<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>After sweeping all of the Hindi heartland and western parts of the country in 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party framed a &lsquo;Look North-East&rsquo; plan and set about achieving its goal to gain a foothold in the region. The northeastern states posed a challenge because the political structure there was a maze of regional outfits, and the Congress was already a dominant presence. Besides, there was little the BJP had done in the region in recent years to be counted as a serious player. It became clear to the party at the outset that it would have to pick and choose allies from among the regional parties and lead an effective coalition. In some states, it could be the dominant partner, in others, it would have to cede space. And so began the plan&rsquo;s execution &mdash; the &lsquo;Act North-East&rsquo;, with party president Amit and a clutch of influential regional leaders burning the midnight oil.</p>

<p>The results have been quick in coming. The BJP now has a government in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur. Its ally rules in Sikkim, and the party is already working out combinations for Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram. The biggest casualty of the BJP&rsquo;s aggression in the North-East has been the Congress. It lost Assam (through the ballot box), Arunachal Pradesh (through political migration) and Manipur (as a result of poor post-poll result strategising).&nbsp;</p>

<p>And even as the Congress grapples to stem the slide, the BJP is optimally using&nbsp;the North East Democratic Alliance (NEDA) to ride into the region. Launched by the BJP after the party&rsquo;s spectacular victory in Assam in May 2016,&nbsp;NEDA is&nbsp;a broadband political alliance of some 11 regional parties. &nbsp;</p>

<p>In a sense, therefore, the Assam result was the protein-boost for NEDA. The BJP displaced the Congress-led Tarun Gogoi regime with a massive win. The two main factors responsible for the outcome were the voters&rsquo; growing disenchantment with the Congress, and their shift towards a party that was until recently considered an &lsquo;outsider&rsquo;. Both these factors are going to play out in the subsequent months as more North-East states go to polls. But Assam also offers a third reason, and which the Congress will do well to understand if it has to counter the BJP&rsquo;s rise: The effective use of powerful regional leaders.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

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<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The man who played a significant role in scripting the BJP&rsquo;s victory &mdash; Himanta Biswa Sarma &mdash; was only months before a Congress leader. He had been with the party for two decades but found himself pushed to the sidelines by both the central and local leaderships. Neither of the two seemed to have grasped his potential. The BJP did, and soon after Sarma walked into its camp, party president Amit Shah identified him as the key person to devise the electoral campaign for Assam. The rest, as they say, is history. Sarma is today the convenor of NEDA, even as he juggles with his responsibilities as a minister in the Assam government led by Sarbanand Sonowal, and is considered the prime pusher for the BJP&rsquo;s drive into the North-East.</p>

<p>If the Assam win triggered the formalisation of NEDA, the alliance ran into some early embarrassment as well. In mid-2016, after a political mess in Arunachal Pradesh which saw the destabilisation of the then Congress regime allegedly by the BJP, the Supreme Court restored the regime. It was a setback for the BJP and for NEDA. But characteristically enough, the Congress failed to hold on to the advantage for long. The People&rsquo;s Party of Arunachal came along, then the PPA split and a major faction joined the BJP, thus giving the national party a government in the state on a platter. The Congress&rsquo;s failure to read the signals and act before the crisis blew on its face as badly as it did in Assam.</p>

<p>But while political management has been the focus of attention in the success of the BJP and the decline of the Congress in the North-East, one factor that has played a steady but silent role in the changing political dynamics of the region is the rise of the RSS. Till a few years ago, the organisation had just one branch in the entire region; today it has four divisions with several branches that cover Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

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<h5>The Nagaland party chief has said that a ban on cow slaughter will not happen if the BJP comes to power in the state</h5>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The growth of the RSS has been due to effective mobilisation on the plank of &lsquo;Hindu identity&rsquo;, but also in the belief (right or wrong) that the RSS is not opposed to the minorities &mdash; who form a significant base of the population in the North-East. Besides, the RSS has been doing a good deal of social work for decades among the tribals and the less privileged, encompassing the areas of education and health. Of course, a lot of this has had to do with countering the work done by outfits of minority faiths, especially the Christian missionaries; RSS would like to refer to all such activities as proselytising.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Having gained ground, the BJP&rsquo;s challenge is not just to sustain the electoral momentum; it comes also from a different and interesting source: cow politics. Across the country, the party has made cow protection a sacred duty. In BJP-ruled states particularly, there is a sense of belligerence in this direction, with certain elements taking the issue to violent extremes. But beef is consumed in considerable quantity in the three States that vote next year in Assembly elections &mdash; Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland &mdash; and so the BJP&rsquo;s local units are treading carefully.&nbsp;</p>

<p>The Nagaland party chief has said that a ban on cow slaughter will not happen if the BJP comes to power in the state because the &ldquo;reality here is very different and our central leaders are aware of it&rdquo;. There is no doubt that the party will have to do some intricate manoeuvring. According to the 2001 Census, 88 per cent of Nagaland&rsquo;s population, 87 per cent of Mizoram&rsquo;s population and close to 75 per cent of Meghalaya&rsquo;s population are Christian, who eat beef.&nbsp;</p>

<p>The difference in approach has its own credibility problems. If cow protection is a deeply-felt belief for the rank and file of the BJP, how will the party reconcile to a different approach for cows in the North-East? Does the duality not strengthen criticism against them, of using the beef issue as a political tool to raise passions across the country in general? However, given the sensitivity attached nationwide, it&rsquo;s unlikely that the BJP&rsquo;s political opponents will risk using the issue during election time against the party. That could be some solace for the BJP.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>


The complexity of cow politics poses a serious challenge to BJP's electoral momentum in NE India

After sweeping all of the Hindi heartland and western parts of the country in 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party framed a ‘Look North-East’ plan and set about achieving its goal to gain a foothold in the region. The northeastern states posed a challenge because the political structure there was a maze of regional outfits, and the Congress was already a dominant presence. Besides, there was little the BJP had done in the region in recent years to be counted as a serious player. It became clear to the party at the outset that it would have to pick and choose allies from among the regional parties and lead an effective coalition. In some states, it could be the dominant partner, in others, it would have to cede space. And so began the plan’s execution — the ‘Act North-East’, with party president Amit and a clutch of influential regional leaders burning the midnight oil. The results have been quick in coming. The BJP now has a government in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur. Its ally rules in Sikkim, and the party is already working out combinations for Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram. The biggest casualty of the BJP’s aggression in the North-East has been the Congress. It lost Assam (through the ballot box), Arunachal Pradesh (through political migration) and Manipur (as a result of poor post-poll result strategising). And even as the Congress grapples to stem the slide, the BJP is optimally using the North East Democratic Alliance (NEDA) to ride into the region. Launched by the BJP after the party’s spectacular victory in Assam in May 2016, NEDA is a broadband political alliance of some 11 regional parties. In a sense, therefore, the Assam result was the protein-boost for NEDA. The BJP displaced the Congress-led Tarun Gogoi regime with a massive win. The two main factors responsible for the outcome were the voters’ growing disenchantment with the Congress, and their shift towards a party that was until recently considered an ‘outsider’. Both these factors are going to play out in the subsequent months as more North-East states go to polls. But Assam also offers a third reason, and which the Congress will do well to understand if it has to counter the BJP’s rise: The effective use of powerful regional leaders. But Assam also offers a third reason, and which the Congress will do well to understand if it has to counter the BJP’s rise: The effective use of powerful regional leaders. × The man who played a significant role in scripting the BJP’s victory — Himanta Biswa Sarma — was only months before a Congress leader. He had been with the party for two decades but found himself pushed to the sidelines by both the central and local leaderships. Neither of the two seemed to have grasped his potential. The BJP did, and soon after Sarma walked into its camp, party president Amit Shah identified him as the key person to devise the electoral campaign for Assam. The rest, as they say, is history. Sarma is today the convenor of NEDA, even as he juggles with his responsibilities as a minister in the Assam government led by Sarbanand Sonowal, and is considered the prime pusher for the BJP’s drive into the North-East. If the Assam win triggered the formalisation of NEDA, the alliance ran into some early embarrassment as well. In mid-2016, after a political mess in Arunachal Pradesh which saw the destabilisation of the then Congress regime allegedly by the BJP, the Supreme Court restored the regime. It was a setback for the BJP and for NEDA. But characteristically enough, the Congress failed to hold on to the advantage for long. The People’s Party of Arunachal came along, then the PPA split and a major faction joined the BJP, thus giving the national party a government in the state on a platter. The Congress’s failure to read the signals and act before the crisis blew on its face as badly as it did in Assam. But while political management has been the focus of attention in the success of the BJP and the decline of the Congress in the North-East, one factor that has played a steady but silent role in the changing political dynamics of the region is the rise of the RSS. Till a few years ago, the organisation had just one branch in the entire region; today it has four divisions with several branches that cover Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. The Nagaland party chief has said that a ban on cow slaughter will not happen if the BJP comes to power in the state × The growth of the RSS has been due to effective mobilisation on the plank of ‘Hindu identity’, but also in the belief (right or wrong) that the RSS is not opposed to the minorities — who form a significant base of the population in the North-East. Besides, the RSS has been doing a good deal of social work for decades among the tribals and the less privileged, encompassing the areas of education and health. Of course, a lot of this has had to do with countering the work done by outfits of minority faiths, especially the Christian missionaries; RSS would like to refer to all such activities as proselytising. Having gained ground, the BJP’s challenge is not just to sustain the electoral momentum; it comes also from a different and interesting source: cow politics. Across the country, the party has made cow protection a sacred duty. In BJP-ruled states particularly, there is a sense of belligerence in this direction, with certain elements taking the issue to violent extremes. But beef is consumed in considerable quantity in the three States that vote next year in Assembly elections — Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland — and so the BJP’s local units are treading carefully. The Nagaland party chief has said that a ban on cow slaughter will not happen if the BJP comes to power in the state because the “reality here is very different and our central leaders are aware of it”. There is no doubt that the party will have to do some intricate manoeuvring. According to the 2001 Census, 88 per cent of Nagaland’s population, 87 per cent of Mizoram’s population and close to 75 per cent of Meghalaya’s population are Christian, who eat beef. The difference in approach has its own credibility problems. If cow protection is a deeply-felt belief for the rank and file of the BJP, how will the party reconcile to a different approach for cows in the North-East? Does the duality not strengthen criticism against them, of using the beef issue as a political tool to raise passions across the country in general? However, given the sensitivity attached nationwide, it’s unlikely that the BJP’s political opponents will risk using the issue during election time against the party. That could be some solace for the BJP.

BJP, beef and North-East India

<p>The Congress is finding it difficult to swallow the reality that it has been outfoxed in Goa, despite emerging as the single largest party in the recently held assembly election.</p>

<p>Even as it was celebrating its win, the Bharatiya Janata Party cobbled an alliance that secured a majority in the 40-member House. The Congress&rsquo;s last ditch appeal to the Supreme Court also failed to stop the formation of a BJP-led government. Even as it continued to hurl accusations, the new government won the floor test too.</p>

<p>As if this was not trouble enough for the Congress, there is a revolt brewing within the party. Senior leader and newly elected MLA Vishwajit Rane has quit the party and his Goa Assembly membership in disgust. It&rsquo;s expected that more could follow.</p>

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<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>What went wrong for the Congress? At least two things.</p>

<p>To begin with, Congress demonstrated shocking lethargy in the face of a hung House. As the single largest party, it should have moved swiftly to stitch a coalition and approach the governor with enhanced numbers. It ought to have shown flexibility--&nbsp;bend like a willow in the wind and not stood like an obstinate oak, as a party leader remarked. The Goa Forward Party, with three legislators, was willing to do business with the Congress provided state party chief Luzinho Faleiro opted out of the chief ministerial race. The GFP leader Vijay Sardesai and Faleiro do not see eye to eye but Faleiro refused to oblige.</p>

<p>The second mistake was that of the Congress high command led by Rahul Gandhi. It provided no sense of urgency or purpose to its state unit. The central leadership of the Congress party ought to have cracked the whip and asked Faleiro to step aside in the larger interests of the party, but it did not. As a result, veteran Congressman Digvijaya Singh - the party&#39;s&nbsp;nominee to firefight the challenge - was fettered in taking on-the-spot decisions. He had only to win over the GFP and get its three MLAs on board, and the government would have been its for the asking. There was no need to woo the Independents even.</p>

<p>In contrast, the BJP had a tougher task, given its low figures.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

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<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The party had to get the support of the GFP, the Independents and the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party. That it managed to get them all to its side, demonstrates a political adroitness which was missing in the Congress. The BJP did not dither for a moment once the GFP and the MGP made it known that they would extend support only if Manohar Parrikar were to become the chief minister. Parrikar was asked to resign as the country&rsquo;s defence minister and take charge in Goa.</p>

<p>Now outmanoeuvred, the Congress has been crying foul. It sought to raise the issue of ethics, constitutional propriety, and of money power. The Supreme Court&rsquo;s dismissal of Congress&#39;s&nbsp;plea should have ended the talk of any constitutional wrongdoing on the governor&rsquo;s part in inviting the BJP-led combination to form the government. The apex court&rsquo;s telling remarks expose the Congress&rsquo;s weak defence. The court asked: If the Congress had the numbers, why did it then not approach the governor and lay its claim? The judges pointed out that the party&rsquo;s petition before them did not even mention the magic figure or implead Parrikar.</p>

<p>The Congress is on weak grounds on the matter of ethics too. In 2002, the National Conference had bigger numbers in Jammu &amp; Kashmir, but the Congress teamed up with the Peoples Democratic Party to form the government. In 2005, the BJP was the single largest party in Jharkhand, but the Congress teamed up with Shibu Soren of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha to form the government. In 2013, the BJP emerged as the single largest party in the Delhi Assembly election, but the Congress extended support to the Aam Aadmi Party and helped it form the government.</p>

<p>The Congress in Goa now faces a period of turmoil. Even an MLA from its ally, the Nationalist Congress Party, backed the BJP-led regime during the trust vote on Thursday. Vishwajit Rane&rsquo;s plans are unclear, but he may well join the BJP or float an outfit that aligns with the BJP. His father, Pratapsinh Rane, is a veteran Congressman and former chief minister. The factions led by the senior Rane and Faleiro are at loggerheads, and for the moment it appears that the latter is on the blackfoot, since many believe his intransigence has led to the party&rsquo;s humiliation.</p>

<p>It is ironical that the 2017 verdict, which should have led to the revival of the Congress in Goa, has proved to be undoing.</p>

<p>The ruling BJP had slipped to 13 seats from the 21 it had won in 2012, and this was a clear thumbs down from the electorate. The reasons for the loss are many, but two factors are primary. The first is the absence of Parrikar from the helm. It is true that even after shifting to Delhi, Parrikar had kept himself connected with the politics of Goa, but a hand on approach was naturally not possible. He commands an across-the-party connect and has excellent relations with several players in the field. For instance, his personal equations with Vijay Sardesai swung the GFP to the BJP&rsquo;s side. The MGP, which broke away from the BJP alliance and contested the election on its own, came around to supporting the BJP once it became known that Parrikar would head the government.</p>

<p>The second cause of the BJP&rsquo;s relatively poor performance was the failure of Laxmikant Parsekar to provide effective leadership. Parsekar took over as chief minister after Parrikar shifted to Delhi as defence minister, but he simply did not have the acumen of his predecessor. The revolt by a section of the RSS in the State, which happened with senior RSS leader Subhash Velingkar forming his own outfit, may have been directed against Parrikar, but it was for Parsekar to tackle it; he failed. There had been murmurs when Parsekar was named the new chief minister, with many within the party of the belief that Deputy Chief Minister Francis D&rsquo; Souza ought to have assumed the mantle.</p>

<p>But all of that is past now. Parrikar has the challenge to reinvigorate the party, balance the demands and counter demands of his coalition partners who hold the key to the Government&rsquo;s survival, and do his bit to exploit the fissures in the Congress. All this, while providing good governance in the run-up to the 2019 general election.</p>


While BJP showed political adroitness, the Congress party stood like an obstinate oak

The Congress is finding it difficult to swallow the reality that it has been outfoxed in Goa, despite emerging as the single largest party in the recently held assembly election. Even as it was celebrating its win, the Bharatiya Janata Party cobbled an alliance that secured a majority in the 40-member House. The Congress’s last ditch appeal to the Supreme Court also failed to stop the formation of a BJP-led government. Even as it continued to hurl accusations, the new government won the floor test too. As if this was not trouble enough for the Congress, there is a revolt brewing within the party. Senior leader and newly elected MLA Vishwajit Rane has quit the party and his Goa Assembly membership in disgust. It’s expected that more could follow. The central leadership of the Congress party ought to have cracked the whip and asked Faleiro to step aside in the larger interests of the party, but it did not × What went wrong for the Congress? At least two things. To begin with, Congress demonstrated shocking lethargy in the face of a hung House. As the single largest party, it should have moved swiftly to stitch a coalition and approach the governor with enhanced numbers. It ought to have shown flexibility-- bend like a willow in the wind and not stood like an obstinate oak, as a party leader remarked. The Goa Forward Party, with three legislators, was willing to do business with the Congress provided state party chief Luzinho Faleiro opted out of the chief ministerial race. The GFP leader Vijay Sardesai and Faleiro do not see eye to eye but Faleiro refused to oblige. The second mistake was that of the Congress high command led by Rahul Gandhi. It provided no sense of urgency or purpose to its state unit. The central leadership of the Congress party ought to have cracked the whip and asked Faleiro to step aside in the larger interests of the party, but it did not. As a result, veteran Congressman Digvijaya Singh - the party's nominee to firefight the challenge - was fettered in taking on-the-spot decisions. He had only to win over the GFP and get its three MLAs on board, and the government would have been its for the asking. There was no need to woo the Independents even. In contrast, the BJP had a tougher task, given its low figures. The Supreme Court’s dismissal of Congress's plea should have ended the talk of any constitutional wrongdoing on the governor’s part in inviting the BJP-led combination to form the government × The party had to get the support of the GFP, the Independents and the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party. That it managed to get them all to its side, demonstrates a political adroitness which was missing in the Congress. The BJP did not dither for a moment once the GFP and the MGP made it known that they would extend support only if Manohar Parrikar were to become the chief minister. Parrikar was asked to resign as the country’s defence minister and take charge in Goa. Now outmanoeuvred, the Congress has been crying foul. It sought to raise the issue of ethics, constitutional propriety, and of money power. The Supreme Court’s dismissal of Congress's plea should have ended the talk of any constitutional wrongdoing on the governor’s part in inviting the BJP-led combination to form the government. The apex court’s telling remarks expose the Congress’s weak defence. The court asked: If the Congress had the numbers, why did it then not approach the governor and lay its claim? The judges pointed out that the party’s petition before them did not even mention the magic figure or implead Parrikar. The Congress is on weak grounds on the matter of ethics too. In 2002, the National Conference had bigger numbers in Jammu & Kashmir, but the Congress teamed up with the Peoples Democratic Party to form the government. In 2005, the BJP was the single largest party in Jharkhand, but the Congress teamed up with Shibu Soren of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha to form the government. In 2013, the BJP emerged as the single largest party in the Delhi Assembly election, but the Congress extended support to the Aam Aadmi Party and helped it form the government. The Congress in Goa now faces a period of turmoil. Even an MLA from its ally, the Nationalist Congress Party, backed the BJP-led regime during the trust vote on Thursday. Vishwajit Rane’s plans are unclear, but he may well join the BJP or float an outfit that aligns with the BJP. His father, Pratapsinh Rane, is a veteran Congressman and former chief minister. The factions led by the senior Rane and Faleiro are at loggerheads, and for the moment it appears that the latter is on the blackfoot, since many believe his intransigence has led to the party’s humiliation. It is ironical that the 2017 verdict, which should have led to the revival of the Congress in Goa, has proved to be undoing. The ruling BJP had slipped to 13 seats from the 21 it had won in 2012, and this was a clear thumbs down from the electorate. The reasons for the loss are many, but two factors are primary. The first is the absence of Parrikar from the helm. It is true that even after shifting to Delhi, Parrikar had kept himself connected with the politics of Goa, but a hand on approach was naturally not possible. He commands an across-the-party connect and has excellent relations with several players in the field. For instance, his personal equations with Vijay Sardesai swung the GFP to the BJP’s side. The MGP, which broke away from the BJP alliance and contested the election on its own, came around to supporting the BJP once it became known that Parrikar would head the government. The second cause of the BJP’s relatively poor performance was the failure of Laxmikant Parsekar to provide effective leadership. Parsekar took over as chief minister after Parrikar shifted to Delhi as defence minister, but he simply did not have the acumen of his predecessor. The revolt by a section of the RSS in the State, which happened with senior RSS leader Subhash Velingkar forming his own outfit, may have been directed against Parrikar, but it was for Parsekar to tackle it; he failed. There had been murmurs when Parsekar was named the new chief minister, with many within the party of the belief that Deputy Chief Minister Francis D’ Souza ought to have assumed the mantle. But all of that is past now. Parrikar has the challenge to reinvigorate the party, balance the demands and counter demands of his coalition partners who hold the key to the Government’s survival, and do his bit to exploit the fissures in the Congress. All this, while providing good governance in the run-up to the 2019 general election.

What went wrong for the Congress in Goa

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>There cannot be one definitive reason for the Bharatiya Janata Party&rsquo;s sweeping win in the 2017 Uttar Pradesh Assembly election, though Prime Minister Narendra Modi&rsquo;s charisma is certainly the most dominant one. Party president Amit Shah&rsquo;s effective strategising and micro-handling of the election campaign &mdash; right from candidates&rsquo; selection to booth management &mdash; is the other major contributor. Then there are the self-goals that the BJP&rsquo;s rivals scored. The internecine quarrel in the Samajwadi Party, the ill-advised alliance it struck with the Congress, the Bahujan Samaj Party&rsquo;s taking for granted the Scheduled Caste votes and the Congress&rsquo;s lack-lustre image in the State played significant roles in the BJP&rsquo;s grand triumph.</p>

<p>If the party won the 2014 Lok Sabha on the resonance of expectations from it and the people&rsquo;s disgust with the Congress-led UPA regime&rsquo;s performance, it was the confidence among voters that those hopes would be realised and distrust of the two principal regional parties, which has fetched the BJP more than 300 seats in the 403-member Uttar Pradesh House. But this is only the overarching message; the finer points are more interesting.</p>

<p>To begin with, the BJP is gaining rapidly at the expense of the Congress which dominated the State&rsquo;s political landscape before it went into disrepair from the early 1990s. Of the 10 Assembly seats in the Nehru-Gandhi stronghold of Amethi and Rae Bareli, the party has won six. In Rahul Gandhi&rsquo;s Lok Sabha constituency of Amethi, just one Assembly segment voted for the Congress-Samajwadi Party partnership, while the situation was marginally better in Rae Bareli where it got three seats. This is not any better than the 2012 performance, when the Congress managed just two of the 10 seats in the twin regions.</p>

<p>Although it contested this election in partnership with the formidable Samajwadi Party, and on more than 100 seats, the Congress&rsquo;s strike rate was abysmal. The party could not even touch the double-digit figure and ended up with a number lower than the regional Apna Dal &mdash; and just about the same as the lesser known Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party. Both these regional outfits are BJP allies. Overall, the Congress has managed just one-third of the seats that it had in the State in 2012. In other words, it dragged down its already struggling partner, the Samajwadi Party, to a new low.</p>

<p>The other interesting contributor to the BJP&rsquo;s monumental victory is the minority factor, and there is an irony to this. The Bahujan Samaj Party had given close to 100 tickets to Muslim candidates while the Samajwadi Party had over 50 of them. The idea was to lure the minority community through a consolidation of their votes. The consolidation did happen, but not in the manner these two parties had planned. In Saharanpur, Deoband and Muzaffarnagar &mdash; all Muslim-dominated constituencies &mdash; the majority voters coalesced in response to the minority challenge and went the BJP&rsquo;s way. In 2012, the BJP had not won a single seat in Muzaffarnagar district; this time it bagged all the six on offer. The majority consolidation was also evident in the Mau region, where don Mukhtar Ansari has a hold. Although he managed to win the Mau seat as a BSP candidate, his son and brother lost the other seats in the region.</p>

<p>The majority polarisation (particularly in the post-Muzaffarnagar riots backdrop) played out in other ways too. The BJP&rsquo;s wins in Jat-dominated regions is a good instance. The Jats, who comprise some two per cent of the State&rsquo;s total population but are located in large numbers in western Uttar Pradesh, had announced their determination to vote against the party for a host of reasons. But the minority factor ensured that virtually the whole lot of non-Jat voters, including the Other Backward Classes, pitched in for the BJP candidates. The Jat marginalisation was so complete that even in the Jat heartland of Baghpat, once the stronghold of Jat leader and former Prime Minister Charan Singh, the Rashtriya Lok Dal, led by his son Ajit Singh, the voters preferred the BJP. The RLD won just one of the three seats there. Given that 13 of the 15 Jat candidates of the BJP succeeded &mdash; despite considerable opposition from their community voters &mdash; the majority polarisation, including that of the non-Yadav Other Backward Classes and the upper castes (Brahmins and Kshatriyas voting together for the same party), cannot be downplayed.</p>

<p>What worked additionally for the BJP was the minority vote fragmentation alongside the majority vote consolidation. The Bahujan Samaj Party and the Samajwadi Party&rsquo;s Muslim candidates clashed with one another in many constituencies, especially in Muslim-dominated ones. Minority votes got massively split, leaving both these parties stranded. For example, the BJP won all the eight seats in Sant Kabir Nagar and Siddharth Nagar districts in eastern Uttar Pradesh, which have a substantial number of Muslim voters. Nearly similar was the case in Bahraich, which again has a sizeable Muslim presence &mdash; the BJP won all but one. it secured two seats in SP leader Azam Khan&rsquo;s Rampur district and registered wins in Amroha and Moradabad. It did well in Saharanpur too. Of the 140 constituencies where the Muslim population is 20 per cent or more, the BJP and its ally, the Apna Dal, won 109. There is no way the BJP could have managed these victories without a significant split in Muslim votes between the BSP and the SP-Congress combine. In hindsight, therefore, the BJP lost nothing by not giving tickets to a single Muslim candidate and its rivals lost out by going overboard in offering such representation.</p>

<p>One obstacle crossed, the BJP has two challenges ahead. The first and the most immediate one is the choice of a chief minister. There are many claimants and the party has to select one that has the ability to take everyone along and not cause fissures, both within the party and society. This should rule out the likes of Yogi Adityanath and Mahesh Sharma, although both played important roles in the party&rsquo;s massive win. State party president Keshav Prasad Maurya is a strong contender &mdash; being from the OBC is an added advantage &mdash; along with the &nbsp;dark horse and Lucknow Mayor Dinesh Sharma. Both Maurya and Sharma are known to be in the good books of Prime Minister Modi and Amit Shah. But so is Union Minister Manoj Sinha. And, if one talks of a Union Minister shifting from Delhi to Lucknow, there is also Rajnath Singh. The candidate must resonate with the Hindutva-minded voter, the OBCs and the Dalits (a good segment of which appears to have backed the BJP this time, as it did in 2014, and busted the BSP&rsquo;s attempt at recovering lost ground). It&rsquo;s a task that the Modi-Amit Shah duo will find almost as challenging as winning Uttar Pradesh.</p>


The chief ministerial candidate must resonate with Hindutva-minded voter, the OBCs and the Dalits, with the ability to take everyone along

There cannot be one definitive reason for the Bharatiya Janata Party’s sweeping win in the 2017 Uttar Pradesh Assembly election, though Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s charisma is certainly the most dominant one. Party president Amit Shah’s effective strategising and micro-handling of the election campaign — right from candidates’ selection to booth management — is the other major contributor. Then there are the self-goals that the BJP’s rivals scored. The internecine quarrel in the Samajwadi Party, the ill-advised alliance it struck with the Congress, the Bahujan Samaj Party’s taking for granted the Scheduled Caste votes and the Congress’s lack-lustre image in the State played significant roles in the BJP’s grand triumph. If the party won the 2014 Lok Sabha on the resonance of expectations from it and the people’s disgust with the Congress-led UPA regime’s performance, it was the confidence among voters that those hopes would be realised and distrust of the two principal regional parties, which has fetched the BJP more than 300 seats in the 403-member Uttar Pradesh House. But this is only the overarching message; the finer points are more interesting. To begin with, the BJP is gaining rapidly at the expense of the Congress which dominated the State’s political landscape before it went into disrepair from the early 1990s. Of the 10 Assembly seats in the Nehru-Gandhi stronghold of Amethi and Rae Bareli, the party has won six. In Rahul Gandhi’s Lok Sabha constituency of Amethi, just one Assembly segment voted for the Congress-Samajwadi Party partnership, while the situation was marginally better in Rae Bareli where it got three seats. This is not any better than the 2012 performance, when the Congress managed just two of the 10 seats in the twin regions. Although it contested this election in partnership with the formidable Samajwadi Party, and on more than 100 seats, the Congress’s strike rate was abysmal. The party could not even touch the double-digit figure and ended up with a number lower than the regional Apna Dal — and just about the same as the lesser known Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party. Both these regional outfits are BJP allies. Overall, the Congress has managed just one-third of the seats that it had in the State in 2012. In other words, it dragged down its already struggling partner, the Samajwadi Party, to a new low. The other interesting contributor to the BJP’s monumental victory is the minority factor, and there is an irony to this. The Bahujan Samaj Party had given close to 100 tickets to Muslim candidates while the Samajwadi Party had over 50 of them. The idea was to lure the minority community through a consolidation of their votes. The consolidation did happen, but not in the manner these two parties had planned. In Saharanpur, Deoband and Muzaffarnagar — all Muslim-dominated constituencies — the majority voters coalesced in response to the minority challenge and went the BJP’s way. In 2012, the BJP had not won a single seat in Muzaffarnagar district; this time it bagged all the six on offer. The majority consolidation was also evident in the Mau region, where don Mukhtar Ansari has a hold. Although he managed to win the Mau seat as a BSP candidate, his son and brother lost the other seats in the region. The majority polarisation (particularly in the post-Muzaffarnagar riots backdrop) played out in other ways too. The BJP’s wins in Jat-dominated regions is a good instance. The Jats, who comprise some two per cent of the State’s total population but are located in large numbers in western Uttar Pradesh, had announced their determination to vote against the party for a host of reasons. But the minority factor ensured that virtually the whole lot of non-Jat voters, including the Other Backward Classes, pitched in for the BJP candidates. The Jat marginalisation was so complete that even in the Jat heartland of Baghpat, once the stronghold of Jat leader and former Prime Minister Charan Singh, the Rashtriya Lok Dal, led by his son Ajit Singh, the voters preferred the BJP. The RLD won just one of the three seats there. Given that 13 of the 15 Jat candidates of the BJP succeeded — despite considerable opposition from their community voters — the majority polarisation, including that of the non-Yadav Other Backward Classes and the upper castes (Brahmins and Kshatriyas voting together for the same party), cannot be downplayed. What worked additionally for the BJP was the minority vote fragmentation alongside the majority vote consolidation. The Bahujan Samaj Party and the Samajwadi Party’s Muslim candidates clashed with one another in many constituencies, especially in Muslim-dominated ones. Minority votes got massively split, leaving both these parties stranded. For example, the BJP won all the eight seats in Sant Kabir Nagar and Siddharth Nagar districts in eastern Uttar Pradesh, which have a substantial number of Muslim voters. Nearly similar was the case in Bahraich, which again has a sizeable Muslim presence — the BJP won all but one. it secured two seats in SP leader Azam Khan’s Rampur district and registered wins in Amroha and Moradabad. It did well in Saharanpur too. Of the 140 constituencies where the Muslim population is 20 per cent or more, the BJP and its ally, the Apna Dal, won 109. There is no way the BJP could have managed these victories without a significant split in Muslim votes between the BSP and the SP-Congress combine. In hindsight, therefore, the BJP lost nothing by not giving tickets to a single Muslim candidate and its rivals lost out by going overboard in offering such representation. One obstacle crossed, the BJP has two challenges ahead. The first and the most immediate one is the choice of a chief minister. There are many claimants and the party has to select one that has the ability to take everyone along and not cause fissures, both within the party and society. This should rule out the likes of Yogi Adityanath and Mahesh Sharma, although both played important roles in the party’s massive win. State party president Keshav Prasad Maurya is a strong contender — being from the OBC is an added advantage — along with the dark horse and Lucknow Mayor Dinesh Sharma. Both Maurya and Sharma are known to be in the good books of Prime Minister Modi and Amit Shah. But so is Union Minister Manoj Sinha. And, if one talks of a Union Minister shifting from Delhi to Lucknow, there is also Rajnath Singh. The candidate must resonate with the Hindutva-minded voter, the OBCs and the Dalits (a good segment of which appears to have backed the BJP this time, as it did in 2014, and busted the BSP’s attempt at recovering lost ground). It’s a task that the Modi-Amit Shah duo will find almost as challenging as winning Uttar Pradesh.

Who will be the next chief minister of Uttar Pradesh?

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>While many unknown factors can determine the outcome of the 2017 Uttar Pradesh Assembly election, the most intriguing of them is the Muslim mood. Voting is done and the result will be known on March 11, but nobody can say for sure which way the minorities in the state have tilted. The only certainty is that they have not pressed the button on the Lotus symbol or, at least, not in sufficient numbers to be considered significant.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The Bharatiya Janata Party, like its opponents, knows it well but is not losing sleep over it. After all, it had not fielded a single Muslim candidate, even in constituencies which had a sizeable Muslim population. The Muslim vote does not count in its calculations. But it does for the Samajwadi Party-Congress alliance and the Bahujan Samaj Party. It can make or break their prospects.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The Muslims form 19 per cent of Uttar Pradesh&#39;s voters, with a majority located in urban regions. In western Uttar Pradesh, the number is significantly higher, with the proportion of Muslims being 26 per cent. If this is large enough to be the deciding factor, consider the following: In constituencies such as Rampur, Moradabad, Bijnor and Saharanpur, the minority voter is predominant. In few other parts of western Uttar Pradesh, it is even stronger, going up to 70 per cent in certain segments.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

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<h5>The voter can be a Samajwadi Party supporter, for instance, but he would opt for the Elephant if he believes Mayawati&rsquo;s candidate is better placed in the constituency to neutralise the BJP</h5>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Beyond the Muslim community&#39;s anti-BJP stance, it is difficult to predict how they will vote. Reading the trend is difficult due to several reasons. The first is that the minorities have been spoilt for choice. They can pick their lot from the Samajwadi Party-Congress, the Bahujan Samaj Party and Ajit Singh&rsquo;s Rashtriya Lok Dal. In certain pockets, they even have an option to vote for Asaduddin Owaisi&rsquo;s All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen. But the choice comes with its own set of problems.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>In many constituencies, there is more than one Muslim contestant and the voters have to, therefore, split their preference. The proportion of the split in votes will determine the fate of the candidates and their parties. The Bahujan Samaj Party fielded nearly 100 Muslim contestants while the Samajwadi Party gave tickets to almost half that number.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The split in support happens due to tactical voting, among other things. Muslims would cast their votes in favour of a candidate who they feel has the best chance to defeat the BJP nominee. The voter can be a Samajwadi Party supporter, for instance, but he would opt for the Elephant if he believes Mayawati&rsquo;s candidate is better placed in the constituency to neutralise the BJP. The same calculation can work in the Samajwadi Party&rsquo;s favour in another constituency.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The BJP hopes this will work for it as well, assuming two things: The first is that the split leaves each of its rivals with fewer minority votes. And the second is that the non-minority vote consolidates in its support as a result of the onslaught of the Muslim candidates, numbering more than one in a constituency. This is, particularly, true for constituencies where the Muslims are in considerable strength. The non-Muslims, in this case, believe they have to halt the march of the minorities.</p>

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<h5>VP Singh lost steam and the grand anti-Congress experiment flopped. But it had unleashed new forces, one among them being the rise of regional outfits</h5>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Such complicated electoral calculations did not exist until the end of 1989, and there had been no need to seek refuge in number-crunching to understand the minority swing in the State. The Congress had been the dominant party since independence, and the Muslim voters in Uttar Pradesh, as in the rest of the country, did not have to look any beyond &mdash; or at least they had nothing to look beyond.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>True, there were the likes of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the Prajatantrik Party or even the Republican Party of India, among others but they had no real pan-India image. In any case, the Jana Sangh, with its overtly aggressive pro-Hindu ideology, was a no-go. The disruption came in 1989 with VP Singh rebelling.&nbsp; Singh quit the Congress, formed Jan Morcha (which later metamorphosed into Janata Dal) and contested against the Congress. Suddenly, the Muslim voters swayed, like many in the country,&nbsp;by VP Singh&rsquo;s anti-corruption drive, had a real choice. And it exercised the new-found option.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>That became the turning point. The Janata Dal later splintered in many directions, VP Singh lost steam and the grand anti-Congress experiment flopped. But it had unleashed new forces, one among them being the rise of regional outfits, such as the Samajwadi Party. Established by Mulayam Singh Yadav in 1992, it soon captured the minority community&rsquo;s imagination with its robust opposition to the BJP.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>After the Janata Dal failure, the Congress party&#39;s hopes of regaining Muslim support were effectively dashed to the ground with the demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya. The community held the Congress (with its government at the Centre) squarely responsible for the debacle and never returned to the party&rsquo;s fold.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>But the Muslim voter wasn&rsquo;t always happy with the Samajwadi Party. This antipathy is there though the community acknowledges Mulayam Singh Yadav&rsquo;s affinity to them, particularly, his &lsquo;courage&rsquo; in ordering fire on kar sevaks in October 1990. The incident had led to 16 deaths. Mulayam recently expressed &lsquo;regret&rsquo; over the incident but maintained that the directive was necessary &ldquo;to keep the Muslim faith in this country intact&rdquo;.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>With enough political alternatives to choose from, many of the community members turned to Mayawati&rsquo;s Bahujan Samaj Party when in distress. In 2007, the minorities, as the others, were disgusted with growing hooliganism in the Samajwadi party regime. Mayawati sensed the mood and fielded some 30 candidates in the Assembly election. The move paid a rich dividend; she romped home with the combined votes of the Dalit and the Muslims.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>But this liking for Mayawati would not last long; the minorities promptly returned to the Samajwadi Party five years later. This time they were upset with rampant corruption during Mayawati&rsquo;s tenure and propelled by the fear that the BJP could make a comeback.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>One key reason why it has become so difficult to understand the mood of the minorities in this election is that there is no unifying force to pick hints from; not even from their hostility to the BJP. There was a time when prominent religious leaders, the clerics, took sides and the community by and large respected that position &mdash; which got reflected in their voting preference.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The Shahi Imam of Delhi&rsquo;s Jama Masjid dabbled openly in politics, and even national leaders paid obeisance to him. Today, he is a spent force and is openly challenged by prominent community leaders. Mohammed Azam Khan of the Samajwadi Party, for example, holds the Shahi Imam in contempt. Other prominent Uttar Pradesh-based clerics from both the Sunni and the Shia sects do have their biases and they have made that known, but they do not have the capacity to influence voter behaviour. The qazi&rsquo;s call is today rarely heeded in political matters in the country&rsquo;s politically most significant State.</p>


The Muslim vote does not count in BJP's calculations. But it does for the Samajwadi Party-Congress alliance and the Bahujan Samaj Party

While many unknown factors can determine the outcome of the 2017 Uttar Pradesh Assembly election, the most intriguing of them is the Muslim mood. Voting is done and the result will be known on March 11, but nobody can say for sure which way the minorities in the state have tilted. The only certainty is that they have not pressed the button on the Lotus symbol or, at least, not in sufficient numbers to be considered significant. The Bharatiya Janata Party, like its opponents, knows it well but is not losing sleep over it. After all, it had not fielded a single Muslim candidate, even in constituencies which had a sizeable Muslim population. The Muslim vote does not count in its calculations. But it does for the Samajwadi Party-Congress alliance and the Bahujan Samaj Party. It can make or break their prospects. The Muslims form 19 per cent of Uttar Pradesh's voters, with a majority located in urban regions. In western Uttar Pradesh, the number is significantly higher, with the proportion of Muslims being 26 per cent. If this is large enough to be the deciding factor, consider the following: In constituencies such as Rampur, Moradabad, Bijnor and Saharanpur, the minority voter is predominant. In few other parts of western Uttar Pradesh, it is even stronger, going up to 70 per cent in certain segments. The voter can be a Samajwadi Party supporter, for instance, but he would opt for the Elephant if he believes Mayawati’s candidate is better placed in the constituency to neutralise the BJP × Beyond the Muslim community's anti-BJP stance, it is difficult to predict how they will vote. Reading the trend is difficult due to several reasons. The first is that the minorities have been spoilt for choice. They can pick their lot from the Samajwadi Party-Congress, the Bahujan Samaj Party and Ajit Singh’s Rashtriya Lok Dal. In certain pockets, they even have an option to vote for Asaduddin Owaisi’s All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen. But the choice comes with its own set of problems. In many constituencies, there is more than one Muslim contestant and the voters have to, therefore, split their preference. The proportion of the split in votes will determine the fate of the candidates and their parties. The Bahujan Samaj Party fielded nearly 100 Muslim contestants while the Samajwadi Party gave tickets to almost half that number. The split in support happens due to tactical voting, among other things. Muslims would cast their votes in favour of a candidate who they feel has the best chance to defeat the BJP nominee. The voter can be a Samajwadi Party supporter, for instance, but he would opt for the Elephant if he believes Mayawati’s candidate is better placed in the constituency to neutralise the BJP. The same calculation can work in the Samajwadi Party’s favour in another constituency. The BJP hopes this will work for it as well, assuming two things: The first is that the split leaves each of its rivals with fewer minority votes. And the second is that the non-minority vote consolidates in its support as a result of the onslaught of the Muslim candidates, numbering more than one in a constituency. This is, particularly, true for constituencies where the Muslims are in considerable strength. The non-Muslims, in this case, believe they have to halt the march of the minorities. VP Singh lost steam and the grand anti-Congress experiment flopped. But it had unleashed new forces, one among them being the rise of regional outfits × Such complicated electoral calculations did not exist until the end of 1989, and there had been no need to seek refuge in number-crunching to understand the minority swing in the State. The Congress had been the dominant party since independence, and the Muslim voters in Uttar Pradesh, as in the rest of the country, did not have to look any beyond — or at least they had nothing to look beyond. True, there were the likes of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the Prajatantrik Party or even the Republican Party of India, among others but they had no real pan-India image. In any case, the Jana Sangh, with its overtly aggressive pro-Hindu ideology, was a no-go. The disruption came in 1989 with VP Singh rebelling. Singh quit the Congress, formed Jan Morcha (which later metamorphosed into Janata Dal) and contested against the Congress. Suddenly, the Muslim voters swayed, like many in the country, by VP Singh’s anti-corruption drive, had a real choice. And it exercised the new-found option. That became the turning point. The Janata Dal later splintered in many directions, VP Singh lost steam and the grand anti-Congress experiment flopped. But it had unleashed new forces, one among them being the rise of regional outfits, such as the Samajwadi Party. Established by Mulayam Singh Yadav in 1992, it soon captured the minority community’s imagination with its robust opposition to the BJP. After the Janata Dal failure, the Congress party's hopes of regaining Muslim support were effectively dashed to the ground with the demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya. The community held the Congress (with its government at the Centre) squarely responsible for the debacle and never returned to the party’s fold. But the Muslim voter wasn’t always happy with the Samajwadi Party. This antipathy is there though the community acknowledges Mulayam Singh Yadav’s affinity to them, particularly, his ‘courage’ in ordering fire on kar sevaks in October 1990. The incident had led to 16 deaths. Mulayam recently expressed ‘regret’ over the incident but maintained that the directive was necessary “to keep the Muslim faith in this country intact”. With enough political alternatives to choose from, many of the community members turned to Mayawati’s Bahujan Samaj Party when in distress. In 2007, the minorities, as the others, were disgusted with growing hooliganism in the Samajwadi party regime. Mayawati sensed the mood and fielded some 30 candidates in the Assembly election. The move paid a rich dividend; she romped home with the combined votes of the Dalit and the Muslims. But this liking for Mayawati would not last long; the minorities promptly returned to the Samajwadi Party five years later. This time they were upset with rampant corruption during Mayawati’s tenure and propelled by the fear that the BJP could make a comeback. One key reason why it has become so difficult to understand the mood of the minorities in this election is that there is no unifying force to pick hints from; not even from their hostility to the BJP. There was a time when prominent religious leaders, the clerics, took sides and the community by and large respected that position — which got reflected in their voting preference. The Shahi Imam of Delhi’s Jama Masjid dabbled openly in politics, and even national leaders paid obeisance to him. Today, he is a spent force and is openly challenged by prominent community leaders. Mohammed Azam Khan of the Samajwadi Party, for example, holds the Shahi Imam in contempt. Other prominent Uttar Pradesh-based clerics from both the Sunni and the Shia sects do have their biases and they have made that known, but they do not have the capacity to influence voter behaviour. The qazi’s call is today rarely heeded in political matters in the country’s politically most significant State.

Uttar Pradesh election: Whom will the Muslim community vote for?

Author

Zee News Rajasthan

Editor

Rajesh Singh

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