Tensions between Israel and Syria continue to focus on the strategically important Golan Heights, as both sides remain locked in a dispute over territory and security.

Israel captured most of the Golan Heights from Syria in the 1967 war and later extended its laws and administration over the area. The United Nations and most of the international community continue to regard the territory as occupied Syrian land.

The situation has become more complicated since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024, when Israeli forces moved into the UN-patrolled buffer zone and expanded their military presence in southern Syria.

The latest developments come amid wider efforts to determine the future of Israel-Syria relations, with the Golan Heights remaining one of the most sensitive territorial issues in any potential agreement.

Israel, Syria Tussle Over Control of Golan Heights

Fighting between Israel and Hezbollah continues despite a nominal ceasefire, with fresh strikes and evacuation orders heightening tensions. Israel has urged residents to leave parts of Nabatiyeh in southern Lebanon, while reports suggest U.S. President Donald Trump expressed anger over the latest escalation. The developments have raised concerns about the risk of a wider regional conflict.

Israel Orders Nabatiyeh Evacuation As Trump Reportedly Blasts Netanyahu Over Lebanon Escalation

The spectre of the Chinese military in Southeast Asian countries is back again, with reports suggesting that a base in Cambodia is seeing a permanent&nbsp;presence of its Navy.&nbsp;

Over the past few years, satellite imagery has shown brisk construction activity in the Ream naval base. Now, reports citing the pictures say that Chinese Navy ships appeared to be docked there on a more permanent basis.&nbsp;

Watch: China's new Naval outpost in Cambodia? | China &amp; Cambodia begin joint military drills

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The images showed two Chinese 1,500-tonne warships, the A56 corvettes, and the construction of a new pier that can dock larger vessels, with Chinese funding, said a report in BBC.

The Navy of Cambodia, whose government has been friendly with China in recent&nbsp;years, insists that the Ream base is open to all friendly navies while maintaining that it sticks to a ban on permanent foreign military presence in line with the constitution.

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/chinese-naval-base-in-cambodia-nearly-done-it-has-pier-for-aircraft-carriers-see-satellite-images-619617">Also read: Chinese naval base in Cambodia nearly complete. It has pier for aircraft carriers - see satellite images</a>

BBC, citing analysts said the construction of new infrastructure of the Ream base such as a dry dock, administrative buildings and other facilities appears to be made more for military than civilian use.

Ream base was once backed with US military aid until 2017 when the new government shifted loyalties to China. Earlier, the US had conducted joint military drills with Cambodia, but now, Cambodia has the Golden Dragon exercises with China.

<a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions-blogs/chinas-hegemonic-ambitions-brazen-aggression-in-scs-threat-to-regional-peace-stability-intl-order-734076">Also read: China’s hegemonic ambitions, brazen aggression in SCS: Threat to regional peace, stability, int'l order</a>

Cambodia's tilt towards China is seen as a move to counterbalance its larger neighbours Vietnam and Thailand, but the government has insisted that the Chinese military presence is for training purposes only, and&nbsp;temporary.

Vietnam, Thailand and other countries in the region - several having territorial disputes with China over the South China Sea - worry that China is engaging in a strategic encirclement of the Southeast Asian region.&nbsp;

The US is also worried about the Chinese footprint in the region, said the BBC report.

It noted that China now has more warships&nbsp;than the US but has only one overseas military base in Africa's Djibouti, as compared to the&nbsp;750 American bases including one in Djibouti.

The BBC cited experts who believe that more than military might, China may be using the base for intelligence gathering and monitoring of the region.

It said, citing analysts, that&nbsp;China would eventually have a global network of bases, or civilian ports that it can use as bases and Ream in Cambodia could be one of the first such facilities.

The report said Indian and American strategists are more worried about the possible Chinese base in the Indian Ocean region, in ports like Sri Lanka's&nbsp; Hambantota or Gwadar in Pakistan. Both have gotten Chinese assistance and are being used for civilian purposes, for now.

(With inputs from agencies)

The spectre of the Chinese military in Southeast Asian countries is back again, with reports suggesting that a base in Cambodia is seeing a permanent presence of its Navy.

The spectre of the Chinese military in Southeast Asian countries is back again, with reports suggesting that a base in Cambodia is seeing a permanent presence of its Navy. Over the past few years, satellite imagery has shown brisk construction activity in the Ream naval base. Now, reports citing the pictures say that Chinese Navy ships appeared to be docked there on a more permanent basis. Watch: China's new Naval outpost in Cambodia? | China & Cambodia begin joint military drills × The images showed two Chinese 1,500-tonne warships, the A56 corvettes, and the construction of a new pier that can dock larger vessels, with Chinese funding, said a report in BBC. The Navy of Cambodia, whose government has been friendly with China in recent years, insists that the Ream base is open to all friendly navies while maintaining that it sticks to a ban on permanent foreign military presence in line with the constitution. Also read: Chinese naval base in Cambodia nearly complete. It has pier for aircraft carriers - see satellite images BBC, citing analysts said the construction of new infrastructure of the Ream base such as a dry dock, administrative buildings and other facilities appears to be made more for military than civilian use. Ream base was once backed with US military aid until 2017 when the new government shifted loyalties to China. Earlier, the US had conducted joint military drills with Cambodia, but now, Cambodia has the Golden Dragon exercises with China. Also read: China’s hegemonic ambitions, brazen aggression in SCS: Threat to regional peace, stability, int'l order Cambodia's tilt towards China is seen as a move to counterbalance its larger neighbours Vietnam and Thailand, but the government has insisted that the Chinese military presence is for training purposes only, and temporary. Vietnam, Thailand and other countries in the region - several having territorial disputes with China over the South China Sea - worry that China is engaging in a strategic encirclement of the Southeast Asian region. The US is also worried about the Chinese footprint in the region, said the BBC report. It noted that China now has more warships than the US but has only one overseas military base in Africa's Djibouti, as compared to the 750 American bases including one in Djibouti. The BBC cited experts who believe that more than military might, China may be using the base for intelligence gathering and monitoring of the region. It said, citing analysts, that China would eventually have a global network of bases, or civilian ports that it can use as bases and Ream in Cambodia could be one of the first such facilities. The report said Indian and American strategists are more worried about the possible Chinese base in the Indian Ocean region, in ports like Sri Lanka's Hambantota or Gwadar in Pakistan. Both have gotten Chinese assistance and are being used for civilian purposes, for now. (With inputs from agencies)

China's military presence in Cambodia's Ream naval base is showing signs of being permanent: Report

Public debates about China’s Middle East policy are as much internal Chinese discussions as they are indications of where Beijing’s thinking is going and efforts to nudge countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to accommodate potential policy changes.

Relying on scholars rather than officials, China is signalling to Gulf states adjustments they would have to make to enable China to become more engaged in regional security and geopolitics.

The subtext in the scholars’ writings and statements is that a failure to reduce tension, particularly with Iran, could persuade China to either reduce its economic involvement in the Middle East or focus on relations with non-Arab states, two of which are arch-rivals of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

At the bottom line, China’s subtle hints at what it would like Gulf states to do is in line with a Russian proposal that calls for a non-aggression agreement with Iran and possibly Turkey that would significantly reduce the risk of disputes spinning out of control and allow China to expand its engagement beyond economics.

In the latest blast, Chinese Middle East scholar Fan Hongda suggested that China rather than “overestimating” the importance of Arab states should pay more attention to the Middle East’s non-Arab powers, Turkey, Israel, and particularly Iran.

"Given Iran's expressed willingness to strengthen bilateral relations (with Beijing), China needs to respond more actively," Mr Fan said in an op-ed published by Lianhe Zaobao, a Chinese language newspaper in Singapore.

Driving the point home, Mr Fan argued in two articles in Hamshahri, a popular Iranian newspaper published by the municipality of Tehran, that China should forge closer ties to Iran irrespective of US policy or potential Arab opposition. “These overcautious concerns have no advantage whatsoever for the 'second most powerful country in the world,” Mr Fan said referring to China.

The timing of Mr Fan’s article will not have been lost on Gulf leaders. It comes on the back of the publication in Iran of a draft 25-year multi-billion dollar Chinese-Iranian agreement on economic and military cooperation. The draft sparked intense speculation about Chinese Middle East policy and how realistic an agreement was.

To capitalize on the speculation, Iran substantially increased the number of companies populating its pavilion at this month’s China International Expo (CIIE) in Shanghai.

Mr Fan’s article was further published as US President-elect Joe Biden prepares to take office in January with the stated intention to break with Donald J. Trump’s harsh ‘maximum pressure’ sanctions policy and return the United States to the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program. Mr Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018.

China’s suggestion that it has alternatives in the Middle East puts pressure on countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE as they try to come to grips with a Biden administration that is likely to put greater emphasis on human rights and take a more critical view towards Gulf involvement in wars in Yemen and Libya.

Similarly, the suggestion anticipated a Biden administration effort to rejigger, if not reduce, the United States’ security commitment to the Middle East and possibly entertain a more multilateral regional architecture.

Mr Fan’s proposal follows an article by prominent Chinese scholars Sun Degang and Wu Sike &nbsp;arguing that the Middle East was a “key region in big power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in a new era.”

Messrs. Sun and Wu indicated that Chinese characteristics would involve “seeking common ground while reserving differences,” a formula that implies conflict management rather than conflict resolution.

The scholars said Chinese engagement in Middle Eastern security would seek to build an inclusive and shared regional collective security mechanism based on fairness, justice, multilateralism, comprehensive governance, and the containment of differences.

Earlier, Niu Xinchun, director of Middle East studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), widely viewed as one of China’s most influential think tanks, adopted a different tone to drive the same message home: China’s interest in the Middle East was waning. To avoid losing China, Gulf states need to create a degree of stability.

“For China, the Middle East is always on the very distant backburner of China’s strategic global strategies … Covid-19, combined with the oil price crisis, will dramatically change the Middle East. (This) will change China’s investment model in the Middle East,” Mr. Niu said.

With few exceptions, Gulf states and media have largely remained silent about Chinese voices that reflect thinking in Beijing that calls into question China’s relations with key Arab states.

No doubt, Gulf states believe that China’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy and their significance to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) makes them all but indispensable.

The BRI is Chinese President’s Xi Jinping’s energy, infrastructure, and telecommunications-driven Eurasia-wide signature foreign policy initiative.

While the Gulf states may not be wrong, they remain vulnerable in an environment in which shifts in US policy force them to hedge their bets and be more attentive to the positions of China in an increasingly multi-polar world. 
 
Said Mordechai Chaziza, an expert on China-Middle East relations: “Beijing has indeed become more concerned about the stability of Middle Eastern regimes. Its growing regional interests combined with its BRI ambitions underscore that Middle East stability, particularly in the Persian Gulf, is now a matter of strategic concern for China.” 
A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox.

(With inputs from Dr Alessandro Arduino, he is a principal research fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore.)

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do&nbsp;not represent the views of&nbsp;WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse&nbsp;the views of the writer)

Public debates about China’s Middle East policy are as much internal Chinese discussions as they are indications of where Beijing’s thinking is going and efforts to nudge countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to accommodate potential policy changes.

Public debates about China’s Middle East policy are as much internal Chinese discussions as they are indications of where Beijing’s thinking is going and efforts to nudge countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to accommodate potential policy changes. Relying on scholars rather than officials, China is signalling to Gulf states adjustments they would have to make to enable China to become more engaged in regional security and geopolitics. The subtext in the scholars’ writings and statements is that a failure to reduce tension, particularly with Iran, could persuade China to either reduce its economic involvement in the Middle East or focus on relations with non-Arab states, two of which are arch-rivals of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. At the bottom line, China’s subtle hints at what it would like Gulf states to do is in line with a Russian proposal that calls for a non-aggression agreement with Iran and possibly Turkey that would significantly reduce the risk of disputes spinning out of control and allow China to expand its engagement beyond economics. In the latest blast, Chinese Middle East scholar Fan Hongda suggested that China rather than “overestimating” the importance of Arab states should pay more attention to the Middle East’s non-Arab powers, Turkey, Israel, and particularly Iran. "Given Iran's expressed willingness to strengthen bilateral relations (with Beijing), China needs to respond more actively," Mr Fan said in an op-ed published by Lianhe Zaobao, a Chinese language newspaper in Singapore. Driving the point home, Mr Fan argued in two articles in Hamshahri, a popular Iranian newspaper published by the municipality of Tehran, that China should forge closer ties to Iran irrespective of US policy or potential Arab opposition. “These overcautious concerns have no advantage whatsoever for the 'second most powerful country in the world,” Mr Fan said referring to China. The timing of Mr Fan’s article will not have been lost on Gulf leaders. It comes on the back of the publication in Iran of a draft 25-year multi-billion dollar Chinese-Iranian agreement on economic and military cooperation. The draft sparked intense speculation about Chinese Middle East policy and how realistic an agreement was. To capitalize on the speculation, Iran substantially increased the number of companies populating its pavilion at this month’s China International Expo (CIIE) in Shanghai. Mr Fan’s article was further published as US President-elect Joe Biden prepares to take office in January with the stated intention to break with Donald J. Trump’s harsh ‘maximum pressure’ sanctions policy and return the United States to the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program. Mr Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018. China’s suggestion that it has alternatives in the Middle East puts pressure on countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE as they try to come to grips with a Biden administration that is likely to put greater emphasis on human rights and take a more critical view towards Gulf involvement in wars in Yemen and Libya. Similarly, the suggestion anticipated a Biden administration effort to rejigger, if not reduce, the United States’ security commitment to the Middle East and possibly entertain a more multilateral regional architecture. Mr Fan’s proposal follows an article by prominent Chinese scholars Sun Degang and Wu Sike arguing that the Middle East was a “key region in big power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in a new era.” Messrs. Sun and Wu indicated that Chinese characteristics would involve “seeking common ground while reserving differences,” a formula that implies conflict management rather than conflict resolution. The scholars said Chinese engagement in Middle Eastern security would seek to build an inclusive and shared regional collective security mechanism based on fairness, justice, multilateralism, comprehensive governance, and the containment of differences. Earlier, Niu Xinchun, director of Middle East studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), widely viewed as one of China’s most influential think tanks, adopted a different tone to drive the same message home: China’s interest in the Middle East was waning. To avoid losing China, Gulf states need to create a degree of stability. “For China, the Middle East is always on the very distant backburner of China’s strategic global strategies … Covid-19, combined with the oil price crisis, will dramatically change the Middle East. (This) will change China’s investment model in the Middle East,” Mr. Niu said. With few exceptions, Gulf states and media have largely remained silent about Chinese voices that reflect thinking in Beijing that calls into question China’s relations with key Arab states. No doubt, Gulf states believe that China’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy and their significance to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) makes them all but indispensable. The BRI is Chinese President’s Xi Jinping’s energy, infrastructure, and telecommunications-driven Eurasia-wide signature foreign policy initiative. While the Gulf states may not be wrong, they remain vulnerable in an environment in which shifts in US policy force them to hedge their bets and be more attentive to the positions of China in an increasingly multi-polar world. Said Mordechai Chaziza, an expert on China-Middle East relations: “Beijing has indeed become more concerned about the stability of Middle Eastern regimes. Its growing regional interests combined with its BRI ambitions underscore that Middle East stability, particularly in the Persian Gulf, is now a matter of strategic concern for China.” A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox. (With inputs from Dr Alessandro Arduino, he is a principal research fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore.) (Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer)

Subtly, China pressures Gulf states to reduce regional tensions

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