The Arab Spring phenomenon&nbsp;sparked on December 18, 2010, with a Tunisian fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation to protest against official corruption and indifference. The incident triggered unprecedentedly large anti-government protests in Tunisia which toppled long-established dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and set the Arab Spring rolling across a number of Arab countries, such as Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria.&nbsp;

The mass protestors called for a more representative state for greater equity and better governance. With the solitary exception of Tunisia itself(1), the outcome of the Arab Spring was disappointing in most cases. Successful toppling President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak in Egypt led to a new constitution and a general election which ushered in a Muslim Brotherhood government. However, the new inexperienced government’s radical and populist policies, as well as its incompetence, led to its overthrow and Egypt went back to a military rule.&nbsp;

Arab Spring triggered civil wars in Yemen, Libya and Syria(2), making these countries poster children of its worst-case scenarios and veritable cautionary examples. The Arab Spring in Bahrain waded into an extant Shia – Sunni divide on the island, precipitating military intervention by fellow GCC states to sustain the status quo. &nbsp;

Nine years on, the inconsequentiality and failure of the Arab Spring to achieve are widely acknowledged and the “old normal” of non-representative, despotic and corrupt regimes has been re-enforced. But then, 2019 produced a surprise: A fresh wave of youth-led Arab Spring in each of Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq. After a relatively more persistent but less violent confrontation, these public outrages have so far succeeded in toppling the rulers in first three countries – even as their transition to sustainable democracy is still a work in progress. 
 
Iraq, the fourth, continues to be an outlier with escalating violence amidst angry, but mostly non-violent, youth and trigger happy security forces and militias claiming over 320 lives in the past month. However, given the contrast between huge oil revenues and widespread abject poverty(3), as well as, the proliferation of weapons and explosives, this figure should be considered as moderate. Although Iraqi President publicly declared that Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mehdi would resign “as soon as a successor can be found”, the political coalition backing him agreed to give him more time to “meet the popular demands.” &nbsp;

A comparative study of the “Arab Spring 2.0” – as it is being billed – with its predecessor is quite revealing. The popular wish-list of the protestors remains largely unchanged: Replacement of the extant leadership and total overhaul of the political system with more transparent and representative governance, greater trickle-down of wealth and jobs and less sectarianism and repression. Although the protestors are quite motivated and well-mobilised, their lack of hierarchy and chain of command complicate the endgame. On the other hand, the ruling elites in these countries have not lost their determination to hold on to power. This time, however, they pretend to be more open and participative and toned down the Hogra(4) and their visibility. They have also revved up the use and surveillance of social media. &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp; 
 
How is the Arab Spring 2.0 different? Firstly, both sides realise that it is a battle of attrition for the hearts and minds and it would be unrealistic to expect a quick and decisive breakthrough. Secondly, both sides have realised that the use of violent means is counterproductive. Both sides, therefore, feign a sense of injured innocence. Thirdly, the protestors have shunned all the traditional symbols of religious, sectarian, ideological nature and have not allowed infiltration by any anti-government elements. They have no political preferences or foreign paradigms to espouse.&nbsp;

Their demand for complete systemic overhaul may appear simplistic and utopian, but it avoids inner contradictions and friction, which can be exploited by the authorities. They have also managed to avoid any foreign affiliation, which is a kiss of death in a fairly xenophobic and Byzantine polity. &nbsp;Fourthly, as a tactic, the protestors have avoided frontal, set-piece confrontations with the authorities; Instead, they have learned to be mobile and obstruct the elite at its various eco-political choke points and symbols, such as highways, banks, ports and airports. The fifth big difference this time is the erosion of state’s capacity to make concessions: The previous Arab Spring took place in an era of high oil prices, giving the authorities more resources to make token concessions to ease popular penury. This time, the discredited State apparatus has not only lost its aura of invincibility but also the financial capacity to buy its way out of this quandary. &nbsp;

All bets are off as this uncharted confrontation between an irresistible force and an immovable object plays out. Eventually, a Sudan-type solution appears the most probable outcome. It would be recalled that after a chaotic and protracted confrontation with protestors, the military clique removed long-ruling President Oman Hassan Al-Bashir in April this year. After much shuffling of political cards, an impromptu association of Sudanese professionals and the new military dispensation negotiated an agreement to share power in a transitional period. IGAD, a regional body, led by Ethiopian Prime Minister facilitated this arrangement. It is quite ironical that after nearly a lost decade which has witnessed unprecedented strife, death and destruction, the antagonists are rewriting their respective rule-books to provide for a degree of non-violence and mutual accommodation. &nbsp;

This turn of Arab Spring 2.0 has two salient points for India too. Firstly, it is quite symbolic that as we mark the centenary of Jalianwala Bagh Massacre this year, Bapu’s message of non-violence finds relevance in the Arab world, a longstanding redoubt of “might is right” aphorism. Secondly, as experience in Sudan and elsewhere has demonstrated, the Arab Spring is essentially about the deficit of political institutions, which are either non-existent or weak or lacking in credibility. The various attempts to cover this flaw by fostering the personality cults are being rejected(5). &nbsp;

During the first Arab Spring, India was disinterested outsider, while our traditional penchant for non-interference in other’s domestic affairs is understandable, we are also a thriving democracy. Over the past seven decades, we have evolved a number of credible and effective political institutions suited for a multi-ethnic, tolerant society such as those affected by Arab Spring 2.0. This proven set of institutions in a typical 'Third World' setting is far more relevant to the needed politico-economic solutions than any other available model(6). Besides, India has better acceptability in the Arab world than most outsiders. All these attributes provide us with the capacity to hold the hands of these societies to help them make the right political choices. We need to step out of shadows this time and play a constructive role in ensuring that the Arab Spring 2.0 has a more positive and harmonious outcome. This could be the best tribute to Mahatma Gandhi, the apostle of non-violent Satyagraha, as we mark his 150th birth anniversary. &nbsp;&nbsp;

<h6>&nbsp;1. Where a largely peaceful transition to democratic polity took place as was affirmed by the second general election last month 
&nbsp;2. &nbsp;Which are still raging with considerable foreign involvement. 
&nbsp;3. &nbsp;Although Iraq, OPEC’s second largest oil producer, is expected to earn $ 79 billion in oil revenue this year, 22% of its population lives below poverty line and a third of Iraqi youth are unemployed. 
4. &nbsp;“official arrogance” in Algerian Arabic dilect 
&nbsp;5. For instance, when the Lebanese demonstrators demand “all of them out”, they essentially want a technocrats-led government new institutions to replace all the current set of politicians who have played sectarian musical chairs for past three decades at public expense. 
&nbsp;6. For example, our expertise and experience in holding elections can be helpful in creating a credible and elegant exit from this confrontation.</h6>

 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.) 
 
&nbsp;

 
&nbsp;

The Arab Spring phenomenon sparked on December 18, 2010, with a Tunisian fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation to protest against official corruption and indifference.

The Arab Spring phenomenon sparked on December 18, 2010, with a Tunisian fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation to protest against official corruption and indifference. The incident triggered unprecedentedly large anti-government protests in Tunisia which toppled long-established dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and set the Arab Spring rolling across a number of Arab countries, such as Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria. The mass protestors called for a more representative state for greater equity and better governance. With the solitary exception of Tunisia itself(1), the outcome of the Arab Spring was disappointing in most cases. Successful toppling President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak in Egypt led to a new constitution and a general election which ushered in a Muslim Brotherhood government. However, the new inexperienced government’s radical and populist policies, as well as its incompetence, led to its overthrow and Egypt went back to a military rule. Arab Spring triggered civil wars in Yemen, Libya and Syria(2), making these countries poster children of its worst-case scenarios and veritable cautionary examples. The Arab Spring in Bahrain waded into an extant Shia – Sunni divide on the island, precipitating military intervention by fellow GCC states to sustain the status quo. Nine years on, the inconsequentiality and failure of the Arab Spring to achieve are widely acknowledged and the “old normal” of non-representative, despotic and corrupt regimes has been re-enforced. But then, 2019 produced a surprise: A fresh wave of youth-led Arab Spring in each of Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq. After a relatively more persistent but less violent confrontation, these public outrages have so far succeeded in toppling the rulers in first three countries – even as their transition to sustainable democracy is still a work in progress. Iraq, the fourth, continues to be an outlier with escalating violence amidst angry, but mostly non-violent, youth and trigger happy security forces and militias claiming over 320 lives in the past month. However, given the contrast between huge oil revenues and widespread abject poverty(3), as well as, the proliferation of weapons and explosives, this figure should be considered as moderate. Although Iraqi President publicly declared that Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mehdi would resign “as soon as a successor can be found”, the political coalition backing him agreed to give him more time to “meet the popular demands.” A comparative study of the “Arab Spring 2.0” – as it is being billed – with its predecessor is quite revealing. The popular wish-list of the protestors remains largely unchanged: Replacement of the extant leadership and total overhaul of the political system with more transparent and representative governance, greater trickle-down of wealth and jobs and less sectarianism and repression. Although the protestors are quite motivated and well-mobilised, their lack of hierarchy and chain of command complicate the endgame. On the other hand, the ruling elites in these countries have not lost their determination to hold on to power. This time, however, they pretend to be more open and participative and toned down the Hogra(4) and their visibility. They have also revved up the use and surveillance of social media. How is the Arab Spring 2.0 different? Firstly, both sides realise that it is a battle of attrition for the hearts and minds and it would be unrealistic to expect a quick and decisive breakthrough. Secondly, both sides have realised that the use of violent means is counterproductive. Both sides, therefore, feign a sense of injured innocence. Thirdly, the protestors have shunned all the traditional symbols of religious, sectarian, ideological nature and have not allowed infiltration by any anti-government elements. They have no political preferences or foreign paradigms to espouse. Their demand for complete systemic overhaul may appear simplistic and utopian, but it avoids inner contradictions and friction, which can be exploited by the authorities. They have also managed to avoid any foreign affiliation, which is a kiss of death in a fairly xenophobic and Byzantine polity. Fourthly, as a tactic, the protestors have avoided frontal, set-piece confrontations with the authorities; Instead, they have learned to be mobile and obstruct the elite at its various eco-political choke points and symbols, such as highways, banks, ports and airports. The fifth big difference this time is the erosion of state’s capacity to make concessions: The previous Arab Spring took place in an era of high oil prices, giving the authorities more resources to make token concessions to ease popular penury. This time, the discredited State apparatus has not only lost its aura of invincibility but also the financial capacity to buy its way out of this quandary. All bets are off as this uncharted confrontation between an irresistible force and an immovable object plays out. Eventually, a Sudan-type solution appears the most probable outcome. It would be recalled that after a chaotic and protracted confrontation with protestors, the military clique removed long-ruling President Oman Hassan Al-Bashir in April this year. After much shuffling of political cards, an impromptu association of Sudanese professionals and the new military dispensation negotiated an agreement to share power in a transitional period. IGAD, a regional body, led by Ethiopian Prime Minister facilitated this arrangement. It is quite ironical that after nearly a lost decade which has witnessed unprecedented strife, death and destruction, the antagonists are rewriting their respective rule-books to provide for a degree of non-violence and mutual accommodation. This turn of Arab Spring 2.0 has two salient points for India too. Firstly, it is quite symbolic that as we mark the centenary of Jalianwala Bagh Massacre this year, Bapu’s message of non-violence finds relevance in the Arab world, a longstanding redoubt of “might is right” aphorism. Secondly, as experience in Sudan and elsewhere has demonstrated, the Arab Spring is essentially about the deficit of political institutions, which are either non-existent or weak or lacking in credibility. The various attempts to cover this flaw by fostering the personality cults are being rejected(5). During the first Arab Spring, India was disinterested outsider, while our traditional penchant for non-interference in other’s domestic affairs is understandable, we are also a thriving democracy. Over the past seven decades, we have evolved a number of credible and effective political institutions suited for a multi-ethnic, tolerant society such as those affected by Arab Spring 2.0. This proven set of institutions in a typical 'Third World' setting is far more relevant to the needed politico-economic solutions than any other available model(6). Besides, India has better acceptability in the Arab world than most outsiders. All these attributes provide us with the capacity to hold the hands of these societies to help them make the right political choices. We need to step out of shadows this time and play a constructive role in ensuring that the Arab Spring 2.0 has a more positive and harmonious outcome. This could be the best tribute to Mahatma Gandhi, the apostle of non-violent Satyagraha, as we mark his 150th birth anniversary. 1. Where a largely peaceful transition to democratic polity took place as was affirmed by the second general election last month 2. Which are still raging with considerable foreign involvement. 3. Although Iraq, OPEC’s second largest oil producer, is expected to earn $ 79 billion in oil revenue this year, 22% of its population lives below poverty line and a third of Iraqi youth are unemployed. 4. “official arrogance” in Algerian Arabic dilect 5. For instance, when the Lebanese demonstrators demand “all of them out”, they essentially want a technocrats-led government new institutions to replace all the current set of politicians who have played sectarian musical chairs for past three decades at public expense. 6. For example, our expertise and experience in holding elections can be helpful in creating a credible and elegant exit from this confrontation. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

From Arab Spring to Arab Satyagraha?

Mass anti-government protests in several Arab countries are turning into competitions to determine who has the longer breath, the protesters or the government.

In Algeria, Lebanon and Iraq, countries in which the leader was either forced to resign or has agreed to step down, authorities appear to be dragging their feet on handovers of power or agreed transitional power-sharing arrangements in the hope that protesters, determined to hold on to their street power until a political transition process is firmly in place, either lose their momentum or are racked by internal differences.

So far, protesters are holding their ground, having learnt the lesson that their achievements are likely to be rolled back if they vacate the street before having cemented an agreement on the rules of the transitional game and process.

Algerians remain on the streets, seven months after President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was forced to step down, in demand of a complete change of the political system.

Scores of recent arrests on charges that include “harming national unity” and “undermining the morale of the army” have failed to deter Algerians who refuse to accept the military’s proposed December 12 date for elections.

Lebanon enters its second months of protests with the government going through the motions but ultimately failing to respond to demands for a technocratic government, a new non-sectarian electoral law and early elections.

An effort to replace Prime Minister Saad Hariri with another member of the elite, Mohammad Safadi, a billionaire businessman and former finance minister, was rejected by the protesters.

"We are staying here. We don't know how long - maybe one or two months or one or two years. Maybe it will take 10 years to get the state we are dreaming of, but everything starts with a first step," said filmmaker Perla Joe Maaloula.

Weeks after agreeing to resign in response to popular pressure, Iraqi prime minister Adil Abdul Mehdi appears to be increasingly firm in his saddle.

Much like what prompted US President George H W Bush to first call in 1991 for a popular revolt against Saddam Hussein and then give the Iraqi strongman the tools to crush the uprising, Mehdi is holding on to power in the absence of a credible candidate acceptable to the political elite to replace him.

Mehdi’s position is strengthened by the fact that neither the United States nor Iran wants a power vacuum to emerge in Baghdad.

Backtracking on Mehdi’s resignation and refraining from appointing a prime minister who credibly holds out the promise of real change is likely to harden the battle lines between the protesters and the government.

The tugs of war highlight the pitfalls protesters and governments need to manoeuvre in what amounts to a complex game with governments seeking to pacify demonstrators by seemingly entertaining their demands yet plotting to maintain fundamental political structures that anti-government activists want to uproot.

The risk of a tug of war is that protests turn violent as happened in Hong Kong or in Lebanon where cars of parliamentarians were attacked as they drove this week towards the assembly.

Meeting protesters’ demands and aspirations that drive the demonstrations and figure across the Middle East and North Africa, irrespective of whether grievances have spilled into streets, is what makes economic and social reform tricky business for the region’s autocrats.

It is where what is needed for sustainable reforms bounces up against ever more repressive security states intent on exercising increasingly tight control.

Sustainable reform requires capable and effective institutions rather than bloated, bureaucratic job banks and decentralisation with greater authorities granted to municipalities and regions.

Altering social contracts by introducing or increasing taxes, reducing subsidies for basic goods and narrowing opportunities for government employment will have to be buffered by greater transparency that provides the public insight into how the government ensures that it benefits from the still-evolving new social contract.&nbsp;

To many protesters, Sudan has validated protesters’ resolve to retain street power until transitional arrangements are put in place.

It took five months after the toppling of President Omar al-Bashir and a short-lived security force crackdown in which some 100 people were killed before the military, the protesters and political groups agreed and put in place a transitional power-sharing process.

The process involved the creation of a sovereign council made up of civilians and military officers that is governing the country and managing its democratic transition.

Even so, transitional experiences have yet to prove their mettle. Protesters may have learnt lessons from the 2011 popular Arab revolts that toppled the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.

Yet, this time round, protesters lack the broad-based international empathy that 2011 uprisings enjoyed and are up against more than domestic forces backed by conservative Gulf states.

Powers like Russia and China make no bones about their rejection of protest as an expression of popular political will.

So has Iran that has much at stake in Iraq and Lebanon, countries where anti-sectarian sentiment is strong among protesters, even if the Islamic republic was born in one of the 20th century’s epic popular revolts and is confronting protests of its own against fuel price hikes. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp;

Mass anti-government protests in several Arab countries are turning into competitions to determine who has the longer breath, the protesters or the government. In Algeria, Lebanon and Iraq, countries in which the leader was either forced to resign or has agreed to step down, authorities appear to be dragging their feet on handovers of power or agreed transitional power-sharing arrangements in the hope that protesters, determined to hold on to their street power until a political transition process is firmly in place, either lose their momentum or are racked by internal differences.

Mass anti-government protests in several Arab countries are turning into competitions to determine who has the longer breath, the protesters or the government. In Algeria, Lebanon and Iraq, countries in which the leader was either forced to resign or has agreed to step down, authorities appear to be dragging their feet on handovers of power or agreed transitional power-sharing arrangements in the hope that protesters, determined to hold on to their street power until a political transition process is firmly in place, either lose their momentum or are racked by internal differences. So far, protesters are holding their ground, having learnt the lesson that their achievements are likely to be rolled back if they vacate the street before having cemented an agreement on the rules of the transitional game and process. Algerians remain on the streets, seven months after President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was forced to step down, in demand of a complete change of the political system. Scores of recent arrests on charges that include “harming national unity” and “undermining the morale of the army” have failed to deter Algerians who refuse to accept the military’s proposed December 12 date for elections. Lebanon enters its second months of protests with the government going through the motions but ultimately failing to respond to demands for a technocratic government, a new non-sectarian electoral law and early elections. An effort to replace Prime Minister Saad Hariri with another member of the elite, Mohammad Safadi, a billionaire businessman and former finance minister, was rejected by the protesters. "We are staying here. We don't know how long - maybe one or two months or one or two years. Maybe it will take 10 years to get the state we are dreaming of, but everything starts with a first step," said filmmaker Perla Joe Maaloula. Weeks after agreeing to resign in response to popular pressure, Iraqi prime minister Adil Abdul Mehdi appears to be increasingly firm in his saddle. Much like what prompted US President George H W Bush to first call in 1991 for a popular revolt against Saddam Hussein and then give the Iraqi strongman the tools to crush the uprising, Mehdi is holding on to power in the absence of a credible candidate acceptable to the political elite to replace him. Mehdi’s position is strengthened by the fact that neither the United States nor Iran wants a power vacuum to emerge in Baghdad. Backtracking on Mehdi’s resignation and refraining from appointing a prime minister who credibly holds out the promise of real change is likely to harden the battle lines between the protesters and the government. The tugs of war highlight the pitfalls protesters and governments need to manoeuvre in what amounts to a complex game with governments seeking to pacify demonstrators by seemingly entertaining their demands yet plotting to maintain fundamental political structures that anti-government activists want to uproot. The risk of a tug of war is that protests turn violent as happened in Hong Kong or in Lebanon where cars of parliamentarians were attacked as they drove this week towards the assembly. Meeting protesters’ demands and aspirations that drive the demonstrations and figure across the Middle East and North Africa, irrespective of whether grievances have spilled into streets, is what makes economic and social reform tricky business for the region’s autocrats. It is where what is needed for sustainable reforms bounces up against ever more repressive security states intent on exercising increasingly tight control. Sustainable reform requires capable and effective institutions rather than bloated, bureaucratic job banks and decentralisation with greater authorities granted to municipalities and regions. Altering social contracts by introducing or increasing taxes, reducing subsidies for basic goods and narrowing opportunities for government employment will have to be buffered by greater transparency that provides the public insight into how the government ensures that it benefits from the still-evolving new social contract. To many protesters, Sudan has validated protesters’ resolve to retain street power until transitional arrangements are put in place. It took five months after the toppling of President Omar al-Bashir and a short-lived security force crackdown in which some 100 people were killed before the military, the protesters and political groups agreed and put in place a transitional power-sharing process. The process involved the creation of a sovereign council made up of civilians and military officers that is governing the country and managing its democratic transition. Even so, transitional experiences have yet to prove their mettle. Protesters may have learnt lessons from the 2011 popular Arab revolts that toppled the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Yet, this time round, protesters lack the broad-based international empathy that 2011 uprisings enjoyed and are up against more than domestic forces backed by conservative Gulf states. Powers like Russia and China make no bones about their rejection of protest as an expression of popular political will. So has Iran that has much at stake in Iraq and Lebanon, countries where anti-sectarian sentiment is strong among protesters, even if the Islamic republic was born in one of the 20th century’s epic popular revolts and is confronting protests of its own against fuel price hikes. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Middle East protests: A tug of war over who has the longer breath

If there is one theme, beyond corruption and a host of economic and social grievances, that have driven protests -- large and small, local, sectoral and national – across the globe, it has been a call for dignity.

Reflecting a global breakdown in confidence in political systems and leadership, the quest for dignity and social justice links protests in Middle Eastern and North African countries like Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria and Sudan to demonstrations in nations on multiple continents ranging from Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Haiti to France, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, Pakistan and Hong Kong.

The global protests amount to the latest phase of an era of defiance and dissent that erupted in 201l and unfolded most dramatically in the Middle East and North Africa with the toppling of the autocratic leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.

Of the four Arab nations, only Tunisia has produced a relatively successful transition from autocracy to a more democratic form of government.

Regional and domestic counterrevolutionary forces staged a military coup in 2013 to remove Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president from office, installing one of the country’s most brutal and repressive regime in its post-independence history.

Libya and Yemen are wracked by civil wars, fuelled by foreign intervention. Syria has been devastated by an almost nine-year-long civil war between forces supported by outside forces that were determined at whatever cost to decide the fate of the country’s own popular revolt.

Like elsewhere in the region, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan used the 2013 Gezi Park protests, the largest anti-government demonstrations in the decade of his party’s rule, as well as a failed military coup in 2016, to reverse Turkish strides towards democracy and political pluralism.

The Middle East and North Africa’s retreat into more repressive authoritarianism and autocracy coupled with crackdowns of various sorts in Russia, China, Hong Kong, and Kazakhstan, to name just a few examples, has prompted analysts to wonder whether mass protest remains an effective way of achieving political change.

“Only 20 years ago, 70 per cent of protests demanding systemic political change got it — a figure that had been growing steadily since the 1950s. In the mid-2000s, that trend suddenly reversed. Worldwide, protesters’ success rate has since plummeted to only 30 per cent,” concluded New York Times journalists Max Fisher and Amanda Taub in a column exploring the roots of the current wave of discontent.

Fisher and Taub base their conclusion on a study by political scientist Erica Chenoweth that suggests that illiberals, authoritarians and autocrats have become more adept at thwarting protest using what she terms “smart repression.”

Yet, “smart repression” that involves in Chenoweth’s definitions efforts to ensure the loyalty of elites; greater brutality and violence by security and paramilitary proxies; enhanced censorship and criminalization of dissent; and depicting revolts as foreign-inspired conspiracies and forms of terrorism is at best an upgraded version of standard authoritarian and autocratic responses.

It’s hard to describe what is smart or more sophisticated about the repression involved in the military coup in Egypt and its immediate aftermath in which more than 1,000 people were killed; The arbitrary detentions of prominent businessmen, members of the ruling in family, religious figures and activists in what amounted to a power grab by Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman; the mass detention of an estimated one million Turkic Muslims in re-education camps in China’s troubled, north-western province of Xinjiang; or the arrests of tens of thousands in countries like Turkey and Egypt.

What may provide a better explanation of the reduced effectiveness of protest may be the fact that for the first time since World War Two, the number of countries moving toward authoritarianism exceeds the number moving toward democracy as a result of what political scientists Anna Luehrmann and Staffan Lindberg have dubbed “the third wave of autocratisation.”

Underlying that wave is the rise of a critical mass of world leaders that share a belief in illiberal, authoritarian and autocratic principles of governance and disregard human and minority rights in favour of a supremacist endorsement of the rights of an ethnic or religious group.

The rise of those leaders is in many ways the flip side of the protests. They often are political outsiders, men who may or may not be part of the elite like Donald J Trump in the United States, Victor Orban in Hungary, Narendra Modi in India, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines but project themselves as forces of change that will tackle the elites’ grip on power.

Aspects of their civilisationalism and reactionary nationalism has empowered and is supported to varying degrees by often opposed political forces that include far-right, anti-migrant and supremacist ethnic and religious groups as well as popular leftists, including some of the Democratic Party presidential candidates in the United States.

The result is a potential vicious circle in which civilizational attitudes, increasingly restricted democratic rights and greater repression marginalize ever more societal groups including significant segments of the middle class as well as minorities, who like in the case of Hong Kong, Iraq, Sudan or the Rohingya, see their resilience hardened by perceptions of having nothing more to lose. Violence on all sides of the divide increases with the risk of militants having a greater appeal.

The conclusions of Chenoweth, Luehrmann and Lindberg would bear that out. If a protest is people’s only peaceful alternative in response to unresponsive governments and political forces, undermining the protests’ effectiveness narrows the choices to affect change.

From that perspective, the scholars conclusions would amount to a contemporary adaptation of writer George Orwell’s 1944 assertion that “all revolutions are failures, but they are not all the same failure.”

However, that may be prematurely jumping to conclusions despite what the scholars project trends.

To be sure, the jury is still out on whether the revolts in Tunisia and Sudan will produce enduring political change.

But eight years on from the Arab revolts in 2011, protesters. determined to secure recognition and their place in society, underline lessons learnt by no longer declaring victory once a leader is forced to make concessions or resign as in Algeria and Sudan and by transcending easily exploitable sectarian ethnic and religious divides like in Iraq and Lebanon, a mosaic of 18 carefully balanced sectarian groups.

Said Middle East scholar Hanin Ghaddar: “For the first time in a long time, Lebanese have realised that the enemy is within—it is their own government and political leaders—not an outside occupier or regional influencer… Political leaders have been unable to control the course of the protests, which are taking place across all sects and across all regions… What brought them together is an ongoing economic crisis that has hurt people from all sects and regions.”

The realisation that street power needs to be sustained until the modalities of transition are in place is key to enhancing the chances of protest retaining its effectiveness.

The future of protest as an effective tool depends similarly on perceptions of a common interest that transcends sect, ethnicity and class becoming part of the fabric of society. 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

If there is one theme, beyond corruption and a host of economic and social grievances, that have driven protests -- large and small, local, sectoral and national – across the globe, it has been a call for dignity.

If there is one theme, beyond corruption and a host of economic and social grievances, that have driven protests -- large and small, local, sectoral and national – across the globe, it has been a call for dignity. Reflecting a global breakdown in confidence in political systems and leadership, the quest for dignity and social justice links protests in Middle Eastern and North African countries like Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria and Sudan to demonstrations in nations on multiple continents ranging from Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Haiti to France, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, Pakistan and Hong Kong. The global protests amount to the latest phase of an era of defiance and dissent that erupted in 201l and unfolded most dramatically in the Middle East and North Africa with the toppling of the autocratic leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Of the four Arab nations, only Tunisia has produced a relatively successful transition from autocracy to a more democratic form of government. Regional and domestic counterrevolutionary forces staged a military coup in 2013 to remove Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president from office, installing one of the country’s most brutal and repressive regime in its post-independence history. Libya and Yemen are wracked by civil wars, fuelled by foreign intervention. Syria has been devastated by an almost nine-year-long civil war between forces supported by outside forces that were determined at whatever cost to decide the fate of the country’s own popular revolt. Like elsewhere in the region, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan used the 2013 Gezi Park protests, the largest anti-government demonstrations in the decade of his party’s rule, as well as a failed military coup in 2016, to reverse Turkish strides towards democracy and political pluralism. The Middle East and North Africa’s retreat into more repressive authoritarianism and autocracy coupled with crackdowns of various sorts in Russia, China, Hong Kong, and Kazakhstan, to name just a few examples, has prompted analysts to wonder whether mass protest remains an effective way of achieving political change. “Only 20 years ago, 70 per cent of protests demanding systemic political change got it — a figure that had been growing steadily since the 1950s. In the mid-2000s, that trend suddenly reversed. Worldwide, protesters’ success rate has since plummeted to only 30 per cent,” concluded New York Times journalists Max Fisher and Amanda Taub in a column exploring the roots of the current wave of discontent. Fisher and Taub base their conclusion on a study by political scientist Erica Chenoweth that suggests that illiberals, authoritarians and autocrats have become more adept at thwarting protest using what she terms “smart repression.” Yet, “smart repression” that involves in Chenoweth’s definitions efforts to ensure the loyalty of elites; greater brutality and violence by security and paramilitary proxies; enhanced censorship and criminalization of dissent; and depicting revolts as foreign-inspired conspiracies and forms of terrorism is at best an upgraded version of standard authoritarian and autocratic responses. It’s hard to describe what is smart or more sophisticated about the repression involved in the military coup in Egypt and its immediate aftermath in which more than 1,000 people were killed; The arbitrary detentions of prominent businessmen, members of the ruling in family, religious figures and activists in what amounted to a power grab by Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman; the mass detention of an estimated one million Turkic Muslims in re-education camps in China’s troubled, north-western province of Xinjiang; or the arrests of tens of thousands in countries like Turkey and Egypt. What may provide a better explanation of the reduced effectiveness of protest may be the fact that for the first time since World War Two, the number of countries moving toward authoritarianism exceeds the number moving toward democracy as a result of what political scientists Anna Luehrmann and Staffan Lindberg have dubbed “the third wave of autocratisation.” Underlying that wave is the rise of a critical mass of world leaders that share a belief in illiberal, authoritarian and autocratic principles of governance and disregard human and minority rights in favour of a supremacist endorsement of the rights of an ethnic or religious group. The rise of those leaders is in many ways the flip side of the protests. They often are political outsiders, men who may or may not be part of the elite like Donald J Trump in the United States, Victor Orban in Hungary, Narendra Modi in India, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines but project themselves as forces of change that will tackle the elites’ grip on power. Aspects of their civilisationalism and reactionary nationalism has empowered and is supported to varying degrees by often opposed political forces that include far-right, anti-migrant and supremacist ethnic and religious groups as well as popular leftists, including some of the Democratic Party presidential candidates in the United States. The result is a potential vicious circle in which civilizational attitudes, increasingly restricted democratic rights and greater repression marginalize ever more societal groups including significant segments of the middle class as well as minorities, who like in the case of Hong Kong, Iraq, Sudan or the Rohingya, see their resilience hardened by perceptions of having nothing more to lose. Violence on all sides of the divide increases with the risk of militants having a greater appeal. The conclusions of Chenoweth, Luehrmann and Lindberg would bear that out. If a protest is people’s only peaceful alternative in response to unresponsive governments and political forces, undermining the protests’ effectiveness narrows the choices to affect change. From that perspective, the scholars conclusions would amount to a contemporary adaptation of writer George Orwell’s 1944 assertion that “all revolutions are failures, but they are not all the same failure.” However, that may be prematurely jumping to conclusions despite what the scholars project trends. To be sure, the jury is still out on whether the revolts in Tunisia and Sudan will produce enduring political change. But eight years on from the Arab revolts in 2011, protesters. determined to secure recognition and their place in society, underline lessons learnt by no longer declaring victory once a leader is forced to make concessions or resign as in Algeria and Sudan and by transcending easily exploitable sectarian ethnic and religious divides like in Iraq and Lebanon, a mosaic of 18 carefully balanced sectarian groups. Said Middle East scholar Hanin Ghaddar: “For the first time in a long time, Lebanese have realised that the enemy is within—it is their own government and political leaders—not an outside occupier or regional influencer… Political leaders have been unable to control the course of the protests, which are taking place across all sects and across all regions… What brought them together is an ongoing economic crisis that has hurt people from all sects and regions.” The realisation that street power needs to be sustained until the modalities of transition are in place is key to enhancing the chances of protest retaining its effectiveness. The future of protest as an effective tool depends similarly on perceptions of a common interest that transcends sect, ethnicity and class becoming part of the fabric of society. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Quest for social justice links protests in various countries

The Lebanese government faced calls to resign Thursday after thousands of furious demonstrators took to the streets across the country to protest dire economic conditions.

Public anger has simmered since parliament passed an austerity budget in July to help trim a ballooning deficit and flared on Thursday over plans to tax calls on messaging applications, forcing the government to axe the unpopular measure.

Across the country, demonstrators chanted the popular refrain of the 2011 Arab Spring protests: "The people demand the fall of the regime."

Protesters in the capital blocked the road to the airport with burning tyres, prompting a heavy deployment by security forces.

Near government headquarters in central Beirut, violent confrontations broke out between protesters and security forces as demonstrators tried to storm the building.

Security forces fired tear gas to disperse protesters after the Internal Security Forces (ISF) said clashes wounded 40 of its members.

Protesters also sparked a large blaze near the Mohammad al-Amin mosque in Downtown Beirut.

"We elected them and we will remove them from power," one protester told a local TV station.

"What unites us is the standard of living -- we are all destroyed," said another.

Besides the capital Beirut, protests erupted in the southern city of Sidon, the northern city of Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley, before spreading to other areas, the state-run National News Agency reported.

Telecommunications Minister Mohammad Choucair said that the government had reversed its decision to tax calls on messaging apps following the unrest.

The government is weighing a series of further belt-tightening measures it hopes will rescue the ailing economy and secure $11 billion in aid pledged by international donors last year.

It is expected to announce a series of tax hikes in the coming months as part of next year's budget.

Thursday's far-reaching protests prompted calls by senior officials for the government to resign, with influential Druze politician Walid Jumblatt saying he had urged the prime minister to step down.

Interior Minister Raya al-Hassan said the prime minister will deliver a speech on Friday.

"If this government falls, the government that will come after will not have better options," she said in a statement carried by NNA.

The education ministry said schools and universities would be closed on Friday.

Earlier on Thursday, Information Minister Jamal Jarrah had announced a 20-cent daily fee for messaging app users who made calls on platforms such as WhatsApp and Viber, sparking public outrage.

He told reporters after a cabinet session the move would bring $200 million annually into government coffers.

Lebanese digital rights group SMEX said the country's main mobile operators were already planning to introduce new technology that will allow them to detect whether users are trying to make internet calls using their networks.

"Lebanon already has some of the highest mobile prices in the region," SMEX said on Twitter.

The latest policy "will force users to pay for internet services twice", it added.

Growth in Lebanon has plummeted in the wake of repeated political deadlocks in recent years, compounded by the impact of eight years of war in neighbouring Syria.

"Most high-frequency indicators point towards a continuation of weak growth in 2019," the International Monetary Fund said Thursday.

Lebanon's public debt stands at around $86 billion, higher than 150 per cent of gross domestic product, according to the finance ministry.

Eighty per cent of that figure is owed to Lebanon's central bank and local banks.

Last month, banks and money exchange houses rationed dollar sales, sparking fears of a currency devaluation.

The Lebanese government faced calls to resign Thursday after thousands of furious demonstrators took to the streets across the country to protest dire economic conditions.

The Lebanese government faced calls to resign Thursday after thousands of furious demonstrators took to the streets across the country to protest dire economic conditions. Public anger has simmered since parliament passed an austerity budget in July to help trim a ballooning deficit and flared on Thursday over plans to tax calls on messaging applications, forcing the government to axe the unpopular measure. Across the country, demonstrators chanted the popular refrain of the 2011 Arab Spring protests: "The people demand the fall of the regime." Protesters in the capital blocked the road to the airport with burning tyres, prompting a heavy deployment by security forces. Near government headquarters in central Beirut, violent confrontations broke out between protesters and security forces as demonstrators tried to storm the building. Security forces fired tear gas to disperse protesters after the Internal Security Forces (ISF) said clashes wounded 40 of its members. Protesters also sparked a large blaze near the Mohammad al-Amin mosque in Downtown Beirut. "We elected them and we will remove them from power," one protester told a local TV station. "What unites us is the standard of living -- we are all destroyed," said another. Besides the capital Beirut, protests erupted in the southern city of Sidon, the northern city of Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley, before spreading to other areas, the state-run National News Agency reported. Telecommunications Minister Mohammad Choucair said that the government had reversed its decision to tax calls on messaging apps following the unrest. The government is weighing a series of further belt-tightening measures it hopes will rescue the ailing economy and secure $11 billion in aid pledged by international donors last year. It is expected to announce a series of tax hikes in the coming months as part of next year's budget. Thursday's far-reaching protests prompted calls by senior officials for the government to resign, with influential Druze politician Walid Jumblatt saying he had urged the prime minister to step down. Interior Minister Raya al-Hassan said the prime minister will deliver a speech on Friday. "If this government falls, the government that will come after will not have better options," she said in a statement carried by NNA. The education ministry said schools and universities would be closed on Friday. Earlier on Thursday, Information Minister Jamal Jarrah had announced a 20-cent daily fee for messaging app users who made calls on platforms such as WhatsApp and Viber, sparking public outrage. He told reporters after a cabinet session the move would bring $200 million annually into government coffers. Lebanese digital rights group SMEX said the country's main mobile operators were already planning to introduce new technology that will allow them to detect whether users are trying to make internet calls using their networks. "Lebanon already has some of the highest mobile prices in the region," SMEX said on Twitter. The latest policy "will force users to pay for internet services twice", it added. Growth in Lebanon has plummeted in the wake of repeated political deadlocks in recent years, compounded by the impact of eight years of war in neighbouring Syria. "Most high-frequency indicators point towards a continuation of weak growth in 2019," the International Monetary Fund said Thursday. Lebanon's public debt stands at around $86 billion, higher than 150 per cent of gross domestic product, according to the finance ministry. Eighty per cent of that figure is owed to Lebanon's central bank and local banks. Last month, banks and money exchange houses rationed dollar sales, sparking fears of a currency devaluation.

Lebanese government faces calls to resign as austerity protests spread

There’s a deja vu feeling to this year’s wave of protests across the Arab world.

It’s not that this year saw the toppling of the leaders of Algeria and Sudan as a result of popular revolts, a harking back to the 2011 protests that overthrew the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.

It’s that it’s the protesters in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco rather than illiberal or autocratic regimes that have learnt the lessons of 2011.

Had illiberal and autocratic leaders learnt the lessons, they would not have been taken again by surprise by mass protests, often sparked by a black swan.

Lessons learnt would have meant putting their ear to the ground, hearing the groundswell of anger and frustration boiling at the surface over lack of economic opportunity and basic services, widespread corruption that benefits the few and complicates life for the many, and a clamouring for the ability to vent those grievances.

Lessons learnt would have meant addressing those concerns before its too late and spill into the streets in massive votes of no-confidence against&nbsp;the political and economic system and its leaders.

It’s a lesson that is valid beyond the Arab world with similar protests, like in 2011, erupting across the globe in countries such as Hong Kong, Russia, Peru, Haiti, Ecuador, Indonesia, and world-wide climate change-related demonstrations.

For their part, demonstrators in Algeria and Sudan concluded from the 2011 protests that toppling a leader was the beginning not the end of the process.

In Algeria, protesters remain in the streets six months after President Abdelaziz Bouteflika stepped down, battling the army for a political process that will guarantee structural change rather than enable an electoral process that ensures that the military and its aligned business interests remain the power behind the throne.

Sudanese demonstrators surrendered the street only after an agreement had been reached with the military on a three-year-long transition towards the civilian rule.

The Sudanese and Algerian experiences, like the lessons to be learnt from the 2011 revolts, suggest that the playing field in the wake of the fall of an autocrat is striking a balance between protesters’ demands for fundamental change and the determination of elites and the military to preserve their economic interests, some degree of control of security and safeguards against being held accountable for past abuse.

What demonstrators have going for them, beyond the power of the street, is the fact that popular discontent is not the only thing that mitigates against the maintenance of the pre-protest status quo.

Countries across the Middle East and North Africa, characterised by youth bulges, can no longer evade economic reform that addresses widespread youth unemployment, the need to create large numbers of jobs, and inevitable diversification and streamlining of bloated government bureaucracies.

Algeria is a case in point. Foreign exchange reserves have dropped from $193.6 billion in 2014 to $72 billion in 2019. Reserves cover 13 months of imports at best in a country that imports 70 per cent of what it consumes,

“If the state can no longer deliver goods and services, socio-economic discontent will rise further…. In order to avoid such a situation… the state and its citizens will have to renegotiate their relationship. In the past the state provided, and Algerians abided. This is no longer economically feasible today, nor is it what Algerians appear to want as they seek more transparency, less corruption, and better governance of Algeria’s resources,” said Algeria scholar Dalia Ghanem.

Attention in the past years since the 2011 popular Arab revolts have focussed on the consequences of the Saudi-UAE led counterrevolution that brutally rolled back protesters achievements in Egypt and contributed to the Iranian-backed military campaign of Houthi rebels in Yemen and the devastating subsequent military intervention in that country as well as civil wars in Syria and Libya.

Yet, the past eight years have also been characterised by issues-oriented protests that often involved new, creative forms of expression of discontent.

Iraq, Algeria and Sudan rather than Egypt contain lessons for the future.

Egypt’s field marshal-turned-president Abdel Fatah al-Sisi may have squashed recent protests with mass arrests and security force violence, but his conspiratorial depictions of a plot engineered by the repressed and weakened Muslim Brotherhood are unlikely to dampen widespread discontent with his failed economic policies that have benefited the elite and impoverished many.

Al-Sisi may have ended the protests for now, but continued refusal to address grievances makes Egypt an accident waiting to happen.

The demography of protesters in Iraq proves the point. The protests could have been avoided had the Iraqi government focused on tackling corruption, ensuring the delivery of basic services, and creating jobs for university graduates and opportunities for those who returned from defeating the Islamic State to find that they were deprived of opportunities.

One lesson of the protests in Iraq and Hong Kong is the fact that repressive government responses, the killing of more than 100 demonstrators in Iraq or the banning of face masks in Hong Kong, fuel rather than calm public anger.

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) &nbsp;

There’s a deja vu feeling to this year’s wave of protests across the Arab world. It’s not that this year saw the toppling of the leaders of Algeria and Sudan as a result of popular revolts, a harking back to the 2011 protests that overthrew the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.

There’s a deja vu feeling to this year’s wave of protests across the Arab world. It’s not that this year saw the toppling of the leaders of Algeria and Sudan as a result of popular revolts, a harking back to the 2011 protests that overthrew the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. It’s that it’s the protesters in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco rather than illiberal or autocratic regimes that have learnt the lessons of 2011. Had illiberal and autocratic leaders learnt the lessons, they would not have been taken again by surprise by mass protests, often sparked by a black swan. Lessons learnt would have meant putting their ear to the ground, hearing the groundswell of anger and frustration boiling at the surface over lack of economic opportunity and basic services, widespread corruption that benefits the few and complicates life for the many, and a clamouring for the ability to vent those grievances. Lessons learnt would have meant addressing those concerns before its too late and spill into the streets in massive votes of no-confidence against the political and economic system and its leaders. It’s a lesson that is valid beyond the Arab world with similar protests, like in 2011, erupting across the globe in countries such as Hong Kong, Russia, Peru, Haiti, Ecuador, Indonesia, and world-wide climate change-related demonstrations. For their part, demonstrators in Algeria and Sudan concluded from the 2011 protests that toppling a leader was the beginning not the end of the process. In Algeria, protesters remain in the streets six months after President Abdelaziz Bouteflika stepped down, battling the army for a political process that will guarantee structural change rather than enable an electoral process that ensures that the military and its aligned business interests remain the power behind the throne. Sudanese demonstrators surrendered the street only after an agreement had been reached with the military on a three-year-long transition towards the civilian rule. The Sudanese and Algerian experiences, like the lessons to be learnt from the 2011 revolts, suggest that the playing field in the wake of the fall of an autocrat is striking a balance between protesters’ demands for fundamental change and the determination of elites and the military to preserve their economic interests, some degree of control of security and safeguards against being held accountable for past abuse. What demonstrators have going for them, beyond the power of the street, is the fact that popular discontent is not the only thing that mitigates against the maintenance of the pre-protest status quo. Countries across the Middle East and North Africa, characterised by youth bulges, can no longer evade economic reform that addresses widespread youth unemployment, the need to create large numbers of jobs, and inevitable diversification and streamlining of bloated government bureaucracies. Algeria is a case in point. Foreign exchange reserves have dropped from $193.6 billion in 2014 to $72 billion in 2019. Reserves cover 13 months of imports at best in a country that imports 70 per cent of what it consumes, “If the state can no longer deliver goods and services, socio-economic discontent will rise further…. In order to avoid such a situation… the state and its citizens will have to renegotiate their relationship. In the past the state provided, and Algerians abided. This is no longer economically feasible today, nor is it what Algerians appear to want as they seek more transparency, less corruption, and better governance of Algeria’s resources,” said Algeria scholar Dalia Ghanem. Attention in the past years since the 2011 popular Arab revolts have focussed on the consequences of the Saudi-UAE led counterrevolution that brutally rolled back protesters achievements in Egypt and contributed to the Iranian-backed military campaign of Houthi rebels in Yemen and the devastating subsequent military intervention in that country as well as civil wars in Syria and Libya. Yet, the past eight years have also been characterised by issues-oriented protests that often involved new, creative forms of expression of discontent. Iraq, Algeria and Sudan rather than Egypt contain lessons for the future. Egypt’s field marshal-turned-president Abdel Fatah al-Sisi may have squashed recent protests with mass arrests and security force violence, but his conspiratorial depictions of a plot engineered by the repressed and weakened Muslim Brotherhood are unlikely to dampen widespread discontent with his failed economic policies that have benefited the elite and impoverished many. Al-Sisi may have ended the protests for now, but continued refusal to address grievances makes Egypt an accident waiting to happen. The demography of protesters in Iraq proves the point. The protests could have been avoided had the Iraqi government focused on tackling corruption, ensuring the delivery of basic services, and creating jobs for university graduates and opportunities for those who returned from defeating the Islamic State to find that they were deprived of opportunities. One lesson of the protests in Iraq and Hong Kong is the fact that repressive government responses, the killing of more than 100 demonstrators in Iraq or the banning of face masks in Hong Kong, fuel rather than calm public anger. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Learning lessons: Protesters stay one step ahead of rulers

It is not a mere coincidence that the recent happenings in Sudan unquestionably resembles the 2011 Egypt crisis.&nbsp;

On June 3, Sudan security forces opened fire at sit-in protesters killing nearly 100. They were demanding a democratic setup in Sudan following the removal of its long-serving autocratic President Omar al-Bashir. Later, through a statement read on national television, the Transitional Military Council led by Lt. General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan elucidated that the operation solely targeted ‘trouble makers and criminals’. &nbsp;

Remarkably, the crackdown by the military on the massive movement made democracy bear a stunning resemblance to the Egyptian revolution in 2011.&nbsp;

For instance, the August 2013 Rabba massacre, in which more than 800 people were killed, led to mass protests which forced Egyptian dictator, Hosni Mubarak, out of power.

However, the architect of the coup responsible for dethroning the dictator, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, went on to declare himself the president instead. Following Mubarak’s expulsion, a poorly carried transition from monocracy to democracy deviated Egypt’s revolutionaries. As they were clueless about the transition, the mix-up paved the way for a counter-revolutionary coup in Cairo.&nbsp;

Today, Abdel el-Sisi’s regime is more violent and repressive than the one they toppled 7 years ago. These events are worrying, especially after witnessing the similarities they carry. &nbsp;

Transitioning&nbsp;

In both Sudan and Egypt, youth and the working class along with the opposition parties banded together to oppose the brutal authoritarian regime. As did the army generals intervened to dethrone the ruling dictators, only to find themselves in control later. All this during the most crucial period of the movement- transition to democracy. &nbsp;

The sole reason for an uprising to succeed is the power of people in the streets. During late 2012, the secular wing of Egypt’s revolutionary union fell out from the Islamist wing aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood. Both groups, in the end, remained more committed to their own specific political aspirations and interests. The coalitions that have taken to the streets in Sudan are just as diverse as Egypt’s, a weakness Sudan’s military benefits from.&nbsp;

No Love for Democracy&nbsp;

During the Egyptian revolution, the regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates strongly opposed the Muslim Brotherhood and, in a broader context, democracy. They feared that such uprisings could inspire mutiny in their own rule and destabilise their control. Just days after Bashir resigned, Saudi Arabia pledged $3 billion in aid to Sudan’s TMC after meeting Mohamed Dagalo. The US, however, despite being the 'promoter of democracy’, finds itself in a tricky spot, thanks to Saudi’s oil money and its growing arms market. &nbsp;

Egypt’s failed democratic experiment provides key lessons. Changing the entire system of governance while also opposing a powerful and resourceful regime can be unnerving. The next few months will be crucial for not just the people of Sudan but also the whole of Africa.&nbsp;

As Sudan takes its first daring steps toward democracy, they must keep their eyes open as the game may not be all over yet.&nbsp; 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)&nbsp;

It is not a mere coincidence that the recent happenings in Sudan unquestionably resembles the 2011 Egypt crisis. On June 3, Sudan security forces opened fire at sit-in protesters killing nearly 100.

It is not a mere coincidence that the recent happenings in Sudan unquestionably resembles the 2011 Egypt crisis. On June 3, Sudan security forces opened fire at sit-in protesters killing nearly 100. They were demanding a democratic setup in Sudan following the removal of its long-serving autocratic President Omar al-Bashir. Later, through a statement read on national television, the Transitional Military Council led by Lt. General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan elucidated that the operation solely targeted ‘trouble makers and criminals’. Remarkably, the crackdown by the military on the massive movement made democracy bear a stunning resemblance to the Egyptian revolution in 2011. For instance, the August 2013 Rabba massacre, in which more than 800 people were killed, led to mass protests which forced Egyptian dictator, Hosni Mubarak, out of power. However, the architect of the coup responsible for dethroning the dictator, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, went on to declare himself the president instead. Following Mubarak’s expulsion, a poorly carried transition from monocracy to democracy deviated Egypt’s revolutionaries. As they were clueless about the transition, the mix-up paved the way for a counter-revolutionary coup in Cairo. Today, Abdel el-Sisi’s regime is more violent and repressive than the one they toppled 7 years ago. These events are worrying, especially after witnessing the similarities they carry. Transitioning In both Sudan and Egypt, youth and the working class along with the opposition parties banded together to oppose the brutal authoritarian regime. As did the army generals intervened to dethrone the ruling dictators, only to find themselves in control later. All this during the most crucial period of the movement- transition to democracy. The sole reason for an uprising to succeed is the power of people in the streets. During late 2012, the secular wing of Egypt’s revolutionary union fell out from the Islamist wing aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood. Both groups, in the end, remained more committed to their own specific political aspirations and interests. The coalitions that have taken to the streets in Sudan are just as diverse as Egypt’s, a weakness Sudan’s military benefits from. No Love for Democracy During the Egyptian revolution, the regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates strongly opposed the Muslim Brotherhood and, in a broader context, democracy. They feared that such uprisings could inspire mutiny in their own rule and destabilise their control. Just days after Bashir resigned, Saudi Arabia pledged $3 billion in aid to Sudan’s TMC after meeting Mohamed Dagalo. The US, however, despite being the 'promoter of democracy’, finds itself in a tricky spot, thanks to Saudi’s oil money and its growing arms market. Egypt’s failed democratic experiment provides key lessons. Changing the entire system of governance while also opposing a powerful and resourceful regime can be unnerving. The next few months will be crucial for not just the people of Sudan but also the whole of Africa. As Sudan takes its first daring steps toward democracy, they must keep their eyes open as the game may not be all over yet. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Arab springs: The game may not be all over yet

'Every day I cry': Bahrain footballer Hakeem al-Araibi speaks about his time in Thai prison