The curious case of Russian Kremlin critics who were allegedly poisoned

President Vladimir Putin will not reply to a letter from the son of a woman killed by a suspected Russian nerve agent near the English city of Salisbury last year because Russia's ambassador to Britain has already done so, the Kremlin said on Monday.

Ewan Hope called on Putin in a letter publicised by the Daily Mirror earlier this month to allow Britain to question two Russian nationals London suspects of trying to murder former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter last year.

Moscow has denied involvement in the attack.

Hope's mother, Dawn&nbsp;&nbsp;Sturgess, died after coming into contact with the same nerve agent used in the attack, which her partner found in a discarded perfume bottle, police said.

The suspects are now thought to be in Russia.

When asked on Monday whether Putin would respond to Hope, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said he would not, saying it was a job for Russia's ambassador to Britain.

"No, he (Putin) is not obliged to reply at all," said Peskov.

The Russian embassy in London said on Wednesday it had received Hope's letter and that the Russian ambassador had offered his condolences to him. It said in a statement that the ambassador had offered to meet Hope and answer any questions he had.

President Vladimir Putin will not reply to a letter from the son of a woman killed by a suspected Russian nerve agent near the English city of Salisbury last year because Russia's ambassador to Britain has already done so, the Kremlin said on Monday.

President Vladimir Putin will not reply to a letter from the son of a woman killed by a suspected Russian nerve agent near the English city of Salisbury last year because Russia's ambassador to Britain has already done so, the Kremlin said on Monday. Ewan Hope called on Putin in a letter publicised by the Daily Mirror earlier this month to allow Britain to question two Russian nationals London suspects of trying to murder former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter last year. Moscow has denied involvement in the attack. Hope's mother, Dawn Sturgess, died after coming into contact with the same nerve agent used in the attack, which her partner found in a discarded perfume bottle, police said. The suspects are now thought to be in Russia. When asked on Monday whether Putin would respond to Hope, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said he would not, saying it was a job for Russia's ambassador to Britain. "No, he (Putin) is not obliged to reply at all," said Peskov. The Russian embassy in London said on Wednesday it had received Hope's letter and that the Russian ambassador had offered his condolences to him. It said in a statement that the ambassador had offered to meet Hope and answer any questions he had.

Kremlin says it's not Putin's place to answer Briton whose mother died in poisoning

The head of Russia's GRU military intelligence agency that the West has blamed for a string of brazen attacks died on Wednesday after "a serious and long illness," the Russian defence ministry said.

State news agency TASS cited the ministry as saying Igor Korobov, 62, who ran the spy agency since 2016, had been made a Hero of Russia for his service in the post, the highest state award.

Britain has accused the GRU of attempting to poison former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter with a nerve agent in the city of Salisbury, the Netherlands has accused it of trying to hack the global chemical weapons watchdog, and US&nbsp;intelligence agencies say it tried to hack the 2016 presidential election.

Russia denies all those allegations.

Speculation about Korobov's fate had been growing since an unconfirmed Russian media report that he had been summoned by President Vladimir Putin after the Skripal affair and severely criticised for the operation which left the Skripals alive and the GRU a target of mockery in the Western media.

Korobov was absent from a ceremony in Moscow this month where Putin and other senior officials celebrated the centenary of the GRU, with the Russian leader praising its skill and "unique abilities."

Operatives of the agency, widely known by its old acronym of GRU, set an example for a future generation of military spies, said Putin, himself a former intelligence officer, citing their readiness to sacrifice everything "for the motherland".

Soviet veteran

Korobov's death paves the way for Putin to appoint a successor to head an agency that intelligence experts say has stepped up its covert missions as tension mounts between Russia and the West, which has imposed sanctions on Moscow over its annexation of Ukraine's Crimea.

Asked last month if there would be a shake-up at the defence ministry in the aftermath of the Skripal affair, the Kremlin said the low quality of the allegations levelled at GRU did not justify such changes.

The United States included Korobov's name on a March sanctions blacklist of people believed to have helped "undermine cybersecurity on behalf of the Russian government".

Korobov was a Soviet military veteran who served in the air force and, according to his official biography, began working for the GRU in 1985.

The GRU, founded as the registration directorate in 1918 after the Bolshevik revolution, is one of Russia's three main intelligence agencies, alongside the domestic Federal Security Service and the SVR Foreign Intelligence Service.

The head of Russia's GRU military intelligence agency that the West has blamed for a string of brazen attacks died on Wednesday after "a serious and long illness," the Russian defence ministry said.

The head of Russia's GRU military intelligence agency that the West has blamed for a string of brazen attacks died on Wednesday after "a serious and long illness," the Russian defence ministry said. State news agency TASS cited the ministry as saying Igor Korobov, 62, who ran the spy agency since 2016, had been made a Hero of Russia for his service in the post, the highest state award. Britain has accused the GRU of attempting to poison former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter with a nerve agent in the city of Salisbury, the Netherlands has accused it of trying to hack the global chemical weapons watchdog, and US intelligence agencies say it tried to hack the 2016 presidential election. Russia denies all those allegations. Speculation about Korobov's fate had been growing since an unconfirmed Russian media report that he had been summoned by President Vladimir Putin after the Skripal affair and severely criticised for the operation which left the Skripals alive and the GRU a target of mockery in the Western media. Korobov was absent from a ceremony in Moscow this month where Putin and other senior officials celebrated the centenary of the GRU, with the Russian leader praising its skill and "unique abilities." Operatives of the agency, widely known by its old acronym of GRU, set an example for a future generation of military spies, said Putin, himself a former intelligence officer, citing their readiness to sacrifice everything "for the motherland". Soviet veteran Korobov's death paves the way for Putin to appoint a successor to head an agency that intelligence experts say has stepped up its covert missions as tension mounts between Russia and the West, which has imposed sanctions on Moscow over its annexation of Ukraine's Crimea. Asked last month if there would be a shake-up at the defence ministry in the aftermath of the Skripal affair, the Kremlin said the low quality of the allegations levelled at GRU did not justify such changes. The United States included Korobov's name on a March sanctions blacklist of people believed to have helped "undermine cybersecurity on behalf of the Russian government". Korobov was a Soviet military veteran who served in the air force and, according to his official biography, began working for the GRU in 1985. The GRU, founded as the registration directorate in 1918 after the Bolshevik revolution, is one of Russia's three main intelligence agencies, alongside the domestic Federal Security Service and the SVR Foreign Intelligence Service.

Head of Russian spy agency accused of British poison attack dies

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Saturday the nerve agent used to poison former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in Britain could have been the BZ substance - which was never produced in the Soviet Union or Russia.

Lavrov said experts from a laboratory based in the Swiss town of Spiez had analysed a sample of the substance used in the poisoning.

Citing a report from the lab dated March 27, Lavrov said the evidence suggested the nerve agent used could be in the arsenal of the United States and Britain.

Lavrov read out parts of the report that he said showed the substance had traces of the BZ agent.

"This formulation was in the inventory of the United States, Britain and other NATO states," Lavrov said, at an assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy.

The global chemical weapons watchdog concluded on Thursday that the poison that struck down the former Russian spy and his daughter Yulia last month was a highly pure type of Novichok nerve agent, backing Britain's own findings.

British Prime Minister Theresa May has said it is highly likely that Moscow was behind the attack.

Russia has repeatedly denied any involvement in the poisoning.

Lavrov on Saturday said the report from the Swiss lab mentioned no nerve agents by name, such as Novichok, but instead gave a long chemical formula that points to a substance that has been developed by many countries.

"We, as you understand, have abilities to receive confidential information. And as this information concerns questions of life and death, we won’t keep this information secret," Lavrov said.

Lavrov said the Swiss laboratory also identified a high concentration of A-234 agent, known as Novichok. Such a concentration would have quickly resulted in Skripal`s death, Lavrov said.

"Taking into account its (A-234) high volatility, the issue of identification of this poisoning substance in its initial state and in high concentration by specialists at the Spiez (research) centre seems to be very suspicious," Lavrov said.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Saturday the nerve agent used to poison former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in Britain could have been the BZ substance - which was never produced in the Soviet Union or Russia

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Saturday the nerve agent used to poison former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in Britain could have been the BZ substance - which was never produced in the Soviet Union or Russia. Lavrov said experts from a laboratory based in the Swiss town of Spiez had analysed a sample of the substance used in the poisoning. Citing a report from the lab dated March 27, Lavrov said the evidence suggested the nerve agent used could be in the arsenal of the United States and Britain. Lavrov read out parts of the report that he said showed the substance had traces of the BZ agent. "This formulation was in the inventory of the United States, Britain and other NATO states," Lavrov said, at an assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy. The global chemical weapons watchdog concluded on Thursday that the poison that struck down the former Russian spy and his daughter Yulia last month was a highly pure type of Novichok nerve agent, backing Britain's own findings. British Prime Minister Theresa May has said it is highly likely that Moscow was behind the attack. Russia has repeatedly denied any involvement in the poisoning. Lavrov on Saturday said the report from the Swiss lab mentioned no nerve agents by name, such as Novichok, but instead gave a long chemical formula that points to a substance that has been developed by many countries. "We, as you understand, have abilities to receive confidential information. And as this information concerns questions of life and death, we won’t keep this information secret," Lavrov said. Lavrov said the Swiss laboratory also identified a high concentration of A-234 agent, known as Novichok. Such a concentration would have quickly resulted in Skripal`s death, Lavrov said. "Taking into account its (A-234) high volatility, the issue of identification of this poisoning substance in its initial state and in high concentration by specialists at the Spiez (research) centre seems to be very suspicious," Lavrov said.

Russia's Lavrov says Skripals may have been poisoned by substance Russia never made

By&nbsp;Jennifer Mathers*

Vladimir Putin has won re-election by an even greater margin than expected. But he begins his fourth term as president facing antagonism from numerous world leaders over a nerve agent attack in the UK that has hospitalised a former Russian spy and his daughter.

The British prime minister, Theresa May, has made it clear that she thinks Russia is responsible for poisoning former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury. She has received formal backing from France, Germany and the US.

She described the attack as just one in a long line of audacious foreign policy moves authorised by Moscow since Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency in 2012. These actions include the annexation of Crimea, military intervention in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, cyber attacks and the interference in elections in the United States and Europe.

But while Russian foreign policy may give the impression of recklessness and unpredictability, Moscow&rsquo;s words and actions are not the results of random aggression. They fall into distinct patterns. Understanding those patterns can help us interpret and perhaps anticipate Russia&rsquo;s next moves on the world stage as Putin embarks on his fourth term as president.

Much of what we see in Russian foreign policy has a lot in common with a collection of theoretical approaches in the discipline of international relations known as &ldquo;realism&rdquo;. Russia&rsquo;s political leaders tend to treat foreign policy as a zero-sum game, where one state can only make gains if others lose. Their assessment of Russia&rsquo;s place in the world is shaped by very traditional ideas about what makes a state strong, powerful and respected. Possessing a large and well-armed military is high on the list.

While Russia also deploys more conventional tools of foreign policy, such as diplomacy and trade, it relies &ndash; heavily at times &ndash; on a wide range of covert instruments, especially those wielded by its intelligence and security services. Notions of ethics are not absent from the calculations of Russia&rsquo;s political leaders &ndash; but they regard their ethical responsibility as protecting the interests of their own country, rather than following some abstract, philosophical rules for state behaviour.

Russia regards these general principles of foreign policy as universally applicable. In other words, Putin and other senior Russian policymakers expect all states to behave as Russia does. Any claims by other states&rsquo; governments that they have very different motives for their foreign policy actions &ndash; such as protecting human rights and supporting the development of democracy &ndash; are regarded by Moscow as no more than a public relations exercise. This attitude helps to explain why Russian officials feel free to exercise very implausible deniability when it comes to Russia&rsquo;s actions. We saw an example of this in the spring of 2014, when Putin first denied and then admitted that the &ldquo;little green men&rdquo; deployed to Crimea were, in fact, Russian military personnel.

Use of force 
Each situation is different, and Russia&rsquo;s policymakers calculate the relative strengths and limitations when choosing the instruments to use to advance Moscow&rsquo;s foreign policy goals. This means that the use of outright military force is only employed where Moscow judges the odds to be strongly in Russia&rsquo;s favour. Other, less confrontational but perhaps equally effective tools are used where the odds are not thought to be so good.

We can see how this works in practice if we compare the different ways that Russia has behaved in Ukraine. Deploying soldiers to Crimea in 2014 was relatively low risk. Ukraine&rsquo;s government and armed forces were in disarray and there was a high level of support among the local civilian population for Russia. That said, Moscow still took the precaution of initially disguising its troops in case things went badly wrong.&nbsp;

The risks were higher in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, but they were managed in several ways. Military intervention was preceded by a propaganda campaign that exploited existing local concerns about the intentions of the new Ukranian government, especially towards Russian speakers. The actual fighting has been done partly by proxies (local separatists, supplied and directed by Moscow). The participation of Russian soldiers has been presented as the actions of individual volunteers.

In both Crimea and the Donbas, Moscow could be confident that it would not face a direct military confrontation with superior forces. Russia&rsquo;s calculations are very different when it comes to dealing with NATO members. Russia may base military exercises on fighting NATO forces, but in real life this is out of the question except as a last resort. Propaganda, social media trolling and cyber attacks are much less risky methods of weakening a potential opponent.

The danger is that Moscow will underestimate the cumulative effects of its actions short of using military force. With each new provocative act, international tensions rise and so do the chances of a confrontation that cannot easily be denied or defused.

Russia may regard the attack on the Skripals as an isolated incident &ndash; as retribution to a traitor and a warning to others who might be tempted to betray the motherland. But there are increasing calls for Britain and other Western countries to take more decisive action against Moscow than expelling some diplomats and keeping the royal family away from the World Cup. If the West really is coming to the end of its patience with Russia, it could make Putin&rsquo;s next six years as president a lot less comfortable.&nbsp;

&nbsp;

*Jennifer Mathers has a background in the study of Russian politics, history international politics at Aberystwyth University

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Russia may regard the attack on Skripals as an isolated incident, as retribution to a traitor and a warning to others who might be tempted to betray motherland. But if West is coming to the end of its patience with Russia, it could make President Putin’s next six years less comfortable.

By Jennifer Mathers* Vladimir Putin has won re-election by an even greater margin than expected. But he begins his fourth term as president facing antagonism from numerous world leaders over a nerve agent attack in the UK that has hospitalised a former Russian spy and his daughter. The British prime minister, Theresa May, has made it clear that she thinks Russia is responsible for poisoning former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury. She has received formal backing from France, Germany and the US. She described the attack as just one in a long line of audacious foreign policy moves authorised by Moscow since Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency in 2012. These actions include the annexation of Crimea, military intervention in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, cyber attacks and the interference in elections in the United States and Europe. But while Russian foreign policy may give the impression of recklessness and unpredictability, Moscow’s words and actions are not the results of random aggression. They fall into distinct patterns. Understanding those patterns can help us interpret and perhaps anticipate Russia’s next moves on the world stage as Putin embarks on his fourth term as president. Much of what we see in Russian foreign policy has a lot in common with a collection of theoretical approaches in the discipline of international relations known as “realism”. Russia’s political leaders tend to treat foreign policy as a zero-sum game, where one state can only make gains if others lose. Their assessment of Russia’s place in the world is shaped by very traditional ideas about what makes a state strong, powerful and respected. Possessing a large and well-armed military is high on the list. While Russia also deploys more conventional tools of foreign policy, such as diplomacy and trade, it relies – heavily at times – on a wide range of covert instruments, especially those wielded by its intelligence and security services. Notions of ethics are not absent from the calculations of Russia’s political leaders – but they regard their ethical responsibility as protecting the interests of their own country, rather than following some abstract, philosophical rules for state behaviour. Russia regards these general principles of foreign policy as universally applicable. In other words, Putin and other senior Russian policymakers expect all states to behave as Russia does. Any claims by other states’ governments that they have very different motives for their foreign policy actions – such as protecting human rights and supporting the development of democracy – are regarded by Moscow as no more than a public relations exercise. This attitude helps to explain why Russian officials feel free to exercise very implausible deniability when it comes to Russia’s actions. We saw an example of this in the spring of 2014, when Putin first denied and then admitted that the “little green men” deployed to Crimea were, in fact, Russian military personnel. Use of force Each situation is different, and Russia’s policymakers calculate the relative strengths and limitations when choosing the instruments to use to advance Moscow’s foreign policy goals. This means that the use of outright military force is only employed where Moscow judges the odds to be strongly in Russia’s favour. Other, less confrontational but perhaps equally effective tools are used where the odds are not thought to be so good. We can see how this works in practice if we compare the different ways that Russia has behaved in Ukraine. Deploying soldiers to Crimea in 2014 was relatively low risk. Ukraine’s government and armed forces were in disarray and there was a high level of support among the local civilian population for Russia. That said, Moscow still took the precaution of initially disguising its troops in case things went badly wrong. The risks were higher in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, but they were managed in several ways. Military intervention was preceded by a propaganda campaign that exploited existing local concerns about the intentions of the new Ukranian government, especially towards Russian speakers. The actual fighting has been done partly by proxies (local separatists, supplied and directed by Moscow). The participation of Russian soldiers has been presented as the actions of individual volunteers. In both Crimea and the Donbas, Moscow could be confident that it would not face a direct military confrontation with superior forces. Russia’s calculations are very different when it comes to dealing with NATO members. Russia may base military exercises on fighting NATO forces, but in real life this is out of the question except as a last resort. Propaganda, social media trolling and cyber attacks are much less risky methods of weakening a potential opponent. The danger is that Moscow will underestimate the cumulative effects of its actions short of using military force. With each new provocative act, international tensions rise and so do the chances of a confrontation that cannot easily be denied or defused. Russia may regard the attack on the Skripals as an isolated incident – as retribution to a traitor and a warning to others who might be tempted to betray the motherland. But there are increasing calls for Britain and other Western countries to take more decisive action against Moscow than expelling some diplomats and keeping the royal family away from the World Cup. If the West really is coming to the end of its patience with Russia, it could make Putin’s next six years as president a lot less comfortable. *Jennifer Mathers has a background in the study of Russian politics, history international politics at Aberystwyth University (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Opinion: How to understand Putin's view of the world

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The curious case of Russian Kremlin critics who were allegedly poisoned

Kremlin says it's not Putin's place to answer Briton whose mother died in poisoning

Head of Russian spy agency accused of British poison attack dies

Russia's Lavrov says Skripals may have been poisoned by substance Russia never made

Opinion: How to understand Putin's view of the world