Prime Minister Narendra Modi will hold an annual summit with his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe on October 28-29. Modi and Abe will not only review the current status of bilateral ties, but are also expected to take some concrete steps to expand their engagement.

For the two leaders, security and defence cooperation are of utmost importance. Over the last few years, security cooperation between the two sides has taken several strides. While India, Japan and the US conduct Malabar naval exercises, New Delhi and Tokyo also hold the annual Defence Ministerial Dialogue, the National Security Advisers’ dialogue, the ‘2+2’ Dialogue, the Defence Policy Dialogue and the Service-to-Service staff talks. They have also decided to enhance ties in this area by fostering defence equipment and technology cooperation in areas such as surveillance and unmanned system technologies, and defence industry cooperation.

For the first time, Japan will be an observer at the Cope India exercise in December between India and the US air forces. The Indian Army will hold the first ground force exercise with its Japanese counterpart next month. At the same time, Japan has also expressed readiness to provide state-of-the-art US-2 amphibian aircraft. Japan has expressed its desire to strengthen cooperation with India in order to tackle terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. During Modi’s visit, the two countries would reportedly sign the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).&nbsp;

This, in turn, would provide Japanese ships access to fuel and servicing at major Indian naval bases, including the Andaman and Nicobar islands. Modi and Abe said that differences should be resolved through dialogue and all countries, large or small, should enjoy the freedom of navigation, sustainable development, and a free, fair, and open trade and investment system. The two leaders also indicated the need to align Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy with India’s Act East Policy.

The bonhomie between India and Japan comes at a time when China, with which India and Japan both have long-standing disputes, has undertaken aggressive posturing. Since these two countries also want to direction of global politics, they have a shared interest in preventing China’s growing clout. It is in this context that India and Japan are trying to engage with ASEAN countries, including Vietnam and Indonesia. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among the US, India, Japan and Australia was revived last year to promote peace and security in the Indo-Pacific. But it is equally true that the Trump administration’s inclination towards looking at things through the prism of ‘America First’ Policy, thereby jeopardising the security of US’ allies and partners, has also made it necessary for the two countries to foster close security and defence ties with each other and also engage other like-mined countries.

India’s $100 military-modernisation programme is yet another factor for the two sides to promote defence relations. Working with Japan will enable India to strengthen its ‘Make in India’ programme in the defence sector, which in turn will not only reduce the volume of India’s arms imports, but also enable it to realise its dream of becoming a major arms exporter. For Japan, transferring high technology to India will burnish its image of a reliable arms technology provider. This can be gauged from the fact that Hiramatsu, the Japanese Ambassador to India, has said that Japan has responded positively to Indian Navy’s ongoing submarine tender project 75I and is keen on collaborating in this area. In the past, Japan was reluctant to provide defence technology. But the proposed signing of an agreement on maritime domain awareness during Modi’s visit will add a new dimension to India-Japan defence ties, given Japan’s position as a world leader in anti-submarine warfare and maritime awareness equipment.

Infrastructure, trade and commerce will be another area of discussion during Modi’s visit. It is expected that Modi’s visit will witness some concrete efforts to develop Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, which can effectively counter China’s Belt Road Initiative. While the signing of the nuclear agreement was seen as an epoch-making event in the bilateral ties in November 2016, the fact remains that in the last two years no movement has been initiated in this area. So Modi should bring up this issue in his talks with Abe. Now, with the deepening convergence of interests in areas such as security, infrastructure, trade and commerce, the importance of Modi’s visit cannot be overstated. 
 
(This article was originally published on DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-the-imperative-of-strengthening-india-s-ties-with-japan-2679320">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will hold an annual summit with his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe on October 28-29. Modi and Abe will not only review the current status of bilateral ties, but are also expected to take some concrete steps to expand their engagement.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will hold an annual summit with his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe on October 28-29. Modi and Abe will not only review the current status of bilateral ties, but are also expected to take some concrete steps to expand their engagement. For the two leaders, security and defence cooperation are of utmost importance. Over the last few years, security cooperation between the two sides has taken several strides. While India, Japan and the US conduct Malabar naval exercises, New Delhi and Tokyo also hold the annual Defence Ministerial Dialogue, the National Security Advisers’ dialogue, the ‘2+2’ Dialogue, the Defence Policy Dialogue and the Service-to-Service staff talks. They have also decided to enhance ties in this area by fostering defence equipment and technology cooperation in areas such as surveillance and unmanned system technologies, and defence industry cooperation. For the first time, Japan will be an observer at the Cope India exercise in December between India and the US air forces. The Indian Army will hold the first ground force exercise with its Japanese counterpart next month. At the same time, Japan has also expressed readiness to provide state-of-the-art US-2 amphibian aircraft. Japan has expressed its desire to strengthen cooperation with India in order to tackle terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. During Modi’s visit, the two countries would reportedly sign the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). This, in turn, would provide Japanese ships access to fuel and servicing at major Indian naval bases, including the Andaman and Nicobar islands. Modi and Abe said that differences should be resolved through dialogue and all countries, large or small, should enjoy the freedom of navigation, sustainable development, and a free, fair, and open trade and investment system. The two leaders also indicated the need to align Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy with India’s Act East Policy. The bonhomie between India and Japan comes at a time when China, with which India and Japan both have long-standing disputes, has undertaken aggressive posturing. Since these two countries also want to direction of global politics, they have a shared interest in preventing China’s growing clout. It is in this context that India and Japan are trying to engage with ASEAN countries, including Vietnam and Indonesia. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among the US, India, Japan and Australia was revived last year to promote peace and security in the Indo-Pacific. But it is equally true that the Trump administration’s inclination towards looking at things through the prism of ‘America First’ Policy, thereby jeopardising the security of US’ allies and partners, has also made it necessary for the two countries to foster close security and defence ties with each other and also engage other like-mined countries. India’s $100 military-modernisation programme is yet another factor for the two sides to promote defence relations. Working with Japan will enable India to strengthen its ‘Make in India’ programme in the defence sector, which in turn will not only reduce the volume of India’s arms imports, but also enable it to realise its dream of becoming a major arms exporter. For Japan, transferring high technology to India will burnish its image of a reliable arms technology provider. This can be gauged from the fact that Hiramatsu, the Japanese Ambassador to India, has said that Japan has responded positively to Indian Navy’s ongoing submarine tender project 75I and is keen on collaborating in this area. In the past, Japan was reluctant to provide defence technology. But the proposed signing of an agreement on maritime domain awareness during Modi’s visit will add a new dimension to India-Japan defence ties, given Japan’s position as a world leader in anti-submarine warfare and maritime awareness equipment. Infrastructure, trade and commerce will be another area of discussion during Modi’s visit. It is expected that Modi’s visit will witness some concrete efforts to develop Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, which can effectively counter China’s Belt Road Initiative. While the signing of the nuclear agreement was seen as an epoch-making event in the bilateral ties in November 2016, the fact remains that in the last two years no movement has been initiated in this area. So Modi should bring up this issue in his talks with Abe. Now, with the deepening convergence of interests in areas such as security, infrastructure, trade and commerce, the importance of Modi’s visit cannot be overstated. (This article was originally published on DNA. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

The imperative of strengthening India’s ties with Japan

The tension between China and the US has intensified, following the Trump administration’s decision to impose sanctions on China for purchasing Russian jets and surface to farce missiles.

Under Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) of 2017, the US Department of State recently announced sanctions on the Chinese Defence Ministry’s Equipment Development Department (EDD) and its director, Li Shangfu, for buying Russian jets and missile equipment.&nbsp;

According to the statement of the US Department of State, the transactions involved the purchase of Russian Su-35 combat aircraft and S-400 surface-to-air missile system-related equipment. Consequently, the EDD will be denied US foreign export licenses, banned from making foreign exchange transactions within US jurisdictions and prohibited from using the US financial system.

Any of the EDD’s property and interests within the US will be blocked. Li will also be subjected to similar restrictions, including the fact that will also not be able to get a US visa.

On the other hand, China and Russia have strongly criticised the US action. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said that the US was “thoughtlessly undermining” global stability, and warned it against “playing with fire”. Chinese Foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said on Friday, “The US has seriously violated the basic norms of international relations and disturbed the relationship between China and the US. We strongly call on the US to remedy the mistake and cancel the sanctions. Otherwise, the US has to bear the consequences.”

One of the reasons the US imposed sanctions on China under CAATSA was to effectively respond to Russia’s meddling in the US elections, its competition with the US, its allies and its partners. Thus, while the US had already imposed several sanctions on Russia, this time the Trump administration added 33 additional persons to the CAATSA section 231 List of “Specified Persons” for being a part of or operating for or on behalf of, the defence or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation.

Certainly, India is also closely watching this development since the sanction against China is also a signal to other countries that are in the process of buying Russian military hardware. This is evident from the fact that the US State Department has made it clear that Turkey would also be subjected to similar sanctions if it purchased S-400 missiles which are due to be delivered next year. Consequently, the CAATSA has also alarmed India because the Trump administration has not yet indicated whether it would exempt India from the US’ punitive action under this Act. 
 
Thus, in this situation, India’s increasing dependence on US arms can be used by Washington to force New Delhi to toe its line on many issues, which in turn, endangers India’s strategic autonomy. At the same time, Russia is already disturbed by expanding ties between India and the US since the two sides signed the civil nuclear agreement in 2008. In fact, the Putin government has expressed guarded disappointment about India’s efforts towards improving deference military ties with the US. This is clearly evident from a marked shift in Russia’s South policy. In 2014 Russia lifted a ban on arms supplies to Pakistan. Moscow also signed a defence agreement and technical cooperation agreement with Pakistan in 2015 for arms supplies and sold it four helicopters in August 2017.

Today, talks for purchasing Russian SU-35 fighter jets are going on along with Pakistan’s reported desire to buy T-90 tanks from Russia. On September 29, Russia has also signed a memorandum of understanding on implementing a project to build an underwater gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan and India. At the same time, India is also worried about deepening defence ties between Russia and China, given the fact that even today, the Indian military uses Russian arms, and in fact, Russia accounted for 68 per cent of India’s arms import from 2012 to 2016. Rising tension between the US and Russia has placed India in a very volatile security situation. 
 
To effectively defuse this situation, it can be hoped that during the upcoming visit of President Vladimir Putin, the two sides will infuse a momentum into their time-tested friendship. New Delhi must ensure that Russia does not foster defence ties with other South Asian countries at the cost of India’s security.

(This article was originally published on DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-us-sanctions-on-russia-china-add-to-india-s-security-woes-2669987">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

&nbsp;

The tension between China and the US has intensified, following the Trump administration’s decision to impose sanctions on China for purchasing Russian jets and surface to farce missiles.

The tension between China and the US has intensified, following the Trump administration’s decision to impose sanctions on China for purchasing Russian jets and surface to farce missiles. Under Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) of 2017, the US Department of State recently announced sanctions on the Chinese Defence Ministry’s Equipment Development Department (EDD) and its director, Li Shangfu, for buying Russian jets and missile equipment. According to the statement of the US Department of State, the transactions involved the purchase of Russian Su-35 combat aircraft and S-400 surface-to-air missile system-related equipment. Consequently, the EDD will be denied US foreign export licenses, banned from making foreign exchange transactions within US jurisdictions and prohibited from using the US financial system. Any of the EDD’s property and interests within the US will be blocked. Li will also be subjected to similar restrictions, including the fact that will also not be able to get a US visa. On the other hand, China and Russia have strongly criticised the US action. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said that the US was “thoughtlessly undermining” global stability, and warned it against “playing with fire”. Chinese Foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said on Friday, “The US has seriously violated the basic norms of international relations and disturbed the relationship between China and the US. We strongly call on the US to remedy the mistake and cancel the sanctions. Otherwise, the US has to bear the consequences.” One of the reasons the US imposed sanctions on China under CAATSA was to effectively respond to Russia’s meddling in the US elections, its competition with the US, its allies and its partners. Thus, while the US had already imposed several sanctions on Russia, this time the Trump administration added 33 additional persons to the CAATSA section 231 List of “Specified Persons” for being a part of or operating for or on behalf of, the defence or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation. Certainly, India is also closely watching this development since the sanction against China is also a signal to other countries that are in the process of buying Russian military hardware. This is evident from the fact that the US State Department has made it clear that Turkey would also be subjected to similar sanctions if it purchased S-400 missiles which are due to be delivered next year. Consequently, the CAATSA has also alarmed India because the Trump administration has not yet indicated whether it would exempt India from the US’ punitive action under this Act. Thus, in this situation, India’s increasing dependence on US arms can be used by Washington to force New Delhi to toe its line on many issues, which in turn, endangers India’s strategic autonomy. At the same time, Russia is already disturbed by expanding ties between India and the US since the two sides signed the civil nuclear agreement in 2008. In fact, the Putin government has expressed guarded disappointment about India’s efforts towards improving deference military ties with the US. This is clearly evident from a marked shift in Russia’s South policy. In 2014 Russia lifted a ban on arms supplies to Pakistan. Moscow also signed a defence agreement and technical cooperation agreement with Pakistan in 2015 for arms supplies and sold it four helicopters in August 2017. Today, talks for purchasing Russian SU-35 fighter jets are going on along with Pakistan’s reported desire to buy T-90 tanks from Russia. On September 29, Russia has also signed a memorandum of understanding on implementing a project to build an underwater gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan and India. At the same time, India is also worried about deepening defence ties between Russia and China, given the fact that even today, the Indian military uses Russian arms, and in fact, Russia accounted for 68 per cent of India’s arms import from 2012 to 2016. Rising tension between the US and Russia has placed India in a very volatile security situation. To effectively defuse this situation, it can be hoped that during the upcoming visit of President Vladimir Putin, the two sides will infuse a momentum into their time-tested friendship. New Delhi must ensure that Russia does not foster defence ties with other South Asian countries at the cost of India’s security. (This article was originally published on DNA. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

US sanctions on Russia, China add to India’s security woes

The recent decision by China to allow Nepal to use all its ports for trade is a move that will be viewed by India with some concern. According to the agreement inked between Kathmandu and Beijing, Nepal can get access to the facilities at Chinese ports of Tianjin, Shenzen, Lianyungang and Zhanjiang.

Kathmandu has good reason to want to shake off New Delhi’s influence over it. In 2015, India’s tacit support to the Madhesi people who had agitated against the fact that they were not mentioned in the newly promulgated Constitution, by blocking all the crucial entry points on Nepal’s borders with India, had resulted in great resentment against New Delhi in Kathmandu. This along with the need to shake off India’s “big brother” influence has caused Nepali Prime Minister KP Oli to move towards aggressively fostering ties with China. It was precisely in this context that during his visit to China in 2016 that Oli signed some major agreements including a trade and transit agreement, following which he also agreed to join China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI).&nbsp

Though internal political turmoil did not allow the Oli government to complete its term and successive governments, led by Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ and Sher Bahadur Deuba, did not continue his China Policy, the Oli government has continued to respond to Beijing’s overtures with his return to power. Though he did visit India in April, many felt that the visit was one of politeness and lacked the usual warmth displayed by Nepali leaders when visiting New Delhi.

On the Indian side, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has spared no effort to boost India’s infrastructure with Nepal. Modi announced plans to construct a new electrified rail line, that will connect the border city of Raxaul in India with Kathmandu in Nepal. The two prime ministers also took the decision to develop inland waterways for the movement of cargo, within the framework of trade and transit arrangements, providing additional access to the sea for Nepal.

Such moves were heartening but Oli’s visit to China in June showed him being more effusive about Beijing’s support and cooperation in Nepal’s development. Analysts in Delhi would also note that the two sides signed several agreements which arguably went much further than the India-Nepal agreements.&nbsp

These included the construction of the Keyrong-Kathmandu railway line, expansion of land and air connectivity, construction of the Koshi, Gandaki and Karnali economic corridors and other projects.

Beijing’s offer of ready cash has helped boost ties. In 2017, Chinese companies announced an investment of $8.3 billion in Nepal. And in the same year, the Chinese defense minister and State Councilor General Chang Wanquan visited Kathmandu, offering a grant of $32.3 million to the Nepalese Army for the purpose of strengthening its capacity to deal with natural calamities. Now, China’s decision to allow Nepal the use of its ports is a godsend. Nepal’s recent decision to not participate in a week-long military exercise of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation in India, while reportedly taking part in a 12-day military exercise with China this month, sums up the situation.

The deepening engagement between Kathmandu and Beijing not only poses security concerns for India but also undermines its influence in the neighbourhood. Already, other nations such as the Maldives have begun to assert themselves against what they see as undue Indian influence by returning a helicopter gifted to them by Delhi.

While domestic politics will certainly take centre-stage for the moment, Prime Minister Modi, who has won laurels for his foreign policy so far, needs to think long and hard about this issue. India needs to master the tricky balance of maintaining allies in the neighbourhood while subtly showing them and the world that it is a growing power to be reckoned with. For this, it needs to start by showing Kathmandu and its other neighbours that India too has much to offer in the way of economic initiatives while reminding them of the dangers of getting too close to China. It will not be an easy task. 
 
(This article was first published on The DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-india-must-act-fast-to-win-back-nepal-s-goodwill-2665324">original article</a>.) 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

India needs to master the tricky balance of maintaining allies in the neighbourhood while subtly showing them and the world that it is a growing power to be reckoned with.

The recent decision by China to allow Nepal to use all its ports for trade is a move that will be viewed by India with some concern. According to the agreement inked between Kathmandu and Beijing, Nepal can get access to the facilities at Chinese ports of Tianjin, Shenzen, Lianyungang and Zhanjiang. Kathmandu has good reason to want to shake off New Delhi’s influence over it. In 2015, India’s tacit support to the Madhesi people who had agitated against the fact that they were not mentioned in the newly promulgated Constitution, by blocking all the crucial entry points on Nepal’s borders with India, had resulted in great resentment against New Delhi in Kathmandu. This along with the need to shake off India’s “big brother” influence has caused Nepali Prime Minister KP Oli to move towards aggressively fostering ties with China. It was precisely in this context that during his visit to China in 2016 that Oli signed some major agreements including a trade and transit agreement, following which he also agreed to join China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI). Though internal political turmoil did not allow the Oli government to complete its term and successive governments, led by Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ and Sher Bahadur Deuba, did not continue his China Policy, the Oli government has continued to respond to Beijing’s overtures with his return to power. Though he did visit India in April, many felt that the visit was one of politeness and lacked the usual warmth displayed by Nepali leaders when visiting New Delhi. On the Indian side, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has spared no effort to boost India’s infrastructure with Nepal. Modi announced plans to construct a new electrified rail line, that will connect the border city of Raxaul in India with Kathmandu in Nepal. The two prime ministers also took the decision to develop inland waterways for the movement of cargo, within the framework of trade and transit arrangements, providing additional access to the sea for Nepal. Such moves were heartening but Oli’s visit to China in June showed him being more effusive about Beijing’s support and cooperation in Nepal’s development. Analysts in Delhi would also note that the two sides signed several agreements which arguably went much further than the India-Nepal agreements. These included the construction of the Keyrong-Kathmandu railway line, expansion of land and air connectivity, construction of the Koshi, Gandaki and Karnali economic corridors and other projects. Beijing’s offer of ready cash has helped boost ties. In 2017, Chinese companies announced an investment of $8.3 billion in Nepal. And in the same year, the Chinese defense minister and State Councilor General Chang Wanquan visited Kathmandu, offering a grant of $32.3 million to the Nepalese Army for the purpose of strengthening its capacity to deal with natural calamities. Now, China’s decision to allow Nepal the use of its ports is a godsend. Nepal’s recent decision to not participate in a week-long military exercise of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation in India, while reportedly taking part in a 12-day military exercise with China this month, sums up the situation. The deepening engagement between Kathmandu and Beijing not only poses security concerns for India but also undermines its influence in the neighbourhood. Already, other nations such as the Maldives have begun to assert themselves against what they see as undue Indian influence by returning a helicopter gifted to them by Delhi. While domestic politics will certainly take centre-stage for the moment, Prime Minister Modi, who has won laurels for his foreign policy so far, needs to think long and hard about this issue. India needs to master the tricky balance of maintaining allies in the neighbourhood while subtly showing them and the world that it is a growing power to be reckoned with. For this, it needs to start by showing Kathmandu and its other neighbours that India too has much to offer in the way of economic initiatives while reminding them of the dangers of getting too close to China. It will not be an easy task. (This article was first published on The DNA. Read the original article.) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Opinion: India must act fast to win back Nepal’s goodwill

At a time when there is increasing uneasiness between India and the US due to the Trump administration’s trade policy and America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and other issues, Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj and Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman are holding the inaugural meeting of 2+2 Dialogue with US Foreign Secretary Michael R. Pompeo and Defence Secretary James N. Mattis in Delhi to strengthen their partnership in Indo-Pacific, among others. At the same time, China has described India as a natural partner in its Belt Road Initiative (BRI).

In this context, it may be recalled that since BRI was launched in 2013, it has become the most ambitious project of the Chinese government to reshape the regional and global order. While the BRI is generally viewed in terms of a plan to build infrastructure projects, other elements of BRI are to strengthen regional political cooperation, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people exchanges.

The BRI covering 76 countries from Asia, Africa and Europe, account for half the world’s population and a quarter of global GDP. In fact, the Xi Jinping government has focused on mobilising the country’s political, diplomatic, intellectual, economic and financial resources to make China as the unquestionable regional and global power. While the Belt and Road Initiative is expected to cost more than $11 trillion and so far around $350 billion worth of projects have been financed by Chinese developments banks, according to the Chinese government, Beijing has also signed 270 commitments with countries across the globe.

Surely, South Asia has assumed a special focus of the BRI. This can be easily gauged from the fact that China has signed a $3.1 billion bridge and railway project in Bangladesh, a new city next to Colombo’s port in Sri Lanka that will have a total investment of $13 billion over the next 25 years, and a freight route that now links China’s eastern coast and London. The $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is, of course, a major aspect of the BRI.

True, while the signatures of the BRI have pledged “to oppose all forms of protectionism, including in the framework of the BRI “promoting a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system,” it is also true that sections of experts and scholars see the BRI as China’s debt trap diplomacy, mentioning the cases of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the Hambantota Port and others projects. Fearing China’s possible imperialist motives, the newly elected government under Mahathir Mohammad has recently cancelled a series of large investment projects under the BRI.

At the same time while India has refused to join BRI, New Delhi, along with the US, is also mindful of the possible strategic and security threats emerging from the BRI. India argues that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project violates its sovereignty because it passes through the part of the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir that belongs to India.

It is in this context that New Delhi and Washington have taken several measures to effectively challenge Xi Jinping’s pet project. In doing so, while India has focused on enhancing its engagement with Southeast Asian countries under the Act East Policy, it also sees a point in Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy to maintain and promote peace and security in the region. US Foreign Secretary Pompeo has announced that “Indo-Pacific Economic Vision” will increase the financial support that the US government provides to countries in the region through a proposed agency, the US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC). Needless to add, one of the driving forces behind the Indo-Pacific strategy is aimed at containing China’s assertive posturing in the South China Sea and beyond.

The rival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the US, Japan, Australia and India last year is also attributed to the intention of these countries to check China’s rise. At the same time, India is focused on working with Japan in developing an Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), which will help create a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” by rediscovering ancient sea-routes and creating new sea corridors that will link the African continent with India and countries in South-Asia and South-East Asia. The ongoing visit of Indian President Ram Nath Kovind to Cyprus, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic on September 2-9 is also an attempt to boost India’s ties with the erstwhile communist states of Eastern Europe and with Southern Europe amid inroads by China as part of its mega infrastructure project, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

It remains to be seen as to what extent the uneasiness between New Delhi and Washington on the issue of India’s continued import of Iran oil, its decision to purchase arms from Russia, the H1B visa issue and others on the one hand and the trade war between China and the US on the other, shape India-China ties and the strategic partnership between the US and India. 
 
(This article was first published on The DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-china-s-bri-after-five-years-implications-for-india-us-2660066">original article</a>.)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) 
&nbsp;

&nbsp;

At the same time while India has refused to join BRI, New Delhi, along with the US, is also mindful of the possible strategic and security threats emerging from the BRI.

At a time when there is increasing uneasiness between India and the US due to the Trump administration’s trade policy and America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and other issues, Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj and Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman are holding the inaugural meeting of 2+2 Dialogue with US Foreign Secretary Michael R. Pompeo and Defence Secretary James N. Mattis in Delhi to strengthen their partnership in Indo-Pacific, among others. At the same time, China has described India as a natural partner in its Belt Road Initiative (BRI). In this context, it may be recalled that since BRI was launched in 2013, it has become the most ambitious project of the Chinese government to reshape the regional and global order. While the BRI is generally viewed in terms of a plan to build infrastructure projects, other elements of BRI are to strengthen regional political cooperation, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people exchanges. The BRI covering 76 countries from Asia, Africa and Europe, account for half the world’s population and a quarter of global GDP. In fact, the Xi Jinping government has focused on mobilising the country’s political, diplomatic, intellectual, economic and financial resources to make China as the unquestionable regional and global power. While the Belt and Road Initiative is expected to cost more than $11 trillion and so far around $350 billion worth of projects have been financed by Chinese developments banks, according to the Chinese government, Beijing has also signed 270 commitments with countries across the globe. Surely, South Asia has assumed a special focus of the BRI. This can be easily gauged from the fact that China has signed a $3.1 billion bridge and railway project in Bangladesh, a new city next to Colombo’s port in Sri Lanka that will have a total investment of $13 billion over the next 25 years, and a freight route that now links China’s eastern coast and London. The $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is, of course, a major aspect of the BRI. True, while the signatures of the BRI have pledged “to oppose all forms of protectionism, including in the framework of the BRI “promoting a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system,” it is also true that sections of experts and scholars see the BRI as China’s debt trap diplomacy, mentioning the cases of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the Hambantota Port and others projects. Fearing China’s possible imperialist motives, the newly elected government under Mahathir Mohammad has recently cancelled a series of large investment projects under the BRI. At the same time while India has refused to join BRI, New Delhi, along with the US, is also mindful of the possible strategic and security threats emerging from the BRI. India argues that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project violates its sovereignty because it passes through the part of the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir that belongs to India. It is in this context that New Delhi and Washington have taken several measures to effectively challenge Xi Jinping’s pet project. In doing so, while India has focused on enhancing its engagement with Southeast Asian countries under the Act East Policy, it also sees a point in Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy to maintain and promote peace and security in the region. US Foreign Secretary Pompeo has announced that “Indo-Pacific Economic Vision” will increase the financial support that the US government provides to countries in the region through a proposed agency, the US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC). Needless to add, one of the driving forces behind the Indo-Pacific strategy is aimed at containing China’s assertive posturing in the South China Sea and beyond. The rival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the US, Japan, Australia and India last year is also attributed to the intention of these countries to check China’s rise. At the same time, India is focused on working with Japan in developing an Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), which will help create a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” by rediscovering ancient sea-routes and creating new sea corridors that will link the African continent with India and countries in South-Asia and South-East Asia. The ongoing visit of Indian President Ram Nath Kovind to Cyprus, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic on September 2-9 is also an attempt to boost India’s ties with the erstwhile communist states of Eastern Europe and with Southern Europe amid inroads by China as part of its mega infrastructure project, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It remains to be seen as to what extent the uneasiness between New Delhi and Washington on the issue of India’s continued import of Iran oil, its decision to purchase arms from Russia, the H1B visa issue and others on the one hand and the trade war between China and the US on the other, shape India-China ties and the strategic partnership between the US and India. (This article was first published on The DNA. Read the original article.) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Opinion: BRI after five years - implications for India & US

The fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been warming up to Pakistan is an open secret. Observers believe that Putin, who is becoming increasingly upset with India’s growing proximity to the US, has reached out to Islamabad in a manner that should make New Delhi pause for thought. The MoU signed by Pakistan’s chief of naval staff Vice Admiral Kaleem Shaukat while he was in Russia, along with the joint military exercises scheduled for September, suggests that Putin, since he took office for a fourth term in May this year, has so far shown more inclination to reach out to Pakistan than India.

There are many reasons why both countries would want to cement bilateral ties. Apart from the growing India-US proximity which has frustrated both Moscow and Islamabad, Russia has now started viewing Pakistan as a prospective buyer of its military hardware. This could be gauged from the fact that in a major policy change in 2014 Russia lifted a ban on arms supplies to Pakistan. Moscow also signed a defence agreement and technical cooperation agreement with Pakistan in 2015 for arms supplies and sold it four helicopters in August 2017. Today, talks for purchasing Russian SU-35 fighter jets are going on along with Pakistan’s reported desire to buy T-90 tanks from Russia. These talks come as India has focused on expanding its defence trade options and reducing its dependability on Russian military hardware. By reminding India and the world that Russia has other partners, President Putin’s development of strategic ties with Pakistan is being seen as a calibrated move to influence regional politics in South Asia and beyond.

From Pakistan’s point of view, increased ties with Russia are a welcome development because this will put a strain on the time-tested friendship between India and Russia. Increasing defence ties can also allow Pakistan to jeopardise India’s security system, as the India military establishment is heavily dependent on Russia. Also, as the US has taken a strong position against Pakistan for its failure to effectively work against terrorist organisations on its soil by imposing military and other restrictions, Islamabad needs the support of other major countries to ensure the bonhomie between New Delhi and Washington and the US’s hard attitude to Pakistan does not possess a security threat to it.

Pakistan’s proximity to Russia makes all the more sense given that its “all-weather friend” China is deepening ties with Moscow. As India and the US will be all too aware, the Moscow-Beijing-Islamabad alliance can play a vital role in shaping the direction of the security environment in South Asia in Pakistan’s favour.

India has already expressed its discomfort over the development of military ties between Russia and Pakistan and has repeatedly requested Moscow not to sell arms to Pakistan. And though Moscow, which is still sensitive to the fact that India is the largest buyer of Russian arms, has stated that Russia-Pakistan ties will remain quite “limited” the recent high profile visits between the militaries of the two countries tells another story. New Delhi is aware of this and in an attempt to redress the balance, India has recently announced the purchase of five S-400 supersonic air-defence systems from Russia, costing $6 billion.

The deal which is slated to escape US sanctions will help cool the waters but New Delhi will know that unlike the past it cannot take Moscow’s support for granted. This was perhaps why Prime Minister Narendra Modi saw it fit to meet with President Putin for an “agenda-less” set of talks in the Russian city of Sochi before the annual bilateral summit slated to be held in October. The summit, to be held in India, will mark 70 years of India-Russia ties.

India must use the upcoming summit to emphasise its concerns to Russia. It must also remind Moscow that it has continued to support Russia on the international stage by taking careful and calibrated positions on all Russian actions. Be it in Chechnya, Syria, Ukraine and elsewhere, India has tacitly continued to support Russia.

These reminders are important as New Delhi needs Moscow’s goodwill and support for creating a bigger role for India on the world stage. Already, foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale has visited Moscow to ensure that Russia supports India’s bid to get membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The Trump administration has already signalled to China that it believes India deserves a seat at the high table but given the fact that mid-term elections in November and domestic problems will keep President Trump busy for the foreseeable future, India will have to rely more and more on Russia. It now remains to be seen if Putin will oblige or continue with his “slow tilt” towards Pakistan.

(This article was first published on The DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-russia-tilting-towards-pakistan-irks-close-friend-india-2657094">original article</a>.)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) 
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Apart from the growing India-US proximity which has frustrated both Moscow and Islamabad, Russia has now started viewing Pakistan as a prospective buyer of its military hardware.

The fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been warming up to Pakistan is an open secret. Observers believe that Putin, who is becoming increasingly upset with India’s growing proximity to the US, has reached out to Islamabad in a manner that should make New Delhi pause for thought. The MoU signed by Pakistan’s chief of naval staff Vice Admiral Kaleem Shaukat while he was in Russia, along with the joint military exercises scheduled for September, suggests that Putin, since he took office for a fourth term in May this year, has so far shown more inclination to reach out to Pakistan than India. There are many reasons why both countries would want to cement bilateral ties. Apart from the growing India-US proximity which has frustrated both Moscow and Islamabad, Russia has now started viewing Pakistan as a prospective buyer of its military hardware. This could be gauged from the fact that in a major policy change in 2014 Russia lifted a ban on arms supplies to Pakistan. Moscow also signed a defence agreement and technical cooperation agreement with Pakistan in 2015 for arms supplies and sold it four helicopters in August 2017. Today, talks for purchasing Russian SU-35 fighter jets are going on along with Pakistan’s reported desire to buy T-90 tanks from Russia. These talks come as India has focused on expanding its defence trade options and reducing its dependability on Russian military hardware. By reminding India and the world that Russia has other partners, President Putin’s development of strategic ties with Pakistan is being seen as a calibrated move to influence regional politics in South Asia and beyond. From Pakistan’s point of view, increased ties with Russia are a welcome development because this will put a strain on the time-tested friendship between India and Russia. Increasing defence ties can also allow Pakistan to jeopardise India’s security system, as the India military establishment is heavily dependent on Russia. Also, as the US has taken a strong position against Pakistan for its failure to effectively work against terrorist organisations on its soil by imposing military and other restrictions, Islamabad needs the support of other major countries to ensure the bonhomie between New Delhi and Washington and the US’s hard attitude to Pakistan does not possess a security threat to it. Pakistan’s proximity to Russia makes all the more sense given that its “all-weather friend” China is deepening ties with Moscow. As India and the US will be all too aware, the Moscow-Beijing-Islamabad alliance can play a vital role in shaping the direction of the security environment in South Asia in Pakistan’s favour. India has already expressed its discomfort over the development of military ties between Russia and Pakistan and has repeatedly requested Moscow not to sell arms to Pakistan. And though Moscow, which is still sensitive to the fact that India is the largest buyer of Russian arms, has stated that Russia-Pakistan ties will remain quite “limited” the recent high profile visits between the militaries of the two countries tells another story. New Delhi is aware of this and in an attempt to redress the balance, India has recently announced the purchase of five S-400 supersonic air-defence systems from Russia, costing $6 billion. The deal which is slated to escape US sanctions will help cool the waters but New Delhi will know that unlike the past it cannot take Moscow’s support for granted. This was perhaps why Prime Minister Narendra Modi saw it fit to meet with President Putin for an “agenda-less” set of talks in the Russian city of Sochi before the annual bilateral summit slated to be held in October. The summit, to be held in India, will mark 70 years of India-Russia ties. India must use the upcoming summit to emphasise its concerns to Russia. It must also remind Moscow that it has continued to support Russia on the international stage by taking careful and calibrated positions on all Russian actions. Be it in Chechnya, Syria, Ukraine and elsewhere, India has tacitly continued to support Russia. These reminders are important as New Delhi needs Moscow’s goodwill and support for creating a bigger role for India on the world stage. Already, foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale has visited Moscow to ensure that Russia supports India’s bid to get membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The Trump administration has already signalled to China that it believes India deserves a seat at the high table but given the fact that mid-term elections in November and domestic problems will keep President Trump busy for the foreseeable future, India will have to rely more and more on Russia. It now remains to be seen if Putin will oblige or continue with his “slow tilt” towards Pakistan. (This article was first published on The DNA. Read the original article.) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Opinion: Russia tilting towards Pakistan irks India

Author

Zee News Rajasthan

Editor

Sumit Kumar

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