July 8 in history: First-ever photo of Jupiter's moon, Kim Jong-il becomes leader of North Korea and more

It was a train that alerted the world to the fact that North Korea's supreme leader Kim Jong-Un might be in Beijing. The dark green train with yellow piping has been "in the family" for generations.&nbsp;

Kim's father, Kim Jong-Il, did not like flying. So he used the train instead.&nbsp;

News reports say he had fresh lobster delivered to the train everyday, and French wine flown in from Paris. The reports quote foreign officials who had the rare chance of travelling on the train as saying it was possible to order any Korean, Chinese, Russian, French, and Japanese dish on the train.&nbsp;

The elder Kim made about a dozen trips abroad. Most of them to China and all of them by train.&nbsp;

Kim's grandfather and North Korean founder, Kim Il-Sung, took the train all the way to eastern Europe in 1984.&nbsp;

Reports from Kim Jong-Il's time say that when he stepped out in his train, a total of three trains would travel with him. An advance security train that also checks on the condition of the tracks, a train carrying the leader, and a train that follows with additional security and supplies.&nbsp;

The trains' carriages are all bulletproof. That also makes them heavier, which means they travel no faster than 60 kilometres per hour.&nbsp;

And planes and helicopters fly overhead to provide even more security.&nbsp;

The reports say that 20 train stations have been built across the secretive country just for the leader’s personal use.

The reports add that when bored, a group of female entertainers aka lady conductors would sing to Kim Jong-Il in Korean and Russian.

Current news reports say Kim Jong-Un likes Swiss cheese, Cristal champagne, and Hennessy cognac.

It was the green train with yellow piping that alerted the world to the fact that North Korea's supreme leader Kim Jong-Un might be in Beijing

It was a train that alerted the world to the fact that North Korea's supreme leader Kim Jong-Un might be in Beijing. The dark green train with yellow piping has been "in the family" for generations. Kim's father, Kim Jong-Il, did not like flying. So he used the train instead. News reports say he had fresh lobster delivered to the train everyday, and French wine flown in from Paris. The reports quote foreign officials who had the rare chance of travelling on the train as saying it was possible to order any Korean, Chinese, Russian, French, and Japanese dish on the train. The elder Kim made about a dozen trips abroad. Most of them to China and all of them by train. Kim's grandfather and North Korean founder, Kim Il-Sung, took the train all the way to eastern Europe in 1984. Reports from Kim Jong-Il's time say that when he stepped out in his train, a total of three trains would travel with him. An advance security train that also checks on the condition of the tracks, a train carrying the leader, and a train that follows with additional security and supplies. The trains' carriages are all bulletproof. That also makes them heavier, which means they travel no faster than 60 kilometres per hour. And planes and helicopters fly overhead to provide even more security. The reports say that 20 train stations have been built across the secretive country just for the leader’s personal use. The reports add that when bored, a group of female entertainers aka lady conductors would sing to Kim Jong-Il in Korean and Russian. Current news reports say Kim Jong-Un likes Swiss cheese, Cristal champagne, and Hennessy cognac.

Kim Jong-Un's train: Fresh lobster, lady conductors & French wine from Paris

Novelist and investigative journalist Suki Kim, who went undercover in North Korea in 2011 posing as a missionary and an English teacher, says when one talks of art and literature in that country, one has to step back to see if that is even possible.

When all universities in North Korea were shut down for an entire year in 2011, the students were sent to construction fields except for 270 students at Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST), a brand-new university staffed only by foreigners for sons of North Korea&#39;s ruling class.

Thrice a day, the students had to sing praises to Kim Jong-il and North Korea: &quot;Without you, there is no motherland. Without you, there is no us.&quot;

This went on to become the title of Suki&#39;s book. &quot;Without You, There Is No Us: My Time with the Sons of North Korea&#39;s Elite&quot; is Suki&#39;s account of teaching English during the last six months of Kim Jong-il&#39;s reign.

Suki describes this university as a walled compound where portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il look on impassively from the walls of every room, and where she accepted a job teaching English.

Over the next six months, she taught them under the watchful eye of the regime.

&quot;But strangely, there were no inquisitiveness on the part of the students. They were not connected to the outside world and did not have the curiosity too. Actually, they were not allowed to nurture any such curiosity,&quot; Suki said during the recently-concluded Jaipur Literature Festival.

Suki scribbled notes whenever she could and later kept the written matter on USB sticks. Since 2002, she has travelled to North Korea, witnessing both Kim Jong-il&#39;s 60th Birthday celebrations as well as his death at age 69 in 2011.

She says no freedom of expression exists in North Korea.

&quot;It is all under surveillance. How can one talk of art and literature in North Korea when one is allowed only to write and speak about the top leader. One has to step back to see if that (arts and literature) is even possible,&quot; she says. 
According to Suki, it is important to examine and verify news and information related to North Korea.

She was responding to a question related to the book &quot;The Accusation: Forbidden Stories from Inside North Korea&quot;, written in 2014 by an anonymous writer from that country and translated by Deborah Smith.

In the collection, the dissident known only by the pseudonym Bandi paints a powerful and unflinching portrait of life under the rule of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.

&quot;I am not sure if one can give a proof that a real North Korean wrote that book. Not every bit of information related to North Korea can be considered genuine without proper verification,&quot; Suki says.

Born and raised in Seoul, Suki lives in New York. Her first novel, &quot;The Interpreter&quot;, was a finalist for a PEN Hemingway Prize.

Suki, who came to the Jaipur Literature Festival for the first time, says she loves novels of mother-daughter duo of Anita and Kiran Desai and Manil Suri.

When all universities in North Korea were shut down for an entire year in 2011, the students were sent to construction fields except for 270 students at Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. Thrice a day, the students had to sing praises to Kim Jong-il and North Korea

Novelist and investigative journalist Suki Kim, who went undercover in North Korea in 2011 posing as a missionary and an English teacher, says when one talks of art and literature in that country, one has to step back to see if that is even possible. When all universities in North Korea were shut down for an entire year in 2011, the students were sent to construction fields except for 270 students at Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST), a brand-new university staffed only by foreigners for sons of North Korea's ruling class. Thrice a day, the students had to sing praises to Kim Jong-il and North Korea: "Without you, there is no motherland. Without you, there is no us." This went on to become the title of Suki's book. "Without You, There Is No Us: My Time with the Sons of North Korea's Elite" is Suki's account of teaching English during the last six months of Kim Jong-il's reign. Suki describes this university as a walled compound where portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il look on impassively from the walls of every room, and where she accepted a job teaching English. Over the next six months, she taught them under the watchful eye of the regime. "But strangely, there were no inquisitiveness on the part of the students. They were not connected to the outside world and did not have the curiosity too. Actually, they were not allowed to nurture any such curiosity," Suki said during the recently-concluded Jaipur Literature Festival. Suki scribbled notes whenever she could and later kept the written matter on USB sticks. Since 2002, she has travelled to North Korea, witnessing both Kim Jong-il's 60th Birthday celebrations as well as his death at age 69 in 2011. She says no freedom of expression exists in North Korea. "It is all under surveillance. How can one talk of art and literature in North Korea when one is allowed only to write and speak about the top leader. One has to step back to see if that (arts and literature) is even possible," she says. According to Suki, it is important to examine and verify news and information related to North Korea. She was responding to a question related to the book "The Accusation: Forbidden Stories from Inside North Korea", written in 2014 by an anonymous writer from that country and translated by Deborah Smith. In the collection, the dissident known only by the pseudonym Bandi paints a powerful and unflinching portrait of life under the rule of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. "I am not sure if one can give a proof that a real North Korean wrote that book. Not every bit of information related to North Korea can be considered genuine without proper verification," Suki says. Born and raised in Seoul, Suki lives in New York. Her first novel, "The Interpreter", was a finalist for a PEN Hemingway Prize. Suki, who came to the Jaipur Literature Festival for the first time, says she loves novels of mother-daughter duo of Anita and Kiran Desai and Manil Suri.

Suki Kim: The novelist who went undercover in North Korea

With every new North Korean missile &ndash; such as the one launched on Tuesday, November 28 &ndash; or nuclear test, all eyes are on China. Like previous American presidents, Donald Trump believes that the road to a diplomatic solution on North Korea runs through Beijing. He holds the view that, of any country, China has the most leverage over North Korea and therefore could &ldquo;quickly and easily&rdquo; solve the problem with the Kim Jung-un regime &ndash; but is just not willing to do so.

For Washington, North Korea has become a top national security priority, in particular, because of Pyongyang&rsquo;s unexpectedly fast progress in developing intercontinental nuclear capabilities that may be able to reach the US mainland. Since assuming office, Trump has made North Korea the main focus of US-China relations. His main strategy has been to use trade issues as a bargaining chip to pressure China on North Korea, convinced that exerting enough economic pressure on Beijing will eventually force China to do what he wants.

Not budging

While recent measures &ndash; such as closing joint ventures with North Korean entities in China &ndash; have been viewed as signs of Beijing getting tougher on North Korea, the actions of the Chinese government are unlikely to be overly tough in the future. If it really wanted to take North Korea to task, China has a number of important economic levers at its disposal that it could use. The most effective measure against Kim Jong-un&rsquo;s regime would be for Beijing to completely stop its crude oil supply to its neighbour and thus cut off North Korea&rsquo;s main lifeline. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, China is the largest oil supplier to Pyongyang and accounts for about 90% of North Korea&rsquo;s total trade.

This is why most experts outside of China believe that Beijing is the key to solving the North Korean problem. But why are the Chinese so reluctant to do more despite the increasingly troubling behaviour of their neighbour?

China keeps Pyongyang economically viable because it fears the possible implications for China of the collapse of Kim Jong-un&rsquo;s regime. For a start, it would bring chaos and refugees to China&rsquo;s border. It would also induce an important foreign policy shift for Beijing in north-east Asia. And such interests are all related to one main actor: the United States.

Clash with US interests

Washington&rsquo;s aspirations for the endgame in North Korea are clearly in stark contrast to China&rsquo;s own long-term national interests. Beijing would certainly want to avoid a reunification of two Koreas under the banner of a democratic pro-American Republic of Korea &ndash; especially if this meant the presence of around 28,000 US troops next to its borders.

However, regardless of whether the US military moves north of the 38th parallel, in China&rsquo;s assessment, the US influence and its alliances on the whole Korean peninsula would likely remain. This would not only negatively affect China&rsquo;s security environment but also ultimately have a considerable impact on the balance of power in north-east Asia to Beijing&rsquo;s disadvantage.

In general, Chinese policy-makers view North Korea primarily through the prism of its greater rivalry with the US in Asia. Historically, Pyongyang has been regarded as an important strategic buffer zone against American influence. The very fact that the Chinese government continues to support the Kim regime suggests that this strategic thinking continues to play a substantive role in the calculus of China&rsquo;s foreign policy-making.

North Korea has also become an asset as a bargaining leverage vis-&agrave;-vis the US with respect to other conflicts between Washington and Beijing: for instance the maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas as well as the question of Taiwan&rsquo;s status.

The shift of US foreign policy towards the Asia-pacific region initiated by the Obama administration appears to have increased the value of North Korea for China. As part of its rebalancing strategy, the US has strengthened its relations and military cooperations with regional allies and partners, as well as expanding its institutional involvement in the region.

Washington&rsquo;s strategy in Asia has mainly focused on military issues. Most of China&rsquo;s foreign policy thinkers believe that the US wants to contain China&rsquo;s rise and influence while trying to preserve US dominance in the region. The fear of a strategic encirclement by a chain of US and allied air and military bases has grown in recent years. Moreover, China worries about being surrounded by a gradually expanding US missile defence system in Asia.

Fear of US surveillance&nbsp;

Beijing views the recent instalment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) in South Korea (which Washington bills as a protection against the missile threat from North Korea) primarily as part of a US-led regional missile defence network serving the larger purpose of weakening China&rsquo;s nuclear deterrence capability. Chinese military and security experts believe that the X-band radar system which comes with the THAAD missile defence battery enables the US to conduct surveillance deep into the Chinese and Russian territory.

The Chinese are particularly concerned that the THAAD system in Seoul will be connected to the other two American X-band radars stationed in the north and the south of Japan &ndash; expanding further data exchange and strengthening the US missile defence system in China&rsquo;s close neighbourhood.

<div class="ui-state-default"><img alt="" src="http://s.wionews.com/photos/file-20171129-28917-oeyxue-20171205072955.jpg" />
<div class="media-description">
The mobile Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defence system at a golf course in Seongju, South Korea. (Others)
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<a class="close-mark close-div" href="javascript:void(0)">&times;</a></div>

This would also be likely to foster a trilateral US-South Korea-Japan military alliance countering China. China also worries that the deployment of THAAD in Seoul might trigger other countries such as Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines to follow suit. Chinese analysts argue that the US is using the North Korea crisis as a pretext to expand its military capabilities in the region.

Whether the crisis amplifies or declines, Washington&rsquo;s interests are at stake in the region &ndash; so, for Beijing, the greatest threat to its national security is not the Kim regime but the US.

So far, US officials have failed to provide China with any good reasons why it should abandon its strategic leverage on North Korea and risk chaos on its doorstep.

This article was originally published on <a href="http://theconversation.com" rel="nofollow">The Conversation</a>. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/for-beijing-the-greatest-threat-to-chinas-national-security-is-not-the-kim-regime-it-is-the-us-88271" rel="nofollow">original article</a>.

(Disclaimer: The author writes here in a personal capacity).

Image credit: EPA

China is reluctant to be more active in dealing with Pyongyang for fear of consolidating the US take over in the region

With every new North Korean missile – such as the one launched on Tuesday, November 28 – or nuclear test, all eyes are on China. Like previous American presidents, Donald Trump believes that the road to a diplomatic solution on North Korea runs through Beijing. He holds the view that, of any country, China has the most leverage over North Korea and therefore could “quickly and easily” solve the problem with the Kim Jung-un regime – but is just not willing to do so. For Washington, North Korea has become a top national security priority, in particular, because of Pyongyang’s unexpectedly fast progress in developing intercontinental nuclear capabilities that may be able to reach the US mainland. Since assuming office, Trump has made North Korea the main focus of US-China relations. His main strategy has been to use trade issues as a bargaining chip to pressure China on North Korea, convinced that exerting enough economic pressure on Beijing will eventually force China to do what he wants. Not budging While recent measures – such as closing joint ventures with North Korean entities in China – have been viewed as signs of Beijing getting tougher on North Korea, the actions of the Chinese government are unlikely to be overly tough in the future. If it really wanted to take North Korea to task, China has a number of important economic levers at its disposal that it could use. The most effective measure against Kim Jong-un’s regime would be for Beijing to completely stop its crude oil supply to its neighbour and thus cut off North Korea’s main lifeline. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, China is the largest oil supplier to Pyongyang and accounts for about 90% of North Korea’s total trade. This is why most experts outside of China believe that Beijing is the key to solving the North Korean problem. But why are the Chinese so reluctant to do more despite the increasingly troubling behaviour of their neighbour? China keeps Pyongyang economically viable because it fears the possible implications for China of the collapse of Kim Jong-un’s regime. For a start, it would bring chaos and refugees to China’s border. It would also induce an important foreign policy shift for Beijing in north-east Asia. And such interests are all related to one main actor: the United States. Clash with US interests Washington’s aspirations for the endgame in North Korea are clearly in stark contrast to China’s own long-term national interests. Beijing would certainly want to avoid a reunification of two Koreas under the banner of a democratic pro-American Republic of Korea – especially if this meant the presence of around 28,000 US troops next to its borders. However, regardless of whether the US military moves north of the 38th parallel, in China’s assessment, the US influence and its alliances on the whole Korean peninsula would likely remain. This would not only negatively affect China’s security environment but also ultimately have a considerable impact on the balance of power in north-east Asia to Beijing’s disadvantage. In general, Chinese policy-makers view North Korea primarily through the prism of its greater rivalry with the US in Asia. Historically, Pyongyang has been regarded as an important strategic buffer zone against American influence. The very fact that the Chinese government continues to support the Kim regime suggests that this strategic thinking continues to play a substantive role in the calculus of China’s foreign policy-making. North Korea has also become an asset as a bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the US with respect to other conflicts between Washington and Beijing: for instance the maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas as well as the question of Taiwan’s status. The shift of US foreign policy towards the Asia-pacific region initiated by the Obama administration appears to have increased the value of North Korea for China. As part of its rebalancing strategy, the US has strengthened its relations and military cooperations with regional allies and partners, as well as expanding its institutional involvement in the region. Washington’s strategy in Asia has mainly focused on military issues. Most of China’s foreign policy thinkers believe that the US wants to contain China’s rise and influence while trying to preserve US dominance in the region. The fear of a strategic encirclement by a chain of US and allied air and military bases has grown in recent years. Moreover, China worries about being surrounded by a gradually expanding US missile defence system in Asia. Fear of US surveillance Beijing views the recent instalment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) in South Korea (which Washington bills as a protection against the missile threat from North Korea) primarily as part of a US-led regional missile defence network serving the larger purpose of weakening China’s nuclear deterrence capability. Chinese military and security experts believe that the X-band radar system which comes with the THAAD missile defence battery enables the US to conduct surveillance deep into the Chinese and Russian territory. The Chinese are particularly concerned that the THAAD system in Seoul will be connected to the other two American X-band radars stationed in the north and the south of Japan – expanding further data exchange and strengthening the US missile defence system in China’s close neighbourhood. The mobile Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defence system at a golf course in Seongju, South Korea. (Others) × This would also be likely to foster a trilateral US-South Korea-Japan military alliance countering China. China also worries that the deployment of THAAD in Seoul might trigger other countries such as Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines to follow suit. Chinese analysts argue that the US is using the North Korea crisis as a pretext to expand its military capabilities in the region. Whether the crisis amplifies or declines, Washington’s interests are at stake in the region – so, for Beijing, the greatest threat to its national security is not the Kim regime but the US. So far, US officials have failed to provide China with any good reasons why it should abandon its strategic leverage on North Korea and risk chaos on its doorstep. This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article. (Disclaimer: The author writes here in a personal capacity). Image credit: EPA

Opinion: The greatest threat to China is US, not the Kim regime

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July 8 in history: First-ever photo of Jupiter's moon, Kim Jong-il becomes leader of North Korea and more

Kim Jong-Un's train: Fresh lobster, lady conductors & French wine from Paris

Suki Kim: The novelist who went undercover in North Korea

Opinion: The greatest threat to China is US, not the Kim regime