<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>There cannot be one definitive reason for the Bharatiya Janata Party&rsquo;s sweeping win in the 2017 Uttar Pradesh Assembly election, though Prime Minister Narendra Modi&rsquo;s charisma is certainly the most dominant one. Party president Amit Shah&rsquo;s effective strategising and micro-handling of the election campaign &mdash; right from candidates&rsquo; selection to booth management &mdash; is the other major contributor. Then there are the self-goals that the BJP&rsquo;s rivals scored. The internecine quarrel in the Samajwadi Party, the ill-advised alliance it struck with the Congress, the Bahujan Samaj Party&rsquo;s taking for granted the Scheduled Caste votes and the Congress&rsquo;s lack-lustre image in the State played significant roles in the BJP&rsquo;s grand triumph.</p>

<p>If the party won the 2014 Lok Sabha on the resonance of expectations from it and the people&rsquo;s disgust with the Congress-led UPA regime&rsquo;s performance, it was the confidence among voters that those hopes would be realised and distrust of the two principal regional parties, which has fetched the BJP more than 300 seats in the 403-member Uttar Pradesh House. But this is only the overarching message; the finer points are more interesting.</p>

<p>To begin with, the BJP is gaining rapidly at the expense of the Congress which dominated the State&rsquo;s political landscape before it went into disrepair from the early 1990s. Of the 10 Assembly seats in the Nehru-Gandhi stronghold of Amethi and Rae Bareli, the party has won six. In Rahul Gandhi&rsquo;s Lok Sabha constituency of Amethi, just one Assembly segment voted for the Congress-Samajwadi Party partnership, while the situation was marginally better in Rae Bareli where it got three seats. This is not any better than the 2012 performance, when the Congress managed just two of the 10 seats in the twin regions.</p>

<p>Although it contested this election in partnership with the formidable Samajwadi Party, and on more than 100 seats, the Congress&rsquo;s strike rate was abysmal. The party could not even touch the double-digit figure and ended up with a number lower than the regional Apna Dal &mdash; and just about the same as the lesser known Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party. Both these regional outfits are BJP allies. Overall, the Congress has managed just one-third of the seats that it had in the State in 2012. In other words, it dragged down its already struggling partner, the Samajwadi Party, to a new low.</p>

<p>The other interesting contributor to the BJP&rsquo;s monumental victory is the minority factor, and there is an irony to this. The Bahujan Samaj Party had given close to 100 tickets to Muslim candidates while the Samajwadi Party had over 50 of them. The idea was to lure the minority community through a consolidation of their votes. The consolidation did happen, but not in the manner these two parties had planned. In Saharanpur, Deoband and Muzaffarnagar &mdash; all Muslim-dominated constituencies &mdash; the majority voters coalesced in response to the minority challenge and went the BJP&rsquo;s way. In 2012, the BJP had not won a single seat in Muzaffarnagar district; this time it bagged all the six on offer. The majority consolidation was also evident in the Mau region, where don Mukhtar Ansari has a hold. Although he managed to win the Mau seat as a BSP candidate, his son and brother lost the other seats in the region.</p>

<p>The majority polarisation (particularly in the post-Muzaffarnagar riots backdrop) played out in other ways too. The BJP&rsquo;s wins in Jat-dominated regions is a good instance. The Jats, who comprise some two per cent of the State&rsquo;s total population but are located in large numbers in western Uttar Pradesh, had announced their determination to vote against the party for a host of reasons. But the minority factor ensured that virtually the whole lot of non-Jat voters, including the Other Backward Classes, pitched in for the BJP candidates. The Jat marginalisation was so complete that even in the Jat heartland of Baghpat, once the stronghold of Jat leader and former Prime Minister Charan Singh, the Rashtriya Lok Dal, led by his son Ajit Singh, the voters preferred the BJP. The RLD won just one of the three seats there. Given that 13 of the 15 Jat candidates of the BJP succeeded &mdash; despite considerable opposition from their community voters &mdash; the majority polarisation, including that of the non-Yadav Other Backward Classes and the upper castes (Brahmins and Kshatriyas voting together for the same party), cannot be downplayed.</p>

<p>What worked additionally for the BJP was the minority vote fragmentation alongside the majority vote consolidation. The Bahujan Samaj Party and the Samajwadi Party&rsquo;s Muslim candidates clashed with one another in many constituencies, especially in Muslim-dominated ones. Minority votes got massively split, leaving both these parties stranded. For example, the BJP won all the eight seats in Sant Kabir Nagar and Siddharth Nagar districts in eastern Uttar Pradesh, which have a substantial number of Muslim voters. Nearly similar was the case in Bahraich, which again has a sizeable Muslim presence &mdash; the BJP won all but one. it secured two seats in SP leader Azam Khan&rsquo;s Rampur district and registered wins in Amroha and Moradabad. It did well in Saharanpur too. Of the 140 constituencies where the Muslim population is 20 per cent or more, the BJP and its ally, the Apna Dal, won 109. There is no way the BJP could have managed these victories without a significant split in Muslim votes between the BSP and the SP-Congress combine. In hindsight, therefore, the BJP lost nothing by not giving tickets to a single Muslim candidate and its rivals lost out by going overboard in offering such representation.</p>

<p>One obstacle crossed, the BJP has two challenges ahead. The first and the most immediate one is the choice of a chief minister. There are many claimants and the party has to select one that has the ability to take everyone along and not cause fissures, both within the party and society. This should rule out the likes of Yogi Adityanath and Mahesh Sharma, although both played important roles in the party&rsquo;s massive win. State party president Keshav Prasad Maurya is a strong contender &mdash; being from the OBC is an added advantage &mdash; along with the &nbsp;dark horse and Lucknow Mayor Dinesh Sharma. Both Maurya and Sharma are known to be in the good books of Prime Minister Modi and Amit Shah. But so is Union Minister Manoj Sinha. And, if one talks of a Union Minister shifting from Delhi to Lucknow, there is also Rajnath Singh. The candidate must resonate with the Hindutva-minded voter, the OBCs and the Dalits (a good segment of which appears to have backed the BJP this time, as it did in 2014, and busted the BSP&rsquo;s attempt at recovering lost ground). It&rsquo;s a task that the Modi-Amit Shah duo will find almost as challenging as winning Uttar Pradesh.</p>


The chief ministerial candidate must resonate with Hindutva-minded voter, the OBCs and the Dalits, with the ability to take everyone along

There cannot be one definitive reason for the Bharatiya Janata Party’s sweeping win in the 2017 Uttar Pradesh Assembly election, though Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s charisma is certainly the most dominant one. Party president Amit Shah’s effective strategising and micro-handling of the election campaign — right from candidates’ selection to booth management — is the other major contributor. Then there are the self-goals that the BJP’s rivals scored. The internecine quarrel in the Samajwadi Party, the ill-advised alliance it struck with the Congress, the Bahujan Samaj Party’s taking for granted the Scheduled Caste votes and the Congress’s lack-lustre image in the State played significant roles in the BJP’s grand triumph. If the party won the 2014 Lok Sabha on the resonance of expectations from it and the people’s disgust with the Congress-led UPA regime’s performance, it was the confidence among voters that those hopes would be realised and distrust of the two principal regional parties, which has fetched the BJP more than 300 seats in the 403-member Uttar Pradesh House. But this is only the overarching message; the finer points are more interesting. To begin with, the BJP is gaining rapidly at the expense of the Congress which dominated the State’s political landscape before it went into disrepair from the early 1990s. Of the 10 Assembly seats in the Nehru-Gandhi stronghold of Amethi and Rae Bareli, the party has won six. In Rahul Gandhi’s Lok Sabha constituency of Amethi, just one Assembly segment voted for the Congress-Samajwadi Party partnership, while the situation was marginally better in Rae Bareli where it got three seats. This is not any better than the 2012 performance, when the Congress managed just two of the 10 seats in the twin regions. Although it contested this election in partnership with the formidable Samajwadi Party, and on more than 100 seats, the Congress’s strike rate was abysmal. The party could not even touch the double-digit figure and ended up with a number lower than the regional Apna Dal — and just about the same as the lesser known Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party. Both these regional outfits are BJP allies. Overall, the Congress has managed just one-third of the seats that it had in the State in 2012. In other words, it dragged down its already struggling partner, the Samajwadi Party, to a new low. The other interesting contributor to the BJP’s monumental victory is the minority factor, and there is an irony to this. The Bahujan Samaj Party had given close to 100 tickets to Muslim candidates while the Samajwadi Party had over 50 of them. The idea was to lure the minority community through a consolidation of their votes. The consolidation did happen, but not in the manner these two parties had planned. In Saharanpur, Deoband and Muzaffarnagar — all Muslim-dominated constituencies — the majority voters coalesced in response to the minority challenge and went the BJP’s way. In 2012, the BJP had not won a single seat in Muzaffarnagar district; this time it bagged all the six on offer. The majority consolidation was also evident in the Mau region, where don Mukhtar Ansari has a hold. Although he managed to win the Mau seat as a BSP candidate, his son and brother lost the other seats in the region. The majority polarisation (particularly in the post-Muzaffarnagar riots backdrop) played out in other ways too. The BJP’s wins in Jat-dominated regions is a good instance. The Jats, who comprise some two per cent of the State’s total population but are located in large numbers in western Uttar Pradesh, had announced their determination to vote against the party for a host of reasons. But the minority factor ensured that virtually the whole lot of non-Jat voters, including the Other Backward Classes, pitched in for the BJP candidates. The Jat marginalisation was so complete that even in the Jat heartland of Baghpat, once the stronghold of Jat leader and former Prime Minister Charan Singh, the Rashtriya Lok Dal, led by his son Ajit Singh, the voters preferred the BJP. The RLD won just one of the three seats there. Given that 13 of the 15 Jat candidates of the BJP succeeded — despite considerable opposition from their community voters — the majority polarisation, including that of the non-Yadav Other Backward Classes and the upper castes (Brahmins and Kshatriyas voting together for the same party), cannot be downplayed. What worked additionally for the BJP was the minority vote fragmentation alongside the majority vote consolidation. The Bahujan Samaj Party and the Samajwadi Party’s Muslim candidates clashed with one another in many constituencies, especially in Muslim-dominated ones. Minority votes got massively split, leaving both these parties stranded. For example, the BJP won all the eight seats in Sant Kabir Nagar and Siddharth Nagar districts in eastern Uttar Pradesh, which have a substantial number of Muslim voters. Nearly similar was the case in Bahraich, which again has a sizeable Muslim presence — the BJP won all but one. it secured two seats in SP leader Azam Khan’s Rampur district and registered wins in Amroha and Moradabad. It did well in Saharanpur too. Of the 140 constituencies where the Muslim population is 20 per cent or more, the BJP and its ally, the Apna Dal, won 109. There is no way the BJP could have managed these victories without a significant split in Muslim votes between the BSP and the SP-Congress combine. In hindsight, therefore, the BJP lost nothing by not giving tickets to a single Muslim candidate and its rivals lost out by going overboard in offering such representation. One obstacle crossed, the BJP has two challenges ahead. The first and the most immediate one is the choice of a chief minister. There are many claimants and the party has to select one that has the ability to take everyone along and not cause fissures, both within the party and society. This should rule out the likes of Yogi Adityanath and Mahesh Sharma, although both played important roles in the party’s massive win. State party president Keshav Prasad Maurya is a strong contender — being from the OBC is an added advantage — along with the dark horse and Lucknow Mayor Dinesh Sharma. Both Maurya and Sharma are known to be in the good books of Prime Minister Modi and Amit Shah. But so is Union Minister Manoj Sinha. And, if one talks of a Union Minister shifting from Delhi to Lucknow, there is also Rajnath Singh. The candidate must resonate with the Hindutva-minded voter, the OBCs and the Dalits (a good segment of which appears to have backed the BJP this time, as it did in 2014, and busted the BSP’s attempt at recovering lost ground). It’s a task that the Modi-Amit Shah duo will find almost as challenging as winning Uttar Pradesh.

Who will be the next chief minister of Uttar Pradesh?

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Given its spectacular performance in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) was best placed to win the 2017 assembly election in Uttar Pradesh. Winning 71 of 80 seats on a vote share of 42 per cent provided it with a margin of invincibility to withstand a large negative vote swing. But the party&rsquo;s changing campaign strategy betrays a lack of confidence in the outcome of the elections.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The campaign which started on the high note of development has begun to traverse the familiar ground of Hindu consolidation. This is very similar to 2014 when development-oriented politics made way for majoritarianism. The BJP knows that ultimately its success depends on Hindu unity; consequently, its leaders, operatives, and the members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh(RSS) resolutely focused on religious polarisation.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Known for its abysmal record in human development, one would think the Uttar Pradesh assembly elections would be all about progress and change. But no, this is not the case. The leading campaign issue is not the prospect of development but the politics around graveyards. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is taking up the case of discrimination against cremation grounds in comparison to graveyards. The political discourse has exposed BJP&rsquo;s stress on polarisation as a strategy of mobilisation in this complex election.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<div class="ui-state-default" contenteditable="false">
<div class="row">
<div class="article-blockquote">
<div class="col-sm-10 col-sm-offset-1 blockquote-content quoteshare">
<blockquote>
<h5>The last few phases of the elections have, therefore, seen a sharp contest between ideologies of pluralism-inclusion on the one side and assimilation-exclusion on the other</h5>
</blockquote>
</div>

<div class="col-sm-1 blockquote-content">
<div class="share-blockquote"><a class="twitter popup" href="http://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=The last few phases of the elections have, therefore, seen a sharp contest between ideologies of pluralism-inclusion on the one side and assimilation-exclusion on the other" target="_blank"><i class="fa fa-share">&nbsp;</i></a></div>
</div>
<a class="close-mark close-div" href="#" id="jqquoteclosemark">&times;</a></div>
</div>
</div>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The BJP seeks to unite Hindu votes in its favour while dividing Muslim votes between the Samajwadi Party (SP) and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) who are vying for the support of Muslims. Implicit in this political belief is the apprehension that Muslims would vote for the SP-Congress combine and not for the BSP.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>There are two concerted elements in BJP&#39;s majoritarian campaign this year. The two elements include divisive rhetoric on communal issues and debasing the development discourse. The strategy works directly by raising controversial issues, such as the triple talaq, Hindu migration from Kairana and other western UP towns, illegal abattoirs etc to appeal to the traditional middle-class voters in the state.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>An election that started out as a contest about governance and development has changed since polarisation gradually entered the picture. The last few phases of the elections have, therefore, seen a sharp contest between ideologies of pluralism-inclusion on the one side and assimilation-exclusion on the other. Changing the terms of public discourse involved an unmistakable communalisation of development politics and, thereby, pulling people to its side.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The ostensible provocation for this shift was that both the BSP and the SP-Congress alliance have been vigorously appealing to the minorities for votes to keep the BJP at bay. Critics blame the BSP for starting this by giving 97 assembly tickets to Muslims. However, the dispute over who is to blame for the acceleration of polarisation seldom takes into account that the BJP has not given a single ticket to a Muslim.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>In UP, even as the BJP was propagating its &lsquo;vikas&rsquo; or development plans, it has lost no opportunity to communalise development politics.&nbsp; The party has been working actively on dividing communities along religious lines at the ground level since the violence in Muzaffarnagar in 2013; Modi&rsquo;s speech at Fatehpur on February 19, 2017, was basically an attempt to give it a further push and this was immediately taken forward by the party president Amit Shah.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Amit Shah said, &quot;If BJP is not voted to power, people&rsquo;s money would be spent on building karbala aur kabristan. When BJP introduces programmes like Startup India, Make in India and so on, they are for everyone, but when the UP government starts a scholarship scheme, it is only for Muslim girls.&quot; Incidentally, Shah is referring here to the Kanya Vidya Dhan Yojana, under which the UP government provides assistance of Rs 30,000 to each girl student who has passed the 12th board examinations with distinction. Many Hindus have complained that Muslims are the only ones to benefit from this scheme; a claim which is yet to be verified. Moreover, BJP activists continue to allege leniency in the grading of exams at schools situated in Muslim neighborhoods, and that such leniency is responsible for more Muslim girls benefiting from this scheme.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<div class="ui-state-default" contenteditable="false">
<div class="row">
<div class="article-blockquote">
<div class="col-sm-10 col-sm-offset-1 blockquote-content quoteshare">
<blockquote>
<h5>The big question is whether communal polarisation at the grass root level electorally benefits the BJP, and what political impact will this electoral strategy have on India&rsquo;s democracy</h5>
</blockquote>
</div>

<div class="col-sm-1 blockquote-content">
<div class="share-blockquote"><a class="twitter popup" href="http://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=The big question is whether communal polarisation at the grass root level electorally benefits the BJP, and what political impact will this electoral strategy have on India?s democracy" target="_blank"><i class="fa fa-share">&nbsp;</i></a></div>
</div>
<a class="close-mark close-div" href="#" id="jqquoteclosemark">&times;</a></div>
</div>
</div>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Clearly, post-truth is having a field day in UP, and not just in the United States. A blithe disregard for facts has characterised the propaganda campaign of the BJP in the UP election. This type of talk makes it clear that mobilisation gained through polarisation has become the principal instrument of the election campaign.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The BJP has regularly attacked the SP government for appeasement of one community in matters as diverse as power supply and laptop distribution under the government schemes. Accusing its rivals of Muslim appeasement has been the staple of BJP politics. This has happened even after official data and academic research show Muslims to be one of India&rsquo;s most disadvantaged communities, and nowhere more so than in UP. Any attempt to redress the imbalance is damned as appeasement.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Finally, one thing is clear: the BJP is fighting the 2017 election with an unconcealed anti-Muslim propaganda. On the face of it, it seems that incendiary majoritarian nationalism and the language of polarisation has had an impact on the thought processes of a large number of people. Unfortunately, the acerbic discourse has split Uttar Pradesh, once defined by cultural syncretism, along Hindu-Muslim lines.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Everywhere, the BJP campaign targets Muslims and how they were not part of the (Hindu) nationalist narrative. There are many who are inclined to buy into BJP&rsquo;s charges of minority appeasement because prejudice against minorities has crept into everyday life.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The big question is whether communal polarisation at the grass root level electorally benefits the BJP, and what political impact will this electoral strategy have on India&rsquo;s democracy.</p>


The leading campaign issue in the Uttar Pradesh election is not the prospect of development but the politics around graveyards

Given its spectacular performance in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) was best placed to win the 2017 assembly election in Uttar Pradesh. Winning 71 of 80 seats on a vote share of 42 per cent provided it with a margin of invincibility to withstand a large negative vote swing. But the party’s changing campaign strategy betrays a lack of confidence in the outcome of the elections. The campaign which started on the high note of development has begun to traverse the familiar ground of Hindu consolidation. This is very similar to 2014 when development-oriented politics made way for majoritarianism. The BJP knows that ultimately its success depends on Hindu unity; consequently, its leaders, operatives, and the members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh(RSS) resolutely focused on religious polarisation. Known for its abysmal record in human development, one would think the Uttar Pradesh assembly elections would be all about progress and change. But no, this is not the case. The leading campaign issue is not the prospect of development but the politics around graveyards. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is taking up the case of discrimination against cremation grounds in comparison to graveyards. The political discourse has exposed BJP’s stress on polarisation as a strategy of mobilisation in this complex election. The last few phases of the elections have, therefore, seen a sharp contest between ideologies of pluralism-inclusion on the one side and assimilation-exclusion on the other × The BJP seeks to unite Hindu votes in its favour while dividing Muslim votes between the Samajwadi Party (SP) and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) who are vying for the support of Muslims. Implicit in this political belief is the apprehension that Muslims would vote for the SP-Congress combine and not for the BSP. There are two concerted elements in BJP's majoritarian campaign this year. The two elements include divisive rhetoric on communal issues and debasing the development discourse. The strategy works directly by raising controversial issues, such as the triple talaq, Hindu migration from Kairana and other western UP towns, illegal abattoirs etc to appeal to the traditional middle-class voters in the state. An election that started out as a contest about governance and development has changed since polarisation gradually entered the picture. The last few phases of the elections have, therefore, seen a sharp contest between ideologies of pluralism-inclusion on the one side and assimilation-exclusion on the other. Changing the terms of public discourse involved an unmistakable communalisation of development politics and, thereby, pulling people to its side. The ostensible provocation for this shift was that both the BSP and the SP-Congress alliance have been vigorously appealing to the minorities for votes to keep the BJP at bay. Critics blame the BSP for starting this by giving 97 assembly tickets to Muslims. However, the dispute over who is to blame for the acceleration of polarisation seldom takes into account that the BJP has not given a single ticket to a Muslim. In UP, even as the BJP was propagating its ‘vikas’ or development plans, it has lost no opportunity to communalise development politics. The party has been working actively on dividing communities along religious lines at the ground level since the violence in Muzaffarnagar in 2013; Modi’s speech at Fatehpur on February 19, 2017, was basically an attempt to give it a further push and this was immediately taken forward by the party president Amit Shah. Amit Shah said, "If BJP is not voted to power, people’s money would be spent on building karbala aur kabristan. When BJP introduces programmes like Startup India, Make in India and so on, they are for everyone, but when the UP government starts a scholarship scheme, it is only for Muslim girls." Incidentally, Shah is referring here to the Kanya Vidya Dhan Yojana, under which the UP government provides assistance of Rs 30,000 to each girl student who has passed the 12th board examinations with distinction. Many Hindus have complained that Muslims are the only ones to benefit from this scheme; a claim which is yet to be verified. Moreover, BJP activists continue to allege leniency in the grading of exams at schools situated in Muslim neighborhoods, and that such leniency is responsible for more Muslim girls benefiting from this scheme. The big question is whether communal polarisation at the grass root level electorally benefits the BJP, and what political impact will this electoral strategy have on India’s democracy × Clearly, post-truth is having a field day in UP, and not just in the United States. A blithe disregard for facts has characterised the propaganda campaign of the BJP in the UP election. This type of talk makes it clear that mobilisation gained through polarisation has become the principal instrument of the election campaign. The BJP has regularly attacked the SP government for appeasement of one community in matters as diverse as power supply and laptop distribution under the government schemes. Accusing its rivals of Muslim appeasement has been the staple of BJP politics. This has happened even after official data and academic research show Muslims to be one of India’s most disadvantaged communities, and nowhere more so than in UP. Any attempt to redress the imbalance is damned as appeasement. Finally, one thing is clear: the BJP is fighting the 2017 election with an unconcealed anti-Muslim propaganda. On the face of it, it seems that incendiary majoritarian nationalism and the language of polarisation has had an impact on the thought processes of a large number of people. Unfortunately, the acerbic discourse has split Uttar Pradesh, once defined by cultural syncretism, along Hindu-Muslim lines. Everywhere, the BJP campaign targets Muslims and how they were not part of the (Hindu) nationalist narrative. There are many who are inclined to buy into BJP’s charges of minority appeasement because prejudice against minorities has crept into everyday life. The big question is whether communal polarisation at the grass root level electorally benefits the BJP, and what political impact will this electoral strategy have on India’s democracy.

Majoritarianism drives the BJP campaign in Uttar Pradesh elections

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>It is commonly said that the road to New Delhi passes through Lucknow, the capital of Uttar Pradesh. UP is not just any other state. It is the largest with a population of over 200 million, and is politically an extremely important state but also one of the most socio-economically backward in India.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>With its 80 Members of Parliament (MP) and 403 Members of Legislative Assembly (MLA), UP has been the nerve centre of Indian politics. In the 2014 national election, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) swept the state, winning 71 of these seats (with coalition partner Apna Dal winning two more). Without a large number of seats from UP, the BJP and its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) would not have had the majority to form government at the Centre.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The importance of UP for national politics can never be overstated. The results of a bitterly fought and excessively long (7-phase) 2017 assembly election will have a crucial bearing on the template of the 2019 elections.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<div class="ui-state-default" contenteditable="false">
<div class="row">
<div class="article-blockquote">
<div class="col-sm-10 col-sm-offset-1 blockquote-content quoteshare">
<blockquote>
<h5>Hindu nationalism and caste-based parties gave momentum to the process of identity politics, occupying spaces vacated by the once-dominant Congress party</h5>
</blockquote>
</div>

<div class="col-sm-1 blockquote-content">
<div class="share-blockquote"><a class="twitter popup" href="http://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Hindu nationalism and caste-based parties gave momentum to the process of identity politics, occupying spaces vacated by the once-dominant Congress party" target="_blank"><i class="fa fa-share">&nbsp;</i></a></div>
</div>
<a class="close-mark close-div" href="#" id="jqquoteclosemark">&times;</a></div>
</div>
</div>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Over the years, UP has seen remarkable changes in its politics both within and across ruling parties and coalitions. The impetus for change originated in the political realignments that began to take place in the late 1980s. The emergence of Hindu nationalism and caste-based parties gave momentum to the process of identity politics, occupying spaces vacated by the once-dominant Congress party.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The tropes of Mandal Commission controversy and the Babri Masjid issue dominated the political narrative in the 1990s. Later, as Dalit mobilisation reached a high tempo, it shaped electoral outcomes in this crucial state. The churning in UP was the most stunning expression of a new political paradigm, with caste-based parties and factions disrupting traditional arrangements and drawing hitherto marginalised forces into play. Two political parties, the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) symbolised this process. &nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The SP and BSP have governed the state for most of the past two decades. These parties and the governments they dominate have empowered the lower castes. Both parties have raised the standing and representation of the Dalits and Other Backward Classes (OBCs). Consequently, increasing number of disadvantaged groups are part of the ruling elite now, with an access to state resources. Though a lot still needs to be done, economic and educational development has weakened caste barriers in Uttar Pradesh.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>But castes are not classes. Constructed around caste, political representation and the activism surrounding it inevitably promotes symbolic rather than substantive changes. The politics is crucially limited by bitter competition for power and fights over resources. It is also marred by the absence of a common agenda on structural changes which could have facilitated the redistribution of resources.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>If we compare the Samajwadi party with parties in South India, it is clear the latter draws on a much longer history of social mobilisation and this has defined substantive social welfare agenda in the southern states. In UP, by contrast, political empowerment was not building on a long record of social mobilisation.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>In fact, OBC politics in Uttar Pradesh came into its own during the implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations that gave the members of backward classes a political heft. from the outset, it was principally a top-down process of gaining power. No attention was paid to the promotion of broader social policies with the aim to level the playing field for everyone. In Uttar Pradesh, OBC and Dalit politics was all about transforming the pre-existing balance of social powers, and not addressing socio-economic inequalities. Clearly, poverty is not seen as a problem on par with the problem of social inequality. Consequently, the state has lagged behind in terms of economic and social development in comparison to other Indian states.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<div class="ui-state-default" contenteditable="false">
<div class="row">
<div class="article-blockquote">
<div class="col-sm-10 col-sm-offset-1 blockquote-content quoteshare">
<blockquote>
<h5>The two overarching themes of this election are the growing discontent with under-development and the wider aspiration for development.</h5>
</blockquote>
</div>

<div class="col-sm-1 blockquote-content">
<div class="share-blockquote"><a class="twitter popup" href="http://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=The two overarching themes of this election are the growing discontent with under-development and the wider aspiration for development." target="_blank"><i class="fa fa-share">&nbsp;</i></a></div>
</div>
<a class="close-mark close-div" href="#" id="jqquoteclosemark">&times;</a></div>
</div>
</div>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The 2017 assembly election in Uttar Pradesh marks a transition from identity politics to the politics of development. The two overarching themes of this election are the growing discontent with under-development and the wider aspiration for development. Although the overall record of the past five years of the Samajwadi party led government is not encouraging, there had been a spurt in development activities in the last two years. In the event, the election is being contested on the promise of development.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The current Chief Minister Akhilesh Yadav&rsquo;s slogan &lsquo;Kaam Bolta Hai&rsquo; (the work speaks for itself) signals the attempt at building a counter-narrative around economic development. Akhilesh has gone to the polls showcasing new expressways, the Lucknow metro project, distributing laptops to students and bicycles to girls. Prime Minister Narendra Modi&rsquo;s mordant criticism of the UP chief minister&rsquo;s development work and his pungent disparagement of the claims all other parties underscore the sharp divide over which party can promote development better than others.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Meanwhile, BJP claims &lsquo;it will end development&rsquo;s 14-year exile in UP&rsquo;.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>As the 2017 election progressed from western to eastern UP,&nbsp; the focus of political campaigning shifted from development to the religion and caste arithmetic of the past. Speeches of almost all the major leaders suggest that religious polarisation is emerging as the central theme again. But the calculation is driven by a different impulse this time; there is a novel desire to remove caste and religion as the basis for economic distribution rather than the explicit assertion of it.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<div class="ui-state-default" contenteditable="false">
<div class="row">
<div class="article-blockquote">
<div class="col-sm-10 col-sm-offset-1 blockquote-content quoteshare">
<blockquote>
<h5>Most upper-caste Hindus are expected to vote for the BJP and they will be doing so for communitarian rather than caste reasons</h5>
</blockquote>
</div>

<div class="col-sm-1 blockquote-content">
<div class="share-blockquote"><a class="twitter popup" href="http://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Most upper-caste Hindus are expected to vote for the BJP and they will be doing so for communitarian rather than caste reasons" target="_blank"><i class="fa fa-share">&nbsp;</i></a></div>
</div>
<a class="close-mark close-div" href="#" id="jqquoteclosemark">&times;</a></div>
</div>
</div>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Some of the development policies and promises do appear to have had an electoral impact, this cannot be construed as an indication of the end of identity politics. All parties, in varying degrees, remain anchored to a caste-community calculus. But the dynamics of voting goes beyond the arithmetic of caste. And that makes politics of UP qualitatively different from the identity politics of the past.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The 2017 campaign signifies that there is no contradiction between identity and issue-based politics. This necessitates that politicians underplay caste and communal identities and touch overarching topics. The sharper import of issue-based election might actually merge with identity-based social groupings. This coalescence would not do away with caste/community-based voting trends, but these are increasingly informed by development concerns.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>While voters say issues, such as livelihoods, employment and law and order are key concerns but when it comes to voting, there is a community bias in this election which is likely to overpower the instinctive caste bias of the UP voter. Every single news report indicates that most upper-caste Hindus are expected to vote for the BJP and they will be doing so for communitarian rather than caste reasons. Along the same line, the BSP and SP, claiming to represent the socially backward population as a whole, provide disproportionate representation to Dalits, Muslims and OBCs respectively.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>


As election progressed from west to east UP, the focus of campaigning shifted from development to religion and caste arithmetic of the past

It is commonly said that the road to New Delhi passes through Lucknow, the capital of Uttar Pradesh. UP is not just any other state. It is the largest with a population of over 200 million, and is politically an extremely important state but also one of the most socio-economically backward in India. With its 80 Members of Parliament (MP) and 403 Members of Legislative Assembly (MLA), UP has been the nerve centre of Indian politics. In the 2014 national election, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) swept the state, winning 71 of these seats (with coalition partner Apna Dal winning two more). Without a large number of seats from UP, the BJP and its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) would not have had the majority to form government at the Centre. The importance of UP for national politics can never be overstated. The results of a bitterly fought and excessively long (7-phase) 2017 assembly election will have a crucial bearing on the template of the 2019 elections. Hindu nationalism and caste-based parties gave momentum to the process of identity politics, occupying spaces vacated by the once-dominant Congress party × Over the years, UP has seen remarkable changes in its politics both within and across ruling parties and coalitions. The impetus for change originated in the political realignments that began to take place in the late 1980s. The emergence of Hindu nationalism and caste-based parties gave momentum to the process of identity politics, occupying spaces vacated by the once-dominant Congress party. The tropes of Mandal Commission controversy and the Babri Masjid issue dominated the political narrative in the 1990s. Later, as Dalit mobilisation reached a high tempo, it shaped electoral outcomes in this crucial state. The churning in UP was the most stunning expression of a new political paradigm, with caste-based parties and factions disrupting traditional arrangements and drawing hitherto marginalised forces into play. Two political parties, the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) symbolised this process. The SP and BSP have governed the state for most of the past two decades. These parties and the governments they dominate have empowered the lower castes. Both parties have raised the standing and representation of the Dalits and Other Backward Classes (OBCs). Consequently, increasing number of disadvantaged groups are part of the ruling elite now, with an access to state resources. Though a lot still needs to be done, economic and educational development has weakened caste barriers in Uttar Pradesh. But castes are not classes. Constructed around caste, political representation and the activism surrounding it inevitably promotes symbolic rather than substantive changes. The politics is crucially limited by bitter competition for power and fights over resources. It is also marred by the absence of a common agenda on structural changes which could have facilitated the redistribution of resources. If we compare the Samajwadi party with parties in South India, it is clear the latter draws on a much longer history of social mobilisation and this has defined substantive social welfare agenda in the southern states. In UP, by contrast, political empowerment was not building on a long record of social mobilisation. In fact, OBC politics in Uttar Pradesh came into its own during the implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations that gave the members of backward classes a political heft. from the outset, it was principally a top-down process of gaining power. No attention was paid to the promotion of broader social policies with the aim to level the playing field for everyone. In Uttar Pradesh, OBC and Dalit politics was all about transforming the pre-existing balance of social powers, and not addressing socio-economic inequalities. Clearly, poverty is not seen as a problem on par with the problem of social inequality. Consequently, the state has lagged behind in terms of economic and social development in comparison to other Indian states. The two overarching themes of this election are the growing discontent with under-development and the wider aspiration for development. × The 2017 assembly election in Uttar Pradesh marks a transition from identity politics to the politics of development. The two overarching themes of this election are the growing discontent with under-development and the wider aspiration for development. Although the overall record of the past five years of the Samajwadi party led government is not encouraging, there had been a spurt in development activities in the last two years. In the event, the election is being contested on the promise of development. The current Chief Minister Akhilesh Yadav’s slogan ‘Kaam Bolta Hai’ (the work speaks for itself) signals the attempt at building a counter-narrative around economic development. Akhilesh has gone to the polls showcasing new expressways, the Lucknow metro project, distributing laptops to students and bicycles to girls. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s mordant criticism of the UP chief minister’s development work and his pungent disparagement of the claims all other parties underscore the sharp divide over which party can promote development better than others. Meanwhile, BJP claims ‘it will end development’s 14-year exile in UP’. As the 2017 election progressed from western to eastern UP, the focus of political campaigning shifted from development to the religion and caste arithmetic of the past. Speeches of almost all the major leaders suggest that religious polarisation is emerging as the central theme again. But the calculation is driven by a different impulse this time; there is a novel desire to remove caste and religion as the basis for economic distribution rather than the explicit assertion of it. Most upper-caste Hindus are expected to vote for the BJP and they will be doing so for communitarian rather than caste reasons × Some of the development policies and promises do appear to have had an electoral impact, this cannot be construed as an indication of the end of identity politics. All parties, in varying degrees, remain anchored to a caste-community calculus. But the dynamics of voting goes beyond the arithmetic of caste. And that makes politics of UP qualitatively different from the identity politics of the past. The 2017 campaign signifies that there is no contradiction between identity and issue-based politics. This necessitates that politicians underplay caste and communal identities and touch overarching topics. The sharper import of issue-based election might actually merge with identity-based social groupings. This coalescence would not do away with caste/community-based voting trends, but these are increasingly informed by development concerns. While voters say issues, such as livelihoods, employment and law and order are key concerns but when it comes to voting, there is a community bias in this election which is likely to overpower the instinctive caste bias of the UP voter. Every single news report indicates that most upper-caste Hindus are expected to vote for the BJP and they will be doing so for communitarian rather than caste reasons. Along the same line, the BSP and SP, claiming to represent the socially backward population as a whole, provide disproportionate representation to Dalits, Muslims and OBCs respectively.

Identity and development in the 2017 Uttar Pradesh elections

up-election-2017

Up Election 2017, News on Up Election 2017, stories on Up Election 2017, articles on Up Election 2017, Up Election 2017 stories at Wion, Up Election 2017 news, Up Election 2017 latest news

up election-2017

Who will be the next chief minister of Uttar Pradesh?

Majoritarianism drives the BJP campaign in Uttar Pradesh elections

Identity and development in the 2017 Uttar Pradesh elections