In response to a proposal about the relocation of Uyghur Muslims, China urged Canada on Thursday (February 2), to abstain from utilising&nbsp;Xinjiang-related concerns for "political manipulation." On Wednesday, (February 1), the Canadian Parliament unanimously passed a non-binding proposal for the two-year relocation of 10,000 Uyghur Muslim migrants from China's Xinjiang region into&nbsp;Canada, as per a Reuter's report.

A non-binding proposal to relocate 10,000 Uyghur Muslim migrants from China's Xinjiang province to Canada over the course of two years was approved by the Canadian parliament on Wednesday with a unanimous vote. The House of Commons approved Sameer Zuberi's bill, which also urged the government to acknowledge that Uyghurs and other ethnic Turkic Muslims who have migrated to other countries face "pressure and intimidation" from China to do so, by a vote of 322-0.

Also read |&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/india-news/us-india-enter-deal-that-aims-to-counter-china-on-ai-and-military-557726">US, India enter deal that aims to counter China on AI and military</a>

"At present, Xinjiang's society is safe and stable. The development continues to improve, and people are living and working in peace and happiness. The level of human rights protection for people of all ethnic groups has been continuously improved.&nbsp;We urge the Canadian side to respect the truth, stop political manipulation with ulterior motives on Xinjiang-related issues, stop spreading false information, and misleading the public," Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said at a regular press briefing.

Also watch |&nbsp;China: Beijing says city has achieved 'temporary herd immunity'

<div class="videoWrapper trancodeVideo"><iframe allowfullscreen="" autoplay="1" class="includeVideo" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.wionews.com/videos/china-beijing-says-city-has-achieved-temporary-herd-immunity-557708/embed" style="width:100%;max-width:560px;" width="560"></iframe></div>

The region's human rights laws for all ethnic groups are increasing steadily, according to Mao, who also noted that the people of Xinjiang live in peace and work satisfactorily.

(With inputs from agencies)

WATCH WION LIVE HERE:

<iframe allowfullscreen="" autoplay="1" class="includeVideo" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.wionews.com/live-tv/embed" style="width:100%;max-width:560px;" width="560"></iframe>

In response to a proposal about the relocation of Uyghur Muslims, China urged Canada on Thursday (February 2), to abstain from utilising Xinjiang-related concerns for "political manipulation.

In response to a proposal about the relocation of Uyghur Muslims, China urged Canada on Thursday (February 2), to abstain from utilising Xinjiang-related concerns for "political manipulation." On Wednesday, (February 1), the Canadian Parliament unanimously passed a non-binding proposal for the two-year relocation of 10,000 Uyghur Muslim migrants from China's Xinjiang region into Canada, as per a Reuter's report. A non-binding proposal to relocate 10,000 Uyghur Muslim migrants from China's Xinjiang province to Canada over the course of two years was approved by the Canadian parliament on Wednesday with a unanimous vote. The House of Commons approved Sameer Zuberi's bill, which also urged the government to acknowledge that Uyghurs and other ethnic Turkic Muslims who have migrated to other countries face "pressure and intimidation" from China to do so, by a vote of 322-0. Also read | US, India enter deal that aims to counter China on AI and military "At present, Xinjiang's society is safe and stable. The development continues to improve, and people are living and working in peace and happiness. The level of human rights protection for people of all ethnic groups has been continuously improved. We urge the Canadian side to respect the truth, stop political manipulation with ulterior motives on Xinjiang-related issues, stop spreading false information, and misleading the public," Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said at a regular press briefing. Also watch | China: Beijing says city has achieved 'temporary herd immunity' The region's human rights laws for all ethnic groups are increasing steadily, according to Mao, who also noted that the people of Xinjiang live in peace and work satisfactorily. (With inputs from agencies) WATCH WION LIVE HERE:

China urges Canada not to engage in 'political manipulation' over Uyghur Muslims

The Shia Ulema Council in Afghanistan has called for an inclusive government in the country giving adequate representation to Shia Muslims and one that respects rights of all minorities. The Taliban formed an interim "Islamic Emirate" and announced a government earlier this week.

The cabinet members includes Taliban leaders many of whom are considered hardliners. Several of them, including Sirajuddin Haqqani feature on global terrorism lists. The list announced by Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid is dominated by members of the group's old guard. Not a single woman finds representation in the government.

"Our demands should be taken seriously. We want honorable officials, Jafari Jurisprudence (Shia school) should be recognized," said Ayatullah Salehi Mudaras, a member of the Shia Ulema, as quoted by TOLO News. This comes after a large gathering was held by the Shia Ulema on Tuesday.

However, Taliban appear to gain a steady hold on power in Afghanistan. Other countries appear to slowly accept the new reality.

Saudi Arabia on Thursday <a href="https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/saudi-arabia-shows-support-for-talibans-new-government-in-afghanistan-412024">said that it stood with the wishes of the Afghan people</a>. Saudi Arabia was one of the few countries that had formally recognised Taliban regime when they were in power in late 90s

Meanwhile, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Thursday <a href="https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/must-maintain-a-dialogue-with-taliban-says-un-secretary-general-411988">said that the world must maintain a dialogue</a> with the Taliban.

He expressed fears that hardline Islamists' return to power in Afghanistan may embolden jihadists in Sahel region of Africa.&nbsp;

"We must maintain a dialogue with the Taliban, where we affirm our principles directly -- a dialogue with a feeling of solidarity with the Afghan people," he said.

(With inputs from agencies)

The Shia Ulema Council in Afghanistan has called for an inclusive government in the country giving adequate representation to Shia Muslims and one that respects rights of all minorities.

The Shia Ulema Council in Afghanistan has called for an inclusive government in the country giving adequate representation to Shia Muslims and one that respects rights of all minorities. The Taliban formed an interim "Islamic Emirate" and announced a government earlier this week. The cabinet members includes Taliban leaders many of whom are considered hardliners. Several of them, including Sirajuddin Haqqani feature on global terrorism lists. The list announced by Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid is dominated by members of the group's old guard. Not a single woman finds representation in the government. "Our demands should be taken seriously. We want honorable officials, Jafari Jurisprudence (Shia school) should be recognized," said Ayatullah Salehi Mudaras, a member of the Shia Ulema, as quoted by TOLO News. This comes after a large gathering was held by the Shia Ulema on Tuesday. However, Taliban appear to gain a steady hold on power in Afghanistan. Other countries appear to slowly accept the new reality. Saudi Arabia on Thursday said that it stood with the wishes of the Afghan people. Saudi Arabia was one of the few countries that had formally recognised Taliban regime when they were in power in late 90s Meanwhile, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Thursday said that the world must maintain a dialogue with the Taliban. He expressed fears that hardline Islamists' return to power in Afghanistan may embolden jihadists in Sahel region of Africa. "We must maintain a dialogue with the Taliban, where we affirm our principles directly -- a dialogue with a feeling of solidarity with the Afghan people," he said. (With inputs from agencies)

Afghanistan: Shia body calls for inclusive government, minority rights

Over 1.7 crore minority community students have been awarded a scholarship in West Bengal, Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee said Tuesday.

"You will be happy to know that in #Bangla, we have distributed scholarships to over 1.7 crore minority students, the highest in the country. 
My best wishes to all,” the chief minister tweeted on the occasion of Minorities Rights Day.&nbsp;

Stressing on equality and the necessity of staying united, the chief minister tweeted, "Today is #MinorityRightsDay. We are all equal and united. 
Unity in diversity is our strength.”&nbsp;

Minorities Rights Day is celebrated on this day every year to protect the rights of the minority communities and forge a better understanding among religious minorities in the country.

Over 1.7 crore minority community students have been awarded a scholarship in West Bengal, Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee said Tuesday. "You will be happy to know that in #Bangla, we have distributed scholarships to over 1.

Over 1.7 crore minority community students have been awarded a scholarship in West Bengal, Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee said Tuesday. "You will be happy to know that in #Bangla, we have distributed scholarships to over 1.7 crore minority students, the highest in the country. My best wishes to all,” the chief minister tweeted on the occasion of Minorities Rights Day. Stressing on equality and the necessity of staying united, the chief minister tweeted, "Today is #MinorityRightsDay. We are all equal and united. Unity in diversity is our strength.” Minorities Rights Day is celebrated on this day every year to protect the rights of the minority communities and forge a better understanding among religious minorities in the country.

Scholarships awarded to 1.7 crore minority students in West Bengal: CM Mamata Banerjee

Fear has been stalking a group of poor roadside food vendors in the Mewat district in the Indian province of Haryana. The local police had forcefully picked up samples from their stocks, following complaints that they contained beef, and tests later carried out in a facility at a public university reportedly confirmed the suspicion. Slaughter and sale of beef, and according to some interpretations, even consumption, have been made illegal in the province following the implementation of a more stringent cow protection law early this year. The new law makes cow slaughter punishable by rigorous imprisonment for a maximum of 10 years and a fine extending up to hundred thousand rupees. While the police mull over the next course of action, the hapless food vendors count their days in anxiety.&nbsp;

In a related development, Jignesh Mevani, convener of a platform of Dalit (formerly untouchables) protesters against the public lynching of Dalit young men in Prime Minster Modi&rsquo;s home province Gujrat in early July, has announced plans for a new campaign to be called &lsquo;Badbu Gujrat ki&rsquo; (the stench of Gujrat). Videos of seven Dalit men being publicly flogged by self-styled cow protectors in Mota Samadhiyala village in the Una Taluqa of the province of Gujrat went viral in early July. The Dalit youth had been accused of illegally slaughtering and carrying away dead cows.&nbsp;

Dalits in Gujrat and elsewhere have since then launched sustained protests, the strategies including attempted suicides, resolve to quit skinning as a profession, long marches and public meetings in Gujrat and elsewhere. Mevani&rsquo;s new campaign involves mass mailing to actor Amitabh Bachchan, who currently serves as the Brand Ambassador for tourism in the province and to Prime Minister Modi. Meanwhile, the streets of Gujrat have been stinking as Dalits have refused since July to dispose of cow carcasses. &nbsp;

Late last September, Mohammad Akhlaq, a lower middle-class resident of a village near Dadri town in the north Indian province of Uttar Pradesh, was dragged out of his home and lynched to death by a Hindu nationalist mob, following rumours that he had slaughtered a local cow and eaten its flesh.&nbsp;

During the last two years&nbsp;there had been reports from several other provinces---Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh and Jharkahnd&mdash;of vigilante armies of self-styled cow protectors lynching and threatening ordinary citizens on the mere suspicion that they had either been illegally carrying away cows for export and slaughter or eating their flesh.

Among them, these incidents point to larger fault lines in Indian polity and society. Three points in particular call for immediate attention. The first is the divisive politics of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, and its ideological parent Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. The second is the ambivalence with which the issue of cow protection has been handled by the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution. The third relates to interrogating what may at best be described as a belated and half-hearted condemnation by the prime minister of the recent spate in vigilantism in the name cow protection. It can be safely conjectured that the year-long silence of the prime minister on the issue was broken less out of remorse than by the relentless and strident protests by Dalit activists.

An apparent contradiction seemingly plagues Hindu nationalist politics in India. Its professed admiration for free market economy presupposes respect, indeed sanctity, for free choice of consumers. Yet, the free run of the vigilante Hindu nationalist mobs murdering and lynching members of vulnerable communities raise questions about the Indian state&rsquo;s commitment to secular and liberal values.&nbsp;

Prime Minister Modi often gets angry, he said, at anti-socials who have turned cow protection into a petty trade. Some anti-socials, he continued, commit crimes at night and change into the garbs of cow protectors by the day, presumably to hide their crimes and acquire respectability. If the provincial governments were to prepare a dossier on such characters, the prime minister was sure that 70 to 80 per cent of them would be found dubious. On another occasion, he called upon the states to initiate strong measures against the fake cow protectors, and the &lsquo;real&rsquo; cow protectors to expose imposters who create mayhem in their name. He has, thus, shifted the responsibility to act against the vigilantes to the provincial governments and to &lsquo;real&rsquo; cow protectors.

The prime minister&rsquo;s rhetoric demands interrogation, primarily, for its timing and content. He was clear that while cow protection (or professed devotion for or veneration towards the cow, to repeat his exact words) is a desirable project, it must not result in violence, brutalisation or terrorisation. From his perspective, therefore, it is at best an instance of imposters sullying the good name of cow protection. Critics argue, however, that divisive mobilisation in the name of cow protection has been a definitive characteristic of the politics of the ruling BJP party and the wider family of Hindu nationalist organisations to which it belongs.

The right question to ask, therefore, is whether and how organised cow protection campaigns like these could lead to violence or persecution against vulnerable groups, such as Muslims and the Dalits. 
 
Historically, there have been Hindu-Muslim riots in the name of the cow in India since the late 19th century. Cow slayers and beef-eaters have come to be defined as the classical &lsquo;other&rsquo; of devout Hindus in hegemonic Hindu discourses. Most importantly, popular common sense has often translated these terms as a euphemism for Muslims, although plenty of non-Muslims, including Hindus, eat beef, according to surveys carried out by public authorities.

Roughly two years ago, leading his party&rsquo;s campaign for the national elections as the prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi publicly accused their main rival Indian National Congress party of indirectly encouraging cow abduction with an intention to scale up beef export. There is no denying that at the time Modi had been projecting an impression that the Congress was indifferent to the cause of cow protection and that the BJP, when in power, would encourage those devoted to cow protection. It is no wonder that governments in provinces where BJP was elected to power soon after, such as Haryana, quickly enacted stringent cow protection laws.&nbsp;

It has to be conceded, therefore, that the recent election campaigns of the party in power had at least indirectly offered incentives to aggressive campaigns for cow protection.&nbsp;

It is useful in this context to revisit the ambivalence with which the framers of the Indian Constitution dealt with the cow protection issue. The cause of cow protection had been enshrined, as it were, in the form of a Directive Principle (Article 48), calling upon the state to enact laws for cow protection. However, protection of cows has been acknowledged in this discourse not as a religious imperative, but as an economic good ostensibly in terms of the scientific organisation of animal husbandry.

There were demands in the Assembly, the body that wrote and adopted the Indian Constitution, to accommodate an article banning cow slaughter as a Fundamental Right. However, in the present Constitution, it has been admitted as a Directive Principle. Fundamental Rights are justiciable while Directive Principles are at best recommendations that cannot be legally binding. At the time, some advocates of cow protection interpreted it as a &lsquo;sacrifice&rsquo; by the Hindu community and reflecting an approach of non-coercion.

Some Muslim members called for clarity on the matter, arguing that the necessary connection between scientific agriculture and cow protection was not sufficiently established. Legal scholars have suggested that some articles such as Article 48 embodied expedient intra-party compromises and not fundamental principles of &lsquo;social policy&rsquo;, which Directive Principles were meant to uphold.

There is no doubt, of course, that the Article was written and assented to in terms of scientific organisation of animal husbandry. Yet, it cannot be disputed that at least to participants in the debate the article did reflect Hindu sentiment on the matter, and perhaps still does. At the same time, none at the time foresaw the Dalit resistance. It is only with an upsurge of Dalit identity politics that brought the community into the quagmire of cow protection movement in India.

&nbsp;

India's free market economy presupposes free choice of consumers, yet cow vigilantes run amok

Fear has been stalking a group of poor roadside food vendors in the Mewat district in the Indian province of Haryana. The local police had forcefully picked up samples from their stocks, following complaints that they contained beef, and tests later carried out in a facility at a public university reportedly confirmed the suspicion. Slaughter and sale of beef, and according to some interpretations, even consumption, have been made illegal in the province following the implementation of a more stringent cow protection law early this year. The new law makes cow slaughter punishable by rigorous imprisonment for a maximum of 10 years and a fine extending up to hundred thousand rupees. While the police mull over the next course of action, the hapless food vendors count their days in anxiety. In a related development, Jignesh Mevani, convener of a platform of Dalit (formerly untouchables) protesters against the public lynching of Dalit young men in Prime Minster Modi’s home province Gujrat in early July, has announced plans for a new campaign to be called ‘Badbu Gujrat ki’ (the stench of Gujrat). Videos of seven Dalit men being publicly flogged by self-styled cow protectors in Mota Samadhiyala village in the Una Taluqa of the province of Gujrat went viral in early July. The Dalit youth had been accused of illegally slaughtering and carrying away dead cows. Dalits in Gujrat and elsewhere have since then launched sustained protests, the strategies including attempted suicides, resolve to quit skinning as a profession, long marches and public meetings in Gujrat and elsewhere. Mevani’s new campaign involves mass mailing to actor Amitabh Bachchan, who currently serves as the Brand Ambassador for tourism in the province and to Prime Minister Modi. Meanwhile, the streets of Gujrat have been stinking as Dalits have refused since July to dispose of cow carcasses. Late last September, Mohammad Akhlaq, a lower middle-class resident of a village near Dadri town in the north Indian province of Uttar Pradesh, was dragged out of his home and lynched to death by a Hindu nationalist mob, following rumours that he had slaughtered a local cow and eaten its flesh. During the last two years there had been reports from several other provinces---Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh and Jharkahnd—of vigilante armies of self-styled cow protectors lynching and threatening ordinary citizens on the mere suspicion that they had either been illegally carrying away cows for export and slaughter or eating their flesh. Among them, these incidents point to larger fault lines in Indian polity and society. Three points in particular call for immediate attention. The first is the divisive politics of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, and its ideological parent Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. The second is the ambivalence with which the issue of cow protection has been handled by the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution. The third relates to interrogating what may at best be described as a belated and half-hearted condemnation by the prime minister of the recent spate in vigilantism in the name cow protection. It can be safely conjectured that the year-long silence of the prime minister on the issue was broken less out of remorse than by the relentless and strident protests by Dalit activists. An apparent contradiction seemingly plagues Hindu nationalist politics in India. Its professed admiration for free market economy presupposes respect, indeed sanctity, for free choice of consumers. Yet, the free run of the vigilante Hindu nationalist mobs murdering and lynching members of vulnerable communities raise questions about the Indian state’s commitment to secular and liberal values. Prime Minister Modi often gets angry, he said, at anti-socials who have turned cow protection into a petty trade. Some anti-socials, he continued, commit crimes at night and change into the garbs of cow protectors by the day, presumably to hide their crimes and acquire respectability. If the provincial governments were to prepare a dossier on such characters, the prime minister was sure that 70 to 80 per cent of them would be found dubious. On another occasion, he called upon the states to initiate strong measures against the fake cow protectors, and the ‘real’ cow protectors to expose imposters who create mayhem in their name. He has, thus, shifted the responsibility to act against the vigilantes to the provincial governments and to ‘real’ cow protectors. The prime minister’s rhetoric demands interrogation, primarily, for its timing and content. He was clear that while cow protection (or professed devotion for or veneration towards the cow, to repeat his exact words) is a desirable project, it must not result in violence, brutalisation or terrorisation. From his perspective, therefore, it is at best an instance of imposters sullying the good name of cow protection. Critics argue, however, that divisive mobilisation in the name of cow protection has been a definitive characteristic of the politics of the ruling BJP party and the wider family of Hindu nationalist organisations to which it belongs. The right question to ask, therefore, is whether and how organised cow protection campaigns like these could lead to violence or persecution against vulnerable groups, such as Muslims and the Dalits. Historically, there have been Hindu-Muslim riots in the name of the cow in India since the late 19th century. Cow slayers and beef-eaters have come to be defined as the classical ‘other’ of devout Hindus in hegemonic Hindu discourses. Most importantly, popular common sense has often translated these terms as a euphemism for Muslims, although plenty of non-Muslims, including Hindus, eat beef, according to surveys carried out by public authorities. Roughly two years ago, leading his party’s campaign for the national elections as the prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi publicly accused their main rival Indian National Congress party of indirectly encouraging cow abduction with an intention to scale up beef export. There is no denying that at the time Modi had been projecting an impression that the Congress was indifferent to the cause of cow protection and that the BJP, when in power, would encourage those devoted to cow protection. It is no wonder that governments in provinces where BJP was elected to power soon after, such as Haryana, quickly enacted stringent cow protection laws. It has to be conceded, therefore, that the recent election campaigns of the party in power had at least indirectly offered incentives to aggressive campaigns for cow protection. It is useful in this context to revisit the ambivalence with which the framers of the Indian Constitution dealt with the cow protection issue. The cause of cow protection had been enshrined, as it were, in the form of a Directive Principle (Article 48), calling upon the state to enact laws for cow protection. However, protection of cows has been acknowledged in this discourse not as a religious imperative, but as an economic good ostensibly in terms of the scientific organisation of animal husbandry. There were demands in the Assembly, the body that wrote and adopted the Indian Constitution, to accommodate an article banning cow slaughter as a Fundamental Right. However, in the present Constitution, it has been admitted as a Directive Principle. Fundamental Rights are justiciable while Directive Principles are at best recommendations that cannot be legally binding. At the time, some advocates of cow protection interpreted it as a ‘sacrifice’ by the Hindu community and reflecting an approach of non-coercion. Some Muslim members called for clarity on the matter, arguing that the necessary connection between scientific agriculture and cow protection was not sufficiently established. Legal scholars have suggested that some articles such as Article 48 embodied expedient intra-party compromises and not fundamental principles of ‘social policy’, which Directive Principles were meant to uphold. There is no doubt, of course, that the Article was written and assented to in terms of scientific organisation of animal husbandry. Yet, it cannot be disputed that at least to participants in the debate the article did reflect Hindu sentiment on the matter, and perhaps still does. At the same time, none at the time foresaw the Dalit resistance. It is only with an upsurge of Dalit identity politics that brought the community into the quagmire of cow protection movement in India.

The conflicted democracy: Cows, minorities and the Indian Constitution

Bangladesh, unlike its neighbour India, has maintained a low profile for the outside world. However, contrary to its image, the political-economic significance of Bangladesh is actually huge. To start with, the country happens to be the eighth most populous nation-state in the world with a vast majority of Muslim population. It has a thriving $26 billion garment industry and the economic growth rates exceed that of India&rsquo;s. In matters of gender equality, the country has made impressive strides too. And the world is aware of its highly touted, though controversial, investments in micro-finance. These achievements, however, have been overshadowed in the last few years as Bangladesh experiences outbursts of inexplicable violence.&nbsp;

Recently, at some levels, Bangladesh seems to have been motivated by terrorism and some sort of affiliation with radical Islam.&nbsp;

Since 2013, the world is learning increasingly about attacks on whole hosts of minorities, such as secularists, Hindus, LGBT activists, Shia Muslims, among others. In 2016 itself, reports of attacks on Hindus and other religious minorities are crowding our space. The most recent strike happened at Holey Bakery in the diplomatic enclave of Dhaka, in which twenty hostages were killed and many more injured.&nbsp;

For those familiar with the religious and cultural traditions of Bangladesh, and its neighboring Indian state of West Bengal, the society has nurtured a long-standing rationalist tradition along with a secular outlook in most affairs.&nbsp; This worldview dominates the region&rsquo;s literature and cultural traditions&nbsp;and is, particularly, evident in its multi-religious histories.&nbsp;

Historically, poets, writers, painters, scholars of South Asia, and even those who have traveled through the subcontinent, tended to see the multi-cultural ethos of the Bengali social life. Deeply influenced by works of poets, such as Rabindranath Tagore and Kazi Nazrul Islam, the Bengali culture transcends the sort of political extremism that has long marked states, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan.&nbsp;

However, this starry-eyed view of Bengali regional culture betrays another history, one in which religion, language, and some vision of the future have been intermingled with the violent changes of the twentieth century.&nbsp;

So what explains these recent outbursts? As the New York Times reported back in 2005, is Bangladesh headed for the next &ldquo;Islamist&rdquo; revolution?&nbsp;

Such an &ldquo;Islamist&rdquo; revolution is unlikely given the vast religious and cultural diversity of the country; though largely a Sunni Muslim country, it has longstanding minority communities of Hindus and Buddhists. Along with the deeply ingrained traditions of secular activism, there is a lively political culture of popular protests and organisation, particularly, led by students of the country.&nbsp;

The country was founded, at least formally, on principles of secularism.&nbsp;

To understand the recent surge of radicalism, we have to have a clear picture of injustices that the people of Bangladesh had to suffer since the first half of the twentieth century. The country&rsquo;s infrastructure, government services, and funding opportunities have displayed a consistent mark of inequities right since 1947, as it became the eastern half of Pakistan through the partition of the subcontinent.&nbsp;

Though ushered in via the official frenzy of independence and the new-fangled idea of a two-winged Muslim majority, yet secular nation-state of Pakistan, the eastern half witnessed deep social dislocation; a vast majority of civil servants and professionals who were essential for starting a new state migrated to India. Moreover, famine and food shortages throughout the much of the late 1940s and early 1950s coloured the rise of a new East Pakistani Muslim identity and politics.&nbsp;

The process led to two factors that are brewing ever since &ndash; a failing and increasingly repressive state apparatus as well as an increasing attachment to symbols and institutions marked by Islam in the rural hinterlands, such as madrasas, particularly those operated privately and depended on foreign funding.

Both before and after 1971, the government of the region has been increasingly less able to manage the needs and aspirations of the people, and particularly in the last five years, has delivered unimaginable repression by arresting common people in the name of national security. Nearly 15,000 people have been arrested in the month of June 2016, as the state responded to attacks by militants.&nbsp;

The attacks by militants have made global headlines, whereas the arrests and state repression have not. Additionally, the state machinery in Bangladesh has proceeded down the complex road of war crimes tribunals and reckonings with the various crimes committed during the 1971 war.

As a small and population dense nation-state with an annual GDP of 150 billion USD, Bangladesh has been subject to the fluctuations of the global labor market. The birth of Bangladesh in 1971, in the aftermath of a civil war and cyclone, coincided with the 1970s oil boom in the Gulf, which prompted approximately 6,000 workers to migrate to the Middle Eastern countries in 1976.&nbsp;

Countries like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar now receive approximately 500,000 &ndash; 800,000 Bangladeshi labourers a year, with remittances back to Bangladesh totaling approximately 3.7 billion USD. Currently, an estimated 2 million Bangladeshis live and work in the Gulf. In addition to the money these workers send back home, private foundations and foreign governments of the Middle East regularly fund elements of the sprawling private &lsquo;Quomi&rsquo; madrasa system.&nbsp;

The &lsquo;Quomi&rsquo; madrasas function outside the state, depends on private sources and is not regulated by any state or inter-state system.&nbsp;

These madrasas answer to no state authority about its curriculum. They stand in sharp contrast with the state-sponsored &#39;Aliya&#39; madrasas, of which there are several thousand; it prescribes a diverse curriculum in Bangla, English, science and math, and various subjects that lead its graduates to secular universities.

Ironically, after the 1971 war that was associated with the fight for the language of the nation &ndash; Bangla &ndash; political powers in the country have been increasingly controlled by actors from outside the country. Money flowed in from the Gulf region and brought with it hyper-conservative variants of Islam. On top of it, there has been a contemporary focus on markets for the garments sector that is directed primarily at European and American locales. It is this loss of any sense of localised language and culture at the political level that requires sustained analytical attention to better contextualise the recent surge of radical Islamic feelings in Bangladesh.

There is no doubt that Bengali language and literature&nbsp;as well as other shared cultural practices&nbsp;certainly exist in the mind and heart of Bangladeshis. In fact, the massive swell of protests against the recent killings shows that feelings of solidarity are very much present. But the more important question remains, whether this shared regional culture, and its practices, can successfully&nbsp;confront the powerful vectors of globalisation &ndash; whether of garment-centric global capitalism or Saudi-led investment &ndash; that shapes much of Bangladesh today.

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

&nbsp;

Global capitalism and Saudi investment shape much of Bangladesh today

Bangladesh, unlike its neighbour India, has maintained a low profile for the outside world. However, contrary to its image, the political-economic significance of Bangladesh is actually huge. To start with, the country happens to be the eighth most populous nation-state in the world with a vast majority of Muslim population. It has a thriving $26 billion garment industry and the economic growth rates exceed that of India’s. In matters of gender equality, the country has made impressive strides too. And the world is aware of its highly touted, though controversial, investments in micro-finance. These achievements, however, have been overshadowed in the last few years as Bangladesh experiences outbursts of inexplicable violence. Recently, at some levels, Bangladesh seems to have been motivated by terrorism and some sort of affiliation with radical Islam. Since 2013, the world is learning increasingly about attacks on whole hosts of minorities, such as secularists, Hindus, LGBT activists, Shia Muslims, among others. In 2016 itself, reports of attacks on Hindus and other religious minorities are crowding our space. The most recent strike happened at Holey Bakery in the diplomatic enclave of Dhaka, in which twenty hostages were killed and many more injured. For those familiar with the religious and cultural traditions of Bangladesh, and its neighboring Indian state of West Bengal, the society has nurtured a long-standing rationalist tradition along with a secular outlook in most affairs. This worldview dominates the region’s literature and cultural traditions and is, particularly, evident in its multi-religious histories. Historically, poets, writers, painters, scholars of South Asia, and even those who have traveled through the subcontinent, tended to see the multi-cultural ethos of the Bengali social life. Deeply influenced by works of poets, such as Rabindranath Tagore and Kazi Nazrul Islam, the Bengali culture transcends the sort of political extremism that has long marked states, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, this starry-eyed view of Bengali regional culture betrays another history, one in which religion, language, and some vision of the future have been intermingled with the violent changes of the twentieth century. So what explains these recent outbursts? As the New York Times reported back in 2005, is Bangladesh headed for the next “Islamist” revolution? Such an “Islamist” revolution is unlikely given the vast religious and cultural diversity of the country; though largely a Sunni Muslim country, it has longstanding minority communities of Hindus and Buddhists. Along with the deeply ingrained traditions of secular activism, there is a lively political culture of popular protests and organisation, particularly, led by students of the country. The country was founded, at least formally, on principles of secularism. To understand the recent surge of radicalism, we have to have a clear picture of injustices that the people of Bangladesh had to suffer since the first half of the twentieth century. The country’s infrastructure, government services, and funding opportunities have displayed a consistent mark of inequities right since 1947, as it became the eastern half of Pakistan through the partition of the subcontinent. Though ushered in via the official frenzy of independence and the new-fangled idea of a two-winged Muslim majority, yet secular nation-state of Pakistan, the eastern half witnessed deep social dislocation; a vast majority of civil servants and professionals who were essential for starting a new state migrated to India. Moreover, famine and food shortages throughout the much of the late 1940s and early 1950s coloured the rise of a new East Pakistani Muslim identity and politics. The process led to two factors that are brewing ever since – a failing and increasingly repressive state apparatus as well as an increasing attachment to symbols and institutions marked by Islam in the rural hinterlands, such as madrasas, particularly those operated privately and depended on foreign funding. Both before and after 1971, the government of the region has been increasingly less able to manage the needs and aspirations of the people, and particularly in the last five years, has delivered unimaginable repression by arresting common people in the name of national security. Nearly 15,000 people have been arrested in the month of June 2016, as the state responded to attacks by militants. The attacks by militants have made global headlines, whereas the arrests and state repression have not. Additionally, the state machinery in Bangladesh has proceeded down the complex road of war crimes tribunals and reckonings with the various crimes committed during the 1971 war. As a small and population dense nation-state with an annual GDP of 150 billion USD, Bangladesh has been subject to the fluctuations of the global labor market. The birth of Bangladesh in 1971, in the aftermath of a civil war and cyclone, coincided with the 1970s oil boom in the Gulf, which prompted approximately 6,000 workers to migrate to the Middle Eastern countries in 1976. Countries like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar now receive approximately 500,000 – 800,000 Bangladeshi labourers a year, with remittances back to Bangladesh totaling approximately 3.7 billion USD. Currently, an estimated 2 million Bangladeshis live and work in the Gulf. In addition to the money these workers send back home, private foundations and foreign governments of the Middle East regularly fund elements of the sprawling private ‘Quomi’ madrasa system. The ‘Quomi’ madrasas function outside the state, depends on private sources and is not regulated by any state or inter-state system. These madrasas answer to no state authority about its curriculum. They stand in sharp contrast with the state-sponsored 'Aliya' madrasas, of which there are several thousand; it prescribes a diverse curriculum in Bangla, English, science and math, and various subjects that lead its graduates to secular universities. Ironically, after the 1971 war that was associated with the fight for the language of the nation – Bangla – political powers in the country have been increasingly controlled by actors from outside the country. Money flowed in from the Gulf region and brought with it hyper-conservative variants of Islam. On top of it, there has been a contemporary focus on markets for the garments sector that is directed primarily at European and American locales. It is this loss of any sense of localised language and culture at the political level that requires sustained analytical attention to better contextualise the recent surge of radical Islamic feelings in Bangladesh. There is no doubt that Bengali language and literature as well as other shared cultural practices certainly exist in the mind and heart of Bangladeshis. In fact, the massive swell of protests against the recent killings shows that feelings of solidarity are very much present. But the more important question remains, whether this shared regional culture, and its practices, can successfully confront the powerful vectors of globalisation – whether of garment-centric global capitalism or Saudi-led investment – that shapes much of Bangladesh today.

Bangladesh's current crisis: Globalisation threatens secular ethos of the country

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