Indian government sources have called China's decision to put a hold on UN listing of &nbsp;Lashkar-e-Taiba's 2nd command Abdul Rehman Makki as "extremely unfortunate" despite 'overwhelming evidence" against the Pakistan-based terrorist.

The sources pointed out that Beijing's action "runs counter to China’s claims of combating terrorism".

On June&nbsp;1, 2022, India and the US jointly proposed to list Makki,&nbsp;the brother-in-law of Lashkar-e-Taiba head and 26/11 mastermind Hafiz Saeed,&nbsp;under the UN Security Council’s Al-Qaeda (Dae’sh) and ISIL Sanctions Committee. Both India and the US had already listed Makki as a terrorist under their domestic laws.

But on&nbsp;Thursday, China placed a “technical hold” on the proposal, effectively blocking the listing of the proposal till the hold is withdrawn,&nbsp;which&nbsp;can last for up to 6 months at a time.&nbsp;&nbsp;

This is not the first time that China has placed hurdles for the listing of known terrorists. In the past, it had repeatedly blocked proposals to designate Maulana Masood Azhar, chief of Pakistan-based and UN-proscribed terrorist entity, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).&nbsp;

Hafiz Abdul Rahman Makki, also known as Abdulrahman Maki. Makki has occupied various leadership roles within Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), a US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). He has also played a role in raising funds for LeT operations.&nbsp;

Makki has a reward of $2 million on him placed by the US government. Moreover, both Washington and Delhi have listed him as a terrorist under domestic laws.

Makki has been involved in raising funds, recruiting and radicalizing youth to violence and planning attacks in India, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. While Makki was holding leadership positions in LeT and JuD, LeT has been responsible for and had involvement in prominent attacks in India such as the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack, Red Fort Attack on 22 December 2000, Rampur CRPF Camp attack on 1 January 2008, Karan Nagar (Srinagar) attack on 12-13 February 2018, Khanpora (Baramulla) attack on 30 May 2018, Srinagar attack on 14 June 2018 and Gurez/Bandipora attack on 7 August 2018.&nbsp;

Makki was reportedly arrested by Pakistan Government on May 15, 2019, and was kept under house arrest in Lahore. In 2020, he was convicted of terrorism financing and was sentenced to prison by a Pakistani court.&nbsp;

The United States continues to seek information on&nbsp;Makki because the Pakistani judicial system has released convicted LeT leaders and operatives in the past.&nbsp;

WATCH WION LIVE HERE

<iframe allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.wionews.com/live-tv/embed?autoplay=1&amp;mute=1" width="100%"></iframe>

Earlier also, China, an all-weather friend of Pakistan, has placed holds and blocks on bids by India and its allies to list Pakistan-based terrorists.

Indian government sources have called China's decision to put a hold on UN listing of Lashkar-e-Taiba's 2nd command Abdul Rehman Makki as "extremely unfortunate" despite 'overwhelming evidence" against the Pakistan-based terrorist.

Indian government sources have called China's decision to put a hold on UN listing of Lashkar-e-Taiba's 2nd command Abdul Rehman Makki as "extremely unfortunate" despite 'overwhelming evidence" against the Pakistan-based terrorist. The sources pointed out that Beijing's action "runs counter to China’s claims of combating terrorism". On June 1, 2022, India and the US jointly proposed to list Makki, the brother-in-law of Lashkar-e-Taiba head and 26/11 mastermind Hafiz Saeed, under the UN Security Council’s Al-Qaeda (Dae’sh) and ISIL Sanctions Committee. Both India and the US had already listed Makki as a terrorist under their domestic laws. But on Thursday, China placed a “technical hold” on the proposal, effectively blocking the listing of the proposal till the hold is withdrawn, which can last for up to 6 months at a time. This is not the first time that China has placed hurdles for the listing of known terrorists. In the past, it had repeatedly blocked proposals to designate Maulana Masood Azhar, chief of Pakistan-based and UN-proscribed terrorist entity, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Hafiz Abdul Rahman Makki, also known as Abdulrahman Maki. Makki has occupied various leadership roles within Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), a US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). He has also played a role in raising funds for LeT operations. Makki has a reward of $2 million on him placed by the US government. Moreover, both Washington and Delhi have listed him as a terrorist under domestic laws. Makki has been involved in raising funds, recruiting and radicalizing youth to violence and planning attacks in India, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. While Makki was holding leadership positions in LeT and JuD, LeT has been responsible for and had involvement in prominent attacks in India such as the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack, Red Fort Attack on 22 December 2000, Rampur CRPF Camp attack on 1 January 2008, Karan Nagar (Srinagar) attack on 12-13 February 2018, Khanpora (Baramulla) attack on 30 May 2018, Srinagar attack on 14 June 2018 and Gurez/Bandipora attack on 7 August 2018. Makki was reportedly arrested by Pakistan Government on May 15, 2019, and was kept under house arrest in Lahore. In 2020, he was convicted of terrorism financing and was sentenced to prison by a Pakistani court. The United States continues to seek information on Makki because the Pakistani judicial system has released convicted LeT leaders and operatives in the past. WATCH WION LIVE HERE Earlier also, China, an all-weather friend of Pakistan, has placed holds and blocks on bids by India and its allies to list Pakistan-based terrorists.

India slams China for blocking UN listing of Pak based terrorist Makki, calls it 'unfortunate'

Did India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, make a historic error by turning down an offer made, first, by the United States in 1950 and then, in 1955, by the Soviet Union to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)?&nbsp;

Were these offers made at all? And if so, were they merely feelers, not a serious reflection of intent by the two superpowers at the beginning of the Cold War?

Two schools of thought have emerged. The first holds that the US and the USSR merely broached the subject of a permanent UNSC seat for India. The offer was a feeler. Nehru’s sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, then India’s representative at the UN, was firmly against India “usurping” China’s claim to a permanent seat. Nehru agreed with her assessment. China, he wrote to her, is a great nation and deserves permanent membership of the UNSC.&nbsp;

Both he and his sister, highly influential in the US and at the UN, felt that India must be a neutral party in the Cold War. By accepting the offer of a permanent seat in the UNSC, however informal the offer was, the two Nehru siblings felt India would need to take sides in international crises like the Korean War. That would compromise India’s position as a founder of the non-aligned movement (NAM).

The second school of thought holds a diametrically opposite point of view. India misread the situation. It dismissed Washington’s overtures in 1950 when the US wanted to contain the influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which had in 1949 won a civil war against Chiang Kai-Shek’s nationalists who fled to Taiwan and, as the Republic of China (ROC), represented the PRC at the UN from 1949 to 1971. The Soviets in 1955 too wanted India as a permanent member of the UNSC but Nehru again brushed off the offer as not being a serious one.&nbsp;

This, the second school of thought holds, amounted to compounding the earlier historic error of rejecting Washington’s offer of a UNSC seat in 1950 for which India, nearly 70 years later, is paying a heavy price.

Which of the two schools of thought has greater merit? For the answer, turn to original sources. In painstaking research, Anton Harder, a PhD scholar specialising in Sino-India relations, wrote in 2015: “The issue of India’s right to a seat on the UNSC has centred on Nehru not seizing several alleged opportunities for India to join the UNSC as a permanent member in the 1950s. The question, however, goes beyond Nehru’s reputation, as it provides rare insights into India’s relations with the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the beginning of the Cold War.

“The 1955 offer from the Soviets is well-documented, although perhaps not widely known. The 1955 incident was publicly discussed in 2002 in print by AG Noorani, a major scholar of modern Indian history and politics. However, new evidence of an even earlier offer — by the US in August 1950 — to assist India in assuming a permanent seat at the UNSC has recently emerged, adding substantially to what Noorani earlier wrote. Nehru’s rejection of the US offer underlined the consistency of his conviction that the PRC’s legitimate interests must be acknowledged in order to reduce international tensions. Integrating the PRC into the international community by conceding its right to the Chinese seat at the Security Council was, in fact, a central pillar of Nehru’s foreign policy.

“The documents critical to answering these questions are stowed away in the Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit papers held at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML). The importance of Pandit’s papers lies in her relationship with her brother Jawaharlal Nehru. The Pandit papers have not been deployed thus far in studies focused on India’s relationship with China. In late August 1950, Pandit wrote to her brother from Washington, DC, where she was then posted as India’s ambassador to the United States: ‘One matter that is being cooked up in the State Department should be known to you. This is the unseating of China as a Permanent Member in the Security Council and of India being put in her place.’

“Nehru’s response within the week was unequivocal: ‘In your letter, you mention that the State Department is trying to unseat China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council and to put India in her place. So far as we are concerned, we are not going to countenance it. That would be bad from every point of view. It would be a clear affront to China and it would mean some kind of a break between us and China.’”

The Indian establishment had quickly closed ranks around Nehru’s controversial historic decision. K Shankar Bajpai, former secretary in the MEA and ambassador to the US and China, told The Print last week: &nbsp;“It has become a fashion to blame Nehru for everything. To think that India could have taken China’s seat is utter nonsense.”

While the geopolitical imperatives of the 1950s cannot be viewed through a contemporary prism, Nehru’s decision to cede veto-carrying membership of the UNSC to China has led, decades later, to aggressive Chinese behaviour, including supporting Pakistan based Jaish-e-Mohammed founder Masood Azhar at the UNSC. Nehru, were he alive, would be mortified. 
&nbsp;

(This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-nehru-china-and-the-unsc-2733960">original article)</a>

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Did India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, make a historic error by turning down an offer made, first, by the United States in 1950 and then, in 1955, by the Soviet Union to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)?

Did India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, make a historic error by turning down an offer made, first, by the United States in 1950 and then, in 1955, by the Soviet Union to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)? Were these offers made at all? And if so, were they merely feelers, not a serious reflection of intent by the two superpowers at the beginning of the Cold War? Two schools of thought have emerged. The first holds that the US and the USSR merely broached the subject of a permanent UNSC seat for India. The offer was a feeler. Nehru’s sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, then India’s representative at the UN, was firmly against India “usurping” China’s claim to a permanent seat. Nehru agreed with her assessment. China, he wrote to her, is a great nation and deserves permanent membership of the UNSC. Both he and his sister, highly influential in the US and at the UN, felt that India must be a neutral party in the Cold War. By accepting the offer of a permanent seat in the UNSC, however informal the offer was, the two Nehru siblings felt India would need to take sides in international crises like the Korean War. That would compromise India’s position as a founder of the non-aligned movement (NAM). The second school of thought holds a diametrically opposite point of view. India misread the situation. It dismissed Washington’s overtures in 1950 when the US wanted to contain the influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which had in 1949 won a civil war against Chiang Kai-Shek’s nationalists who fled to Taiwan and, as the Republic of China (ROC), represented the PRC at the UN from 1949 to 1971. The Soviets in 1955 too wanted India as a permanent member of the UNSC but Nehru again brushed off the offer as not being a serious one. This, the second school of thought holds, amounted to compounding the earlier historic error of rejecting Washington’s offer of a UNSC seat in 1950 for which India, nearly 70 years later, is paying a heavy price. Which of the two schools of thought has greater merit? For the answer, turn to original sources. In painstaking research, Anton Harder, a PhD scholar specialising in Sino-India relations, wrote in 2015: “The issue of India’s right to a seat on the UNSC has centred on Nehru not seizing several alleged opportunities for India to join the UNSC as a permanent member in the 1950s. The question, however, goes beyond Nehru’s reputation, as it provides rare insights into India’s relations with the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the beginning of the Cold War. “The 1955 offer from the Soviets is well-documented, although perhaps not widely known. The 1955 incident was publicly discussed in 2002 in print by AG Noorani, a major scholar of modern Indian history and politics. However, new evidence of an even earlier offer — by the US in August 1950 — to assist India in assuming a permanent seat at the UNSC has recently emerged, adding substantially to what Noorani earlier wrote. Nehru’s rejection of the US offer underlined the consistency of his conviction that the PRC’s legitimate interests must be acknowledged in order to reduce international tensions. Integrating the PRC into the international community by conceding its right to the Chinese seat at the Security Council was, in fact, a central pillar of Nehru’s foreign policy. “The documents critical to answering these questions are stowed away in the Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit papers held at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML). The importance of Pandit’s papers lies in her relationship with her brother Jawaharlal Nehru. The Pandit papers have not been deployed thus far in studies focused on India’s relationship with China. In late August 1950, Pandit wrote to her brother from Washington, DC, where she was then posted as India’s ambassador to the United States: ‘One matter that is being cooked up in the State Department should be known to you. This is the unseating of China as a Permanent Member in the Security Council and of India being put in her place.’ “Nehru’s response within the week was unequivocal: ‘In your letter, you mention that the State Department is trying to unseat China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council and to put India in her place. So far as we are concerned, we are not going to countenance it. That would be bad from every point of view. It would be a clear affront to China and it would mean some kind of a break between us and China.’” The Indian establishment had quickly closed ranks around Nehru’s controversial historic decision. K Shankar Bajpai, former secretary in the MEA and ambassador to the US and China, told The Print last week: “It has become a fashion to blame Nehru for everything. To think that India could have taken China’s seat is utter nonsense.” While the geopolitical imperatives of the 1950s cannot be viewed through a contemporary prism, Nehru’s decision to cede veto-carrying membership of the UNSC to China has led, decades later, to aggressive Chinese behaviour, including supporting Pakistan based Jaish-e-Mohammed founder Masood Azhar at the UNSC. Nehru, were he alive, would be mortified. (This article was originally published on The DNA. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Jawaharlal Nehru's decision to 'favour China' for UNSC seat led to Chinese aggressive behaviour

Under pressure from the world community to act on terror, Pakistan on Monday banned 26/11 mastermind Hafiz Saeed's Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and Falah-e-Insaniat (FiF) by issuing a United Nations Security Council (Freezing and Seizure) Order (SRO), 2019.

The objective of the SRO is to make certain UN Security Council sanctions are applied on individuals and entities such as the JuD and FiF. The UNSC list includes the names of the al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, JuD, FiF, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other organisations and individuals.

The SRO overrides all previous local listings and under it, the assets of terror groups are frozen and taken over by the Pakistani government.

But India has dismissed the actions taken.&nbsp;

"JUD, LeT, FiF have been banned by UN since 2009. So is Pak saying they are following that decision now? &nbsp;If so what were they doing all these many years," top government sources told WION.&nbsp;

"Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me," the sources added.&nbsp;

Pakistan's flip-flop was very visible earlier in the day as a list from Pakistan's interior ministry's NACTA or the national counter-terrorism authority placed the JuD and FiF in the <a href="http://www.wionews.com/south-asia/after-saying-it-will-pakistan-does-not-ban-hafiz-saeeds-jud-fif-201111">organisations "under watch" category</a> despite Pakistan declaring publicly on February 21 that both would be banned.

The banning had been decided after a national security committee meeting held under the chairmanship of Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan in February.

The announcement of the ban came during the Financial Action Task Force or FATF meet in Paris from February 17 to 22 at which Pakistan was put under tremendous pressure to act on terror. &nbsp;

FATF had slammed Islamabad in a statement after the week-long meet, saying the country had not demonstrated a "proper understanding" of the terror financing risks posed by Islamic State, al-Qaeda, JuD, FiF, LeT, JeM, the Haqqani Network, and persons affiliated with the Taliban.

In the aftermath of the Pulwama terror attack on February 14 in which at least 40 CRPF personnel died, the US, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Austrlia, and the EU have called for Pakistan to act against terror groups on its soil.

Under pressure from the world community to act on terror, Pakistan on Monday banned 26/11 mastermind Hafiz Saeed's Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and Falah-e-Insaniat (FiF) by issuing a United Nations Security Council (Freezing and Seizure) Order (SRO), 2019.

Under pressure from the world community to act on terror, Pakistan on Monday banned 26/11 mastermind Hafiz Saeed's Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and Falah-e-Insaniat (FiF) by issuing a United Nations Security Council (Freezing and Seizure) Order (SRO), 2019. The objective of the SRO is to make certain UN Security Council sanctions are applied on individuals and entities such as the JuD and FiF. The UNSC list includes the names of the al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, JuD, FiF, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other organisations and individuals. The SRO overrides all previous local listings and under it, the assets of terror groups are frozen and taken over by the Pakistani government. But India has dismissed the actions taken. "JUD, LeT, FiF have been banned by UN since 2009. So is Pak saying they are following that decision now? If so what were they doing all these many years," top government sources told WION. "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me," the sources added. Pakistan's flip-flop was very visible earlier in the day as a list from Pakistan's interior ministry's NACTA or the national counter-terrorism authority placed the JuD and FiF in the organisations "under watch" category despite Pakistan declaring publicly on February 21 that both would be banned. The banning had been decided after a national security committee meeting held under the chairmanship of Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan in February. The announcement of the ban came during the Financial Action Task Force or FATF meet in Paris from February 17 to 22 at which Pakistan was put under tremendous pressure to act on terror. FATF had slammed Islamabad in a statement after the week-long meet, saying the country had not demonstrated a "proper understanding" of the terror financing risks posed by Islamic State, al-Qaeda, JuD, FiF, LeT, JeM, the Haqqani Network, and persons affiliated with the Taliban. In the aftermath of the Pulwama terror attack on February 14 in which at least 40 CRPF personnel died, the US, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Austrlia, and the EU have called for Pakistan to act against terror groups on its soil.

Pakistan bans Hafiz Saeed's JuD & FiF, India says it isn't quite convinced

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India slams China for blocking UN listing of Pak based terrorist Makki, calls it 'unfortunate'

Jawaharlal Nehru's decision to 'favour China' for UNSC seat led to Chinese aggressive behaviour

Pakistan bans Hafiz Saeed's JuD & FiF, India says it isn't quite convinced