The Islamic State group is weakened but a resurgence is possible if the <a href="https://www.wionews.com/.../trump-tears-into-environmental-doom-mongers -at-davos-forum-275841">United States</a> leaves Iraq, US Major General Alexus Grynkewich, the number two commander for the international anti-jihadist coalition in Iraq and Syria, said Wednesday.

Also read:&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/us-iran-tensions-washington-turns-down-iraqi-request-to-remove-troops-273509">US-Iran tensions escalate as Washington refuses Tehran's request to remove troops</a>

The group "certainly still remain a threat," he said. "They have the potential to resurge if we take the pressure off of them for too long."

The general said he did not see the threat of an immediate IS comeback.

"But the more time we take pressure off of them, the more of that threat will continue to grow," he said.

At a <a href="https://www.wionews.com/.../pentagon-restricts-access-to-guns-for-foreign- trainees-after-shooting-at-base-274969">Pentagon</a> press conference, he said the structural weakness of IS is shown by their failure to take advantage of demonstrations in Iraq calling for political reforms since October.

More than 460 protesters have been killed, and demonstrators are angry that few Iraqi security personnel have been charged for the violence.

<div class="videoWrapper trancodeVideo"><iframe allowfullscreen="" autoplay="1" class="includeVideo" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.wionews.com/videos/iraqs-parliament-votes-to-expel-all-5000-us-troops-272384/embed" style="width:100%;max-width:560px;" width="560"></iframe></div>

The allies at the heart of the international coalition have over the last few months been evaluating the position of the jihadist movement whose self-declared "caliphate" once spanned parts of Iraq and Syria. It collapsed last March after years of battle with coalition-backed forces.

IS went underground and reverted to well-honed guerrilla tactics that continued to do damage.

The coalition wanted to determine whether the group is "executing some sort of strategic patience, waiting for an opportunity that they can exploit, or are they truly on the ropes a bit more and lacking in capability and capacity?" Grynkewich said.

<div class="videoWrapper trancodeVideo"><iframe allowfullscreen="" autoplay="1" class="includeVideo" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.wionews.com/videos/wion-dispatch-what-remains-of-us-largest-base-where-us-troops-sheltered-during-iran-missile-attack-274459/embed" style="width:100%;max-width:560px;" width="560"></iframe></div>

He said the Iraqi protests helped the coalition to refine its assessment "that it's actually ISIS is a little bit more on the lack of capability and capacity side, than strategically patient," using another acronym for the jihadists.

Tensions between Washington and Tehran boiled over onto Iraqi soil this month. The US killed top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad and Tehran retaliated against an Iraqi base hosting American soldiers, some of whom were hurt.

Furious at the US hit, Iraq's parliament voted January 5 to oust all foreign troops, including about 5,200 American soldiers deployed alongside local forces.

Coalition troops have ostensibly reduced their operations in Iraq since then, even if cooperation with the Iraqi army continues discreetly, according to several US military sources.

US President <a href="https://www.wionews.com/.../trump-tears-into-environmental-doom-mongers -at-davos-forum-275841">Donald Trump</a> and his Iraqi counterpart Barham Saleh agreed Wednesday in Davos, Switzerland on the need for a continued US military role in the country, the White House said.

"That's really kind of a government-to-government discussion on when we get back to full restoration of that partnership. They certainly have an interest in it, as do we," Grynkewich said.

The Islamic State group is weakened but a resurgence is possible if the United States leaves Iraq, US Major General Alexus Grynkewich, the number two commander for the international anti-jihadist coalition in Iraq and Syria, said Wednesday.

The Islamic State group is weakened but a resurgence is possible if the United States leaves Iraq, US Major General Alexus Grynkewich, the number two commander for the international anti-jihadist coalition in Iraq and Syria, said Wednesday. Also read: US-Iran tensions escalate as Washington refuses Tehran's request to remove troops The group "certainly still remain a threat," he said. "They have the potential to resurge if we take the pressure off of them for too long." The general said he did not see the threat of an immediate IS comeback. "But the more time we take pressure off of them, the more of that threat will continue to grow," he said. At a Pentagon press conference, he said the structural weakness of IS is shown by their failure to take advantage of demonstrations in Iraq calling for political reforms since October. More than 460 protesters have been killed, and demonstrators are angry that few Iraqi security personnel have been charged for the violence. The allies at the heart of the international coalition have over the last few months been evaluating the position of the jihadist movement whose self-declared "caliphate" once spanned parts of Iraq and Syria. It collapsed last March after years of battle with coalition-backed forces. IS went underground and reverted to well-honed guerrilla tactics that continued to do damage. The coalition wanted to determine whether the group is "executing some sort of strategic patience, waiting for an opportunity that they can exploit, or are they truly on the ropes a bit more and lacking in capability and capacity?" Grynkewich said. He said the Iraqi protests helped the coalition to refine its assessment "that it's actually ISIS is a little bit more on the lack of capability and capacity side, than strategically patient," using another acronym for the jihadists. Tensions between Washington and Tehran boiled over onto Iraqi soil this month. The US killed top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad and Tehran retaliated against an Iraqi base hosting American soldiers, some of whom were hurt. Furious at the US hit, Iraq's parliament voted January 5 to oust all foreign troops, including about 5,200 American soldiers deployed alongside local forces. Coalition troops have ostensibly reduced their operations in Iraq since then, even if cooperation with the Iraqi army continues discreetly, according to several US military sources. US President Donald Trump and his Iraqi counterpart Barham Saleh agreed Wednesday in Davos, Switzerland on the need for a continued US military role in the country, the White House said. "That's really kind of a government-to-government discussion on when we get back to full restoration of that partnership. They certainly have an interest in it, as do we," Grynkewich said.

Islamic State resurgence possible if America leaves Iraq: US General

By Harout Akdedian

The so-called Islamic State (IS) recently lost its last remnant of territory in Syria, but observers were quick to remind the world that the war against the organisation is far from over. What then does this loss of territorial control actually mean for IS?

At its height, the self-proclaimed “caliphate” controlled an estimated 34,000 square miles across Syria and Iraq, so its defeat on the ground is clearly a severe blow for it. Nevertheless, IS is now expected to evolve. Its networks will disperse into virtual, online spaces and become largely invisible. It will focus on insurgency tactics and terror attacks with a wider reach.

In the face of this evolution, it may seem like maintaining IS in a contained geographic pocket would have been better than eradicating its primary territorial base altogether.

With its defeat on the ground in Syria and Iraq, however, IS and its offshoots will have a more limited capacity for recruitment, indoctrination and growth.

The importance of territory

The success of rebel groups to survive protracted armed conflicts is dependent on their ability to maintain territorial control. They require it to extract resources and enlist local recruits.

Territorial control allows armed groups to force local populations into compliance and conformity with their ideological outlook. Since its inception, IS understood that its radical “Islamic” community does not locally exist. Instead, the organisation set about creating it, reshaping communities under its control in its own image.

Comparative evidence from civil wars around the world demonstrates how territorial control does not depend on a local population’s ideological agreement with the forces in place. Instead, in his book The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Stathis Kalyvas argues that a combination of coercive measures and local administrative bodies allows a force to maintain order, stability and compliance.

For example, during the Liberian civil war in the early 1990s, NPFL (The National Patriotic Front of Liberia) rebels, led by Charles Taylor, used administrative bodies and courts in the territory they controlled to create an alternative order backed up by displays of brutality and violence. This led to an intricate system of patronage and loyalty that created new dependencies between local communities and the new regime.

These Taylor-era Liberian courts are comparable to IS’s religious courts which controlled the issuing of permits for cross border activities, defined the educational content of local schools, distributed social services – and carried out extreme public punishments.

In enduring armed conflict, these administrative bodies, social services and displays of order encourage the cooperation of the local population. In other words, territorial control allows the occupier to manage the behaviour and, potentially, the ideology of the people under its control.

Instruments of control

Under IS, spectacles of brutality and violence were a key part of this. Public executions involved people being incinerated, stoned, decapitated and thrown off towers. Staged in front of local people, these executions were carefully choreographed and meticulously documented and disseminated – both locally and internationally.

IS explicitly claimed that these acts of brutality were intended to create a vacuum by disrupting local societal structures that could then be “filled” and “managed” by them. Essentially, displays of violence were used as an instrument of social organisation.

Data personally collected between 2012 and 2014 shows that many living under the rule of radicalised groups such as IS judge these groups based on their own immediate day-to-day conditions rather than the organisation’s overall performance or outlook.

If administrative structures function and people have access to food and basic services, for example, local populations may overlook – or even adhere to – the occupying force’s ideology (albeit under duress). And those that don’t are severely and publicly punished as an “example” to others.

The 2014 executions of members of the Sunni Arab al-Sheitaat tribe, in Deir el-Zor, Syria, are a case in point. IS took the lives of more than 700 of its members for revoking a pledge of allegiance. In addition, IS incessantly targeted other Jihadi or predominantly Sunni rebel formations. Indeed, the tally of those killed continues to increase as more mass graves are discovered.

Violent consolidation 
 
Such atrocities were examples of IS consolidating its power through the elimination of rivals and the suppression of potential or real dissent within its area of control. Faced with this, local populations had no choice but to imitate expressions of religiosity as defined by IS and to demonstrate compliance. For local people, this was a method of adaptation and survival – but IS’s loss of territorial control now greatly reduces its capacity to control and indoctrinate local residents in this way.

The question of how IS’s methods impacted local populations, in the long run, is yet to be answered. A lot will depend on what happens next in its former territory and to those living there now.

Either way, while IS is badly incapacitated, it certainly is not finished. It will most likely splinter into new organisations which might try to establish territorial control elsewhere. Parts of North Africa and the Maghreb are particularly susceptible, where control over vast swathes of land remain contested. In the meantime, IS will continue to try to nurture its virtual communities and seek new audiences online.

(Harout Akdedian is Carnegie SFM Postdoctoral fellow, Central European University)

(This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-the-caliphate-is-off-the-map-for-now-but-will-evolve-in-dangerous-ways-114831">original article</a>)

(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)&nbsp; 
&nbsp;

 
&nbsp;

By Harout Akdedian The so-called Islamic State (IS) recently lost its last remnant of territory in Syria, but observers were quick to remind the world that the war against the organisation is far from over.

By Harout Akdedian The so-called Islamic State (IS) recently lost its last remnant of territory in Syria, but observers were quick to remind the world that the war against the organisation is far from over. What then does this loss of territorial control actually mean for IS? At its height, the self-proclaimed “caliphate” controlled an estimated 34,000 square miles across Syria and Iraq, so its defeat on the ground is clearly a severe blow for it. Nevertheless, IS is now expected to evolve. Its networks will disperse into virtual, online spaces and become largely invisible. It will focus on insurgency tactics and terror attacks with a wider reach. In the face of this evolution, it may seem like maintaining IS in a contained geographic pocket would have been better than eradicating its primary territorial base altogether. With its defeat on the ground in Syria and Iraq, however, IS and its offshoots will have a more limited capacity for recruitment, indoctrination and growth. The importance of territory The success of rebel groups to survive protracted armed conflicts is dependent on their ability to maintain territorial control. They require it to extract resources and enlist local recruits. Territorial control allows armed groups to force local populations into compliance and conformity with their ideological outlook. Since its inception, IS understood that its radical “Islamic” community does not locally exist. Instead, the organisation set about creating it, reshaping communities under its control in its own image. Comparative evidence from civil wars around the world demonstrates how territorial control does not depend on a local population’s ideological agreement with the forces in place. Instead, in his book The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Stathis Kalyvas argues that a combination of coercive measures and local administrative bodies allows a force to maintain order, stability and compliance. For example, during the Liberian civil war in the early 1990s, NPFL (The National Patriotic Front of Liberia) rebels, led by Charles Taylor, used administrative bodies and courts in the territory they controlled to create an alternative order backed up by displays of brutality and violence. This led to an intricate system of patronage and loyalty that created new dependencies between local communities and the new regime. These Taylor-era Liberian courts are comparable to IS’s religious courts which controlled the issuing of permits for cross border activities, defined the educational content of local schools, distributed social services – and carried out extreme public punishments. In enduring armed conflict, these administrative bodies, social services and displays of order encourage the cooperation of the local population. In other words, territorial control allows the occupier to manage the behaviour and, potentially, the ideology of the people under its control. Instruments of control Under IS, spectacles of brutality and violence were a key part of this. Public executions involved people being incinerated, stoned, decapitated and thrown off towers. Staged in front of local people, these executions were carefully choreographed and meticulously documented and disseminated – both locally and internationally. IS explicitly claimed that these acts of brutality were intended to create a vacuum by disrupting local societal structures that could then be “filled” and “managed” by them. Essentially, displays of violence were used as an instrument of social organisation. Data personally collected between 2012 and 2014 shows that many living under the rule of radicalised groups such as IS judge these groups based on their own immediate day-to-day conditions rather than the organisation’s overall performance or outlook. If administrative structures function and people have access to food and basic services, for example, local populations may overlook – or even adhere to – the occupying force’s ideology (albeit under duress). And those that don’t are severely and publicly punished as an “example” to others. The 2014 executions of members of the Sunni Arab al-Sheitaat tribe, in Deir el-Zor, Syria, are a case in point. IS took the lives of more than 700 of its members for revoking a pledge of allegiance. In addition, IS incessantly targeted other Jihadi or predominantly Sunni rebel formations. Indeed, the tally of those killed continues to increase as more mass graves are discovered. Violent consolidation Such atrocities were examples of IS consolidating its power through the elimination of rivals and the suppression of potential or real dissent within its area of control. Faced with this, local populations had no choice but to imitate expressions of religiosity as defined by IS and to demonstrate compliance. For local people, this was a method of adaptation and survival – but IS’s loss of territorial control now greatly reduces its capacity to control and indoctrinate local residents in this way. The question of how IS’s methods impacted local populations, in the long run, is yet to be answered. A lot will depend on what happens next in its former territory and to those living there now. Either way, while IS is badly incapacitated, it certainly is not finished. It will most likely splinter into new organisations which might try to establish territorial control elsewhere. Parts of North Africa and the Maghreb are particularly susceptible, where control over vast swathes of land remain contested. In the meantime, IS will continue to try to nurture its virtual communities and seek new audiences online. (Harout Akdedian is Carnegie SFM Postdoctoral fellow, Central European University) (This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article) (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL.)

Islamic State is off the map for now, but war against the organisation is far from over

iraq-against-is

Iraq Against Is, News on Iraq Against Is, stories on Iraq Against Is, articles on Iraq Against Is, Iraq Against Is stories at Wion, Iraq Against Is news, Iraq Against Is latest news

iraq against-is

Islamic State resurgence possible if America leaves Iraq: US General

Islamic State is off the map for now, but war against the organisation is far from over