US forces are set to leave their remaining bases in Iraq by Wednesday, bringing an end to their military presence in the country after more than two decades. Iran and its allies have described the withdrawal as a victory, while Iraqi officials have raised concerns about the possible security consequences.&nbsp;The departure could strengthen Iran's position in Iraq and give other US adversaries, including Islamic State, an opportunity to rebuild their presence, Iraqi security experts said.&nbsp;Jasim al-Bahadli, an Iraqi security analyst specialising in armed Shi'ite groups linked to Iran, said Tehran could gain from the end of the US military presence.&nbsp;"Iran stands to benefit strategically from the coalition's departure because it removes a military presence that for years acted as a counterweight to Tehran's influence in Iraq," he was quoted as saying by Reuters.&nbsp;The withdrawal was agreed in 2024 under then-US President Joe Biden. Donald Trump's administration is now carrying it out even as the United States is fighting a war against Iran. Around 4,500 Americans died during more than two decades of US military involvement in Iraq.<h2>From Saddam's fall to the fight against Islamic State</h2>The United States, with its allies, invaded Iraq in 2003 in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in New York to remove Saddam Hussein. US forces occupied the country, helped establish a Shi'ite-led government and fought a long counterinsurgency campaign.&nbsp;American troops left Iraq at the end of 2011. However, they returned less than three years later after Islamic State captured large areas of the country. US forces then helped Iraqi troops fight the group between 2014 and 2017.&nbsp;Islamic State once controlled around a third of Iraq and killed thousands of people. Hundreds were also filmed being shot at a former base used by the US military.&nbsp;The Iraq War cost the United States heavily in terms of lives. Around twice as many Americans died in “Operation Iraqi Freedom” as in the parallel war in Afghanistan, which ended with the US withdrawal in 2021.&nbsp;Washington's military presence also brought it into conflict with Tehran and Iran-backed groups. In 2020, the United States killed senior Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani in a strike at Baghdad Airport.&nbsp;Also Read: <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/iran-warns-no-infrastructure-will-remain-safe-if-its-security-is-not-guaranteed-as-it-awaits-us-response-on-hormuz-plan-1790679122753">Iran warns ‘no infrastructure will remain safe’ if its security is not guaranteed as it awaits US response on Hormuz plan</a><h2>Islamic State sleeper cells raise concerns</h2>Iraqi security officials have warned that the US departure could create an opening for Islamic State. Officials from Iraq's federal government and the semi-autonomous Kurdish region said the group continues to maintain sleeper cells despite losing its self-declared caliphate nearly a decade ago.&nbsp;Iraqi security forces also said a suspected Islamic State cell was preparing suicide attacks to coincide with the withdrawal.&nbsp;Iran has presented the US departure as a victory for its “axis of resistance”, made up of allied armed groups across the region. Tehran has repeatedly demanded that US forces leave the Middle East and that American bases in Gulf countries be closed.&nbsp;During the ongoing war, Iran has launched missile and drone attacks on US bases in these countries, causing significant damage and destroying American military equipment.

US troops are set to leave their last bases in Iraq after more than two decades, a move Iran sees as a strategic victory while Iraqi officials warn of increased Iranian influence and a possible Islamic State resurgence.

US forces are set to leave their remaining bases in Iraq by Wednesday, bringing an end to their military presence in the country after more than two decades. Iran and its allies have described the withdrawal as a victory, while Iraqi officials have raised concerns about the possible security consequences. The departure could strengthen Iran's position in Iraq and give other US adversaries, including Islamic State, an opportunity to rebuild their presence, Iraqi security experts said. Jasim al-Bahadli, an Iraqi security analyst specialising in armed Shi'ite groups linked to Iran, said Tehran could gain from the end of the US military presence. "Iran stands to benefit strategically from the coalition's departure because it removes a military presence that for years acted as a counterweight to Tehran's influence in Iraq," he was quoted as saying by Reuters. The withdrawal was agreed in 2024 under then-US President Joe Biden. Donald Trump's administration is now carrying it out even as the United States is fighting a war against Iran. Around 4,500 Americans died during more than two decades of US military involvement in Iraq. From Saddam's fall to the fight against Islamic State The United States, with its allies, invaded Iraq in 2003 in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in New York to remove Saddam Hussein. US forces occupied the country, helped establish a Shi'ite-led government and fought a long counterinsurgency campaign. American troops left Iraq at the end of 2011. However, they returned less than three years later after Islamic State captured large areas of the country. US forces then helped Iraqi troops fight the group between 2014 and 2017. Islamic State once controlled around a third of Iraq and killed thousands of people. Hundreds were also filmed being shot at a former base used by the US military. The Iraq War cost the United States heavily in terms of lives. Around twice as many Americans died in “Operation Iraqi Freedom” as in the parallel war in Afghanistan, which ended with the US withdrawal in 2021. Washington's military presence also brought it into conflict with Tehran and Iran-backed groups. In 2020, the United States killed senior Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani in a strike at Baghdad Airport. Also Read: Iran warns ‘no infrastructure will remain safe’ if its security is not guaranteed as it awaits US response on Hormuz plan Islamic State sleeper cells raise concerns Iraqi security officials have warned that the US departure could create an opening for Islamic State. Officials from Iraq's federal government and the semi-autonomous Kurdish region said the group continues to maintain sleeper cells despite losing its self-declared caliphate nearly a decade ago. Iraqi security forces also said a suspected Islamic State cell was preparing suicide attacks to coincide with the withdrawal. Iran has presented the US departure as a victory for its “axis of resistance”, made up of allied armed groups across the region. Tehran has repeatedly demanded that US forces leave the Middle East and that American bases in Gulf countries be closed. During the ongoing war, Iran has launched missile and drone attacks on US bases in these countries, causing significant damage and destroying American military equipment.

US troops are set to leave their last bases in Iraq after more than two decades, a move Iran sees as a strategic victory while Iraqi officials warn of increased Iranian influence and a possible Islamic State resurgence.

US troops end Iraq presence after two decades; Iran sees strategic gain

In the early part of 2003, American Army rumbled over the Kuwait border into Iraq in the name of liberation. The pretext: weapons of mass destruction, regime change, and freedom for the Iraqi people. Within a matter of weeks, Baghdad had fallen. Saddam Hussein had been toppled; his regime destroyed.&nbsp;But as history would soon reveal, over-throwing a government was the simple part. What ensued was decades of sectarian strife, insurgencies, foreign interventions, and a region thrown into disarray. Now, with Israel bombarding Iranian military and nuclear facilities and the threat of American intervention hanging over it, the world is asking an all-too-familiar and foreboding question: Is America about to revive 2003 in Tehran?&nbsp;The Iran-Israel war that has broken out has spread much beyond covert attacks and proxy tensions. In what Israel called as ‘Operation Rising Lion’, its fighter jets have initiated prolonged air bombardment operations above Tehran, Natanz, Esfahan, and other military centres.&nbsp;Civilian neighbourhoods have been hit; communication and energy grids are crumbling. As of June 19, more than 500 have been killed and thousand injured, according to a human rights group. Iran’s response, swift and muscular, included launching hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones at Israeli territory—most intercepted, some not. The region is on fire.&nbsp;Amidst this spiral, the voice of US President Donald Trump—now again a leading figure in American foreign policy—is unmistakably belligerent. He has called for Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” declared that the Supreme Leader is “not hard to find,” and suggested that only full military intervention can bring this war to a decisive close. The language mirrors that of George W. Bush in 2003. The assumptions do too: that air superiority, regime decapitation, and a short, sharp campaign can reset the Middle East in America’s favour.&nbsp;But this is not Iraq. And that assumption may be the most dangerous one yet. The strategic thinking in 2003 was based on two key premises: that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and that a swift removal of Saddam’s regime would lead to democratic transformation.&nbsp;&nbsp;Both premises collapsed under the weight of reality. Iran, on the other hand, does have an advanced nuclear program—although how close it is to building a weapon remains hotly debated. What’s beyond dispute is that its nuclear infrastructure is more advanced, more dispersed, and significantly better protected than Iraq’s ever was. Facilities like Fordow and Natanz are buried deep underground, hardened against aerial attacks. Even Israel’s cutting-edge F-35s and intelligence assets cannot reach them without either massive US bunker-busting weaponry or ground troops.&nbsp;Therein lies the Iraq parallel—and the trap. Just as Iraq’s regime change required boots on the ground to truly take control of the state apparatus, any serious attempt to dismantle Iran’s nuclear and military command structure would likely require a similar invasion. Airstrikes, however sophisticated, have their limits. And Tehran knows this.&nbsp;But there are deeper differences that make a repeat of 2003 far more perilous in 2025. Iran is a large, militarily capable state with regional networks—from Hezbollah in Lebanon to militias in Iraq and Syria—that can ignite multiple fronts. Its ability to retaliate is proven. Within hours of the first Israeli strikes, it launched one of the largest missile salvos in modern military history. Though most were intercepted, the message was clear: this is not a regime that will fall quietly.&nbsp;Even more critical is the geopolitical context. In 2003, the United States enjoyed broad—if ultimately misguided—international support. Today, the US is deeply divided at home and increasingly distrusted abroad. More importantly, it's not a unipolar world anymore. Russia and China—both Iran's friends—are vying for global power and actively shaping a multipolar order that resists American dominance. Any US action against Tehran will have to contend not just with Iran, but with a broader geopolitical axis that sees American interventionism as a common threat.&nbsp;These questions have no clear answers—and that’s exactly the problem. Iran, for all its internal repression and foreign policy aggressions, retains a resilient state structure. Removing its leadership without triggering national fragmentation would be almost impossible.&nbsp;Already, the Israeli bombings have stirred both fear and fury within Iran. Anti-government protests have erupted, yes—but so have nationalistic calls for unity. The regime is bloodied but not broken. And unlike Iraq, it has prepared for this scenario for decades.&nbsp;There are also the legal and humanitarian ramifications to consider. Several civilians have died in the Tehran region alone since Israeli strikes began. Hospitals are overwhelmed, and infrastructure is buckling. An American-led invasion would only magnify the toll—likely exponentially. The US would find itself at the center of international condemnation, with little to show but further destabilisation.&nbsp;And yet, despite all this, the temptation to act militarily remains strong in Washington’s more hawkish circles. They argue that deterrence has failed, that Iran’s leadership is emboldened, and that without a decisive blow, the region will descend into permanent conflict. They point to the limitations of sanctions, the breakdown of the 2015 nuclear deal, and the erosion of American credibility. To them, war is not the worst option—it is the only option left.&nbsp;But this is a false binary. Between all-out invasion and passive diplomacy lies a spectrum of action. The United States could intensify its containment strategy—reinforce missile defense across the Gulf, expand cyber operations to disrupt Iranian command-and-control networks, empower internal dissent, and prepare for limited retaliatory strikes without committing to regime change.&nbsp;The lessons of 2003 are not just historical footnotes. They are warnings. They tell us that removing a regime without understanding the society underneath is folly. That military victory without political vision is ruinous. And that America’s power, though vast, cannot impose stability on nations from 30,000 feet in the sky. As Israeli jets continue to strike and Tehran vows vengeance, the drums of intervention beat louder. But the echoes from Baghdad still ring. The world would do well to listen.

The Iraq invasion playbook returns: But can it work against Iran?

In the early part of 2003, American Army rumbled over the Kuwait border into Iraq in the name of liberation. The pretext: weapons of mass destruction, regime change, and freedom for the Iraqi people. Within a matter of weeks, Baghdad had fallen. Saddam Hussein had been toppled; his regime destroyed. But as history would soon reveal, over-throwing a government was the simple part. What ensued was decades of sectarian strife, insurgencies, foreign interventions, and a region thrown into disarray. Now, with Israel bombarding Iranian military and nuclear facilities and the threat of American intervention hanging over it, the world is asking an all-too-familiar and foreboding question: Is America about to revive 2003 in Tehran? The Iran-Israel war that has broken out has spread much beyond covert attacks and proxy tensions. In what Israel called as ‘Operation Rising Lion’, its fighter jets have initiated prolonged air bombardment operations above Tehran, Natanz, Esfahan, and other military centres. Civilian neighbourhoods have been hit; communication and energy grids are crumbling. As of June 19, more than 500 have been killed and thousand injured, according to a human rights group. Iran’s response, swift and muscular, included launching hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones at Israeli territory—most intercepted, some not. The region is on fire. Amidst this spiral, the voice of US President Donald Trump—now again a leading figure in American foreign policy—is unmistakably belligerent. He has called for Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” declared that the Supreme Leader is “not hard to find,” and suggested that only full military intervention can bring this war to a decisive close. The language mirrors that of George W. Bush in 2003. The assumptions do too: that air superiority, regime decapitation, and a short, sharp campaign can reset the Middle East in America’s favour. But this is not Iraq. And that assumption may be the most dangerous one yet. The strategic thinking in 2003 was based on two key premises: that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and that a swift removal of Saddam’s regime would lead to democratic transformation. Both premises collapsed under the weight of reality. Iran, on the other hand, does have an advanced nuclear program—although how close it is to building a weapon remains hotly debated. What’s beyond dispute is that its nuclear infrastructure is more advanced, more dispersed, and significantly better protected than Iraq’s ever was. Facilities like Fordow and Natanz are buried deep underground, hardened against aerial attacks. Even Israel’s cutting-edge F-35s and intelligence assets cannot reach them without either massive US bunker-busting weaponry or ground troops. Therein lies the Iraq parallel—and the trap. Just as Iraq’s regime change required boots on the ground to truly take control of the state apparatus, any serious attempt to dismantle Iran’s nuclear and military command structure would likely require a similar invasion. Airstrikes, however sophisticated, have their limits. And Tehran knows this. But there are deeper differences that make a repeat of 2003 far more perilous in 2025. Iran is a large, militarily capable state with regional networks—from Hezbollah in Lebanon to militias in Iraq and Syria—that can ignite multiple fronts. Its ability to retaliate is proven. Within hours of the first Israeli strikes, it launched one of the largest missile salvos in modern military history. Though most were intercepted, the message was clear: this is not a regime that will fall quietly. Even more critical is the geopolitical context. In 2003, the United States enjoyed broad—if ultimately misguided—international support. Today, the US is deeply divided at home and increasingly distrusted abroad. More importantly, it's not a unipolar world anymore. Russia and China—both Iran's friends—are vying for global power and actively shaping a multipolar order that resists American dominance. Any US action against Tehran will have to contend not just with Iran, but with a broader geopolitical axis that sees American interventionism as a common threat. These questions have no clear answers—and that’s exactly the problem. Iran, for all its internal repression and foreign policy aggressions, retains a resilient state structure. Removing its leadership without triggering national fragmentation would be almost impossible. Already, the Israeli bombings have stirred both fear and fury within Iran. Anti-government protests have erupted, yes—but so have nationalistic calls for unity. The regime is bloodied but not broken. And unlike Iraq, it has prepared for this scenario for decades. There are also the legal and humanitarian ramifications to consider. Several civilians have died in the Tehran region alone since Israeli strikes began. Hospitals are overwhelmed, and infrastructure is buckling. An American-led invasion would only magnify the toll—likely exponentially. The US would find itself at the center of international condemnation, with little to show but further destabilisation. And yet, despite all this, the temptation to act militarily remains strong in Washington’s more hawkish circles. They argue that deterrence has failed, that Iran’s leadership is emboldened, and that without a decisive blow, the region will descend into permanent conflict. They point to the limitations of sanctions, the breakdown of the 2015 nuclear deal, and the erosion of American credibility. To them, war is not the worst option—it is the only option left. But this is a false binary. Between all-out invasion and passive diplomacy lies a spectrum of action. The United States could intensify its containment strategy—reinforce missile defense across the Gulf, expand cyber operations to disrupt Iranian command-and-control networks, empower internal dissent, and prepare for limited retaliatory strikes without committing to regime change. The lessons of 2003 are not just historical footnotes. They are warnings. They tell us that removing a regime without understanding the society underneath is folly. That military victory without political vision is ruinous. And that America’s power, though vast, cannot impose stability on nations from 30,000 feet in the sky. As Israeli jets continue to strike and Tehran vows vengeance, the drums of intervention beat louder. But the echoes from Baghdad still ring. The world would do well to listen.

The Iran-Israel war that has broken out has spread much beyond covert attacks and proxy tensions

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US troops end Iraq presence after two decades; Iran sees strategic gain

The Iraq invasion playbook returns: But can it work against Iran?