<p>October 2017 marks the 55th anniversary of the Sino-Indian war of 1962, a conflict that left a lasting impression on the minds of Indian policy-makers, military men, academics and the general public. The 32-day war which saw a decisive defeat of the Indian army at the hands of the Chinese military served India with some hard lessons on foreign policy and border defenses.</p>

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<h5>The processes of state-building post decolonisation contributed much to the deep mistrust between the two countries.</h5>
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<p>On October 20, 1962, the Chinese military launched a two-pronged attack on the Sino-Indian border, invading Ladakh in the west and the McMahon line in the east. After successfully fending off the Chinese for the initial few days, the Indian army was considerably outnumbered- with about 20,000 Indian troops facing 80,000 Chinese troops- resulting in a disastrous defeat for India.&nbsp;</p>

<p>The causes of the India-China war were multi-pronged, but the processes of state-building post decolonisation contributed much to the deep mistrust between the two countries. The border conflict is a colonial legacy inherited by the two nations. The Ardagh-Johnson line in the NW Himalayas near Ladakh was negotiated between the Dogra empire of Jammu and Tibet through the treaty of 1842.</p>

<p>The McMahon line was an outcome of the Simla convention of 1914, which interestingly though was settled bilaterally between British India and Tibet as the sole Chinese representative backed out of the negotiations owing to differences regarding the position and status of the Inner-Outer Tibet boundary. In July 1914, after China withdrew from the negotiations, British Indian and Tibetan representatives formalised an agreement in the form of the Simla convention which fixed an international boundary north of Assam, also known as the McMahon Line.</p>

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<h5>Post decolonisation, the lack of any political will on both sides to resolve the boundaries further complicated matters.</h5>
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<p>The colonial enterprise of demarcating boundaries is found to be lacking on knowledge of specificities- the regional geographies, land distribution patterns, cultural affiliations and traditional ties- and is therefore responsible for much of the present day interstate disputes in the decolonised countries.</p>

<p>The bilateral ties between India and China have also suffered the same fate. However, post decolonisation, the lack of any political will on both sides to resolve the boundaries further complicated matters. Between 1950 and 1962, state-building in the two countries was carried out on different ideological trajectories. While India, under the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, resolved to stay committed to liberal values as the ideological core of national security and foreign policies, China, under Mao Zedong, took a more realist stance on consolidating its territorial claims and strengthen its sovereignty.</p>

<p>The differences in the ideological dispositions of the two leaders made themselves evident in the series of meetings that Nehru had with Mao Zedong and Zhou en Lai. In one such meeting, held in 1954, Mao and Nehru took significantly opposing stands on the idea of war.</p>

<p>Mao remarked that war both benefited and harmed the nations that start them. &ldquo;...a tense situation would awaken the people and make them prepare to resist pressure.&rdquo; While Nehru felt that with the passing of every year, the chances of war were receding. During the same meeting, Mao had also indicated China&#39;s intentions of developing atomic bombs.</p>

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<h5>The clash of 1962 eventually personified the clash of two competing ideologies.</h5>
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<p>This, while Nehru&#39;s passionate views on nuclear disarmament and ban on nuclear testing were well known. The clash of 1962 eventually personified the clash of two competing ideologies- the belief that liberalism could eventually trump realpolitik was unfounded and rested on a mistaken assumption that decolonisation had served similar lessons for different countries.&nbsp;</p>

<p>Five and a half decades later, both countries have achieved remarkable successes in the processes of state-building. While this has worked to subdue other contentious aspects of the relationship, it has also worked to create a bipolar regional order in South Asia, where each state now works to challenge the regional primacy of the other.</p>

<p>This has served to heighten tensions at the border, reflected in the increasing frequency of skirmishes witnessed over the years. As a structural consequence of its growth, China will grow from an assertive neighbour into an assertive world power. This will have important consequences for multilateral institutions and global norms, some of which will be rendered obsolete, others- transformed, while some new will be created.</p>

<p>In this scenario, and given the history of their conflictual relationship, India and China may increasingly find themselves at loggerheads. The two countries have seen very little cooperation at the global platforms, despite working under the common banner of &lsquo;developing nations&rsquo;. The recent showdown over India&rsquo;s NSG membership serves as an important case in point.</p>

<p>The frequency of such bilateral skirmishes playing out on multilateral forums will go up as the gap between China and India&rsquo;s growth rate increases. The window of collaboration over non-traditional issues such as energy security and climate change too is rapidly shrinking, given the pace at which China is achieving its developmental targets.</p>

<p>It may be underlined here, that as China joins the club of developed nations and great powers in a few years from now, the space for India&rsquo;s concerns will shrink while the dynamics of its multilateral negotiations will undergo significant transformation, in the face of increasing resistance offered by China. Thus, while the Sino-India war may still be a far-fetched idea, China&rsquo;s autocratic expansion and USA&rsquo;s retrenchment will see the two countries frequently battling it out in a rapidly changing global order.</p>

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<h5>India will need to deepen its strategic engagement with other countries in the region as well as the great powers, including the US.</h5>
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<p>To counter this, India will need to deepen its strategic engagement with other countries in the region as well as the great powers, including the US. The India-US strategic partnership may work to take the edge off India-China bilateral ties. Further, the presence of the US as a key ally to India and Japan will work to stabilise the balance of power in the South and East Asian region. India&rsquo;s stronger alignment with other great powers, including the UK and the member nations of the EU, will provide India with the diplomatic and strategic clout at various multilateral forums.&nbsp;</p>

<p>To counter China&rsquo;s rise, India will need to resort to a calibrated mix of diplomatic and military solutions. Indian policy-makers will need to engage in effective scenario building and analyse the consequences of a China-led regional order and a China-dominated global order.</p>


India needs to reanalyse diplomatic and military solutions to counter China's growth

October 2017 marks the 55th anniversary of the Sino-Indian war of 1962, a conflict that left a lasting impression on the minds of Indian policy-makers, military men, academics and the general public. The 32-day war which saw a decisive defeat of the Indian army at the hands of the Chinese military served India with some hard lessons on foreign policy and border defenses. The processes of state-building post decolonisation contributed much to the deep mistrust between the two countries. × On October 20, 1962, the Chinese military launched a two-pronged attack on the Sino-Indian border, invading Ladakh in the west and the McMahon line in the east. After successfully fending off the Chinese for the initial few days, the Indian army was considerably outnumbered- with about 20,000 Indian troops facing 80,000 Chinese troops- resulting in a disastrous defeat for India. The causes of the India-China war were multi-pronged, but the processes of state-building post decolonisation contributed much to the deep mistrust between the two countries. The border conflict is a colonial legacy inherited by the two nations. The Ardagh-Johnson line in the NW Himalayas near Ladakh was negotiated between the Dogra empire of Jammu and Tibet through the treaty of 1842. The McMahon line was an outcome of the Simla convention of 1914, which interestingly though was settled bilaterally between British India and Tibet as the sole Chinese representative backed out of the negotiations owing to differences regarding the position and status of the Inner-Outer Tibet boundary. In July 1914, after China withdrew from the negotiations, British Indian and Tibetan representatives formalised an agreement in the form of the Simla convention which fixed an international boundary north of Assam, also known as the McMahon Line. Post decolonisation, the lack of any political will on both sides to resolve the boundaries further complicated matters. × The colonial enterprise of demarcating boundaries is found to be lacking on knowledge of specificities- the regional geographies, land distribution patterns, cultural affiliations and traditional ties- and is therefore responsible for much of the present day interstate disputes in the decolonised countries. The bilateral ties between India and China have also suffered the same fate. However, post decolonisation, the lack of any political will on both sides to resolve the boundaries further complicated matters. Between 1950 and 1962, state-building in the two countries was carried out on different ideological trajectories. While India, under the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, resolved to stay committed to liberal values as the ideological core of national security and foreign policies, China, under Mao Zedong, took a more realist stance on consolidating its territorial claims and strengthen its sovereignty. The differences in the ideological dispositions of the two leaders made themselves evident in the series of meetings that Nehru had with Mao Zedong and Zhou en Lai. In one such meeting, held in 1954, Mao and Nehru took significantly opposing stands on the idea of war. Mao remarked that war both benefited and harmed the nations that start them. “...a tense situation would awaken the people and make them prepare to resist pressure.” While Nehru felt that with the passing of every year, the chances of war were receding. During the same meeting, Mao had also indicated China's intentions of developing atomic bombs. The clash of 1962 eventually personified the clash of two competing ideologies. × This, while Nehru's passionate views on nuclear disarmament and ban on nuclear testing were well known. The clash of 1962 eventually personified the clash of two competing ideologies- the belief that liberalism could eventually trump realpolitik was unfounded and rested on a mistaken assumption that decolonisation had served similar lessons for different countries. Five and a half decades later, both countries have achieved remarkable successes in the processes of state-building. While this has worked to subdue other contentious aspects of the relationship, it has also worked to create a bipolar regional order in South Asia, where each state now works to challenge the regional primacy of the other. This has served to heighten tensions at the border, reflected in the increasing frequency of skirmishes witnessed over the years. As a structural consequence of its growth, China will grow from an assertive neighbour into an assertive world power. This will have important consequences for multilateral institutions and global norms, some of which will be rendered obsolete, others- transformed, while some new will be created. In this scenario, and given the history of their conflictual relationship, India and China may increasingly find themselves at loggerheads. The two countries have seen very little cooperation at the global platforms, despite working under the common banner of ‘developing nations’. The recent showdown over India’s NSG membership serves as an important case in point. The frequency of such bilateral skirmishes playing out on multilateral forums will go up as the gap between China and India’s growth rate increases. The window of collaboration over non-traditional issues such as energy security and climate change too is rapidly shrinking, given the pace at which China is achieving its developmental targets. It may be underlined here, that as China joins the club of developed nations and great powers in a few years from now, the space for India’s concerns will shrink while the dynamics of its multilateral negotiations will undergo significant transformation, in the face of increasing resistance offered by China. Thus, while the Sino-India war may still be a far-fetched idea, China’s autocratic expansion and USA’s retrenchment will see the two countries frequently battling it out in a rapidly changing global order. India will need to deepen its strategic engagement with other countries in the region as well as the great powers, including the US. × To counter this, India will need to deepen its strategic engagement with other countries in the region as well as the great powers, including the US. The India-US strategic partnership may work to take the edge off India-China bilateral ties. Further, the presence of the US as a key ally to India and Japan will work to stabilise the balance of power in the South and East Asian region. India’s stronger alignment with other great powers, including the UK and the member nations of the EU, will provide India with the diplomatic and strategic clout at various multilateral forums. To counter China’s rise, India will need to resort to a calibrated mix of diplomatic and military solutions. Indian policy-makers will need to engage in effective scenario building and analyse the consequences of a China-led regional order and a China-dominated global order.

India-China: 55 years of bittersweet solidarity

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India-China: 55 years of bittersweet solidarity