financial crisis that is forcing it to default on its ballooning debt. "You won't be of much help to Algeria if you're dead," quipped one person on Twitter. Embattled governments see opportunity in the virus, just not one that will prevent the temporary lid on what is a boiling pot from exploding again once the crisis is over, possibly with a greater vengeance if Corona exposes the authorities’ and the health system’s inability to cope. "In Algeria, the government's calls for cancelling the protests are not motivated by sanitary concerns as it is the case in France, the US or elsewhere,” said Riad Kaced, a US-based activist who flew to Algiers almost every second week to take part in the protests. “The Algerian regime wants to seize this opportunity to strangle the Hirak and kill it off," Kaced said, referring to the protest movement by its Arabic name. In that mould, the virus, which has so far infected 62 people in Saudi Arabia did not stop Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman from rounding up potential opponents whom he suspected of plotting against him and launching an oil war with Russia that has wreaked havoc at a time that the global economy can least afford it. Another clear indication that Middle Eastern autocrats and discredited elites see no reason to use the virus crisis as a monkey wrench to reduce regional tensions and create political and social structures that would make their societies more resilient is their failure to crack down on opinion makers, influencers and rumour mongers that seek to weaponise Corona on tightly controlled mainstream and new media. The Saudi and United Arab Emirates governments remained silent while pro-government voices came to the defence of Saudi-based journalist Noura al-Moteari who tweeted that the virus and its spread had been funded by Qatar in order to undermine Prince Mohammed’s plans for social and economic reform and the UAE's upcoming Expo 2020. They also looked the other way, despite a Saudi government warning that rumour-mongers could face jail terms of up to five years and a fine of up to $800,000, after analyst Zayed al-Amri claimed on Saudi television that Turkey and Iran were using the virus to target Arab tourists and attack countries across the globe. Said social media scholar Marc Owen Jones: 'Coronavirus is being opportunistically weaponised through disinformation and propaganda tactics aimed at demonising political opponents while exposing latent prejudices.” The Coronavirus crisis is taking its toll, including the lives of many that good and transparent governance possibly could have saved. Ultimately, authorities will get a grip on it. However, Corona wasn’t the first such crisis and won’t be the last. The risk is that weaponisation serves rulers’ short-term interests but contributes little to building the kind of national and regional resilience and cohesion needed to confront the next one. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Coronavirus outbreak: How Middle-East is dealing with the global pandemic

A 7-year-old boy from Hyderabad who has third stage cancer and who has expressed his only desire to meet Dubai's Crown Prince Hamdan bin Mohammed Al Maktoum. Why does this boy want to meet the Crown Prince, Watch report:

Hyderabad boy suffering from cancer wishes to meet Dubai's Crown Prince

US&nbsp;President <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/donald-trump-tells-jewish-americans-he-is-israels-best-friend-266897">Donald Trump</a> and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on Sunday discussed last week's Florida naval base shooting and vowed to work together on the investigation of the attack, which left three people dead and injured eight others.

"The Crown Prince reiterated Saudi Arabia’s commitment to working with the United States to prevent a horrific attack like the Pensacola shooting from ever happening again," White House spokesman Judd Deere said in a statement.

Trump thanked "the Crown Prince for Saudi Arabia’s assistance with the investigation and continued partnership," Deere added in the statement released Sunday night.

Watch:&nbsp;Florida Naval Base shooting accused photograph released

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Saudi Arabia's state news agency on Sunday also said the crown prince had called Trump to express his condolences and support for the families of the victims of the shooting and assure the Republican US&nbsp;president that Saudi authorities would offer their absolute cooperation with US&nbsp;investigators.

The FBI has said US&nbsp;investigators believe Saudi Air Force Second Lieutenant Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani, 21, acted alone when he attacked a US&nbsp;Navy base in Pensacola, Florida on Friday, before he was fatally shot by a deputy sheriff.

US investigators are facing <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/fbi-thinks-saudi-shooter-acted-alone-florida-governor-decries-deep-seated-hatred-267095">mounting pressure</a> to discover his motives in the attack.

US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on Sunday discussed last week's Florida naval base shooting and vowed to work together on the investigation of the attack, which left three people dead and injured eight others.

US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on Sunday discussed last week's Florida naval base shooting and vowed to work together on the investigation of the attack, which left three people dead and injured eight others. "The Crown Prince reiterated Saudi Arabia’s commitment to working with the United States to prevent a horrific attack like the Pensacola shooting from ever happening again," White House spokesman Judd Deere said in a statement. Trump thanked "the Crown Prince for Saudi Arabia’s assistance with the investigation and continued partnership," Deere added in the statement released Sunday night. Watch: Florida Naval Base shooting accused photograph released Saudi Arabia's state news agency on Sunday also said the crown prince had called Trump to express his condolences and support for the families of the victims of the shooting and assure the Republican US president that Saudi authorities would offer their absolute cooperation with US investigators. The FBI has said US investigators believe Saudi Air Force Second Lieutenant Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani, 21, acted alone when he attacked a US Navy base in Pensacola, Florida on Friday, before he was fatally shot by a deputy sheriff. US investigators are facing mounting pressure to discover his motives in the attack.

Florida base shooting probe: Trump, Saudi crown prince vow to cooperate

Saudi Arabia wants to forge strong ties with India. This is a relationship rooted in the realm of political and economic realities.&nbsp;

Truth be told, strong ties will benefit both sides. India needs oil. What about the Saudis? Why has Riyadh prioritised Delhi?

What is the strategic significance? On WION Edit, we will explore these questions. First, let's tell you what India has been up to. Diversifying sources of energy.

PM Narendra Modi's government is credited for boosting India's ability to do this through multiple engagements. After US sanctions on Iran and Venezuela, India needed to secure its energy interests.&nbsp;

And Saudi Arabia was quick to fill the gaps. Right now, India imports 83 per cent of its oil needs and Saudi Arabia is the second-biggest supplier

So technically, access to Indian markets is a huge economic benefit for a country like Saudi Arabia - whose economy is fueled by oil. But that's not the only draw for Riyadh.

It is looking at the long term and India's growing clout. Here are some points to note:

Going forward, Saudi Arabia wants to rely less on its oil reserves. In March 2018, the Kingdom announced the largest renewables project ever, a solar push worth over 200 billion dollars.

That project failed to take off and was eventually. But Saudi Arabia has not given up its goal to move away from oil dependence. Recently, Riyadh tripled its renewable energy target. The focus is wind and solar energy, projects have been tendered.

So why does Saudi Arabia want to move away from oil? Because depending on oil is dangerous.

First, fluctuating prices hurt the Saudi economy. A drop in oil prices puts them under fiscal pressure. Two, as the world transitions towards clean and renewable energy, countries like Saudi Arabia will be hit hard.

So what can the Kingdom do? Shift to renewable energy. Insulate the economy from oil price shocks and as a buffer, establish ties with countries that import oil-- i.e. India.

Yes, countries will aggressively push for climate action in the coming years. But that doesn't imply a total ban on fossil fuel. At least for the next few decades.

And countries like India and China will have more energy needs as their economies expand. So Saudi Arabia will find no better importers than India and China during this transition period. Besides, India will be perfectly placed to help Saudi Arabia through the clean energy transition.

The solar market in India is robust and ever-growing, the synergies are also in India's favour.

Besides, Saudi investments in India are strategic. The return from Indian markets is one of the best in the world. And the economy is pegged to grow further in the coming decades.

This is the grand plan, Saudi investments in India are strategic and a win-win proposition for both. This relationship is no more about remittances or immediate gains. India is one of the biggest games in town and Saudi Arabia only knows it too well. 
 
(Disclaimer: WION Edit is the channel's take on the big events of the world) 
&nbsp;

Saudi Arabia wants to forge strong ties with India. This is a relationship rooted in the realm of political and economic realities. Truth be told, strong ties will benefit both sides.

Saudi Arabia wants to forge strong ties with India. This is a relationship rooted in the realm of political and economic realities. Truth be told, strong ties will benefit both sides. India needs oil. What about the Saudis? Why has Riyadh prioritised Delhi? What is the strategic significance? On WION Edit, we will explore these questions. First, let's tell you what India has been up to. Diversifying sources of energy. PM Narendra Modi's government is credited for boosting India's ability to do this through multiple engagements. After US sanctions on Iran and Venezuela, India needed to secure its energy interests. And Saudi Arabia was quick to fill the gaps. Right now, India imports 83 per cent of its oil needs and Saudi Arabia is the second-biggest supplier So technically, access to Indian markets is a huge economic benefit for a country like Saudi Arabia - whose economy is fueled by oil. But that's not the only draw for Riyadh. It is looking at the long term and India's growing clout. Here are some points to note: Going forward, Saudi Arabia wants to rely less on its oil reserves. In March 2018, the Kingdom announced the largest renewables project ever, a solar push worth over 200 billion dollars. That project failed to take off and was eventually. But Saudi Arabia has not given up its goal to move away from oil dependence. Recently, Riyadh tripled its renewable energy target. The focus is wind and solar energy, projects have been tendered. So why does Saudi Arabia want to move away from oil? Because depending on oil is dangerous. First, fluctuating prices hurt the Saudi economy. A drop in oil prices puts them under fiscal pressure. Two, as the world transitions towards clean and renewable energy, countries like Saudi Arabia will be hit hard. So what can the Kingdom do? Shift to renewable energy. Insulate the economy from oil price shocks and as a buffer, establish ties with countries that import oil-- i.e. India. Yes, countries will aggressively push for climate action in the coming years. But that doesn't imply a total ban on fossil fuel. At least for the next few decades. And countries like India and China will have more energy needs as their economies expand. So Saudi Arabia will find no better importers than India and China during this transition period. Besides, India will be perfectly placed to help Saudi Arabia through the clean energy transition. The solar market in India is robust and ever-growing, the synergies are also in India's favour. Besides, Saudi investments in India are strategic. The return from Indian markets is one of the best in the world. And the economy is pegged to grow further in the coming decades. This is the grand plan, Saudi investments in India are strategic and a win-win proposition for both. This relationship is no more about remittances or immediate gains. India is one of the biggest games in town and Saudi Arabia only knows it too well. (Disclaimer: WION Edit is the channel's take on the big events of the world)

Strong ties will benefit both India and Saudi Arabia

National Security Advisory NSA Ajit Doval on Thursday was in UAE and met Crown Prince of Emirate of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed with focus on energy ties.&nbsp;

NSA also met Tahnoun bin Mohammed Al Nahyan, chairman of the UAE's state-owned oil company — the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company or ADNOC.&nbsp;

Saudi Arabia's Aramco and UAE's ADNOC are planning a refinery in India's west coast at the cost of $44 billion &amp; will have a capacity of 60 million metric tonnes. India has also got oil from ADNOC for its Strategic Petroleum Reserve at Mangalore.&nbsp;

UAE accounts for 8 per cent of India’s oil imports and is the fifth-largest supplier of crude oil to India.

A govt release said,"UAE and India have strong bonds and there have regular interactions on various issues at the highest levels. NSA’s visit will further strengthen the understanding and cooperation between the two nations."

NSA Doval offered his condolences on the death of his uncle, Sheikh Suhail bin Mubarak Al Ketbi, on behalf of PM Modi to the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi.

PM Modi had tweeted about the passing of Mubarak Al Ketbi on Wednesday. PM tweeted, "I am deeply anguished by the passing away of His Highness Sheikh Suhail bin Mubarak Al Ketbi, the uncle of Crown Prince Sheikh @MohamedBinZayed. He served his nation with utmost dedication and diligence. My condolences to the family of the Crown Prince in this hour of grief."

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I am deeply anguished by the passing away of His Highness Sheikh Suhail bin Mubarak Al Ketbi, the uncle of Crown Prince Sheikh <a href="https://twitter.com/MohamedBinZayed?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@MohamedBinZayed</a>. He served his nation with utmost dedication and diligence. My condolences to the family of the Crown Prince in this hour of grief.
— Narendra Modi (@narendramodi) <a href="https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/1179430700610719745?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">October 2, 2019</a></blockquote>
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The visit to the UAE comes a day after his visit to Saudi Arabia where he met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman for 2 hours.

India is increasing its engagement with the Islamic world. Earlier this year, PM Modi visited UAE and was conferred the highest civilian award of the country--the Zayed Medal.&nbsp;

PM Modi first visited the country in August of 2015 which was followed by the visit of Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in 2016. The following year the Crown Prince was the chief guest at India's republic day parade and again in 2018 PM Modi visited the country and was the chief guest at the sixth World Government Summit in Dubai. 2019 he again visited the west asian country.

National Security Advisory NSA Ajit Doval on Thursday was in UAE and met Crown Prince of Emirate of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed with focus on energy ties.

National Security Advisory NSA Ajit Doval on Thursday was in UAE and met Crown Prince of Emirate of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed with focus on energy ties. NSA also met Tahnoun bin Mohammed Al Nahyan, chairman of the UAE's state-owned oil company — the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company or ADNOC. Saudi Arabia's Aramco and UAE's ADNOC are planning a refinery in India's west coast at the cost of $44 billion & will have a capacity of 60 million metric tonnes. India has also got oil from ADNOC for its Strategic Petroleum Reserve at Mangalore. UAE accounts for 8 per cent of India’s oil imports and is the fifth-largest supplier of crude oil to India. A govt release said,"UAE and India have strong bonds and there have regular interactions on various issues at the highest levels. NSA’s visit will further strengthen the understanding and cooperation between the two nations." NSA Doval offered his condolences on the death of his uncle, Sheikh Suhail bin Mubarak Al Ketbi, on behalf of PM Modi to the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi. PM Modi had tweeted about the passing of Mubarak Al Ketbi on Wednesday. PM tweeted, "I am deeply anguished by the passing away of His Highness Sheikh Suhail bin Mubarak Al Ketbi, the uncle of Crown Prince Sheikh @MohamedBinZayed. He served his nation with utmost dedication and diligence. My condolences to the family of the Crown Prince in this hour of grief." I am deeply anguished by the passing away of His Highness Sheikh Suhail bin Mubarak Al Ketbi, the uncle of Crown Prince Sheikh @MohamedBinZayed. He served his nation with utmost dedication and diligence. My condolences to the family of the Crown Prince in this hour of grief. — Narendra Modi (@narendramodi) October 2, 2019 × The visit to the UAE comes a day after his visit to Saudi Arabia where he met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman for 2 hours. India is increasing its engagement with the Islamic world. Earlier this year, PM Modi visited UAE and was conferred the highest civilian award of the country--the Zayed Medal. PM Modi first visited the country in August of 2015 which was followed by the visit of Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in 2016. The following year the Crown Prince was the chief guest at India's republic day parade and again in 2018 PM Modi visited the country and was the chief guest at the sixth World Government Summit in Dubai. 2019 he again visited the west asian country.

NSA Ajit Doval meets Abu Dhabi crown prince; focus on energy ties

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/fire-strikes-saudi-high-speed-train-station-at-least-five-injured-252699">Saudi Arabia's crown prince</a> warned in an interview broadcast on Sunday that oil prices could spike to "unimaginably high numbers" if the world does not come together to deter Iran, but said he would prefer a political solution to a military one.

Speaking to the CBS programme "60 Minutes," Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom's de facto ruler, also denied that he ordered the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi operatives nearly a year ago, but said he ultimately bears "full responsibility" as the leader of his country.

While Khashoggi's death sparked a global uproar and tarnished the crown prince's reputation, the Trump administration's tense standoff with Iran, Saudi Arabia's arch-foe, has more recently dominated US&nbsp;policy toward Riyadh, especially after the September&nbsp;14 attacks on the heartland of the Saudi oil industry.

"If the world does not take a strong and firm action to deter Iran, we will see further escalations that will threaten world interests," the crown prince said. "Oil supplies will be disrupted and oil prices will jump to unimaginably high numbers that we haven’t seen in our lifetimes."

The crown prince, in an interview conducted on Tuesday in Saudi Arabia, said he agreed with US&nbsp;Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that the September&nbsp;14 attacks, which damaged the world's biggest petroleum-processing facility and knocked out more than 5 per cent&nbsp;of global oil supply, were an act of war by Iran.

But he said he preferred a peaceful resolution because a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran would collapse the global economy.

The United States, European powers and Saudi Arabia have blamed the attacks on Iran. Tehran has denied any involvement. Instead, the Iran-aligned Yemeni Houthi rebel group claimed responsibility.

"The political and peaceful solution is much better than the military one," he said.

The crown prince also said US&nbsp;President Donald Trump should meet with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to craft a new deal on Tehran's nuclear program and influence across the Middle East.

Efforts to bring the two together last week at the United Nations General Assembly failed. Tensions between Washington and Tehran have escalated over the US&nbsp;withdrawal from an Iranian nuclear deal and its reinstatement of sanctions against Tehran.

'Absolutely not'

Days before the anniversary of the <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/one-year-on-saudi-struggles-to-turn-page-on-khashoggi-murder-252688">killing of Khashoggi</a> in a Saudi consulate in Turkey, the crown prince said: "Absolutely not," when asked if he ordered the murder.

But he said he took full responsibility for the killing, "since it was committed by individuals working for the Saudi government."

"This was a mistake. And I must take all actions to avoid such a thing in the future," the crown prince said of the killing, which he called "heinous."

The CIA and some Western governments have said they believe he ordered it, but Saudi officials have repeatedly said he had no role.

After initial denials, the official Saudi narrative blamed the murder on rogue operatives. The public prosecutor said the then-deputy intelligence chief ordered the repatriation of Khashoggi, a royal insider who became an outspoken critic, but the lead negotiator ordered him killed after discussions for his return failed.

Asked how the killing could have happened without him knowing about it," the crown prince said: "Some think that I should know what 3 million people working for the Saudi government do daily? It's impossible that the 3 million would send their daily reports to the leader or the second highest person in the Saudi government."

He insisted that "the investigations are being carried out, and once charges are proven against someone, regardless of their rank, it will be taken to court, no exception made."

Eleven Saudi suspects have been put on trial in secretive proceedings but only a few hearings have been held. A U.N. report has called for Prince Mohammed and other senior Saudi officials to be investigated.

Khashoggi, a Washington Post columnist, was last seen at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October&nbsp;2, where he was to receive papers ahead of his wedding. His body was dismembered and removed from the building, according to reports, and his remains have not been found.

Asked about criticism of the Saudis in the US&nbsp;Congress over the Khashoggi killing and the Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen, which has taken a huge civilian toll, the crown prince said: "The (US-Saudi) relationship is much larger than that."

Trump has resisted congressional efforts to block US&nbsp;arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/attacked-saudi-border-frontline-captured-troops-houthis-252644">The crown prince</a> also repeated a Saudi call for Iran to halt its support for Houthi forces in Yemen and said he was open to "all initiatives for a political solution" to end the war there.

Saudi Arabia's crown prince warned in an interview broadcast on Sunday that oil prices could spike to "unimaginably high numbers" if the world does not come together to deter Iran, but said he would prefer a political solution to a military one.

Saudi Arabia's crown prince warned in an interview broadcast on Sunday that oil prices could spike to "unimaginably high numbers" if the world does not come together to deter Iran, but said he would prefer a political solution to a military one. Speaking to the CBS programme "60 Minutes," Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom's de facto ruler, also denied that he ordered the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi operatives nearly a year ago, but said he ultimately bears "full responsibility" as the leader of his country. While Khashoggi's death sparked a global uproar and tarnished the crown prince's reputation, the Trump administration's tense standoff with Iran, Saudi Arabia's arch-foe, has more recently dominated US policy toward Riyadh, especially after the September 14 attacks on the heartland of the Saudi oil industry. "If the world does not take a strong and firm action to deter Iran, we will see further escalations that will threaten world interests," the crown prince said. "Oil supplies will be disrupted and oil prices will jump to unimaginably high numbers that we haven’t seen in our lifetimes." The crown prince, in an interview conducted on Tuesday in Saudi Arabia, said he agreed with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that the September 14 attacks, which damaged the world's biggest petroleum-processing facility and knocked out more than 5 per cent of global oil supply, were an act of war by Iran. But he said he preferred a peaceful resolution because a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran would collapse the global economy. The United States, European powers and Saudi Arabia have blamed the attacks on Iran. Tehran has denied any involvement. Instead, the Iran-aligned Yemeni Houthi rebel group claimed responsibility. "The political and peaceful solution is much better than the military one," he said. The crown prince also said US President Donald Trump should meet with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to craft a new deal on Tehran's nuclear program and influence across the Middle East. Efforts to bring the two together last week at the United Nations General Assembly failed. Tensions between Washington and Tehran have escalated over the US withdrawal from an Iranian nuclear deal and its reinstatement of sanctions against Tehran. 'Absolutely not' Days before the anniversary of the killing of Khashoggi in a Saudi consulate in Turkey, the crown prince said: "Absolutely not," when asked if he ordered the murder. But he said he took full responsibility for the killing, "since it was committed by individuals working for the Saudi government." "This was a mistake. And I must take all actions to avoid such a thing in the future," the crown prince said of the killing, which he called "heinous." The CIA and some Western governments have said they believe he ordered it, but Saudi officials have repeatedly said he had no role. After initial denials, the official Saudi narrative blamed the murder on rogue operatives. The public prosecutor said the then-deputy intelligence chief ordered the repatriation of Khashoggi, a royal insider who became an outspoken critic, but the lead negotiator ordered him killed after discussions for his return failed. Asked how the killing could have happened without him knowing about it," the crown prince said: "Some think that I should know what 3 million people working for the Saudi government do daily? It's impossible that the 3 million would send their daily reports to the leader or the second highest person in the Saudi government." He insisted that "the investigations are being carried out, and once charges are proven against someone, regardless of their rank, it will be taken to court, no exception made." Eleven Saudi suspects have been put on trial in secretive proceedings but only a few hearings have been held. A U.N. report has called for Prince Mohammed and other senior Saudi officials to be investigated. Khashoggi, a Washington Post columnist, was last seen at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October 2, where he was to receive papers ahead of his wedding. His body was dismembered and removed from the building, according to reports, and his remains have not been found. Asked about criticism of the Saudis in the US Congress over the Khashoggi killing and the Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen, which has taken a huge civilian toll, the crown prince said: "The (US-Saudi) relationship is much larger than that." Trump has resisted congressional efforts to block US arms sales to Saudi Arabia. The crown prince also repeated a Saudi call for Iran to halt its support for Houthi forces in Yemen and said he was open to "all initiatives for a political solution" to end the war there.

Saudi crown prince warns of escalation with Iran, says he prefers political solution

Amidst heightened tensions in the region following the drone attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/mike-pompeo-heading-to-saudi-arabia-over-iran-tensions-pence-250263">US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo</a> on Wednesday met Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) and expressed support for the Kingdom's right to defend itself.

"Met with #Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman today to discuss the unprecedented attacks against Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure. The US&nbsp;stands with #SaudiArabia and supports its right to defend itself. The Iranian regime's threatening behaviour will not be tolerated," Pompeo said in a tweet.

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Met with <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Saudi?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#Saudi</a> Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman today to discuss the unprecedented attacks against Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure. The U.S. stands with <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/SaudiArabia?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#SaudiArabia</a> and supports its right to defend itself. The Iranian regime’s threatening behavior will not be tolerated.
— Secretary Pompeo (@SecPompeo) <a href="https://twitter.com/SecPompeo/status/1174451339042144256?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">September 18, 2019</a></blockquote>
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A US State Department spokesperson said Pompeo discussed "the recent attacks by Iran against oil facilities in <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/saudi-aramco-pursues-ipo-planning-despite-attack-damage-doubts-250228">Saudi Arabia</a>" with the Saudi Crown Prince.

Both of them agreed that "this was an unacceptable and unprecedented attack that not only threatened Saudi Arabian national security but also endangered the lives of all the American citizens living and working in Saudi Arabia, as well as the world's energy supply in general."

"The Secretary and the Crown Prince discussed the need for the international community to come together to counter the continued threat of the Iranian regime and agreed that the Iranian regime must be held accountable for its continued aggressive, reckless, and threatening behaviour," the Spokesperson added.

The drone attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia was claimed by Yemen's Houthi rebels, backed by Iran.

The attack took place on Saturday escalating tensions in the region.

Amidst heightened tensions in the region following the drone attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Wednesday met Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) and expressed support for the Kingdom's right to defend itself.

Amidst heightened tensions in the region following the drone attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Wednesday met Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) and expressed support for the Kingdom's right to defend itself. "Met with #Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman today to discuss the unprecedented attacks against Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure. The US stands with #SaudiArabia and supports its right to defend itself. The Iranian regime's threatening behaviour will not be tolerated," Pompeo said in a tweet. Met with #Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman today to discuss the unprecedented attacks against Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure. The U.S. stands with #SaudiArabia and supports its right to defend itself. The Iranian regime’s threatening behavior will not be tolerated. — Secretary Pompeo (@SecPompeo) September 18, 2019 × A US State Department spokesperson said Pompeo discussed "the recent attacks by Iran against oil facilities in Saudi Arabia" with the Saudi Crown Prince. Both of them agreed that "this was an unacceptable and unprecedented attack that not only threatened Saudi Arabian national security but also endangered the lives of all the American citizens living and working in Saudi Arabia, as well as the world's energy supply in general." "The Secretary and the Crown Prince discussed the need for the international community to come together to counter the continued threat of the Iranian regime and agreed that the Iranian regime must be held accountable for its continued aggressive, reckless, and threatening behaviour," the Spokesperson added. The drone attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia was claimed by Yemen's Houthi rebels, backed by Iran. The attack took place on Saturday escalating tensions in the region.

US stands with Saudi Arabia, says Mike Pompeo after meeting Crown Prince

Little suggests that fabulously wealthy Gulf states and their Middle Eastern and North African beneficiaries have recognised what is perhaps the most important lesson of this year’s popular uprisings in Algeria and Sudan and the 2011 Arab revolts: All that glitters is not gold.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and to a lesser extent Kuwait have in the last decade invested billions of dollars in either reversing or hollowing out the revolts’ achievements in a bid to ensure that political change elsewhere in the region does not come to haunt them.

Qatar, in a counterintuitive strategy that has earned it the ire of the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, has sought to achieve the same goal by attempting to be on the right side of the region’s forces of change.

The irony is that both approaches, despite also involving huge investments at home in economic diversification, education and healthcare, could produce the very result Gulf states seek to avoid: A region that has many of the trappings of 21st century knowledge states but that is incapable of catering to the aspirations of a youth bulge expected to annually increase the workforce by a million people over the next 12 years.

UNICEF, the United Nations Children's Fund, concluded earlier this year, that the region’s youth bulge was a double-edged sword. It could either pose a threat to regional stability or be an asset for development.

Turning the youth bulge into an asset “Requires urgent and significant investment to create opportunities for meaningful learning, social engagement and work, all of which are currently limited, particularly for young women and the most vulnerable,” the UN agency said in a report entitled MENA (Middle East and North Africa) Generation 2030.

UNICEF arrived at its conclusion even though Gulf states have adopted grandiose plans that envision them becoming within a matter of a decade or two diversified, knowledge-driven economies that enact the social reforms needed to create an opportunity for all segments of society.

The group’s conclusion applies as much to the wealthy Gulf states as it does to the Arab beneficiaries of their politically motivated financial largesse.

The problems with the flexing of the Gulf states’ financial muscle as well as the implementation of reform plans are multi-fold.

They relate as much to quality of the upgrading of services such as education as they are about how political intent shapes development efforts and how high domestic debt in countries like Egypt, where 27 per cent of government expenditure goes to interest payments, and Lebanon, which spends 38 per cent of its budget on debt servicing, benefits Gulf banks and stymies social and economic development.

Credit rating agency Fitch recently downgraded Lebanon’s credit rating to CCC from B- because of "intensifying pressure on Lebanon's financing model and increasing risks to the government's debt-servicing capacity."

Gulf scholar Rohan Advani notes that Gulf institutions account for most of the financial sector investment in countries like Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

“In Lebanon, just over 50 per cent of the country’s bank assets are held by GCC-related banks, in Palestine this figure is 63 per cent, and in Jordan it is as high as 86 per cent,” Advani wrote in a review of political economist Adam Hanieh’s study of Gulf finance, Money, Markets, and Monarchies.

Hanieh argues that the bulk of the debt payments are to financial establishments whose major shareholders include Gulf institutions in a process in which “the Arab state…increasingly mediates the transfer of national wealth to large Gulf-related banks.”

Advani warned that “Indebted governments are compelled to intensify a politics of austerity, further trapping these societies in cycles of debt. Investments in social programs or infrastructural developments are often stalled. Popular movements are unable to realise their demands at the state level due to the requirements of foreign creditors and domestic capitalists. The ensuing scenario is one where alternative politics are asphyxiated and increasingly circumscribed by an atrophied status quo.”

That may well be the purpose of the exercise with economic diversification efforts in the Gulf being driven more by the need of autocracies to upgrade their autocratic style and create an opportunity for a restive youth in a bid to ensure regime survival rather than by the acknowledgement of a government’s responsibility to serve the people.

The result is a flawed approach to all aspects of reform.

In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 economic and social reform plan that calls for greater private sector involvement has turned into a top-down effort that emphasises state control with the government’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) as the key player.

A combination of depressed oil prices and the recent replacement of energy minister Khalid al-Falih as chairman of the board of Aramco by PIF head Yasir al-Rumayyan, a close associate of Prince Mohammed, raises questions about the state oil company’s positioning in advance of a much-touted initial public offering.

Ellen Wald, an energy analyst and author of a history of Aramco, the kingdom’s main source of revenue, noted that at PIF Al-Rumayyan had overseen investments more geared towards speculative gains than the sustainable growth of Saudi wealth.

Wald said that raised the question of whether Al-Rumayyan’s objective with Aramco would be to serve the company’s long-term interests or those of the PIF.

Aramco this year bought a 70 per cent stake in petrochemicals maker Saudi Basic Industries Corp for $69 billion in an effort to raise funds for PIF and delay the Aramco IPO that had originally been scheduled for 2018 but has since been delayed until 2020 or 2021. The megadeal is expected to boost the oil company’s downstream growth plans.

Nonetheless, Wald cautions that Al-Rumayyan’s appointment “Doesn't necessarily bode well for Aramco, which is a different kind of company. It has to make stable decisions for the long term," she said.

By the same token, UNICEF warned that poverty, violent conflict, restrictive social norms, patriarchy, rights violations and lack of safe spaces for expression and recreation were limiting opportunities as well as civic adolescent and youth engagement.

Gulf emphasis on geopolitical dominance, regime survival and return on financial investment produces short term solutions that often exacerbate conflict, produce little trickle-down effect and few prospects for long-term stability.

“As a result, adolescents and youth in MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) feel disillusioned, with girls and young women, refugees, those with disabilities and the poor being particularly marginalised and underrepresented,” the UNICEF report said.

“Youth unemployment in the region is currently the highest in the world. Education systems are failing to prepare adolescents and youth for the workplace, and markets are not generating urgently needed jobs,” the report warned.

Gulf wealth glitters but if the UNICEF report is anything to go by, it has yet to demonstrate that it can produce the gold of a development that is sustainable and benefits not only all segments of Gulf societies but also of those across the region that have become dependent on it. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) 
&nbsp;

Little suggests that fabulously wealthy Gulf states and their Middle Eastern and North African beneficiaries have recognised what is perhaps the most important lesson of this year’s popular uprisings in Algeria and Sudan and the 2011 Arab revolts: All that glitters is not gold.

Little suggests that fabulously wealthy Gulf states and their Middle Eastern and North African beneficiaries have recognised what is perhaps the most important lesson of this year’s popular uprisings in Algeria and Sudan and the 2011 Arab revolts: All that glitters is not gold. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and to a lesser extent Kuwait have in the last decade invested billions of dollars in either reversing or hollowing out the revolts’ achievements in a bid to ensure that political change elsewhere in the region does not come to haunt them. Qatar, in a counterintuitive strategy that has earned it the ire of the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, has sought to achieve the same goal by attempting to be on the right side of the region’s forces of change. The irony is that both approaches, despite also involving huge investments at home in economic diversification, education and healthcare, could produce the very result Gulf states seek to avoid: A region that has many of the trappings of 21st century knowledge states but that is incapable of catering to the aspirations of a youth bulge expected to annually increase the workforce by a million people over the next 12 years. UNICEF, the United Nations Children's Fund, concluded earlier this year, that the region’s youth bulge was a double-edged sword. It could either pose a threat to regional stability or be an asset for development. Turning the youth bulge into an asset “Requires urgent and significant investment to create opportunities for meaningful learning, social engagement and work, all of which are currently limited, particularly for young women and the most vulnerable,” the UN agency said in a report entitled MENA (Middle East and North Africa) Generation 2030. UNICEF arrived at its conclusion even though Gulf states have adopted grandiose plans that envision them becoming within a matter of a decade or two diversified, knowledge-driven economies that enact the social reforms needed to create an opportunity for all segments of society. The group’s conclusion applies as much to the wealthy Gulf states as it does to the Arab beneficiaries of their politically motivated financial largesse. The problems with the flexing of the Gulf states’ financial muscle as well as the implementation of reform plans are multi-fold. They relate as much to quality of the upgrading of services such as education as they are about how political intent shapes development efforts and how high domestic debt in countries like Egypt, where 27 per cent of government expenditure goes to interest payments, and Lebanon, which spends 38 per cent of its budget on debt servicing, benefits Gulf banks and stymies social and economic development. Credit rating agency Fitch recently downgraded Lebanon’s credit rating to CCC from B- because of "intensifying pressure on Lebanon's financing model and increasing risks to the government's debt-servicing capacity." Gulf scholar Rohan Advani notes that Gulf institutions account for most of the financial sector investment in countries like Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. “In Lebanon, just over 50 per cent of the country’s bank assets are held by GCC-related banks, in Palestine this figure is 63 per cent, and in Jordan it is as high as 86 per cent,” Advani wrote in a review of political economist Adam Hanieh’s study of Gulf finance, Money, Markets, and Monarchies. Hanieh argues that the bulk of the debt payments are to financial establishments whose major shareholders include Gulf institutions in a process in which “the Arab state…increasingly mediates the transfer of national wealth to large Gulf-related banks.” Advani warned that “Indebted governments are compelled to intensify a politics of austerity, further trapping these societies in cycles of debt. Investments in social programs or infrastructural developments are often stalled. Popular movements are unable to realise their demands at the state level due to the requirements of foreign creditors and domestic capitalists. The ensuing scenario is one where alternative politics are asphyxiated and increasingly circumscribed by an atrophied status quo.” That may well be the purpose of the exercise with economic diversification efforts in the Gulf being driven more by the need of autocracies to upgrade their autocratic style and create an opportunity for a restive youth in a bid to ensure regime survival rather than by the acknowledgement of a government’s responsibility to serve the people. The result is a flawed approach to all aspects of reform. In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 economic and social reform plan that calls for greater private sector involvement has turned into a top-down effort that emphasises state control with the government’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) as the key player. A combination of depressed oil prices and the recent replacement of energy minister Khalid al-Falih as chairman of the board of Aramco by PIF head Yasir al-Rumayyan, a close associate of Prince Mohammed, raises questions about the state oil company’s positioning in advance of a much-touted initial public offering. Ellen Wald, an energy analyst and author of a history of Aramco, the kingdom’s main source of revenue, noted that at PIF Al-Rumayyan had overseen investments more geared towards speculative gains than the sustainable growth of Saudi wealth. Wald said that raised the question of whether Al-Rumayyan’s objective with Aramco would be to serve the company’s long-term interests or those of the PIF. Aramco this year bought a 70 per cent stake in petrochemicals maker Saudi Basic Industries Corp for $69 billion in an effort to raise funds for PIF and delay the Aramco IPO that had originally been scheduled for 2018 but has since been delayed until 2020 or 2021. The megadeal is expected to boost the oil company’s downstream growth plans. Nonetheless, Wald cautions that Al-Rumayyan’s appointment “Doesn't necessarily bode well for Aramco, which is a different kind of company. It has to make stable decisions for the long term," she said. By the same token, UNICEF warned that poverty, violent conflict, restrictive social norms, patriarchy, rights violations and lack of safe spaces for expression and recreation were limiting opportunities as well as civic adolescent and youth engagement. Gulf emphasis on geopolitical dominance, regime survival and return on financial investment produces short term solutions that often exacerbate conflict, produce little trickle-down effect and few prospects for long-term stability. “As a result, adolescents and youth in MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) feel disillusioned, with girls and young women, refugees, those with disabilities and the poor being particularly marginalised and underrepresented,” the UNICEF report said. “Youth unemployment in the region is currently the highest in the world. Education systems are failing to prepare adolescents and youth for the workplace, and markets are not generating urgently needed jobs,” the report warned. Gulf wealth glitters but if the UNICEF report is anything to go by, it has yet to demonstrate that it can produce the gold of a development that is sustainable and benefits not only all segments of Gulf societies but also of those across the region that have become dependent on it. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Gulf economies: All that glitters is not gold

US President Donald Trump spoke on Friday to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman about Middle East stability and the oil market, the White House said, after tensions with <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/we-were-cocked-and-loaded-to-retaliate-i-stopped-it-10-minutes-before-striking-iran-trump-229293">Iran prompted a rise in oil prices</a>.

"The two leaders discussed Saudi Arabia’s critical role in ensuring stability in the Middle East and in the global oil market. They also discussed the threat posed by the Iranian regime’s escalatory behavior," White House spokesman Hogan Gidley said in a statement.

The phone call took place in the wake of Iran's shooting down of an <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/iran-needs-to-meet-diplomacy-with-diplomacy-not-military-force-us-229256">unmanned US drone in the Gulf region</a>, which prompted Trump to prepare but ultimately hold back from launching a retaliatory attack.

There was no word from the White House statement on whether Trump raised with the crown prince the death last October of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

A 100-page report by the UNspecial rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, Agnes Callamard, earlier this week accused Saudi Arabia of a “deliberate, premeditated execution” and said the crown prince should be investigated for it.

Agnes Callamard, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, had called for countries to widen sanctions to include the Crown Prince and his personal assets, until and unless he can prove he has no responsibility.

Khashoggi, a critic of the prince and a Washington Post columnist, was last seen at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October 2 where he was to receive papers ahead of his wedding.

His body was dismembered and removed from the building, the Saudi prosecutor has said, and his remains have not been found.

Callamard went to Turkey earlier this year with a team of forensic and legal experts and said she received evidence from Turkish authorities. 
&nbsp;

US President Donald Trump spoke on Friday to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman about Middle East stability and the oil market, the White House said, after tensions with Iran prompted a rise in oil prices.

US President Donald Trump spoke on Friday to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman about Middle East stability and the oil market, the White House said, after tensions with Iran prompted a rise in oil prices. "The two leaders discussed Saudi Arabia’s critical role in ensuring stability in the Middle East and in the global oil market. They also discussed the threat posed by the Iranian regime’s escalatory behavior," White House spokesman Hogan Gidley said in a statement. The phone call took place in the wake of Iran's shooting down of an unmanned US drone in the Gulf region, which prompted Trump to prepare but ultimately hold back from launching a retaliatory attack. There was no word from the White House statement on whether Trump raised with the crown prince the death last October of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. A 100-page report by the UNspecial rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, Agnes Callamard, earlier this week accused Saudi Arabia of a “deliberate, premeditated execution” and said the crown prince should be investigated for it. Agnes Callamard, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, had called for countries to widen sanctions to include the Crown Prince and his personal assets, until and unless he can prove he has no responsibility. Khashoggi, a critic of the prince and a Washington Post columnist, was last seen at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October 2 where he was to receive papers ahead of his wedding. His body was dismembered and removed from the building, the Saudi prosecutor has said, and his remains have not been found. Callamard went to Turkey earlier this year with a team of forensic and legal experts and said she received evidence from Turkish authorities.

Trump spoke to Crown Prince Salman on Middle East stability, oil market: White House

United Arab Emirates (UAE)'s envoy to India, Ahmed Albanna on Monday said that his country did not mediate in India-Pakistan tensions that happened in February but did played an important role in reducing tension between the two countries.

In response to a question Albanna said, "We did not mediate. When we talk about mediation, it has to be requested from both parties and then after that. We tried to decrease the tension by that special relationship."

"We have played an important role in reducing tension. On the day of a big escalation, our Crown Prince spoke to PM Modi and PM Imran Khan. Our role was to give word of wisdom and trying to sort out difference in a peaceful manner. UAE played an important role," Albanna added.

PM Modi and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan spoke two times in the last three weeks.

On the issue of cross border terror emanating from Pakistan, the envoy said, "Without mentioning any specific person, name or country UAE has a long-standing in preventing, fighting act of terrorism and those radicalise, radical organisation, so we work with all partners, with many different countries, with all the countries in the region to make our region peaceful that we can live together and coexist".

Albanna also welcomed India's presence at Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Foreign Ministers meet in Abu Dhabi saying New Delhi was invited because of special relationship shared by both the countries.

External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj represented India during the two-day OIC FMs meet in the country in early March. This is the first time India was invited as the guest of honour at the meet.

On oil import, one of the key commodities India imports from West Asia, Albanna said, UAE and Saudi Arabia covered the shortage of oil for India after Iran Sanction.

India and UAE ties have been on an upward trajectory with number of high levels visits between the two countries in the last few years with PM Modi visiting the country twice.

United Arab Emirates (UAE)'s envoy to India, Ahmed Albanna on Monday said that his country did not mediate in India-Pakistan tensions that happened in February but did played an important role in reducing tension between the two countries.

United Arab Emirates (UAE)'s envoy to India, Ahmed Albanna on Monday said that his country did not mediate in India-Pakistan tensions that happened in February but did played an important role in reducing tension between the two countries. In response to a question Albanna said, "We did not mediate. When we talk about mediation, it has to be requested from both parties and then after that. We tried to decrease the tension by that special relationship." "We have played an important role in reducing tension. On the day of a big escalation, our Crown Prince spoke to PM Modi and PM Imran Khan. Our role was to give word of wisdom and trying to sort out difference in a peaceful manner. UAE played an important role," Albanna added. PM Modi and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan spoke two times in the last three weeks. On the issue of cross border terror emanating from Pakistan, the envoy said, "Without mentioning any specific person, name or country UAE has a long-standing in preventing, fighting act of terrorism and those radicalise, radical organisation, so we work with all partners, with many different countries, with all the countries in the region to make our region peaceful that we can live together and coexist". Albanna also welcomed India's presence at Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Foreign Ministers meet in Abu Dhabi saying New Delhi was invited because of special relationship shared by both the countries. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj represented India during the two-day OIC FMs meet in the country in early March. This is the first time India was invited as the guest of honour at the meet. On oil import, one of the key commodities India imports from West Asia, Albanna said, UAE and Saudi Arabia covered the shortage of oil for India after Iran Sanction. India and UAE ties have been on an upward trajectory with number of high levels visits between the two countries in the last few years with PM Modi visiting the country twice.

We played important role in reducing India-Pak tensions: UAE envoy Ahmed Albanna

These are tough times for Saudi Arabia.

The drama enveloping the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the brutal way in which it was carried out has captured public attention. In reality, however, Saudi Arabia’s real problems began earlier as a result of its conduct of the Yemen War.

Saudi interference in Yemen that culminated in military intervention predates the four-year-old war. Yemen has long been perceived by Saudi Arabia as a threat. That threat went far beyond current Iranian support for the Houthis. In fact, it was Saudi divide-and-rule tactics in Yemen, changing Saudi attitudes towards the Houthis and Saudi Arabia’s global campaign to promote anti-Shiite, anti-Iranian strands of ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim Islam that helped pave the way for the current Yemen crisis.

It is only half a century ago that the Houthis were part of a Saudi effort to confront Arab nationalism. As an aside, Saudis and Israelis cooperated already then with Israeli military aircraft dropping weapons for the Saudi-backed rebels that included the Houthis. The deterioration in Saudi-Houthi relations accelerated just after the turn to this century when the Saudis funded the opening of a Salafi centre on the outskirts of the Houthi capital of Saada.

The centre constituted not only a challenge to the Houthis but also to the power of the Houthi leadership. It successfully appealed to the socially disadvantaged as well as youth who were attracted by Salafism’s egalitarianism, resented the power of the older generation and saw puritan Islam as a vehicle to challenge the traditional hierarchy. Fear of the Wahhabi/Salafi encroachment fuelled the Houthi’s armed fight against the government of the then President Ali Abdullah Saleh, his Saudi-backed successor Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, and ultimately the Saudis themselves, which led to the kingdom’s military intervention in Yemen in March 2015.

To initially counter the threat, the leadership of the Houthis, Zaidis who are Shiites with practices more akin to Sunni Muslim ritual, turned to Iran for support in religious education, a development that further angered the kingdom, and laid the groundwork for a war that has devastated a country that already ranked as one of the world’s poorest.

The Saudi intervention was, however, about more than just confronting an Iranian proxy on its doorstep. For one, if anything, it was the intervention that really drove the Houthis and Iranians closer to one another. Even so, the Houthis remain an opportunity in a far broader Saudi-Iranian rivalry rather than a strategic target for the Iranians.&nbsp;

The Salmans, the king and his son, have since coming to office and despite the emergence of Donald Trump, taken to new heights a far more assertive foreign and military policy that was initially crafted by their predecessors in response to the popular Arab revolts in 2011. Make however no mistake, Saudi Arabia’s new assertiveness is not a declaration of independence from the United States even if the kingdom is expanding its international relations as is evident in Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s recent tour of Asia.

On the contrary, Prince Mohammed made that very clear in multiple interviews. His goal was to force the United States to reengage in the Middle East as the best guarantor for regional stability. The Saudis appear to be operating on the basis of Karl Marx’s Verelendungs theory: things have to get worse to get better. That is the part of the backdrop of the stalled military intervention in Yemen. Dangling Iran as the real threat emanating from Yemen serves the Saudis’ purpose.

In doing so Saudi Arabia has proven to be driven. It is a drive that is fuelled by a perception that Iran poses an existential threat to Saudi Arabia. In fact, that may not be incorrect, certainly from the perception of the monarchy and its ruling family.

Saudi Arabia dazzles with the billions of dollars gained from oil exports that it is able to invest overseas and the investment opportunities it creates in the kingdom itself. But the truth of the matter is that long-term Saudi Arabia’s future is not that of a regional hegemon.

Saudi regional leadership, even if it has been tarnished in Yemen in military and reputational terms, amounts to exploitation of a window of opportunity rather than reliance on the assets and power needed to sustain it. Saudi Arabia’s interest is to extend its window of opportunity for as long as possible. That window of opportunity exists as long as the obvious regional powers – Iran, Turkey and Egypt – are in various degrees of disrepair. For now, punitive economic sanctions and international isolation take care of Iran.

And that is what bites. Iran may not be Arab and maintains a sense of Persian superiority, but it has like Turkey and Egypt assets Saudi Arabia lacks: a large population base, an industrial base, a huge domestic market, a battle-hardened military, a deep-rooted culture, a history of empire and geography that makes it a crossroads. Mecca and money will not be able to compete.

Add to all of these two factors. The Islamic regime came to power in a revolution that preceded the 2011 Arab revolts by 32 years. Moreover, the Iranian revolution toppled a monarch, not a president and an icon of US power in the Middle East.

Perhaps, more importantly, if one disregards the sanctioning of Iran, it is Iran rather than Saudi Arabia that is likely to shape the future energy architecture of Eurasia. Oil, in terms of demand, is a diminishing commodity. If the long-term future is renewables, the medium term will be shaped by gas. Iran has gas, Saudi Arabia does not, at least not the kind of gas it can export. In fact, Iran has the world’s second largest gas reserves. Again, disregarding the sanctions, Iran would have in the next five years 24.6 billion cubic metres available for annual piped exports beyond its current supply commitments.

If, indeed, Iran poses an existential threat to the rule of the Al Saud family that it cannot eliminate and at best contain with the support of the United States, the question is what Saudi Arabia’s goal in Yemen is as well as in its broader rivalry with Iran. There are those who coherently argue that Saudi Arabia’s goal in Yemen may have initially been the roll-back of Houthi advances with their occupation of the Yemeni capital Sana’s and large parts of Yemen, destruction of Houthi power and forcing them into a situation in which they would have had to accept a Saudi-dictated end to the war.

Four years into the war, that is not a realistic goal. Short of that, the question is how sincere Saudi and for that matter, UAE interest is in finding a way out of the war. It is conceivable that short of outright victory, Saudi Arabia would want to keep Yemen weak and the Houthis militarily on the defensive. That is at best only sustainable in the short term. The fact of the matter is that the reputational damage Saudi Arabia has suffered is starting to hurt witness measures taken by the US Congress and Germany’s decision to halt arms sales to the kingdom. Conflicts are only ended, if not resolved if the pain of continuing the conflict is greater than the pain of ending it. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia could well be nearing the inflection point.

The problem is that even if the United Nations-mediated peace talks ultimately produce an end to the war, Yemen, if anything, will pose in the post-war era an even greater and more real threat. Yemen for much of post-World War two history has been an afterthought in the international community if it sparked a thought at all. Yet, what a post-war Yemen will represent is a devastated country that largely needs to be rebuilt from scratch, a country whose traumatised population has suffered one the world’s worst humanitarian disasters and will need all the after-care that goes with that.

Beyond the taking care of the most immediate humanitarian issues, there is little reason to believe that investors and governments with massive aid packages and offers of reconstruction will be knocking on Yemen’s doors. Like in Syria and Libya, the risk is of the emergence of a generation that has nothing to look forward to and nothing to lose. In Yemen, that generation is likely to deeply resent what it perceives Saudi Arabia has done to their country. If Saudi Arabia, long saw Yemen as the Gulf’s most populous nation with a battle-hardened military that needed to be managed, that new generation is likely to put flesh on the skeleton.

It's not a pretty picture to look forward to. And it is one in which the damage has already been done. Having said that, its never too late to try to limit the damage, if not reverse affairs. That, however, would take the kind of courage and vision that Prince Mohammed and others in power elsewhere in the Middle East have yet to demonstrate. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

These are tough times for Saudi Arabia. The drama enveloping the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the brutal way in which it was carried out has captured public attention.

These are tough times for Saudi Arabia. The drama enveloping the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the brutal way in which it was carried out has captured public attention. In reality, however, Saudi Arabia’s real problems began earlier as a result of its conduct of the Yemen War. Saudi interference in Yemen that culminated in military intervention predates the four-year-old war. Yemen has long been perceived by Saudi Arabia as a threat. That threat went far beyond current Iranian support for the Houthis. In fact, it was Saudi divide-and-rule tactics in Yemen, changing Saudi attitudes towards the Houthis and Saudi Arabia’s global campaign to promote anti-Shiite, anti-Iranian strands of ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim Islam that helped pave the way for the current Yemen crisis. It is only half a century ago that the Houthis were part of a Saudi effort to confront Arab nationalism. As an aside, Saudis and Israelis cooperated already then with Israeli military aircraft dropping weapons for the Saudi-backed rebels that included the Houthis. The deterioration in Saudi-Houthi relations accelerated just after the turn to this century when the Saudis funded the opening of a Salafi centre on the outskirts of the Houthi capital of Saada. The centre constituted not only a challenge to the Houthis but also to the power of the Houthi leadership. It successfully appealed to the socially disadvantaged as well as youth who were attracted by Salafism’s egalitarianism, resented the power of the older generation and saw puritan Islam as a vehicle to challenge the traditional hierarchy. Fear of the Wahhabi/Salafi encroachment fuelled the Houthi’s armed fight against the government of the then President Ali Abdullah Saleh, his Saudi-backed successor Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, and ultimately the Saudis themselves, which led to the kingdom’s military intervention in Yemen in March 2015. To initially counter the threat, the leadership of the Houthis, Zaidis who are Shiites with practices more akin to Sunni Muslim ritual, turned to Iran for support in religious education, a development that further angered the kingdom, and laid the groundwork for a war that has devastated a country that already ranked as one of the world’s poorest. The Saudi intervention was, however, about more than just confronting an Iranian proxy on its doorstep. For one, if anything, it was the intervention that really drove the Houthis and Iranians closer to one another. Even so, the Houthis remain an opportunity in a far broader Saudi-Iranian rivalry rather than a strategic target for the Iranians. The Salmans, the king and his son, have since coming to office and despite the emergence of Donald Trump, taken to new heights a far more assertive foreign and military policy that was initially crafted by their predecessors in response to the popular Arab revolts in 2011. Make however no mistake, Saudi Arabia’s new assertiveness is not a declaration of independence from the United States even if the kingdom is expanding its international relations as is evident in Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s recent tour of Asia. On the contrary, Prince Mohammed made that very clear in multiple interviews. His goal was to force the United States to reengage in the Middle East as the best guarantor for regional stability. The Saudis appear to be operating on the basis of Karl Marx’s Verelendungs theory: things have to get worse to get better. That is the part of the backdrop of the stalled military intervention in Yemen. Dangling Iran as the real threat emanating from Yemen serves the Saudis’ purpose. In doing so Saudi Arabia has proven to be driven. It is a drive that is fuelled by a perception that Iran poses an existential threat to Saudi Arabia. In fact, that may not be incorrect, certainly from the perception of the monarchy and its ruling family. Saudi Arabia dazzles with the billions of dollars gained from oil exports that it is able to invest overseas and the investment opportunities it creates in the kingdom itself. But the truth of the matter is that long-term Saudi Arabia’s future is not that of a regional hegemon. Saudi regional leadership, even if it has been tarnished in Yemen in military and reputational terms, amounts to exploitation of a window of opportunity rather than reliance on the assets and power needed to sustain it. Saudi Arabia’s interest is to extend its window of opportunity for as long as possible. That window of opportunity exists as long as the obvious regional powers – Iran, Turkey and Egypt – are in various degrees of disrepair. For now, punitive economic sanctions and international isolation take care of Iran. And that is what bites. Iran may not be Arab and maintains a sense of Persian superiority, but it has like Turkey and Egypt assets Saudi Arabia lacks: a large population base, an industrial base, a huge domestic market, a battle-hardened military, a deep-rooted culture, a history of empire and geography that makes it a crossroads. Mecca and money will not be able to compete. Add to all of these two factors. The Islamic regime came to power in a revolution that preceded the 2011 Arab revolts by 32 years. Moreover, the Iranian revolution toppled a monarch, not a president and an icon of US power in the Middle East. Perhaps, more importantly, if one disregards the sanctioning of Iran, it is Iran rather than Saudi Arabia that is likely to shape the future energy architecture of Eurasia. Oil, in terms of demand, is a diminishing commodity. If the long-term future is renewables, the medium term will be shaped by gas. Iran has gas, Saudi Arabia does not, at least not the kind of gas it can export. In fact, Iran has the world’s second largest gas reserves. Again, disregarding the sanctions, Iran would have in the next five years 24.6 billion cubic metres available for annual piped exports beyond its current supply commitments. If, indeed, Iran poses an existential threat to the rule of the Al Saud family that it cannot eliminate and at best contain with the support of the United States, the question is what Saudi Arabia’s goal in Yemen is as well as in its broader rivalry with Iran. There are those who coherently argue that Saudi Arabia’s goal in Yemen may have initially been the roll-back of Houthi advances with their occupation of the Yemeni capital Sana’s and large parts of Yemen, destruction of Houthi power and forcing them into a situation in which they would have had to accept a Saudi-dictated end to the war. Four years into the war, that is not a realistic goal. Short of that, the question is how sincere Saudi and for that matter, UAE interest is in finding a way out of the war. It is conceivable that short of outright victory, Saudi Arabia would want to keep Yemen weak and the Houthis militarily on the defensive. That is at best only sustainable in the short term. The fact of the matter is that the reputational damage Saudi Arabia has suffered is starting to hurt witness measures taken by the US Congress and Germany’s decision to halt arms sales to the kingdom. Conflicts are only ended, if not resolved if the pain of continuing the conflict is greater than the pain of ending it. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia could well be nearing the inflection point. The problem is that even if the United Nations-mediated peace talks ultimately produce an end to the war, Yemen, if anything, will pose in the post-war era an even greater and more real threat. Yemen for much of post-World War two history has been an afterthought in the international community if it sparked a thought at all. Yet, what a post-war Yemen will represent is a devastated country that largely needs to be rebuilt from scratch, a country whose traumatised population has suffered one the world’s worst humanitarian disasters and will need all the after-care that goes with that. Beyond the taking care of the most immediate humanitarian issues, there is little reason to believe that investors and governments with massive aid packages and offers of reconstruction will be knocking on Yemen’s doors. Like in Syria and Libya, the risk is of the emergence of a generation that has nothing to look forward to and nothing to lose. In Yemen, that generation is likely to deeply resent what it perceives Saudi Arabia has done to their country. If Saudi Arabia, long saw Yemen as the Gulf’s most populous nation with a battle-hardened military that needed to be managed, that new generation is likely to put flesh on the skeleton. It's not a pretty picture to look forward to. And it is one in which the damage has already been done. Having said that, its never too late to try to limit the damage, if not reverse affairs. That, however, would take the kind of courage and vision that Prince Mohammed and others in power elsewhere in the Middle East have yet to demonstrate. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

In Yemen, Saudi Arabia could be nearing the inflection point

It may be reading tea leaves but analysis of the walk-up to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman’s visit and his sojourn in Islamabad suggests that Pakistan may be about to fight battles on two fronts rather than just the Indian one in the wake of this month’s attacks in Kashmir.

Prince Mohammed’s expressions of unconditional support for Pakistan coupled with his promise of $20 billion in investments in addition to $6 billion in desperately needed financial aid raise the spectre of a shift in Pakistani efforts in recent years to walk a fine line in the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

That fine line included a 2015 Pakistani refusal to send troops to the kingdom in support of the Saudi military intervention in Yemen.

Speaking to the Arab News this week, Major General Asif Ghafoor, head of the Pakistan army’s media wing, suggested that Pakistan’s commitment to Saudi Arabia was equally unconditional. “Pakistan is committed to standing by its Saudi brethren,” Major General Ghafoor said.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi seemed to fine tune the officer’s statement by not mentioning Yemen in his remarks to the Saudi paper and limiting Pakistan’s commitment to the kingdom itself. “If anyone would create chaos in or attack the Kingdom, Pakistan would stand by its brethren Saudi Arabia,” Qureshi said.

The stakes for Pakistan that borders on Iran and is home to the world’s largest minority Shiite Muslim community could not be higher.

Concerned that Pakistan’s position may be shifting, Iran dialled up the rhetoric by warning that Pakistan would "pay a high price" for last week’s attack in the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan that killed 27 Revolutionary Guards.

Like with India, in the case of Kashmir, Iran asserted that the perpetrators, Jaish-al-Adl, were operating from Pakistani territory with at least the tacit knowledge of Pakistani authorities. In an unusual disclosure, Iran said three of the six perpetrators of last week’s attack, including the suicide bomber, were Pakistani nationals.

In the past, Iran had said that militants who had launched attacks were Iranian nationals rather than Pakistanis.

The tone of Revolutionary Guards chief Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari’s statement holding Pakistan, alongside the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel, responsible for the recent attack reflected Iranian concern with what may flow from Prince Mohammed’s visit.

“Why do Pakistan’s army and security body ... give refuge to these anti-revolutionary groups? Pakistan will no doubt pay a high price. Just in the past year, six or seven suicide attacks were neutralised but they were able to carry out this one,” Major General Jafari said in remarks live on state television.

Initially, Iran had limited itself to blaming external powers rather than Pakistan for the attack.

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan expressed, in a little-noticed declaration, in their joint statement at the end of the Crown Prince’s visit “The need to avoid politicisation of the United Nations listing system.”

The statement was implicitly referring to Indian efforts to get the UN Security Council to designate Masood Azhar as a global terrorist. Azhar is the head of Jaish-e-Mohammed, the group that has claimed responsibility for the Kashmir attack.

China, which at Pakistan’s behest has blocked Azhar’s designation in recent years, this week rejected an Indian request that it lift its veto. China asserts that Indian evidence fails to meet UN standards.

The reference to UN listing in the Saudi-Pakistani statement seemingly failed to resonate in New Delhi where Prince Mohammed stopped after visiting Islamabad.

In another tantalising incident, Qureshi, the Pakistani foreign minister, did nothing to distance his country from a statement in his presence by Saudi State Minister for Foreign Affairs Adel Al-Jubeir accusing Iran of being the "world’s chief sponsor of terrorism"

Similarly, in preparation of Prince Mohammed’s talks, retired General Raheel Sharif, the Pakistani commander of the Saudi-based, 40-nation Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), flew from Riyadh to Islamabad for talks with prime minister Imran Khan and Pakistani chief of staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa. 
 
Pakistani military officials argued at the time that while the appointment would irritate Iran, refusal of the Saudi request would expose Pakistan to criticism from many more in the Islamic world.

Neither the Pakistani government nor the IMCTC gave details of General Sharif’s discussions. The IMCTC, however, said in a tweet that “salient contours of IMCTC's domains and initiatives in the fight against #terrorism were discussed.”

The tone and gestures during Prince Mohammed’s visit contrasted starkly with positions adopted by Khan during his election campaign and immediately after he took office last year.

In his first post-election televised speech Khan made a point of discussing his country’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and Iran.

“We want to improve ties with Iran. Saudi Arabia is a friend who has always stood by us in difficult times. Our aim will be that whatever we can do for conciliation in the Middle East, we want to play that role. Those tensions, that fight, between neighbours, we will try to bring them together," &nbsp;Khan said.

The geopolitical fallout, if any, of what for now amounts to symbolism will likely only be evident in the weeks and months to come.

Beyond Iran’s toughening stance towards Pakistan in the wake of the attack on its Revolutionary Guards, tell-tale signs would be a closer Pakistani alignment with the Saud-led anti-terrorism coalition and the degree to which Pakistan-based militant launch attacks inside Iran.

Middle East scholar Michael Stephens, who heads the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) operation in Qatar, suggested that reading the tea leaves may best be done with a grain of salt.

“Geography is what it is, and Pakistan will always have to maintain a relationship with Iran (economic and security) regardless of how much cash it gets from Riyadh… Pakistan will do what's best for Pakistan, and not Riyadh, the US or Tehran. Telling everyone what they want to hear is kinda how this all works,” Stephens said.

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

It may be reading tea leaves but analysis of the walk-up to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman’s visit and his sojourn in Islamabad suggests that Pakistan may be about to fight battles on two fronts rather than just the Indian one in the wake of this month’s attacks in Kashmir.

It may be reading tea leaves but analysis of the walk-up to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman’s visit and his sojourn in Islamabad suggests that Pakistan may be about to fight battles on two fronts rather than just the Indian one in the wake of this month’s attacks in Kashmir. Prince Mohammed’s expressions of unconditional support for Pakistan coupled with his promise of $20 billion in investments in addition to $6 billion in desperately needed financial aid raise the spectre of a shift in Pakistani efforts in recent years to walk a fine line in the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. That fine line included a 2015 Pakistani refusal to send troops to the kingdom in support of the Saudi military intervention in Yemen. Speaking to the Arab News this week, Major General Asif Ghafoor, head of the Pakistan army’s media wing, suggested that Pakistan’s commitment to Saudi Arabia was equally unconditional. “Pakistan is committed to standing by its Saudi brethren,” Major General Ghafoor said. Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi seemed to fine tune the officer’s statement by not mentioning Yemen in his remarks to the Saudi paper and limiting Pakistan’s commitment to the kingdom itself. “If anyone would create chaos in or attack the Kingdom, Pakistan would stand by its brethren Saudi Arabia,” Qureshi said. The stakes for Pakistan that borders on Iran and is home to the world’s largest minority Shiite Muslim community could not be higher. Concerned that Pakistan’s position may be shifting, Iran dialled up the rhetoric by warning that Pakistan would "pay a high price" for last week’s attack in the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan that killed 27 Revolutionary Guards. Like with India, in the case of Kashmir, Iran asserted that the perpetrators, Jaish-al-Adl, were operating from Pakistani territory with at least the tacit knowledge of Pakistani authorities. In an unusual disclosure, Iran said three of the six perpetrators of last week’s attack, including the suicide bomber, were Pakistani nationals. In the past, Iran had said that militants who had launched attacks were Iranian nationals rather than Pakistanis. The tone of Revolutionary Guards chief Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari’s statement holding Pakistan, alongside the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel, responsible for the recent attack reflected Iranian concern with what may flow from Prince Mohammed’s visit. “Why do Pakistan’s army and security body ... give refuge to these anti-revolutionary groups? Pakistan will no doubt pay a high price. Just in the past year, six or seven suicide attacks were neutralised but they were able to carry out this one,” Major General Jafari said in remarks live on state television. Initially, Iran had limited itself to blaming external powers rather than Pakistan for the attack. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan expressed, in a little-noticed declaration, in their joint statement at the end of the Crown Prince’s visit “The need to avoid politicisation of the United Nations listing system.” The statement was implicitly referring to Indian efforts to get the UN Security Council to designate Masood Azhar as a global terrorist. Azhar is the head of Jaish-e-Mohammed, the group that has claimed responsibility for the Kashmir attack. China, which at Pakistan’s behest has blocked Azhar’s designation in recent years, this week rejected an Indian request that it lift its veto. China asserts that Indian evidence fails to meet UN standards. The reference to UN listing in the Saudi-Pakistani statement seemingly failed to resonate in New Delhi where Prince Mohammed stopped after visiting Islamabad. In another tantalising incident, Qureshi, the Pakistani foreign minister, did nothing to distance his country from a statement in his presence by Saudi State Minister for Foreign Affairs Adel Al-Jubeir accusing Iran of being the "world’s chief sponsor of terrorism" Similarly, in preparation of Prince Mohammed’s talks, retired General Raheel Sharif, the Pakistani commander of the Saudi-based, 40-nation Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), flew from Riyadh to Islamabad for talks with prime minister Imran Khan and Pakistani chief of staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa. Pakistani military officials argued at the time that while the appointment would irritate Iran, refusal of the Saudi request would expose Pakistan to criticism from many more in the Islamic world. Neither the Pakistani government nor the IMCTC gave details of General Sharif’s discussions. The IMCTC, however, said in a tweet that “salient contours of IMCTC's domains and initiatives in the fight against #terrorism were discussed.” The tone and gestures during Prince Mohammed’s visit contrasted starkly with positions adopted by Khan during his election campaign and immediately after he took office last year. In his first post-election televised speech Khan made a point of discussing his country’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and Iran. “We want to improve ties with Iran. Saudi Arabia is a friend who has always stood by us in difficult times. Our aim will be that whatever we can do for conciliation in the Middle East, we want to play that role. Those tensions, that fight, between neighbours, we will try to bring them together," Khan said. The geopolitical fallout, if any, of what for now amounts to symbolism will likely only be evident in the weeks and months to come. Beyond Iran’s toughening stance towards Pakistan in the wake of the attack on its Revolutionary Guards, tell-tale signs would be a closer Pakistani alignment with the Saud-led anti-terrorism coalition and the degree to which Pakistan-based militant launch attacks inside Iran. Middle East scholar Michael Stephens, who heads the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) operation in Qatar, suggested that reading the tea leaves may best be done with a grain of salt. “Geography is what it is, and Pakistan will always have to maintain a relationship with Iran (economic and security) regardless of how much cash it gets from Riyadh… Pakistan will do what's best for Pakistan, and not Riyadh, the US or Tehran. Telling everyone what they want to hear is kinda how this all works,” Stephens said. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Decoding Saudi Arabia Crown Prince's visit to Pakistan

Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince <a href="http://www.wionews.com/south-asia/saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-heads-for-pakistan-197900">Mohammed bin Salman</a>, who is also the Gulf nation's defence minister on Tuesday arrived in New Delhi for his first state visit to the country.&nbsp;

Mohammed bin Salman was warmly embraced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi as he stepped onto a red carpet at IGI airport in New Delhi.

India is likely to strongly raise the issue of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism with Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman even as the two countries will look at further enhancing defence ties, including having a joint naval exercise, during his two-day visit here beginning today.

Ahead of the visit by the Crown Prince, Saudi Arabia's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir said in Islamabad on Monday that Riyadh will try to "de-escalate" tensions between India and Pakistan in the wake of the deadly terror attack in Pulwama by Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad.

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<a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/WATCH?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#WATCH</a> Prime Minister Narendra Modi receives Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman upon his arrival in India. <a href="https://t.co/huwzGrPhFG">pic.twitter.com/huwzGrPhFG</a>
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Official sources said Saudi Arabia was no longer accepting Pakistan's narrative on Kashmir and cross border terrorism and that India will forcefully raise the issue of Pakistan's support to terror groups during delegation-level talks between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Crown Prince on Wednesday.

They said the joint statement to be issued after talks between the two sides is likely to have a strong reference about terrorism and ways to deal with it.

Secretary, Economic Affairs in the External Affairs Ministry T S Tirumurti said both sides are expected to sign five agreements in areas of investment, tourism, housing and information and broadcasting during the Saudi leader's visit.

"We are confident that this visit will open a new chapter in India-Saudi bilateral relationship," he said.

Referring to cross border terrorism, he said, "Saudi Arabia has strongly condemned and denounced the terrorist attack on Indian security forces in Pulwama on 14 February. We appreciate Kingdom's cooperation in security and counter-terrorism areas over the years."

Official sources said there has been a "change" in the way Saudi Arabia looked at relations between India and Pakistan and that the powerful Gulf nation has a better understanding of the cross-border terrorism.

"India has been identified as one of the eight strategic partners with whom Saudi Arabia intends to deepen partnership in areas of political, security, trade and investment and culture," said Tirumurti.

"As part of this engagement, we are finalizing the setting up of 'Strategic Partnership Council' between the two countries at ministerial level. We are confident that this will give greater thrust to our strategic partnership and take forward our discussions in a focussed and action-oriented manner," he said.

The sources said the two sides are looking at joint exercise between the two navies besides significantly ramping up overall defence cooperation.

They said Saudi Arabia has been providing India information and intelligence about various terror networks.&nbsp;

The two countries had inked a pact on the exchange of intelligence related to money laundering and terrorism during Modi's visit to Riyadh in 2016.

Modi will host a lunch in honour of the Crown Prince at Hyderabad House on Wednesday.

The Crown Prince will call on President Ram Nath Kovind and he will host a banquet in honour of the visiting dignitary

During the visit of PM Modi to Saudi Arabia in 2016, an MoU on cooperation in exchange of intelligence related to money laundering and terrorism financing was signed. The Kingdom has shown a greater understanding of India's terrorism-related concerns and also agreed to work with India in countering this global menace.

The two countries held a meeting of 4th Joint Defence Cooperation Committee last month in Riyadh during which both sides explored the possibility of elevating the defence engagement with joint production and joint exercises, particularly joint naval exercises, said Tirumurti.

India's bilateral trade with Saudi Arabia was $27.48 billion in 2017-18, making Saudi Arabia its 4th largest trading partner.

Saudi Arabia is also a key pillar of India's energy security, being a source of 17 per cent or more of crude oil and 32 per cent of LPG requirements of India.

(With inputs from PTI)

Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is also the Gulf nation's defence minister on Tuesday arrived in New Delhi for his first state visit to the country.

Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is also the Gulf nation's defence minister on Tuesday arrived in New Delhi for his first state visit to the country. Mohammed bin Salman was warmly embraced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi as he stepped onto a red carpet at IGI airport in New Delhi. India is likely to strongly raise the issue of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism with Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman even as the two countries will look at further enhancing defence ties, including having a joint naval exercise, during his two-day visit here beginning today. Ahead of the visit by the Crown Prince, Saudi Arabia's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir said in Islamabad on Monday that Riyadh will try to "de-escalate" tensions between India and Pakistan in the wake of the deadly terror attack in Pulwama by Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad. #WATCH Prime Minister Narendra Modi receives Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman upon his arrival in India. pic.twitter.com/huwzGrPhFG — ANI (@ANI) February 19, 2019 × Official sources said Saudi Arabia was no longer accepting Pakistan's narrative on Kashmir and cross border terrorism and that India will forcefully raise the issue of Pakistan's support to terror groups during delegation-level talks between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Crown Prince on Wednesday. They said the joint statement to be issued after talks between the two sides is likely to have a strong reference about terrorism and ways to deal with it. Secretary, Economic Affairs in the External Affairs Ministry T S Tirumurti said both sides are expected to sign five agreements in areas of investment, tourism, housing and information and broadcasting during the Saudi leader's visit. "We are confident that this visit will open a new chapter in India-Saudi bilateral relationship," he said. Referring to cross border terrorism, he said, "Saudi Arabia has strongly condemned and denounced the terrorist attack on Indian security forces in Pulwama on 14 February. We appreciate Kingdom's cooperation in security and counter-terrorism areas over the years." Official sources said there has been a "change" in the way Saudi Arabia looked at relations between India and Pakistan and that the powerful Gulf nation has a better understanding of the cross-border terrorism. "India has been identified as one of the eight strategic partners with whom Saudi Arabia intends to deepen partnership in areas of political, security, trade and investment and culture," said Tirumurti. "As part of this engagement, we are finalizing the setting up of 'Strategic Partnership Council' between the two countries at ministerial level. We are confident that this will give greater thrust to our strategic partnership and take forward our discussions in a focussed and action-oriented manner," he said. The sources said the two sides are looking at joint exercise between the two navies besides significantly ramping up overall defence cooperation. They said Saudi Arabia has been providing India information and intelligence about various terror networks. The two countries had inked a pact on the exchange of intelligence related to money laundering and terrorism during Modi's visit to Riyadh in 2016. Modi will host a lunch in honour of the Crown Prince at Hyderabad House on Wednesday. The Crown Prince will call on President Ram Nath Kovind and he will host a banquet in honour of the visiting dignitary During the visit of PM Modi to Saudi Arabia in 2016, an MoU on cooperation in exchange of intelligence related to money laundering and terrorism financing was signed. The Kingdom has shown a greater understanding of India's terrorism-related concerns and also agreed to work with India in countering this global menace. The two countries held a meeting of 4th Joint Defence Cooperation Committee last month in Riyadh during which both sides explored the possibility of elevating the defence engagement with joint production and joint exercises, particularly joint naval exercises, said Tirumurti. India's bilateral trade with Saudi Arabia was $27.48 billion in 2017-18, making Saudi Arabia its 4th largest trading partner. Saudi Arabia is also a key pillar of India's energy security, being a source of 17 per cent or more of crude oil and 32 per cent of LPG requirements of India. (With inputs from PTI)

Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman arrives in India on two-day visit

By Jeff Bachman

The US House of Representatives has voted overwhelmingly to pass legislation to deny further military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen.

The bipartisan vote for the bill was a repudiation of the Obama and Trump administrations’ support for the Saudis and a war that many charge includes violations of human rights. A Saudi-led coalition of states has been aggressively bombing Yemen and imposing an air and naval blockade of its ports for more than three years, leading UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to describe Yemen as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”

The legislation now goes to the Senate. President Trump has said that he would veto it if passed.

Guterres put the crisis in stark perspective, emphasising the near complete lack of security for the Yemeni people. More than 22 million people out of a total population of 28 million are in need of humanitarian aid and protection. Eighteen million people lack reliable access to food; 8.4 million people “do not know how they will obtain their next meal.”

As a scholar of genocide and human rights, I believe the destruction brought about by these attacks combined with the blockade amounts to genocide.

Based on my research, published online by Third World Quarterly, I believe the coalition would not be capable of committing this crime without the material and logistical support of both the Obama and Trump administrations.

A ‘storm’ recast as ‘hope’

Yemen has been gripped by a civil war since 2015, pitting the Shia Houthi movement – which has fought for centuries for control of parts of Yemen – against a government backed by Sunni Saudi Arabia. Because of these religious differences, it would be easy to recast what is largely a political conflict in Yemen as a sectarian one.

That characterisation fits Saudi and US assertions that the Houthis are controlled by Shiite Iran, a claim that has not gone uncontested. Both the Saudis and the US are hostile to Iran, so US support of Saudia Arabia in Yemen represents what US administrations have said are strategic interests in the region.

Besides Saudi Arabia, the coalition attacking Yemen includes the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar was part of the coalition but is no longer.

During the first three years of “Operation Decisive Storm,” later renamed “Operation Renewal of Hope,” 16,749 coalition air attacks in Yemen were documented by the Yemen Data Project, which describes itself as an “independent data collection project aimed at collecting and disseminating data on the conduct of the war in Yemen.”

Based on the information available to it using open sources, the Yemen Data Project reports that two-thirds of the coalition’s bombing attacks have been against nonmilitary and unknown targets. The coalition isn’t accidentally attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure – it’s doing it deliberately.

That’s evident from the kind – and volume – of civilian targets documented. They include places that are generally protected against attack even under the lax rules of international humanitarian law: Residential areas, vehicles, marketplaces and mosques as well as boats, social gatherings and camps for internally displaced persons.

Because of the role it plays in movement of people, food and medicine, Yemen’s transportation infrastructure is especially important. Airports, ports, bridges and roads have all been repeatedly attacked.

Yemen’s economic infrastructure – farms, private businesses and factories, oil and gas facilities, water and electricity lines and food storage – have also been hit. And the coalition has targeted and destroyed schools and medical facilities, too.

Finally, Yemen’s cultural heritage has been attacked. In all, at least 78 cultural sites have been damaged or destroyed, including archaeological sites, museums, mosques, churches and tombs, as well as numerous other monuments and residences that have great historical and cultural significance.

How to make a crisis

The attacks aren’t the only way the coalition is creating a massive humanitarian crisis.

The air and naval blockade, in effect since March 2015, “is essentially using the threat of starvation as a bargaining tool and an instrument of war,” according to the UN panel of experts on Yemen.

The blockade stops and inspects vessels seeking entry to Yemen’s ports. That allows the coalition to regulate and restrict Yemenis’ access to food, fuel, medical supplies and humanitarian aid.

In his analysis of the blockade’s legality, Dutch military scholar Martin Fink writes that the blockade means “massive time delays and uncertainty on what products would be allowed to enter.”

Despite U.N. efforts to alleviate some of the worst delays, imports are often held up for a long time. In some cases, food that makes it through the blockade has already spoiled, if the entry is not denied altogether.

In some ways, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is unprecedented and can be tied directly to the conflict. As the World Bank notes, “Yemen’s very difficult economic challenges before the current conflict cannot be compared to the intensely critical situation the country is facing today.”

Similarly, Tufts University scholar Alex de Waal describes Yemen as “the greatest famine atrocity of our lifetimes.” It was caused, writes de Waal, by the coalition “deliberately destroying the country’s food-producing infrastructure.”

The failing security for the people of Yemen has been compounded by a failing health system. The World Health Organisation reported in September 2017 that only 45 per cent of health facilities in Yemen were functional.

As Secretary-General Guterres put it, “Treatable illnesses become a death sentence when local health services are suspended and it is impossible to travel outside the country.”

As of February 2018, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the coalition had killed 6,000 people in airstrikes and wounded nearly 10,000 more.

Yet, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights report, these counts are conservative. Tens of thousands of Yemenis have also died from causes related to the war. According to Save the Children, an estimated 85,000 children under five may have died since 2015, with more than 50,000 child deaths in 2017 alone from hunger and related causes.

Coalition actions in Yemen amount to nothing short of what Raphael Lemkin, the individual who coined the term “genocide,” referred to as a “synchronized attack on different aspects of life.”

The US contribution

The coalition’s genocide in Yemen would not be possible without the complicity of the US. This has been a bipartisan presidential effort, covering both the Obama and Trump administrations.

US arms are being used to kill Yemenis and destroy their country. In 2016, well after the coalition began its genocidal assault on Yemen, four of the top five recipients of US arms sales were members of the coalition.

The U.S. has also provided the coalition with logistical support, including mid-air refuelling, targeting advice and support, intelligence, expedited munitions resupply and maintenance.

Other than the sale of arms, perhaps the most significant contribution to the coalition’s ability to commit genocide in Yemen has been the provision of fuel and midair refuelling of coalition warplanes, which was halted in early November 2018. By the middle of 2017, the US had delivered over 67 million pounds of fuel to the coalition and refuelled coalition aircraft more than 9,000 times.

Shared responsibility for genocide

As a genocide scholar, I believe that under international law, the US shares responsibility with the coalition for genocide in Yemen.

What does this mean? It means that the US must cease and desist all activities that facilitate genocide in Yemen. This would include stopping all sales of weapons and ending logistical support for coalition action. The legislation passed by the House would largely accomplish this, though the House bill would allow intelligence sharing with Saudi Arabia to continue when “appropriate in the national security interest of the United States.”

However, even if the Senate passes it, the president’s likely veto of the bill will mean no change in the deadly status quo unless the legislation garners enough support to override a presidential veto.

In an ideal world, one in which all states are equally subjects before international law, the U.S. would also seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding what restitution it owes the people of Yemen for its role in the coalition’s genocide.

Similarly, the US would request an International Criminal Court investigation into individual culpability of US officials in both the Obama and Trump administrations for their role in facilitating the crimes committed in Yemen.

Of course, this is not an ideal world.

The US recognises neither the International Court of Justice’s authority to judge the legality of its actions, nor the International Criminal Court’s authority to investigate the suspected criminal acts of individual US officials. Such an investigation could be triggered by a UN Security Council referral, but the US would simply veto any such effort.

All that is left, then, is for the people of the US to hold their own to account for the crimes committed in their names. 
 
(Jeff Bachman is Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights, American University School of International Service)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/senate-vote-could-end-us-complicity-in-the-saudi-led-genocide-in-yemen-111952">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

By Jeff Bachman The US House of Representatives has voted overwhelmingly to pass legislation to deny further military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen.

By Jeff Bachman The US House of Representatives has voted overwhelmingly to pass legislation to deny further military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen. The bipartisan vote for the bill was a repudiation of the Obama and Trump administrations’ support for the Saudis and a war that many charge includes violations of human rights. A Saudi-led coalition of states has been aggressively bombing Yemen and imposing an air and naval blockade of its ports for more than three years, leading UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to describe Yemen as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.” The legislation now goes to the Senate. President Trump has said that he would veto it if passed. Guterres put the crisis in stark perspective, emphasising the near complete lack of security for the Yemeni people. More than 22 million people out of a total population of 28 million are in need of humanitarian aid and protection. Eighteen million people lack reliable access to food; 8.4 million people “do not know how they will obtain their next meal.” As a scholar of genocide and human rights, I believe the destruction brought about by these attacks combined with the blockade amounts to genocide. Based on my research, published online by Third World Quarterly, I believe the coalition would not be capable of committing this crime without the material and logistical support of both the Obama and Trump administrations. A ‘storm’ recast as ‘hope’ Yemen has been gripped by a civil war since 2015, pitting the Shia Houthi movement – which has fought for centuries for control of parts of Yemen – against a government backed by Sunni Saudi Arabia. Because of these religious differences, it would be easy to recast what is largely a political conflict in Yemen as a sectarian one. That characterisation fits Saudi and US assertions that the Houthis are controlled by Shiite Iran, a claim that has not gone uncontested. Both the Saudis and the US are hostile to Iran, so US support of Saudia Arabia in Yemen represents what US administrations have said are strategic interests in the region. Besides Saudi Arabia, the coalition attacking Yemen includes the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar was part of the coalition but is no longer. During the first three years of “Operation Decisive Storm,” later renamed “Operation Renewal of Hope,” 16,749 coalition air attacks in Yemen were documented by the Yemen Data Project, which describes itself as an “independent data collection project aimed at collecting and disseminating data on the conduct of the war in Yemen.” Based on the information available to it using open sources, the Yemen Data Project reports that two-thirds of the coalition’s bombing attacks have been against nonmilitary and unknown targets. The coalition isn’t accidentally attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure – it’s doing it deliberately. That’s evident from the kind – and volume – of civilian targets documented. They include places that are generally protected against attack even under the lax rules of international humanitarian law: Residential areas, vehicles, marketplaces and mosques as well as boats, social gatherings and camps for internally displaced persons. Because of the role it plays in movement of people, food and medicine, Yemen’s transportation infrastructure is especially important. Airports, ports, bridges and roads have all been repeatedly attacked. Yemen’s economic infrastructure – farms, private businesses and factories, oil and gas facilities, water and electricity lines and food storage – have also been hit. And the coalition has targeted and destroyed schools and medical facilities, too. Finally, Yemen’s cultural heritage has been attacked. In all, at least 78 cultural sites have been damaged or destroyed, including archaeological sites, museums, mosques, churches and tombs, as well as numerous other monuments and residences that have great historical and cultural significance. How to make a crisis The attacks aren’t the only way the coalition is creating a massive humanitarian crisis. The air and naval blockade, in effect since March 2015, “is essentially using the threat of starvation as a bargaining tool and an instrument of war,” according to the UN panel of experts on Yemen. The blockade stops and inspects vessels seeking entry to Yemen’s ports. That allows the coalition to regulate and restrict Yemenis’ access to food, fuel, medical supplies and humanitarian aid. In his analysis of the blockade’s legality, Dutch military scholar Martin Fink writes that the blockade means “massive time delays and uncertainty on what products would be allowed to enter.” Despite U.N. efforts to alleviate some of the worst delays, imports are often held up for a long time. In some cases, food that makes it through the blockade has already spoiled, if the entry is not denied altogether. In some ways, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is unprecedented and can be tied directly to the conflict. As the World Bank notes, “Yemen’s very difficult economic challenges before the current conflict cannot be compared to the intensely critical situation the country is facing today.” Similarly, Tufts University scholar Alex de Waal describes Yemen as “the greatest famine atrocity of our lifetimes.” It was caused, writes de Waal, by the coalition “deliberately destroying the country’s food-producing infrastructure.” The failing security for the people of Yemen has been compounded by a failing health system. The World Health Organisation reported in September 2017 that only 45 per cent of health facilities in Yemen were functional. As Secretary-General Guterres put it, “Treatable illnesses become a death sentence when local health services are suspended and it is impossible to travel outside the country.” As of February 2018, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the coalition had killed 6,000 people in airstrikes and wounded nearly 10,000 more. Yet, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights report, these counts are conservative. Tens of thousands of Yemenis have also died from causes related to the war. According to Save the Children, an estimated 85,000 children under five may have died since 2015, with more than 50,000 child deaths in 2017 alone from hunger and related causes. Coalition actions in Yemen amount to nothing short of what Raphael Lemkin, the individual who coined the term “genocide,” referred to as a “synchronized attack on different aspects of life.” The US contribution The coalition’s genocide in Yemen would not be possible without the complicity of the US. This has been a bipartisan presidential effort, covering both the Obama and Trump administrations. US arms are being used to kill Yemenis and destroy their country. In 2016, well after the coalition began its genocidal assault on Yemen, four of the top five recipients of US arms sales were members of the coalition. The U.S. has also provided the coalition with logistical support, including mid-air refuelling, targeting advice and support, intelligence, expedited munitions resupply and maintenance. Other than the sale of arms, perhaps the most significant contribution to the coalition’s ability to commit genocide in Yemen has been the provision of fuel and midair refuelling of coalition warplanes, which was halted in early November 2018. By the middle of 2017, the US had delivered over 67 million pounds of fuel to the coalition and refuelled coalition aircraft more than 9,000 times. Shared responsibility for genocide As a genocide scholar, I believe that under international law, the US shares responsibility with the coalition for genocide in Yemen. What does this mean? It means that the US must cease and desist all activities that facilitate genocide in Yemen. This would include stopping all sales of weapons and ending logistical support for coalition action. The legislation passed by the House would largely accomplish this, though the House bill would allow intelligence sharing with Saudi Arabia to continue when “appropriate in the national security interest of the United States.” However, even if the Senate passes it, the president’s likely veto of the bill will mean no change in the deadly status quo unless the legislation garners enough support to override a presidential veto. In an ideal world, one in which all states are equally subjects before international law, the U.S. would also seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding what restitution it owes the people of Yemen for its role in the coalition’s genocide. Similarly, the US would request an International Criminal Court investigation into individual culpability of US officials in both the Obama and Trump administrations for their role in facilitating the crimes committed in Yemen. Of course, this is not an ideal world. The US recognises neither the International Court of Justice’s authority to judge the legality of its actions, nor the International Criminal Court’s authority to investigate the suspected criminal acts of individual US officials. Such an investigation could be triggered by a UN Security Council referral, but the US would simply veto any such effort. All that is left, then, is for the people of the US to hold their own to account for the crimes committed in their names. (Jeff Bachman is Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights, American University School of International Service) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Senate vote could end US complicity in the Saudi-led genocide in Yemen

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s three-nation tour of Asia is about demonstrating that he stands tall – despite Western criticism of the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the war in Yemen – as it is about exploiting the geopolitical and economic opportunity.

Prince Mohammed changed his itinerary at the last minute, delaying by a day his arrival in Pakistan and postponing visits to Malaysia and Indonesia. The stakes are nonetheless high.

Saudi Arabia has sought to strengthen ties with Pakistan with one eye on neighbouring Iran. The Crown Prince&nbsp;visit coincides with Pakistan becoming increasingly dependent on Saudi Arabia while relations with China, its closest ally, have become strained.

Saudi financial support for Pakistan is designed to counter expanding ties with Iran. That support includes a $3 billion deposit into Pakistan’s central bank to bolster the country’s balance of payments and another $3 billion in deferred oil import payments coupled with an expected $10 billion investment in the troubled province of Balochistan, which borders Iran.

Prince Mohammed could also seize upon Pakistani criticism of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” and efforts to refocus the $45 billion-plus China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on job creation, agriculture and industry.

However, Saudi investment in Pakistan could complicate Prince Mohammed’s attempts to forge closer economic and security ties with India, in light of the recent attack in Kashmir that killed at least 40 Indian military personnel, blamed on Pakistan. India has vowed to isolate Pakistan internationally, including seeking Pakistan’s blacklisting by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which monitors financing of terrorism.

Managing the India-Pakistan minefield will test Prince Mohammed’s diplomatic skills. Iran’s India-backed, Arabian Sea deep-sea port of Chabahar is viewed by Saudi Arabia as encroaching on the kingdom’s national security and economic interests.

A study published in late 2017 by the Riyadh-based and government-backed International Institute for Iranian Studies identified Chabahar as a “direct threat to the Arab Gulf states”. The study warned Chabahar would enable Iran to increase oil exports to India at the expense of Saudi Arabia and raise foreign investment in Iran.

The study’s author, Mohammed Hassan Husseinbor, noted the expanse of Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan province.

“It would be a formidable challenge, if not impossible, for the Iranian government to protect such long distances and secure Chabahar in the face of widespread Baluch opposition, particularly if this opposition is supported by Iran’s regional adversaries and world powers,” Husseinbor wrote.

Iran has blamed a series of recent attacks in Sistan and Baluchestan on Pakistan-based militants allegedly supported by Saudi Arabia, the US and Israel.

Saudi Arabia’s economic and geopolitical investment in Pakistan will be on the agenda for the Crown Prince’s talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Saudi Arabia is a cesspool of constant rivalry among the princes Mohamad Sabu, Malaysian defence minister

China rejected Pakistan’s initial plan to incorporate into CPEC Saudi investment in a refinery in Gwadar, a crown jewel of the “Belt and Road Initiative”, and a gold and copper mine on the Iranian border.

Nonetheless, China has benefited from Saudi engagement in Pakistan despite concerns about the kingdom’s intentions. Financial support from Saudi Arabia and UAE has made a Pakistani request for a bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) less urgent. That has in turn shielded China from potentially embarrassing disclosures of the financial terms of CPEC-related projects the IMF was demanding as part of a Pakistani bailout.

While the crown prince gave no reason for the postponement of his visit to Malaysia, it is unlikely money and investment would have been enough to fix Saudi Arabia’s problems with the Southeast Asian nation.

Relations since Mahathir Mohamad’s upset electoral victory last year have been strained by Saudi efforts to protect Najib Razak while he was prime minister. Deposed by Mahathir, the former prime minister has since been charged with corruption. Mahathir’s election victory also brought to office Mohamad Sabu, a defence minister with a track record of criticising the kingdom.

“Malaysia should not be too close to a country whose internal politics are getting toxic,” Sabu warned in a commentary. “For the lack of a better word, Saudi Arabia is a cesspool of constant rivalry among the princes. By this token, it is also a vortex that could suck any country into its black hole if one is not careful.”

Sabu has since withdrawn Malaysian troops from the Saudi Arabia-based 41-nation, Saudi-sponsored Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition. He has also closed a Saudi-funded anti-terrorism centre, the King Salman Centre for International Peace, which was allocated 16 hectares of land in Putrajaya, close to the prime minister’s complex, by the Razak government. The centre was inaugurated in 2017 by Prince Mohammed’s father, King Salman.

Prince Mohammed may emerge from his tour reassured, having been feted – certainly, he would be less welcome in Washington or Western European capitals. The ultimate measure, however, will be his ability to manoeuvre and master a minefield of conflicting geopolitical interests, something he has not yet shown he can do. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s three-nation tour of Asia is about demonstrating that he stands tall – despite Western criticism of the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the war in Yemen – as it is about exploiting the geopolitical and economic opportunity.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s three-nation tour of Asia is about demonstrating that he stands tall – despite Western criticism of the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the war in Yemen – as it is about exploiting the geopolitical and economic opportunity. Prince Mohammed changed his itinerary at the last minute, delaying by a day his arrival in Pakistan and postponing visits to Malaysia and Indonesia. The stakes are nonetheless high. Saudi Arabia has sought to strengthen ties with Pakistan with one eye on neighbouring Iran. The Crown Prince visit coincides with Pakistan becoming increasingly dependent on Saudi Arabia while relations with China, its closest ally, have become strained. Saudi financial support for Pakistan is designed to counter expanding ties with Iran. That support includes a $3 billion deposit into Pakistan’s central bank to bolster the country’s balance of payments and another $3 billion in deferred oil import payments coupled with an expected $10 billion investment in the troubled province of Balochistan, which borders Iran. Prince Mohammed could also seize upon Pakistani criticism of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” and efforts to refocus the $45 billion-plus China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on job creation, agriculture and industry. However, Saudi investment in Pakistan could complicate Prince Mohammed’s attempts to forge closer economic and security ties with India, in light of the recent attack in Kashmir that killed at least 40 Indian military personnel, blamed on Pakistan. India has vowed to isolate Pakistan internationally, including seeking Pakistan’s blacklisting by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which monitors financing of terrorism. Managing the India-Pakistan minefield will test Prince Mohammed’s diplomatic skills. Iran’s India-backed, Arabian Sea deep-sea port of Chabahar is viewed by Saudi Arabia as encroaching on the kingdom’s national security and economic interests. A study published in late 2017 by the Riyadh-based and government-backed International Institute for Iranian Studies identified Chabahar as a “direct threat to the Arab Gulf states”. The study warned Chabahar would enable Iran to increase oil exports to India at the expense of Saudi Arabia and raise foreign investment in Iran. The study’s author, Mohammed Hassan Husseinbor, noted the expanse of Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan province. “It would be a formidable challenge, if not impossible, for the Iranian government to protect such long distances and secure Chabahar in the face of widespread Baluch opposition, particularly if this opposition is supported by Iran’s regional adversaries and world powers,” Husseinbor wrote. Iran has blamed a series of recent attacks in Sistan and Baluchestan on Pakistan-based militants allegedly supported by Saudi Arabia, the US and Israel. Saudi Arabia’s economic and geopolitical investment in Pakistan will be on the agenda for the Crown Prince’s talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Saudi Arabia is a cesspool of constant rivalry among the princes Mohamad Sabu, Malaysian defence minister China rejected Pakistan’s initial plan to incorporate into CPEC Saudi investment in a refinery in Gwadar, a crown jewel of the “Belt and Road Initiative”, and a gold and copper mine on the Iranian border. Nonetheless, China has benefited from Saudi engagement in Pakistan despite concerns about the kingdom’s intentions. Financial support from Saudi Arabia and UAE has made a Pakistani request for a bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) less urgent. That has in turn shielded China from potentially embarrassing disclosures of the financial terms of CPEC-related projects the IMF was demanding as part of a Pakistani bailout. While the crown prince gave no reason for the postponement of his visit to Malaysia, it is unlikely money and investment would have been enough to fix Saudi Arabia’s problems with the Southeast Asian nation. Relations since Mahathir Mohamad’s upset electoral victory last year have been strained by Saudi efforts to protect Najib Razak while he was prime minister. Deposed by Mahathir, the former prime minister has since been charged with corruption. Mahathir’s election victory also brought to office Mohamad Sabu, a defence minister with a track record of criticising the kingdom. “Malaysia should not be too close to a country whose internal politics are getting toxic,” Sabu warned in a commentary. “For the lack of a better word, Saudi Arabia is a cesspool of constant rivalry among the princes. By this token, it is also a vortex that could suck any country into its black hole if one is not careful.” Sabu has since withdrawn Malaysian troops from the Saudi Arabia-based 41-nation, Saudi-sponsored Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition. He has also closed a Saudi-funded anti-terrorism centre, the King Salman Centre for International Peace, which was allocated 16 hectares of land in Putrajaya, close to the prime minister’s complex, by the Razak government. The centre was inaugurated in 2017 by Prince Mohammed’s father, King Salman. Prince Mohammed may emerge from his tour reassured, having been feted – certainly, he would be less welcome in Washington or Western European capitals. The ultimate measure, however, will be his ability to manoeuvre and master a minefield of conflicting geopolitical interests, something he has not yet shown he can do. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Crown Prince's investment deals in Pakistan could complicate Saudi-India ties

Ahead of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to India next week, India's cabinet approved three Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between India and Saudi Arabia in tourism, investment and Customs matters.

The MoU on establishing a mechanism for investment infrastructure in India will help give a platform to institutions of Saudi Arabia to attract potential investment into the infrastructure sector in the country.

A government release said, "It will lead to boosting infrastructure development in the country, creation of more jobs, growth of ancillary industries/sectors which will lead to growth in GDP and overall economic prosperity."

The MoU on tourism will help to organise joint tourism events, participate in exhibitions, encourage mutual tourism investment in tourism projects among other things.

Saudi Arabia is one of the potential tourist generating market for India from West Asia and the signing of MoU with Riyadh will be instrumental in increasing arrival from this source market.

The MoU on cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matters will help in making available, reliable, quick and cost-effective information and intelligence for the prevention and investigation of customs offences and apprehending of customs offenders.

Saudi Arabia's crown prince will visit India on February 19, 20, 2019. He met the Indian Prime minister Narendra Modi in November of 2018 in Argentina on the sidelines of G20 summit.

Ahead of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to India next week, India's cabinet approved three Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between India and Saudi Arabia in tourism, investment and Customs matters.

Ahead of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to India next week, India's cabinet approved three Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between India and Saudi Arabia in tourism, investment and Customs matters. The MoU on establishing a mechanism for investment infrastructure in India will help give a platform to institutions of Saudi Arabia to attract potential investment into the infrastructure sector in the country. A government release said, "It will lead to boosting infrastructure development in the country, creation of more jobs, growth of ancillary industries/sectors which will lead to growth in GDP and overall economic prosperity." The MoU on tourism will help to organise joint tourism events, participate in exhibitions, encourage mutual tourism investment in tourism projects among other things. Saudi Arabia is one of the potential tourist generating market for India from West Asia and the signing of MoU with Riyadh will be instrumental in increasing arrival from this source market. The MoU on cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matters will help in making available, reliable, quick and cost-effective information and intelligence for the prevention and investigation of customs offences and apprehending of customs offenders. Saudi Arabia's crown prince will visit India on February 19, 20, 2019. He met the Indian Prime minister Narendra Modi in November of 2018 in Argentina on the sidelines of G20 summit.

Ahead of Saudi Crown Prince's India visit, cabinet gives nod for MoUs with Riyadh

This week’s suicide attack on Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s south-eastern province of Sistan and Baluchistan, the second in two months, could not have come at a more awkward moment for Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan.

The assault on a bus carrying the guards back from patrols on the province’s border with the troubled Pakistani region of Baluchistan killed 27 people and wounded 13 others. It occurred days before Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was scheduled to visit Pakistan as part of a tour of Asian countries.

While Baluchistan is set to figure prominently in Prince Mohammed’s talks with Khan, the attack also coincided with a US-sponsored conference in Warsaw, widely seen as an effort by the Trump administration to further isolate Iran economically and diplomatically.

Inside the conference, dubbed The Ministerial to Promote a Future of Peace and Security in the Middle East, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insisted that US policy was designed to force Iran to alter its regional and defence policies and not geared towards regime change in Tehran.

Yet, US President Donald J Trump appeared to be sending mixed messages to the Iranians as well as sceptical European governments with his personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, addressing a rally outside the conference organised by the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, a controversial Iranian exile group believed to enjoy Saudi backing.

Giuliani told the protesters who waved Iranian flags and giant yellow balloons emblazoned with the words, “Regime Change” that “We want to see a regime change in Iran.”

Trump appeared to fuel suspicion that Giuliani represented his true sentiment by tweeting on the eve of the Warsaw conference in a reference to the 40th anniversary of the Islamic revolution: “40 years of corruption. 40 years of repression. 40 years of terror. The regime in Iran has produced only #40YearsofFailure. The long-suffering Iranian people deserve a much brighter future.”

In a statement, the Revolutionary Guards blamed the attack on "mercenaries of intelligence agencies of world arrogance and domination," a reference to Saudi Arabia, the United States and Israel.

Jaish-al-Adl (the Army of Justice), a Pakistan-based splinter group that traces its roots to Saudi-backed anti-Shiite groups with a history of attacks on Iranian and Shiite targets, has claimed responsibility for the attack.

The group says it is not seeking Baluch secession from Iran. Instead, it wants to "Force the regime of the guardianship of jurisconsult (Iran) to respect the demands of the Muslim Baloch and Sunni society alongside the other compatriots of our country."

Militants targeted a Revolutionary Guards headquarters in December in a rare suicide bombing in Chabahar, home to Iran’s Indian-backed port on the Arabian Sea, a mere 70 kilometres from the Chinese supported the port of Gwadar, a crown jewel in the Pakistani leg of the People’s Republic’s Belt and Road initiative.

The attacks coupled with indications that Saudi Arabia and the United States may be contemplating covert action against Iran using Pakistani Balochistan as a launching pad, and heightened Saudi economic and commercial interest in the province, frame Prince Mohammed’s upcoming talks in Islamabad.

During his visit, Prince Mohammed is expected to sign a memorandum of understanding on a framework for $10 billion in Saudi investments. &nbsp;

The memorandum includes a plan by Saudi national oil company Aramco to build a refinery in Gwadar as well as Saudi investment in Baluchistan’s Reko Diq copper and gold mine.

The investments would further enhance Saudi influence in Pakistan as well as the kingdom’s foothold in Balochistan.

They would come on the back of significant Saudi aid to help Pakistan evade a financial crisis that included a $3 billion deposit in Pakistan’s central bank to support the country’s balance of payments and another $3 billion in deferred payments for oil imports.

Taken together, the refinery, a strategic oil reserve in Gwadar and the mine would also help Saudi Arabia in potential efforts to prevent Chabahar from emerging as a powerful Arabian Sea hub.

Saudi funds have been flowing for some time into the coffers of ultra-conservative anti-Shiite, anti-Iranian Sunni Muslim Madrassahs or religious seminars in Balochistan. It remains unclear whether they originate with the Saudi government or Saudi nationals of Baloch descent and members of the two million-strong Pakistani Diaspora in the kingdom.&nbsp;

The funds help put in place potential building blocks for possible covert action should the kingdom and/or the United States decide to act on proposals to support irredentist activity.

The flow started at about the time that the Riyadh-based International Institute for Iranian Studies, formerly known as the Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies, an allegedly Saudi government-backed think tank, published &nbsp;a study that argued that Chabahar posed “a direct threat to the Arab Gulf states” that called for “immediate countermeasures.”

If executed, covert action could jeopardise Indian hopes to use Chabahar to bypass Pakistan, significantly enhance its trade with Afghanistan and Central Asian nations and create an antidote to Gwadar.

Pakistani analysts expect an estimated $5 billion in Afghan trade to flow through Chabahar after India in December started handling the port’s operations.

Iranian concerns that the attacks represent the US and/or Saudi covert effort are grounded not only in more recent US and Saudi policies, including Trump’s withdrawal last year from the 2015 international agreement to curb Iran's nuclear program despite confirmation of its adherence to the accord and re-imposition of harsh economic sanctions against the Islamic republic.

They are also rooted in US and Saudi backing of Iraq in the 1980s Gulf war, US overtures in the last year to Iranian Kurdish insurgents, the long-standing broad spectrum of support of former and serving US officials for the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq and in recent years of Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former head of Saudi intelligence and ex-ambassador to the United States and Britain.

Said Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group’s Iran analyst: “The concern was never that the Trump admin would avert its eyes from Iran, but rather that is in inflicted by an unhealthy obsession with it. In hyping the threat emanating from Iran, Trump is more likely than not to mishandle it and thus further destabilise the Middle East.”

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

This week’s suicide attack on Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s south-eastern province of Sistan and Baluchistan, the second in two months, could not have come at a more awkward moment for Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan.

This week’s suicide attack on Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s south-eastern province of Sistan and Baluchistan, the second in two months, could not have come at a more awkward moment for Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan. The assault on a bus carrying the guards back from patrols on the province’s border with the troubled Pakistani region of Baluchistan killed 27 people and wounded 13 others. It occurred days before Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was scheduled to visit Pakistan as part of a tour of Asian countries. While Baluchistan is set to figure prominently in Prince Mohammed’s talks with Khan, the attack also coincided with a US-sponsored conference in Warsaw, widely seen as an effort by the Trump administration to further isolate Iran economically and diplomatically. Inside the conference, dubbed The Ministerial to Promote a Future of Peace and Security in the Middle East, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insisted that US policy was designed to force Iran to alter its regional and defence policies and not geared towards regime change in Tehran. Yet, US President Donald J Trump appeared to be sending mixed messages to the Iranians as well as sceptical European governments with his personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, addressing a rally outside the conference organised by the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, a controversial Iranian exile group believed to enjoy Saudi backing. Giuliani told the protesters who waved Iranian flags and giant yellow balloons emblazoned with the words, “Regime Change” that “We want to see a regime change in Iran.” Trump appeared to fuel suspicion that Giuliani represented his true sentiment by tweeting on the eve of the Warsaw conference in a reference to the 40th anniversary of the Islamic revolution: “40 years of corruption. 40 years of repression. 40 years of terror. The regime in Iran has produced only #40YearsofFailure. The long-suffering Iranian people deserve a much brighter future.” In a statement, the Revolutionary Guards blamed the attack on "mercenaries of intelligence agencies of world arrogance and domination," a reference to Saudi Arabia, the United States and Israel. Jaish-al-Adl (the Army of Justice), a Pakistan-based splinter group that traces its roots to Saudi-backed anti-Shiite groups with a history of attacks on Iranian and Shiite targets, has claimed responsibility for the attack. The group says it is not seeking Baluch secession from Iran. Instead, it wants to "Force the regime of the guardianship of jurisconsult (Iran) to respect the demands of the Muslim Baloch and Sunni society alongside the other compatriots of our country." Militants targeted a Revolutionary Guards headquarters in December in a rare suicide bombing in Chabahar, home to Iran’s Indian-backed port on the Arabian Sea, a mere 70 kilometres from the Chinese supported the port of Gwadar, a crown jewel in the Pakistani leg of the People’s Republic’s Belt and Road initiative. The attacks coupled with indications that Saudi Arabia and the United States may be contemplating covert action against Iran using Pakistani Balochistan as a launching pad, and heightened Saudi economic and commercial interest in the province, frame Prince Mohammed’s upcoming talks in Islamabad. During his visit, Prince Mohammed is expected to sign a memorandum of understanding on a framework for $10 billion in Saudi investments. The memorandum includes a plan by Saudi national oil company Aramco to build a refinery in Gwadar as well as Saudi investment in Baluchistan’s Reko Diq copper and gold mine. The investments would further enhance Saudi influence in Pakistan as well as the kingdom’s foothold in Balochistan. They would come on the back of significant Saudi aid to help Pakistan evade a financial crisis that included a $3 billion deposit in Pakistan’s central bank to support the country’s balance of payments and another $3 billion in deferred payments for oil imports. Taken together, the refinery, a strategic oil reserve in Gwadar and the mine would also help Saudi Arabia in potential efforts to prevent Chabahar from emerging as a powerful Arabian Sea hub. Saudi funds have been flowing for some time into the coffers of ultra-conservative anti-Shiite, anti-Iranian Sunni Muslim Madrassahs or religious seminars in Balochistan. It remains unclear whether they originate with the Saudi government or Saudi nationals of Baloch descent and members of the two million-strong Pakistani Diaspora in the kingdom. The funds help put in place potential building blocks for possible covert action should the kingdom and/or the United States decide to act on proposals to support irredentist activity. The flow started at about the time that the Riyadh-based International Institute for Iranian Studies, formerly known as the Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies, an allegedly Saudi government-backed think tank, published a study that argued that Chabahar posed “a direct threat to the Arab Gulf states” that called for “immediate countermeasures.” If executed, covert action could jeopardise Indian hopes to use Chabahar to bypass Pakistan, significantly enhance its trade with Afghanistan and Central Asian nations and create an antidote to Gwadar. Pakistani analysts expect an estimated $5 billion in Afghan trade to flow through Chabahar after India in December started handling the port’s operations. Iranian concerns that the attacks represent the US and/or Saudi covert effort are grounded not only in more recent US and Saudi policies, including Trump’s withdrawal last year from the 2015 international agreement to curb Iran's nuclear program despite confirmation of its adherence to the accord and re-imposition of harsh economic sanctions against the Islamic republic. They are also rooted in US and Saudi backing of Iraq in the 1980s Gulf war, US overtures in the last year to Iranian Kurdish insurgents, the long-standing broad spectrum of support of former and serving US officials for the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq and in recent years of Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former head of Saudi intelligence and ex-ambassador to the United States and Britain. Said Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group’s Iran analyst: “The concern was never that the Trump admin would avert its eyes from Iran, but rather that is in inflicted by an unhealthy obsession with it. In hyping the threat emanating from Iran, Trump is more likely than not to mishandle it and thus further destabilise the Middle East.” (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

The significance of Saudi Crown Prince's visit to Pakistan

Pakistan on Sunday said the UAE has "almost finalised" investment plan for the setting up of an oil refinery in the country as the <a href="http://www.wionews.com/south-asia/pakistan-pm-welcomes-abu-dhabi-prince-sheikh-mohamed-bin-zayed-drives-him-to-pm-house-188542">Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi met Prime Minister Imran Khan</a> and discussed economic assistance to the cash-strapped country to bolster its foreign exchange reserves.&nbsp;

Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, who was on a day-long visit to the country after nearly 12 years, was received by Khan upon his arrival at Nur Khan airbase in Rawalpindi and the Prime Minister personally drove him to his residency for a welcome ceremony.

He was given a guard of honour and a fly-past during the red carpet welcome.

The Prince and the Prime Minister held a one-on-one meeting, followed by delegation-level talks between the top officials of the two sides as Pakistan seeks economic assistance to bolster its foreign exchange reserves and the government's fiscal policies.

Both delegations discussed bilateral relations and matters of mutual, regional and international interest.

Pakistan, reeling under severe financial crisis, reached out to some "friendly countries" for economic assistance including Saudi Arabia, China and the UAE since Prime Minister Khan assumed office in August.

Information Minister Fawad Chaudhry said the UAE has already promised to provide US $3 billion assistance and the Crown Prince also discussed investment to set up an oil refinery.

"The two side have almost finalised investment for setting up of a refinery," he said.

He said the two countries enjoyed traditional friendship and the Crown Prince said that he considered Pakistan as his "second home".

Foreign Office said this was the third interaction between the leadership of Pakistan and the UAE in less than three months, which is a "testimony to the special nature of our brotherly relations with this important GCC country".

"The UAE is Pakistan's largest trading partner in the Middle East and a major source of investments. It is home to more than 1.6 million expatriate community which contributes around US $4.5 billion annually to the GDP,"&nbsp;the foreign office said.

It said Pakistan and the UAE are working closely to transform the existing special relations into a "long-term strategic economic partnership", as agreed between the two leaders during Prime Minister Khan's visit to the Emirates in November.

It said that apart from a "generous US $3 billion support to help Pakistan overcome its balance of payment crisis, provision oil on deferred payment was also under discussion."

Khan visited the UAE twice since August to seek economic assistance to ward off the country's foreign exchange crisis.

Pakistan and the UAE last week finalised the terms and conditions of a US $6.2 billion support package for Islamabad to help address the balance of payments crisis.

According to a statement released by the Pakistan government, Prime Minister Khan thanked the UAE for extending balance of payment support of US $3 million and said this financial support shows the continued commitment and steady friendship between the two countries.

The two sides also resolved to take all necessary measures to deal with matters related to trade enhancement and decided to form a Task Force to achieve this objective, the statement said.&nbsp;

Pakistan's all-weather ally China has also pledged to provide a generous aid to Islamabad to overcome its financial woes. Beijing has not yet revealed the quantum of its financial support.

Pakistan is negotiating a US $8 billion bailout package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to overcome a severe balance-of-payments crisis that threatens to cripple the country's economy.

Pakistan apprehends the IMF will come with stringent conditions of austerity besides scrutiny of US $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects whose terms till now remained confidential.

The Trump administration is making all efforts to ensure that any IMF loan to Pakistan is not used to repay its Chinese debt.&nbsp;

The&nbsp;government statement said the two sides strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and expressed their resolve to work closely to root out the scourge.

To counter white collar crimes, including money laundering, the two leaders instructed the concerned authorities to expedite the finalisation of the Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, the statement said.

Khan also briefed the Crown Prince about the efforts being taken by Pakistan to support and facilitate the Afghan-owned and Afghan-led reconciliation process. The two leaders agreed to work closely for the lasting peace and stability of Afghanistan.

The Pakistani Prime Minister congratulated the leadership of the UAE for declaring 2019 as the 'Year of Tolerance'.

Pakistan on Sunday said the UAE has "almost finalised" investment plan for the setting up of an oil refinery in the country as the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi met Prime Minister Imran Khan and discussed economic assistance to the cash-strapped country to bolster its foreign exchange reserves.

Pakistan on Sunday said the UAE has "almost finalised" investment plan for the setting up of an oil refinery in the country as the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi met Prime Minister Imran Khan and discussed economic assistance to the cash-strapped country to bolster its foreign exchange reserves. Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, who was on a day-long visit to the country after nearly 12 years, was received by Khan upon his arrival at Nur Khan airbase in Rawalpindi and the Prime Minister personally drove him to his residency for a welcome ceremony. He was given a guard of honour and a fly-past during the red carpet welcome. The Prince and the Prime Minister held a one-on-one meeting, followed by delegation-level talks between the top officials of the two sides as Pakistan seeks economic assistance to bolster its foreign exchange reserves and the government's fiscal policies. Both delegations discussed bilateral relations and matters of mutual, regional and international interest. Pakistan, reeling under severe financial crisis, reached out to some "friendly countries" for economic assistance including Saudi Arabia, China and the UAE since Prime Minister Khan assumed office in August. Information Minister Fawad Chaudhry said the UAE has already promised to provide US $3 billion assistance and the Crown Prince also discussed investment to set up an oil refinery. "The two side have almost finalised investment for setting up of a refinery," he said. He said the two countries enjoyed traditional friendship and the Crown Prince said that he considered Pakistan as his "second home". Foreign Office said this was the third interaction between the leadership of Pakistan and the UAE in less than three months, which is a "testimony to the special nature of our brotherly relations with this important GCC country". "The UAE is Pakistan's largest trading partner in the Middle East and a major source of investments. It is home to more than 1.6 million expatriate community which contributes around US $4.5 billion annually to the GDP," the foreign office said. It said Pakistan and the UAE are working closely to transform the existing special relations into a "long-term strategic economic partnership", as agreed between the two leaders during Prime Minister Khan's visit to the Emirates in November. It said that apart from a "generous US $3 billion support to help Pakistan overcome its balance of payment crisis, provision oil on deferred payment was also under discussion." Khan visited the UAE twice since August to seek economic assistance to ward off the country's foreign exchange crisis. Pakistan and the UAE last week finalised the terms and conditions of a US $6.2 billion support package for Islamabad to help address the balance of payments crisis. According to a statement released by the Pakistan government, Prime Minister Khan thanked the UAE for extending balance of payment support of US $3 million and said this financial support shows the continued commitment and steady friendship between the two countries. The two sides also resolved to take all necessary measures to deal with matters related to trade enhancement and decided to form a Task Force to achieve this objective, the statement said. Pakistan's all-weather ally China has also pledged to provide a generous aid to Islamabad to overcome its financial woes. Beijing has not yet revealed the quantum of its financial support. Pakistan is negotiating a US $8 billion bailout package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to overcome a severe balance-of-payments crisis that threatens to cripple the country's economy. Pakistan apprehends the IMF will come with stringent conditions of austerity besides scrutiny of US $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects whose terms till now remained confidential. The Trump administration is making all efforts to ensure that any IMF loan to Pakistan is not used to repay its Chinese debt. The government statement said the two sides strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and expressed their resolve to work closely to root out the scourge. To counter white collar crimes, including money laundering, the two leaders instructed the concerned authorities to expedite the finalisation of the Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, the statement said. Khan also briefed the Crown Prince about the efforts being taken by Pakistan to support and facilitate the Afghan-owned and Afghan-led reconciliation process. The two leaders agreed to work closely for the lasting peace and stability of Afghanistan. The Pakistani Prime Minister congratulated the leadership of the UAE for declaring 2019 as the 'Year of Tolerance'.

Abu Dhabi Crown Prince holds talks with Khan, discusses oil refinery in Pakistan

Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan received Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan at the Islamabad airport on Sunday and then drove him himself to the PM House.&nbsp;

A formation of air force jets marked Zayed's arrival with a flyby. Zayed was also given a guard of honour at PM House and a 21-gun salute.&nbsp;

The UAE recently announced aid to Pakistan which is currently suffering from a massive <a href="http://www.wionews.com/south-asia/pakistans-balance-of-payments-worsens-likely-to-approach-imf-next-month-126485">balance of payments crisis</a>, which explains the red carpet welcome.&nbsp;

The video of Zayed being driven by Khan was put out on his official Instagram account.&nbsp;

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<a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/BsSQhFsHEZs/?utm_source=ig_embed&amp;utm_medium=loading" style=" color:#000; font-family:Arial,sans-serif; font-size:14px; font-style:normal; font-weight:normal; line-height:17px; text-decoration:none; word-wrap:break-word;" target="_blank">Prime Minister Imran Khan drives His Highness Sheikh Muhamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of UAE Armed Forces to Islamabad from Nur Khan Airbase. 🇵🇰🇦🇪 #PMIK</a>

<p style=" color:#c9c8cd; font-family:Arial,sans-serif; font-size:14px; line-height:17px; margin-bottom:0; margin-top:8px; overflow:hidden; padding:8px 0 7px; text-align:center; text-overflow:ellipsis; white-space:nowrap;">A post shared by <a href="https://www.instagram.com/imrankhan.pti/?utm_source=ig_embed&amp;utm_medium=loading" style=" color:#c9c8cd; font-family:Arial,sans-serif; font-size:14px; font-style:normal; font-weight:normal; line-height:17px;" target="_blank"> Imran Khan</a> (@imrankhan.pti) on <time datetime="2019-01-06T07:49:01+00:00" style=" font-family:Arial,sans-serif; font-size:14px; line-height:17px;">Jan 5, 2019 at 11:49pm PST</time>
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Khan received praises on the internet for personally welcoming the Crown Prince and reviving the ties with UAE.&nbsp;

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Prime Minister <a href="https://twitter.com/ImranKhanPTI?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@ImranKhanPTI</a> takes the wheel <a href="https://twitter.com/MohamedBinZayed?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@MohamedBinZayed</a> 
 
Sheikh Muhamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi arrives at Noor Khan Airbase Islamabad, <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Pakistan?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#Pakistan</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/UAE?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#UAE</a> <a href="https://t.co/cDCNPIclYZ">pic.twitter.com/cDCNPIclYZ</a>
— Rana Shahroz (@LOVER_OF_PTI) <a href="https://twitter.com/LOVER_OF_PTI/status/1081820044873646081?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">January 6, 2019</a></blockquote>
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Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Muhammad bin Zayed al Nahyan arrived in Pakistan at the Invitation of Prime Minister Imran Khan. 
PM <a href="https://twitter.com/ImranKhanPTI?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@ImranKhanPTI</a> received the Crown Prince and is him self Driving him to PM House.<a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/PMIK?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#PMIK</a> <a href="https://t.co/yS2Xx6ckjs">pic.twitter.com/yS2Xx6ckjs</a>
— Ali Hashmi (Audiology) (@alihashmi903) <a href="https://twitter.com/alihashmi903/status/1081817696554151936?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">January 6, 2019</a></blockquote>
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Prime Minister - Imran Khan gears up for revitalizing the Pakistan-UAE ties, taking up the driving seat as he receives Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi - <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/ZayedAlNahyan?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#ZayedAlNahyan</a> who arrives in Pakistan after 12 YEARS. It's going to be quite an interesting day! 😎 <a href="https://t.co/wwWBSvkKKp">pic.twitter.com/wwWBSvkKKp</a>
— Maleeha Hashmey (@MaleehaHashmey) <a href="https://twitter.com/MaleehaHashmey/status/1081828374647992320?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">January 6, 2019</a></blockquote>
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Prime Minister Imran Khan receiving the the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and driving the car himself. This man is giving it his all for the success of this country and its people. <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/PrimeMinisterImrankhan?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#PrimeMinisterImrankhan</a> <a href="https://t.co/kyjMsENenE">pic.twitter.com/kyjMsENenE</a>
— Talha Siddiqui (@_TalhaSiddiqui) <a href="https://twitter.com/_TalhaSiddiqui/status/1081847231517474823?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">January 6, 2019</a></blockquote>
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Banners on the road depicted the <a href="http://www.wionews.com/south-asia/uae-crown-prince-arrives-in-pakistan-likely-to-announce-62-billion-aid-188514">crown prince</a> and read "Zayed in Our Hearts" and "Pakistan-UAE partner in development".

The United Arab Emirates is Pakistan's largest trading partner in the Middle East and a major investment source, Pakistan's foreign ministry said in a statement ahead of the visit.

More than 1.5 million Pakistanis live in the Gulf state and send millions of dollars in remittances back home, it added.

The crown prince last visited Pakistan in January 2007.

The UAE announced in December it would deposit $3 billion in the central bank of Pakistan to help "enhance liquidity" as the country struggles with a widening balance of payments crisis.

The Pakistani rupee plunged almost five per cent to a record low at the end of November, after what appeared to be the sixth devaluation by the central bank in the past year.&nbsp;

It also secured $6 billion in funding from Saudi Arabia and struck a 12-month deal for a cash lifeline during Khan's visit to the kingdom in October.

Islamabad has also received billions of dollars in Chinese loans to finance ambitious infrastructure projects.

A team from the International Monetary Fund visited Pakistan in November to discuss a possible bailout with officials but talks ended without agreement.

(With inputs from AFP)

Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan received Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan at the Islamabad airport on Sunday and then drove him himself to the PM House.

Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan received Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan at the Islamabad airport on Sunday and then drove him himself to the PM House. A formation of air force jets marked Zayed's arrival with a flyby. Zayed was also given a guard of honour at PM House and a 21-gun salute. The UAE recently announced aid to Pakistan which is currently suffering from a massive balance of payments crisis, which explains the red carpet welcome. The video of Zayed being driven by Khan was put out on his official Instagram account. View this post on Instagram Prime Minister Imran Khan drives His Highness Sheikh Muhamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of UAE Armed Forces to Islamabad from Nur Khan Airbase. 🇵🇰🇦🇪 #PMIK A post shared by Imran Khan (@imrankhan.pti) on Jan 5, 2019 at 11:49pm PST × Khan received praises on the internet for personally welcoming the Crown Prince and reviving the ties with UAE. Prime Minister @ImranKhanPTI takes the wheel @MohamedBinZayed Sheikh Muhamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi arrives at Noor Khan Airbase Islamabad, #Pakistan #UAE pic.twitter.com/cDCNPIclYZ — Rana Shahroz (@LOVER_OF_PTI) January 6, 2019 × Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Muhammad bin Zayed al Nahyan arrived in Pakistan at the Invitation of Prime Minister Imran Khan. PM @ImranKhanPTI received the Crown Prince and is him self Driving him to PM House.#PMIK pic.twitter.com/yS2Xx6ckjs — Ali Hashmi (Audiology) (@alihashmi903) January 6, 2019 × Prime Minister - Imran Khan gears up for revitalizing the Pakistan-UAE ties, taking up the driving seat as he receives Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi - #ZayedAlNahyan who arrives in Pakistan after 12 YEARS. It's going to be quite an interesting day! 😎 pic.twitter.com/wwWBSvkKKp — Maleeha Hashmey (@MaleehaHashmey) January 6, 2019 × Prime Minister Imran Khan receiving the the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and driving the car himself. This man is giving it his all for the success of this country and its people. #PrimeMinisterImrankhan pic.twitter.com/kyjMsENenE — Talha Siddiqui (@_TalhaSiddiqui) January 6, 2019 × Banners on the road depicted the crown prince and read "Zayed in Our Hearts" and "Pakistan-UAE partner in development". The United Arab Emirates is Pakistan's largest trading partner in the Middle East and a major investment source, Pakistan's foreign ministry said in a statement ahead of the visit. More than 1.5 million Pakistanis live in the Gulf state and send millions of dollars in remittances back home, it added. The crown prince last visited Pakistan in January 2007. The UAE announced in December it would deposit $3 billion in the central bank of Pakistan to help "enhance liquidity" as the country struggles with a widening balance of payments crisis. The Pakistani rupee plunged almost five per cent to a record low at the end of November, after what appeared to be the sixth devaluation by the central bank in the past year. It also secured $6 billion in funding from Saudi Arabia and struck a 12-month deal for a cash lifeline during Khan's visit to the kingdom in October. Islamabad has also received billions of dollars in Chinese loans to finance ambitious infrastructure projects. A team from the International Monetary Fund visited Pakistan in November to discuss a possible bailout with officials but talks ended without agreement. (With inputs from AFP)

Imran Khan picks up Abu Dhabi crown prince at airport, drives car himself to PM House

Traditionally focussed on ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim Islam, Saudi funding in the era of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been streamlined and finetuned to ensure that it serves his geopolitical ambitions, primarily stymying the expansion of Iranian influence in the Middle East and North Africa and enhancing the kingdom’s global impact.

The effort, however, has so far produced a mixed bag. Spending is down but more targeted. Saudi Arabia has handed over control of the Grand Mosque in Brussels in a move designed to demonstrate its newly found moderation and reduce the reputational damage of Saudi ultra-conservative management that had become contentious in Belgium.

Yet, monies still flowed to militant, ultra-conservative Madrassas or religious seminaries that dot the Pakistani-Iranian border. The kingdom’s focus, moreover, has shifted in selected countries to the promotion of a strand of Salafi ultra-conservatism that preaches absolute obedience to the ruler, a corollary to Prince Mohammed’s crackdown on critics and activists at home.

Saudi governmental, non-governmental organisations that once distributed the kingdom’s largesse to advance ultra-conservatism as well as officials have adopted the language of tolerance and respect and principles of inter-faith but have little tangible change at home to back it up.

To be sure, Prince Mohammed has lifted the ban on women’s driving, enhanced women’s work and leisure opportunities and kickstarted the creation of a modern entertainment industry but none of these measures amount to his promise to foster an unidentified but truly moderate form of Islam.

The prince’s moves, moreover, have been accompanied by an embrace of the European right and far-right, as well as, Western ultra-conservative groups that by and large are hardly beacons of tolerance and mutual respect.

“Saudi Arabia with MBS as Crown Prince has not been advocating Islamic religious reform,” said Middle East scholar HA Hellyer, referring to the Saudi leader by his initials.

“The existing Saudi religious establishment has not been encouraged to engage in a genuine rethinking of its ideas that draws it closer to the normative Sunni mainstream, nor listen to existing Saudi religious scholars who advocate more normative and mainstream approaches. Rather, the establishment has been muzzled. MBS’s ‘reforms’ in this arena are about centralising power—they are not about restoring the Saudi religious establishment to a normative Sunnism,” Hellyer added.

Prince Mohammed’s interest in non-Muslim, ultra-conservative groups in the West fits a global pattern, highlighted by political scientists Yascha Mounk and Roberto Stefan Foa, in which technological advances and the increased importance of soft power that lie at the root of Russian intervention in elections in the United States and Europe, have revealed the information and public relations policies of multiple autocratic states.

Technology and soft power, according to Messrs. Mounk and Foa, are likely to spark greater efforts by authoritarians and autocrats in general to influence Western nations and undermine confidence in democracy.

“Indeed, China is already stepping up ideological pressure on its overseas residents and establishing influential Confucius Institutes in major centres of learning. And over the past two years, Saudi Arabia has dramatically upped its payments to registered US lobbyists, increasing the number of registered foreign agents working on its behalf from 25 to 145… The rise of authoritarian soft power is already apparent across a variety of domains, including academia, popular culture, foreign investment, and development aid,” Messrs. Mounk and Foa said.

Saudi Arabia alongside other Gulf states, including the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait, as well as China, have furthermore been major donors to Western universities and think tanks and developed media outlets of their own such as Qatar’s Al Jazeera, Turkey’s TRT World China’s CCTV, and Russia’s RT that reach global audiences. They compete with the likes of the BBC and CNN.

The need for Saudi Arabia to acquire soft power was driven home by mounting Western criticism of its war in Yemen and condemnation of the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi on the premises of the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

The Saudi effort to do so by garnering conservative, right-wing and far-right support was evident in Northern Ireland.

Investigating a remarkable campaign by Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), a key support pillar of British prime minister Teresa May’s government, in favour of Britain’s exit from the European Union, Irish Times columnist Fintan O'Toole suggested that a senior member of Saudi Arabia’s ruling family and former head of the country’s intelligence service, Prince Nawwaf bin Abdul Aziz al Saud, as well as its just replaced ambassador to Britain, had funded the anti-Brexit effort through a commercial tie-up with a relatively obscure Scottish conservative activist of modest means, Richard Cook.

The ambassador, Prince Nawaf’s son, Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf al Saud, was Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Britain until last month’s Saudi cabinet reshuffle.

“It may be entirely coincidental that the man who channelled £425,622 to the DUP had such extremely high-level Saudi connections. We simply don’t know. We also don’t know whether the… Saudi ambassador had any knowledge of his father’s connection to Richard Cook,” O’Toole said.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia has invited dozens of British members of parliament on all-expenses paid visits to the kingdom and showered at least 50 members of the government, including May, with enormous hampers of food weighing up to 18 pounds.

One package destined for a member of the House of Lords included seaweed and garlic mayonnaise; smoked salmon, trout and mussels; and a kilogram of Stilton cheese. Others contained bottles of claret, white wine, champagne, and Talisker whisky despite the kingdom’s ban of alcohol.

In a move similar to Russian efforts to influence European politics, Saudi Arabia has also forged close ties to conservative and far-right groups in Europe that include the Danish People’s Party and the Sweden Democrats as well as other Islamophobes, according to the member of the European parliament Eldar Mamedov.

Writing on LobeLog, Mamedov said the kingdom frequently worked through the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) bloc, the third largest grouping in the European parliament. Saudi Arabia also enjoyed the support of European Parliament member Mario Borghezio of Italy’s Lega, who is a member of Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF), a bloc of far-right parties in the parliament.

The kingdom’s strategy, in a twist of irony, although in pursuit of different goals, resembles to a degree that of one of its nemeses, Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest Muslim non-governmental organisation that has opposition to Saudi Arabia’s puritan strand of Islam carved into its DNA and has forged close ties to the European right and far-right in its bid to reform the faith.

The Saudi strategy could prove tricky, particularly in the United States, dependent on the evolution of US special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into foreign interference in the 2016 election that brought President Donald J Trump to the office.

Mueller reportedly is set in court filings to unveil efforts by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the kingdom’s closest ally, to influence American politics. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) 
&nbsp;

Traditionally focussed on ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim Islam, Saudi funding in the era of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been streamlined and finetuned to ensure that it serves his geopolitical ambitions, primarily stymying the expansion of Iranian influence in the Middle East and North Africa and enhancing the kingdom’s global impact.

Traditionally focussed on ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim Islam, Saudi funding in the era of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been streamlined and finetuned to ensure that it serves his geopolitical ambitions, primarily stymying the expansion of Iranian influence in the Middle East and North Africa and enhancing the kingdom’s global impact. The effort, however, has so far produced a mixed bag. Spending is down but more targeted. Saudi Arabia has handed over control of the Grand Mosque in Brussels in a move designed to demonstrate its newly found moderation and reduce the reputational damage of Saudi ultra-conservative management that had become contentious in Belgium. Yet, monies still flowed to militant, ultra-conservative Madrassas or religious seminaries that dot the Pakistani-Iranian border. The kingdom’s focus, moreover, has shifted in selected countries to the promotion of a strand of Salafi ultra-conservatism that preaches absolute obedience to the ruler, a corollary to Prince Mohammed’s crackdown on critics and activists at home. Saudi governmental, non-governmental organisations that once distributed the kingdom’s largesse to advance ultra-conservatism as well as officials have adopted the language of tolerance and respect and principles of inter-faith but have little tangible change at home to back it up. To be sure, Prince Mohammed has lifted the ban on women’s driving, enhanced women’s work and leisure opportunities and kickstarted the creation of a modern entertainment industry but none of these measures amount to his promise to foster an unidentified but truly moderate form of Islam. The prince’s moves, moreover, have been accompanied by an embrace of the European right and far-right, as well as, Western ultra-conservative groups that by and large are hardly beacons of tolerance and mutual respect. “Saudi Arabia with MBS as Crown Prince has not been advocating Islamic religious reform,” said Middle East scholar HA Hellyer, referring to the Saudi leader by his initials. “The existing Saudi religious establishment has not been encouraged to engage in a genuine rethinking of its ideas that draws it closer to the normative Sunni mainstream, nor listen to existing Saudi religious scholars who advocate more normative and mainstream approaches. Rather, the establishment has been muzzled. MBS’s ‘reforms’ in this arena are about centralising power—they are not about restoring the Saudi religious establishment to a normative Sunnism,” Hellyer added. Prince Mohammed’s interest in non-Muslim, ultra-conservative groups in the West fits a global pattern, highlighted by political scientists Yascha Mounk and Roberto Stefan Foa, in which technological advances and the increased importance of soft power that lie at the root of Russian intervention in elections in the United States and Europe, have revealed the information and public relations policies of multiple autocratic states. Technology and soft power, according to Messrs. Mounk and Foa, are likely to spark greater efforts by authoritarians and autocrats in general to influence Western nations and undermine confidence in democracy. “Indeed, China is already stepping up ideological pressure on its overseas residents and establishing influential Confucius Institutes in major centres of learning. And over the past two years, Saudi Arabia has dramatically upped its payments to registered US lobbyists, increasing the number of registered foreign agents working on its behalf from 25 to 145… The rise of authoritarian soft power is already apparent across a variety of domains, including academia, popular culture, foreign investment, and development aid,” Messrs. Mounk and Foa said. Saudi Arabia alongside other Gulf states, including the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait, as well as China, have furthermore been major donors to Western universities and think tanks and developed media outlets of their own such as Qatar’s Al Jazeera, Turkey’s TRT World China’s CCTV, and Russia’s RT that reach global audiences. They compete with the likes of the BBC and CNN. The need for Saudi Arabia to acquire soft power was driven home by mounting Western criticism of its war in Yemen and condemnation of the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi on the premises of the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. The Saudi effort to do so by garnering conservative, right-wing and far-right support was evident in Northern Ireland. Investigating a remarkable campaign by Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), a key support pillar of British prime minister Teresa May’s government, in favour of Britain’s exit from the European Union, Irish Times columnist Fintan O'Toole suggested that a senior member of Saudi Arabia’s ruling family and former head of the country’s intelligence service, Prince Nawwaf bin Abdul Aziz al Saud, as well as its just replaced ambassador to Britain, had funded the anti-Brexit effort through a commercial tie-up with a relatively obscure Scottish conservative activist of modest means, Richard Cook. The ambassador, Prince Nawaf’s son, Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf al Saud, was Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Britain until last month’s Saudi cabinet reshuffle. “It may be entirely coincidental that the man who channelled £425,622 to the DUP had such extremely high-level Saudi connections. We simply don’t know. We also don’t know whether the… Saudi ambassador had any knowledge of his father’s connection to Richard Cook,” O’Toole said. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has invited dozens of British members of parliament on all-expenses paid visits to the kingdom and showered at least 50 members of the government, including May, with enormous hampers of food weighing up to 18 pounds. One package destined for a member of the House of Lords included seaweed and garlic mayonnaise; smoked salmon, trout and mussels; and a kilogram of Stilton cheese. Others contained bottles of claret, white wine, champagne, and Talisker whisky despite the kingdom’s ban of alcohol. In a move similar to Russian efforts to influence European politics, Saudi Arabia has also forged close ties to conservative and far-right groups in Europe that include the Danish People’s Party and the Sweden Democrats as well as other Islamophobes, according to the member of the European parliament Eldar Mamedov. Writing on LobeLog, Mamedov said the kingdom frequently worked through the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) bloc, the third largest grouping in the European parliament. Saudi Arabia also enjoyed the support of European Parliament member Mario Borghezio of Italy’s Lega, who is a member of Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF), a bloc of far-right parties in the parliament. The kingdom’s strategy, in a twist of irony, although in pursuit of different goals, resembles to a degree that of one of its nemeses, Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest Muslim non-governmental organisation that has opposition to Saudi Arabia’s puritan strand of Islam carved into its DNA and has forged close ties to the European right and far-right in its bid to reform the faith. The Saudi strategy could prove tricky, particularly in the United States, dependent on the evolution of US special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into foreign interference in the 2016 election that brought President Donald J Trump to the office. Mueller reportedly is set in court filings to unveil efforts by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the kingdom’s closest ally, to influence American politics. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Saudi Arabia and the West’s right-wing: A dubious alliance

By Gary Grappo

The December 14 Senate votes to end US military aid for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen and to condemn Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for his responsibility in the death of journalist Jamal Khashoggi mark a watershed moment in US-Saudi Arabia relations. The actions by the American congressional body are a significant departure not only from the policy of the Trump administration but also from the norm of US-Saudi relations dating back to 1945. Today, the three pillars on which US-Saudi relations sit — the administration, the Congress and American business — are becoming anxiously unstable for the House of Saud and the US administration.

The historic decisions by the Senate were a predictable result of a briefing provided by CIA Director Gina Haspel, during which she effectively fingered the de facto ruler of the kingdom for the horrific murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October. Though not provided to all members, the briefing was reportedly so convincing, that of those who did attend, many left the session “outraged” at the Crown Prince’s behaviour.

“There is not a smoking gun, there’s a smoking saw,” declared Senator Lindsey Graham, a Republican from South Carolina and otherwise stalwart supporter of President Donald Trump. The senator’s assertion stood in stark contrast to Trump’s unconvincing and capricious excusal, “Maybe he did, maybe he didn’t.”

A relationship in turmoil

The vote to cut off aid means that while the Crown Prince’s prosecution of the Yemen War may be safe for now — the House of Representatives did not vote on the measure — it will be in jeopardy when the new Democratic-controlled House convenes next month. That war has been a disaster on many counts, not least of which the high rate of Yemeni casualties — over 10,000 deaths (though likely as much as five times higher) and 14 million facing starvation.

For Saudi Arabia, the war has been an embarrassment. The nation with the world’s third highest defence budget has been unable to defeat a ragtag Houthi rebel army. It begs the question of how much worse their performance would have been without American (and other Western) assistance. Imagine if Riyadh had to deliver on some of the Crown Prince’s bluster against Iran, whose military and paramilitary forces are far more numerous and infinitely more capable than the hapless Houthis. So, the Senate’s action, though toothless for now, taken in conjunction with the ceasefire negotiated in Stockholm, spells good news for a Yemeni population in desperate need after nearly four years of war and deprivation.

The Senate’s unanimous condemnation of Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS, will be more significant for the US-Saudi relationship. Though MBS’ position appears secure for the moment — and all evidence points to his likely ascension to the Saudi throne after his father, King Salman — he will be forever marked by the US Congress for his role in the Khashoggi execution. It is difficult to see how he overcomes such an unprecedented handicap as the leader of a nation previously viewed as one of America’s most important allies. In fact, it would be hard to find the leader of any close American ally in recent history with such a cloud over his head.

This ought to register on the minds of every member of the House of Saud. As important as the relationship is for the US, it is indispensable and fundamental to Riyadh. The folly in Yemen is a perfect example of why the kingdom must maintain its close relations with Washington and, most importantly, the American defensive backstop that comes with it.

Critical to maintaining that relationship has been the congressional support nearly always given to every administration’s Saudi policy starting in 1945 under President Franklin Roosevelt. The Senate’s votes, and those likely to follow when the new Congress takes office next month will mean that fulsome support can no longer be assumed. To be sure, the relationship unquestionably remains in American and Saudi national interests. But the kind of support that the Saudis could previously count on and the usually friendly reception it got on The Hill are no longer certain and, in fact, highly doubtful.

Backed into Royal corner

For the Trump administration, which has placed so much stock on both the president’s and his son-in-law’s personal relationships with the Crown Prince, the Senate actions are especially painful. The president can no longer look to the Republican-controlled Congress to back him up on the kingdom. Donald Trump and Jared Kushner must now dance to a much different tune.

Those personal relations have attracted added scrutiny of late. First, there is the recent New York Times report of the inordinately close relationship between Kushner and Mohammed bin Salman. The relationship is particularly unsettling given Kushner’s lack of diplomatic or military experience and ignorance about the Middle East region generally, and Saudi Arabia specifically. It calls into question who may be using whom.

Then, there is the more recent revelation that Kushner may have dispensed advice to MBS after the latter’s dispatching of Khashoggi. In addition to the potential criminal element in that action, there is also the violation of standard White House and State Department protocol, namely the absence of other officials on the call, not to mention simple common sense. Finally, there comes word that Special Counsel Robert Mueller may be extending his investigation into the Trump campaign to possible illicit involvement of Middle Eastern governments, including Saudi Arabia’s. Are the kingdom and its crown prince becoming a liability for this White House?

Business becomes nervous

The third leg of the US-Saudi relationship has been the attendant support the kingdom typically received from US businesses and banks. But there is apparent and growing disenchantment of international investors with the kingdom, who view it as less than a good bet these days. In fact, businesses saw the writing on the wall considerably sooner than the Senate votes and the Khashoggi affair. After MBS detained hundreds of Saudi Arabia’s exalted business elite in the Ritz Carlton for an extended period and imposed a blockade on fellow Gulf Cooperation Council member Qatar in June 2017, international business questioned the judgment, business acumen and ultimate political intentions of the brash crown prince who had committed to vault Saudi Arabia’s non-oil sector to unprecedented levels.

Today, the platform of the US-Saudi relationship is seriously out of kilter. Two of the three pillars on which it rests — Congressional backing and business support — have been weakened. The third cannot now be considered a certainty in a post-Trump White House. And with the mercurial, impulsive and politically toxic Mohammed bin Salman at the helm, it is difficult to see how the sides can come together to rebalance this vital relationship to serve their mutual interests.

 
(Gary Grappo is a former US ambassador and a distinguished fellow at the Center for Middle East Studies at the Korbel School for International Studies)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/senate-saudi-arabia-vote-war-yemen-mbs-jamal-khashoggi-gulf-news-16521/">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

 
&nbsp;

By Gary Grappo The December 14 Senate votes to end US military aid for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen and to condemn Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for his responsibility in the death of journalist Jamal Khashoggi mark a watershed moment in US-Saudi Arabia relations.

By Gary Grappo The December 14 Senate votes to end US military aid for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen and to condemn Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for his responsibility in the death of journalist Jamal Khashoggi mark a watershed moment in US-Saudi Arabia relations. The actions by the American congressional body are a significant departure not only from the policy of the Trump administration but also from the norm of US-Saudi relations dating back to 1945. Today, the three pillars on which US-Saudi relations sit — the administration, the Congress and American business — are becoming anxiously unstable for the House of Saud and the US administration. The historic decisions by the Senate were a predictable result of a briefing provided by CIA Director Gina Haspel, during which she effectively fingered the de facto ruler of the kingdom for the horrific murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October. Though not provided to all members, the briefing was reportedly so convincing, that of those who did attend, many left the session “outraged” at the Crown Prince’s behaviour. “There is not a smoking gun, there’s a smoking saw,” declared Senator Lindsey Graham, a Republican from South Carolina and otherwise stalwart supporter of President Donald Trump. The senator’s assertion stood in stark contrast to Trump’s unconvincing and capricious excusal, “Maybe he did, maybe he didn’t.” A relationship in turmoil The vote to cut off aid means that while the Crown Prince’s prosecution of the Yemen War may be safe for now — the House of Representatives did not vote on the measure — it will be in jeopardy when the new Democratic-controlled House convenes next month. That war has been a disaster on many counts, not least of which the high rate of Yemeni casualties — over 10,000 deaths (though likely as much as five times higher) and 14 million facing starvation. For Saudi Arabia, the war has been an embarrassment. The nation with the world’s third highest defence budget has been unable to defeat a ragtag Houthi rebel army. It begs the question of how much worse their performance would have been without American (and other Western) assistance. Imagine if Riyadh had to deliver on some of the Crown Prince’s bluster against Iran, whose military and paramilitary forces are far more numerous and infinitely more capable than the hapless Houthis. So, the Senate’s action, though toothless for now, taken in conjunction with the ceasefire negotiated in Stockholm, spells good news for a Yemeni population in desperate need after nearly four years of war and deprivation. The Senate’s unanimous condemnation of Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS, will be more significant for the US-Saudi relationship. Though MBS’ position appears secure for the moment — and all evidence points to his likely ascension to the Saudi throne after his father, King Salman — he will be forever marked by the US Congress for his role in the Khashoggi execution. It is difficult to see how he overcomes such an unprecedented handicap as the leader of a nation previously viewed as one of America’s most important allies. In fact, it would be hard to find the leader of any close American ally in recent history with such a cloud over his head. This ought to register on the minds of every member of the House of Saud. As important as the relationship is for the US, it is indispensable and fundamental to Riyadh. The folly in Yemen is a perfect example of why the kingdom must maintain its close relations with Washington and, most importantly, the American defensive backstop that comes with it. Critical to maintaining that relationship has been the congressional support nearly always given to every administration’s Saudi policy starting in 1945 under President Franklin Roosevelt. The Senate’s votes, and those likely to follow when the new Congress takes office next month will mean that fulsome support can no longer be assumed. To be sure, the relationship unquestionably remains in American and Saudi national interests. But the kind of support that the Saudis could previously count on and the usually friendly reception it got on The Hill are no longer certain and, in fact, highly doubtful. Backed into Royal corner For the Trump administration, which has placed so much stock on both the president’s and his son-in-law’s personal relationships with the Crown Prince, the Senate actions are especially painful. The president can no longer look to the Republican-controlled Congress to back him up on the kingdom. Donald Trump and Jared Kushner must now dance to a much different tune. Those personal relations have attracted added scrutiny of late. First, there is the recent New York Times report of the inordinately close relationship between Kushner and Mohammed bin Salman. The relationship is particularly unsettling given Kushner’s lack of diplomatic or military experience and ignorance about the Middle East region generally, and Saudi Arabia specifically. It calls into question who may be using whom. Then, there is the more recent revelation that Kushner may have dispensed advice to MBS after the latter’s dispatching of Khashoggi. In addition to the potential criminal element in that action, there is also the violation of standard White House and State Department protocol, namely the absence of other officials on the call, not to mention simple common sense. Finally, there comes word that Special Counsel Robert Mueller may be extending his investigation into the Trump campaign to possible illicit involvement of Middle Eastern governments, including Saudi Arabia’s. Are the kingdom and its crown prince becoming a liability for this White House? Business becomes nervous The third leg of the US-Saudi relationship has been the attendant support the kingdom typically received from US businesses and banks. But there is apparent and growing disenchantment of international investors with the kingdom, who view it as less than a good bet these days. In fact, businesses saw the writing on the wall considerably sooner than the Senate votes and the Khashoggi affair. After MBS detained hundreds of Saudi Arabia’s exalted business elite in the Ritz Carlton for an extended period and imposed a blockade on fellow Gulf Cooperation Council member Qatar in June 2017, international business questioned the judgment, business acumen and ultimate political intentions of the brash crown prince who had committed to vault Saudi Arabia’s non-oil sector to unprecedented levels. Today, the platform of the US-Saudi relationship is seriously out of kilter. Two of the three pillars on which it rests — Congressional backing and business support — have been weakened. The third cannot now be considered a certainty in a post-Trump White House. And with the mercurial, impulsive and politically toxic Mohammed bin Salman at the helm, it is difficult to see how the sides can come together to rebalance this vital relationship to serve their mutual interests. (Gary Grappo is a former US ambassador and a distinguished fellow at the Center for Middle East Studies at the Korbel School for International Studies) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Are Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince becoming a liability for the White House?

Khashoggi Murder: CIA says that Arab Crown Prince ordered the killing

As Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman tours friendly Arab nations ahead of the Group of 20 (G-20) industrialised nations summit in Argentina, Saudi diplomacy aims to achieve two goals: put the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi behind it and thwart Qatari efforts to benefit from the kingdom’s predicament.

The Saudi campaign is producing predictably mixed results. It is proving successful with nations willing to back it for political, financial or economic gain, such as Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia, and Palestine or nations like the United Arab Emirates, Russia and China that share Saudi Arabia’s illiberal, authoritarian values.

Prince Mohammed and the kingdom’s ties to Western nations, even those like the United States that have opted for maintaining close ties in the face of mounting criticism in their national legislatures, hang in the balance despite having survived the storm so far.

With the US Congress gearing up for potential action against Saudi Arabia, not only because of the October 2 killing of Khashoggi in the kingdom’s Istanbul consulate but also the humanitarian crisis sparked by Saudi military intervention in Yemen, President Donald J Trump has no plans to meet Prince Mohammed one on one at this weekend’s G-20 gathering.

Much like Trump’s decision may be perceived as a public slap, it does not suggest that Trump has backed away from his determination to shield US-Saudi relations and the crown prince from the potential fallout of the Khashoggi killing.

Similarly, Britain this week went ahead with joint exercises of the British and Saudi air forces although the United Kingdom has left open the possibility of imposing sanctions if the killing proves to have been government-sanctioned rather than an operation by rogue elements.

One key focus of the Saudi campaign appears to be Palestine and Iraq, countries not on Prince Mohammed’s travel schedule but where Qatar, that has been resisting an 18-month old Saudi-UAE-led economic and diplomatic boycott, stands to benefit from the Khashoggi crisis and that figure prominently in Trump’s designs for the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia this month said that it had transferred $60 million to President Mahmoud Abbas’ Palestine Authority, financially strapped as a result of the Trump administration cutting hundreds of millions of dollars in funding of the authority as well as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (Unwra) that supports Palestinian refugees.

Saudi Arabia’s resumption of funding followed several Palestinian statements in the last two months supporting the kingdom’s assertion that it had not sanctioned the killing of Khashoggi and expressing confidence in the Saudi judiciary’s ability to mete out justice to the culprits.

Saudi Arabia, ostensibly at Prince Mohammed’s behest, had in the past year withheld payments to the Palestine Authority because of its refusal to engage with the United States following Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the authority’s support for Turkey’s leadership in rallying Muslim opposition to US policy.

The resumption of funding is also in line with King Salman’s intervention in the last year insisting that the kingdom was committed to Palestinian rights, including declaring East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state.

It also coincided with Israeli acquiescence in the flow of $150 million from Qatar to Gaza, controlled by Islamist Hamas, in a bid to alleviate the crippling impact of an Israeli-Egyptian blockade of the region and prevent tension between Israel and the group spinning out of control.

Beyond countering expanding Qatari influence, the Saudi move is likely to increase the kingdom’s leverage in pressuring the Palestine Authority to back off its refusal to entertain a mooted US Israeli-Palestinian peace plan that has yet to be made public but would be stillborn without Palestinian participation.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are competing for influence in Iraq, another battleground that is important to both the United States and the kingdom because of the close ties between Iraq and Iran.

Senior Saudi and Qatari officials have frequented Baghdad in recent weeks as Iraq’s new prime minister, Adel Abdul Mahdi, puts his cabinet together and pushes an ambitious economic development plan that is dependent on foreign investment.

Even though Iraq is likely to balance relations between the two Gulf rivals, it is also not going to trouble its burgeoning relationship with the kingdom by speaking out on the Khashoggi issue.

Prince Mohammed, despite protests in Tunisia, the only country on the crown prince’s itinerary that has not brutally suppressed freedom of expression, and a legal challenge in Argentina, which could curtail his future travel plans even if it does not stop him from attending the G-20 summit, has proven in recent days that he is not universally persona non grata.

Nonetheless, his reception in Argentina by world leaders is likely to be a litmus test of the degree of reputational damage that he and the kingdom have suffered. Trump’s apparent hesitancy to meet separately with the crown prince could set the tone if indeed the president sticks by his initial decision. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

As Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman tours friendly Arab nations ahead of the Group of 20 (G-20) industrialised nations summit in Argentina, Saudi diplomacy aims to achieve two goals: put the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi behind it and thwart Qatari efforts to benefit from the kingdom’s predicament.

As Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman tours friendly Arab nations ahead of the Group of 20 (G-20) industrialised nations summit in Argentina, Saudi diplomacy aims to achieve two goals: put the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi behind it and thwart Qatari efforts to benefit from the kingdom’s predicament. The Saudi campaign is producing predictably mixed results. It is proving successful with nations willing to back it for political, financial or economic gain, such as Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia, and Palestine or nations like the United Arab Emirates, Russia and China that share Saudi Arabia’s illiberal, authoritarian values. Prince Mohammed and the kingdom’s ties to Western nations, even those like the United States that have opted for maintaining close ties in the face of mounting criticism in their national legislatures, hang in the balance despite having survived the storm so far. With the US Congress gearing up for potential action against Saudi Arabia, not only because of the October 2 killing of Khashoggi in the kingdom’s Istanbul consulate but also the humanitarian crisis sparked by Saudi military intervention in Yemen, President Donald J Trump has no plans to meet Prince Mohammed one on one at this weekend’s G-20 gathering. Much like Trump’s decision may be perceived as a public slap, it does not suggest that Trump has backed away from his determination to shield US-Saudi relations and the crown prince from the potential fallout of the Khashoggi killing. Similarly, Britain this week went ahead with joint exercises of the British and Saudi air forces although the United Kingdom has left open the possibility of imposing sanctions if the killing proves to have been government-sanctioned rather than an operation by rogue elements. One key focus of the Saudi campaign appears to be Palestine and Iraq, countries not on Prince Mohammed’s travel schedule but where Qatar, that has been resisting an 18-month old Saudi-UAE-led economic and diplomatic boycott, stands to benefit from the Khashoggi crisis and that figure prominently in Trump’s designs for the Middle East. Saudi Arabia this month said that it had transferred $60 million to President Mahmoud Abbas’ Palestine Authority, financially strapped as a result of the Trump administration cutting hundreds of millions of dollars in funding of the authority as well as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (Unwra) that supports Palestinian refugees. Saudi Arabia’s resumption of funding followed several Palestinian statements in the last two months supporting the kingdom’s assertion that it had not sanctioned the killing of Khashoggi and expressing confidence in the Saudi judiciary’s ability to mete out justice to the culprits. Saudi Arabia, ostensibly at Prince Mohammed’s behest, had in the past year withheld payments to the Palestine Authority because of its refusal to engage with the United States following Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the authority’s support for Turkey’s leadership in rallying Muslim opposition to US policy. The resumption of funding is also in line with King Salman’s intervention in the last year insisting that the kingdom was committed to Palestinian rights, including declaring East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state. It also coincided with Israeli acquiescence in the flow of $150 million from Qatar to Gaza, controlled by Islamist Hamas, in a bid to alleviate the crippling impact of an Israeli-Egyptian blockade of the region and prevent tension between Israel and the group spinning out of control. Beyond countering expanding Qatari influence, the Saudi move is likely to increase the kingdom’s leverage in pressuring the Palestine Authority to back off its refusal to entertain a mooted US Israeli-Palestinian peace plan that has yet to be made public but would be stillborn without Palestinian participation. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are competing for influence in Iraq, another battleground that is important to both the United States and the kingdom because of the close ties between Iraq and Iran. Senior Saudi and Qatari officials have frequented Baghdad in recent weeks as Iraq’s new prime minister, Adel Abdul Mahdi, puts his cabinet together and pushes an ambitious economic development plan that is dependent on foreign investment. Even though Iraq is likely to balance relations between the two Gulf rivals, it is also not going to trouble its burgeoning relationship with the kingdom by speaking out on the Khashoggi issue. Prince Mohammed, despite protests in Tunisia, the only country on the crown prince’s itinerary that has not brutally suppressed freedom of expression, and a legal challenge in Argentina, which could curtail his future travel plans even if it does not stop him from attending the G-20 summit, has proven in recent days that he is not universally persona non grata. Nonetheless, his reception in Argentina by world leaders is likely to be a litmus test of the degree of reputational damage that he and the kingdom have suffered. Trump’s apparent hesitancy to meet separately with the crown prince could set the tone if indeed the president sticks by his initial decision. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

How Saudi and Qatar are competing over Iraq

When Saudi General Khalid bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz went shopping in the late 1980s for Chinese medium-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear, chemical or biological warheads he made no bones about keeping the United States, one of the kingdom’s closest allies, in the dark.

It was “my task to negotiate the deal, devise an appropriate deception plan, choose a team of Saudi officers and men and arrange for their training in both Saudi Arabia and China, build and defend operation bases and storage facilities in different parts of the kingdom, arrange for the shipment of the missiles from China and, at every stage, be ready to defend the project against sabotage or any form of attack,” General Bin Sultan, a son of the late Saudi crown prince and defense minister, Sultan bin Abdul Aziz al Saud, and commander of the US-led international alliance that forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait in 1991, recounted in his memoir.

The incident coupled with more recent Saudi statements and the kingdom’s inability to present from the outset a credible and sustainable version of events surrounding the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi on the premises of its Istanbul consulate is complicating its negotiations with the United States for the acquisition of designs for nuclear power plants, a deal valued at up to $80 billion depending on how many Saudi Arabia ultimately decides to build.

Prospects of a massive deal go to the heart of US President Donald J Trump’s jobs and deals-focussed America First policy. Yet, growing criticism and distrust of Saudi Arabia in the US Congress and intelligence community as a result of the Khashoggi crisis and the kingdom’s handling of the Yemen war that has sparked the world’s worst humanitarian crisis since World War Two are likely to strengthen efforts to thwart an agreement that honours Saudi insistence on producing its own nuclear fuel, even though it could buy it more cheaply abroad.

The Saudi insistence has fuelled concerns that the kingdom may divert their fuel for military purposes. Those kinds of fears coupled with Iran’s ballistic missile program drove world powers to first sanction Iran and then conclude a 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program. Trump withdrew from the agreement earlier this year, charging that it did not provide sufficient guarantees that Iran would not be able to develop a nuclear weapon.

Democrats in the US Congress have described refusing to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear technology as proper punishment for the killing of Khashoggi that the kingdom insists was done without the knowledge of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

While the Trump administration has as yet not abandoned long-standing strict US nuclear export safeguards to secure a deal with Saudi Arabia, it has also not unambiguously said that it would uphold them.

Like with his rejection of hard-hitting sanctions in the wake of the Khashoggi killing, Trump is likely to ultimately argue that if the United States does not conclude a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, countries like China, Russia and South Korea, that have less strict controls will. The argument amounts to the equivalent of committing a wrong because if one doesn’t, someone else will.

Saudi officials have repeatedly insisted that the kingdom is developing nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes such as medicine, electricity generation, and desalination of sea water. They say that Saudi Arabia is committed to putting its future facilities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Yet, with a $56 billion military budget for 2018, Saudi Arabia is stepping up the development of a domestic military industry. The kingdom aims to source 50 per cent of its military procurement domestically by 2030, up from its current two per cent.

Speaking to CBS earlier this year, Prince Mohammed appeared to put conditions on Saudi nuclear assurances by warning that “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”

In putting forward &nbsp;demands for parity with Iran by getting the right to controlled enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spent fuel into plutonium, potential building blocks for nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia was also seen as potentially backing away from a 2009 memorandum of understanding with the United States in which it pledged to acquire nuclear fuel from international markets.

Nuclear energy cooperation was one of a host of agreements concluded last year by Saudi Arabia and China during a visit to Beijing by Saudi King Salman. The agreement included a feasibility study for the construction of high-temperature gas-cooled (HTGR) nuclear power plants in the kingdom as well as cooperation in intellectual property and the development of a domestic industrial supply chain for HTGRs built in Saudi Arabia. The HTGR agreement built on an accord signed in 2012 that involved maintenance and development of nuclear power plants and research reactors, as well as the provision of Chinese nuclear fuel.

A report by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) released shortly after the king’s visit warned that the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement had “not eliminated the kingdom’s desire for nuclear weapons capabilities and even nuclear weapons.”

Much like the era of General Bin Sultan, potential Chinese sales to Saudi Arabia of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles remain one of the murkier areas of Sino-Saudi military cooperation.

Military experts say that satellite imagery of missile bases in Saudi Arabia in recent years and other open-source circumstantial evidence, including Saudi press coverage of graduation ceremonies at the kingdom’s Strategic Missile Force school in Wadi ad-Dawasir, attest to ongoing transfers.

Saudi Arabia in 2014 showcased Chinese-made Dongfeng-3 missiles that have a range of up to 5,000 kilometres. Media reports said the missiles had been purchased in 2007, possibly with US acquiescence.

“Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in conventional ballistic and cruise missiles to provide the kingdom a shot of strategic deterrence,” said non-proliferation expert Jeffrey Lewis. Lewis’ conclusion was confirmed by Anwar Eshqi, a retired Saudi major general and advisor to the Saudi military.

“The Saudi military did indeed receive DF-21 missiles from China and the integration of the missiles, including a full maintenance check and upgraded facilities, is complete, “ Eshqi said referring to the People’s Republic’s East Wind solid-fuel, medium-range ballistic missile. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

When Saudi General Khalid bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz went shopping in the late 1980s for Chinese medium-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear, chemical or biological warheads he made no bones about keeping the United States, one of the kingdom’s closest allies, in the dark.

When Saudi General Khalid bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz went shopping in the late 1980s for Chinese medium-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear, chemical or biological warheads he made no bones about keeping the United States, one of the kingdom’s closest allies, in the dark. It was “my task to negotiate the deal, devise an appropriate deception plan, choose a team of Saudi officers and men and arrange for their training in both Saudi Arabia and China, build and defend operation bases and storage facilities in different parts of the kingdom, arrange for the shipment of the missiles from China and, at every stage, be ready to defend the project against sabotage or any form of attack,” General Bin Sultan, a son of the late Saudi crown prince and defense minister, Sultan bin Abdul Aziz al Saud, and commander of the US-led international alliance that forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait in 1991, recounted in his memoir. The incident coupled with more recent Saudi statements and the kingdom’s inability to present from the outset a credible and sustainable version of events surrounding the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi on the premises of its Istanbul consulate is complicating its negotiations with the United States for the acquisition of designs for nuclear power plants, a deal valued at up to $80 billion depending on how many Saudi Arabia ultimately decides to build. Prospects of a massive deal go to the heart of US President Donald J Trump’s jobs and deals-focussed America First policy. Yet, growing criticism and distrust of Saudi Arabia in the US Congress and intelligence community as a result of the Khashoggi crisis and the kingdom’s handling of the Yemen war that has sparked the world’s worst humanitarian crisis since World War Two are likely to strengthen efforts to thwart an agreement that honours Saudi insistence on producing its own nuclear fuel, even though it could buy it more cheaply abroad. The Saudi insistence has fuelled concerns that the kingdom may divert their fuel for military purposes. Those kinds of fears coupled with Iran’s ballistic missile program drove world powers to first sanction Iran and then conclude a 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program. Trump withdrew from the agreement earlier this year, charging that it did not provide sufficient guarantees that Iran would not be able to develop a nuclear weapon. Democrats in the US Congress have described refusing to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear technology as proper punishment for the killing of Khashoggi that the kingdom insists was done without the knowledge of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. While the Trump administration has as yet not abandoned long-standing strict US nuclear export safeguards to secure a deal with Saudi Arabia, it has also not unambiguously said that it would uphold them. Like with his rejection of hard-hitting sanctions in the wake of the Khashoggi killing, Trump is likely to ultimately argue that if the United States does not conclude a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, countries like China, Russia and South Korea, that have less strict controls will. The argument amounts to the equivalent of committing a wrong because if one doesn’t, someone else will. Saudi officials have repeatedly insisted that the kingdom is developing nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes such as medicine, electricity generation, and desalination of sea water. They say that Saudi Arabia is committed to putting its future facilities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Yet, with a $56 billion military budget for 2018, Saudi Arabia is stepping up the development of a domestic military industry. The kingdom aims to source 50 per cent of its military procurement domestically by 2030, up from its current two per cent. Speaking to CBS earlier this year, Prince Mohammed appeared to put conditions on Saudi nuclear assurances by warning that “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” In putting forward demands for parity with Iran by getting the right to controlled enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spent fuel into plutonium, potential building blocks for nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia was also seen as potentially backing away from a 2009 memorandum of understanding with the United States in which it pledged to acquire nuclear fuel from international markets. Nuclear energy cooperation was one of a host of agreements concluded last year by Saudi Arabia and China during a visit to Beijing by Saudi King Salman. The agreement included a feasibility study for the construction of high-temperature gas-cooled (HTGR) nuclear power plants in the kingdom as well as cooperation in intellectual property and the development of a domestic industrial supply chain for HTGRs built in Saudi Arabia. The HTGR agreement built on an accord signed in 2012 that involved maintenance and development of nuclear power plants and research reactors, as well as the provision of Chinese nuclear fuel. A report by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) released shortly after the king’s visit warned that the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement had “not eliminated the kingdom’s desire for nuclear weapons capabilities and even nuclear weapons.” Much like the era of General Bin Sultan, potential Chinese sales to Saudi Arabia of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles remain one of the murkier areas of Sino-Saudi military cooperation. Military experts say that satellite imagery of missile bases in Saudi Arabia in recent years and other open-source circumstantial evidence, including Saudi press coverage of graduation ceremonies at the kingdom’s Strategic Missile Force school in Wadi ad-Dawasir, attest to ongoing transfers. Saudi Arabia in 2014 showcased Chinese-made Dongfeng-3 missiles that have a range of up to 5,000 kilometres. Media reports said the missiles had been purchased in 2007, possibly with US acquiescence. “Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in conventional ballistic and cruise missiles to provide the kingdom a shot of strategic deterrence,” said non-proliferation expert Jeffrey Lewis. Lewis’ conclusion was confirmed by Anwar Eshqi, a retired Saudi major general and advisor to the Saudi military. “The Saudi military did indeed receive DF-21 missiles from China and the integration of the missiles, including a full maintenance check and upgraded facilities, is complete, “ Eshqi said referring to the People’s Republic’s East Wind solid-fuel, medium-range ballistic missile. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

What Khashoggi killing means for US-Saudi Nuclear talks

Breaking News: Crown Prince's recorded order to kill Khashogggi in possession of CIA

The killers of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi may have gotten more than they bargained for.

The killing has sparked multiple battles that are likely in coming months to shape relationships ranging from that between the United States and Saudi Arabia to those between US President Donald J Trump, his Republican party, the US Congress, and the country’s intelligence community.

The fallout of the killing could also shape Trump’s ability to pursue his policy goals in the Middle East, including forcing Iran to its knees and imposing a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Rather than putting an end to differences over how to respond to &nbsp;Khashoggi’s killing, Trump’s decision to stand by Saudi Arabia and its crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, irrespective of who may have been responsible for the murder, marks the opening of a new round in what prominent journalist Rami Khouri dubbed “a new era in the Khashoggi case.”

The battles are likely to be fought on multiple fronts. One venue will be the Group of 20 (G-20) summit at the end of this month in Argentina with Prince Mohammed, whom the Central Intelligence Agency and many in the US Congress believe to be responsible for the killing, in attendance.

How Prince Mohammed is received at the summit is certain to indicate to what degree the crown prince’s international standing has been tarnished and may constitute a reality check for him of the damage Saudi Arabia has suffered as a result of Khashoggi’s killing.

It will also serve as one indication of how much of a battle Trump may have to fight in seeking to ensure that Prince Mohammed remains insulated from consequences of Khashoggi’s death.

To be sure, Prince Mohammed decided to attend the G-20 summit prior to Trump’s decision to take no further action against Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, by attending the crown prince, emboldened by Trump’s support, “is daring his international critics to put their rhetoric into action and betting that they won't," said Gulf scholar Kristian Ulrichsen.

The stakes for both Trump and Prince Mohammed are high.

In leaking its conclusion that Prince Mohammed was responsible for the killing, the CIA was sending two messages: its willingness to take on Trump against the backdrop of a long-strained relationship between the president and the intelligence community and the suggestion that the agency does not believe that Prince Mohammed’s survival as king-in-waiting is crucial to US national security or the stability of the kingdom.

Both messages feed into what potentially constitutes the first major policy confrontation between Trump, the Republican party and Congress. The anti-Saudi sentiment was mounting in Congress already before Khashoggi’s killing because of Saudi conduct of its war in Yemen that has created the worst humanitarian crisis since World War Two. The killing appears to be propelling the Congress into action.

The CIA’s implicit challenging of Trump’s assessment of the importance of Prince Mohammed was followed by a report &nbsp;by the Washington-based Center for International Policy that concluded that US arms sales to the kingdom accounted for fewer than 20,000 US jobs a year – a far cry from the hundreds of thousands of jobs asserted by the president.

Prince Mohammed’s reception at the G-20 summit coupled with the outcome of the potential battle between Trump, the CIA and Congress could also shape developments in Saudi Arabia.

The kingdom has so far dug in its heels with King Salman relying on concepts of prestige and honour as well as patronage to signal full support for his son while Prince Mohammed appears to be trying to show that Saudi Arabia is not wholly dependent on the United States.

Bolstering the Center for International Policy report, Reuters reported this week seeing a letter pre-dating the Khashoggi killing in which Prince Mohammed instructs the defence ministry to “focus on purchasing weapon systems and equipment in the most pressing fields” and get training on them, including the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile system.

The letter takes on added significance with Germany this week imposing an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia and the US Congress potentially adopting similar measures.

The letter goes to the heart of the debate in Washington that beyond issues of values is about the importance of the US-Saudi relationship. Members of Congress, and the intelligence and foreign policy community question the relationship’s significance despite Trump’s insistence on the value of Saudi arms purchases as well as the kingdom’s importance in managing oil prices and supporting US policy in the Middle East.

“The real facts are: 1) the Saudis need US weapons and equipment more than we need to sell them, in part because they demonstrate the US security commitment to the kingdom; and 2) it would be very difficult and expensive for the Saudis to make good on their periodic threats to ‘buy foreign’ if they can't get what they want from the United States,” said former US Middle East negotiator Aaron David Miller in an article for CNN co-authored by Richard Sokolsky.

Messrs. Miller and Sokolsky went on to question Saudi Arabia’s importance in countering Iran and forging an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement. “Saudi Arabia has proven to be too weak and incompetent to be a bulwark against Iran; on the contrary, it has been an enabler of Tehran's influence,” the two men said.

They cautioned that “direct and under-the-table (Saudi) contacts (with Israel) are a far cry from open meetings or support for a US peace plan that on issues like Jerusalem and borders violates the Arab consensus and could hand Iran and Sunni Muslims a propaganda windfall.”

Despite mounting criticism of the kingdom, most analysts argue that Prince Mohammed is likely to weather the Khashoggi crisis.

Saudi Arabia is, nevertheless, already feeling the fallout of the crisis not only internationally but also in terms of the prospects for Prince Mohammed’s plans to reform and diversify the kingdom’s economy.

The crisis was one reason why Aramco, the kingdom’s giant national oil company, shelved plans to embark on a massive corporate-bond sale to fund a $70 billion stake in national petrochemical firm SABIC. The sale was considered after Saudi Arabia earlier suspended plans to take Aramco public in a move that Prince Mohammed had hoped would raise $100 billion.

Close ties with the United States have long been at the core of the ruling Al Saud family’s survival strategy. They were also at the heart of the approach of Prince Mohammed who appeared determined to ensure at whatever cost US reengagement in the Middle East in alliance with the kingdom following former President Barak Obama’s perceived pivot towards Asia and determination to bring Iran back into the international fold.

The rise of Trump appears to hold out that promise. Trump’s decision to stand by Saudi Arabia and its rulers no matter what positions the president as the kind of friend the kingdom can rely on. The coming weeks and months are likely to be a litmus test of Trump’s ability to keep his end of the bargain.

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

&nbsp;

The killers of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi may have gotten more than they bargained for. The killing has sparked multiple battles that are likely in coming months to shape relationships ranging from that between the United States and Saudi Arabia to those between US President Donald J Trump, his Republican party, the US Congress, and the country’s intelligence community.

The killers of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi may have gotten more than they bargained for. The killing has sparked multiple battles that are likely in coming months to shape relationships ranging from that between the United States and Saudi Arabia to those between US President Donald J Trump, his Republican party, the US Congress, and the country’s intelligence community. The fallout of the killing could also shape Trump’s ability to pursue his policy goals in the Middle East, including forcing Iran to its knees and imposing a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather than putting an end to differences over how to respond to Khashoggi’s killing, Trump’s decision to stand by Saudi Arabia and its crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, irrespective of who may have been responsible for the murder, marks the opening of a new round in what prominent journalist Rami Khouri dubbed “a new era in the Khashoggi case.” The battles are likely to be fought on multiple fronts. One venue will be the Group of 20 (G-20) summit at the end of this month in Argentina with Prince Mohammed, whom the Central Intelligence Agency and many in the US Congress believe to be responsible for the killing, in attendance. How Prince Mohammed is received at the summit is certain to indicate to what degree the crown prince’s international standing has been tarnished and may constitute a reality check for him of the damage Saudi Arabia has suffered as a result of Khashoggi’s killing. It will also serve as one indication of how much of a battle Trump may have to fight in seeking to ensure that Prince Mohammed remains insulated from consequences of Khashoggi’s death. To be sure, Prince Mohammed decided to attend the G-20 summit prior to Trump’s decision to take no further action against Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, by attending the crown prince, emboldened by Trump’s support, “is daring his international critics to put their rhetoric into action and betting that they won't," said Gulf scholar Kristian Ulrichsen. The stakes for both Trump and Prince Mohammed are high. In leaking its conclusion that Prince Mohammed was responsible for the killing, the CIA was sending two messages: its willingness to take on Trump against the backdrop of a long-strained relationship between the president and the intelligence community and the suggestion that the agency does not believe that Prince Mohammed’s survival as king-in-waiting is crucial to US national security or the stability of the kingdom. Both messages feed into what potentially constitutes the first major policy confrontation between Trump, the Republican party and Congress. The anti-Saudi sentiment was mounting in Congress already before Khashoggi’s killing because of Saudi conduct of its war in Yemen that has created the worst humanitarian crisis since World War Two. The killing appears to be propelling the Congress into action. The CIA’s implicit challenging of Trump’s assessment of the importance of Prince Mohammed was followed by a report by the Washington-based Center for International Policy that concluded that US arms sales to the kingdom accounted for fewer than 20,000 US jobs a year – a far cry from the hundreds of thousands of jobs asserted by the president. Prince Mohammed’s reception at the G-20 summit coupled with the outcome of the potential battle between Trump, the CIA and Congress could also shape developments in Saudi Arabia. The kingdom has so far dug in its heels with King Salman relying on concepts of prestige and honour as well as patronage to signal full support for his son while Prince Mohammed appears to be trying to show that Saudi Arabia is not wholly dependent on the United States. Bolstering the Center for International Policy report, Reuters reported this week seeing a letter pre-dating the Khashoggi killing in which Prince Mohammed instructs the defence ministry to “focus on purchasing weapon systems and equipment in the most pressing fields” and get training on them, including the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile system. The letter takes on added significance with Germany this week imposing an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia and the US Congress potentially adopting similar measures. The letter goes to the heart of the debate in Washington that beyond issues of values is about the importance of the US-Saudi relationship. Members of Congress, and the intelligence and foreign policy community question the relationship’s significance despite Trump’s insistence on the value of Saudi arms purchases as well as the kingdom’s importance in managing oil prices and supporting US policy in the Middle East. “The real facts are: 1) the Saudis need US weapons and equipment more than we need to sell them, in part because they demonstrate the US security commitment to the kingdom; and 2) it would be very difficult and expensive for the Saudis to make good on their periodic threats to ‘buy foreign’ if they can't get what they want from the United States,” said former US Middle East negotiator Aaron David Miller in an article for CNN co-authored by Richard Sokolsky. Messrs. Miller and Sokolsky went on to question Saudi Arabia’s importance in countering Iran and forging an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement. “Saudi Arabia has proven to be too weak and incompetent to be a bulwark against Iran; on the contrary, it has been an enabler of Tehran's influence,” the two men said. They cautioned that “direct and under-the-table (Saudi) contacts (with Israel) are a far cry from open meetings or support for a US peace plan that on issues like Jerusalem and borders violates the Arab consensus and could hand Iran and Sunni Muslims a propaganda windfall.” Despite mounting criticism of the kingdom, most analysts argue that Prince Mohammed is likely to weather the Khashoggi crisis. Saudi Arabia is, nevertheless, already feeling the fallout of the crisis not only internationally but also in terms of the prospects for Prince Mohammed’s plans to reform and diversify the kingdom’s economy. The crisis was one reason why Aramco, the kingdom’s giant national oil company, shelved plans to embark on a massive corporate-bond sale to fund a $70 billion stake in national petrochemical firm SABIC. The sale was considered after Saudi Arabia earlier suspended plans to take Aramco public in a move that Prince Mohammed had hoped would raise $100 billion. Close ties with the United States have long been at the core of the ruling Al Saud family’s survival strategy. They were also at the heart of the approach of Prince Mohammed who appeared determined to ensure at whatever cost US reengagement in the Middle East in alliance with the kingdom following former President Barak Obama’s perceived pivot towards Asia and determination to bring Iran back into the international fold. The rise of Trump appears to hold out that promise. Trump’s decision to stand by Saudi Arabia and its rulers no matter what positions the president as the kind of friend the kingdom can rely on. The coming weeks and months are likely to be a litmus test of Trump’s ability to keep his end of the bargain. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Khashoggi crisis: Reshaping US politics and relations with Saudi Arabia

Audio linked to <a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/jamal-khashoggi-murder-saudi-kill-teams-luggage-contained-syringes-scissors-says-report-177063">Jamal Khashoggi's murder</a> inside Saudi Arabia's Istanbul consulate does not implicate Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, US National Security Advisor John Bolton said Tuesday, citing others who have heard the tapes.

Turkey has previously said it shared <a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/im-suffocating-take-this-bag-off-my-head-jamal-khashoggis-last-words-176839">recordings linked to the murder</a> of Khashoggi - a Saudi dissident and fierce critic of the crown prince - with officials in Riyadh, Washington and other capitals.

<a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/khashoggi-was-dead-in-twenty-minutes-says-tura-khislakchi-as-he-unfolds-the-incident-to-wion-173771">Khashoggi</a> was last seen entering the consulate on October 2 to obtain documents for his forthcoming marriage.

After repeated denials, Saudi Arabia finally admitted the 59-year-old had been murdered at the mission in a "rogue" operation.

Bolton, speaking to reporters in Singapore ahead of a regional summit, was asked whether it was right to say the audio contained nothing that implicated the crown prince. &nbsp;

"I haven't listened to the tape myself but in the assessment of those who have listened to it that’s right," he said.

Khashoggi's brazen murder has caused intense speculation over what, if anything, Crown Prince Salman might have known about the operation.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said the order to murder Khashoggi came from "the highest levels" of the Saudi government and pointedly failed to absolve Crown Prince Salman of responsibility.

The New York Times reported that a member of the team at the consulate had told a superior by phone to "tell your boss", suspected to be the crown prince, that the operation had been accomplished.

The Trump administration embraced the young prince as a reform-minded ally, but the murder of Khashoggi - a US resident - has soured that narrative.

Bolton emphasised that Trump has demanded a full investigation from the Saudis and for those responsible to be held accountable. &nbsp;

"The president has made it very clear that he expects we’re going to get the truth from the Saudis - and the king and the crown prince, in the conversations they’ve had with the president, have committed to that," he said.

But Trump has also emphasised America's important commercial, strategic and national security relationships with the petro-state as well as lucrative arms contracts.

Audio linked to Jamal Khashoggi's murder inside Saudi Arabia's Istanbul consulate does not implicate Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, US National Security Advisor John Bolton said Tuesday, citing others who have heard the tapes.

Audio linked to Jamal Khashoggi's murder inside Saudi Arabia's Istanbul consulate does not implicate Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, US National Security Advisor John Bolton said Tuesday, citing others who have heard the tapes. Turkey has previously said it shared recordings linked to the murder of Khashoggi - a Saudi dissident and fierce critic of the crown prince - with officials in Riyadh, Washington and other capitals. Khashoggi was last seen entering the consulate on October 2 to obtain documents for his forthcoming marriage. After repeated denials, Saudi Arabia finally admitted the 59-year-old had been murdered at the mission in a "rogue" operation. Bolton, speaking to reporters in Singapore ahead of a regional summit, was asked whether it was right to say the audio contained nothing that implicated the crown prince. "I haven't listened to the tape myself but in the assessment of those who have listened to it that’s right," he said. Khashoggi's brazen murder has caused intense speculation over what, if anything, Crown Prince Salman might have known about the operation. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said the order to murder Khashoggi came from "the highest levels" of the Saudi government and pointedly failed to absolve Crown Prince Salman of responsibility. The New York Times reported that a member of the team at the consulate had told a superior by phone to "tell your boss", suspected to be the crown prince, that the operation had been accomplished. The Trump administration embraced the young prince as a reform-minded ally, but the murder of Khashoggi - a US resident - has soured that narrative. Bolton emphasised that Trump has demanded a full investigation from the Saudis and for those responsible to be held accountable. "The president has made it very clear that he expects we’re going to get the truth from the Saudis - and the king and the crown prince, in the conversations they’ve had with the president, have committed to that," he said. But Trump has also emphasised America's important commercial, strategic and national security relationships with the petro-state as well as lucrative arms contracts.

Khashoggi murder tapes do not implicate Mohammed bin Salman: US's Bolton

If Saudi Arabia is under pressure to give chapter and verse on the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in its consulate in Istanbul, Iran risks straining relations with Europe at a time when it needs European support the most by targeting ethnic rights activists.

Khashoggi’s murder has focused attention on Saudi harassment and intimidation of dissidents as part of the kingdom’s effort to silence critical voices. The Saudi campaign had little geopolitical significance until Khashoggi’s killing.

By contrast, Iran’s long history of targeting ethnic rights activists, including Iranians of Arab descent and Kurds, has long been rooted in the Islamic republic’s belief that they enjoy the support of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel in a bid to destabilise the country.

If Saudi Arabia has suffered severe reputational damage with the killing of Khashoggi and could face sanctions for the first time in its history, Iran, long struggling to polish its tarnished image, could face sanctioning by Europe at a moment when it needs the Europeans the most.

In the latest Iranian incident, Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen and intelligence chief Finn Borch Andersen are calling for European Union sanctions after they discovered a plot to kill Danish residents associated with the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA), an Iranian Arab group.

The plot, together with at least two other incidents in Europe in the last year, complicates European efforts to salvage a 2015 international agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear program after the United States withdrew from the deal and imposed crippling sanctions on Iran despite Iran’s denials of involvement.

The alleged Danish plot came to a head when authorities in late September closed bridges into Copenhagen and suspended train operations in connection with the case. Andersen said that Norway had since extradited to Denmark a Norwegian national of Iranian descent who was seen taking pictures of the Danish home of an ASMLA leader.

ASMLA strives for the independence of Iran’s south-eastern oil-rich province of Khuzestan that is home to Iran’s ethnic Arab community and borders on Iraq at the head of the Gulf.

Two other groups, the Islamic State and the Ahvaz National Resistance, claimed responsibility in September for an attack on a Revolutionary Guards parade in the Khuzestan capital of Ahwaz in which 29 people were killed and 70 others wounded.

Iranian officials blamed the United States and its allies, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel for the attack.

Iran at the time summoned the ambassadors of the Netherlands, Denmark and Britain to protest the three countries’ hosting of Iranian ethnic rights militants.

The Danish plot followed the killing by unidentified gunmen in the Netherlands in November 2017 of Ahmad Mola Nissi, another ASMLA leader. Shot dead on a street in The Hague, Mola Nissi died the violent life he was alleged to have lived.

A 52-year-old refugee living in the Netherlands since 2005, was believed to have been responsible for attacks in Khuzestan in 2005, 2006 and 2013 on oil facilities, the office of the Khuzestan governor, other government offices, and banks.

Together with Habib Jaber al-Ahvazi also known as Abo Naheth, another ASMLA activist, Mola Nissi focussed in recent years on media activities and fundraising, at times creating footage of alleged attacks involving gas cylinder explosions to attract Saudi funding, according to Iranian activists.

Mola Nissi was killed as he was preparing to establish a television station backed by Saudi-trained personnel and funding that would target Khuzestan.

The Netherlands has emerged in recent years as a hub for Iranian activists alongside Britain.

A group of exile Iranian academics and political activists, led by The Hague-based social scientist Damon Golriz, announced in September the creation of a group that intends to campaign for a liberal democracy in Iran under the auspices of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the ousted Shah of Iran who lives in the United States.

Compounding the fallout of Iran’s targeting of activists is last month’s expulsion by France of an Iranian diplomat accused of being part of a plot to bomb a rally in Paris organised by the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, a Saudi-backed Iranian exile group that calls for regime change in Tehran. The diplomat was among six people arrested for allegedly plotting the bombing.

Mujahedeen enjoy the support of prominent Western politicians like US President Donald J Trump’s national security advisor, John Bolton, his personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, and Saudi Arabia’s former intelligence chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal. Giuliani addressed the targeted rally.

US officials say Iran plotted to attack the group’s massive base in Albania in March.

Support for the Mujahedeen has figured prominently in broadcasts of UK-based television station Iran International that according to The Guardian is owned by a secretive offshore entity with close links to Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman.

The Guardian reported that Saud al-Qahtani, Prince Mohammed’s menacing information czar who was one of several senior Saudi officials removed from office in the wake of the killing of Khashoggi, was among the station’s main funders.

“I can say that Iran International TV has turned into a platform … for ethnic partisanship and sectarianism,” The Guardian quoted a source as saying.

The Danish, French and Dutch incidents suggest that Iran takes serious indications that Saudi Arabia is considering attempting to destabilise the Islamic republic by stirring unrest among its ethnic minorities.

Bolton advocated a similar strategy before becoming Trump’s national security advisor.

Iran has been the target in the past year of various insurgent groups believed to have Saudi support, sparking repeated clashes with Iranian security forces and the interception of Kurdish, Baloch and other ethnic rebels.

Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif arrived in Islamabad this week on an unscheduled visit to discuss the recent kidnapping of at least 12 Iranian border and Revolutionary Guards believed to have been abducted on the Iranian side of the Pakistani-Iranian border by Jaish al-Adl, a Pakistani group that often issues its statements in Arabic rather than Baloch, Urdu or Farsi.

As the United States prepared to next week impose a new round of sanctions against Iran, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo used the Iranian attacks in Europe to weaken European rejection of the US move.

“For nearly 40 years, Europe has been the target of Iran-sponsored terrorist attacks. We call on our allies and partners to confront the full range of Iran’s threats to peace and security,” Pompeo tweeted.

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) 
&nbsp;

If Saudi Arabia is under pressure to give chapter and verse on the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in its consulate in Istanbul, Iran risks straining relations with Europe at a time when it needs European support the most by targeting ethnic rights activists.

If Saudi Arabia is under pressure to give chapter and verse on the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in its consulate in Istanbul, Iran risks straining relations with Europe at a time when it needs European support the most by targeting ethnic rights activists. Khashoggi’s murder has focused attention on Saudi harassment and intimidation of dissidents as part of the kingdom’s effort to silence critical voices. The Saudi campaign had little geopolitical significance until Khashoggi’s killing. By contrast, Iran’s long history of targeting ethnic rights activists, including Iranians of Arab descent and Kurds, has long been rooted in the Islamic republic’s belief that they enjoy the support of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel in a bid to destabilise the country. If Saudi Arabia has suffered severe reputational damage with the killing of Khashoggi and could face sanctions for the first time in its history, Iran, long struggling to polish its tarnished image, could face sanctioning by Europe at a moment when it needs the Europeans the most. In the latest Iranian incident, Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen and intelligence chief Finn Borch Andersen are calling for European Union sanctions after they discovered a plot to kill Danish residents associated with the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA), an Iranian Arab group. The plot, together with at least two other incidents in Europe in the last year, complicates European efforts to salvage a 2015 international agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear program after the United States withdrew from the deal and imposed crippling sanctions on Iran despite Iran’s denials of involvement. The alleged Danish plot came to a head when authorities in late September closed bridges into Copenhagen and suspended train operations in connection with the case. Andersen said that Norway had since extradited to Denmark a Norwegian national of Iranian descent who was seen taking pictures of the Danish home of an ASMLA leader. ASMLA strives for the independence of Iran’s south-eastern oil-rich province of Khuzestan that is home to Iran’s ethnic Arab community and borders on Iraq at the head of the Gulf. Two other groups, the Islamic State and the Ahvaz National Resistance, claimed responsibility in September for an attack on a Revolutionary Guards parade in the Khuzestan capital of Ahwaz in which 29 people were killed and 70 others wounded. Iranian officials blamed the United States and its allies, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel for the attack. Iran at the time summoned the ambassadors of the Netherlands, Denmark and Britain to protest the three countries’ hosting of Iranian ethnic rights militants. The Danish plot followed the killing by unidentified gunmen in the Netherlands in November 2017 of Ahmad Mola Nissi, another ASMLA leader. Shot dead on a street in The Hague, Mola Nissi died the violent life he was alleged to have lived. A 52-year-old refugee living in the Netherlands since 2005, was believed to have been responsible for attacks in Khuzestan in 2005, 2006 and 2013 on oil facilities, the office of the Khuzestan governor, other government offices, and banks. Together with Habib Jaber al-Ahvazi also known as Abo Naheth, another ASMLA activist, Mola Nissi focussed in recent years on media activities and fundraising, at times creating footage of alleged attacks involving gas cylinder explosions to attract Saudi funding, according to Iranian activists. Mola Nissi was killed as he was preparing to establish a television station backed by Saudi-trained personnel and funding that would target Khuzestan. The Netherlands has emerged in recent years as a hub for Iranian activists alongside Britain. A group of exile Iranian academics and political activists, led by The Hague-based social scientist Damon Golriz, announced in September the creation of a group that intends to campaign for a liberal democracy in Iran under the auspices of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the ousted Shah of Iran who lives in the United States. Compounding the fallout of Iran’s targeting of activists is last month’s expulsion by France of an Iranian diplomat accused of being part of a plot to bomb a rally in Paris organised by the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, a Saudi-backed Iranian exile group that calls for regime change in Tehran. The diplomat was among six people arrested for allegedly plotting the bombing. Mujahedeen enjoy the support of prominent Western politicians like US President Donald J Trump’s national security advisor, John Bolton, his personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, and Saudi Arabia’s former intelligence chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal. Giuliani addressed the targeted rally. US officials say Iran plotted to attack the group’s massive base in Albania in March. Support for the Mujahedeen has figured prominently in broadcasts of UK-based television station Iran International that according to The Guardian is owned by a secretive offshore entity with close links to Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman. The Guardian reported that Saud al-Qahtani, Prince Mohammed’s menacing information czar who was one of several senior Saudi officials removed from office in the wake of the killing of Khashoggi, was among the station’s main funders. “I can say that Iran International TV has turned into a platform … for ethnic partisanship and sectarianism,” The Guardian quoted a source as saying. The Danish, French and Dutch incidents suggest that Iran takes serious indications that Saudi Arabia is considering attempting to destabilise the Islamic republic by stirring unrest among its ethnic minorities. Bolton advocated a similar strategy before becoming Trump’s national security advisor. Iran has been the target in the past year of various insurgent groups believed to have Saudi support, sparking repeated clashes with Iranian security forces and the interception of Kurdish, Baloch and other ethnic rebels. Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif arrived in Islamabad this week on an unscheduled visit to discuss the recent kidnapping of at least 12 Iranian border and Revolutionary Guards believed to have been abducted on the Iranian side of the Pakistani-Iranian border by Jaish al-Adl, a Pakistani group that often issues its statements in Arabic rather than Baloch, Urdu or Farsi. As the United States prepared to next week impose a new round of sanctions against Iran, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo used the Iranian attacks in Europe to weaken European rejection of the US move. “For nearly 40 years, Europe has been the target of Iran-sponsored terrorist attacks. We call on our allies and partners to confront the full range of Iran’s threats to peace and security,” Pompeo tweeted. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Saudi Arabia and Iran: When it comes to exiles, the pot calls the kettle black

The death of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi is proving to be a blessing in disguise for cash- strapped Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan. Khan’s blessing is also likely to offer Saudi Arabia geopolitical advantage.

On the principle of all good things are three, Khan struck gold on his second visit to the kingdom since coming to office in August.

Khan was rewarded for attending Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s showcase investors conference in Riyadh, dubbed Davos in the Desert, that was being shunned by numerous CEOs of Western financial institutions, tech entrepreneurs and media moguls as well as senior Western government officials because of the Khashoggi affair.

Saudi Arabia promised to deposit $3 billion in Pakistan’s central bank as balance of payments support and to defer up to $3 billion in payments for oil imports for a year.

Saudi Arabia declined Khan’s request for financial aid during his first visit to the kingdom in September but was willing to consider investing billions of dollars in a refinery in the Chinese-operated Arabian Sea port of Gwadar as well as in mining but was reluctant to acquiesce to Pakistani requests for financial relief.

Saudi Arabia’s subsequent agreement to provided finance is likely to help Khan reduce the size of the $8-12 billion bailout he is negotiating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Speaking in an interview before leaving for Riyadh, Khan said he was attending the conference despite the “shocking” killing of&nbsp;Khashoggi because “unless we get loans from friendly countries or the IMF, we actually won’t have in another two or three months enough foreign exchange to service our debts or to pay for our imports. So we’re desperate at the moment.”

Pakistan’s foreign reserves dropped this month to $8.1 billion, a four-year low and barely enough to cover sovereign debt payments due through the end of the year. The current account deficit has swelled to about $18 billion.

Potential Saudi investment in the Reko Diq copper and gold mine as well as a refinery in Gwadar, both close to Pakistan’s border with Iran would give it a further foothold in the troubled province of Balochistan. Gwadar is a mere 70 kilometres down the coast from the Indian-backed Iranian port of Chabahar.

Pakistani militants reported last year that funds from the kingdom were flowing into the coffers of ultra-conservative anti-Shiite, anti-Iranian Sunni Muslim madrassahs or religious seminars in the region. It was unclear whether the funds originated with the Saudi government or Saudi nationals of Baloch descent and members of the two million-strong Pakistani Diaspora in the kingdom.

It was equally unclear how Saudi Arabia expected to capitalize on its rewarding of Khan in its competition with Iran for Pakistan’s favours.

Ensuring that Pakistan, home to the world’s largest Shiite minority, does not snuggle up too much to Iran has become even more crucial for Saudi Arabia as it seeks in the wake of Khashoggi’s death to enhance its indispensability to US President Donald J. Trump’s effort to isolate and cripple Iran economically, if not to engineer a change of regime in Tehran.

Trump sees Saudi Arabia as central to his strategy aimed at forcing the Islamic republic to halt its support for proxies in Yemen and Lebanon, withdraw its forces from Syria, and permanently dismantle its nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.

Saudi financial support means that Khan may find it more difficult to shield Pakistan from being sucked into the US-Saudi effort.

Insurgents last week kidnapped 14 Iranian security personnel, reportedly including Revolutionary Guards on the Iranian side of the border with Pakistan. Pakistan pledged to help liberate the abductees who are believed to have been taken across the border into Balochistan, long a militant and Baloch nationalist hotbed.

“Members of terrorist groups that are guided and supported by foreign forces carried this out through deceiving and bribing infiltrators,” the Guards said in a statement that appeared to blame Saudi Arabia and the United States without mentioning them by name.

The incident is likely to heighten Chinese concerns that in a worst-case scenario, Saudi investment rather than boosting economic activity and helping Gwadar get out of the starting blocks, could ensnare it too in one of the Middle East’s most debilitating conflicts.

China is further concerned that there would be a set of third-party eyes monitoring activity if and when it decides to use Gwadar not only for commercial purposes but also as a naval facility.

Saudi investment could further thwart potential Chinese plans to link the ports of Gwadar and Chabahar, a prospect that Pakistani and Iranian officials have in the past not excluded. With Saudi financial aid, that may no longer be an option that Khan can entertain.

Khan will have to take that into account when he travels to Beijing next week in a bid to secure Chinese financial support and convince Beijing to fast forward focusing the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a $45 billion plus infrastructure and energy generation-driven Belt and Road crown jewel, on issues such as job creation, manufacturing and agriculture.

Khan appeared to anticipate in his interview with Middle East Eye on the eve of his participation in the Riyadh investment conference that he would have reduced leeway by blaming the United States for increased tensions with Iran and hinting that Pakistan did not want to be drawn into conflict with the Islamic republic.

Said Khan: “The US-Iran situation is disturbing for all of us in the Muslim world... The last thing the Muslim world wants is another conflict. The worrying part is that the Trump administration is moving towards some sort of conflict with Iran.” 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

The death of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi is proving to be a blessing in disguise for cash- strapped Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan. Khan’s blessing is also likely to offer Saudi Arabia geopolitical advantage.

The death of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi is proving to be a blessing in disguise for cash- strapped Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan. Khan’s blessing is also likely to offer Saudi Arabia geopolitical advantage. On the principle of all good things are three, Khan struck gold on his second visit to the kingdom since coming to office in August. Khan was rewarded for attending Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s showcase investors conference in Riyadh, dubbed Davos in the Desert, that was being shunned by numerous CEOs of Western financial institutions, tech entrepreneurs and media moguls as well as senior Western government officials because of the Khashoggi affair. Saudi Arabia promised to deposit $3 billion in Pakistan’s central bank as balance of payments support and to defer up to $3 billion in payments for oil imports for a year. Saudi Arabia declined Khan’s request for financial aid during his first visit to the kingdom in September but was willing to consider investing billions of dollars in a refinery in the Chinese-operated Arabian Sea port of Gwadar as well as in mining but was reluctant to acquiesce to Pakistani requests for financial relief. Saudi Arabia’s subsequent agreement to provided finance is likely to help Khan reduce the size of the $8-12 billion bailout he is negotiating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Speaking in an interview before leaving for Riyadh, Khan said he was attending the conference despite the “shocking” killing of Khashoggi because “unless we get loans from friendly countries or the IMF, we actually won’t have in another two or three months enough foreign exchange to service our debts or to pay for our imports. So we’re desperate at the moment.” Pakistan’s foreign reserves dropped this month to $8.1 billion, a four-year low and barely enough to cover sovereign debt payments due through the end of the year. The current account deficit has swelled to about $18 billion. Potential Saudi investment in the Reko Diq copper and gold mine as well as a refinery in Gwadar, both close to Pakistan’s border with Iran would give it a further foothold in the troubled province of Balochistan. Gwadar is a mere 70 kilometres down the coast from the Indian-backed Iranian port of Chabahar. Pakistani militants reported last year that funds from the kingdom were flowing into the coffers of ultra-conservative anti-Shiite, anti-Iranian Sunni Muslim madrassahs or religious seminars in the region. It was unclear whether the funds originated with the Saudi government or Saudi nationals of Baloch descent and members of the two million-strong Pakistani Diaspora in the kingdom. It was equally unclear how Saudi Arabia expected to capitalize on its rewarding of Khan in its competition with Iran for Pakistan’s favours. Ensuring that Pakistan, home to the world’s largest Shiite minority, does not snuggle up too much to Iran has become even more crucial for Saudi Arabia as it seeks in the wake of Khashoggi’s death to enhance its indispensability to US President Donald J. Trump’s effort to isolate and cripple Iran economically, if not to engineer a change of regime in Tehran. Trump sees Saudi Arabia as central to his strategy aimed at forcing the Islamic republic to halt its support for proxies in Yemen and Lebanon, withdraw its forces from Syria, and permanently dismantle its nuclear and ballistic missiles programs. Saudi financial support means that Khan may find it more difficult to shield Pakistan from being sucked into the US-Saudi effort. Insurgents last week kidnapped 14 Iranian security personnel, reportedly including Revolutionary Guards on the Iranian side of the border with Pakistan. Pakistan pledged to help liberate the abductees who are believed to have been taken across the border into Balochistan, long a militant and Baloch nationalist hotbed. “Members of terrorist groups that are guided and supported by foreign forces carried this out through deceiving and bribing infiltrators,” the Guards said in a statement that appeared to blame Saudi Arabia and the United States without mentioning them by name. The incident is likely to heighten Chinese concerns that in a worst-case scenario, Saudi investment rather than boosting economic activity and helping Gwadar get out of the starting blocks, could ensnare it too in one of the Middle East’s most debilitating conflicts. China is further concerned that there would be a set of third-party eyes monitoring activity if and when it decides to use Gwadar not only for commercial purposes but also as a naval facility. Saudi investment could further thwart potential Chinese plans to link the ports of Gwadar and Chabahar, a prospect that Pakistani and Iranian officials have in the past not excluded. With Saudi financial aid, that may no longer be an option that Khan can entertain. Khan will have to take that into account when he travels to Beijing next week in a bid to secure Chinese financial support and convince Beijing to fast forward focusing the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a $45 billion plus infrastructure and energy generation-driven Belt and Road crown jewel, on issues such as job creation, manufacturing and agriculture. Khan appeared to anticipate in his interview with Middle East Eye on the eve of his participation in the Riyadh investment conference that he would have reduced leeway by blaming the United States for increased tensions with Iran and hinting that Pakistan did not want to be drawn into conflict with the Islamic republic. Said Khan: “The US-Iran situation is disturbing for all of us in the Muslim world... The last thing the Muslim world wants is another conflict. The worrying part is that the Trump administration is moving towards some sort of conflict with Iran.” (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Khashoggi crisis a blessing in disguise for Imran Khan

The most serious threat to the Saudi version is in the hands of Turkish intelligence. Ankara might determine the nature of relations between Riyadh and Washington, and the question is – what will it want to make of the scandal?

Has the formula been found for the lie that absolves Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of responsibility for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi?

Is the kingdom’s latest version, according to which the Saudi journalist died in a fist fight with a number of Saudis who were arrested last week, enough to salvage Donald Trump’s precious $110 billion arms deal?&nbsp;

The US president rushed to declare the Saudi explanation “credible.” It’s possible that someone who dispenses lies on a daily basis knows the difference between credible and incredible lies. But anyone who chooses to believe the Saudi version must ask a few nagging questions.

The first pertains to the location of Khashoggi’s body, whole or otherwise. If he died in a brawl, why was it necessary to dismember the corpse? What were 15 Saudi security officers doing at the consulate? Why did the crown prince lie when he said he didn’t know about Khashoggi’s murder, and why did the Saudis say the journalist left the consulate shortly after arriving, which is why he could not be found?&nbsp;

But, even if these contradictions can be papered over with a credible cover story, the dismissal of senior Saudi intelligence official General Ahmed al-Asiri and Saud al-Qahtani, both of them close advisers to Crown Prince Mohammed, has pulled the rug out from under the official version. If the two knew about the murder, or perhaps even ordered it, this cannot have been without the knowledge of Saudi General Intelligence Khalid al-Humaidan. And if Humaidan, whose head hasn’t rolled yet, knew about it, so did the crown prince.&nbsp;

One should treat with suspicion these dismissals, as well as King Salman’s establishment of a commission of inquiry, under Crown Prince Mohammed, that has also been tasked with reorganising the kingdom’s intelligence services. Asiri and Qahtani, who were appointed by the crown prince, will most likely win new appointments: they know too much about the crown prince and his military and economic failures.&nbsp;

Asiri was previously a spokesman for the Saudi forces operating in Yemen, heading PR efforts to justify the war as benefiting international interests and to absolve Saudi Arabia from responsibility for the deaths of thousands of civilians in Yemen. Qahtani, meanwhile, directed the Saudi media from behind the scenes, operating social networks while shaping a positive image for the crown prince in Arab and international media.&nbsp;

But, the most serious threat to the Saudi story and an American seal of approval is in Turkish intelligence headquarters in Ankara. Turkish listening devices and sensitive cameras have already yielded most of the horrific details of Khashoggi’s murder. Turkey claims the Saudis are cooperating with Turkish investigators, who are sharing their findings with their US counterparts, American intelligence agencies, but no one knows what is being held back from publication. Turkey, which changed from a Saudi rival to its enemy in the wake of the incident, is the main target of criticism of Saudi Arabia and its allies.&nbsp;

Ankara is not accepting Saudi explanations regarding Khashoggi’s death. A spokesman for the ruling Justice and Development Party, Omer Celik, has said that Turkey will get to the bottom of Khashoggi’s disappearance and death.&nbsp;

His remark suggests that Turkey, to the extent that it has the evidence to back its claims, will determine the nature of future relations between Riyadh and Washington. If it has a recording of the murderers calling Crown Prince Mohammed to announce “mission accomplished,” or a record of the crown prince calling them during their stay in Turkey, Trump will have to re-examine, if not disavow, his support for the new Saudi version of events.&nbsp;

The question is whether and how Turkey might want to leverage the Khashoggi affair, which is evolving from a mafia-style hit by Saudi intelligence operatives into an international incident obligating Western countries to manoeuvre carefully vis-a-vis Riyadh, caught between pressure to guarantee a transparent investigation of the murder and the need to preserve their political and economic interests. Theoretically, Turkey could demand political “hush money” such as the lifting of the Saudi embargo on Qatar in exchange for freezing the investigation or accepting the Saudi version. This is a high price, which the crown prince is unlikely to pay, but if the demand comes with American pressure and mediation, it could serve the interests of all sides.&nbsp;

Khashoggi’s murder poses a dilemma for Saudi Arabia’s allies. For now, only Trump is willing to pull Riyadh’s chestnuts out of the fire. His decision will clearly and greatly affect the future of the investigation as well as international responses towards Saudi Arabia.&nbsp;

Interestingly, no leader, including Turkey’s president, has called for sanctions like the ones imposed on Russia for assassinating former agents and dissident journalists. Perhaps that’s because Western states still regard the killing of a journalist by an Arab government as infuriating but not inconceivable, particularly since this was done in another Muslim state, which treats its own journalists as criminals.&nbsp;

Russia, on the other hand, is perceived as part of the “civilised” world, committing its assassinations in the heart of Europe. Saudi Arabia, however, is seen as pro-Western by virtue of its membership in the alliance against Iran. As a result, even if it is far removed from embracing Western values, it enjoys certain “discounts” that the anti-Western resistance front members, Russia and China, do not.

(This article was originally published on DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-more-queries-than-answers-2678020">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

The most serious threat to the Saudi version is in the hands of Turkish intelligence. Ankara might determine the nature of relations between Riyadh and Washington, and the question is – what will it want to make of the scandal?

The most serious threat to the Saudi version is in the hands of Turkish intelligence. Ankara might determine the nature of relations between Riyadh and Washington, and the question is – what will it want to make of the scandal? Has the formula been found for the lie that absolves Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of responsibility for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi? Is the kingdom’s latest version, according to which the Saudi journalist died in a fist fight with a number of Saudis who were arrested last week, enough to salvage Donald Trump’s precious $110 billion arms deal? The US president rushed to declare the Saudi explanation “credible.” It’s possible that someone who dispenses lies on a daily basis knows the difference between credible and incredible lies. But anyone who chooses to believe the Saudi version must ask a few nagging questions. The first pertains to the location of Khashoggi’s body, whole or otherwise. If he died in a brawl, why was it necessary to dismember the corpse? What were 15 Saudi security officers doing at the consulate? Why did the crown prince lie when he said he didn’t know about Khashoggi’s murder, and why did the Saudis say the journalist left the consulate shortly after arriving, which is why he could not be found? But, even if these contradictions can be papered over with a credible cover story, the dismissal of senior Saudi intelligence official General Ahmed al-Asiri and Saud al-Qahtani, both of them close advisers to Crown Prince Mohammed, has pulled the rug out from under the official version. If the two knew about the murder, or perhaps even ordered it, this cannot have been without the knowledge of Saudi General Intelligence Khalid al-Humaidan. And if Humaidan, whose head hasn’t rolled yet, knew about it, so did the crown prince. One should treat with suspicion these dismissals, as well as King Salman’s establishment of a commission of inquiry, under Crown Prince Mohammed, that has also been tasked with reorganising the kingdom’s intelligence services. Asiri and Qahtani, who were appointed by the crown prince, will most likely win new appointments: they know too much about the crown prince and his military and economic failures. Asiri was previously a spokesman for the Saudi forces operating in Yemen, heading PR efforts to justify the war as benefiting international interests and to absolve Saudi Arabia from responsibility for the deaths of thousands of civilians in Yemen. Qahtani, meanwhile, directed the Saudi media from behind the scenes, operating social networks while shaping a positive image for the crown prince in Arab and international media. But, the most serious threat to the Saudi story and an American seal of approval is in Turkish intelligence headquarters in Ankara. Turkish listening devices and sensitive cameras have already yielded most of the horrific details of Khashoggi’s murder. Turkey claims the Saudis are cooperating with Turkish investigators, who are sharing their findings with their US counterparts, American intelligence agencies, but no one knows what is being held back from publication. Turkey, which changed from a Saudi rival to its enemy in the wake of the incident, is the main target of criticism of Saudi Arabia and its allies. Ankara is not accepting Saudi explanations regarding Khashoggi’s death. A spokesman for the ruling Justice and Development Party, Omer Celik, has said that Turkey will get to the bottom of Khashoggi’s disappearance and death. His remark suggests that Turkey, to the extent that it has the evidence to back its claims, will determine the nature of future relations between Riyadh and Washington. If it has a recording of the murderers calling Crown Prince Mohammed to announce “mission accomplished,” or a record of the crown prince calling them during their stay in Turkey, Trump will have to re-examine, if not disavow, his support for the new Saudi version of events. The question is whether and how Turkey might want to leverage the Khashoggi affair, which is evolving from a mafia-style hit by Saudi intelligence operatives into an international incident obligating Western countries to manoeuvre carefully vis-a-vis Riyadh, caught between pressure to guarantee a transparent investigation of the murder and the need to preserve their political and economic interests. Theoretically, Turkey could demand political “hush money” such as the lifting of the Saudi embargo on Qatar in exchange for freezing the investigation or accepting the Saudi version. This is a high price, which the crown prince is unlikely to pay, but if the demand comes with American pressure and mediation, it could serve the interests of all sides. Khashoggi’s murder poses a dilemma for Saudi Arabia’s allies. For now, only Trump is willing to pull Riyadh’s chestnuts out of the fire. His decision will clearly and greatly affect the future of the investigation as well as international responses towards Saudi Arabia. Interestingly, no leader, including Turkey’s president, has called for sanctions like the ones imposed on Russia for assassinating former agents and dissident journalists. Perhaps that’s because Western states still regard the killing of a journalist by an Arab government as infuriating but not inconceivable, particularly since this was done in another Muslim state, which treats its own journalists as criminals. Russia, on the other hand, is perceived as part of the “civilised” world, committing its assassinations in the heart of Europe. Saudi Arabia, however, is seen as pro-Western by virtue of its membership in the alliance against Iran. As a result, even if it is far removed from embracing Western values, it enjoys certain “discounts” that the anti-Western resistance front members, Russia and China, do not. (This article was originally published on DNA. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Jamal Khashoggi’s murder poses a dilemma for Saudi Arabia’s allies

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