By Ken Chitwood

Just days after the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on October 27, the Islamic State named Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi as the new “caliph.”

In 2014, IS conquered vast swaths of Iraq and Syria and declared itself to be the “caliphate.”

Defined and applied in different ways over the centuries, the fundamental idea behind the caliphate is the just ordering of society according to the will of God.

The Islamic State’s caliphate was never widely recognized among the global Muslim community and no longer has significant territory. But the Islamic State still uses the history of the caliphate to push their claims.

As a scholar of global Islam, every time I teach my “Introduction to Islam” class, questions about the caliphate come up, in part because of IS’s claims.

Caliph conundrums 
 
The leader of a caliphate is called the caliph, meaning deputy or representative. All caliphs are believed to be the successor to Prophet Muhammad. Muhammad was not a caliph; according to the Quran he was the last and greatest of the prophets.

That means no one can replace Muhammad as the messenger of God. The caliph, for example, is not always seen as holding special spiritual authority. But he is meant to preside over the caliphate in the absence of Muhammad.

The debate over who was the rightful representative of the prophet began immediately after his death. While the majority supported Abu Bakr – one of the prophet’s closest companions – a minority opted for his young son-in-law and cousin, Ali.

Abu Bakr’s supporters would come to be known as Sunni Muslims, who believe that Muhammad did not leave instructions regarding his successor. Those who felt Ali was appointed by the prophet to be the political and spiritual leader of the fledgling Muslim community became known as Shiite Muslims.

Abu Bakr was the first caliph and Ali the fourth.

The second and third caliphs were Umar and Uthman. Under Umar, the caliphate expanded to include many regions of the world such as the lands of the former Byzantine and Sassanian empires in Asia Minor, Persia and Central Asia. Uthman is credited with compiling the Quran.

That al-Baghdadi adopted the name of the first caliph was no coincidence. Together, Sunni Muslims call the first four caliphs the Rashidun, or the “Rightly Guided Caliphs,” because they were close companions or relations of Muhammad. They are also believed to be extraordinarily pious. This period lasted about 30 years.

The complex history of the caliphate 
 
After rebels assassinated Uthman in A.D. 656, Ali was elected caliph. However, civil war soon broke out between Ali and Muʿawiya ibn Abi Sufyan. The civil war ended in Sufyan’s victory and the formation of the Umayyad caliphate in A.D. 661.

The Umayyad dynasty lasted 89 years.

The Abbasid dynasty descended from Muhammad’s uncle, Abbas ibn Abdul-Muttalib, and succeeded the Umayyads.

These two caliphates oversaw the continuing expansion of the empire. Under them architecture, the arts and sciences flourished.

For example, the “Dome of the Rock,” a shrine in the Old City of Jerusalem, was built under an Umayyad caliph as a monument to the rising supremacy of their empire.

The Grand Library of Baghdad, also known as the “House of Wisdom,” was supported by Abbasid patronage. The “House of Wisdom” is credited with being a center of translation, scientific study and academic exchange. This period of flourishing, from the eighth to the 14th century, is often referred to as the “Islamic Golden Age.”

Both before and after the fall of the Abbasids in A.D. 1258, a succession of various empires made overlapping and competing claims to the caliphate. These included the Mamluks of Cairo and the Umayyads in Cordóba, Spain.

In 1517, the Turkish Ottomans amassed enough land and power throughout Asia Minor, North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and Eastern Europe to claim the title “caliphate.” Ottoman sultans, however, were not universally recognized as caliphs. Many Muslims believe that the caliphate effectively ended after the Mongol conquest of Abbasid Baghdad in A.D. 1258.

Nonetheless, the Ottomans effectively held on to that title until 1924, when the Turkish nationalist and secularist Kemal Ataturk abolished the caliphate.

Resurrecting the caliphate?

The idea of the caliphate, which the Islamic State has forcefully promoted, recalls a time and a place when Islamic states flourished politically, economically and socially. It also summons up a spiritual vision of a supposedly more devout and dedicated Muslim community than exists today.

Other modern-day Islamists have called for a resurrection of the caliphate, or at least its ideals, as a way to recapture the vibrancy of the past. However, only violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida or the Islamic State have tried to make it a tangible reality.

Killing al-Baghdadi has not quashed the Islamic State’s version of the caliphate. The idea lives on and continues to motivate its members in enclaves across the globe. It is worth mentioning that the name of their new caliph is an honorific title for a member of Prophet Muhammad’s family – “al-Qurashi.” This prophetic lineage is one more way IS is trying to resurrect the history of the caliphate for its destructive purposes. 
&nbsp;

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-a-caliph-the-islamic-state-tries-to-boost-its-legitimacy-by-hijacking-a-historic-institution-126175">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)&nbsp;

By Ken Chitwood Just days after the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on October 27, the Islamic State named Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi as the new “caliph.” In 2014, IS conquered vast swaths of Iraq and Syria and declared itself to be the “caliphate.

By Ken Chitwood Just days after the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on October 27, the Islamic State named Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi as the new “caliph.” In 2014, IS conquered vast swaths of Iraq and Syria and declared itself to be the “caliphate.” Defined and applied in different ways over the centuries, the fundamental idea behind the caliphate is the just ordering of society according to the will of God. The Islamic State’s caliphate was never widely recognized among the global Muslim community and no longer has significant territory. But the Islamic State still uses the history of the caliphate to push their claims. As a scholar of global Islam, every time I teach my “Introduction to Islam” class, questions about the caliphate come up, in part because of IS’s claims. Caliph conundrums The leader of a caliphate is called the caliph, meaning deputy or representative. All caliphs are believed to be the successor to Prophet Muhammad. Muhammad was not a caliph; according to the Quran he was the last and greatest of the prophets. That means no one can replace Muhammad as the messenger of God. The caliph, for example, is not always seen as holding special spiritual authority. But he is meant to preside over the caliphate in the absence of Muhammad. The debate over who was the rightful representative of the prophet began immediately after his death. While the majority supported Abu Bakr – one of the prophet’s closest companions – a minority opted for his young son-in-law and cousin, Ali. Abu Bakr’s supporters would come to be known as Sunni Muslims, who believe that Muhammad did not leave instructions regarding his successor. Those who felt Ali was appointed by the prophet to be the political and spiritual leader of the fledgling Muslim community became known as Shiite Muslims. Abu Bakr was the first caliph and Ali the fourth. The second and third caliphs were Umar and Uthman. Under Umar, the caliphate expanded to include many regions of the world such as the lands of the former Byzantine and Sassanian empires in Asia Minor, Persia and Central Asia. Uthman is credited with compiling the Quran. That al-Baghdadi adopted the name of the first caliph was no coincidence. Together, Sunni Muslims call the first four caliphs the Rashidun, or the “Rightly Guided Caliphs,” because they were close companions or relations of Muhammad. They are also believed to be extraordinarily pious. This period lasted about 30 years. The complex history of the caliphate After rebels assassinated Uthman in A.D. 656, Ali was elected caliph. However, civil war soon broke out between Ali and Muʿawiya ibn Abi Sufyan. The civil war ended in Sufyan’s victory and the formation of the Umayyad caliphate in A.D. 661. The Umayyad dynasty lasted 89 years. The Abbasid dynasty descended from Muhammad’s uncle, Abbas ibn Abdul-Muttalib, and succeeded the Umayyads. These two caliphates oversaw the continuing expansion of the empire. Under them architecture, the arts and sciences flourished. For example, the “Dome of the Rock,” a shrine in the Old City of Jerusalem, was built under an Umayyad caliph as a monument to the rising supremacy of their empire. The Grand Library of Baghdad, also known as the “House of Wisdom,” was supported by Abbasid patronage. The “House of Wisdom” is credited with being a center of translation, scientific study and academic exchange. This period of flourishing, from the eighth to the 14th century, is often referred to as the “Islamic Golden Age.” Both before and after the fall of the Abbasids in A.D. 1258, a succession of various empires made overlapping and competing claims to the caliphate. These included the Mamluks of Cairo and the Umayyads in Cordóba, Spain. In 1517, the Turkish Ottomans amassed enough land and power throughout Asia Minor, North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and Eastern Europe to claim the title “caliphate.” Ottoman sultans, however, were not universally recognized as caliphs. Many Muslims believe that the caliphate effectively ended after the Mongol conquest of Abbasid Baghdad in A.D. 1258. Nonetheless, the Ottomans effectively held on to that title until 1924, when the Turkish nationalist and secularist Kemal Ataturk abolished the caliphate. Resurrecting the caliphate? The idea of the caliphate, which the Islamic State has forcefully promoted, recalls a time and a place when Islamic states flourished politically, economically and socially. It also summons up a spiritual vision of a supposedly more devout and dedicated Muslim community than exists today. Other modern-day Islamists have called for a resurrection of the caliphate, or at least its ideals, as a way to recapture the vibrancy of the past. However, only violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida or the Islamic State have tried to make it a tangible reality. Killing al-Baghdadi has not quashed the Islamic State’s version of the caliphate. The idea lives on and continues to motivate its members in enclaves across the globe. It is worth mentioning that the name of their new caliph is an honorific title for a member of Prophet Muhammad’s family – “al-Qurashi.” This prophetic lineage is one more way IS is trying to resurrect the history of the caliphate for its destructive purposes. (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

What is a caliph? The Islamic State tries to boost its legitimacy by hijacking a historic institution

US President Donald Trump’s announcement that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi died during a US military operation in Syria, later confirmed by ISIS itself, was welcome news. &nbsp;

This was followed by the death of their spokesperson and the arrest of his sister and wife by Turkey. After the decimation of IS caliphate, IS continues to exist in small modules in many parts of the world, mainly in West Asia, but the loss of its undisputed leader who inspired youth globally towards radicalisation as never before, during his peak performance days will not be easy to fulfil.&nbsp;

He revolutionised the art of extending terror network through the internet, made IS the richest terror group in the world, with a caliphate to govern through sharia laws and revived sex slavery.&nbsp;

It’s a major setback to IS and affiliated terror groups but long overdue good news for those suffered its brutality, like Yezidi women. The idea of IS does not end with the death of Baghdadi who stands replaced by Ibrahim al Hashimi al Quraishi from Prophet Mohammad lineage (qualified to become caliph) with a vow to avenge Baghdadi’s death. There being no change in the overall aim and ideology of IS, it will manage to regroup with lesser fund flow and area of influence and wait for the opportunity to reemerge; hence the global fight against IS has to continue. &nbsp;&nbsp;

What does it mean for regional terror groups?&nbsp;

The US has given a strong message to terrorists but its declared withdrawal from Syria is untimely; hence the Middle-East needs a fresh look from a strategic perspective. Turkey cross-border offensive on October 9 against the Kurdish YPG militia, whose fighters made up the bulk of the SDF controlling IS is a game spoiler in the fight against IS.&nbsp;

Turkeys double game with terrorists is marred with helping IS and treating Kurds as terrorists as they demand a homeland. Its desire to invade Syria and destroy Assad's supporters made it an ally of US, but the US is not keen on the decimation of Kurds, who will be left with no choice but to commence terrorist activities against Turkey.&nbsp;

The temporary five days truce, sanctions against Turkey could buy some time, but is unlikely to change Erdogan’s intent who seems to have decided to go Wahhabi way. It does give some extra lifeline to IS, which is going to get dispersed to other areas, in addition to some existing ones like Afghanistan. US withdrawal also cedes this strategic space in Syria to the forces loyal to Assad and Russia, something which the US was not very keen to concede till a short while ago as it was not in the best interest of Israel. This strategic equation does not change the terror potential of Hamas appreciably.&nbsp;

The internal political disturbance Lebanon puts Hezbollah in a tight spot. The current internal political turbulence in Iraq is helpful for the reorganisation of IS as it dampens the Shia spirit which indirectly helps Sunni terror groups. The recent strategic clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia triggered by a drone attack on Saudi’s oil establishment followed by an attack on Iran oil tanker is also a recipe for refuelling of Shia – Sunni terror competition in West Asia. After US walked out of JCPOA (Iran Nuclear Deal) renewed and clamped additional sanctions on Iran which European Union could not prevent, Iran has also climbed the escalation ladder by announcing to fill gas in over 1000 centrifuges to enrich uranium further, which it was holding out due to the deal.&nbsp;

This is another dangerous spiral in the region to increase the insecurity of Saudi Arabia and may result in a further push to the Sunni cause. These developments have blurred the definition of victim and oppressor. The internal turbulence of West Asia, therefore, is creating an environment for breeding terrorists. &nbsp;

After IS suffered these reverses it has opened opportunities and ignited some competition for other terror groups like Taliban and al Qaeda, to strive to gain the influence they lost to ISIS earlier. This has increased their quest to grab more power and money, a bulk of which comes from coercion globally, prove their terror potential to the target population and governments to get more attention, followers, logistics and other resources. It is, however, noteworthy a number of terror organisations having allegiance to IS have still not changed their allegiance, indicating that demise of IS may not be on the card so soon and the group is still not out of the competition.&nbsp;

What does it mean for AfPak region?&nbsp;

Afghanistan continues to face aggressive and coordinated attacks by ISIS’s branch in the region, the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and the Afghan Taliban, including the affiliated Haqqani Network (HQN). Afghan Taliban seems to have grown much stronger for the fact that it controls more territory in Afghanistan than what it controlled when US forces marched in 19 years back. The fact that all world powers talked to them for peace (to fulfil their respective interests) indicate the blackmailing potential of Taliban. &nbsp;Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and remaining US forces have not been able to control their terror strikes despite their best efforts, which are likely to increase if the US chooses to withdraw completely. I do visualise some more efforts by global powers for talks to Taliban in the near future. Although al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan was degraded earlier by multinational forces, remnants of al-Qaida’s global leadership, as well as its regional affiliate - al Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), continue to operate from remote locations in the region have a reason to cheer Baghdadi’s death. &nbsp;

Pakistan continues to be the epicentre of global terrorism playing host to maximum UN-designated terrorist organisations and terrorists in the world, a large No of them have indicated allegiance to IS. Pakistani military counter-terrorism operations are more of ethnic cleansing acts against Pashtuns and Baluchis directed against groups which conducted attacks within Pakistan, such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan Army and ISI support externally focused groups such as Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), which continue to train, organise, and fundraise in Pakistan with a narrative of pseudo Islamic Jihad. The Pakistani Army does not restrict the Afghan Taliban and HQN from operating in Pakistan and threatening the US and Afghan forces in Afghanistan, despite being placed on the “grey list” continuously till date, since June 2018. The support of Pakistan to terror groups is well known and IS is no exception. The increasing radicalisation of establishments in Pakistan, a conglomeration of terrorist groups in AfPak region is a dangerous sign as it indicates a caliphate in making, far more dangerous than ISIS caliphate.&nbsp;

What does it mean for South Asia?&nbsp;

After the declaration of the caliphate, the newly named Caliph, Baghdadi while addressing the jihadists the world over explicitly mentioned China and India as one of the prime targets of the ISIS amongst many others and there are no signs of change in that narrative. ISIS and other militant groups are attempting to spread their ideology to countries that have a Muslim population, and where there is a chance to reach out to dissatisfied youth. al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and ISIS have together claimed responsibility for over 40 attacks in Bangladesh since 2015. The government in Bangladesh continues to battle terrorism with strict Anti-Terrorism Act in place, however, terrorists do manage to operate there with backing from ISI, Pakistan. Terrorist organisations are using the internet, social media to spread their ideologies and solicit followers globally including South Asia and many terrorists have been featured in multiple publications, videos, and websites associated with ISIS and AQIS. Terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka and rapid radicalisation in the Maldives are some more examples of IS mastered methodologies to spread terror, which is likely to continue. &nbsp;&nbsp;

India having the second-largest Muslim population in the world is an obvious target for IS. Many lone wolf attacks in Europe, like the 2017 suicidal car crash attack in Westminster in London, is a possibility in India as well. The Incidents like the train explosion in Bhopal-Ujjain express allegedly by a member of the ISIS(K) module, occasional display of IS flags in Kashmir Valley, bursting of few IS modules in South India by National Investigative Agency, announce the arrival of IS in India. These incidents need to be viewed in consonance with the global scene, wherein Daesh is looking for new hosts after the decimation of their caliphate. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

US President Donald Trump’s announcement that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi died during a US military operation in Syria, later confirmed by ISIS itself, was welcome news.

US President Donald Trump’s announcement that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi died during a US military operation in Syria, later confirmed by ISIS itself, was welcome news. This was followed by the death of their spokesperson and the arrest of his sister and wife by Turkey. After the decimation of IS caliphate, IS continues to exist in small modules in many parts of the world, mainly in West Asia, but the loss of its undisputed leader who inspired youth globally towards radicalisation as never before, during his peak performance days will not be easy to fulfil. He revolutionised the art of extending terror network through the internet, made IS the richest terror group in the world, with a caliphate to govern through sharia laws and revived sex slavery. It’s a major setback to IS and affiliated terror groups but long overdue good news for those suffered its brutality, like Yezidi women. The idea of IS does not end with the death of Baghdadi who stands replaced by Ibrahim al Hashimi al Quraishi from Prophet Mohammad lineage (qualified to become caliph) with a vow to avenge Baghdadi’s death. There being no change in the overall aim and ideology of IS, it will manage to regroup with lesser fund flow and area of influence and wait for the opportunity to reemerge; hence the global fight against IS has to continue. What does it mean for regional terror groups? The US has given a strong message to terrorists but its declared withdrawal from Syria is untimely; hence the Middle-East needs a fresh look from a strategic perspective. Turkey cross-border offensive on October 9 against the Kurdish YPG militia, whose fighters made up the bulk of the SDF controlling IS is a game spoiler in the fight against IS. Turkeys double game with terrorists is marred with helping IS and treating Kurds as terrorists as they demand a homeland. Its desire to invade Syria and destroy Assad's supporters made it an ally of US, but the US is not keen on the decimation of Kurds, who will be left with no choice but to commence terrorist activities against Turkey. The temporary five days truce, sanctions against Turkey could buy some time, but is unlikely to change Erdogan’s intent who seems to have decided to go Wahhabi way. It does give some extra lifeline to IS, which is going to get dispersed to other areas, in addition to some existing ones like Afghanistan. US withdrawal also cedes this strategic space in Syria to the forces loyal to Assad and Russia, something which the US was not very keen to concede till a short while ago as it was not in the best interest of Israel. This strategic equation does not change the terror potential of Hamas appreciably. The internal political disturbance Lebanon puts Hezbollah in a tight spot. The current internal political turbulence in Iraq is helpful for the reorganisation of IS as it dampens the Shia spirit which indirectly helps Sunni terror groups. The recent strategic clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia triggered by a drone attack on Saudi’s oil establishment followed by an attack on Iran oil tanker is also a recipe for refuelling of Shia – Sunni terror competition in West Asia. After US walked out of JCPOA (Iran Nuclear Deal) renewed and clamped additional sanctions on Iran which European Union could not prevent, Iran has also climbed the escalation ladder by announcing to fill gas in over 1000 centrifuges to enrich uranium further, which it was holding out due to the deal. This is another dangerous spiral in the region to increase the insecurity of Saudi Arabia and may result in a further push to the Sunni cause. These developments have blurred the definition of victim and oppressor. The internal turbulence of West Asia, therefore, is creating an environment for breeding terrorists. After IS suffered these reverses it has opened opportunities and ignited some competition for other terror groups like Taliban and al Qaeda, to strive to gain the influence they lost to ISIS earlier. This has increased their quest to grab more power and money, a bulk of which comes from coercion globally, prove their terror potential to the target population and governments to get more attention, followers, logistics and other resources. It is, however, noteworthy a number of terror organisations having allegiance to IS have still not changed their allegiance, indicating that demise of IS may not be on the card so soon and the group is still not out of the competition. What does it mean for AfPak region? Afghanistan continues to face aggressive and coordinated attacks by ISIS’s branch in the region, the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and the Afghan Taliban, including the affiliated Haqqani Network (HQN). Afghan Taliban seems to have grown much stronger for the fact that it controls more territory in Afghanistan than what it controlled when US forces marched in 19 years back. The fact that all world powers talked to them for peace (to fulfil their respective interests) indicate the blackmailing potential of Taliban. Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and remaining US forces have not been able to control their terror strikes despite their best efforts, which are likely to increase if the US chooses to withdraw completely. I do visualise some more efforts by global powers for talks to Taliban in the near future. Although al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan was degraded earlier by multinational forces, remnants of al-Qaida’s global leadership, as well as its regional affiliate - al Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), continue to operate from remote locations in the region have a reason to cheer Baghdadi’s death. Pakistan continues to be the epicentre of global terrorism playing host to maximum UN-designated terrorist organisations and terrorists in the world, a large No of them have indicated allegiance to IS. Pakistani military counter-terrorism operations are more of ethnic cleansing acts against Pashtuns and Baluchis directed against groups which conducted attacks within Pakistan, such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan Army and ISI support externally focused groups such as Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), which continue to train, organise, and fundraise in Pakistan with a narrative of pseudo Islamic Jihad. The Pakistani Army does not restrict the Afghan Taliban and HQN from operating in Pakistan and threatening the US and Afghan forces in Afghanistan, despite being placed on the “grey list” continuously till date, since June 2018. The support of Pakistan to terror groups is well known and IS is no exception. The increasing radicalisation of establishments in Pakistan, a conglomeration of terrorist groups in AfPak region is a dangerous sign as it indicates a caliphate in making, far more dangerous than ISIS caliphate. What does it mean for South Asia? After the declaration of the caliphate, the newly named Caliph, Baghdadi while addressing the jihadists the world over explicitly mentioned China and India as one of the prime targets of the ISIS amongst many others and there are no signs of change in that narrative. ISIS and other militant groups are attempting to spread their ideology to countries that have a Muslim population, and where there is a chance to reach out to dissatisfied youth. al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and ISIS have together claimed responsibility for over 40 attacks in Bangladesh since 2015. The government in Bangladesh continues to battle terrorism with strict Anti-Terrorism Act in place, however, terrorists do manage to operate there with backing from ISI, Pakistan. Terrorist organisations are using the internet, social media to spread their ideologies and solicit followers globally including South Asia and many terrorists have been featured in multiple publications, videos, and websites associated with ISIS and AQIS. Terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka and rapid radicalisation in the Maldives are some more examples of IS mastered methodologies to spread terror, which is likely to continue. India having the second-largest Muslim population in the world is an obvious target for IS. Many lone wolf attacks in Europe, like the 2017 suicidal car crash attack in Westminster in London, is a possibility in India as well. The Incidents like the train explosion in Bhopal-Ujjain express allegedly by a member of the ISIS(K) module, occasional display of IS flags in Kashmir Valley, bursting of few IS modules in South India by National Investigative Agency, announce the arrival of IS in India. These incidents need to be viewed in consonance with the global scene, wherein Daesh is looking for new hosts after the decimation of their caliphate. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

What Baghdadi's death means for South Asia and future of Islamic State

By John A Tures

After former Islamic State Group leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a US military action, speculation began on whether or not President Donald Trump would get a boost in public opinion surveys as a result.

My political science research with my students shows that presidents do enjoy a short-term poll boost after foreign policy raids and capital city captures.

However, that’s often followed by a long-term decline.

A closer look at the polls 
 
Supporters of the diversionary theory of war, known in the media as the “Wag the Dog” effect, contend that presidents can boost their approval ratings in the polls by fighting a war abroad.

In other words, they benefit from a burst of patriotism during the conflict.

But international relations scholars Bradley Lian and John R. Oneal tested this theory by looking at conflicts from 1950 through 1984 and found scant empirical support for this hypothesis.

My students and I considered 12 cases to determine whether presidents benefit at the polls from conducting raids involving the capture of a leader, seizure of a capital city or an attempt to rescue hostages, and how long that support can be expected to last.

The events we looked at included the surrender of Manuel Noriega in January of 1990; the apprehension of Saddam Hussein in 2003; and the killing of Moammar Gaddafi in 2011.

We looked at polls conducted by the Gallup Polling Presidential Job Approval Center, calculating an average of three presidential approval polls taken before the foreign policy event, and the mean of the first three polls issued after the case.

We also analysed polls taken by the end of the year, or six months later if the raid took place near the end of the year, to see how presidents fared long after the event.

Our results show that in 75 per cent of cases, the US President received a boost in the polls shortly after a foreign policy raid or capital capture.

But the jump is short lived. In 83 per cent of cases, presidential approval declined over the next several months. In seven cases, it fell by more than five percentage points from the initial poll boost.

For example, President Donald Trump insisted that al-Baghdadi’s death was a bigger deal than the raid that killed Osama Bin-Laden. That May 2011 event was widely credited with sealing President Barack Obama’s reelection the following year.

That credit may have been misplaced. Our evidence shows that Obama’s approval ratings had declined to 45 per cent by December of 2011. Thus, if history is any guide, I expect that Trump may have higher approval ratings in the coming days but shouldn’t count on better polls over the next several months.

(John A Tures is Professor of Political Science, LaGrange College)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-killing-al-baghdadi-give-trump-a-boost-in-the-polls-probably-but-it-wont-last-125987"> original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp;

 
&nbsp;

By John A Tures After former Islamic State Group leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a US military action, speculation began on whether or not President Donald Trump would get a boost in public opinion surveys as a result.

By John A Tures After former Islamic State Group leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a US military action, speculation began on whether or not President Donald Trump would get a boost in public opinion surveys as a result. My political science research with my students shows that presidents do enjoy a short-term poll boost after foreign policy raids and capital city captures. However, that’s often followed by a long-term decline. A closer look at the polls Supporters of the diversionary theory of war, known in the media as the “Wag the Dog” effect, contend that presidents can boost their approval ratings in the polls by fighting a war abroad. In other words, they benefit from a burst of patriotism during the conflict. But international relations scholars Bradley Lian and John R. Oneal tested this theory by looking at conflicts from 1950 through 1984 and found scant empirical support for this hypothesis. My students and I considered 12 cases to determine whether presidents benefit at the polls from conducting raids involving the capture of a leader, seizure of a capital city or an attempt to rescue hostages, and how long that support can be expected to last. The events we looked at included the surrender of Manuel Noriega in January of 1990; the apprehension of Saddam Hussein in 2003; and the killing of Moammar Gaddafi in 2011. We looked at polls conducted by the Gallup Polling Presidential Job Approval Center, calculating an average of three presidential approval polls taken before the foreign policy event, and the mean of the first three polls issued after the case. We also analysed polls taken by the end of the year, or six months later if the raid took place near the end of the year, to see how presidents fared long after the event. Our results show that in 75 per cent of cases, the US President received a boost in the polls shortly after a foreign policy raid or capital capture. But the jump is short lived. In 83 per cent of cases, presidential approval declined over the next several months. In seven cases, it fell by more than five percentage points from the initial poll boost. For example, President Donald Trump insisted that al-Baghdadi’s death was a bigger deal than the raid that killed Osama Bin-Laden. That May 2011 event was widely credited with sealing President Barack Obama’s reelection the following year. That credit may have been misplaced. Our evidence shows that Obama’s approval ratings had declined to 45 per cent by December of 2011. Thus, if history is any guide, I expect that Trump may have higher approval ratings in the coming days but shouldn’t count on better polls over the next several months. (John A Tures is Professor of Political Science, LaGrange College) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Will killing Al-Baghdadi give Donald Trump a boost in the polls?

By Natasha Lindstaedt

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State (IS), is dead. After US special forces raided his safe house in Idlib province in north-west Syria, Baghdadi reportedly fled and detonated a suicide vest, killing himself and three of his children. Over the past several years, there have been constant reports of his death but up until now, none of these reports have been verified.

The death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 did not lead to the end of Al-Qaeda, but what does al-Baghdadi’s death mean for IS?

Al-Baghdadi was most likely born in the Iraqi city of Samarra in 1971. Though he was a poor student with bad eyesight, he rose to command al-Qaeda’s Iraqi division. He was captured by US forces in a raid in 2004 in Falluja, Iraq, but was not considered to be particularly important at the time. Few would predict that Al-Baghdadi would rise to such a position of power. He was not noted for being particularly charismatic or memorable.

By 2010, al-Baghdadi took control of the group that would be eventually called the Islamic State, a group whose predecessor was Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI had been led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until he was killed in 2006. Under the helm of al-Zarqawi, AQI had become one of the region’s most brutal and effective insurgent groups, controlling the flow of resources and foreign fighters into Iraq. By 2007, the group had almost faded away, but by 2009 it was gaining support in Sunni tribal areas now known as the Islamic State in Iraq.

Split with Al-Qaeda

By the time al-Baghdadi took over, a rift had grown between the wider al-Qaeda group and IS, which had been simmering since al-Zarqawi led AQI. To al-Qaeda, Baghdadi was excessively violent and counter-productive to al-Qaeda’s objectives. Extravagant brutality such as beheading Muslims would alienate most Muslims. Al-Qaeda was also alarmed at IS’s predatory strategy of taking territory and resources from other rebel groups.

Al-Baghdadi, for his part, had no interest in subsuming IS under the wider leadership of al-Qaeda. He sent delegates (who were mostly of Syrian descent) into Syria after the Syrian war began in March 2011, a decision which al-Qaeda rejected. After repeated attempts by al-Qaeda to convince al-Baghdadi to move out of Syria, it officially cut its ties with him in February 2014.

Al-Baghdadi believed that al-Qaeda was ineffective, and had failed to set up an actual state.

Declaration of the caliphate

In June 2014, al-Baghdadi made his first public appearance delivering a sermon from a mosque in the recently captured city of Mosul, where he claimed to come from the same tribe as the prophet Muhammad. He also brazenly declared himself to be the caliph – or the political and religious leader of the Muslim community. Though this declaration was universally rejected by Islamic authorities, his plan of setting up a caliphate attracted thousands of foreign fighters to his cause.

At the height of al-Baghdadi’s power, IS had set up organisational structures across multiple countries and created a de facto state, the size of Belgium with 8m people living under its control. He established a brutal justice system, legalised slavery, collected taxes and provided a handful of public services.

While Bin Laden was more concerned with overthrowing modern Arab dictators, eliminating Israel and knocking over Western symbols of power, al-Baghdadi focused more on reviving the glory of the past. His dramatic vision for IS attracted those that wanted to be considered to be part of a line of warriors that extended back to the Prophet Muhammad.

Fall from power

By 2017, IS’s fortunes started to turn. It had inspired or helped to plan a series of terrorist attacks in Belgium, the US, France and Turkey that drew increasing resolve from the West to step up efforts to eliminate the group. Iraq’s forces also became more effective against IS, eventually retaking Mosul in 2017.

By March of 2019, IS surrendered its final territorial stronghold in Baghouz, Syria after extensive fighting with the mostly Kurdish, Syrian Democratic Forces. IS no longer had territory that it could lay claim to, and without territory, it could not claim to be a valid caliphate.

In an attempt to strengthen his standing, al-Baghdadi appeared in a video in April to demonstrate that the group could still exist, even if it lacked territory. He tried to energise his fighters to redouble their efforts. This would be only the second time that he would appear to the public.

His decision not to appear in person was about ensuring his own safety. Airstrikes had already caused a series of injuries. To avoid being caught, he never used mobile phones and frequently changed safe houses.

This makes his presence in Idlib province in Syria where he died somewhat surprising. The province is controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an Islamist militia fiercely opposed to IS. The region is also currently under siege by Russian and Syrian forces.

What’s next for IS?

As I’ve argued in my own research, for most terrorist groups which are hierarchically organised, the death of a leader signals its demise. In fact most terrorist groups fall apart within a year of forming once the group has been decapitated. Terrorist groups that are larger and more cellular in structure, such as Al-Qaeda, have been able to weather the deaths of leaders, helping to explain the group’s longevity.

IS will likely name a successor to lead the group, and al-Baghdadi tried to prepare his followers that he would not live forever. But it could now start to operate in a way similar to Al-Qaeda with a cell-like structure, where it may attempt to plan terrorist attacks to signal its continued relevance to its followers. It needs to attract new numbers as it has seen its membership dwindle since its territory has disappeared.

The US decision to pull out of Syria has compromised the Kurds, who were managing detention centres holding captured IS fighters. The Turkish advance into Kurdish held territory in north-eastern Syria has led to the escape of several hundreds of IS fighters. The US, however, already claims it has gathered further intelligence from al-Baghdadi’s compound that will continue to weaken IS.

Studies of terrorist groups that have managed succession raise concerns that when one leader dies, the leadership that follows can be less disciplined, more violent and determined to exact revenge. Given Baghdadi’s penchant for brutality, it’s hard to imagine how that’s possible.

(Natasha Lindstaedt is Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/al-baghdadis-death-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-leader-of-islamic-state-125947">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp; 
&nbsp;

By Natasha Lindstaedt Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State (IS), is dead. After US special forces raided his safe house in Idlib province in north-west Syria, Baghdadi reportedly fled and detonated a suicide vest, killing himself and three of his children.

By Natasha Lindstaedt Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State (IS), is dead. After US special forces raided his safe house in Idlib province in north-west Syria, Baghdadi reportedly fled and detonated a suicide vest, killing himself and three of his children. Over the past several years, there have been constant reports of his death but up until now, none of these reports have been verified. The death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 did not lead to the end of Al-Qaeda, but what does al-Baghdadi’s death mean for IS? Al-Baghdadi was most likely born in the Iraqi city of Samarra in 1971. Though he was a poor student with bad eyesight, he rose to command al-Qaeda’s Iraqi division. He was captured by US forces in a raid in 2004 in Falluja, Iraq, but was not considered to be particularly important at the time. Few would predict that Al-Baghdadi would rise to such a position of power. He was not noted for being particularly charismatic or memorable. By 2010, al-Baghdadi took control of the group that would be eventually called the Islamic State, a group whose predecessor was Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI had been led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until he was killed in 2006. Under the helm of al-Zarqawi, AQI had become one of the region’s most brutal and effective insurgent groups, controlling the flow of resources and foreign fighters into Iraq. By 2007, the group had almost faded away, but by 2009 it was gaining support in Sunni tribal areas now known as the Islamic State in Iraq. Split with Al-Qaeda By the time al-Baghdadi took over, a rift had grown between the wider al-Qaeda group and IS, which had been simmering since al-Zarqawi led AQI. To al-Qaeda, Baghdadi was excessively violent and counter-productive to al-Qaeda’s objectives. Extravagant brutality such as beheading Muslims would alienate most Muslims. Al-Qaeda was also alarmed at IS’s predatory strategy of taking territory and resources from other rebel groups. Al-Baghdadi, for his part, had no interest in subsuming IS under the wider leadership of al-Qaeda. He sent delegates (who were mostly of Syrian descent) into Syria after the Syrian war began in March 2011, a decision which al-Qaeda rejected. After repeated attempts by al-Qaeda to convince al-Baghdadi to move out of Syria, it officially cut its ties with him in February 2014. Al-Baghdadi believed that al-Qaeda was ineffective, and had failed to set up an actual state. Declaration of the caliphate In June 2014, al-Baghdadi made his first public appearance delivering a sermon from a mosque in the recently captured city of Mosul, where he claimed to come from the same tribe as the prophet Muhammad. He also brazenly declared himself to be the caliph – or the political and religious leader of the Muslim community. Though this declaration was universally rejected by Islamic authorities, his plan of setting up a caliphate attracted thousands of foreign fighters to his cause. At the height of al-Baghdadi’s power, IS had set up organisational structures across multiple countries and created a de facto state, the size of Belgium with 8m people living under its control. He established a brutal justice system, legalised slavery, collected taxes and provided a handful of public services. While Bin Laden was more concerned with overthrowing modern Arab dictators, eliminating Israel and knocking over Western symbols of power, al-Baghdadi focused more on reviving the glory of the past. His dramatic vision for IS attracted those that wanted to be considered to be part of a line of warriors that extended back to the Prophet Muhammad. Fall from power By 2017, IS’s fortunes started to turn. It had inspired or helped to plan a series of terrorist attacks in Belgium, the US, France and Turkey that drew increasing resolve from the West to step up efforts to eliminate the group. Iraq’s forces also became more effective against IS, eventually retaking Mosul in 2017. By March of 2019, IS surrendered its final territorial stronghold in Baghouz, Syria after extensive fighting with the mostly Kurdish, Syrian Democratic Forces. IS no longer had territory that it could lay claim to, and without territory, it could not claim to be a valid caliphate. In an attempt to strengthen his standing, al-Baghdadi appeared in a video in April to demonstrate that the group could still exist, even if it lacked territory. He tried to energise his fighters to redouble their efforts. This would be only the second time that he would appear to the public. His decision not to appear in person was about ensuring his own safety. Airstrikes had already caused a series of injuries. To avoid being caught, he never used mobile phones and frequently changed safe houses. This makes his presence in Idlib province in Syria where he died somewhat surprising. The province is controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an Islamist militia fiercely opposed to IS. The region is also currently under siege by Russian and Syrian forces. What’s next for IS? As I’ve argued in my own research, for most terrorist groups which are hierarchically organised, the death of a leader signals its demise. In fact most terrorist groups fall apart within a year of forming once the group has been decapitated. Terrorist groups that are larger and more cellular in structure, such as Al-Qaeda, have been able to weather the deaths of leaders, helping to explain the group’s longevity. IS will likely name a successor to lead the group, and al-Baghdadi tried to prepare his followers that he would not live forever. But it could now start to operate in a way similar to Al-Qaeda with a cell-like structure, where it may attempt to plan terrorist attacks to signal its continued relevance to its followers. It needs to attract new numbers as it has seen its membership dwindle since its territory has disappeared. The US decision to pull out of Syria has compromised the Kurds, who were managing detention centres holding captured IS fighters. The Turkish advance into Kurdish held territory in north-eastern Syria has led to the escape of several hundreds of IS fighters. The US, however, already claims it has gathered further intelligence from al-Baghdadi’s compound that will continue to weaken IS. Studies of terrorist groups that have managed succession raise concerns that when one leader dies, the leadership that follows can be less disciplined, more violent and determined to exact revenge. Given Baghdadi’s penchant for brutality, it’s hard to imagine how that’s possible. (Natasha Lindstaedt is Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

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