The Indian politico-diplomatic policy contour, in relation to two major events slated for end April in the Chinese calendar, is indicative of a carefully nuanced posture that Delhi is adopting towards Beijing, even as the world’s largest democracy is in the middle of a major national election.

The Modi led NDA government is in caretaker mode and a new Prime Minister will assume office after May 23 but some import-laden Indian policies that are unfolding this week warrant scrutiny.

On April 23 (Tuesday), two Indian naval ships – the INS Kolkata, a guided-missile destroyer and INS Shakti the fleet tanker will be part of the International Fleet Review (IFR) that China is conducting off Qingdao as part of the 70th-anniversary celebrations of the PLA Navy. Chinese President Xi Jinping will review the 50 naval ships assembled from 13 nations (excluding the host) on Tuesday. Major foreign navies represented at the PLA(N) IFR &nbsp;include Russia, Japan and India and some ASEAN nations. It may be recalled that India had conducted an IFR in February 2016 that saw 100 ships from 50 navies anchored off Visakhapatnam and the assemblage included two PLA(N) frigates.

International fleet reviews are a demonstration of a nation’s politico-diplomatic and military credibility as also acceptability and China is engaged in a similar pursuit against the backdrop of regional anxiety and unease over the kind of military assertiveness that Beijing has demonstrated in recent years in relation to its territorial claims in the East Asia-western Pacific continuum.

But in contrast to this friendly overture apropos the Qingdao IFR, Delhi has decided that India will not be part of the second OBOR (one belt-one road) summit being held in Beijing later in the week (April 26). This summit meeting has been billed as the biggest diplomatic event for China in 2019 and is acknowledged as a hugely ambitious personal project of President Xi Jinping that has complex strategic implications linked to the ‘rise of China’.

Delhi had stayed away from the inaugural summit in 2017 due to the manner in which India’s sovereignty claims over POK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir) were ignored among other concerns. Yet given the manner in which the post-Doklam tension was sought to be assuaged at the informal Xi-Modi summit Wuhan, it was expected that India would review its non-participation at the second OBOR (aka Belt and Road Initiative) &nbsp;summit. &nbsp;&nbsp;

However, in what was seen as a major disappointment for Beijing, earlier in March, the Indian ambassador to China Vikram Misri explained the rationale for the Indian refusal to be part of the 2019 summit. Misri noted: &nbsp;"Above all, connectivity initiatives must be pursued in a manner that respects the sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of nations".

He further added: "No country can participate in an initiative that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity. To be honest, we have made no secret of our views and our position on the BRI is clear and consistent and one that we have conveyed to the authorities concerned.”&nbsp; 
 
It is understood that most of the global community would be present at the second BRI &nbsp;summit, including nations with whom China currently has an uneasy or tense relationship including the USA and Japan and India’s determined ‘absence’ would be visible.

The inference that could be made is that by adopting two very different policy &nbsp;options in relation to the PLA (Navy) IFR on April 23 and the BRI summit on April 26, Delhi &nbsp;is signalling both malleability and resolve in what may be described as an ‘issue-based’ and carefully calibrated approach in its overall China policy.

In yet another development, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has set up a new division designated the Indo-Pacific and it is understood that this division will integrate policies pertaining to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and deliberations related to the Quad. The latter refers to maritime/naval consultations between the USA, Japan, India and Australia.

The Indo-Pacific is both a geographic entity that links the two oceans – the Indian and the Pacific; and a nascent strategic construct mooted by the USA in some detail in October 2017. The Indian formulation in relation to the Indo-Pacific was outlined by PM Modi at the Shangri-La dialogue in mid-2018 which dwelt on the centrality of ASEAN in this maritime framework. China has its own reservations about this yoking of the two oceans and the strategic sub-text advanced by the USA and the Indian decision to formally create a new division dedicated to the Indo-Pacific will not go unnoticed.

Managing the bilateral with China will be a major challenge for the next Indian government and the policy contours of end April, as manifest in the IFR and the BRI summit, will remain important punctuation in this uneasy relationship between the two Asian giants.

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

The Indian politico-diplomatic policy contour, in relation to two major events slated for end April in the Chinese calendar, is indicative of a carefully nuanced posture that Delhi is adopting towards Beijing, even as the world’s largest democracy is in the middle of a major national election.

The Indian politico-diplomatic policy contour, in relation to two major events slated for end April in the Chinese calendar, is indicative of a carefully nuanced posture that Delhi is adopting towards Beijing, even as the world’s largest democracy is in the middle of a major national election. The Modi led NDA government is in caretaker mode and a new Prime Minister will assume office after May 23 but some import-laden Indian policies that are unfolding this week warrant scrutiny. On April 23 (Tuesday), two Indian naval ships – the INS Kolkata, a guided-missile destroyer and INS Shakti the fleet tanker will be part of the International Fleet Review (IFR) that China is conducting off Qingdao as part of the 70th-anniversary celebrations of the PLA Navy. Chinese President Xi Jinping will review the 50 naval ships assembled from 13 nations (excluding the host) on Tuesday. Major foreign navies represented at the PLA(N) IFR include Russia, Japan and India and some ASEAN nations. It may be recalled that India had conducted an IFR in February 2016 that saw 100 ships from 50 navies anchored off Visakhapatnam and the assemblage included two PLA(N) frigates. International fleet reviews are a demonstration of a nation’s politico-diplomatic and military credibility as also acceptability and China is engaged in a similar pursuit against the backdrop of regional anxiety and unease over the kind of military assertiveness that Beijing has demonstrated in recent years in relation to its territorial claims in the East Asia-western Pacific continuum. But in contrast to this friendly overture apropos the Qingdao IFR, Delhi has decided that India will not be part of the second OBOR (one belt-one road) summit being held in Beijing later in the week (April 26). This summit meeting has been billed as the biggest diplomatic event for China in 2019 and is acknowledged as a hugely ambitious personal project of President Xi Jinping that has complex strategic implications linked to the ‘rise of China’. Delhi had stayed away from the inaugural summit in 2017 due to the manner in which India’s sovereignty claims over POK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir) were ignored among other concerns. Yet given the manner in which the post-Doklam tension was sought to be assuaged at the informal Xi-Modi summit Wuhan, it was expected that India would review its non-participation at the second OBOR (aka Belt and Road Initiative) summit. However, in what was seen as a major disappointment for Beijing, earlier in March, the Indian ambassador to China Vikram Misri explained the rationale for the Indian refusal to be part of the 2019 summit. Misri noted: "Above all, connectivity initiatives must be pursued in a manner that respects the sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of nations". He further added: "No country can participate in an initiative that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity. To be honest, we have made no secret of our views and our position on the BRI is clear and consistent and one that we have conveyed to the authorities concerned.” It is understood that most of the global community would be present at the second BRI summit, including nations with whom China currently has an uneasy or tense relationship including the USA and Japan and India’s determined ‘absence’ would be visible. The inference that could be made is that by adopting two very different policy options in relation to the PLA (Navy) IFR on April 23 and the BRI summit on April 26, Delhi is signalling both malleability and resolve in what may be described as an ‘issue-based’ and carefully calibrated approach in its overall China policy. In yet another development, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has set up a new division designated the Indo-Pacific and it is understood that this division will integrate policies pertaining to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and deliberations related to the Quad. The latter refers to maritime/naval consultations between the USA, Japan, India and Australia. The Indo-Pacific is both a geographic entity that links the two oceans – the Indian and the Pacific; and a nascent strategic construct mooted by the USA in some detail in October 2017. The Indian formulation in relation to the Indo-Pacific was outlined by PM Modi at the Shangri-La dialogue in mid-2018 which dwelt on the centrality of ASEAN in this maritime framework. China has its own reservations about this yoking of the two oceans and the strategic sub-text advanced by the USA and the Indian decision to formally create a new division dedicated to the Indo-Pacific will not go unnoticed. Managing the bilateral with China will be a major challenge for the next Indian government and the policy contours of end April, as manifest in the IFR and the BRI summit, will remain important punctuation in this uneasy relationship between the two Asian giants. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Managing bilateral relations with China will be a major challenge for the next Indian government

The Indian Army inducted its first batch of artillery guns on November 9 in Deolali and it is expected that over the next two years, a total of 245 guns will be progressively acquired.&nbsp;

These guns are 145 in number M 777 (from the US) and 100 in number K 9 Vajra (with South Korean cooperation) and will cost a little under Rs 10,000 crores.

It may be recalled that after India acquired the Bofors artillery gun from Sweden in 1986, this is the first induction of fresh inventory and is an indicator of the many constraints that bedevil the military procurement process in India.

Both the Bofors gun and the HDW submarine acquired from then West Germany in the later 1980s have become synonymous with financial transgressions and corruption cum bribery charges were levelled against then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

It also merits note that after more than 30 years of investigation, the Bofors case has been more or less closed for extended delays by the CBI and lack of substantive evidence–though a window has been kept open on technical grounds.

However, it would be valid to infer that then PM Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress party were placed on the defensive by the opposition parties and the electoral defeat of the Congress party in late 1989 was shaped by the perception among the electorate that the government of the day was ‘corrupt’ and hence voted out.

These elements are indicative of the multi-layered significance of the induction in Deolali on Friday where the Defence Minister and the Army Chief were both present. &nbsp;

In her remarks, Minister Nirmala Sitharaman provided the political context when she noted: “These guns are being inducted almost 30 years after the Bofors guns were inducted” &nbsp;and added that though the process to acquire these guns began in 2006, there was no tangible progress.

In the pre-election phase that India is now in, the Minister further added: “In contrast, our government shrunk the process in the last four years and not only initiated the procurement process, but ensured its induction.”&nbsp;

While the M 777 is a case of a direct government to government (G2G) &nbsp;purchase from the USA, thereby avoiding the kind of Rafale fiasco, the Vajra has the potential for contributing to the Make In India initiative prioritized by the Modi government.

The Indian army has been in dire need of acquiring greater fire-power by way of the artillery and this was evidenced during the Kargil war of 1999. Yet, the higher defence decision-making apparatus in India during NDA-I led by PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the UPA decade led by PM Manmohan Singh were unable to redress a major inventory gap for the army and these 15 years did not lead to any meaningful policy decision by way of direct import, &nbsp;technology transfer and assemble in India, as well as provide encouragement to the private sector. &nbsp;

Much the same paradigm applies to the Indian Air Force and the induction of a fighter aircraft now symbolized by the Rafale controversy.

Thus the policy cues from the Deolali induction of artillery guns can be reviewed along three tracks. The first is that the armed forces of India must not be denied critical equipment/ platform due to political mud-slinging between the major parties and the Bofors-HDW cross ought to be an internalised for lessons learnt and pitfalls to be avoided by the legislature and the PMO in an appropriate manner.

This is easier said than done given the current ethos in India, which is a relentless zero-sum approach towards national security and seeking political mileage for electoral benefit.

The second is that whether UPA or NDA, the military inventory procurement procedures in India have to be made more time and cost efficient. The submarine saga of India is one of precious time and resources – both fiscal and HR being squandered due to faulty policy making and an indifferent/impulsive higher defence management approach.&nbsp;

The Rafale fighter aircraft experience and the Scorpene submarine now being built in India as the new Kalveri class, are illustrative.

The third policy strand that merits some deep introspection is the Indian inability to nurture a national eco-system for encouraging Make in India in the defence sector in a meaningful manner.&nbsp;

The Vajra K 9 guns inducted in Deolali are the result of cooperation between a South Korean technology major and an &nbsp;Indian company — Larsen &amp; Toubro. &nbsp;This is a commendable initiative in relation to domestic manufacture of conventional military equipment for the army, which despite being the largest service in India, does not have a significant track-record in design and manufacture of equipment/platforms. &nbsp;&nbsp;

India needs to nurture the private sector –both major and medium - to become stakeholders in the path towards some degree of self-sufficiency.

Defence R&amp;D and manufacture in India has been zealously guarded by the DRDO and the defence PSUs, including the Ordnance factories.&nbsp;

While there have been notable successes in the strategic domain due to the perseverance of these institutions, for example, the missile and nuclear weapon programme– the conventional arms spectrum is disappointing.&nbsp;

While the DRDO has been accused of being a ‘dog-in-the-manger’, in certain instances the faith and trust placed in the private sector has been misplaced leading to bitter acrimony between the principal stakeholders.

India is planning a manned mission to the moon but is unable to design and manufacture a personal weapon for its one million-plus army and a para-military that is as large. Irrigating the defence design and manufacturing eco-system towards this end for the long term is a national imperative. 
 
(This article was originally published on DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-acquisitions-long-overdue-2686109">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

 
&nbsp;

The Indian Army inducted its first batch of artillery guns on November 9 in Deolali and it is expected that over the next two years, a total of 245 guns will be progressively acquired.

The Indian Army inducted its first batch of artillery guns on November 9 in Deolali and it is expected that over the next two years, a total of 245 guns will be progressively acquired. These guns are 145 in number M 777 (from the US) and 100 in number K 9 Vajra (with South Korean cooperation) and will cost a little under Rs 10,000 crores. It may be recalled that after India acquired the Bofors artillery gun from Sweden in 1986, this is the first induction of fresh inventory and is an indicator of the many constraints that bedevil the military procurement process in India. Both the Bofors gun and the HDW submarine acquired from then West Germany in the later 1980s have become synonymous with financial transgressions and corruption cum bribery charges were levelled against then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. It also merits note that after more than 30 years of investigation, the Bofors case has been more or less closed for extended delays by the CBI and lack of substantive evidence–though a window has been kept open on technical grounds. However, it would be valid to infer that then PM Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress party were placed on the defensive by the opposition parties and the electoral defeat of the Congress party in late 1989 was shaped by the perception among the electorate that the government of the day was ‘corrupt’ and hence voted out. These elements are indicative of the multi-layered significance of the induction in Deolali on Friday where the Defence Minister and the Army Chief were both present. In her remarks, Minister Nirmala Sitharaman provided the political context when she noted: “These guns are being inducted almost 30 years after the Bofors guns were inducted” and added that though the process to acquire these guns began in 2006, there was no tangible progress. In the pre-election phase that India is now in, the Minister further added: “In contrast, our government shrunk the process in the last four years and not only initiated the procurement process, but ensured its induction.” While the M 777 is a case of a direct government to government (G2G) purchase from the USA, thereby avoiding the kind of Rafale fiasco, the Vajra has the potential for contributing to the Make In India initiative prioritized by the Modi government. The Indian army has been in dire need of acquiring greater fire-power by way of the artillery and this was evidenced during the Kargil war of 1999. Yet, the higher defence decision-making apparatus in India during NDA-I led by PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the UPA decade led by PM Manmohan Singh were unable to redress a major inventory gap for the army and these 15 years did not lead to any meaningful policy decision by way of direct import, technology transfer and assemble in India, as well as provide encouragement to the private sector. Much the same paradigm applies to the Indian Air Force and the induction of a fighter aircraft now symbolized by the Rafale controversy. Thus the policy cues from the Deolali induction of artillery guns can be reviewed along three tracks. The first is that the armed forces of India must not be denied critical equipment/ platform due to political mud-slinging between the major parties and the Bofors-HDW cross ought to be an internalised for lessons learnt and pitfalls to be avoided by the legislature and the PMO in an appropriate manner. This is easier said than done given the current ethos in India, which is a relentless zero-sum approach towards national security and seeking political mileage for electoral benefit. The second is that whether UPA or NDA, the military inventory procurement procedures in India have to be made more time and cost efficient. The submarine saga of India is one of precious time and resources – both fiscal and HR being squandered due to faulty policy making and an indifferent/impulsive higher defence management approach. The Rafale fighter aircraft experience and the Scorpene submarine now being built in India as the new Kalveri class, are illustrative. The third policy strand that merits some deep introspection is the Indian inability to nurture a national eco-system for encouraging Make in India in the defence sector in a meaningful manner. The Vajra K 9 guns inducted in Deolali are the result of cooperation between a South Korean technology major and an Indian company — Larsen & Toubro. This is a commendable initiative in relation to domestic manufacture of conventional military equipment for the army, which despite being the largest service in India, does not have a significant track-record in design and manufacture of equipment/platforms. India needs to nurture the private sector –both major and medium - to become stakeholders in the path towards some degree of self-sufficiency. Defence R&D and manufacture in India has been zealously guarded by the DRDO and the defence PSUs, including the Ordnance factories. While there have been notable successes in the strategic domain due to the perseverance of these institutions, for example, the missile and nuclear weapon programme– the conventional arms spectrum is disappointing. While the DRDO has been accused of being a ‘dog-in-the-manger’, in certain instances the faith and trust placed in the private sector has been misplaced leading to bitter acrimony between the principal stakeholders. India is planning a manned mission to the moon but is unable to design and manufacture a personal weapon for its one million-plus army and a para-military that is as large. Irrigating the defence design and manufacturing eco-system towards this end for the long term is a national imperative. (This article was originally published on DNA. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Acquisitions long overdue

Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to arrive in New Delhi on October 5 for the 19th India-Russia summit meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and this comes against the backdrop of a complex dynamic that relates to the texture of their individual relations with the US.

On Thursday (September 20), the Trump administration imposed sanctions on China by invoking CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) provisions since Beijing had engaged in “significant transactions” with Russia. These include the Su-35 combat aircraft and the S-400 surface-to-air missile system and it is instructive to note that these inventory items are also part of the acquisitions that are in the pipeline for India to obtain from Russia. Moscow has been a major supplier of military equipment to India for five decades and the agenda for the current Putin visit is likely to include some important G2G (government to government) agreements for the ‘Make-in-India’ initiative.

It is pertinent to note that India is among the world’s largest importers of military equipment, for it has no significant indigenous manufacturing and design/R&amp;D capability in the defence sector as related to conventional weaponry. It is an anomalous characteristic, that while India has acquired a certain degree of self-sufficiency in relation to strategic capability (nuclear weapons, missiles and nuclear propulsion), it is also a country that has not been able to design and manufacture its own rifle or pistol with a performance index that is on par with the global benchmark.

This has been a major inadequacy in the higher defence management of India for years and this manufacturing-design void in conventional military capability dilutes India’s claim to “strategic autonomy” in the global arena. While Moscow, in its own transition from the former USSR to the current Russian Federation, has provided India invaluable support in certain niches — for instance nuclear submarine construction — this has not been the case in relation to conventional military equipment, however rudimentary. Consequently, the five decades of Indian engagement with the former Soviet Union and later Russia (after the end of the Cold War in December 1991) did not lead to any significant addition to India’s defence manufacturing sector.

Thus it is significant that the Putin visit in October may also include G2G protocols for the licenced-production of the AK-103 assault rifle in an Indian defence public sector unit and a joint venture between Rostec, a Russian helicopter entity, and HAL for the production of the Ka-226 light utility helicopters. Taken to their logical conclusion, this initiative will provide substantive content to the Make in India effort that has been prioritised by Prime Minister Modi, though the question lingers as to why such a step was not taken much earlier by New Delhi. It is understood that the Russian origin Talwar class frigates and IL-78 transport aircraft would also be considered for acquisition.

But all of this would be deemed to be a “significant” transaction with Russia by the White House and early signals coming from the Beltway are cautioning India that the CAASTA legislation could be invoked against New Delhi. It may be recalled that during the recently concluded ‘2+2’ talks that India had with the US, this issue had been flagged but no official position was articulated by both sides and prudently so.

The Trump administration has advised its allies and friends that it expects them to comply with the US line on both Russia and Iran and different domestic legislation such as CAASTA has been introduced. This is a demand that cannot easily be agreed to by many nations who have a long-standing military equipment relationship with Moscow and it is expected that the waiver route would be resorted to on a case-by-case basis.

For the US, the more immediate reaction has come from Beijing which responded to the September 19 CAASTA sanctions by summoning the US ambassador in Beijing and advising Washington to review its position or “bear the consequences.” The US-China tension that is already at play in the economic-trade domain has now spread to the military domain and has become a triangular issue involving Russia as well.

How India will deal with a Trump-led US diktat over CAASTA (and later Iran) will be a litmus test for the resilience of the India-US relationship, as also an indicator of the strategic import that Delhi accords to its ties with Moscow. There are many strands of tactical discord between India and Russia that have emerged in recent years — for instance Russian dismay at the Delhi-Washington partnership that had grown to a robust military sales relationship of $15 billion in a decade and the relative lack of enthusiasm from New Delhi to pursue any new big-ticket projects with Moscow.

On the Indian side, the more recent Russia-Pakistan military relationship and coordination over the Taliban issue in Afghanistan has stoked Indian anxiety. Furthermore, India has to accept the reality that there will be a greater degree of strategic engagement between Moscow and Beijing to deal with the current US orientation in global affairs led by an unpredictable Trump administration.

But the paradox is that while there are specific and complex tactical dissonances in the bilaterals, India remains a distinctive swing State for all three of its major interlocutors: Russia, US and China. While India is militarily dependent on both the US and Russia, they are aware that to realise their respective strategic objectives over the next 25 years, it would be desirable for them to have a stable and satisfactory relationship with India. In like fashion, the Indian swing index works differently for China, wherein pushing New Delhi into the Washington camp would introduce a brittleness in the China-US relationship that will not be favourable to Beijing. India has to distribute its military dependency astutely and Putin’s visit may enable a more nuanced dialogue with Washington over CAATSA and other prickly issues.

(This article was first published on The DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-dynamics-around-putin-s-visit-2666999">original article</a>.)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to arrive in New Delhi on October 5 for the 19th India-Russia summit meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and this comes against the backdrop of a complex dynamic that relates to the texture of their individual relations with the US.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to arrive in New Delhi on October 5 for the 19th India-Russia summit meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and this comes against the backdrop of a complex dynamic that relates to the texture of their individual relations with the US. On Thursday (September 20), the Trump administration imposed sanctions on China by invoking CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) provisions since Beijing had engaged in “significant transactions” with Russia. These include the Su-35 combat aircraft and the S-400 surface-to-air missile system and it is instructive to note that these inventory items are also part of the acquisitions that are in the pipeline for India to obtain from Russia. Moscow has been a major supplier of military equipment to India for five decades and the agenda for the current Putin visit is likely to include some important G2G (government to government) agreements for the ‘Make-in-India’ initiative. It is pertinent to note that India is among the world’s largest importers of military equipment, for it has no significant indigenous manufacturing and design/R&D capability in the defence sector as related to conventional weaponry. It is an anomalous characteristic, that while India has acquired a certain degree of self-sufficiency in relation to strategic capability (nuclear weapons, missiles and nuclear propulsion), it is also a country that has not been able to design and manufacture its own rifle or pistol with a performance index that is on par with the global benchmark. This has been a major inadequacy in the higher defence management of India for years and this manufacturing-design void in conventional military capability dilutes India’s claim to “strategic autonomy” in the global arena. While Moscow, in its own transition from the former USSR to the current Russian Federation, has provided India invaluable support in certain niches — for instance nuclear submarine construction — this has not been the case in relation to conventional military equipment, however rudimentary. Consequently, the five decades of Indian engagement with the former Soviet Union and later Russia (after the end of the Cold War in December 1991) did not lead to any significant addition to India’s defence manufacturing sector. Thus it is significant that the Putin visit in October may also include G2G protocols for the licenced-production of the AK-103 assault rifle in an Indian defence public sector unit and a joint venture between Rostec, a Russian helicopter entity, and HAL for the production of the Ka-226 light utility helicopters. Taken to their logical conclusion, this initiative will provide substantive content to the Make in India effort that has been prioritised by Prime Minister Modi, though the question lingers as to why such a step was not taken much earlier by New Delhi. It is understood that the Russian origin Talwar class frigates and IL-78 transport aircraft would also be considered for acquisition. But all of this would be deemed to be a “significant” transaction with Russia by the White House and early signals coming from the Beltway are cautioning India that the CAASTA legislation could be invoked against New Delhi. It may be recalled that during the recently concluded ‘2+2’ talks that India had with the US, this issue had been flagged but no official position was articulated by both sides and prudently so. The Trump administration has advised its allies and friends that it expects them to comply with the US line on both Russia and Iran and different domestic legislation such as CAASTA has been introduced. This is a demand that cannot easily be agreed to by many nations who have a long-standing military equipment relationship with Moscow and it is expected that the waiver route would be resorted to on a case-by-case basis. For the US, the more immediate reaction has come from Beijing which responded to the September 19 CAASTA sanctions by summoning the US ambassador in Beijing and advising Washington to review its position or “bear the consequences.” The US-China tension that is already at play in the economic-trade domain has now spread to the military domain and has become a triangular issue involving Russia as well. How India will deal with a Trump-led US diktat over CAASTA (and later Iran) will be a litmus test for the resilience of the India-US relationship, as also an indicator of the strategic import that Delhi accords to its ties with Moscow. There are many strands of tactical discord between India and Russia that have emerged in recent years — for instance Russian dismay at the Delhi-Washington partnership that had grown to a robust military sales relationship of $15 billion in a decade and the relative lack of enthusiasm from New Delhi to pursue any new big-ticket projects with Moscow. On the Indian side, the more recent Russia-Pakistan military relationship and coordination over the Taliban issue in Afghanistan has stoked Indian anxiety. Furthermore, India has to accept the reality that there will be a greater degree of strategic engagement between Moscow and Beijing to deal with the current US orientation in global affairs led by an unpredictable Trump administration. But the paradox is that while there are specific and complex tactical dissonances in the bilaterals, India remains a distinctive swing State for all three of its major interlocutors: Russia, US and China. While India is militarily dependent on both the US and Russia, they are aware that to realise their respective strategic objectives over the next 25 years, it would be desirable for them to have a stable and satisfactory relationship with India. In like fashion, the Indian swing index works differently for China, wherein pushing New Delhi into the Washington camp would introduce a brittleness in the China-US relationship that will not be favourable to Beijing. India has to distribute its military dependency astutely and Putin’s visit may enable a more nuanced dialogue with Washington over CAATSA and other prickly issues. (This article was first published on The DNA. Read the original article.) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Opinion: Dynamics around Putin’s India visit

India and the US spent a greater part of the Cold War (1945-91) as being ‘estranged’ democracies and this was driven by their divergent security interests and the mismatch in their world view at the time. For the US and its allies, the containment of Communism was the overriding objective and countries were either with the US or against it. India, with its commitment to non-alignment, fell into a fuzzy grey zone. To put it mildly, the two nations and their officials were wary of each other even if people-to-people contact was more robust and forthcoming.

The nuclear issue was the principal bone of contention and finally, this was resolved in an innovative manner in September 2008, primarily because of the political resolve and sagacity of the then US President George Bush and PM Manmohan Singh. In the intervening decade, the two democracies have embarked upon a path of cooperation in the defence and military domain and the transmutation in the relationship has been quite remarkable.

This was reflected in New Delhi on September 6, when the two nations met at the ministerial level in an innovative 2+2 format, one that brings the foreign and defence minister equivalents of both nations together at one forum. This is a distinctive framework for both nations, meaning that they do not have a similar format with any other nation.

The first 2+2 was held in New Delhi after being postponed more than once, and at the time there was considerable speculation in the media and in think-tanks that this was a reflection of the reality that the “estrangement” had not really gone and that the political sub-text remained strained.

However, the reality was more mundane (scheduling issues, given the fact that the time-lines of four Cabinet ministers had to be harmonised) and the inaugural meeting had some significant takeaways. After much delay, India finally inked a military communication protocol termed the COMCASA. This unwieldy acronym stands for Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement and is India-specific.

This is part of three foundational agreements that the US enters into with all nations that it provides military platforms and equipment to, and the other two pertain to logistics and the sharing of geospatial data. India had signed the logistic agreement in August 2016 which allows the two nations to exchange and share each other’s logistic facilities as and when required.

India’s deeply ingrained reluctance to enter into any formal agreement with the US, in particular, merits review. There is a deep historical animus on both sides going back to the nuclear agreements of the 1960s and the ‘Atoms for Peace’ project that became the confrontational ‘Tarapur Syndrome’ after India’s peaceful nuclear explosion of May 1974. Betrayal of trust, breach of contract — the allegations flew fast and furious from both sides and very soon the US introduced its country-specific NNPA (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act) of 1978 and the denial of technology sanctions that followed.

Against this backdrop, the wariness on the Indian side to enter into any military-related agreement with the US was predictable. Congress-led governments at the Centre were doubly cautious — more so due to the criticism that was expected from the Opposition parties (Left and BJP) of capitulating to Uncle Sam.

It was then PM Vajpayee who began the rapprochement with the US, paradoxically by carrying out the Shakti nuclear tests of May 1998, and it was this radical outreach to the Beltway that led to the first steps in a defence and strategic partnership. Consequently, the first of the foundational agreements was mooted in 2003 and the actual signing took place in 2016 under another BJP-led government.

COMCASA signed in New Delhi will allow India to maximise the full communication and surveillance potential of US-supplied platforms, and the P8 maritime reconnaissance aircraft and the heavy-duty C-130J transport aircraft are the cases in point. Though the Indian military was no doubt operating the platforms before inking the COMCASA, they were not able to utilise the full spectrum of the communication and surveillance equipment without the encrypted security provisions. Modern warfare is predicated on the speed and security of sharing information through a dedicated network that brings together many participants/platforms and the term network-centric warfare symbolises this capability.

Thus, at the tactical plane, the inking of COMCASA will enhance the operational capability of existing US-origin platforms in the Indian military. Concurrently, this will allow for greater interoperability between the military services on both sides and this could have considerable value in HADR (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief), as also at the next Malabar exercise that will see the two navies engaging with each other. Is there a geopolitical signal here? The answer is, yes.

Furthermore, signing COMCASA can open up other windows with US entities for long-term cooperation in the communication-surveillance technology domain that is undergoing rapid transformation. However, this is a work in progress and there are many banana peels that need to be avoided.

Critics of COMCASA have suggested that India’s communication networks, including the strategic forces (nuclear weapons and missiles), will be compromised and subject to US intrusion. This is not a tenable assertion and does little justice to the professionalism of the Indian security establishment. India has entered into a defence partnership with the US and historical misgivings should not be allowed to morph into deep mistrust. New Delhi’s stake in this relationship is greater than that of the Beltway.

 
(This article was first published on The DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-military-edge-to-india-us-ties-2662928">original article</a>.)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) 
&nbsp

&nbsp

The inking of COMCASA will enhance the operational capability of existing US-origin platforms in the Indian military

India and the US spent a greater part of the Cold War (1945-91) as being ‘estranged’ democracies and this was driven by their divergent security interests and the mismatch in their world view at the time. For the US and its allies, the containment of Communism was the overriding objective and countries were either with the US or against it. India, with its commitment to non-alignment, fell into a fuzzy grey zone. To put it mildly, the two nations and their officials were wary of each other even if people-to-people contact was more robust and forthcoming. The nuclear issue was the principal bone of contention and finally, this was resolved in an innovative manner in September 2008, primarily because of the political resolve and sagacity of the then US President George Bush and PM Manmohan Singh. In the intervening decade, the two democracies have embarked upon a path of cooperation in the defence and military domain and the transmutation in the relationship has been quite remarkable. This was reflected in New Delhi on September 6, when the two nations met at the ministerial level in an innovative 2+2 format, one that brings the foreign and defence minister equivalents of both nations together at one forum. This is a distinctive framework for both nations, meaning that they do not have a similar format with any other nation. The first 2+2 was held in New Delhi after being postponed more than once, and at the time there was considerable speculation in the media and in think-tanks that this was a reflection of the reality that the “estrangement” had not really gone and that the political sub-text remained strained. However, the reality was more mundane (scheduling issues, given the fact that the time-lines of four Cabinet ministers had to be harmonised) and the inaugural meeting had some significant takeaways. After much delay, India finally inked a military communication protocol termed the COMCASA. This unwieldy acronym stands for Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement and is India-specific. This is part of three foundational agreements that the US enters into with all nations that it provides military platforms and equipment to, and the other two pertain to logistics and the sharing of geospatial data. India had signed the logistic agreement in August 2016 which allows the two nations to exchange and share each other’s logistic facilities as and when required. India’s deeply ingrained reluctance to enter into any formal agreement with the US, in particular, merits review. There is a deep historical animus on both sides going back to the nuclear agreements of the 1960s and the ‘Atoms for Peace’ project that became the confrontational ‘Tarapur Syndrome’ after India’s peaceful nuclear explosion of May 1974. Betrayal of trust, breach of contract — the allegations flew fast and furious from both sides and very soon the US introduced its country-specific NNPA (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act) of 1978 and the denial of technology sanctions that followed. Against this backdrop, the wariness on the Indian side to enter into any military-related agreement with the US was predictable. Congress-led governments at the Centre were doubly cautious — more so due to the criticism that was expected from the Opposition parties (Left and BJP) of capitulating to Uncle Sam. It was then PM Vajpayee who began the rapprochement with the US, paradoxically by carrying out the Shakti nuclear tests of May 1998, and it was this radical outreach to the Beltway that led to the first steps in a defence and strategic partnership. Consequently, the first of the foundational agreements was mooted in 2003 and the actual signing took place in 2016 under another BJP-led government. COMCASA signed in New Delhi will allow India to maximise the full communication and surveillance potential of US-supplied platforms, and the P8 maritime reconnaissance aircraft and the heavy-duty C-130J transport aircraft are the cases in point. Though the Indian military was no doubt operating the platforms before inking the COMCASA, they were not able to utilise the full spectrum of the communication and surveillance equipment without the encrypted security provisions. Modern warfare is predicated on the speed and security of sharing information through a dedicated network that brings together many participants/platforms and the term network-centric warfare symbolises this capability. Thus, at the tactical plane, the inking of COMCASA will enhance the operational capability of existing US-origin platforms in the Indian military. Concurrently, this will allow for greater interoperability between the military services on both sides and this could have considerable value in HADR (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief), as also at the next Malabar exercise that will see the two navies engaging with each other. Is there a geopolitical signal here? The answer is, yes. Furthermore, signing COMCASA can open up other windows with US entities for long-term cooperation in the communication-surveillance technology domain that is undergoing rapid transformation. However, this is a work in progress and there are many banana peels that need to be avoided. Critics of COMCASA have suggested that India’s communication networks, including the strategic forces (nuclear weapons and missiles), will be compromised and subject to US intrusion. This is not a tenable assertion and does little justice to the professionalism of the Indian security establishment. India has entered into a defence partnership with the US and historical misgivings should not be allowed to morph into deep mistrust. New Delhi’s stake in this relationship is greater than that of the Beltway. (This article was first published on The DNA. Read the original article.) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Opinion: Military edge to India-US ties

Cricketer-turned politician Imran Khan who was sworn in as the 22nd Prime Minister of Pakistan on August 18 faced his first major challenge in less than two weeks after assuming office, when the right-wing Islamic party Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) threatened to march to Islamabad to register their protest against a blasphemous cartoon contest that was to be held in the Netherlands later in November.&nbsp;

The protesters in the thousands led by firebrand TLP leaders Peer Muhammad Afzal Qadri and Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi set out on&nbsp;August 29&nbsp;and demanded that Pakistan sever its diplomatic ties with the Netherlands and also ensure that the proposed cartoon event be cancelled.

The protesters marched from Lahore and reached Rawalpindi a day later, during which period intense consultations and negotiations were conducted and to the relief of the new Imran Khan government – the march was called off after the TLP cadres were assured that the cartoon contest had indeed been cancelled.

In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders, the far-right Dutch politician who was the &nbsp;brains &nbsp;behind the Prophet Muhammad cartoon contest deferred to the prevailing anger in Pakistan and cancelled the event. Earlier, the Dutch government had distanced itself from this proposed contest but had also indicated that it would not trample on the freedom of speech principle that the Netherlands upheld.&nbsp;

The satirical treatment of the Prophet Muhammad by the French magazine Charlie Hebdo in February 2006 had led to a wave of &nbsp;protests from the Muslim world and the matter was referred to the French courts which again upheld freedom of expression and the tradition of satire. The controversy simmered with Islamic groups warning of retribution and the magazine occasionally continuing this practice till January 2015, when gunmen entered the office of the magazine in Paris and killed 12 staff cartoonists and plunged France into grief, anger and insecurity. No country in the world can accept its citizens being held to ransom in this manner by Islamic terrorists. &nbsp;

The siege of Islamabad by thousands of ardent guardians of the Islamic faith was averted at the last minute and there was an element of poetic justice at what had unfolded for the new PM of Pakistan. It may be recalled that in November 2016, Imran Khan, then an Opposition leader led a march to Islamabad to force then prime minister Nawaz Sharif to step down over corruption charges related to the Panama papers. At the time it was &nbsp;widely believed that both the Pakistan military and the right-wing Islamic constituency had endorsed this use of muscle-power to intimidate the government of &nbsp;the day.

Pakistan is familiar and now weary with the cynical use by its political representatives and the military of both religion and related violence to advance domestic agendas. This pattern began in full measure during the General Zia-ul-Haq years (1978 – 88) &nbsp;which saw the steady Islamisation of both state and society. But the Islamic right-wing constituency represented by clerics and the spectrum of the Mujahideen-militant-terrorist was relatively subordinate to the military or the political dispensation till recently.

The TLP which is the political wing of the religious group Tehreek-e-Labaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYR) came into prominence after the assassination of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer in 2011 by his bodyguard Mumtaz Qadri. The latter, a fundamentalist Barhelvi adherent took this extreme step since the Governor was supportive of seeking legal recourse in a blasphemy case, as opposed to the mob-lynching that was being attempted. The TLP celebrated the assassination of Taseer and deified Qadri as a true defender of the faith and ever since, this relatively little-known outfit has acquired a larger than life visibility in Pakistan.

In October 2017, the TLP seized upon a minor error in an election &nbsp;bill relating to the finality of Prophet Muhammad and brought the government to a halt. Whipping up religious fervor and insinuating that the Nawaz Sharif government was guilty of blasphemy, the TLP embarked upon a sit-in and a siege to Islamabad and finally forced the government to recant. It was supported by Imran Khan’s PTI that played the religious card deftly and thereby entered into a Faustian bargain.

The TLP tiger had tasted blood and was now ready to take the electoral plunge in 2018. At the just concluded national election, the TLP garnered 2.23 million votes and emerged as the fifth largest party in vote share which is quite significant given that this is a first-time national debut. While it did not obtain any seats in the assembly, the TLP emerged as a critical swing party in many constituencies and enabled Khan’s PTI to edge past the PML (N) of Nawaz Sharif.

The TLP is again claiming victory over the Dutch cartoon stand-off and while a crisis may have been averted for now, the implications of appeasing the TLP could prove costly and corrosive for Prime Minister Imran Khan and the short-term trajectory of Pakistan. The conjecture that follows is that the TLP, despite its legislative void, is a force to be reckoned with on Pakistan’s streets and has demonstrated that it can shape the country’s foreign policy. More recently it is rumoured that Prime Minister Imran Khan did not take a telephone call from the French President since some hardliners had ostensibly “blacklisted” France for its earlier Charlie Hebdo blasphemy.&nbsp;

Even if this allegation is baseless, it points to the manner in which the Imran Khan government will have to constantly look over its shoulder and pander to the preferences of the TLP and its inflexible, intolerant interpretation of the tenets of Islam. In the run up to the protest march to Islamabad, TLP leader Rizvi asserted to his flock: “If they give me the atom bomb, I’ll immediately bomb Holland, before they are able to hold any caricature competitions on the prophet.” It appears that Pakistan’s foreign and security policies will now have to factor in one more player – the TLP and its ideological clones. The cartoon competition may have been cancelled but a far deeper and more complex one in the power grid of Pakistan may have &nbsp;just begun. 
 
(This article was first published on The DNA. Read the <a href="https://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-imran-khan-s-first-major-challenge-2659216">original article</a>.)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) 
&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

 
&nbsp;

It appears that Pakistan’s foreign and security policies will now have to factor in one more player – the TLP and its ideological clones.

Cricketer-turned politician Imran Khan who was sworn in as the 22nd Prime Minister of Pakistan on August 18 faced his first major challenge in less than two weeks after assuming office, when the right-wing Islamic party Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) threatened to march to Islamabad to register their protest against a blasphemous cartoon contest that was to be held in the Netherlands later in November. The protesters in the thousands led by firebrand TLP leaders Peer Muhammad Afzal Qadri and Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi set out on August 29 and demanded that Pakistan sever its diplomatic ties with the Netherlands and also ensure that the proposed cartoon event be cancelled. The protesters marched from Lahore and reached Rawalpindi a day later, during which period intense consultations and negotiations were conducted and to the relief of the new Imran Khan government – the march was called off after the TLP cadres were assured that the cartoon contest had indeed been cancelled. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders, the far-right Dutch politician who was the brains behind the Prophet Muhammad cartoon contest deferred to the prevailing anger in Pakistan and cancelled the event. Earlier, the Dutch government had distanced itself from this proposed contest but had also indicated that it would not trample on the freedom of speech principle that the Netherlands upheld. The satirical treatment of the Prophet Muhammad by the French magazine Charlie Hebdo in February 2006 had led to a wave of protests from the Muslim world and the matter was referred to the French courts which again upheld freedom of expression and the tradition of satire. The controversy simmered with Islamic groups warning of retribution and the magazine occasionally continuing this practice till January 2015, when gunmen entered the office of the magazine in Paris and killed 12 staff cartoonists and plunged France into grief, anger and insecurity. No country in the world can accept its citizens being held to ransom in this manner by Islamic terrorists. The siege of Islamabad by thousands of ardent guardians of the Islamic faith was averted at the last minute and there was an element of poetic justice at what had unfolded for the new PM of Pakistan. It may be recalled that in November 2016, Imran Khan, then an Opposition leader led a march to Islamabad to force then prime minister Nawaz Sharif to step down over corruption charges related to the Panama papers. At the time it was widely believed that both the Pakistan military and the right-wing Islamic constituency had endorsed this use of muscle-power to intimidate the government of the day. Pakistan is familiar and now weary with the cynical use by its political representatives and the military of both religion and related violence to advance domestic agendas. This pattern began in full measure during the General Zia-ul-Haq years (1978 – 88) which saw the steady Islamisation of both state and society. But the Islamic right-wing constituency represented by clerics and the spectrum of the Mujahideen-militant-terrorist was relatively subordinate to the military or the political dispensation till recently. The TLP which is the political wing of the religious group Tehreek-e-Labaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYR) came into prominence after the assassination of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer in 2011 by his bodyguard Mumtaz Qadri. The latter, a fundamentalist Barhelvi adherent took this extreme step since the Governor was supportive of seeking legal recourse in a blasphemy case, as opposed to the mob-lynching that was being attempted. The TLP celebrated the assassination of Taseer and deified Qadri as a true defender of the faith and ever since, this relatively little-known outfit has acquired a larger than life visibility in Pakistan. In October 2017, the TLP seized upon a minor error in an election bill relating to the finality of Prophet Muhammad and brought the government to a halt. Whipping up religious fervor and insinuating that the Nawaz Sharif government was guilty of blasphemy, the TLP embarked upon a sit-in and a siege to Islamabad and finally forced the government to recant. It was supported by Imran Khan’s PTI that played the religious card deftly and thereby entered into a Faustian bargain. The TLP tiger had tasted blood and was now ready to take the electoral plunge in 2018. At the just concluded national election, the TLP garnered 2.23 million votes and emerged as the fifth largest party in vote share which is quite significant given that this is a first-time national debut. While it did not obtain any seats in the assembly, the TLP emerged as a critical swing party in many constituencies and enabled Khan’s PTI to edge past the PML (N) of Nawaz Sharif. The TLP is again claiming victory over the Dutch cartoon stand-off and while a crisis may have been averted for now, the implications of appeasing the TLP could prove costly and corrosive for Prime Minister Imran Khan and the short-term trajectory of Pakistan. The conjecture that follows is that the TLP, despite its legislative void, is a force to be reckoned with on Pakistan’s streets and has demonstrated that it can shape the country’s foreign policy. More recently it is rumoured that Prime Minister Imran Khan did not take a telephone call from the French President since some hardliners had ostensibly “blacklisted” France for its earlier Charlie Hebdo blasphemy. Even if this allegation is baseless, it points to the manner in which the Imran Khan government will have to constantly look over its shoulder and pander to the preferences of the TLP and its inflexible, intolerant interpretation of the tenets of Islam. In the run up to the protest march to Islamabad, TLP leader Rizvi asserted to his flock: “If they give me the atom bomb, I’ll immediately bomb Holland, before they are able to hold any caricature competitions on the prophet.” It appears that Pakistan’s foreign and security policies will now have to factor in one more player – the TLP and its ideological clones. The cartoon competition may have been cancelled but a far deeper and more complex one in the power grid of Pakistan may have just begun. (This article was first published on The DNA. Read the original article.) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Opinion: Imran Khan’s first major challenge

A few days before India celebrated its Independence Day (August 15) the Maldives envoy in New Delhi ‘reminded’ his host nation that Male wanted India to withdraw its two military helicopters and the service personnel stationed in the island nation. This terse message was first conveyed to Delhi in July after the agreement for stationing Indian helicopters expired in June this year.&nbsp

This development is a reflection of a steady downward spiral in the India-Maldives bilateral relationship that has been troubled for some years.

The bilateral relationship between India and the smallest SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) member, Maldives (population 417,000), has become a victim of the domestic political discord within the island state. It may be recalled that current President Abdulla Yameen Gayoom who assumed office in November 2013 has suppressed all dissent and political opposition in the Maldives and governed with an iron hand. This culminated with the arrest of opposition leaders and even the Chief Justice of the country in February this year.

New Delhi along with many other nations had expressed their dismay at this turn of events and had advocated an immediate release of those imprisoned and a return to the dialogue process in the furtherance of the democratic principle. Clearly this was not acceptable to the Maldivian leader who saw this as an affront to him and ever since President Yameen has adopted an intense anti-India stance.&nbsp

The return of the helicopters apart, there have been many political and diplomatic snubs aimed at Delhi by Male over the last year and this is ironic, considering that almost 30 years ago – to the date – in November 1988, India had mounted an extraordinary military operation (Cactus) to avert a mercenary coup that was seeking to overthrow then President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom – half-bother of the current President.

The sub-text of Maldives cocking a snook, as it were at India, has to do with the China card, which refers to the manner in which Beijing is making steady inroads into the Indian periphery over the last decade.

This has included the opening of Chinese missions where they did not exist – Maldives is a case in point – and tacitly signalling that the smaller neighbours have a supportive ‘big brother’ in Beijing.

It may be recalled that the 17 th SAARC Summit was held in the Maldives on November 10, 2011 and two days prior to this major regional event, Beijing opened its embassy in Male. The politico- diplomatic signal was clear – Beijing had decided to increase its foot- print in the Indian Ocean region and the strategic geography of these small islands was being acknowledged.

In September 2014, President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese leader to visit the island nation and the domestic political environment allowed Beijing to ‘invest’ in the local leadership. In December 2017, Beijing rolled out the red carpet for the Maldives President Abdulla Yameen and to India’s chagrin – Male signed its first FTA (free trade agreement) with China. Traditionally India has been a major trading partner for the Maldives and Delhi has been the first-provider of critical aid and assistance over the decades. But the India-first option for Male has now been slanted in favor of China.

Given the critical location of the Maldives in the Indian Ocean and China’s long term global maritime aspirations now subsumed in the ambitious Xi Jinping led BRI (Belt-Road-Initiative), there is a certain strategic logic and compulsion to Beijing investing in the Maldives, Sri Lanka and now Djibouti.&nbsp

Cumulatively this “Maldives syndrome” and the steady increase in Chinese presence in the Indian neighbourhood has resulted in a relative shrinking of New Delhi’s profile. This has diluted the natural primacy accorded to India that was taken as an existential reality of South Asia.

Over the last decade, China’s political, trade-economic and military foot-print in the Indian &nbspneighbourhood is being enhanced in a visible manner. Traditionally, it was Pakistan that was seen as the “all- weather” ally of China and the Sino-Pak bilateral remains a deep and opaque strategic partnership that includes WMD (weapons of mass destruction) cooperation. Over the last decade, China is emerging as a major benefactor for all of India's neighbors.China has evolved a regional template for southern Asia with a clear maritime and land connectivity focus as part of the BRI and many SAARC nations have signed up to this macro connectivity project.

Paradoxically the success, or lack thereof of the BRI will be determined to a considerable extent by the stance that India adopts. Currently India has distanced itself from the BRI due to the territorial sovereignty issues related to the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) and this will be a major item on the bilateral agenda in the near future.

With a population of a billion plus and an economic trajectory that projects India as the world’s third largest GDP within a decade (next to China and the USA), it would be imprudent for China to trample over Delhi’s core national interests and sensitivities within the SAARC region. That would be the normative logic in the event the Xi Jinping “dream” is able to envision a China and Asia rising together in tandem. This would also enable the realisation of the “Asian century” wherein China and India would be among the three top global economies in the run up to 2050.

However this exigency, promising as it is, will have to navigate the complex Maldives syndrome – that is the degree to which India and China will either compete or cooperate in the extended south Asian neighborhood. The smaller nations, including Maldives, are uneasy about getting into a debt-trap with Beijing and the Sri Lankan example, where Colombo has had to hand over a port facility for 99 years to a Chinese entity is a case in point.

Maldives is expected to “elect” its leader on September 23 and the outcome will have implications that go beyond the destiny of its tiny population.

(The author is Director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi)

(This article was first published on The DNA. Read the <a href="http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-india-s-south-asia-problem-2652400">original article</a>.)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Over the last decade, China’s political, trade-economic and military foot-print in the Indian neighbourhood is being enhanced in a visible manner.

A few days before India celebrated its Independence Day (August 15) the Maldives envoy in New Delhi ‘reminded’ his host nation that Male wanted India to withdraw its two military helicopters and the service personnel stationed in the island nation. This terse message was first conveyed to Delhi in July after the agreement for stationing Indian helicopters expired in June this year. This development is a reflection of a steady downward spiral in the India-Maldives bilateral relationship that has been troubled for some years. The bilateral relationship between India and the smallest SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) member, Maldives (population 417,000), has become a victim of the domestic political discord within the island state. It may be recalled that current President Abdulla Yameen Gayoom who assumed office in November 2013 has suppressed all dissent and political opposition in the Maldives and governed with an iron hand. This culminated with the arrest of opposition leaders and even the Chief Justice of the country in February this year. New Delhi along with many other nations had expressed their dismay at this turn of events and had advocated an immediate release of those imprisoned and a return to the dialogue process in the furtherance of the democratic principle. Clearly this was not acceptable to the Maldivian leader who saw this as an affront to him and ever since President Yameen has adopted an intense anti-India stance. The return of the helicopters apart, there have been many political and diplomatic snubs aimed at Delhi by Male over the last year and this is ironic, considering that almost 30 years ago – to the date – in November 1988, India had mounted an extraordinary military operation (Cactus) to avert a mercenary coup that was seeking to overthrow then President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom – half-bother of the current President. The sub-text of Maldives cocking a snook, as it were at India, has to do with the China card, which refers to the manner in which Beijing is making steady inroads into the Indian periphery over the last decade. This has included the opening of Chinese missions where they did not exist – Maldives is a case in point – and tacitly signalling that the smaller neighbours have a supportive ‘big brother’ in Beijing. It may be recalled that the 17 th SAARC Summit was held in the Maldives on November 10, 2011 and two days prior to this major regional event, Beijing opened its embassy in Male. The politico- diplomatic signal was clear – Beijing had decided to increase its foot- print in the Indian Ocean region and the strategic geography of these small islands was being acknowledged. In September 2014, President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese leader to visit the island nation and the domestic political environment allowed Beijing to ‘invest’ in the local leadership. In December 2017, Beijing rolled out the red carpet for the Maldives President Abdulla Yameen and to India’s chagrin – Male signed its first FTA (free trade agreement) with China. Traditionally India has been a major trading partner for the Maldives and Delhi has been the first-provider of critical aid and assistance over the decades. But the India-first option for Male has now been slanted in favor of China. Given the critical location of the Maldives in the Indian Ocean and China’s long term global maritime aspirations now subsumed in the ambitious Xi Jinping led BRI (Belt-Road-Initiative), there is a certain strategic logic and compulsion to Beijing investing in the Maldives, Sri Lanka and now Djibouti. Cumulatively this “Maldives syndrome” and the steady increase in Chinese presence in the Indian neighbourhood has resulted in a relative shrinking of New Delhi’s profile. This has diluted the natural primacy accorded to India that was taken as an existential reality of South Asia. Over the last decade, China’s political, trade-economic and military foot-print in the Indian &nbspneighbourhood is being enhanced in a visible manner. Traditionally, it was Pakistan that was seen as the “all- weather” ally of China and the Sino-Pak bilateral remains a deep and opaque strategic partnership that includes WMD (weapons of mass destruction) cooperation. Over the last decade, China is emerging as a major benefactor for all of India's neighbors.China has evolved a regional template for southern Asia with a clear maritime and land connectivity focus as part of the BRI and many SAARC nations have signed up to this macro connectivity project. Paradoxically the success, or lack thereof of the BRI will be determined to a considerable extent by the stance that India adopts. Currently India has distanced itself from the BRI due to the territorial sovereignty issues related to the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) and this will be a major item on the bilateral agenda in the near future. With a population of a billion plus and an economic trajectory that projects India as the world’s third largest GDP within a decade (next to China and the USA), it would be imprudent for China to trample over Delhi’s core national interests and sensitivities within the SAARC region. That would be the normative logic in the event the Xi Jinping “dream” is able to envision a China and Asia rising together in tandem. This would also enable the realisation of the “Asian century” wherein China and India would be among the three top global economies in the run up to 2050. However this exigency, promising as it is, will have to navigate the complex Maldives syndrome – that is the degree to which India and China will either compete or cooperate in the extended south Asian neighborhood. The smaller nations, including Maldives, are uneasy about getting into a debt-trap with Beijing and the Sri Lankan example, where Colombo has had to hand over a port facility for 99 years to a Chinese entity is a case in point. Maldives is expected to “elect” its leader on September 23 and the outcome will have implications that go beyond the destiny of its tiny population. (The author is Director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi) (This article was first published on The DNA. Read the original article.) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL)

Opinion: China’s increased presence in Maldives has resulted in a shrinking of New Delhi’s profile

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Zee News Rajasthan

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C Uday Bhaskar

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