The Islamic State in Pakistan&nbsp;

 
Since November 2016, the Islamic State has increased its activity in Pakistan. The terrorist organisation killed 144 citizens and injured more than 300, almost all of them innocent civilians. This is a worrying sign of the group&#39;s increased activity in the country.

&nbsp;

<div class="ui-state-default" contenteditable="false"><img alt="" draggable="false" src="http://s.wionews.com/photos/revised_slide%204-20170223103833.jpg" />
<div class="media-description">
The Islamic State in Pakistan killed 144 people from November 2016 to February 2017. (WION)
</div>
<a class="close-mark close-div" href="javascript:void(0)" id="jqclosemark">&times;</a></div>

&nbsp;

&quot;Several groups in the region&nbsp;have been engaged, one way or the other, by the Islamic State,&quot; says Khadim Hussain, a Pakistani author and counter-terrorism expert. &quot;All these groups actually belong to the Pakistani Taliban. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) established an organized cell of IS which was later acknowledged through a video message by Abu Bakr-al Baghdadi.&quot;&nbsp;

TTP is the umbrella organisation where almost all Pakistan&#39;s terror groups converge. &nbsp;

In 2014, The Express Tribune reported that a representative of the Islamic State visited the Balochistan-based terror group Jundallah whose spokesperson said the purpose of the visit was to assess the possibility for the Islamic State to establish a presence in Pakistan.

The IS in Pakistan is not a foreign presence though. There is no relevant influx of militants abandoning West Asia&#39;s battlefields to start over in Pakistan. It is a local network made of groups who are unsatisfied with the Pakistani Taliban leadership and fascinated by the IS&#39; territorial acquisitions. &nbsp;

&quot;If we, for instance, take the case of the Khyber Agency in Pakistan where Lashkar-e-Islam was active long time ago, we see that nowadays most of IS fighters present in the neighbouring Afghan province of Nangarhar belonged to Lashkar-e-Islam,&quot; says Hussain.&nbsp;

Control of territory is probably the most appealing factor: Pakistani Taliban exercises control over certain areas of Pakistan, mainly on the Afghan border, but they are still a non-state actor. They have never succeeded in becoming &#39;the state&#39;.&nbsp;

&quot;The IS now an organised structure (in Pakistan). There are cells present in the north-west, in the east and in the south but an&nbsp;organised structure has been established in the border&nbsp;areas of Afghanistan. As far as the narrative is concerned, the individuals, the cells and the organised structure, the IS perhaps has enough presence in Pakistan,&quot; says Hussain.&nbsp;

The Islamic State is like a brand, anyone who is in line with its narrative can adopt it. Its central leadership often publicly recognises new affiliated groups, showing a capability of responding and addressing quickly to their global partners. In doing so, they normally do not impose their men from the centre, but rather rely on local networks. &nbsp;

&quot;The Islamic State adapts to the context. In Pakistan they have local members, speaking the local language&nbsp;and they know&nbsp;and follow&nbsp;local traditions,&quot; says&lrm; Ijaz Khan, counter-terrorism policy consultant and professor at the University of Peshawar. &quot;IS is the next level of Islamist extremism, it is the first strongly pan-Islamic organisation. Al-Qaida&nbsp;has definitely become secondary to them.&quot;&nbsp;

<div class="ui-state-default" contenteditable="false"><img alt="" draggable="false" src="http://s.wionews.com/photos/slide%203-20170223090807.jpg" />
<div class="media-description">
The five deadliest terror attacks in Pakistan caused 345 victims. (WION)
</div>
<a class="close-mark close-div" href="javascript:void(0)" id="jqclosemark">&times;</a></div>

&nbsp;

Fighters might not come from West Asia, but money does!&nbsp;

Every terrorist group needs to buy equipment, protection and must pay salaries. The Islamic State in Pakistan makes no exception.&nbsp;

&quot;Reports of individuals who belong to the Islamic State or who are very close to it tell us that a large part of the money is transferred from the base of IS in the Middle-East. These are not small amount of funds, one can assume that 40 per cent of this&nbsp;money comes from criminal activities like kidnapping and extortion,&quot; says Hussain.

&quot;There can be many ways to bring money to Pakistan, but perhaps one of the most common is through &quot;Hundis&quot;. This mode of transferring money is yet to be arrested completely in the country,&quot; Hussain adds.&nbsp;

Hundis are bills of exchange, widely used by emigrants to send back remittances. This system is very common in South Asia, it operates through family or community connections and relies on trusted middlemen working outside the official bank circuit. It does not leave any track, making it a perfect way to avoid taxation and questioning. &nbsp;

Even if Hundi is formally illegal in Pakistan, it is a consolidated and ancient tradition and people value its secrecy and velocity. The Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported that in 2015 &quot;as much as $15bn has been transacted through hundi and hawala in a year. The actual volume could actually be double the projected figure as reliable data is not available.&quot;&nbsp;

The tens of thousands Madrasas across the country could also play a role in funding terrorist activities.&nbsp;

&quot;There is also, perhaps, the probability that funds are transferred to Madrasas and from there they are channelled to IS cells. There have been reports of many madrasas in Pakistan, and even in Islamabad which has&nbsp;been accused of collecting money and then sending them to fighters,&quot; says Hussain.&nbsp;

Following and stopping the money will be way more effective than military actions. The problem is that it could also expose high profile individuals who got corrupted to cover ambiguous financial operations.&nbsp;

Organised force is not enough&nbsp;

 
After the recent<a href="http://www.wionews.com/south-asia/at-least-72-killed-in-blast-at-sufi-shrine-in-pakistan-12484"> Lal Shahbaz Qalandar Sufi shrine attack</a>, the Pakistani army launched a<a href="http://www.wionews.com/south-asia/after-attack-on-shrine-pak-army-says-over-100-terrorists-killed-12511"> large-scale offensive</a>. According to the military establishment, they killed more than 100 terrorists. There has been no&nbsp;attempt to verify this claim, nor to understand who was actually killed and the groups involved. &nbsp;

On February 22nd the army upscaled the game and launched operation<a href="http://www.wionews.com/south-asia/pakistan-army-launches-nationwide-counter-terrorism-operation-12702"> Radd-ul-Fasaad</a>, with the aim of &quot;indiscriminately eliminating residual/latent threat of terrorism, consolidating gains of operations made thus far and further ensuring security of the borders.&rdquo;&nbsp;

<div class="ui-state-default" contenteditable="false"><img alt="" draggable="false" src="http://s.wionews.com/photos/slide%202-20170223090619.jpg" />
<div class="media-description">
Suicide attacks in Pakistan have been more deadly in 2016 than in 2015 (WION)
</div>
<a class="close-mark close-div" href="javascript:void(0)" id="jqclosemark">&times;</a></div>

&nbsp;

The risk, once again, is that the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies will differentiate between good and bad terrorists attacking IS affiliated groups and not touching others. &nbsp;

This has always been a losing strategy and the many attacks which keep&nbsp;taking place in Pakistan provide strong evidence. According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) in 2016 there have been 441 terrorist attacks, claiming 908 lives. Despite a decline in the overall number of attacks, the PIPS report shows that &quot;the number of people killed by Taliban and other groups with similar objectives increased by over 10 per cent.&quot; The same seems to be happening in 2017: in less then two months five major attacks specifically directed against civilians killed at least 130 people.&nbsp;

<div class="ui-state-default" contenteditable="false"><img alt="" draggable="false" src="http://s.wionews.com/photos/slide%201-20170223090251.jpg" />
<div class="media-description">
2016 has seen a decrease in the overall number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. (WION)
</div>
<a class="close-mark close-div" href="javascript:void(0)" id="jqclosemark">&times;</a></div>

&nbsp;

&quot;States of the region should not look at a phenomenon of competing forces. They should not think that the IS is going to compete against Al Qaida or that the IS competes against the Afghan Taliban,&quot; says Khadim Hussain. &quot;All these organisations converge on few points: they all believe in the necessity to establish a global Khilafat (Caliphate). They also share the same opinion on what is called the &#39;clash of civilisations&#39;. They truly believe it is Islam versus the West. Finally they all agree on the fact that jihadism must be the mode of fighting for Islam,&quot; says Hussain.

The Islamic State functions like a brand, whoever is ready to embrace its ideology is considered an affiliate. A military defeat is necessary, but the difficult battle will be in countering <a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/the-intimate-invitation-deciphering-the-ideological-appeal-of-the-islamic-state-12128">their theological and ideological</a> production which is&nbsp;currently&nbsp;global and very appealing.

&quot;The only solution for a long term dissolution of these terror networks is the construction of an alternative narrative. This has to happen alongside the use of force to destroy their bases&nbsp;and training camps and to cut out their supply routes,&quot; Hussain declares.&nbsp;

(WION)

The Islamic State has seamlessly integrated itself in Pakistan society

The Islamic State in Pakistan Since November 2016, the Islamic State has increased its activity in Pakistan. The terrorist organisation killed 144 citizens and injured more than 300, almost all of them innocent civilians. This is a worrying sign of the group's increased activity in the country. The Islamic State in Pakistan killed 144 people from November 2016 to February 2017. (WION) × "Several groups in the region have been engaged, one way or the other, by the Islamic State," says Khadim Hussain, a Pakistani author and counter-terrorism expert. "All these groups actually belong to the Pakistani Taliban. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) established an organized cell of IS which was later acknowledged through a video message by Abu Bakr-al Baghdadi." TTP is the umbrella organisation where almost all Pakistan's terror groups converge. In 2014, The Express Tribune reported that a representative of the Islamic State visited the Balochistan-based terror group Jundallah whose spokesperson said the purpose of the visit was to assess the possibility for the Islamic State to establish a presence in Pakistan. The IS in Pakistan is not a foreign presence though. There is no relevant influx of militants abandoning West Asia's battlefields to start over in Pakistan. It is a local network made of groups who are unsatisfied with the Pakistani Taliban leadership and fascinated by the IS' territorial acquisitions. "If we, for instance, take the case of the Khyber Agency in Pakistan where Lashkar-e-Islam was active long time ago, we see that nowadays most of IS fighters present in the neighbouring Afghan province of Nangarhar belonged to Lashkar-e-Islam," says Hussain. Control of territory is probably the most appealing factor: Pakistani Taliban exercises control over certain areas of Pakistan, mainly on the Afghan border, but they are still a non-state actor. They have never succeeded in becoming 'the state'. "The IS now an organised structure (in Pakistan). There are cells present in the north-west, in the east and in the south but an organised structure has been established in the border areas of Afghanistan. As far as the narrative is concerned, the individuals, the cells and the organised structure, the IS perhaps has enough presence in Pakistan," says Hussain. The Islamic State is like a brand, anyone who is in line with its narrative can adopt it. Its central leadership often publicly recognises new affiliated groups, showing a capability of responding and addressing quickly to their global partners. In doing so, they normally do not impose their men from the centre, but rather rely on local networks. "The Islamic State adapts to the context. In Pakistan they have local members, speaking the local language and they know and follow local traditions," says‎ Ijaz Khan, counter-terrorism policy consultant and professor at the University of Peshawar. "IS is the next level of Islamist extremism, it is the first strongly pan-Islamic organisation. Al-Qaida has definitely become secondary to them." The five deadliest terror attacks in Pakistan caused 345 victims. (WION) × Fighters might not come from West Asia, but money does! Every terrorist group needs to buy equipment, protection and must pay salaries. The Islamic State in Pakistan makes no exception. "Reports of individuals who belong to the Islamic State or who are very close to it tell us that a large part of the money is transferred from the base of IS in the Middle-East. These are not small amount of funds, one can assume that 40 per cent of this money comes from criminal activities like kidnapping and extortion," says Hussain. "There can be many ways to bring money to Pakistan, but perhaps one of the most common is through "Hundis". This mode of transferring money is yet to be arrested completely in the country," Hussain adds. Hundis are bills of exchange, widely used by emigrants to send back remittances. This system is very common in South Asia, it operates through family or community connections and relies on trusted middlemen working outside the official bank circuit. It does not leave any track, making it a perfect way to avoid taxation and questioning. Even if Hundi is formally illegal in Pakistan, it is a consolidated and ancient tradition and people value its secrecy and velocity. The Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported that in 2015 "as much as $15bn has been transacted through hundi and hawala in a year. The actual volume could actually be double the projected figure as reliable data is not available." The tens of thousands Madrasas across the country could also play a role in funding terrorist activities. "There is also, perhaps, the probability that funds are transferred to Madrasas and from there they are channelled to IS cells. There have been reports of many madrasas in Pakistan, and even in Islamabad which has been accused of collecting money and then sending them to fighters," says Hussain. Following and stopping the money will be way more effective than military actions. The problem is that it could also expose high profile individuals who got corrupted to cover ambiguous financial operations. Organised force is not enough After the recent Lal Shahbaz Qalandar Sufi shrine attack, the Pakistani army launched a large-scale offensive. According to the military establishment, they killed more than 100 terrorists. There has been no attempt to verify this claim, nor to understand who was actually killed and the groups involved. On February 22nd the army upscaled the game and launched operation Radd-ul-Fasaad, with the aim of "indiscriminately eliminating residual/latent threat of terrorism, consolidating gains of operations made thus far and further ensuring security of the borders.” Suicide attacks in Pakistan have been more deadly in 2016 than in 2015 (WION) × The risk, once again, is that the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies will differentiate between good and bad terrorists attacking IS affiliated groups and not touching others. This has always been a losing strategy and the many attacks which keep taking place in Pakistan provide strong evidence. According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) in 2016 there have been 441 terrorist attacks, claiming 908 lives. Despite a decline in the overall number of attacks, the PIPS report shows that "the number of people killed by Taliban and other groups with similar objectives increased by over 10 per cent." The same seems to be happening in 2017: in less then two months five major attacks specifically directed against civilians killed at least 130 people. 2016 has seen a decrease in the overall number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. (WION) × "States of the region should not look at a phenomenon of competing forces. They should not think that the IS is going to compete against Al Qaida or that the IS competes against the Afghan Taliban," says Khadim Hussain. "All these organisations converge on few points: they all believe in the necessity to establish a global Khilafat (Caliphate). They also share the same opinion on what is called the 'clash of civilisations'. They truly believe it is Islam versus the West. Finally they all agree on the fact that jihadism must be the mode of fighting for Islam," says Hussain. The Islamic State functions like a brand, whoever is ready to embrace its ideology is considered an affiliate. A military defeat is necessary, but the difficult battle will be in countering their theological and ideological production which is currently global and very appealing. "The only solution for a long term dissolution of these terror networks is the construction of an alternative narrative. This has to happen alongside the use of force to destroy their bases and training camps and to cut out their supply routes," Hussain declares. (WION)

Islamic State in Pakistan: 'Hundis' and extortion fuels terror network

India does not have real Muslims capable of jihad,&rdquo; Mehdi Masroor Biswas reportedly told a police officer during an interrogation after his arrest in Bengaluru over a year ago. The typical &lsquo;takfiri&rsquo; taunt to incite Indian Muslims is unmistakable in the statement of this young engineer, which belies his court plea against being a key ISIS (also called IS) operative on Twitter. 
 
The former executive of a multinational company, Biswas had been broadcasting the ISIS&rsquo; terror missions and luring recruits to fight in Syrian and other Middle East theatres at the time of his arrest in late December 2014. Some analysts have since cited this statement to claim the growing frustration among most pan-jihadist organisations over their near failure in recruiting terrorists in the country. 
 
 
 
<img alt="" class="img-responsive" src="http://s.wionews.com/photos/er1-20160808093952.jpg" />
<div class="media-description">
Mehdi Masroor Biswas, former MNC executive, is presently functioning as one of the broadcasters of Islamic State terror mission.
</div>
According to this view, Indian security agencies and the media are overly obsessing the ISIS threat, sometimes at the expense of the clear and present jihadist danger posed by terror groups like Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-i-Toiba lurking just across the border that have repeatedly conducted some of the deadliest terror attacks on Indian soil. It is even argued that the ISIS is unpopular in the subcontinent because it regards all &lsquo;muqallids&rsquo; (devout adherents of the four orthodox schools of Sunni Islam - Hanafi, Shafai, Malaki and Hanbali) as &lsquo;murtad&rsquo; (apostates fit for execution), which puts most Indian Muslims in that category for the terrorist group. In fact, extremist Salafi-Wahhabi scholars of the ISIS&rsquo; extremist strain regard the Hanafi Maturidis (which includes the Deobandis and Barelvis that constitute majority of Sunni Muslims in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) as non-believers. In addition, the ISIS even regards the Quietist Salafis, like the highly puritanical and strictly apolitical Ahle Hadeeth population in the subcontinent, to be outside the pale. 
 
In fact, this doctrinal clash between Salafi Arabs and South Asian &lsquo;muqallids&rsquo; is nothing new. Its signs can be traced back to the Afghan-Arab war against the Soviets. In his book &lsquo;Call to Global Islamist Resistance&rsquo;, Al-Qaeda&rsquo;s most prolific writer Abu Mus&rsquo;ab Al-Suri notes that most Arab jihadists were derisive of the &lsquo;muqallid&rsquo; doctrinal beliefs of the Taliban in the 1990s and were dismissive of Mullah Omar&rsquo;s claim of the Taliban-held territory being an &ldquo;Islamic emirate&rdquo;. According to Al-Suri, many of the Arab Salafi jihadists considered the Taliban-held areas merely as a &ldquo;safe haven&rdquo; from where they could operate freely and they did not regard the Deobandi Taliban &ldquo;emirate&rdquo; as a suitable starting point for launching their cherished dream of a future Islamic Caliphate. 
 
Thus, in his book (pp.844-45) Al-Suri states: &ldquo;One of the astonishing things &hellip; is a statement made by one of those extremist Salafi-jihadists. He told me in one of our conversations that &lsquo;jihad must be under the Salafist banner; its leadership, program and religious rulings must also be Salafist&hellip;If we should accept that non-Salafists participate with us in jihad, we only do so because we need them. However, they should not have any leadership role at all. We should lead them like a herd of cows to perform their duty of jihad.&rsquo;&rdquo; 
 
Although Al-Qaeda&rsquo;s top leadership (Bin Laden and now Al-Zawahiri) always sought to downplay these doctrinal differences, the emergence of the ISIS brought this internal dissonance to the fore like never before. In fact, the ISIS makes no bones about its dislike of the Deobandi Afghan Taliban and has been weaning away members of the Taliban to its Salafi Jihadist school ever since the death of Mullah Umar. It is also the reason for repeated clashes between the Deobandi JeM and the Salafist factions of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) having ISIS affiliations. Again in a recent propaganda video, the ISIS has declared top leaders of Darul Uloom Deoband in India as apostates. 
 
The doctrinal differences between the two sides are deeply entrenched. Whereas the ISIS strain of Salafism espouses &lsquo;tajsim&rsquo; (the concept that God has a body), all other schools of Sunni and Shiite Islam staunchly oppose the notion and declare it as fundamentally un-Islamic and blasphemous. For their part, Salafists oppose the acceptance of &lsquo;tawassul&rsquo; by all other Sunni schools (seeking God&rsquo;s intercession through reference to prophets and saints) as sacrilegious. With the Indian subcontinent continuing to be the haven of orthodox schools of Islam extant before the rise of Salafi-Wahhabism in the 18th- 19th centuries, the Salafist pan-jihadist resonance does not strike a chord among most Islamic sects in South Asia. 
 
Contrary to the claims of most Islamophobes, ISIS is the most hated of groups among most Muslims around the world for several reasons. ISIS&rsquo; primary mission of targeting the &lsquo;near enemy&rsquo; (Muslim nation states, populations and regimes, most of whom it regards as apostates) to gain territory, its disrespect for all other Islamic sectarian beliefs (even the ideologically akin Salafi extremist schools like the Surooris and parent organisations like Al-Qaeda), its goal of bringing about the so-called prophesised Islamic apocalypse (&lsquo;Al-Malhamal Kubra&rsquo;) as a necessary precondition for achieving the &lsquo;global Caliphate&rsquo; and its insistence that all Muslims recognise its hitherto unknown 44-year-old leader (Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi) as their temporal, military and spiritual Caliph makes it extremely unpopular in the Islamic world. 
 
However, the claim that the ISIS threat is on the wane due to doctrinal or political reasons in the Muslim world is seriously flawed and misleading. Although the group has lost almost half of its previously held territories in Iraq and Syria, and is said to have about 18,000 militants in that region down from the earlier estimate of 33,000, it has at least eight affiliates &mdash; including in Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria and now Bangladesh &mdash; that have pledged allegiance to Baghdadi as caliph. These groups have another 20,000 militants fighting under the ISIS&rsquo; banner. The group&rsquo;s terrorist activities across Europe have seen an exponential increase in recent times. 
 
In the Indian subcontinent, the ISIS is said to have developed close ties with Salafi Lashkar-i-Toiba in Pakistan and Jamaatul Mujahideen in Bangladesh. In the 13th issue of the its Dabiq online magazine, the head of the ISIS in Bangladesh Shaykh Abu Ibrahim al-Hanif has claimed that the group is currently training fighters in Bangladesh and Pakistan to launch simultaneous attacks from both the western and eastern borders of India to create chaos in our country. The mouthpiece also claims that Kashmir will soon be overrun by the ISIS. Indian jihadi groups like the Indian Mujahideen (IM) have links to the group, with many of their members having joined the ranks of ISIS in Syria and Iraq and some planning their return to India. In fact, the Ansar-ut Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (AuT), was formed in 2013 by members of the IM, ISIS and a Taliban faction, and pledged their allegiance to ISIS in September of that year. 
 
Again through its social media campaign, the ISIS is radicalising impressionable minds through the Internet. Clearly, the virulent ideology and lone wolf attacks unleashed by the ISIS in the world will be difficult to contain even after the group is eventually destroyed and defeated. 
 
The writer is Distinguished Research Fellow at the United Service Institution of India and is the author of the book ISIS: Race to Armageddon. 
 
(This article first appeared on DNA)

Contrary to claims of most Islamophobes, Islamic State is the most hated of groups among majority of Muslims, particularly, in South Asia

India does not have real Muslims capable of jihad,” Mehdi Masroor Biswas reportedly told a police officer during an interrogation after his arrest in Bengaluru over a year ago. The typical ‘takfiri’ taunt to incite Indian Muslims is unmistakable in the statement of this young engineer, which belies his court plea against being a key ISIS (also called IS) operative on Twitter. The former executive of a multinational company, Biswas had been broadcasting the ISIS’ terror missions and luring recruits to fight in Syrian and other Middle East theatres at the time of his arrest in late December 2014. Some analysts have since cited this statement to claim the growing frustration among most pan-jihadist organisations over their near failure in recruiting terrorists in the country. Mehdi Masroor Biswas, former MNC executive, is presently functioning as one of the broadcasters of Islamic State terror mission. According to this view, Indian security agencies and the media are overly obsessing the ISIS threat, sometimes at the expense of the clear and present jihadist danger posed by terror groups like Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-i-Toiba lurking just across the border that have repeatedly conducted some of the deadliest terror attacks on Indian soil. It is even argued that the ISIS is unpopular in the subcontinent because it regards all ‘muqallids’ (devout adherents of the four orthodox schools of Sunni Islam - Hanafi, Shafai, Malaki and Hanbali) as ‘murtad’ (apostates fit for execution), which puts most Indian Muslims in that category for the terrorist group. In fact, extremist Salafi-Wahhabi scholars of the ISIS’ extremist strain regard the Hanafi Maturidis (which includes the Deobandis and Barelvis that constitute majority of Sunni Muslims in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) as non-believers. In addition, the ISIS even regards the Quietist Salafis, like the highly puritanical and strictly apolitical Ahle Hadeeth population in the subcontinent, to be outside the pale. In fact, this doctrinal clash between Salafi Arabs and South Asian ‘muqallids’ is nothing new. Its signs can be traced back to the Afghan-Arab war against the Soviets. In his book ‘Call to Global Islamist Resistance’, Al-Qaeda’s most prolific writer Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri notes that most Arab jihadists were derisive of the ‘muqallid’ doctrinal beliefs of the Taliban in the 1990s and were dismissive of Mullah Omar’s claim of the Taliban-held territory being an “Islamic emirate”. According to Al-Suri, many of the Arab Salafi jihadists considered the Taliban-held areas merely as a “safe haven” from where they could operate freely and they did not regard the Deobandi Taliban “emirate” as a suitable starting point for launching their cherished dream of a future Islamic Caliphate. Thus, in his book (pp.844-45) Al-Suri states: “One of the astonishing things … is a statement made by one of those extremist Salafi-jihadists. He told me in one of our conversations that ‘jihad must be under the Salafist banner; its leadership, program and religious rulings must also be Salafist…If we should accept that non-Salafists participate with us in jihad, we only do so because we need them. However, they should not have any leadership role at all. We should lead them like a herd of cows to perform their duty of jihad.’” Although Al-Qaeda’s top leadership (Bin Laden and now Al-Zawahiri) always sought to downplay these doctrinal differences, the emergence of the ISIS brought this internal dissonance to the fore like never before. In fact, the ISIS makes no bones about its dislike of the Deobandi Afghan Taliban and has been weaning away members of the Taliban to its Salafi Jihadist school ever since the death of Mullah Umar. It is also the reason for repeated clashes between the Deobandi JeM and the Salafist factions of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) having ISIS affiliations. Again in a recent propaganda video, the ISIS has declared top leaders of Darul Uloom Deoband in India as apostates. The doctrinal differences between the two sides are deeply entrenched. Whereas the ISIS strain of Salafism espouses ‘tajsim’ (the concept that God has a body), all other schools of Sunni and Shiite Islam staunchly oppose the notion and declare it as fundamentally un-Islamic and blasphemous. For their part, Salafists oppose the acceptance of ‘tawassul’ by all other Sunni schools (seeking God’s intercession through reference to prophets and saints) as sacrilegious. With the Indian subcontinent continuing to be the haven of orthodox schools of Islam extant before the rise of Salafi-Wahhabism in the 18th- 19th centuries, the Salafist pan-jihadist resonance does not strike a chord among most Islamic sects in South Asia. Contrary to the claims of most Islamophobes, ISIS is the most hated of groups among most Muslims around the world for several reasons. ISIS’ primary mission of targeting the ‘near enemy’ (Muslim nation states, populations and regimes, most of whom it regards as apostates) to gain territory, its disrespect for all other Islamic sectarian beliefs (even the ideologically akin Salafi extremist schools like the Surooris and parent organisations like Al-Qaeda), its goal of bringing about the so-called prophesised Islamic apocalypse (‘Al-Malhamal Kubra’) as a necessary precondition for achieving the ‘global Caliphate’ and its insistence that all Muslims recognise its hitherto unknown 44-year-old leader (Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi) as their temporal, military and spiritual Caliph makes it extremely unpopular in the Islamic world. However, the claim that the ISIS threat is on the wane due to doctrinal or political reasons in the Muslim world is seriously flawed and misleading. Although the group has lost almost half of its previously held territories in Iraq and Syria, and is said to have about 18,000 militants in that region down from the earlier estimate of 33,000, it has at least eight affiliates — including in Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria and now Bangladesh — that have pledged allegiance to Baghdadi as caliph. These groups have another 20,000 militants fighting under the ISIS’ banner. The group’s terrorist activities across Europe have seen an exponential increase in recent times. In the Indian subcontinent, the ISIS is said to have developed close ties with Salafi Lashkar-i-Toiba in Pakistan and Jamaatul Mujahideen in Bangladesh. In the 13th issue of the its Dabiq online magazine, the head of the ISIS in Bangladesh Shaykh Abu Ibrahim al-Hanif has claimed that the group is currently training fighters in Bangladesh and Pakistan to launch simultaneous attacks from both the western and eastern borders of India to create chaos in our country. The mouthpiece also claims that Kashmir will soon be overrun by the ISIS. Indian jihadi groups like the Indian Mujahideen (IM) have links to the group, with many of their members having joined the ranks of ISIS in Syria and Iraq and some planning their return to India. In fact, the Ansar-ut Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (AuT), was formed in 2013 by members of the IM, ISIS and a Taliban faction, and pledged their allegiance to ISIS in September of that year. Again through its social media campaign, the ISIS is radicalising impressionable minds through the Internet. Clearly, the virulent ideology and lone wolf attacks unleashed by the ISIS in the world will be difficult to contain even after the group is eventually destroyed and defeated. The writer is Distinguished Research Fellow at the United Service Institution of India and is the author of the book ISIS: Race to Armageddon. (This article first appeared on DNA)

The Islamic State's doctrinal differences surface in South Asia

terrorism-in-south-asia

Terrorism In South Asia, News on Terrorism In South Asia, stories on Terrorism In South Asia, articles on Terrorism In South Asia, Terrorism In South Asia stories at Wion, Terrorism In South Asia news, Terrorism In South Asia latest news

terrorism in-south-asia

Islamic State in Pakistan: 'Hundis' and extortion fuels terror network

The Islamic State's doctrinal differences surface in South Asia