Iraqi Kurdistan's parliament named Masrour Barzani as the region's new premier on Tuesday, a day after his cousin was sworn in as its president.

Masrour Barzani, 50, is the son of longtime Iraqi Kurdish leader <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/kurdish-leader-barzani-resigns-after-independence-vote-backfires-23100">Masoud Barzani</a> and had been serving as national security adviser for the autonomous region since 2012.&nbsp;

He won the votes of 87 of the 97 members present in the region's 111-seat chamber -- more than his cousin received when he was elected president late last month.&nbsp;

PM-elect Barzani will have one month to form the autonomous region's cabinet.&nbsp;

The cousins hail from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which was founded by their grandfather Mustafa in 1946 and remains dominated by the Barzani clan.

Its main rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), boycotted Nechirvan's election as president but at least some of its MPs took part in Tuesday's session.&nbsp;

Born in Arbil in 1969, Masrour joined the Kurdish security forces, known as the peshmerga, as a 16-year-old.&nbsp;

He attended school in neighbouring Iran, then returned to Iraqi Kurdistan to take part in the 1991 uprising against then-dictator Saddam Hussein before travelling to the US to complete his graduate studies.

During his tenure as a national security adviser, Barzani had a major role in the region's fightback against the Islamic State jihadist group, which swept across a third of Iraq in 2014.

He succeeds his cousin Nechirvan who had served as prime minister since 2012.&nbsp;

Nechirvan is now the KRG's second president after Masoud Barzani, who resigned after 12 years in office following a controversial 2017 referendum on Kurdish independence that prompted Baghdad to reoccupy large swathes of Kurdish-held territory.&nbsp;

Iraqi Kurdistan's parliament named Masrour Barzani as the region's new premier on Tuesday, a day after his cousin was sworn in as its president. Masrour Barzani, 50, is the son of longtime Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani and had been serving as national security adviser for the autonomous region since 2012.

Iraqi Kurdistan's parliament named Masrour Barzani as the region's new premier on Tuesday, a day after his cousin was sworn in as its president. Masrour Barzani, 50, is the son of longtime Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani and had been serving as national security adviser for the autonomous region since 2012. He won the votes of 87 of the 97 members present in the region's 111-seat chamber -- more than his cousin received when he was elected president late last month. PM-elect Barzani will have one month to form the autonomous region's cabinet. The cousins hail from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which was founded by their grandfather Mustafa in 1946 and remains dominated by the Barzani clan. Its main rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), boycotted Nechirvan's election as president but at least some of its MPs took part in Tuesday's session. Born in Arbil in 1969, Masrour joined the Kurdish security forces, known as the peshmerga, as a 16-year-old. He attended school in neighbouring Iran, then returned to Iraqi Kurdistan to take part in the 1991 uprising against then-dictator Saddam Hussein before travelling to the US to complete his graduate studies. During his tenure as a national security adviser, Barzani had a major role in the region's fightback against the Islamic State jihadist group, which swept across a third of Iraq in 2014. He succeeds his cousin Nechirvan who had served as prime minister since 2012. Nechirvan is now the KRG's second president after Masoud Barzani, who resigned after 12 years in office following a controversial 2017 referendum on Kurdish independence that prompted Baghdad to reoccupy large swathes of Kurdish-held territory.

Iraq Kurds name president's cousin Masrour Barzani as their new Prime Minister

Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani gave a bitter speech on Sunday to announce his resignation, saying no one outside the Kurds&#39; home region had stood up to support their right of self-determination.

Barzani made a televised speech after the Iraqi Kurdistan parliament approved his request not to extend his term beyond Nov. 1, after an independence referendum he championed last month backfired and triggered military and economic retaliation against the Kurdish region he has been leading since 2005.

<a href="http://www.wionews.com/world/iraqi-forces-seize-oil-city-of-kirkuk-from-kurds-22517" target="_blank">Also read: After they threaten independence referendum, Iraqi forces seize oil city of Kirkuk from Kurds</a>

&quot;Three million votes for Kurdistan independence created history and cannot be erased,&quot; he said, referring to the referendum held on Sept. 25.

&quot;Nobody stood up with us other than our mountains,&quot; he said, speaking with Kurdish and Iraqi flags behind him.

He criticised the United States for allowing Abrams tanks supplied to Iraqi forces to fight Islamic State militants to be used against the Kurds. He said American weapons were also used in attacks by Iranian-backed paramilitaries.

&quot;Without the help of Peshmerga (Kurdish fighters), Iraqi forces could not have liberated Mosul from ISIS alone,&quot; he said, referring to Islamic State&#39;s former stronghold in northern Iraq.

&quot;Why would Washington want to punish Kurdistan?&quot;

He said followers of rival Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, who died in early October, had been guilty of &quot;high treason&quot; for handing over the oil city of Kirkuk to Iraqi forces without a fight two weeks ago.

He said the Iraqi offensives since Oct. 16 and the refusal of the Iraqi government to agree to dialogue vindicated his view that &quot;Iraq no longer believes in Kurdish rights&quot;.

'Nobody stood up with us other than our mountains,' Barzani said in a televised address

Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani gave a bitter speech on Sunday to announce his resignation, saying no one outside the Kurds' home region had stood up to support their right of self-determination. Barzani made a televised speech after the Iraqi Kurdistan parliament approved his request not to extend his term beyond Nov. 1, after an independence referendum he championed last month backfired and triggered military and economic retaliation against the Kurdish region he has been leading since 2005. Also read: After they threaten independence referendum, Iraqi forces seize oil city of Kirkuk from Kurds "Three million votes for Kurdistan independence created history and cannot be erased," he said, referring to the referendum held on Sept. 25. "Nobody stood up with us other than our mountains," he said, speaking with Kurdish and Iraqi flags behind him. He criticised the United States for allowing Abrams tanks supplied to Iraqi forces to fight Islamic State militants to be used against the Kurds. He said American weapons were also used in attacks by Iranian-backed paramilitaries. "Without the help of Peshmerga (Kurdish fighters), Iraqi forces could not have liberated Mosul from ISIS alone," he said, referring to Islamic State's former stronghold in northern Iraq. "Why would Washington want to punish Kurdistan?" He said followers of rival Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, who died in early October, had been guilty of "high treason" for handing over the oil city of Kirkuk to Iraqi forces without a fight two weeks ago. He said the Iraqi offensives since Oct. 16 and the refusal of the Iraqi government to agree to dialogue vindicated his view that "Iraq no longer believes in Kurdish rights".

Kurdish leader Barzani resigns after independence referendum leads to military action by Iraq

Iraqi Kurdish officials <a href="http://www.presidency.krd/english/articledisplay.aspx?id=E8ZKw7evZVQ=" style="font-size: 13px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">have decided</a> to hold an independence referendum <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/06/07/world/middleeast/ap-iraq-kurds.html?_r=0" style="font-size: 13px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">on</a> September 25 of this year. The decision was <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10945578/Kurds-prepare-first-moves-for-independence-referendum.html" style="font-size: 13px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">widely anticipated</a>, since Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), had explicitly <a href="http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/barzani-an-independent-kurdistan-is-coming" style="font-size: 13px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">promised</a> an independence referendum once ISIS were defeated.

Yet without any stamp of approval <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/06/kurdistan-independence-iraq-iran-turkey.html">from Baghdad</a> and the international community &ndash; <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/au/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/international-relations-and-international-organisations/power-politics-and-state-formation-twentieth-century-dynamics-recognition?format=HB&amp;isbn=9781107047358#tZWLG4s2ChU9h8ql.97">or at least</a> from the majority of permanent members on the UN Security Council &ndash; the referendum will not by itself make the Kurdish dream of statehood a reality. The Kurds are <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-idUSKBN18Y284">well aware</a> of this.

Instead, the likely overwhelming vote in favour of independence could inflame <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-politics-kurds-idUSKBN17M1CF">already tense</a> relations between the Kurdish capital, Erbil, and Baghdad. The same goes for <a href="http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_181_-9-june-2017_-press-release-regarding-the-decision-to-organize-independence-referendum-in-the-krg-on-25-september-2017.en.mfa">Turkey</a> and <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/middle-east/147516-170610-iran-opposes-iraqi-kurdish-independence-vote">Iran</a>, on whose trade Erbil currently depends for survival as a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2014.915543">separate entity</a>. So if this independence vote could escalate tensions and will not confer statehood, why is the KRG holding it?

Political goals

The answer is deceptively simple: political expediency. Beyond its historic importance for Kurds&rsquo; independence aspirations, the decision to hold a referendum may conceal more mundane objectives. In particular, this referendum has much to do with tactics in their dealings with the Iraqi government. The <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/07/kurds-finally-set-date-for-independence-referendum/?utm_content=buffer75b29&amp;utm_medium=social&amp;utm_source=facebook.com&amp;utm_campaign=buffer">main prizes</a> are increased oil revenues and territory, particularly the oil-rich region of <a href="http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/14637.html">Kirkuk</a>.

<figure class="align-center zoomable">
First, oil revenues. Baghdad <a href="http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/030320141" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">cut off</a> federal disbursements following an acrimonious dispute over oil revenues in 2014. The Kurds retaliated by stopping crude oil deliveries to the central government, instead of <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-kurdistan-oil-idUSKCN0T61HH20151117" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">selling oil</a> directly to Turkey through a newly built pipeline.

Negotiations with Baghdad have been on hold due to the military imperative of fighting ISIS. But with ISIS now close to defeat, oil sharing has <a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/article/iraq-after-isis-three-major-flashpoints">come back</a> to the fore. KRG officials may be hoping the referendum will increase their bargaining power, pressuring Baghdad into larger monthly disbursements. Erbil argues that, under the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html">Iraqi constitution</a> of 2005, it should receive roughly 17 per cent of federal revenues from oil exports, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-oil-kurdistan-idUSKCN0Z10CY">amounting to</a> about US$1 billion (&pound;785m) per month.
</figure>

Kurdish officials may also have an eye on disputed areas that have fallen under their authority. ISIS previously <a href="http://www.janes.com/article/58831/islamic-state-loses-22-per-cent-of-territory">swept through</a> large swathes of <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/The_Kurds_of_Iraq_Building_a_State_Within_a_State">northwestern Iraq</a>, directly threatening oil-rich Kirkuk. The much acclaimed Kurdish armed forces, the &ldquo;<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/film/2016/may/20/peshmerga-review-bernard-henri-levy-cannes-2016">Peshmerga</a>&rdquo;, fronted the counterattack and have been in <a href="http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/182042/kurdish-independence">de facto control</a> of Kirkuk since 2014. The Kurds recently raised their flag on municipal buildings &ndash; to vehement criticism from <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-erdogan-idUSKBN1761PP">Turkey</a> and the local <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/09/c_136350975.htm">Turkmen</a> community.

<figure class="align-center zoomable">
If these disputed areas deliver a strong Yes vote in September, Kurdish rule could be legitimised. The vote could then confer further bargaining advantages with Baghdad in relation to revenue sharing, further devolution of power and the demarcation of KRG borders (as well as Kirkuk, Erbil claims authority over the contested areas of Makhmour, Shingal and Khanaqin).

Economics and realpolitik
</figure>

The referendum might also divert attention from the <a href="http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/0e44d797-1d90-4d2d-afec-2832a4a7785c/five-reasons-for-kurdistan-region-financial-crisis">dire economic situation</a> in Iraqi Kurdistan since 2014. Along with losing federal disbursements, the fight against ISIS and the fall in oil prices have led the economy to the brink of collapse.

Kurdish officials and the wider population of around 5 million may have valiantly coalesced around the war effort against ISIS, but dissent <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-protests-idUSKCN0VI11X">is intensifying</a>. With the local parliament <a href="http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/190820152">suspended</a> since 2015 following a row over Barzani&rsquo;s decision to extend his term as KRG president, grassroots opposition has been gathering steam.

Cracks have <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/06/kirkuk-iraq-kurdistan-independence-baghdad-oil.html">been appearing</a> in the grand alliance between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). This is critical to the region&rsquo;s survival as a separate entity, KDP and PUK have <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/The_Kurds_of_Iraq_Building_a_State_Within_a_State">fought</a> bitterly in the past for political and military dominance.

<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<figcaption>
With a growing array of disgruntled domestic actors, the Kurdish leadership may have calculated that the moment is ripe to rally the population around the independence struggle and buy precious time to begin &ldquo;putting the house in order&rdquo;.

In addition, the independence vote will help to cement an effective separation from Iraq that <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/doi/10.1093/isq/sqw049/3078982/De-Facto-States-Survival-and-Disappearance-1945" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">dates back</a> to the 1990s. It sends a signal that, in the long run, nothing short of independence will placate the Kurds. The referendum also allows Kurdish politicians to gauge the potential for <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/recognizing-states-9780199564446?cc=gb&amp;lang=en&amp;" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">international recognition</a> of an independent Kurdistan.
</figcaption>
</figure>

<img alt="The Conversation" height="1" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79447/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" width="1" />So barring unforeseen events, the population will probably deliver an overwhelming Yes vote to independence on September 25. Since this is about the latest tactics in the continuation of the conflict between Erbil and Baghdad by other means, we can then expect a showdown with the KRG&rsquo;s domestic and regional adversaries. Only time will tell whether Erbil has been correct to calculate that the benefits outweigh the political risks of going ahead.

This article was originally published on <a href="http://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a>. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/kurdistans-referendum-wont-lead-to-independence-so-why-hold-it-79447">original article</a>.

Iraqi Kurds go for an independence referendum on 25th September. The independence may worsen the socio-economic situation in Iraq and the Kurdish region.

Iraqi Kurdish officials have decided to hold an independence referendum on September 25 of this year. The decision was widely anticipated, since Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), had explicitly promised an independence referendum once ISIS were defeated. Yet without any stamp of approval from Baghdad and the international community – or at least from the majority of permanent members on the UN Security Council – the referendum will not by itself make the Kurdish dream of statehood a reality. The Kurds are well aware of this. Instead, the likely overwhelming vote in favour of independence could inflame already tense relations between the Kurdish capital, Erbil, and Baghdad. The same goes for Turkey and Iran, on whose trade Erbil currently depends for survival as a separate entity. So if this independence vote could escalate tensions and will not confer statehood, why is the KRG holding it? Political goals The answer is deceptively simple: political expediency. Beyond its historic importance for Kurds’ independence aspirations, the decision to hold a referendum may conceal more mundane objectives. In particular, this referendum has much to do with tactics in their dealings with the Iraqi government. The main prizes are increased oil revenues and territory, particularly the oil-rich region of Kirkuk. First, oil revenues. Baghdad cut off federal disbursements following an acrimonious dispute over oil revenues in 2014. The Kurds retaliated by stopping crude oil deliveries to the central government, instead of selling oil directly to Turkey through a newly built pipeline. Negotiations with Baghdad have been on hold due to the military imperative of fighting ISIS. But with ISIS now close to defeat, oil sharing has come back to the fore. KRG officials may be hoping the referendum will increase their bargaining power, pressuring Baghdad into larger monthly disbursements. Erbil argues that, under the Iraqi constitution of 2005, it should receive roughly 17 per cent of federal revenues from oil exports, amounting to about US$1 billion (£785m) per month. Kurdish officials may also have an eye on disputed areas that have fallen under their authority. ISIS previously swept through large swathes of northwestern Iraq, directly threatening oil-rich Kirkuk. The much acclaimed Kurdish armed forces, the “Peshmerga”, fronted the counterattack and have been in de facto control of Kirkuk since 2014. The Kurds recently raised their flag on municipal buildings – to vehement criticism from Turkey and the local Turkmen community. If these disputed areas deliver a strong Yes vote in September, Kurdish rule could be legitimised. The vote could then confer further bargaining advantages with Baghdad in relation to revenue sharing, further devolution of power and the demarcation of KRG borders (as well as Kirkuk, Erbil claims authority over the contested areas of Makhmour, Shingal and Khanaqin). Economics and realpolitik The referendum might also divert attention from the dire economic situation in Iraqi Kurdistan since 2014. Along with losing federal disbursements, the fight against ISIS and the fall in oil prices have led the economy to the brink of collapse. Kurdish officials and the wider population of around 5 million may have valiantly coalesced around the war effort against ISIS, but dissent is intensifying. With the local parliament suspended since 2015 following a row over Barzani’s decision to extend his term as KRG president, grassroots opposition has been gathering steam. Cracks have been appearing in the grand alliance between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). This is critical to the region’s survival as a separate entity, KDP and PUK have fought bitterly in the past for political and military dominance. With a growing array of disgruntled domestic actors, the Kurdish leadership may have calculated that the moment is ripe to rally the population around the independence struggle and buy precious time to begin “putting the house in order”. In addition, the independence vote will help to cement an effective separation from Iraq that dates back to the 1990s. It sends a signal that, in the long run, nothing short of independence will placate the Kurds. The referendum also allows Kurdish politicians to gauge the potential for international recognition of an independent Kurdistan. So barring unforeseen events, the population will probably deliver an overwhelming Yes vote to independence on September 25. Since this is about the latest tactics in the continuation of the conflict between Erbil and Baghdad by other means, we can then expect a showdown with the KRG’s domestic and regional adversaries. Only time will tell whether Erbil has been correct to calculate that the benefits outweigh the political risks of going ahead. This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Kurdistan's referendum won't lead to independence ? so why hold it?

As Iraqi regular forces approach&nbsp;Mosul&#39;s&nbsp;eastern suburbs, Islamic State&#39;s&nbsp;last stronghold&nbsp;in Iraq, they got some good news.

Fuad Hussein, the chief of staff to Kurdish president Masoud Barzani, declared that IS chief&nbsp;&ldquo;Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is there and, if he is killed, it will mean the collapse of the whole [IS] system&rdquo;.

The self-proclaimed caliph, the de facto leader of the sunni terrorist&nbsp;organisation, remained hidden for almost a year, but opted to remain in Mosul while other IS senior leaders decided to leave and reach&nbsp;Syria. Many important figures have been killed during the last offensives to retake important cities like Fallujah and Ramadi.&nbsp;

The importance of Mosul for the terrorist organisation is not only a matter of military control but also a fundamental part of the narrative of being a&nbsp;state --&nbsp;losing it will surely represent a major psychological blow for the many who decided to fight within IS ranks. It will be difficult to sustain the propaganda of a newly born and strong state if the organisation cannot manage to&nbsp;defend its Iraqi capital.&nbsp;

The battle to reconquer the city of Mosul is far from&nbsp;over, it&nbsp;has just entered a new phase which is likely to be the toughest, characterised by urban-guerrilla and unconventional warfare. Iraqi forces reached the eastern border of the city, but there are still many villages especially on the northern side, which need to be conquered and secured before stating that the Islamic State is definitely surrounded.

The Islamic State is also putting up&nbsp;fierce resistance against the first small advance of the Iraqi army. &ldquo;Daesh (IS) is fighting back and have set up concrete blast walls to block off the Karama neighbourhood and [stop] our troops&rsquo; advance,&rdquo; said Major General Sami al-Aridi of the Iraqi special forces.

Fuad Hussein said &ldquo;it is obvious that they will lose, but not how long this will take to happen&rdquo;, and stated that the Peshmerga, the Kurdish regional forces, were surprised when they found an&nbsp;extensive network of underground tunnels which the Islamic State created in&nbsp;the villages and the towns surrounding Mosul.In several areas of the city, the terrorist organisation enjoys the protection&nbsp;of a part of the local population which will prove to be important.&nbsp;

Major General Najim Al-Jubouri, commander in chief of the Nineveh operations, told me in an interview: &ldquo;The most important part of the Mosul offensive is the people. If we bring here the Chinese army, they will not be able to win if they do not enjoy the support of the people, and I believe that the bad relation between the security forces and the people played a central role in the rise of the Islamic State.&rdquo;

The presence of al-Baghdadi in Mosul could make things harder, for many of its loyalists will surely fight until the very end to protect the city. While the&nbsp;eventual death&nbsp;of the&nbsp;man who is perceived by&nbsp;many to be&nbsp;the father of the Islamic State could result in several organisational problems, but it is something which should not be taken for granted.

Other terrorist organisations proved&nbsp;capable of&nbsp;substituting&nbsp;their leaders and continued&nbsp;their operations, such as al Quaeda, which did not dissolve after Bin Laden&rsquo;s died. Al-Baghdadi&rsquo;s decision not to leave Mosul and eventually die&nbsp;fighting, should he in fact be killed, could also turn out to set an example for the many terrorists still supporting the organisation. It could&nbsp;become a powerful instrument of propaganda on how a real Islamic State member should not fear death and martyrdom.&nbsp;

(WION)

IS is putting up fierce resistance, and even their leader's death might inspire them to fight harder towards martyrdom

As Iraqi regular forces approach Mosul's eastern suburbs, Islamic State's last stronghold in Iraq, they got some good news. Fuad Hussein, the chief of staff to Kurdish president Masoud Barzani, declared that IS chief “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is there and, if he is killed, it will mean the collapse of the whole [IS] system”. The self-proclaimed caliph, the de facto leader of the sunni terrorist organisation, remained hidden for almost a year, but opted to remain in Mosul while other IS senior leaders decided to leave and reach Syria. Many important figures have been killed during the last offensives to retake important cities like Fallujah and Ramadi. The importance of Mosul for the terrorist organisation is not only a matter of military control but also a fundamental part of the narrative of being a state -- losing it will surely represent a major psychological blow for the many who decided to fight within IS ranks. It will be difficult to sustain the propaganda of a newly born and strong state if the organisation cannot manage to defend its Iraqi capital. The battle to reconquer the city of Mosul is far from over, it has just entered a new phase which is likely to be the toughest, characterised by urban-guerrilla and unconventional warfare. Iraqi forces reached the eastern border of the city, but there are still many villages especially on the northern side, which need to be conquered and secured before stating that the Islamic State is definitely surrounded. The Islamic State is also putting up fierce resistance against the first small advance of the Iraqi army. “Daesh (IS) is fighting back and have set up concrete blast walls to block off the Karama neighbourhood and [stop] our troops’ advance,” said Major General Sami al-Aridi of the Iraqi special forces. Fuad Hussein said “it is obvious that they will lose, but not how long this will take to happen”, and stated that the Peshmerga, the Kurdish regional forces, were surprised when they found an extensive network of underground tunnels which the Islamic State created in the villages and the towns surrounding Mosul.In several areas of the city, the terrorist organisation enjoys the protection of a part of the local population which will prove to be important. Major General Najim Al-Jubouri, commander in chief of the Nineveh operations, told me in an interview: “The most important part of the Mosul offensive is the people. If we bring here the Chinese army, they will not be able to win if they do not enjoy the support of the people, and I believe that the bad relation between the security forces and the people played a central role in the rise of the Islamic State.” The presence of al-Baghdadi in Mosul could make things harder, for many of its loyalists will surely fight until the very end to protect the city. While the eventual death of the man who is perceived by many to be the father of the Islamic State could result in several organisational problems, but it is something which should not be taken for granted. Other terrorist organisations proved capable of substituting their leaders and continued their operations, such as al Quaeda, which did not dissolve after Bin Laden’s died. Al-Baghdadi’s decision not to leave Mosul and eventually die fighting, should he in fact be killed, could also turn out to set an example for the many terrorists still supporting the organisation. It could become a powerful instrument of propaganda on how a real Islamic State member should not fear death and martyrdom. (WION)

Islamic State facing trouble in Mosul, but not finished yet

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Masoud Barzani, News on Masoud Barzani, stories on Masoud Barzani, articles on Masoud Barzani, Masoud Barzani stories at Wion, Masoud Barzani news, Masoud Barzani latest news

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Iraq Kurds name president's cousin Masrour Barzani as their new Prime Minister

Kurdish leader Barzani resigns after independence referendum leads to military action by Iraq

Kurdistan's referendum won't lead to independence ? so why hold it?

Islamic State facing trouble in Mosul, but not finished yet