As the world navigates rising inflation, supply chain disruptions, and intensifying geopolitical tensions, a new form of economic competition is emerging—less about outproducing rivals, and more about limiting their ability to compete at all.&nbsp;Sustained national prosperity rarely comes from caution. It is shaped—often messily—by risk-takers: innovators and entrepreneurs with vision, instinct, and commercial acumen, willing to make large bets under uncertainty. Their methods can be abrasive to experience in real time. But history suggests that no more reliable engine of national economic strength has yet been found than enterprise that is able to scale.&nbsp;When that capacity emerges elsewhere, states often respond not only by competing harder but also by tightening access—markets, capital, and rules of participation—in effect policing rival champions. “Policing” here can be overt—through tariffs and procurement bans—or more subtle, via financial constraints, licensing obstacles, standards barriers, and selectively applied rules. The label changes; the effect is similar: market denial.&nbsp;The United States is itself a product of the scale-building phase. America’s rise was driven not merely by ideals or institutions but by builders who mobilised capital at scale and created the industrial backbone of modern life—railroads, steel, oil, finance, and manufacturing. The classic “robber baron” era produced figures such as John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, Cornelius Vanderbilt, J. P. Morgan, Andrew Mellon, and Jay Gould: controversial, sometimes ruthless, but undeniably formative in the construction of American industrial power. Many also later turned to large-scale philanthropy—endowing universities, libraries, research, museums, and foundations that helped shape American civic and educational life.&nbsp;America also illustrates the familiar sequencing: societies often tolerate a period of excess while capabilities are being built, and then rein in abuse once costs become politically and socially unacceptable. The Progressive Era and Theodore Roosevelt’s trust-busting posture reflected that logic—permit industrial formation to occur, then impose anti-monopoly discipline to curb predation and restore legitimacy. The point is not to romanticise excess, but to recognise that strong systems can both enable scale and later enforce limits.&nbsp;Across parts of the US political spectrum, there is a belief that the United States has lost its economic mojo. Complacency, cultural conflict, and regulatory and institutional drift are seen as taking hold just as other economies have grown faster and more ambitious. Rebuilding competitiveness is a legitimate objective. But there is a difference between renewing domestic strength and suppressing or containing foreign champions. Too often, the instinct is to treat other countries’ large firms not as competitors to out-produce and out-execute, but as threats to be suppressed or contained—through exclusion, punitive measures, or moralised criteria governments selectively apply.&nbsp;The rhetoric is no longer always cloaked in virtue; it is increasingly explicit about national interest. Either way, the practical outcome is often market denial.&nbsp;This is not uniquely American behaviour. The institutional mix differs across countries, but the pattern recurs: Japan rebuilt through corporate reorganisation and export drive; South Korea scaled through conglomerates aligned with national goals; China’s rise has depended heavily on firms and ecosystems able to take risks and scale rapidly. India, too, has never lacked entrepreneurs—from early industrial and trading pioneers to later builders of manufacturing, services, and national infrastructure. Many Indian entrepreneurs have also built major philanthropic institutions—supporting education, healthcare, scientific research, and cultural initiatives alongside enterprise and scale, in ways that few other countries have rivalled. Across systems, economic strength ultimately rests on human initiative and execution—plus the ability to scale.&nbsp;A contemporary variant is visible in the Gulf. Over the past two decades, state-linked enterprises have built globally significant positions in logistics, ports, energy, aviation, finance, and advanced services—combining strategic direction with commercial execution to create national capability in competitive sectors. It is a reminder that the route to scale often differs across systems, but the underlying logic of power-building through enterprise is persistent.&nbsp;Keynes remains useful here. He called the impulse that drives investment and innovation “animal spirits”—the spontaneous urge to act under uncertainty that no amount of planning can fully replace. When the United States is confident, it celebrates these spirits at home. When it feels anxious, it is tempted to police their emergence abroad.&nbsp;For India’s leadership, the implication is straightforward: treat market access and rule-setting as instruments of competition, not neutral features of the system. When access tightens, it may be justified as principle or national interest; either way, it should be read as strategy. India’s next phase of growth—exports, manufacturing depth, infrastructure scale, and technology upgrading—will depend on entrepreneurs with judgment under uncertainty and the ability to execute at scale. As champions emerge and scale—and as existing ones grow—they are treated not only as commercial actors, but as geopolitical ones.&nbsp;There is also a price to this cycle. Champion-building and winner-take-most dynamics concentrate wealth; gaps widen; those outside the growth story become resentful—fuel for political backlash. In a technological transition, that stress intensifies: productivity rises, but wage dispersion can widen and mid-skill work can be hollowed out. If this era is going to be competitive, it will also have to be governable. Governments and entrepreneurs alike will need to think beyond scale—to the institutions and policies that keep growth socially and politically sustainable.In a world where access itself is contested, success will depend not just on the ability to compete—but on the ability to endure.&nbsp;(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

Across parts of the US political spectrum, there is a belief that the United States has lost its economic mojo. Complacency, cultural conflict, and regulatory and institutional drift are seen as taking hold just as other economies have grown faster and more ambitious.

As the world navigates rising inflation, supply chain disruptions, and intensifying geopolitical tensions, a new form of economic competition is emerging—less about outproducing rivals, and more about limiting their ability to compete at all. Sustained national prosperity rarely comes from caution. It is shaped—often messily—by risk-takers: innovators and entrepreneurs with vision, instinct, and commercial acumen, willing to make large bets under uncertainty. Their methods can be abrasive to experience in real time. But history suggests that no more reliable engine of national economic strength has yet been found than enterprise that is able to scale. When that capacity emerges elsewhere, states often respond not only by competing harder but also by tightening access—markets, capital, and rules of participation—in effect policing rival champions. “Policing” here can be overt—through tariffs and procurement bans—or more subtle, via financial constraints, licensing obstacles, standards barriers, and selectively applied rules. The label changes; the effect is similar: market denial. The United States is itself a product of the scale-building phase. America’s rise was driven not merely by ideals or institutions but by builders who mobilised capital at scale and created the industrial backbone of modern life—railroads, steel, oil, finance, and manufacturing. The classic “robber baron” era produced figures such as John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, Cornelius Vanderbilt, J. P. Morgan, Andrew Mellon, and Jay Gould: controversial, sometimes ruthless, but undeniably formative in the construction of American industrial power. Many also later turned to large-scale philanthropy—endowing universities, libraries, research, museums, and foundations that helped shape American civic and educational life. America also illustrates the familiar sequencing: societies often tolerate a period of excess while capabilities are being built, and then rein in abuse once costs become politically and socially unacceptable. The Progressive Era and Theodore Roosevelt’s trust-busting posture reflected that logic—permit industrial formation to occur, then impose anti-monopoly discipline to curb predation and restore legitimacy. The point is not to romanticise excess, but to recognise that strong systems can both enable scale and later enforce limits. Across parts of the US political spectrum, there is a belief that the United States has lost its economic mojo. Complacency, cultural conflict, and regulatory and institutional drift are seen as taking hold just as other economies have grown faster and more ambitious. Rebuilding competitiveness is a legitimate objective. But there is a difference between renewing domestic strength and suppressing or containing foreign champions. Too often, the instinct is to treat other countries’ large firms not as competitors to out-produce and out-execute, but as threats to be suppressed or contained—through exclusion, punitive measures, or moralised criteria governments selectively apply. The rhetoric is no longer always cloaked in virtue; it is increasingly explicit about national interest. Either way, the practical outcome is often market denial. This is not uniquely American behaviour. The institutional mix differs across countries, but the pattern recurs: Japan rebuilt through corporate reorganisation and export drive; South Korea scaled through conglomerates aligned with national goals; China’s rise has depended heavily on firms and ecosystems able to take risks and scale rapidly. India, too, has never lacked entrepreneurs—from early industrial and trading pioneers to later builders of manufacturing, services, and national infrastructure. Many Indian entrepreneurs have also built major philanthropic institutions—supporting education, healthcare, scientific research, and cultural initiatives alongside enterprise and scale, in ways that few other countries have rivalled. Across systems, economic strength ultimately rests on human initiative and execution—plus the ability to scale. A contemporary variant is visible in the Gulf. Over the past two decades, state-linked enterprises have built globally significant positions in logistics, ports, energy, aviation, finance, and advanced services—combining strategic direction with commercial execution to create national capability in competitive sectors. It is a reminder that the route to scale often differs across systems, but the underlying logic of power-building through enterprise is persistent. Keynes remains useful here. He called the impulse that drives investment and innovation “animal spirits”—the spontaneous urge to act under uncertainty that no amount of planning can fully replace. When the United States is confident, it celebrates these spirits at home. When it feels anxious, it is tempted to police their emergence abroad. For India’s leadership, the implication is straightforward: treat market access and rule-setting as instruments of competition, not neutral features of the system. When access tightens, it may be justified as principle or national interest; either way, it should be read as strategy. India’s next phase of growth—exports, manufacturing depth, infrastructure scale, and technology upgrading—will depend on entrepreneurs with judgment under uncertainty and the ability to execute at scale. As champions emerge and scale—and as existing ones grow—they are treated not only as commercial actors, but as geopolitical ones. There is also a price to this cycle. Champion-building and winner-take-most dynamics concentrate wealth; gaps widen; those outside the growth story become resentful—fuel for political backlash. In a technological transition, that stress intensifies: productivity rises, but wage dispersion can widen and mid-skill work can be hollowed out. If this era is going to be competitive, it will also have to be governable. Governments and entrepreneurs alike will need to think beyond scale—to the institutions and policies that keep growth socially and politically sustainable. In a world where access itself is contested, success will depend not just on the ability to compete—but on the ability to endure. (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

Across parts of the US political spectrum, there is a belief that the United States has lost its economic mojo. Complacency, cultural conflict, and regulatory and institutional drift are seen as taking hold just as other economies have grown faster and more ambitious.

Competing by exclusion: The return of economic containment

The renewed tensions around the Persian Gulf — marked by heightened naval deployments, threats to tanker traffic and rising volatility in oil markets — are an early signal that the foundations of the global order are being reconfigured.What appears on the surface to be a regional confrontation is unfolding at the intersection of several deeper shifts: the strategic importance of energy chokepoints, the emergence of new digital financial infrastructure, and intensifying competition over critical resources.Military tensions around the Gulf have intensified. Western policymakers have again turned their attention to major oil producers such as Venezuela. At the same time, Washington has been moving toward a clearer regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies and dollar-backed stablecoins — developments that together point to a deeper strategic adjustment.The United States appears to be adapting the foundations of its long-standing global influence to a world increasingly shaped by technological disruption, geopolitical rivalry and shifting energy dynamics.For decades, the international system rested on what became known as the petrodollar order. Oil was traded largely in US dollars. Those dollars flowed back into American financial markets through purchases of Treasury securities and other assets. Meanwhile, the sea lanes carrying global energy supplies were secured by US naval power.Energy flows, financial markets and maritime security reinforced one another, placing the dollar at the centre of global commerce.That structure is now under pressure.China has emerged as the world’s largest manufacturing power and a central hub in global supply chains. Alternative payment mechanisms are proliferating. Some countries have begun experimenting with non-dollar energy transactions. At the same time, the scale of US public debt has expanded sharply, raising questions about the durability of global demand for dollar assets.Preserving monetary dominance in this environment requires adaptation.One sign of that adaptation lies in Washington’s growing focus on dollar-backed stablecoins. These digital tokens maintain a fixed value against the US dollar and are typically backed by reserves held in short-term US Treasury securities or dollar deposits.If stablecoins become widely used for cross-border payments, issuers will need to hold substantial quantities of dollar assets in reserve. This creates a new structural source of demand for US government debt.In effect, stablecoins could become a digital extension of the dollar system, embedding American financial influence within the infrastructure of global digital payments while reinforcing demand for US financial assets.Yet financial power alone has never sustained global primacy.The tensions unfolding in the Persian Gulf underline the continuing importance of energy and maritime geography. Nearly a fifth of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most sensitive chokepoints in the global economy. Any disruption there would ripple immediately through energy markets.Even as countries speak of energy transition, petroleum remains central to the functioning of the global economy. Control over energy flows — and the sea lanes that carry them — continues to confer immense geopolitical leverage.The Gulf crisis also highlights another strategic reality: China’s growing energy vulnerability.China is now the world’s largest importer of crude oil, much of it sourced from the Persian Gulf and transported across the Indian Ocean toward East Asia. This dependence creates what Chinese strategists call the “Malacca dilemma” — the vulnerability of China’s energy lifeline to disruption along maritime chokepoints.The security of the Gulf, therefore, carries implications not only for global markets but also for the balance of power in Asia.A parallel contest is unfolding over the resources that will power the technologies of the future. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper and rare earth elements are essential inputs for electric vehicles, semiconductors and artificial intelligence infrastructure. Control over these supply chains is rapidly becoming as strategically significant as control over oil was in the twentieth century.Together, these forces are reshaping the strategic foundations of the global system.The system that underpinned American dominance rested on three pillars: the dollar, energy markets and maritime power. The emerging system is taking shape around four: digital dollar networks, global capital markets, control over energy and mineral supply chains, and military power capable of securing the sea lanes through which these resources move.This does not mean the world is returning to uncontested American supremacy. China retains major advantages in manufacturing, infrastructure development and mineral processing. Beijing is expanding economic partnerships across Asia, Africa and Latin America while promoting alternative financial arrangements.The emerging global system is therefore likely to resemble a hybrid order — one in which financial power remains concentrated in the United States while industrial capacity and production networks become more widely distributed.For India, this evolving landscape presents both opportunity and risk.India’s growing technological capabilities and expanding economy position it well to benefit from the diversification of global supply chains. Partnerships in advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, digital infrastructure and critical minerals could significantly strengthen India’s strategic position.At the same time, India remains deeply exposed to developments in the Persian Gulf. A large share of India’s oil imports passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Any sustained disruption in that corridor would have immediate economic consequences.Yet India’s geography also offers a strategic advantage.The sea lanes connecting the Persian Gulf to East Asia pass directly across the Indian Ocean, the principal artery of the world’s energy trade. Positioned near the midpoint of these routes, India occupies a uniquely important location in the emerging maritime system.During the twentieth century, the North Atlantic formed the strategic centre of the global order. In the twenty-first century, the Indian Ocean is increasingly assuming that role.For India, the ability to help secure these maritime corridors could become one of its most significant strategic contributions to global stability.The Gulf crisis may therefore prove to be more than a regional confrontation. It is an early warning that the structure of global power is changing — and that the states which recognise this shift first will shape the rules of the next international order.Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.

India’s growing technological capabilities and expanding economy position it well to benefit from the diversification of global supply chains. 

The renewed tensions around the Persian Gulf — marked by heightened naval deployments, threats to tanker traffic and rising volatility in oil markets — are an early signal that the foundations of the global order are being reconfigured. What appears on the surface to be a regional confrontation is unfolding at the intersection of several deeper shifts: the strategic importance of energy chokepoints, the emergence of new digital financial infrastructure, and intensifying competition over critical resources. Military tensions around the Gulf have intensified. Western policymakers have again turned their attention to major oil producers such as Venezuela. At the same time, Washington has been moving toward a clearer regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies and dollar-backed stablecoins — developments that together point to a deeper strategic adjustment. The United States appears to be adapting the foundations of its long-standing global influence to a world increasingly shaped by technological disruption, geopolitical rivalry and shifting energy dynamics. For decades, the international system rested on what became known as the petrodollar order. Oil was traded largely in US dollars. Those dollars flowed back into American financial markets through purchases of Treasury securities and other assets. Meanwhile, the sea lanes carrying global energy supplies were secured by US naval power. Energy flows, financial markets and maritime security reinforced one another, placing the dollar at the centre of global commerce. That structure is now under pressure. China has emerged as the world’s largest manufacturing power and a central hub in global supply chains. Alternative payment mechanisms are proliferating. Some countries have begun experimenting with non-dollar energy transactions. At the same time, the scale of US public debt has expanded sharply, raising questions about the durability of global demand for dollar assets. Preserving monetary dominance in this environment requires adaptation. One sign of that adaptation lies in Washington’s growing focus on dollar-backed stablecoins. These digital tokens maintain a fixed value against the US dollar and are typically backed by reserves held in short-term US Treasury securities or dollar deposits. If stablecoins become widely used for cross-border payments, issuers will need to hold substantial quantities of dollar assets in reserve. This creates a new structural source of demand for US government debt. In effect, stablecoins could become a digital extension of the dollar system, embedding American financial influence within the infrastructure of global digital payments while reinforcing demand for US financial assets. Yet financial power alone has never sustained global primacy. The tensions unfolding in the Persian Gulf underline the continuing importance of energy and maritime geography. Nearly a fifth of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most sensitive chokepoints in the global economy. Any disruption there would ripple immediately through energy markets. Even as countries speak of energy transition, petroleum remains central to the functioning of the global economy. Control over energy flows — and the sea lanes that carry them — continues to confer immense geopolitical leverage. The Gulf crisis also highlights another strategic reality: China’s growing energy vulnerability. China is now the world’s largest importer of crude oil, much of it sourced from the Persian Gulf and transported across the Indian Ocean toward East Asia. This dependence creates what Chinese strategists call the “Malacca dilemma” — the vulnerability of China’s energy lifeline to disruption along maritime chokepoints. The security of the Gulf, therefore, carries implications not only for global markets but also for the balance of power in Asia. A parallel contest is unfolding over the resources that will power the technologies of the future. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper and rare earth elements are essential inputs for electric vehicles, semiconductors and artificial intelligence infrastructure. Control over these supply chains is rapidly becoming as strategically significant as control over oil was in the twentieth century. Together, these forces are reshaping the strategic foundations of the global system. The system that underpinned American dominance rested on three pillars: the dollar, energy markets and maritime power. The emerging system is taking shape around four: digital dollar networks, global capital markets, control over energy and mineral supply chains, and military power capable of securing the sea lanes through which these resources move. This does not mean the world is returning to uncontested American supremacy. China retains major advantages in manufacturing, infrastructure development and mineral processing. Beijing is expanding economic partnerships across Asia, Africa and Latin America while promoting alternative financial arrangements. The emerging global system is therefore likely to resemble a hybrid order — one in which financial power remains concentrated in the United States while industrial capacity and production networks become more widely distributed. For India, this evolving landscape presents both opportunity and risk. India’s growing technological capabilities and expanding economy position it well to benefit from the diversification of global supply chains. Partnerships in advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, digital infrastructure and critical minerals could significantly strengthen India’s strategic position. At the same time, India remains deeply exposed to developments in the Persian Gulf. A large share of India’s oil imports passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Any sustained disruption in that corridor would have immediate economic consequences. Yet India’s geography also offers a strategic advantage. The sea lanes connecting the Persian Gulf to East Asia pass directly across the Indian Ocean, the principal artery of the world’s energy trade. Positioned near the midpoint of these routes, India occupies a uniquely important location in the emerging maritime system. During the twentieth century, the North Atlantic formed the strategic centre of the global order. In the twenty-first century, the Indian Ocean is increasingly assuming that role. For India, the ability to help secure these maritime corridors could become one of its most significant strategic contributions to global stability. The Gulf crisis may therefore prove to be more than a regional confrontation. It is an early warning that the structure of global power is changing — and that the states which recognise this shift first will shape the rules of the next international order. Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.

India’s growing technological capabilities and expanding economy position it well to benefit from the diversification of global supply chains.

Why the Gulf crisis could reshape the global order — and India’s role in it

Author

Zee News Rajasthan

Editor

Milinda Moragoda

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