Four weeks into his presidency and President Biden realizes that it is not easy to set back the US's foreign policy aims to its traditional pillars. His outlook was summed up in his first foreign policy statement at the State Department on 4 February 2021 – which included an emphasis on the restoration of the habits of global cooperation and re-building the muscle of democratic alliances that have 'atrophied.' It also emphasized determining the US foreign policy course as a balance between geo-politics and respect for human rights.&nbsp;

Nowhere is this reset being harder to implement than the Middle East region, a volatile cocktail of nation-state conflicts, religious fundamentalism and terrorism and active superpower intervention. For one, some of the conflicts and issues in the Middle East today were created by the Obama era policies when Biden was the Vice President. Two nowhere else was the Trump-style break from a stated 'neutral' US foreign policy to doling out personal favors that changed the contours of interaction between the region's countries more prominent. Third, the absence of a US 'mediating' guarantee created a new/enlarged role for varied actors – Turkey, Russia, and&nbsp;China that the US will find hard to reset.

President Biden's main foreign policy challenge in the Middle East will be 'how you solve a problem like Iran.' Critics have said that given Biden's close involvement with the Iran deal under President Obama, the current administration runs the risk of adopting the 'old wine in a new bottle strategy.' Since Biden has assumed office – Iran has threatened to block a UN nuclear watchdog from conducting snap inspections of some nuclear sites.&nbsp;

Iran-backed Shiite militias have attacked the US-coalition forces in Erbil in northern Iraq, reflecting their growing power in a country embroiled in years of war. In Yemen, Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have escalated violence against the government forces in the oil-rich central province of Marib. They have also intensified drone attacks against the neighboring Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA).&nbsp;

Marking a break from Trump’s four years, these developments are starting to create disquiet among the traditional US allies in the region – Israel, Saudi Arabia and UAE. Under Trump’s policy of maximum pressure on Iran, without any diplomacy, Arab states and Israel had forged a ‘tentative relationship’ focused on containing Iran in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon.

For their efforts at rapprochement with Israel (via the Abraham Accord), the Arab rulers were rewarded personally – when &nbsp;President Trump used his discretionary powers to look the other way as evidence of MBS’s involvement emerged in journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s murder. Or when he signed arms deals with UAE or refused to end the US support of the Yemen war despite a US Senate resolution. However, since Biden's victory, it has been made clear that the US will try and rebalance this 'one-sided' and obvious tilt.

This rebalancing has begun with Saudi Arabia. Supported by a Senate striving to reclaim its war-making powers, the US has ceased its support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Biden has personally criticized Saudi's track record on human rights and said in no uncertain terms that it would speak directly to King Salman and not to Crown Prince MBS, the country's de-facto leader.

The arms sale of F35 fighter jets to the UAE has been put on hold. Regarding Israel, though Biden is unlikely to reverse measures like shifting the US embassy to Jerusalem, there is a general consensus that PM Netanyahu will not be given free rein in the US calculations in the region.&nbsp;

However, as Iran steps up its offensive – Biden will be faced with some critical policy choices –&nbsp;

A) How much to bend to preserve the legacy of the Iran deal and what happens if Iran walks out.

B) How to recalibrate relationships with the allies in the above background.&nbsp;

What has the potential to complicate this balancing act is the new actors/dynamics that have emerged and gained strength in the region.&nbsp;

Of course, the first emphasis is on the US's most significant geopolitical and economic rival – China. While China has developed political, trading and economic linkages with countries across the board in the Middle East, its priorities are not a threat to the US interests just yet. However, three focal areas can complicate the geo-politics for the US.&nbsp;

The first is the partnership between Iran and China that gained strength under the Trump administration. China made huge purchases of Iranian crude oil in violation of US sanctions, invested in infrastructure projects and sold essential supplies to Iran.

A pro-China hardline faction in Iran has gained prominence and is likely driving a hard bargain with the Biden administration. With the Iranian presidential elections scheduled in June 2021, a probable win for this hardline wing could mean an end to all negotiations on the Iran deal and a further shift towards China.&nbsp;

What is problematic for the Biden administration is that China has gained currency as a 'strategic balancer' to the US across all genres of actors – Shiite militias from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon have taken Chinese support.

The region's Arab monarchies and Israel have similarly made investment deals and are using Chinese companies for infrastructure building. They have also chosen to ignore Chinese human rights violations in Uighur.&nbsp;

The second cog in the wheel is Russia’s relationship with Iran and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that has complicated US attempts to detangle from Iraq and Syria.

Turkey has emerged as the ‘black swan’ with emerging stress points with the US – such as the sanctions over its possession of Russia’s S-400 air defense system and its unilateral action in the Kurdish (US allies) areas of Iraq and Syria. There is also an element of a European disengagement with the US stands in the region as Europe has learned to pursue independent stands on Iran, Russia, etc., under the Trump presidency.&nbsp;

After being confirmed, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s initial addresses created a foreign policy roadmap for the Biden administration in which priorities were Asia-Pacific, rapprochement with European allies and then the Western hemisphere. However, developments in the past few weeks have shown that Middle East remains the region where US troops, resources and infra remain high at risk.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the new Biden administration's first military operation targeted Iran-backed fighters in Syria on 25 February. But with allies diverging, Iran belligerent, global consensus on issues such as Iran deal thin at best, US will have to think of out of box solutions.

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

Four weeks into his presidency and President Biden realizes that it is not easy to set back the US's foreign policy aims to its traditional pillars. His outlook was summed up in his first foreign policy statement at the State Department on 4 February 2021 – which included an emphasis on the restoration of the habits of global cooperation and re-building the muscle of democratic alliances that have 'atrophied.

Four weeks into his presidency and President Biden realizes that it is not easy to set back the US's foreign policy aims to its traditional pillars. His outlook was summed up in his first foreign policy statement at the State Department on 4 February 2021 – which included an emphasis on the restoration of the habits of global cooperation and re-building the muscle of democratic alliances that have 'atrophied.' It also emphasized determining the US foreign policy course as a balance between geo-politics and respect for human rights. Nowhere is this reset being harder to implement than the Middle East region, a volatile cocktail of nation-state conflicts, religious fundamentalism and terrorism and active superpower intervention. For one, some of the conflicts and issues in the Middle East today were created by the Obama era policies when Biden was the Vice President. Two nowhere else was the Trump-style break from a stated 'neutral' US foreign policy to doling out personal favors that changed the contours of interaction between the region's countries more prominent. Third, the absence of a US 'mediating' guarantee created a new/enlarged role for varied actors – Turkey, Russia, and China that the US will find hard to reset. President Biden's main foreign policy challenge in the Middle East will be 'how you solve a problem like Iran.' Critics have said that given Biden's close involvement with the Iran deal under President Obama, the current administration runs the risk of adopting the 'old wine in a new bottle strategy.' Since Biden has assumed office – Iran has threatened to block a UN nuclear watchdog from conducting snap inspections of some nuclear sites. Iran-backed Shiite militias have attacked the US-coalition forces in Erbil in northern Iraq, reflecting their growing power in a country embroiled in years of war. In Yemen, Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have escalated violence against the government forces in the oil-rich central province of Marib. They have also intensified drone attacks against the neighboring Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Marking a break from Trump’s four years, these developments are starting to create disquiet among the traditional US allies in the region – Israel, Saudi Arabia and UAE. Under Trump’s policy of maximum pressure on Iran, without any diplomacy, Arab states and Israel had forged a ‘tentative relationship’ focused on containing Iran in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon. For their efforts at rapprochement with Israel (via the Abraham Accord), the Arab rulers were rewarded personally – when President Trump used his discretionary powers to look the other way as evidence of MBS’s involvement emerged in journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s murder. Or when he signed arms deals with UAE or refused to end the US support of the Yemen war despite a US Senate resolution. However, since Biden's victory, it has been made clear that the US will try and rebalance this 'one-sided' and obvious tilt. This rebalancing has begun with Saudi Arabia. Supported by a Senate striving to reclaim its war-making powers, the US has ceased its support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Biden has personally criticized Saudi's track record on human rights and said in no uncertain terms that it would speak directly to King Salman and not to Crown Prince MBS, the country's de-facto leader. The arms sale of F35 fighter jets to the UAE has been put on hold. Regarding Israel, though Biden is unlikely to reverse measures like shifting the US embassy to Jerusalem, there is a general consensus that PM Netanyahu will not be given free rein in the US calculations in the region. However, as Iran steps up its offensive – Biden will be faced with some critical policy choices – A) How much to bend to preserve the legacy of the Iran deal and what happens if Iran walks out. B) How to recalibrate relationships with the allies in the above background. What has the potential to complicate this balancing act is the new actors/dynamics that have emerged and gained strength in the region. Of course, the first emphasis is on the US's most significant geopolitical and economic rival – China. While China has developed political, trading and economic linkages with countries across the board in the Middle East, its priorities are not a threat to the US interests just yet. However, three focal areas can complicate the geo-politics for the US. The first is the partnership between Iran and China that gained strength under the Trump administration. China made huge purchases of Iranian crude oil in violation of US sanctions, invested in infrastructure projects and sold essential supplies to Iran. A pro-China hardline faction in Iran has gained prominence and is likely driving a hard bargain with the Biden administration. With the Iranian presidential elections scheduled in June 2021, a probable win for this hardline wing could mean an end to all negotiations on the Iran deal and a further shift towards China. What is problematic for the Biden administration is that China has gained currency as a 'strategic balancer' to the US across all genres of actors – Shiite militias from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon have taken Chinese support. The region's Arab monarchies and Israel have similarly made investment deals and are using Chinese companies for infrastructure building. They have also chosen to ignore Chinese human rights violations in Uighur. The second cog in the wheel is Russia’s relationship with Iran and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that has complicated US attempts to detangle from Iraq and Syria. Turkey has emerged as the ‘black swan’ with emerging stress points with the US – such as the sanctions over its possession of Russia’s S-400 air defense system and its unilateral action in the Kurdish (US allies) areas of Iraq and Syria. There is also an element of a European disengagement with the US stands in the region as Europe has learned to pursue independent stands on Iran, Russia, etc., under the Trump presidency. After being confirmed, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s initial addresses created a foreign policy roadmap for the Biden administration in which priorities were Asia-Pacific, rapprochement with European allies and then the Western hemisphere. However, developments in the past few weeks have shown that Middle East remains the region where US troops, resources and infra remain high at risk. Therefore, it is not surprising that the new Biden administration's first military operation targeted Iran-backed fighters in Syria on 25 February. But with allies diverging, Iran belligerent, global consensus on issues such as Iran deal thin at best, US will have to think of out of box solutions. (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

Opinion: US foreign policy and its Middle East conundrum

It is the end of an era as German Chancellor Angela Merkel steps down as the head of her political party after 15 years in office &amp; at least a decade as the European Union’s tallest leader. Her term in political life has its shares of successes and failures, but what is agreed upon is her ability to build consensus, to provide the balance between seemingly diverse views and having the political clout, internally &amp; externally, to get things done. As Europe struggles with COVID pandemic, recovery package, reform measures, and the threat of Euroskeptics and external challenges – her legacy will be missed.

So is Europe ready for a post-Merkel age? Where I desist from predicting doomsday scenarios, a leadership vacuum will definitely be created in short to mid-term in the European political environment. There are three main reasons for this prediction.

1. Uncertainty in German domestic politics will have an impact on the EU

On 16 January, Merkel’s party Christian Democratic Union (CDU), chose Armin Laschet as the successor to Merkel. Laschet is the Governor of Germany’s largest state North-Rhine-Westphalia and represents overlapping views with Merkel, especially on immigration, economy and centrist politics. The other major contender Merz was further to the right on issues of immigration, security and European reforms – so in a sense, the party has chosen continuity with Merkel's policies. The succession race, however, has not been as smooth. Merkel had announced in 2018 her desire to step down as leader of the CDU, appointing Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer as her successor. Things became tricky in February 2020, when AKK resigned, breaking the expected continuity and throwing leadership elections wide open.&nbsp;

While by convention, the candidate for Chancellorship is generally the CDU leader, Laschet’s path to this candidacy in the federal elections of September 2021 is far from guaranteed. He is likely to be challenged by the CSU's popular leader (Christian Social Union), Markus Soder from CDU’s sister party in Bavaria &amp; by rogue candidates like Health Minister Jans Spahn. No matter who replaces her eventually – they are likely to be more inexperienced and will have to spend time on domestic challenges and managing the coalition, as Merkel will largely remain in place (as the Chancellor) with reduced influence till September. &nbsp;With the emergence of the Greens as a contending force in German politics – the next government could be of unity between the Greens and CSU-CDU. This is a combination never tried before in German politics between parties with fairly divergent priorities.&nbsp;

Domestic preoccupation is likely to compel Merkel’s successor to put European politics' burning issues on backburner till at least 2022. In the absence of a German leader taking a leadership position in the EU (or trepid steps), no other European leader is tall enough to fill the vacuum. French President Emanual Macron will certainly try and has some strategic ideas – but without a supportive Germany, his attempts to build consensus in the EU bloc will be difficult. Plus, his political challenges at home will keep him embroiled in the run-up to the French Presidential elections in 2022. There have recently been some stress points between the German-Franco priorities and vision for the EU – for example, on the COVID recovery fund and these will have to be managed.

2. These developments are happening as the European project itself becomes more contentious and difficult to manage. 

The recently concluded Brexit saga was the latest in a series of shocks that have highlighted massive divisions within the bloc – far-right and ultra-nationalist actors, Euroskeptics, authoritarian regimes, pro/anti-reform agendas, newly emerging forces such as the Greens. From the sovereign debt crisis to the migrant crisis, the divide between Europe’s North from South and East from West – Merkel’s experience and respect for her abilities has helped wither the impact of these shocks. At least a couple of other examples were on display at the end of 2020 when under Germany's Presidency, the EU was able to make headway on a landmark 750 billion Euro recovery fund in the face of staunch opposition from Poland and Hungary. Though French ideation and support of Europe's northern partners were critical, Merkel's persuasion also helped conclude a trade deal with the UK, an investment deal with China, and an upgrade of the EU's climate ambition.

Merkel has been criticized from several quarters for what has been termed as 'unprincipled compromises,' especially with the authoritarian regimes of Hungary and Poland. For example, the COVID recovery fund that critics say could be passed only after a 'dilution' of the rule of law conditionality as Hungary and Poland (under investigation for democratic backsliding) had threatened to veto the proposal. But these delicate compromises are at the heart of the European project and even though Merkel is known for pushing most crises to the brink before acting, her stewardship at the tipping time will be hard to emulate.&nbsp;

3. At stake is Europe’s role on the world stage as traditional security and geo-political alliances are unravelling

Europe will have to redefine its doctrine of ‘strategic autonomy’ – a key element of balancing an incoming Biden administration's priority of 'containing' China with the EU's own greater investment and trade relations with China. The EU Parliament will consider a historic and controversial deal with China, agreed on under Germany’s presidency, but that seeks to effectively compartmentalize relations with China into two heads – business and labor and human rights. In the absence of a German-Franco coordinated leadership – 'rogue' leaders like Erdogan in Turkey could complicate the Eastern Mediterranean's security landscape. Relations with countries like Russia and Iran will remain complex.&nbsp;

However, all is not gloomy – it seems that in the last few months, the hold of the ultra-nationalist, right-wing parties that seemed on the ascendancy threatening the entire European project has decreased. Some path breaking consensual steps forward have been achieved in the last year. Extreme polarization in the US, the difficulties in Brexit and the carrot of fiscal support has convinced even the most Euroskeptic governments to ‘hang in’ for the moment. But as the new German leader finds his/her feet that could take up much of this and early next year and its staunchest European ally Macron comes up for elections in 2022 – Europe is likely to be led ineffectively for the next 12-15 months. Could the vacuum complicate the massive recovery fund's implementation and the important nascent steps towards fiscal rule reforms – only time will tell?

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.) 
&nbsp;

It is the end of an era as German Chancellor Angela Merkel steps down as the head of her political party after 15 years in office & at least a decade as the European Union’s tallest leader.

It is the end of an era as German Chancellor Angela Merkel steps down as the head of her political party after 15 years in office & at least a decade as the European Union’s tallest leader. Her term in political life has its shares of successes and failures, but what is agreed upon is her ability to build consensus, to provide the balance between seemingly diverse views and having the political clout, internally & externally, to get things done. As Europe struggles with COVID pandemic, recovery package, reform measures, and the threat of Euroskeptics and external challenges – her legacy will be missed. So is Europe ready for a post-Merkel age? Where I desist from predicting doomsday scenarios, a leadership vacuum will definitely be created in short to mid-term in the European political environment. There are three main reasons for this prediction. 1. Uncertainty in German domestic politics will have an impact on the EU On 16 January, Merkel’s party Christian Democratic Union (CDU), chose Armin Laschet as the successor to Merkel. Laschet is the Governor of Germany’s largest state North-Rhine-Westphalia and represents overlapping views with Merkel, especially on immigration, economy and centrist politics. The other major contender Merz was further to the right on issues of immigration, security and European reforms – so in a sense, the party has chosen continuity with Merkel's policies. The succession race, however, has not been as smooth. Merkel had announced in 2018 her desire to step down as leader of the CDU, appointing Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer as her successor. Things became tricky in February 2020, when AKK resigned, breaking the expected continuity and throwing leadership elections wide open. While by convention, the candidate for Chancellorship is generally the CDU leader, Laschet’s path to this candidacy in the federal elections of September 2021 is far from guaranteed. He is likely to be challenged by the CSU's popular leader (Christian Social Union), Markus Soder from CDU’s sister party in Bavaria & by rogue candidates like Health Minister Jans Spahn. No matter who replaces her eventually – they are likely to be more inexperienced and will have to spend time on domestic challenges and managing the coalition, as Merkel will largely remain in place (as the Chancellor) with reduced influence till September. With the emergence of the Greens as a contending force in German politics – the next government could be of unity between the Greens and CSU-CDU. This is a combination never tried before in German politics between parties with fairly divergent priorities. Domestic preoccupation is likely to compel Merkel’s successor to put European politics' burning issues on backburner till at least 2022. In the absence of a German leader taking a leadership position in the EU (or trepid steps), no other European leader is tall enough to fill the vacuum. French President Emanual Macron will certainly try and has some strategic ideas – but without a supportive Germany, his attempts to build consensus in the EU bloc will be difficult. Plus, his political challenges at home will keep him embroiled in the run-up to the French Presidential elections in 2022. There have recently been some stress points between the German-Franco priorities and vision for the EU – for example, on the COVID recovery fund and these will have to be managed. 2. These developments are happening as the European project itself becomes more contentious and difficult to manage. The recently concluded Brexit saga was the latest in a series of shocks that have highlighted massive divisions within the bloc – far-right and ultra-nationalist actors, Euroskeptics, authoritarian regimes, pro/anti-reform agendas, newly emerging forces such as the Greens. From the sovereign debt crisis to the migrant crisis, the divide between Europe’s North from South and East from West – Merkel’s experience and respect for her abilities has helped wither the impact of these shocks. At least a couple of other examples were on display at the end of 2020 when under Germany's Presidency, the EU was able to make headway on a landmark 750 billion Euro recovery fund in the face of staunch opposition from Poland and Hungary. Though French ideation and support of Europe's northern partners were critical, Merkel's persuasion also helped conclude a trade deal with the UK, an investment deal with China, and an upgrade of the EU's climate ambition. Merkel has been criticized from several quarters for what has been termed as 'unprincipled compromises,' especially with the authoritarian regimes of Hungary and Poland. For example, the COVID recovery fund that critics say could be passed only after a 'dilution' of the rule of law conditionality as Hungary and Poland (under investigation for democratic backsliding) had threatened to veto the proposal. But these delicate compromises are at the heart of the European project and even though Merkel is known for pushing most crises to the brink before acting, her stewardship at the tipping time will be hard to emulate. 3. At stake is Europe’s role on the world stage as traditional security and geo-political alliances are unravelling Europe will have to redefine its doctrine of ‘strategic autonomy’ – a key element of balancing an incoming Biden administration's priority of 'containing' China with the EU's own greater investment and trade relations with China. The EU Parliament will consider a historic and controversial deal with China, agreed on under Germany’s presidency, but that seeks to effectively compartmentalize relations with China into two heads – business and labor and human rights. In the absence of a German-Franco coordinated leadership – 'rogue' leaders like Erdogan in Turkey could complicate the Eastern Mediterranean's security landscape. Relations with countries like Russia and Iran will remain complex. However, all is not gloomy – it seems that in the last few months, the hold of the ultra-nationalist, right-wing parties that seemed on the ascendancy threatening the entire European project has decreased. Some path breaking consensual steps forward have been achieved in the last year. Extreme polarization in the US, the difficulties in Brexit and the carrot of fiscal support has convinced even the most Euroskeptic governments to ‘hang in’ for the moment. But as the new German leader finds his/her feet that could take up much of this and early next year and its staunchest European ally Macron comes up for elections in 2022 – Europe is likely to be led ineffectively for the next 12-15 months. Could the vacuum complicate the massive recovery fund's implementation and the important nascent steps towards fiscal rule reforms – only time will tell? (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

Opinion: As Merkel steps down, what’s next for Europe?

By all official counts, Democratic Party candidate - Joe Biden is the new President-elect of the United States of America. After a gruelling morning on 4 November, where President Trump took substantial early leads in most swing states, Biden gradually narrowed the gap in the next few days. Even though the Biden- Harris teamwork has begun, this race is far from over. Trump has refused to concede &amp; his legal team has threatened battles in almost all swing states.

In the last couple of decades, this was perhaps the most closely watched American elections internationally. More than the issues, there was a feeling that the future of the American narrative, balance between right-wing and liberal Left and US's foreign policy was at stake. The fact this was held in a pandemic that threw up unique ways of campaigning, voting and counting added to the thrill.&nbsp;&nbsp;Certain key aspects stand out with implications for domestic US policy and its role in the world:

First, about the content of the vote – There was no 'blue wave' as was predicted by some pollsters. Given the polarization in American society and the nature of the electoral system, any appetite for radical change was an extreme prediction. The Democrats managed to secure the Presidency but their showing in the legislative races was far from satisfactory. They lost seats in the House of Representatives (lower house, where they had a majority) &amp; were not able to get enough seats in the Senate (the upper house) to flip from Republican control. Runoff races in Georgia in January 2021 might give them two more seats to get 50:50, in which case the Vice President-elect Harris can cast a tie-breaker in case of a deadlock.

Explanations for these trends have abounded – was it an anti-Trump vote more than an anti-Republican vote? Did the Democrats overestimate their appeal and now need to introspect. The indications are somewhere in the middle – Trump managed to get 70 million popular votes,&nbsp;more than in 2016 but the Democrats were also able to enthuse their traditional supporters with the message of &nbsp;'getting Trump out' and vote in larger numbers.&nbsp;

The voter turnaround in this election was the highest since 1900. For the Presidency, credit has to be given to Biden, who was not even the DNC’s (Democratic National Convention) first choice and was largely selected to build consensus amongst its diverging moderate and progressive sections. Biden built a grassroots campaign, chose a symbolic running mate, star campaigners like Obama and was able to build a narrative around the mismanagement of COVID.&nbsp;

In the end, the election was not as close as it was initially purported to be – Biden has 4 million-plus popular votes’ lead that might increase as the counting continues in many states. He also managed to flip five states – Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennslyvania and Republican states of Arizona and Georgia.&nbsp;

The legislative results, however, have unleashed infighting between the 'moderate' and progressive' wings with the former blaming the latter’s extreme ‘rhetoric’ for Democrat defeats even in states that Biden was able to carry along. The charge is that demands such as 'Medicare for all', 'Defund the police' etc created a condition that many Americans voted for Republican candidates in these races while rejecting Trump for Presidency. This can be true in some cases but does not seem like a general trend.&nbsp;

Some poll trends have shown that there was a nation-wide pro-Democrat swing (though moderate) since 2016 in the election for a President – but a pro-Republican swing since 2018 in elections for the House. The Democrats in the legislature have been held as responsible as the Republicans for the deadlock on passing a stimulus, non compromising attitudes on judicial nominees, etc. Plus the Democrat strategy of putting accomplished candidates, mainly 'women', was aped by the Republicans in these elections with better than expected results.&nbsp;

So what we have in the US now is a recipe for uncertainty. A Biden Presidency, a Republican-controlled Senate (unless Democrats can win Georgia races), a House with a reduced majority for the Democrats and a Supreme Court with a 6-3 majority for conservative judges. Trump's constant allegations about voter fraud and illegal electoral processes are going to cast a shadow on Biden's presidency that will make it hard for him to carry 70 million people on his COVID agenda, for instance.&nbsp;

The Senate Republicans, whose approval Biden requires for passing key legislation, will make it difficult to undertake crucial reforms, including on taxation, reform of the electoral process, etc. A reduced House Democratic majority will make it difficult for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to get the moderate &amp; progressive sections to co-exist. The result will be a legislative deadlock on many issues unless Biden, a long time, a seasoned politician, can build bi-partisan consensus at least on the immediate requirements. &nbsp;

What happens in the US has consequences globally and even more so because Trump broke from years of diplomatic consensus to bestow personal favors/displeasure on international actors. As Biden emerged the likely winner, there was relief in certain quarters – traditional US allies and Iran against which Trump had taken a hard stance; acceptance in others such as Middle East allies and silence from Brazil, Russia and China.&nbsp;

But despite the fears that Biden will undo many aspects of the Trump foreign policy – the truth is that his first few months will be spent in combating US's domestic challenges – containing COVID surge, an ailing economy &amp; polarised race relations. The first few executive orders could focus on reversing Trump measures aimed to reinforce the US's commitment to multilateralism – re-entering the Paris climate accord, the WHO and lifting the travel ban on Muslim nations.&nbsp;

With a bipartisan consensus on the need for a 'hard stance' towards China, Biden will continue the Trumpian stance towards China though his approach is likely to be different. China’s economic ‘espionage’, theft of intellectual property, human rights abuses, interference in Taiwan will be the main issues of contention. Biden is likely to re-cultivate US relations with its traditional allies, including in Europe and Asia. In the Middle East, a calibrated return to the Iran deal of 2015 will be on the books as also a return to a mediator stance in the Israel-Palestine conflict, but these are not high priority goals. &nbsp;

But all of this is still some days away. In the meantime, the US and world will have to grapple with Trump’s legal challenges, a voter base emboldened to use nonconstitutional means to challenge elections results &amp; Trump’s last few unilateral foreign policy moves on Iran, arms treaties and Israel.

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do&nbsp;not represent the views of&nbsp;WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse&nbsp;the views of the writer)

By all official counts, Democratic Party candidate - Joe Biden is the new President-elect of the United States of America. After a gruelling morning on 4 November, where President Trump took substantial early leads in most swing states, Biden gradually narrowed the gap in the next few days.

By all official counts, Democratic Party candidate - Joe Biden is the new President-elect of the United States of America. After a gruelling morning on 4 November, where President Trump took substantial early leads in most swing states, Biden gradually narrowed the gap in the next few days. Even though the Biden- Harris teamwork has begun, this race is far from over. Trump has refused to concede & his legal team has threatened battles in almost all swing states. In the last couple of decades, this was perhaps the most closely watched American elections internationally. More than the issues, there was a feeling that the future of the American narrative, balance between right-wing and liberal Left and US's foreign policy was at stake. The fact this was held in a pandemic that threw up unique ways of campaigning, voting and counting added to the thrill. Certain key aspects stand out with implications for domestic US policy and its role in the world: First, about the content of the vote – There was no 'blue wave' as was predicted by some pollsters. Given the polarization in American society and the nature of the electoral system, any appetite for radical change was an extreme prediction. The Democrats managed to secure the Presidency but their showing in the legislative races was far from satisfactory. They lost seats in the House of Representatives (lower house, where they had a majority) & were not able to get enough seats in the Senate (the upper house) to flip from Republican control. Runoff races in Georgia in January 2021 might give them two more seats to get 50:50, in which case the Vice President-elect Harris can cast a tie-breaker in case of a deadlock. Explanations for these trends have abounded – was it an anti-Trump vote more than an anti-Republican vote? Did the Democrats overestimate their appeal and now need to introspect. The indications are somewhere in the middle – Trump managed to get 70 million popular votes, more than in 2016 but the Democrats were also able to enthuse their traditional supporters with the message of 'getting Trump out' and vote in larger numbers. The voter turnaround in this election was the highest since 1900. For the Presidency, credit has to be given to Biden, who was not even the DNC’s (Democratic National Convention) first choice and was largely selected to build consensus amongst its diverging moderate and progressive sections. Biden built a grassroots campaign, chose a symbolic running mate, star campaigners like Obama and was able to build a narrative around the mismanagement of COVID. In the end, the election was not as close as it was initially purported to be – Biden has 4 million-plus popular votes’ lead that might increase as the counting continues in many states. He also managed to flip five states – Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennslyvania and Republican states of Arizona and Georgia. The legislative results, however, have unleashed infighting between the 'moderate' and progressive' wings with the former blaming the latter’s extreme ‘rhetoric’ for Democrat defeats even in states that Biden was able to carry along. The charge is that demands such as 'Medicare for all', 'Defund the police' etc created a condition that many Americans voted for Republican candidates in these races while rejecting Trump for Presidency. This can be true in some cases but does not seem like a general trend. Some poll trends have shown that there was a nation-wide pro-Democrat swing (though moderate) since 2016 in the election for a President – but a pro-Republican swing since 2018 in elections for the House. The Democrats in the legislature have been held as responsible as the Republicans for the deadlock on passing a stimulus, non compromising attitudes on judicial nominees, etc. Plus the Democrat strategy of putting accomplished candidates, mainly 'women', was aped by the Republicans in these elections with better than expected results. So what we have in the US now is a recipe for uncertainty. A Biden Presidency, a Republican-controlled Senate (unless Democrats can win Georgia races), a House with a reduced majority for the Democrats and a Supreme Court with a 6-3 majority for conservative judges. Trump's constant allegations about voter fraud and illegal electoral processes are going to cast a shadow on Biden's presidency that will make it hard for him to carry 70 million people on his COVID agenda, for instance. The Senate Republicans, whose approval Biden requires for passing key legislation, will make it difficult to undertake crucial reforms, including on taxation, reform of the electoral process, etc. A reduced House Democratic majority will make it difficult for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to get the moderate & progressive sections to co-exist. The result will be a legislative deadlock on many issues unless Biden, a long time, a seasoned politician, can build bi-partisan consensus at least on the immediate requirements. What happens in the US has consequences globally and even more so because Trump broke from years of diplomatic consensus to bestow personal favors/displeasure on international actors. As Biden emerged the likely winner, there was relief in certain quarters – traditional US allies and Iran against which Trump had taken a hard stance; acceptance in others such as Middle East allies and silence from Brazil, Russia and China. But despite the fears that Biden will undo many aspects of the Trump foreign policy – the truth is that his first few months will be spent in combating US's domestic challenges – containing COVID surge, an ailing economy & polarised race relations. The first few executive orders could focus on reversing Trump measures aimed to reinforce the US's commitment to multilateralism – re-entering the Paris climate accord, the WHO and lifting the travel ban on Muslim nations. With a bipartisan consensus on the need for a 'hard stance' towards China, Biden will continue the Trumpian stance towards China though his approach is likely to be different. China’s economic ‘espionage’, theft of intellectual property, human rights abuses, interference in Taiwan will be the main issues of contention. Biden is likely to re-cultivate US relations with its traditional allies, including in Europe and Asia. In the Middle East, a calibrated return to the Iran deal of 2015 will be on the books as also a return to a mediator stance in the Israel-Palestine conflict, but these are not high priority goals. But all of this is still some days away. In the meantime, the US and world will have to grapple with Trump’s legal challenges, a voter base emboldened to use nonconstitutional means to challenge elections results & Trump’s last few unilateral foreign policy moves on Iran, arms treaties and Israel. (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer)

US Presidential Elections: Reflections of an outside observer

The recently concluded UAE-Israel deal dominated the briefings of US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, on his current visit to Israel and other countries in the region. It was &nbsp;also the central theme in his headlining address, recorded in Jerusalem, for the Republican National Convention where Donald Trump was officially endorsed as the Republican Presidential candidate.

Extolling the Abraham Accords that seek to normalize relations between UAE and Israel, Pompeo hinted at other Arab states following suit and a plan for the Middle East that normalizes trade and business relations, removal of travel restrictions and greater security cooperation to tackle threats, including Iran, ‘rogue’ regimes and non-state actors.

The symbolic significance of this deal cannot be overstated – the UAE becomes the third Middle eastern country to normalize relations with Israel after Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994. It is however the first Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state to take this action.&nbsp;

Though UAE and other Gulf nations have been steadily improving relations with Israel for almost a decade, the formal recognition was held back due to the imperatives of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. The initiative demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied since 1967 in exchange for a &nbsp;diplomatic recognition of the state of Israel. In this case the UAE agreed to recognize Israel in exchange for less – a promise by Israeli PM Netanyahu to temporarily halt annexation of almost a third of West Bank territories, an idea proposed as part of President’s Trump’s middle eastern plan.&nbsp;

The short term political compulsions driving the deal are evident – it provides breathing space to Netanyahu who has been beleaguered by corruption charges and regular protests demanding his resignation. He has portrayed this deal as a vindication of his foreign policy stand that peace with Arab countries does not need a solution of the Palestinian issue. For President Trump, this will be a talking point of his deal making capability in US Presidential Elections in November at a time when opinion polls put him behind his rival Democrat candidate Joe Biden. For the UAE, this has been a ‘diplomatic win’ - &nbsp;garnering them the US favour, benefit of Israel’s ‘hard power’ in its proxy wars and a vindication of its independent foreign policy.&nbsp;

The long term imperatives, however, are more complex and multi-layered and will determine the future of the security in the region.&nbsp;

1.&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;At the local level the Arab Spring &amp; following civil unrest has spooked several Gulf monarchies that realize that they need to focus on continuing effective governance to maintain their political legitimacy. Conflict with Israel has been diluted in order to avoid diversion of resources and re-orient the foreign policy aims. In addition, Israel is capable of fulfilling the Gulf states’ need for sophisticated security and surveillance platforms to police their own populations.&nbsp;

2.&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;At the regional stage, the UAE and Israel’s foreign policy aims have converged at three main levels.&nbsp;

a.&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;A significant common factor has been to counter the Iranian ‘arc of influence’ that extends from Yemen where Iran backed Houthi rebels are engaged in a conflict with Saudi and UAE-led coalition forces supporting President Hadi, Lebanon (via Hezbollah), Iraq &amp; also in Syria with Iran’s support to President Assad. In the last few years, Yemen based Houthi rebels are purported to have acquired sophisticated ‘drone technology’ used to target Saudi airports and military installations and suspected to have disrupted operations at the Dubai airport in 2018. In 2019, attacks on oil tankers, including a UAE vessel just outside the Strait of Hormuz, were also blamed on Iranian proxies. This is a common cause with Israel that has been engaged in a conflict with Hezbollah, has targeted Iranian backed groups in Syria and tackled Hamas in Gaza, with whom Iran has ‘contentious cooperation’.&nbsp;

b.&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;The second imperative has been countering ‘political Islam’ in all its forms – whether Shia variety allied to Iran or the Sunni groups including the Muslim brotherhood &amp; its offshoots such as Hamas and terror groups like Islamic state and the remnants of Al-Qaeda. Many Arab states realize that Israel’s ‘hard power’ including defence technology, cyber surveillance can be instrumental in helping them protect their own interests.&nbsp;

3.&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;At the international level, both UAE and Israel hope that the deal will keep the US sufficiently engaged in the Middle East on their side. For UAE Crown Prince, MBZ (Mohammed Bin Zayed) this is an opportunity to regain the US backing after it garnered backlash from the US Congress for its role in the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and its backing of General Haftar in Libya who is fighting the GNA (Government of National Accord backed by the UN) nominally supported by the US. This deal is also likely to ensure that Israel and UAE can obtain advanced US weaponry and its support in international fora for its strategic objectives. This becomes relevant especially in the context of an increasing China-Iran rapprochement and increased Russian-Iranian cooperation in nations like Syria.&nbsp;

So while these imperatives have pushed the two parties towards the deal, what are the future prospects? There has been commentary on the prospect that if other Arab Gulf states were to follow the UAE, then that can constitute a chance to re-write the security landscape of the region. There has also been a proposal that UAE with its exalted standing in the Middle East can play mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by bringing on board Palestinian stakeholders to develop concrete counter proposals to Trump’s Middle East plan. 
However at least in the short to mid term the above view seems little optimistic. Though Netanyahu has agreed to temporarily to halt West Bank annexation, his hardline &amp; opportunistic politics means that he is unlikely to give concessions that will be required if a lasting Israel-Palestine peace settlement has to be achieved. On the Palestinian side, it is a divided house with too many stakeholders along with radical Islamist groups like Hamas whose use of terror tactics will be a stumbling bloc.

Moreover this deal does not address the fundamental drivers of conflict in the region. The geo-political faultlines have been shifting for almost a decade from the Arab-Israel conflict to the emergence of Iran and its ‘political Islamist’ allies as the ‘bigger fish to fry’. What this deal might end up doing is formalizing the contours of the two opposing blocs that are engaged in proxy conflicts across the Middle East, squeezing out the space that was available to countries like UAE for backchannel negotiations with Iran. While the loosely defined ‘anti-Iran bloc’ has more economic and military power, Iran’s proxies have made sizeable gains across the region - in Yemen (where Houthis control strategic choke points), in Syria (where President Assad has gained control of almost the entire country). In Lebanon, Hezbollah is kept in check mainly by Israeli military action.&nbsp;

In the short to the mid term, Israel’s addition to this ‘club’ of Gulf monarchies and US’s continued attempts to destabilize the Iranian regime can actually exacerbate tensions as Iran will seek to retaliate against the ‘perceived’ grouping. In addition, the self-interests of regional powers are likely to lead them to take individual sides in conflicts blurring the dynamics of the blocs &amp; adding to uncertainty. The UAE’s role in Yemen as both a part of the KSA-led coalition supporting President Hadi &amp; a backer of Southern Transitional Council demanding secession from Yemen is a case in point.&nbsp;

A genuine change in the security architecture of the region will require détente between Middle East’s two rival blocs, addressing the self-interested claims of region’s nations that is complicating proxy conflicts and emergence of one of the international powers as a neutral and unbiased mediator.&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

The recently concluded UAE-Israel deal dominated the briefings of US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, on his current visit to Israel and other countries in the region.

The recently concluded UAE-Israel deal dominated the briefings of US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, on his current visit to Israel and other countries in the region. It was also the central theme in his headlining address, recorded in Jerusalem, for the Republican National Convention where Donald Trump was officially endorsed as the Republican Presidential candidate. Extolling the Abraham Accords that seek to normalize relations between UAE and Israel, Pompeo hinted at other Arab states following suit and a plan for the Middle East that normalizes trade and business relations, removal of travel restrictions and greater security cooperation to tackle threats, including Iran, ‘rogue’ regimes and non-state actors. The symbolic significance of this deal cannot be overstated – the UAE becomes the third Middle eastern country to normalize relations with Israel after Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994. It is however the first Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state to take this action. Though UAE and other Gulf nations have been steadily improving relations with Israel for almost a decade, the formal recognition was held back due to the imperatives of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. The initiative demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied since 1967 in exchange for a diplomatic recognition of the state of Israel. In this case the UAE agreed to recognize Israel in exchange for less – a promise by Israeli PM Netanyahu to temporarily halt annexation of almost a third of West Bank territories, an idea proposed as part of President’s Trump’s middle eastern plan. The short term political compulsions driving the deal are evident – it provides breathing space to Netanyahu who has been beleaguered by corruption charges and regular protests demanding his resignation. He has portrayed this deal as a vindication of his foreign policy stand that peace with Arab countries does not need a solution of the Palestinian issue. For President Trump, this will be a talking point of his deal making capability in US Presidential Elections in November at a time when opinion polls put him behind his rival Democrat candidate Joe Biden. For the UAE, this has been a ‘diplomatic win’ - garnering them the US favour, benefit of Israel’s ‘hard power’ in its proxy wars and a vindication of its independent foreign policy. The long term imperatives, however, are more complex and multi-layered and will determine the future of the security in the region. 1. At the local level the Arab Spring & following civil unrest has spooked several Gulf monarchies that realize that they need to focus on continuing effective governance to maintain their political legitimacy. Conflict with Israel has been diluted in order to avoid diversion of resources and re-orient the foreign policy aims. In addition, Israel is capable of fulfilling the Gulf states’ need for sophisticated security and surveillance platforms to police their own populations. 2. At the regional stage, the UAE and Israel’s foreign policy aims have converged at three main levels. a. A significant common factor has been to counter the Iranian ‘arc of influence’ that extends from Yemen where Iran backed Houthi rebels are engaged in a conflict with Saudi and UAE-led coalition forces supporting President Hadi, Lebanon (via Hezbollah), Iraq & also in Syria with Iran’s support to President Assad. In the last few years, Yemen based Houthi rebels are purported to have acquired sophisticated ‘drone technology’ used to target Saudi airports and military installations and suspected to have disrupted operations at the Dubai airport in 2018. In 2019, attacks on oil tankers, including a UAE vessel just outside the Strait of Hormuz, were also blamed on Iranian proxies. This is a common cause with Israel that has been engaged in a conflict with Hezbollah, has targeted Iranian backed groups in Syria and tackled Hamas in Gaza, with whom Iran has ‘contentious cooperation’. b. The second imperative has been countering ‘political Islam’ in all its forms – whether Shia variety allied to Iran or the Sunni groups including the Muslim brotherhood & its offshoots such as Hamas and terror groups like Islamic state and the remnants of Al-Qaeda. Many Arab states realize that Israel’s ‘hard power’ including defence technology, cyber surveillance can be instrumental in helping them protect their own interests. 3. At the international level, both UAE and Israel hope that the deal will keep the US sufficiently engaged in the Middle East on their side. For UAE Crown Prince, MBZ (Mohammed Bin Zayed) this is an opportunity to regain the US backing after it garnered backlash from the US Congress for its role in the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and its backing of General Haftar in Libya who is fighting the GNA (Government of National Accord backed by the UN) nominally supported by the US. This deal is also likely to ensure that Israel and UAE can obtain advanced US weaponry and its support in international fora for its strategic objectives. This becomes relevant especially in the context of an increasing China-Iran rapprochement and increased Russian-Iranian cooperation in nations like Syria. So while these imperatives have pushed the two parties towards the deal, what are the future prospects? There has been commentary on the prospect that if other Arab Gulf states were to follow the UAE, then that can constitute a chance to re-write the security landscape of the region. There has also been a proposal that UAE with its exalted standing in the Middle East can play mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by bringing on board Palestinian stakeholders to develop concrete counter proposals to Trump’s Middle East plan. However at least in the short to mid term the above view seems little optimistic. Though Netanyahu has agreed to temporarily to halt West Bank annexation, his hardline & opportunistic politics means that he is unlikely to give concessions that will be required if a lasting Israel-Palestine peace settlement has to be achieved. On the Palestinian side, it is a divided house with too many stakeholders along with radical Islamist groups like Hamas whose use of terror tactics will be a stumbling bloc. Moreover this deal does not address the fundamental drivers of conflict in the region. The geo-political faultlines have been shifting for almost a decade from the Arab-Israel conflict to the emergence of Iran and its ‘political Islamist’ allies as the ‘bigger fish to fry’. What this deal might end up doing is formalizing the contours of the two opposing blocs that are engaged in proxy conflicts across the Middle East, squeezing out the space that was available to countries like UAE for backchannel negotiations with Iran. While the loosely defined ‘anti-Iran bloc’ has more economic and military power, Iran’s proxies have made sizeable gains across the region - in Yemen (where Houthis control strategic choke points), in Syria (where President Assad has gained control of almost the entire country). In Lebanon, Hezbollah is kept in check mainly by Israeli military action. In the short to the mid term, Israel’s addition to this ‘club’ of Gulf monarchies and US’s continued attempts to destabilize the Iranian regime can actually exacerbate tensions as Iran will seek to retaliate against the ‘perceived’ grouping. In addition, the self-interests of regional powers are likely to lead them to take individual sides in conflicts blurring the dynamics of the blocs & adding to uncertainty. The UAE’s role in Yemen as both a part of the KSA-led coalition supporting President Hadi & a backer of Southern Transitional Council demanding secession from Yemen is a case in point. A genuine change in the security architecture of the region will require détente between Middle East’s two rival blocs, addressing the self-interested claims of region’s nations that is complicating proxy conflicts and emergence of one of the international powers as a neutral and unbiased mediator.

Israel-UAE deal: A symbolic peace unlikely to address the conflict triggers in Middle East

When the first few cases of COVID 19 were reported from China and other select countries in early to mid-January 2020, few would have realised that the world, as we know it, would be so drastically altered. Today a globalised world has become a cluster of localised countries, suspicious and wary of each other.&nbsp;

Within national boundaries, enclaves of humans have been created that are being encouraged to not ‘socialise’.&nbsp;

The health-related aspects of the emergency have been well covered with the exponential increase in cases in countries like Italy, Spain and the US constantly dominating the headlines. The economic impact has also gotten due importance with the IMF downgrading the growth prospects of several countries. What has perhaps been covered in parts but not fully understood is the larger political and social impact of the pandemic. In some countries, partial authoritarian regimes are converting into full dictatorships, media &amp; individual freedoms are being eroded, social contract with the governments is being questioned. In others, the class, regional and caste impact of the spread of the virus and measures taken to control it are creating grounds for civil unrest. With the perception of the China angle to the virus, World Health Organisation's (WHO) perceived missteps and strengthening of national borders in the EU, the systems of global governance are coming under increased pressure.&nbsp;

While the health impact of the pandemic will subside sooner or later, the trends mentioned above can have lasting consequences:&nbsp;

Political subterfuge and erosion of civil liberties: 
 
In an article published in The Times, Lord Sumption (former senior British judge) aptly summarised the situation – ‘Governments armed with vast powers are usually reluctant to part with it.’ I would add that some governments who have discovered new forms of surveillance or passed absolute ‘coronavirus’ emergency laws will be unable to give up the addiction of continuing to use them. In this context, it is prudent to mention developments in central and eastern Europe where a clash between ‘illiberal populists’ &amp; ‘nationalist governments’ and the perceived democratic, open values of the EU has been ongoing for some time now. &nbsp;

Officially Hungary became the first country to give far-reaching, unlimited and most importantly no-time bound power to its Prime Minister Viktor Orban to rule by decree on March 30. He now has an unlimited authority to fight the COVID emergency by suspending the parliament &amp; all future elections and imprisoning people for “violating a quarantine” and “spreading false information.” PM Orban has been heading towards the path of dismantling parliamentary democracy for some time now along with his government’s controversial anti-immigration stance and subtle tolerance of xenophobia and anti-Semitism. For the last two years, EU has contemplated invoking Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty to sanction Orban’s ‘illiberal’ actions.&nbsp;

In Poland, which has been trailing Hungary in its political developments, the government changed the electoral law overnight to ensure that the presidential elections go ahead on 10 May. Given the restrictions in place for fighting the health emergency, the only candidate who will be able to use state resources to organise a campaign will be the current president, Andrzej Duda. In Slovakia, special measures have been introduced by the government to violate privacy rules and access all citizen data. These measures are not restricted to this part of Europe – in Philippines police has been ordered to take harshest measures against opposition and critics who question the ‘lockdown measures’.&nbsp;

The repudiation may not be this blatant in other countries but increasingly there will be efforts to contain the whistleblowers &amp; critics who question either handling of the pandemic, laws passed or the help that most nations will need to take from China. From countries like Israel (use of secret cellphone data to track COVID outbreak), Myanmar (complete information censorship), Russia (extensive monitoring system that tracks all technological devices) to Venezeula – the governments have rolled out extensive surveillance and any criticism is being stifled. &nbsp;

The looming spectre of civil unrest: 
 
In India, a country of 1.3 billion people, as a nation-wide lockdown was enforced on March 24, millions of migrant labour walked on foot to reach their home states. They were stopped at various places, reportedly beaten by the police and many have been left in limbo. A telephonic survey of workers from North and Central India by an NGO revealed that if the lockdown continued beyond 21 days, 66 per cent of those interviewed will be unable to manage their household expenses. Many of them had no ration left for the day and were worried they would find no employment if the situation continued. &nbsp;

Latest reports from the US showed a surge in demand at food banks, with the food insecurity surging by 30 per cent just in the city of New York. Combined with unemployment and predicted recession, these conditions are likely to amplify. There have been reports of a surge in supermarket raids and robberies in Italy’s southern region as food shortages continue due to extension of the lockdown. As about half of the global population remains in lockdown, supply chains are broken and agricultural harvesting suffers – WHO and other agencies have spoken about the possibility of food riots, intensification of existing conflicts and a spectre of civil unrest. &nbsp;

Further weakening of global governance models: 
 
There is a fear that the COVID 19 crisis will amplify the global stress points – already US President Donald Trump’s regular emphasis on the ‘Chinese virus’ signifies the deepening of distrust with the Chinese leadership. In countries like Italy and Spain – narratives built around African immigrants being responsible for the virus are gaining prominence, which can further fuel the anti-immigration sentiment and populist movements. WHO’s, one of the very few global institutions of repute, role in the handling of the pandemic and accusations of ‘towing the China line’ are creating a renewed questioning of global institutions. &nbsp;

The global watchdogs will have their hands full in keenly observing as countries try to balance the exigencies of fighting the pandemic with increased surveillance and violation of privacy. Governments will have to be on their toes to formulate economic and social packages to ensure that unrest is checked. The pandemic has also offered a unique opportunity for nations to unite – to share information, technology and collaborate on economic revival. However, as of now, the global leadership remains uncoordinated and largely ‘national’. &nbsp;

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

&nbsp;

When the first few cases of COVID 19 were reported from China and other select countries in early to mid-January 2020, few would have realised that the world, as we know it, would be so drastically altered.

When the first few cases of COVID 19 were reported from China and other select countries in early to mid-January 2020, few would have realised that the world, as we know it, would be so drastically altered. Today a globalised world has become a cluster of localised countries, suspicious and wary of each other. Within national boundaries, enclaves of humans have been created that are being encouraged to not ‘socialise’. The health-related aspects of the emergency have been well covered with the exponential increase in cases in countries like Italy, Spain and the US constantly dominating the headlines. The economic impact has also gotten due importance with the IMF downgrading the growth prospects of several countries. What has perhaps been covered in parts but not fully understood is the larger political and social impact of the pandemic. In some countries, partial authoritarian regimes are converting into full dictatorships, media & individual freedoms are being eroded, social contract with the governments is being questioned. In others, the class, regional and caste impact of the spread of the virus and measures taken to control it are creating grounds for civil unrest. With the perception of the China angle to the virus, World Health Organisation's (WHO) perceived missteps and strengthening of national borders in the EU, the systems of global governance are coming under increased pressure. While the health impact of the pandemic will subside sooner or later, the trends mentioned above can have lasting consequences: Political subterfuge and erosion of civil liberties: In an article published in The Times, Lord Sumption (former senior British judge) aptly summarised the situation – ‘Governments armed with vast powers are usually reluctant to part with it.’ I would add that some governments who have discovered new forms of surveillance or passed absolute ‘coronavirus’ emergency laws will be unable to give up the addiction of continuing to use them. In this context, it is prudent to mention developments in central and eastern Europe where a clash between ‘illiberal populists’ & ‘nationalist governments’ and the perceived democratic, open values of the EU has been ongoing for some time now. Officially Hungary became the first country to give far-reaching, unlimited and most importantly no-time bound power to its Prime Minister Viktor Orban to rule by decree on March 30. He now has an unlimited authority to fight the COVID emergency by suspending the parliament & all future elections and imprisoning people for “violating a quarantine” and “spreading false information.” PM Orban has been heading towards the path of dismantling parliamentary democracy for some time now along with his government’s controversial anti-immigration stance and subtle tolerance of xenophobia and anti-Semitism. For the last two years, EU has contemplated invoking Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty to sanction Orban’s ‘illiberal’ actions. In Poland, which has been trailing Hungary in its political developments, the government changed the electoral law overnight to ensure that the presidential elections go ahead on 10 May. Given the restrictions in place for fighting the health emergency, the only candidate who will be able to use state resources to organise a campaign will be the current president, Andrzej Duda. In Slovakia, special measures have been introduced by the government to violate privacy rules and access all citizen data. These measures are not restricted to this part of Europe – in Philippines police has been ordered to take harshest measures against opposition and critics who question the ‘lockdown measures’. The repudiation may not be this blatant in other countries but increasingly there will be efforts to contain the whistleblowers & critics who question either handling of the pandemic, laws passed or the help that most nations will need to take from China. From countries like Israel (use of secret cellphone data to track COVID outbreak), Myanmar (complete information censorship), Russia (extensive monitoring system that tracks all technological devices) to Venezeula – the governments have rolled out extensive surveillance and any criticism is being stifled. The looming spectre of civil unrest: In India, a country of 1.3 billion people, as a nation-wide lockdown was enforced on March 24, millions of migrant labour walked on foot to reach their home states. They were stopped at various places, reportedly beaten by the police and many have been left in limbo. A telephonic survey of workers from North and Central India by an NGO revealed that if the lockdown continued beyond 21 days, 66 per cent of those interviewed will be unable to manage their household expenses. Many of them had no ration left for the day and were worried they would find no employment if the situation continued. Latest reports from the US showed a surge in demand at food banks, with the food insecurity surging by 30 per cent just in the city of New York. Combined with unemployment and predicted recession, these conditions are likely to amplify. There have been reports of a surge in supermarket raids and robberies in Italy’s southern region as food shortages continue due to extension of the lockdown. As about half of the global population remains in lockdown, supply chains are broken and agricultural harvesting suffers – WHO and other agencies have spoken about the possibility of food riots, intensification of existing conflicts and a spectre of civil unrest. Further weakening of global governance models: There is a fear that the COVID 19 crisis will amplify the global stress points – already US President Donald Trump’s regular emphasis on the ‘Chinese virus’ signifies the deepening of distrust with the Chinese leadership. In countries like Italy and Spain – narratives built around African immigrants being responsible for the virus are gaining prominence, which can further fuel the anti-immigration sentiment and populist movements. WHO’s, one of the very few global institutions of repute, role in the handling of the pandemic and accusations of ‘towing the China line’ are creating a renewed questioning of global institutions. The global watchdogs will have their hands full in keenly observing as countries try to balance the exigencies of fighting the pandemic with increased surveillance and violation of privacy. Governments will have to be on their toes to formulate economic and social packages to ensure that unrest is checked. The pandemic has also offered a unique opportunity for nations to unite – to share information, technology and collaborate on economic revival. However, as of now, the global leadership remains uncoordinated and largely ‘national’. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Socio-political implications of coronavirus pandemic

The pendulum of the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) elections seems to be swinging precariously between the incumbent Likud Party led by PM, Benjamin Netanyahu and a new centrist coalition, Blue and White. For the four-times PM Netanyahu, this is panning out to be one of the toughest electoral battles of his career. Firstly, charges of corruption and the breach of trust levied by Israel’s Attorney General Mandelbilt against the PM and his family can erode his legitimacy. Secondly, a centrist Blue and White coalition party, led by a former head of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), is challenging the fortunes of Netanyahu’s Likud party. While Netanyahu’s voter base remains strong, these charges can put pressure on his coalition partners to take a stand. So, are we witnessing the run-up to a post-Netanyahu era in Israeli politics?&nbsp;

In late February 2019, the Attorney General had announced that PM Netanyahu would be indicted on bribery and corruption charges from three separate corruption investigations that are still pending a hearing. Even though in Israeli politics, the PM is not expected to step down until a conviction is upheld through the appeals process, these developments can have a significant impact on the elections. For one, it gives ammunition to the centrist coalition Blue and White party to target the PM. The Blue and White party has been formed by the merger of three parties – Israel Resistance Party, Yesh Atid Party and the Telem party. It is being led by Benny Gantz, ex-Chief of Staff of the IDF, who led the Israeli military through two wars in Gaza in 2012 and 2014. Some voters are likely to perceive him and his party as untainted by Israeli politics, at the same time representing continuity and strength in military and security affairs. &nbsp;

However, in politics, there’s many a slip ‘twixt the cup and the lip’. Netanyahu is a crafty politician who is not going to go down without a fight. In this regard, three factors need to be closely watched – the nature of the coalition politics, the ‘nationalist’ landscape and the future of allegations against Netanyahu’s.&nbsp;

The changing landscape of coalition politics in Israel can produce an ambiguous election result. Likud and Blue White are likely to emerge as the biggest parties, but with not enough majority to form the government, without the support of smaller parties. And here, it is advantage&nbsp;Netanyahu. The smaller right-wing parties have currently pledged their support to Netanyahu, partly to avoid upsetting their joint right-wing support base. Notably, around 40 political parties are competing for seats in the 120-seat parliament. However, given the minimum threshold of qualification of 3.25 per cent of votes, only 10-14 are expected to finally reach the parliament. &nbsp;

Netanyahu still has an upper edge in the ‘nationalist’ narrative. The US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, containing Iran’s presence in Syria and the shifting of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem are perceived as Netanyahu’s policy successes. The recent US recognition of Israeli sovereignty over Golan heights is likely to add to this narrative. Domestically, Netanyahu’s right-wing and religious bloc has more potential voters. The current PM has tried to brand his rival Gantz, as a ‘weak left’ candidate, forcing the latter to prove his credentials by taking a hard stance towards foreign and security policy. &nbsp;

From now on much will depend on how the perception related to the investigation will pan out. The announcement of Mandelbilt’s intention to indict the PM after a year-long investigation had caused a sharp drop in the polls for Likud, with the party trailing behind the main opposition for the first time. However, the situation has somewhat stabilised since then. The recent decision by Madelblit to withhold evidence until after the elections is being seen as a victory for Netanyahu and may boost the perception that the investigations are politically motivated. &nbsp;&nbsp;

With the two main parties – Likud and Blue White - neck to neck in the upcoming elections, it looks difficult that either of them will be able to form a governing coalition with any likely combination of minor parties. A major antithesis to this is that the Arab parties are unlikely to join any coalition government. One of the post-election scenarios can be a ‘national unity’ government made up of Likud and Blue and White Party. The main point here will be who ends up leading this government or who is chosen by the coalition partners to be the next PM – Netanyahu or Gantz. With so many variables at play, the pendulum can sway in either direction. However, no matter who becomes the PM, fundamentals of Israeli politics are unlikely to change.&nbsp; 
 
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.) &nbsp; 
 
&nbsp;

The pendulum of the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) elections seems to be swinging precariously between the incumbent Likud Party led by PM, Benjamin Netanyahu and a new centrist coalition, Blue and White.

The pendulum of the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) elections seems to be swinging precariously between the incumbent Likud Party led by PM, Benjamin Netanyahu and a new centrist coalition, Blue and White. For the four-times PM Netanyahu, this is panning out to be one of the toughest electoral battles of his career. Firstly, charges of corruption and the breach of trust levied by Israel’s Attorney General Mandelbilt against the PM and his family can erode his legitimacy. Secondly, a centrist Blue and White coalition party, led by a former head of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), is challenging the fortunes of Netanyahu’s Likud party. While Netanyahu’s voter base remains strong, these charges can put pressure on his coalition partners to take a stand. So, are we witnessing the run-up to a post-Netanyahu era in Israeli politics? In late February 2019, the Attorney General had announced that PM Netanyahu would be indicted on bribery and corruption charges from three separate corruption investigations that are still pending a hearing. Even though in Israeli politics, the PM is not expected to step down until a conviction is upheld through the appeals process, these developments can have a significant impact on the elections. For one, it gives ammunition to the centrist coalition Blue and White party to target the PM. The Blue and White party has been formed by the merger of three parties – Israel Resistance Party, Yesh Atid Party and the Telem party. It is being led by Benny Gantz, ex-Chief of Staff of the IDF, who led the Israeli military through two wars in Gaza in 2012 and 2014. Some voters are likely to perceive him and his party as untainted by Israeli politics, at the same time representing continuity and strength in military and security affairs. However, in politics, there’s many a slip ‘twixt the cup and the lip’. Netanyahu is a crafty politician who is not going to go down without a fight. In this regard, three factors need to be closely watched – the nature of the coalition politics, the ‘nationalist’ landscape and the future of allegations against Netanyahu’s. The changing landscape of coalition politics in Israel can produce an ambiguous election result. Likud and Blue White are likely to emerge as the biggest parties, but with not enough majority to form the government, without the support of smaller parties. And here, it is advantage Netanyahu. The smaller right-wing parties have currently pledged their support to Netanyahu, partly to avoid upsetting their joint right-wing support base. Notably, around 40 political parties are competing for seats in the 120-seat parliament. However, given the minimum threshold of qualification of 3.25 per cent of votes, only 10-14 are expected to finally reach the parliament. Netanyahu still has an upper edge in the ‘nationalist’ narrative. The US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, containing Iran’s presence in Syria and the shifting of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem are perceived as Netanyahu’s policy successes. The recent US recognition of Israeli sovereignty over Golan heights is likely to add to this narrative. Domestically, Netanyahu’s right-wing and religious bloc has more potential voters. The current PM has tried to brand his rival Gantz, as a ‘weak left’ candidate, forcing the latter to prove his credentials by taking a hard stance towards foreign and security policy. From now on much will depend on how the perception related to the investigation will pan out. The announcement of Mandelbilt’s intention to indict the PM after a year-long investigation had caused a sharp drop in the polls for Likud, with the party trailing behind the main opposition for the first time. However, the situation has somewhat stabilised since then. The recent decision by Madelblit to withhold evidence until after the elections is being seen as a victory for Netanyahu and may boost the perception that the investigations are politically motivated. With the two main parties – Likud and Blue White - neck to neck in the upcoming elections, it looks difficult that either of them will be able to form a governing coalition with any likely combination of minor parties. A major antithesis to this is that the Arab parties are unlikely to join any coalition government. One of the post-election scenarios can be a ‘national unity’ government made up of Likud and Blue and White Party. The main point here will be who ends up leading this government or who is chosen by the coalition partners to be the next PM – Netanyahu or Gantz. With so many variables at play, the pendulum can sway in either direction. However, no matter who becomes the PM, fundamentals of Israeli politics are unlikely to change. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Israel elections 2019: Which way will the pendulum swing?

Author

Zee News Rajasthan

Editor

Shraddha Bhandari

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