<p>The&nbsp;Doklam&nbsp;standoff has underscored that India still lives under the shadow of the 1962 war, says a former Indian army corps commander who served in Sikkim. &nbsp;In his view, the manner in which the incident ballooned&mdash;its non-stop media coverage&mdash;and the&nbsp;grand designs attributed to the&nbsp;mandarins in Beijing by experts of various persuasions&nbsp;suggests that suspicions about&nbsp;China&#39;s intentions run very deep.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

<p>He believes a&nbsp;standoff in some godforsaken corner of their border&nbsp;is too small an issue to&nbsp;excite China&#39;s national leadership. &nbsp;If it is to teach India a lesson, there are other ways this can and has been done: some would say India&#39;s adverse trade balance with China, its inability to effectively counter China in the region, the stark disparities in development and income levels between the two countries has offered daily lessons for India.&nbsp;</p>

<p>But this very obvious economic and strategic asymmetry may be constant reminders in India of the&nbsp;military&nbsp;asymmetry that also&nbsp;prevails. While nobody can deny&nbsp;India&#39;s&nbsp;military has undergone&nbsp;major&nbsp;transformation since 1962, and infrastructure while still developing has improved, the Chinese not only present larger force&nbsp;levels, they can also move them faster and more efficiently given&nbsp;the phenomenal infrastructure they have invested in.&nbsp;</p>

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<h5>What form of retaliation? Some say it could be more transgressions along parts of the Line of Actual Control, pitching tents, refusing to move. We&#39;ve seen this before, small changes.&nbsp;</h5>
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<p>It largely explains India&#39;s measured and limited response to Chinese fulminations, official and otherwise, as well as&nbsp;their intemperate name calling. &nbsp;Clearly, the&nbsp;national security bureaucracy saw no purpose in&nbsp;baiting the dragon, at least not now.&nbsp;</p>

<p>A&nbsp;former intelligence official says India will shake off this mindset&nbsp;the day we give China a&nbsp;bloody nose! He says India needs to defeat China militarily, 1962 must be avenged if India is to come out of this psychological straitjacket. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

<p>All that for later if at all. There&#39;s talk of China neither forgiving nor forgetting their loss of face in&nbsp;Doklam&nbsp;and&nbsp;retaliating maybe after the BRICS summit in Xiamen is over. &nbsp;What form of retaliation? Some say it could be more transgressions along parts of the Line of Actual Control, pitching tents, refusing to move. We&#39;ve seen this before, small changes.&nbsp;</p>

<p>What some find more worrying is the&nbsp;possibility of China doing a&nbsp;Doklam&nbsp;on India. There are at least two tri-junctions where India has territorial disagreements with&nbsp;the neighbours: One is in the&nbsp;Kalapani&nbsp;area which is&nbsp;the tri-junction of Nepal, India and China. Another is a sliver of territory disputed by Myanmar, and&nbsp;India with China forming the third angle of the tri-junction. In that sense, China&#39;s warnings to India in this regard need to be taken seriously.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Also,&nbsp;Arunachal Pradesh. Forget the seven main valleys which India closely monitors. There are scores of&nbsp;other&nbsp;smaller valleys and passes through which China can infiltrate. If the aim is to retaliate, create trouble, China has a range of options open.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

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<p>China is already probing India&#39;s soft underbelly, promising to&nbsp;invest 50 billion dollars or more in Pakistan; other reports said China had offered tiny Bhutan 10 billion dollars to back them on&nbsp;Doklam; China has&nbsp;overtaken India as the largest aid giver to&nbsp;Nepal; it&#39;s giving Bangladesh two submarines!&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

<p>There is a view that China is actively discouraging investment by Chinese companies in India. The argument is, why help build the&nbsp;Indian&nbsp;economy? &nbsp;Current levels of Chinese FDI are quite low, less than five billion dollars. The future doesn&#39;t look good amid reports of India levying tariffs on Chinese&nbsp;imports,&nbsp;and falling sales of Chinese mobile phones.&nbsp;</p>

<p>But there&#39;s always a silver lining. China cannot ignore the Indian market, nor can it afford to not engage with India as it pushes ties with Japan and the US.&nbsp;Doklam&nbsp;could also be the trigger for&nbsp;South-east Asian states to stop bowing to the dragon and build alliances that can help strengthen their own security and independence. &nbsp;Watch this space for more on the post-Doklam scenario.</p>


Post-Doklam, South-east Asian states can stop bowing to China and build alliances that can help strengthen their own security and independence.

The Doklam standoff has underscored that India still lives under the shadow of the 1962 war, says a former Indian army corps commander who served in Sikkim. In his view, the manner in which the incident ballooned—its non-stop media coverage—and the grand designs attributed to the mandarins in Beijing by experts of various persuasions suggests that suspicions about China's intentions run very deep. He believes a standoff in some godforsaken corner of their border is too small an issue to excite China's national leadership. If it is to teach India a lesson, there are other ways this can and has been done: some would say India's adverse trade balance with China, its inability to effectively counter China in the region, the stark disparities in development and income levels between the two countries has offered daily lessons for India. But this very obvious economic and strategic asymmetry may be constant reminders in India of the military asymmetry that also prevails. While nobody can deny India's military has undergone major transformation since 1962, and infrastructure while still developing has improved, the Chinese not only present larger force levels, they can also move them faster and more efficiently given the phenomenal infrastructure they have invested in. What form of retaliation? Some say it could be more transgressions along parts of the Line of Actual Control, pitching tents, refusing to move. We've seen this before, small changes. × It largely explains India's measured and limited response to Chinese fulminations, official and otherwise, as well as their intemperate name calling. Clearly, the national security bureaucracy saw no purpose in baiting the dragon, at least not now. A former intelligence official says India will shake off this mindset the day we give China a bloody nose! He says India needs to defeat China militarily, 1962 must be avenged if India is to come out of this psychological straitjacket. All that for later if at all. There's talk of China neither forgiving nor forgetting their loss of face in Doklam and retaliating maybe after the BRICS summit in Xiamen is over. What form of retaliation? Some say it could be more transgressions along parts of the Line of Actual Control, pitching tents, refusing to move. We've seen this before, small changes. What some find more worrying is the possibility of China doing a Doklam on India. There are at least two tri-junctions where India has territorial disagreements with the neighbours: One is in the Kalapani area which is the tri-junction of Nepal, India and China. Another is a sliver of territory disputed by Myanmar, and India with China forming the third angle of the tri-junction. In that sense, China's warnings to India in this regard need to be taken seriously. Also, Arunachal Pradesh. Forget the seven main valleys which India closely monitors. There are scores of other smaller valleys and passes through which China can infiltrate. If the aim is to retaliate, create trouble, China has a range of options open. China cannot ignore the Indian market, nor can it afford to not engage with India as it pushes ties with Japan and the US. × China is already probing India's soft underbelly, promising to invest 50 billion dollars or more in Pakistan; other reports said China had offered tiny Bhutan 10 billion dollars to back them on Doklam; China has overtaken India as the largest aid giver to Nepal; it's giving Bangladesh two submarines! There is a view that China is actively discouraging investment by Chinese companies in India. The argument is, why help build the Indian economy? Current levels of Chinese FDI are quite low, less than five billion dollars. The future doesn't look good amid reports of India levying tariffs on Chinese imports, and falling sales of Chinese mobile phones. But there's always a silver lining. China cannot ignore the Indian market, nor can it afford to not engage with India as it pushes ties with Japan and the US. Doklam could also be the trigger for South-east Asian states to stop bowing to the dragon and build alliances that can help strengthen their own security and independence. Watch this space for more on the post-Doklam scenario.

China wants to isolate India but can't afford to ignore Indian market

<p>Has the standoff over Doklam deflated the Chinese balloon?&nbsp;Deflated yes, not punctured.</p>

<p>It&#39;s vital, we understand the difference.</p>

<p>India has deflated the perception assiduously propagated by the Chinese media that their country is America&#39;s equal. If that was the case, what explains the Indian wall it has run up against on the Doklam plateau.</p>

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<p>The same Indian wall is being closely watched across a broad swathe of the South China Sea where China has dredged up artificial islands, laid airfields and stocked up with every manner of weapons and equipment. The wall has drawn the attention of South China Sea littoral states which are unable to stand up to China&#39;s naval muscle or are seduced by its money power.</p>

<p>But this has only deflated the Dragon not punctured it.</p>

<p>China watchers say - the debate in Beijing is probably about their lack of proper appreciation of the environment.&nbsp;Meaning, the PLA did not anticipate the manner in which India would respond to the move to lay a road through the Doklam Plateau.</p>

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<p>That tells us something about Chinese military thinking, an element of overconfidence perhaps, which encouraged the perception that India would stand down. Are we being unfair here? Until now all India-China standoffs have been &#39;strictly bilateral&#39;, meaning it has always been about one side claiming territory held or claimed by the other. In that sense, India standing up for a third country may have appeared far-fetched.</p>

<p>What&#39;s clear is that the Chinese will neither forgive nor forget what India has done to them in Doklam.</p>

<p>China analysts like Jayadev Ranade believe the politicians in Beijing are under pressure from the PLA to take off the restraints and allow them to go against India. Apparently, some of this pressure is emanating from the Western Theatre Command tasked with securing the Indian frontier which also includes Bhutan.</p>

<p>What, therefore, can they be expected to do? That&#39;s hard to predict but China watchers say Beijing&#39;s Mandarins will try to extract their pound of flesh from India perhaps not now, maybe later at a time and place of their choosing.&nbsp;The location could range anywhere from Ladakh and Himachal to Arunachal and even Sikkim. A former Northern Army Commander Gen. H.S. Panag has hinted this could even take place sometime in winter, could involve China&#39;s range of rocket artillery and even cyber weapons.</p>

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<p>Ranade believes any action by the Chinese would be limited in scope and duration with the aim of teaching India a lesson. In that context, it&#39;s interesting to examine the efforts by President Xi Jinping to transform the lumbering, a top heavy land dominated military into a nimble integrated force capable of fighting and winning &#39;local wars under hi-tech conditions&#39;.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Srikanth Kondapalli, who teaches China at Delhi&#39;s Jawaharlal Nehru University, says, &quot;The objective is not to occupy territory but paralyse the adversary and for this, you need the concentration of firepower, air force, artillery in one area of mobilisation. They are raising 40 Rapid Response Units and an airborne corps for transporting troops.&quot;</p>

<p>The dilemma for President Xi is whether his newly transformed military can be trusted to deliver in a limited action against India. More important, can the military ensure this does not escalate, that India does not escalate? The word from military analysts here is India will escalate!</p>


China watchers say Beijing will try to extract their pound of flesh from India perhaps not now, maybe later at a time and place of their choosing.

Has the standoff over Doklam deflated the Chinese balloon? Deflated yes, not punctured. It's vital, we understand the difference. India has deflated the perception assiduously propagated by the Chinese media that their country is America's equal. If that was the case, what explains the Indian wall it has run up against on the Doklam plateau. China has dredged up artificial islands, laid airfields and stocked up with every manner of weapons and equipment. × The same Indian wall is being closely watched across a broad swathe of the South China Sea where China has dredged up artificial islands, laid airfields and stocked up with every manner of weapons and equipment. The wall has drawn the attention of South China Sea littoral states which are unable to stand up to China's naval muscle or are seduced by its money power. But this has only deflated the Dragon not punctured it. China watchers say - the debate in Beijing is probably about their lack of proper appreciation of the environment. Meaning, the PLA did not anticipate the manner in which India would respond to the move to lay a road through the Doklam Plateau. Until now all India-China standoffs have been 'strictly bilateral', meaning it has always been about one side claiming territory held or claimed by the other. × That tells us something about Chinese military thinking, an element of overconfidence perhaps, which encouraged the perception that India would stand down. Are we being unfair here? Until now all India-China standoffs have been 'strictly bilateral', meaning it has always been about one side claiming territory held or claimed by the other. In that sense, India standing up for a third country may have appeared far-fetched. What's clear is that the Chinese will neither forgive nor forget what India has done to them in Doklam. China analysts like Jayadev Ranade believe the politicians in Beijing are under pressure from the PLA to take off the restraints and allow them to go against India. Apparently, some of this pressure is emanating from the Western Theatre Command tasked with securing the Indian frontier which also includes Bhutan. What, therefore, can they be expected to do? That's hard to predict but China watchers say Beijing's Mandarins will try to extract their pound of flesh from India perhaps not now, maybe later at a time and place of their choosing. The location could range anywhere from Ladakh and Himachal to Arunachal and even Sikkim. A former Northern Army Commander Gen. H.S. Panag has hinted this could even take place sometime in winter, could involve China's range of rocket artillery and even cyber weapons. It's interesting to examine the efforts by President Xi Jinping to transform the lumbering, a top heavy land dominated military into a nimble integrated force capable of fighting and winning 'local wars under hi-tech conditions'. × Ranade believes any action by the Chinese would be limited in scope and duration with the aim of teaching India a lesson. In that context, it's interesting to examine the efforts by President Xi Jinping to transform the lumbering, a top heavy land dominated military into a nimble integrated force capable of fighting and winning 'local wars under hi-tech conditions'. Srikanth Kondapalli, who teaches China at Delhi's Jawaharlal Nehru University, says, "The objective is not to occupy territory but paralyse the adversary and for this, you need the concentration of firepower, air force, artillery in one area of mobilisation. They are raising 40 Rapid Response Units and an airborne corps for transporting troops." The dilemma for President Xi is whether his newly transformed military can be trusted to deliver in a limited action against India. More important, can the military ensure this does not escalate, that India does not escalate? The word from military analysts here is India will escalate!

Doklam was a setback, China keen on teaching India a lesson

<p>Did China not anticipate the Indian reaction to its road building on the Doklam Plateau? &nbsp;Some of the Indian analysis suggests&nbsp;this may be the case given the intensity of Beijing&#39;s response and the continuing barrage of criticism from its state-controlled media.&nbsp;</p>

<p>A former Indian Army commander who served in the area provided some perspective: &quot;The brinkmanship we see from their side is part of their policy, they think they can browbeat us but we must not blink,&quot; he said. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

<p>He pointed out that India had no alternative since China was altering the status quo on the plateau, so &quot;we had to stop them.&quot; &nbsp;He would not comment on whether India reacted on its own upon seeing what the Chinese were up to, or did it act upon Bhutan&#39;s complaint. &nbsp;But he acknowledged that this scenario had been war gamed by the army brass, and its implications thought through. &nbsp;</p>

<p>A retired brigadier was more direct, saying the Indian Army would have responded to any Chinese provocation in that area on its own regardless of the &quot;sentiments of the Royal Bhutanese Army&quot;. &nbsp;In that sense, It helped that India has a &quot;training team&quot; in Bhutan. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

<p>But is there a larger point here? &nbsp;There is a view that India&#39;s intervention on behalf of its smaller neighbour has upset Beijing. &nbsp;</p>

<p>&quot;We came to the support of Bhutan and that worries them,&quot; said the former army commander. &quot;There was a similar standoff in 1987 in Sumdorong Chu in Arunachal Pradesh which went on for over a year but that was purely bilateral. Here we have intervened in support of a third party.&quot;&nbsp;</p>

<p>It has implications for India&#39;s traditionally negative &#39;Big Brother&#39; image in this region (which among other reasons explains Chinese inroads). If the standoff prolongs, that perception could change to something more favourable towards India. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

<p>The standoff has invited considerable comment not from the ruling Nepali establishment but from the Nepali press with some supporting China, others sympathetic to Bhutan (why can&#39;t Thimphu have relations with China?) and some backing India although with caveats: for instance the need for Nepal to resolve its own tri-junction issues with India and China (Lipulekh in western Nepal and Jhinsang Chuli in eastern Nepal).&nbsp;</p>

<p>Some of the comment also reflects Nepal&#39;s ties with India, ties of blood, culture and history (including the 2-3 million Nepalis living and working in India and the 65,000 Nepalis serving in the Indian armed forces). &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

<p>Sri Lanka has been studiedly silent on the Doklam standoff perhaps with reason: Sri Lanka is indebted to China to the tune of 8 billion dollars. Unable to pay off the debt, it is giving Chinese companies equity in projects like the Hambantota Port. That has ignited a storm of protests from people living near the port whose land the government plans to acquire on behalf of Chinese companies.&nbsp;</p>

<p>To give the Indian devil its due, aid from Delhi has helped Sri Lanka&#39;s social sector, or provided funds and expertise for projects executed by Sri Lankans for Sri Lankans. &nbsp;Which is why India&#39;s decision to stand by Bhutan and take on the Chinese could correct some of the perceptions about India in the neighbourhood.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Looking beyond the neighbourhood, it&#39;s clear that here also India stands alone. The US and Australia have remained neutral, a reflection of how important the China trade and investment is to their economies. The 11-nation ASEAN has kept silent given it is involved in negotiations with the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). &nbsp;As for Europe, apart from some insipid statements from the European Parliament urging India and China to talk, there&#39;s been nothing.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Old ally Russia too has had nothing to say, a reflection again of how indebted it is to Beijing given Western sanctions. &nbsp; &nbsp;</p>

<p>Yes, India is alone in this standoff. But there&#39;s also the buzz that China sees no purpose in escalation. Presently its trade surplus with India is over 50 billion dollars; Chinese companies are moving to India to take advantage of a growing market; there is also perhaps the recognition that China is not liked in most parts of the world and a conflict raises the risk of sanctions and embargoes that could further slow down the economy. &nbsp;So it could well be that the noise over Doklam will subside, hopefully as winter sets in. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

<p>The lack of a resolution is troubling. China could well raise temperatures on the plateau (or elsewhere) again. &nbsp;But India could be even better prepared by then.&nbsp;</p>

<p>(WION)</p>


If the Doklam standoff prolongs, India's "big brother" image could change to something more favourable towards India

Did China not anticipate the Indian reaction to its road building on the Doklam Plateau? Some of the Indian analysis suggests this may be the case given the intensity of Beijing's response and the continuing barrage of criticism from its state-controlled media. A former Indian Army commander who served in the area provided some perspective: "The brinkmanship we see from their side is part of their policy, they think they can browbeat us but we must not blink," he said. He pointed out that India had no alternative since China was altering the status quo on the plateau, so "we had to stop them." He would not comment on whether India reacted on its own upon seeing what the Chinese were up to, or did it act upon Bhutan's complaint. But he acknowledged that this scenario had been war gamed by the army brass, and its implications thought through. A retired brigadier was more direct, saying the Indian Army would have responded to any Chinese provocation in that area on its own regardless of the "sentiments of the Royal Bhutanese Army". In that sense, It helped that India has a "training team" in Bhutan. But is there a larger point here? There is a view that India's intervention on behalf of its smaller neighbour has upset Beijing. "We came to the support of Bhutan and that worries them," said the former army commander. "There was a similar standoff in 1987 in Sumdorong Chu in Arunachal Pradesh which went on for over a year but that was purely bilateral. Here we have intervened in support of a third party." It has implications for India's traditionally negative 'Big Brother' image in this region (which among other reasons explains Chinese inroads). If the standoff prolongs, that perception could change to something more favourable towards India. The standoff has invited considerable comment not from the ruling Nepali establishment but from the Nepali press with some supporting China, others sympathetic to Bhutan (why can't Thimphu have relations with China?) and some backing India although with caveats: for instance the need for Nepal to resolve its own tri-junction issues with India and China (Lipulekh in western Nepal and Jhinsang Chuli in eastern Nepal). Some of the comment also reflects Nepal's ties with India, ties of blood, culture and history (including the 2-3 million Nepalis living and working in India and the 65,000 Nepalis serving in the Indian armed forces). Sri Lanka has been studiedly silent on the Doklam standoff perhaps with reason: Sri Lanka is indebted to China to the tune of 8 billion dollars. Unable to pay off the debt, it is giving Chinese companies equity in projects like the Hambantota Port. That has ignited a storm of protests from people living near the port whose land the government plans to acquire on behalf of Chinese companies. To give the Indian devil its due, aid from Delhi has helped Sri Lanka's social sector, or provided funds and expertise for projects executed by Sri Lankans for Sri Lankans. Which is why India's decision to stand by Bhutan and take on the Chinese could correct some of the perceptions about India in the neighbourhood. Looking beyond the neighbourhood, it's clear that here also India stands alone. The US and Australia have remained neutral, a reflection of how important the China trade and investment is to their economies. The 11-nation ASEAN has kept silent given it is involved in negotiations with the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). As for Europe, apart from some insipid statements from the European Parliament urging India and China to talk, there's been nothing. Old ally Russia too has had nothing to say, a reflection again of how indebted it is to Beijing given Western sanctions. Yes, India is alone in this standoff. But there's also the buzz that China sees no purpose in escalation. Presently its trade surplus with India is over 50 billion dollars; Chinese companies are moving to India to take advantage of a growing market; there is also perhaps the recognition that China is not liked in most parts of the world and a conflict raises the risk of sanctions and embargoes that could further slow down the economy. So it could well be that the noise over Doklam will subside, hopefully as winter sets in. The lack of a resolution is troubling. China could well raise temperatures on the plateau (or elsewhere) again. But India could be even better prepared by then. (WION)

How the Chinese incursions in Doklam can change India's position in the region

<p>Afghans were dealt a blast from the past one morning late last week: Newspapers front paged a photograph of President Ashraf Ghani and his Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah flanking the man widely reviled as the Butcher of Kabul, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Also in the picture was former president Hamid Karzai.&nbsp;<br />
&nbsp;<br />
Hekmatyar&#39;s return to Kabul after 20 years of exile could be described as nothing less than triumphant. He rolled into the city in a convoy of vehicles with his armed Hezb-I-Islami fighters in tow. Apparently, his murderous shelling of Kabul in the 1990s civil war was no longer an issue, which suggests that the Afghan pot is churning again with uncertain consequences for India. But more on that later. Let&#39;s look at some other developments.&nbsp;</p>

<p>This week the Pentagon will shoot off a set of recommendations on Afghanistan to President Trump: The buzz in the US media is about the military proposing to send at least 5000 more troops to that country to add to the 8,400 already there. The troops will be largely &quot;trainers&quot; for the Afghan military. &nbsp;</p>

<p>It doesn&#39;t take a genius to figure out that when the US was not able to sort out the Taliban with 100,000 troops, it cannot do so with 13,500. At the same time, Trump apparently has given his &nbsp;military brass full freedom on Afghanistan. The only caveat is the US should not end up looking defeated.&nbsp;</p>

<p>This comment from Gen. Raymond Thomas of the US Special Operations Command provides insights into the army&#39;s thinking. &nbsp;He said the critical factor in Afghanistan was the US commitment to &ldquo;a sound enduring state&rdquo; which he said, was &ldquo;not described effectively&rdquo; in the past. &ldquo;I think our new strategy is going to establish that definition.&rdquo; &nbsp;</p>

<p>Sameer Lalwani and Travis Wheeler of the Stimson Center, who write&nbsp;in the online magazine The Wire, said the US is hoping to achieve &quot;strategic effects&quot; in Afghanistan, meaning, &quot;the US could use force not simply to reverse battlefield gains by the Taliban but instead could pursue a lasting political settlement.&quot;&nbsp;</p>

<p>That point had been underscored by Richard Olson, former US Special Representative for AfPak, in an op-ed piece in the New York Times where he suggested that a political settlement might be possible allowing (and this is important) for reconciliation and Taliban entrance into the Afghan state!&nbsp;</p>

<p>Finally we have it: The US maybe preparing to do what was until now considered unthinkable, shake hands with the Taliban. &nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

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<p>The pundits would say Washington is rather belatedly waking up to &nbsp;the realities of its 17 year Afghan adventure. The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction recently reported to the US Congress, that Taliban shadow governments now operate in virtually every province and control some of them, like Helmand. Government centres throughout the country are under constant pressure from Taliban insurgents. &nbsp;Violence throughout 2016 and in the first quarter of this year, have reached their highest level since 2007. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</p>

<p>Afghanistan&#39;s neighbours appear to have woken up to this much earlier. Russia and China have been talking to the Taliban, apparently seeing them as less of a threat than the Islamic State. This is happening when the Islamic State&#39;s presence in eastern Afghanistan is at a nascent stage, there is no great territory it controls and its rank and file appear to be disgruntled elements from other insurgent factions including the Taliban. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

<p>Even Shia Iran appears to have come on board to support the Sunni Taliban. There are reports of Taliban leaders being sighted in Kerman, Yazd and Mashad in Iran. Also that the Taliban shura has been allowed to operate since 2012 from Zahedan in south-east Iran bordering Afghanistan. The Afghan government says Taliban leaders cross over into Iran with valid visas on their passports. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, incidentally, is reported to have been living in Iran for the last seven years despite his anti-Shia proclivites. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

<p>South Asia writer Ramtanu Maitra of the Executive Intelligence Review, underscores a crucial point, that Saudi financial largesse for the Taliban maybe drying up, the money now shifting to support the Islamic State. &nbsp;Reports of IS cadres seeking to expand their influence in the Afghan provinces of Zabul, Wardak and Ghazni have been persistent. Maitra points to Russian reports that the IS is infiltrating into Helmand with an eye on controlling the heroin trafficking network there. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

<p>Afghanistan&#39;s neighbours, it seems, see the Taliban as the lesser of the two evils: Although Islamist and conservative, it is an Afghan movement. The Taliban in turn, may find it convenient to moderate its policies in order to draw the support of neighbours as it seeks to ward off the challenge of the Islamic State.&nbsp;<br />
&nbsp;</p>

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<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Where does this leave India? Publicly, India&#39;s policy is no truck with the Taliban. The group is seen in India as Pakistan&#39;s child, an Islamist &nbsp;terror outfit bent on fomenting discord and violence across the region. But does that imply no contact at all with the group? &nbsp;Indian diplomats have indicated privately in the past that the Taliban was not known to target India funded development projects. In 2010 Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid said the movement was not in direct conflict with India and wanted normal relations. &nbsp;This even while claiming responsibility for the attack on a Kabul hotel in Feb 2010 in which seven Indians were killed. &nbsp;</p>

<p>In 2013, the former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan Abdul Salam Zaeef was in Goa to attend the litfest. Reports at that time said Indian intelligence agencies insisted that he get a visa. Zaeef was picked up by the Pakistanis as the US moved into Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11. He spent time in Guantanamo Bay and the book he wrote after his release is scathing in its references to Islamabad. India is hardly mentioned. Ambassador Zaeef told me in an interview in Kabul some years ago that India did wrong by backing the Soviet occupation of his country and supporting the late President Najibullah. But he also acknowledged India never sent troops to Afghanistan. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

<p>Lalwani and Wheeler make the point that an Afghan settlement involving the Taliban could in the long term help India. Currently, Washington&#39;s South Asia focus is driven largely by AfPak with Islamabad exercising considerable leverage in the relationship. &nbsp;</p>

<p>This stems partly from Washington&#39;s reliance on Pakistan to ensure smooth flow of supplies to its forces in Afghanistan. Also partly because the Pakistan-US partnership is an old one, dating back to the 1950s; in the &nbsp;Pentagon and State Department there are &quot;Pakistan hands&quot;; there are individual and institutional relationships; most important the Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies provide valuable support to the US even today. &nbsp;Such ties provide the balance when the outcry against Pakistani involvement and connivance with terror groups gets louder.&nbsp;</p>

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<p>Lalwani and Wheeler believe this interdependence will diminish considerably after an Afghan settlement no longer requires the presence of US forces. The US may then be more inclined to crack down on Pakistan-backed terror groups, including those directed against India.&nbsp;</p>

<p>There is also the point that with its military capacities being significantly augmented, India may have little to fear from the Taliban. If the group does provide sanctuaries and safe haven to terror groups, India can easily target them. Which brings me back to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the churning of the Afghan pot. His anti-India inclinations are well known but sitting in Kabul with a stake in the power structure could transform old attitudes. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

<p>The Taliban, for all its faults, remains an Afghan movement. It is also, going by various reports, splintered and therefore difficult for Pakistan to control. It probably explains Pakistan&#39;s support for other groups, including the Haqqani network, Al-Qaeda (apparently Pakistan is hiding its chief Ayman Zawahiri in Karachi), besides covertly encouraging the rise of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. India needs to play its cards deftly in this new phase of the Afghan Great Game. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;<br />
&nbsp;</p>

<p>(WION)</p>


With the return of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Afghan pot is churning again with uncertain consequences for India.

Afghans were dealt a blast from the past one morning late last week: Newspapers front paged a photograph of President Ashraf Ghani and his Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah flanking the man widely reviled as the Butcher of Kabul, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Also in the picture was former president Hamid Karzai. Hekmatyar's return to Kabul after 20 years of exile could be described as nothing less than triumphant. He rolled into the city in a convoy of vehicles with his armed Hezb-I-Islami fighters in tow. Apparently, his murderous shelling of Kabul in the 1990s civil war was no longer an issue, which suggests that the Afghan pot is churning again with uncertain consequences for India. But more on that later. Let's look at some other developments. This week the Pentagon will shoot off a set of recommendations on Afghanistan to President Trump: The buzz in the US media is about the military proposing to send at least 5000 more troops to that country to add to the 8,400 already there. The troops will be largely "trainers" for the Afghan military. It doesn't take a genius to figure out that when the US was not able to sort out the Taliban with 100,000 troops, it cannot do so with 13,500. At the same time, Trump apparently has given his military brass full freedom on Afghanistan. The only caveat is the US should not end up looking defeated. This comment from Gen. Raymond Thomas of the US Special Operations Command provides insights into the army's thinking. He said the critical factor in Afghanistan was the US commitment to “a sound enduring state” which he said, was “not described effectively” in the past. “I think our new strategy is going to establish that definition.” Sameer Lalwani and Travis Wheeler of the Stimson Center, who write in the online magazine The Wire, said the US is hoping to achieve "strategic effects" in Afghanistan, meaning, "the US could use force not simply to reverse battlefield gains by the Taliban but instead could pursue a lasting political settlement." That point had been underscored by Richard Olson, former US Special Representative for AfPak, in an op-ed piece in the New York Times where he suggested that a political settlement might be possible allowing (and this is important) for reconciliation and Taliban entrance into the Afghan state! Finally we have it: The US maybe preparing to do what was until now considered unthinkable, shake hands with the Taliban. The US maybe preparing to do what was until now considered unthinkable, shake hands with the Taliban. × The pundits would say Washington is rather belatedly waking up to the realities of its 17 year Afghan adventure. The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction recently reported to the US Congress, that Taliban shadow governments now operate in virtually every province and control some of them, like Helmand. Government centres throughout the country are under constant pressure from Taliban insurgents. Violence throughout 2016 and in the first quarter of this year, have reached their highest level since 2007. Afghanistan's neighbours appear to have woken up to this much earlier. Russia and China have been talking to the Taliban, apparently seeing them as less of a threat than the Islamic State. This is happening when the Islamic State's presence in eastern Afghanistan is at a nascent stage, there is no great territory it controls and its rank and file appear to be disgruntled elements from other insurgent factions including the Taliban. Even Shia Iran appears to have come on board to support the Sunni Taliban. There are reports of Taliban leaders being sighted in Kerman, Yazd and Mashad in Iran. Also that the Taliban shura has been allowed to operate since 2012 from Zahedan in south-east Iran bordering Afghanistan. The Afghan government says Taliban leaders cross over into Iran with valid visas on their passports. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, incidentally, is reported to have been living in Iran for the last seven years despite his anti-Shia proclivites. South Asia writer Ramtanu Maitra of the Executive Intelligence Review, underscores a crucial point, that Saudi financial largesse for the Taliban maybe drying up, the money now shifting to support the Islamic State. Reports of IS cadres seeking to expand their influence in the Afghan provinces of Zabul, Wardak and Ghazni have been persistent. Maitra points to Russian reports that the IS is infiltrating into Helmand with an eye on controlling the heroin trafficking network there. Afghanistan's neighbours, it seems, see the Taliban as the lesser of the two evils: Although Islamist and conservative, it is an Afghan movement. The Taliban in turn, may find it convenient to moderate its policies in order to draw the support of neighbours as it seeks to ward off the challenge of the Islamic State. The Taliban in turn, may find it convenient to moderate its policies in order to draw the support of neighbours as it seeks to ward off the challenge of the Islamic State. × Where does this leave India? Publicly, India's policy is no truck with the Taliban. The group is seen in India as Pakistan's child, an Islamist terror outfit bent on fomenting discord and violence across the region. But does that imply no contact at all with the group? Indian diplomats have indicated privately in the past that the Taliban was not known to target India funded development projects. In 2010 Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid said the movement was not in direct conflict with India and wanted normal relations. This even while claiming responsibility for the attack on a Kabul hotel in Feb 2010 in which seven Indians were killed. In 2013, the former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan Abdul Salam Zaeef was in Goa to attend the litfest. Reports at that time said Indian intelligence agencies insisted that he get a visa. Zaeef was picked up by the Pakistanis as the US moved into Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11. He spent time in Guantanamo Bay and the book he wrote after his release is scathing in its references to Islamabad. India is hardly mentioned. Ambassador Zaeef told me in an interview in Kabul some years ago that India did wrong by backing the Soviet occupation of his country and supporting the late President Najibullah. But he also acknowledged India never sent troops to Afghanistan. Lalwani and Wheeler make the point that an Afghan settlement involving the Taliban could in the long term help India. Currently, Washington's South Asia focus is driven largely by AfPak with Islamabad exercising considerable leverage in the relationship. This stems partly from Washington's reliance on Pakistan to ensure smooth flow of supplies to its forces in Afghanistan. Also partly because the Pakistan-US partnership is an old one, dating back to the 1950s; in the Pentagon and State Department there are "Pakistan hands"; there are individual and institutional relationships; most important the Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies provide valuable support to the US even today. Such ties provide the balance when the outcry against Pakistani involvement and connivance with terror groups gets louder. Ambassador Zaeef told me in an interview in Kabul some years ago that India did wrong by backing the Soviet occupation of his country and supporting the late President Najibullah. × Lalwani and Wheeler believe this interdependence will diminish considerably after an Afghan settlement no longer requires the presence of US forces. The US may then be more inclined to crack down on Pakistan-backed terror groups, including those directed against India. There is also the point that with its military capacities being significantly augmented, India may have little to fear from the Taliban. If the group does provide sanctuaries and safe haven to terror groups, India can easily target them. Which brings me back to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the churning of the Afghan pot. His anti-India inclinations are well known but sitting in Kabul with a stake in the power structure could transform old attitudes. The Taliban, for all its faults, remains an Afghan movement. It is also, going by various reports, splintered and therefore difficult for Pakistan to control. It probably explains Pakistan's support for other groups, including the Haqqani network, Al-Qaeda (apparently Pakistan is hiding its chief Ayman Zawahiri in Karachi), besides covertly encouraging the rise of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. India needs to play its cards deftly in this new phase of the Afghan Great Game. (WION)

Afghan Great Game changes with the return of 'Butcher of Kabul'

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>It&#39;s been more than 20 years and memories are a little hazy but I still recall flying into Kigali Airport on a special UN-chartered flight that was taking Indian Army peacekeepers to the Central African Republic of Rwanda. This was some months after the genocide. I, along with my cameraman, was on assignment for&nbsp; NDTV&#39;s The World This Week programme.&nbsp; &nbsp;</p>

<p>Over one week, we travelled the length and breadth of Rwanda usually by helicopter, visiting some of those sites notorious for the massacre of ethnic Tutsis by the majority Hutus. &nbsp;</p>

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<p>Memories of our visit to the Ntarama Church, a couple of hours flying time from the capital Kigali, still remain. As we walked through the grounds, we saw skeletons lying all around, some with scraps of clothing still on them. Till date, images flash before me of a woman raped and her skull broken...a baby... the skeletons of so many children. &nbsp;</p>

<p>The Rwandan army officer accompanying us regretted the display but as he explained, &quot;It makes me sick but we cannot afford to forget what happened&quot;.&nbsp;</p>

<p>It was worse inside the church: Broken pews, shattered skulls, bodies of men women and children on the floor. None was spared and if you were a Hutu supporting the Tutsis, there was no escaping the Hutu Interahamwe militia. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</p>

<p>I met an Indian doing business in Rwanda, operating from what used to be a plush Kigali suburb.&nbsp; He was married to a Tutsi woman. As the madness around him exploded, the businessman had hidden his wife in a specially built loft in his home.&nbsp; It didn&#39;t help. The Hutu mobs descended on his home, found his wife and took her away but spared him. He never saw her again.&nbsp;</p>

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<h5>The Hutu mobs descended on his home, found his wife and took her away but spared him</h5>
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<p>A Keralite who served as a manager in a small factory, manufacturing soaps and detergents, brought a different view about the Hutus.&nbsp; Despite the mass killings, he described the Hutus as &quot;a better, more sincere people than Tutsis&quot;.&nbsp; Tutsis, he claimed, had a superiority complex because they were generally better educated, well-represented in government and looked down on Hutus who formed the working class.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Since those days Rwanda has had over two decades of peace under General&nbsp;Paul Kagame, who led a predominantly Tutsi guerrilla army to victory and ended the slaughter.&nbsp;Kagame appears to have avoided the kind of mass reprisals against the Hutus and some effort has gone into reconciliation programmes.&nbsp;However, whether these have actually overcome old suspicions and tribal animosities is not clear.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Kagame may have succumbed to another weakness: the inability of so many African leaders to accept that power and position are not forever.&nbsp; Has Kagame built up the second rung of leadership within his party; is that leadership inclusive; how democratic is he in his functioning? The answers to these questions could provide clues Rwanda&#39;s political future and long term stability. &nbsp;</p>

<p>(WION)</p>


Rwanda has over two decades of peace now, but whether the country has actually overcome old suspicions and tribal animosities is not clear

It's been more than 20 years and memories are a little hazy but I still recall flying into Kigali Airport on a special UN-chartered flight that was taking Indian Army peacekeepers to the Central African Republic of Rwanda. This was some months after the genocide. I, along with my cameraman, was on assignment for NDTV's The World This Week programme. Over one week, we travelled the length and breadth of Rwanda usually by helicopter, visiting some of those sites notorious for the massacre of ethnic Tutsis by the majority Hutus. images flash before me of a woman raped and her skull broken...a baby... the skeletons of so many children × Memories of our visit to the Ntarama Church, a couple of hours flying time from the capital Kigali, still remain. As we walked through the grounds, we saw skeletons lying all around, some with scraps of clothing still on them. Till date, images flash before me of a woman raped and her skull broken...a baby... the skeletons of so many children. The Rwandan army officer accompanying us regretted the display but as he explained, "It makes me sick but we cannot afford to forget what happened". It was worse inside the church: Broken pews, shattered skulls, bodies of men women and children on the floor. None was spared and if you were a Hutu supporting the Tutsis, there was no escaping the Hutu Interahamwe militia. I met an Indian doing business in Rwanda, operating from what used to be a plush Kigali suburb. He was married to a Tutsi woman. As the madness around him exploded, the businessman had hidden his wife in a specially built loft in his home. It didn't help. The Hutu mobs descended on his home, found his wife and took her away but spared him. He never saw her again. The Hutu mobs descended on his home, found his wife and took her away but spared him × A Keralite who served as a manager in a small factory, manufacturing soaps and detergents, brought a different view about the Hutus. Despite the mass killings, he described the Hutus as "a better, more sincere people than Tutsis". Tutsis, he claimed, had a superiority complex because they were generally better educated, well-represented in government and looked down on Hutus who formed the working class. Since those days Rwanda has had over two decades of peace under General Paul Kagame, who led a predominantly Tutsi guerrilla army to victory and ended the slaughter. Kagame appears to have avoided the kind of mass reprisals against the Hutus and some effort has gone into reconciliation programmes. However, whether these have actually overcome old suspicions and tribal animosities is not clear. Kagame may have succumbed to another weakness: the inability of so many African leaders to accept that power and position are not forever. Has Kagame built up the second rung of leadership within his party; is that leadership inclusive; how democratic is he in his functioning? The answers to these questions could provide clues Rwanda's political future and long term stability. (WION)

Looking back at the Rwanda genocide some 20 years later

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Zee News Rajasthan

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