The war in Ukraine has challenged one of the oldest assumptions of modern land warfare, that the tank remains the dominant weapon on the battlefield. Tanks have not disappeared. Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to use them. But drones have dramatically changed how armour operates and survives.
Cheap FPV drones can hunt vehicles, strike vulnerable areas from above and provide targeting information for artillery. Persistent aerial surveillance also makes it increasingly difficult for large armoured formations to assemble and manoeuvre without being detected. The result is not necessarily the death of the tank, but a transformation of its role. That change becomes clearer when compared with one of the most famous armoured battles of the Gulf War.
In February 1991, the Battle of 73 Easting saw U.S. armoured forces clash with elements of Iraq’s Republican Guard during Operation Desert Storm. American Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles advanced through difficult desert conditions and overwhelmed Iraqi armoured positions in a battle that became a defining example of modern mechanised warfare.
Among the American soldiers who fought at 73 Easting was Lt Col Daniel Davis, then a young U.S. Army officer. Speaking on WION's Defence Pulse, Davis said a battle like 73 Easting would look radically different today. “You mass any formation now like what we did and you're all going to die,” he said.
Davis argued that drones and long-range missiles would pose a threat even before tanks reached the battlefield, potentially targeting ships, ports and logistical infrastructure transporting armour. On the battlefield itself, concentrating tanks to generate overwhelming firepower could instead create a lucrative target for drones and precision weapons.
But Davis does not believe the tank is finished. “You're still going to have to have it. You still have to have armour protection for your infantry,” he said. What must change is both the machine and the doctrine around it. Future tanks will require active protection, electronic warfare, counter-drone systems, sensors and increasingly rapid technological upgrades. For Davis, however, the biggest lesson from Ukraine goes beyond technology.
Armour must operate as part of an integrated network of drones, artillery, missiles, air power, infantry and electronic warfare. The tank remains relevant. The era of the tank fighting alone does not.
