<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Given its spectacular performance in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) was best placed to win the 2017 assembly election in Uttar Pradesh. Winning 71 of 80 seats on a vote share of 42 per cent provided it with a margin of invincibility to withstand a large negative vote swing. But the party&rsquo;s changing campaign strategy betrays a lack of confidence in the outcome of the elections.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The campaign which started on the high note of development has begun to traverse the familiar ground of Hindu consolidation. This is very similar to 2014 when development-oriented politics made way for majoritarianism. The BJP knows that ultimately its success depends on Hindu unity; consequently, its leaders, operatives, and the members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh(RSS) resolutely focused on religious polarisation.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Known for its abysmal record in human development, one would think the Uttar Pradesh assembly elections would be all about progress and change. But no, this is not the case. The leading campaign issue is not the prospect of development but the politics around graveyards. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is taking up the case of discrimination against cremation grounds in comparison to graveyards. The political discourse has exposed BJP&rsquo;s stress on polarisation as a strategy of mobilisation in this complex election.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

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<h5>The last few phases of the elections have, therefore, seen a sharp contest between ideologies of pluralism-inclusion on the one side and assimilation-exclusion on the other</h5>
</blockquote>
</div>

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<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The BJP seeks to unite Hindu votes in its favour while dividing Muslim votes between the Samajwadi Party (SP) and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) who are vying for the support of Muslims. Implicit in this political belief is the apprehension that Muslims would vote for the SP-Congress combine and not for the BSP.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>There are two concerted elements in BJP&#39;s majoritarian campaign this year. The two elements include divisive rhetoric on communal issues and debasing the development discourse. The strategy works directly by raising controversial issues, such as the triple talaq, Hindu migration from Kairana and other western UP towns, illegal abattoirs etc to appeal to the traditional middle-class voters in the state.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>An election that started out as a contest about governance and development has changed since polarisation gradually entered the picture. The last few phases of the elections have, therefore, seen a sharp contest between ideologies of pluralism-inclusion on the one side and assimilation-exclusion on the other. Changing the terms of public discourse involved an unmistakable communalisation of development politics and, thereby, pulling people to its side.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The ostensible provocation for this shift was that both the BSP and the SP-Congress alliance have been vigorously appealing to the minorities for votes to keep the BJP at bay. Critics blame the BSP for starting this by giving 97 assembly tickets to Muslims. However, the dispute over who is to blame for the acceleration of polarisation seldom takes into account that the BJP has not given a single ticket to a Muslim.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>In UP, even as the BJP was propagating its &lsquo;vikas&rsquo; or development plans, it has lost no opportunity to communalise development politics.&nbsp; The party has been working actively on dividing communities along religious lines at the ground level since the violence in Muzaffarnagar in 2013; Modi&rsquo;s speech at Fatehpur on February 19, 2017, was basically an attempt to give it a further push and this was immediately taken forward by the party president Amit Shah.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Amit Shah said, &quot;If BJP is not voted to power, people&rsquo;s money would be spent on building karbala aur kabristan. When BJP introduces programmes like Startup India, Make in India and so on, they are for everyone, but when the UP government starts a scholarship scheme, it is only for Muslim girls.&quot; Incidentally, Shah is referring here to the Kanya Vidya Dhan Yojana, under which the UP government provides assistance of Rs 30,000 to each girl student who has passed the 12th board examinations with distinction. Many Hindus have complained that Muslims are the only ones to benefit from this scheme; a claim which is yet to be verified. Moreover, BJP activists continue to allege leniency in the grading of exams at schools situated in Muslim neighborhoods, and that such leniency is responsible for more Muslim girls benefiting from this scheme.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

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<h5>The big question is whether communal polarisation at the grass root level electorally benefits the BJP, and what political impact will this electoral strategy have on India&rsquo;s democracy</h5>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Clearly, post-truth is having a field day in UP, and not just in the United States. A blithe disregard for facts has characterised the propaganda campaign of the BJP in the UP election. This type of talk makes it clear that mobilisation gained through polarisation has become the principal instrument of the election campaign.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The BJP has regularly attacked the SP government for appeasement of one community in matters as diverse as power supply and laptop distribution under the government schemes. Accusing its rivals of Muslim appeasement has been the staple of BJP politics. This has happened even after official data and academic research show Muslims to be one of India&rsquo;s most disadvantaged communities, and nowhere more so than in UP. Any attempt to redress the imbalance is damned as appeasement.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Finally, one thing is clear: the BJP is fighting the 2017 election with an unconcealed anti-Muslim propaganda. On the face of it, it seems that incendiary majoritarian nationalism and the language of polarisation has had an impact on the thought processes of a large number of people. Unfortunately, the acerbic discourse has split Uttar Pradesh, once defined by cultural syncretism, along Hindu-Muslim lines.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Everywhere, the BJP campaign targets Muslims and how they were not part of the (Hindu) nationalist narrative. There are many who are inclined to buy into BJP&rsquo;s charges of minority appeasement because prejudice against minorities has crept into everyday life.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The big question is whether communal polarisation at the grass root level electorally benefits the BJP, and what political impact will this electoral strategy have on India&rsquo;s democracy.</p>


The leading campaign issue in the Uttar Pradesh election is not the prospect of development but the politics around graveyards

Given its spectacular performance in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) was best placed to win the 2017 assembly election in Uttar Pradesh. Winning 71 of 80 seats on a vote share of 42 per cent provided it with a margin of invincibility to withstand a large negative vote swing. But the party’s changing campaign strategy betrays a lack of confidence in the outcome of the elections. The campaign which started on the high note of development has begun to traverse the familiar ground of Hindu consolidation. This is very similar to 2014 when development-oriented politics made way for majoritarianism. The BJP knows that ultimately its success depends on Hindu unity; consequently, its leaders, operatives, and the members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh(RSS) resolutely focused on religious polarisation. Known for its abysmal record in human development, one would think the Uttar Pradesh assembly elections would be all about progress and change. But no, this is not the case. The leading campaign issue is not the prospect of development but the politics around graveyards. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is taking up the case of discrimination against cremation grounds in comparison to graveyards. The political discourse has exposed BJP’s stress on polarisation as a strategy of mobilisation in this complex election. The last few phases of the elections have, therefore, seen a sharp contest between ideologies of pluralism-inclusion on the one side and assimilation-exclusion on the other × The BJP seeks to unite Hindu votes in its favour while dividing Muslim votes between the Samajwadi Party (SP) and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) who are vying for the support of Muslims. Implicit in this political belief is the apprehension that Muslims would vote for the SP-Congress combine and not for the BSP. There are two concerted elements in BJP's majoritarian campaign this year. The two elements include divisive rhetoric on communal issues and debasing the development discourse. The strategy works directly by raising controversial issues, such as the triple talaq, Hindu migration from Kairana and other western UP towns, illegal abattoirs etc to appeal to the traditional middle-class voters in the state. An election that started out as a contest about governance and development has changed since polarisation gradually entered the picture. The last few phases of the elections have, therefore, seen a sharp contest between ideologies of pluralism-inclusion on the one side and assimilation-exclusion on the other. Changing the terms of public discourse involved an unmistakable communalisation of development politics and, thereby, pulling people to its side. The ostensible provocation for this shift was that both the BSP and the SP-Congress alliance have been vigorously appealing to the minorities for votes to keep the BJP at bay. Critics blame the BSP for starting this by giving 97 assembly tickets to Muslims. However, the dispute over who is to blame for the acceleration of polarisation seldom takes into account that the BJP has not given a single ticket to a Muslim. In UP, even as the BJP was propagating its ‘vikas’ or development plans, it has lost no opportunity to communalise development politics. The party has been working actively on dividing communities along religious lines at the ground level since the violence in Muzaffarnagar in 2013; Modi’s speech at Fatehpur on February 19, 2017, was basically an attempt to give it a further push and this was immediately taken forward by the party president Amit Shah. Amit Shah said, "If BJP is not voted to power, people’s money would be spent on building karbala aur kabristan. When BJP introduces programmes like Startup India, Make in India and so on, they are for everyone, but when the UP government starts a scholarship scheme, it is only for Muslim girls." Incidentally, Shah is referring here to the Kanya Vidya Dhan Yojana, under which the UP government provides assistance of Rs 30,000 to each girl student who has passed the 12th board examinations with distinction. Many Hindus have complained that Muslims are the only ones to benefit from this scheme; a claim which is yet to be verified. Moreover, BJP activists continue to allege leniency in the grading of exams at schools situated in Muslim neighborhoods, and that such leniency is responsible for more Muslim girls benefiting from this scheme. The big question is whether communal polarisation at the grass root level electorally benefits the BJP, and what political impact will this electoral strategy have on India’s democracy × Clearly, post-truth is having a field day in UP, and not just in the United States. A blithe disregard for facts has characterised the propaganda campaign of the BJP in the UP election. This type of talk makes it clear that mobilisation gained through polarisation has become the principal instrument of the election campaign. The BJP has regularly attacked the SP government for appeasement of one community in matters as diverse as power supply and laptop distribution under the government schemes. Accusing its rivals of Muslim appeasement has been the staple of BJP politics. This has happened even after official data and academic research show Muslims to be one of India’s most disadvantaged communities, and nowhere more so than in UP. Any attempt to redress the imbalance is damned as appeasement. Finally, one thing is clear: the BJP is fighting the 2017 election with an unconcealed anti-Muslim propaganda. On the face of it, it seems that incendiary majoritarian nationalism and the language of polarisation has had an impact on the thought processes of a large number of people. Unfortunately, the acerbic discourse has split Uttar Pradesh, once defined by cultural syncretism, along Hindu-Muslim lines. Everywhere, the BJP campaign targets Muslims and how they were not part of the (Hindu) nationalist narrative. There are many who are inclined to buy into BJP’s charges of minority appeasement because prejudice against minorities has crept into everyday life. The big question is whether communal polarisation at the grass root level electorally benefits the BJP, and what political impact will this electoral strategy have on India’s democracy.

Majoritarianism drives the BJP campaign in Uttar Pradesh elections

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>It is commonly said that the road to New Delhi passes through Lucknow, the capital of Uttar Pradesh. UP is not just any other state. It is the largest with a population of over 200 million, and is politically an extremely important state but also one of the most socio-economically backward in India.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>With its 80 Members of Parliament (MP) and 403 Members of Legislative Assembly (MLA), UP has been the nerve centre of Indian politics. In the 2014 national election, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) swept the state, winning 71 of these seats (with coalition partner Apna Dal winning two more). Without a large number of seats from UP, the BJP and its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) would not have had the majority to form government at the Centre.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The importance of UP for national politics can never be overstated. The results of a bitterly fought and excessively long (7-phase) 2017 assembly election will have a crucial bearing on the template of the 2019 elections.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

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<h5>Hindu nationalism and caste-based parties gave momentum to the process of identity politics, occupying spaces vacated by the once-dominant Congress party</h5>
</blockquote>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Over the years, UP has seen remarkable changes in its politics both within and across ruling parties and coalitions. The impetus for change originated in the political realignments that began to take place in the late 1980s. The emergence of Hindu nationalism and caste-based parties gave momentum to the process of identity politics, occupying spaces vacated by the once-dominant Congress party.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The tropes of Mandal Commission controversy and the Babri Masjid issue dominated the political narrative in the 1990s. Later, as Dalit mobilisation reached a high tempo, it shaped electoral outcomes in this crucial state. The churning in UP was the most stunning expression of a new political paradigm, with caste-based parties and factions disrupting traditional arrangements and drawing hitherto marginalised forces into play. Two political parties, the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) symbolised this process. &nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The SP and BSP have governed the state for most of the past two decades. These parties and the governments they dominate have empowered the lower castes. Both parties have raised the standing and representation of the Dalits and Other Backward Classes (OBCs). Consequently, increasing number of disadvantaged groups are part of the ruling elite now, with an access to state resources. Though a lot still needs to be done, economic and educational development has weakened caste barriers in Uttar Pradesh.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>But castes are not classes. Constructed around caste, political representation and the activism surrounding it inevitably promotes symbolic rather than substantive changes. The politics is crucially limited by bitter competition for power and fights over resources. It is also marred by the absence of a common agenda on structural changes which could have facilitated the redistribution of resources.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>If we compare the Samajwadi party with parties in South India, it is clear the latter draws on a much longer history of social mobilisation and this has defined substantive social welfare agenda in the southern states. In UP, by contrast, political empowerment was not building on a long record of social mobilisation.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>In fact, OBC politics in Uttar Pradesh came into its own during the implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations that gave the members of backward classes a political heft. from the outset, it was principally a top-down process of gaining power. No attention was paid to the promotion of broader social policies with the aim to level the playing field for everyone. In Uttar Pradesh, OBC and Dalit politics was all about transforming the pre-existing balance of social powers, and not addressing socio-economic inequalities. Clearly, poverty is not seen as a problem on par with the problem of social inequality. Consequently, the state has lagged behind in terms of economic and social development in comparison to other Indian states.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<div class="ui-state-default" contenteditable="false">
<div class="row">
<div class="article-blockquote">
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<h5>The two overarching themes of this election are the growing discontent with under-development and the wider aspiration for development.</h5>
</blockquote>
</div>

<div class="col-sm-1 blockquote-content">
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<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The 2017 assembly election in Uttar Pradesh marks a transition from identity politics to the politics of development. The two overarching themes of this election are the growing discontent with under-development and the wider aspiration for development. Although the overall record of the past five years of the Samajwadi party led government is not encouraging, there had been a spurt in development activities in the last two years. In the event, the election is being contested on the promise of development.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The current Chief Minister Akhilesh Yadav&rsquo;s slogan &lsquo;Kaam Bolta Hai&rsquo; (the work speaks for itself) signals the attempt at building a counter-narrative around economic development. Akhilesh has gone to the polls showcasing new expressways, the Lucknow metro project, distributing laptops to students and bicycles to girls. Prime Minister Narendra Modi&rsquo;s mordant criticism of the UP chief minister&rsquo;s development work and his pungent disparagement of the claims all other parties underscore the sharp divide over which party can promote development better than others.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Meanwhile, BJP claims &lsquo;it will end development&rsquo;s 14-year exile in UP&rsquo;.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>As the 2017 election progressed from western to eastern UP,&nbsp; the focus of political campaigning shifted from development to the religion and caste arithmetic of the past. Speeches of almost all the major leaders suggest that religious polarisation is emerging as the central theme again. But the calculation is driven by a different impulse this time; there is a novel desire to remove caste and religion as the basis for economic distribution rather than the explicit assertion of it.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<div class="ui-state-default" contenteditable="false">
<div class="row">
<div class="article-blockquote">
<div class="col-sm-10 col-sm-offset-1 blockquote-content quoteshare">
<blockquote>
<h5>Most upper-caste Hindus are expected to vote for the BJP and they will be doing so for communitarian rather than caste reasons</h5>
</blockquote>
</div>

<div class="col-sm-1 blockquote-content">
<div class="share-blockquote"><a class="twitter popup" href="http://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Most upper-caste Hindus are expected to vote for the BJP and they will be doing so for communitarian rather than caste reasons" target="_blank"><i class="fa fa-share">&nbsp;</i></a></div>
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</div>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>Some of the development policies and promises do appear to have had an electoral impact, this cannot be construed as an indication of the end of identity politics. All parties, in varying degrees, remain anchored to a caste-community calculus. But the dynamics of voting goes beyond the arithmetic of caste. And that makes politics of UP qualitatively different from the identity politics of the past.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>The 2017 campaign signifies that there is no contradiction between identity and issue-based politics. This necessitates that politicians underplay caste and communal identities and touch overarching topics. The sharper import of issue-based election might actually merge with identity-based social groupings. This coalescence would not do away with caste/community-based voting trends, but these are increasingly informed by development concerns.</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>

<p>While voters say issues, such as livelihoods, employment and law and order are key concerns but when it comes to voting, there is a community bias in this election which is likely to overpower the instinctive caste bias of the UP voter. Every single news report indicates that most upper-caste Hindus are expected to vote for the BJP and they will be doing so for communitarian rather than caste reasons. Along the same line, the BSP and SP, claiming to represent the socially backward population as a whole, provide disproportionate representation to Dalits, Muslims and OBCs respectively.&nbsp;</p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>


As election progressed from west to east UP, the focus of campaigning shifted from development to religion and caste arithmetic of the past

It is commonly said that the road to New Delhi passes through Lucknow, the capital of Uttar Pradesh. UP is not just any other state. It is the largest with a population of over 200 million, and is politically an extremely important state but also one of the most socio-economically backward in India. With its 80 Members of Parliament (MP) and 403 Members of Legislative Assembly (MLA), UP has been the nerve centre of Indian politics. In the 2014 national election, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) swept the state, winning 71 of these seats (with coalition partner Apna Dal winning two more). Without a large number of seats from UP, the BJP and its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) would not have had the majority to form government at the Centre. The importance of UP for national politics can never be overstated. The results of a bitterly fought and excessively long (7-phase) 2017 assembly election will have a crucial bearing on the template of the 2019 elections. Hindu nationalism and caste-based parties gave momentum to the process of identity politics, occupying spaces vacated by the once-dominant Congress party × Over the years, UP has seen remarkable changes in its politics both within and across ruling parties and coalitions. The impetus for change originated in the political realignments that began to take place in the late 1980s. The emergence of Hindu nationalism and caste-based parties gave momentum to the process of identity politics, occupying spaces vacated by the once-dominant Congress party. The tropes of Mandal Commission controversy and the Babri Masjid issue dominated the political narrative in the 1990s. Later, as Dalit mobilisation reached a high tempo, it shaped electoral outcomes in this crucial state. The churning in UP was the most stunning expression of a new political paradigm, with caste-based parties and factions disrupting traditional arrangements and drawing hitherto marginalised forces into play. Two political parties, the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) symbolised this process. The SP and BSP have governed the state for most of the past two decades. These parties and the governments they dominate have empowered the lower castes. Both parties have raised the standing and representation of the Dalits and Other Backward Classes (OBCs). Consequently, increasing number of disadvantaged groups are part of the ruling elite now, with an access to state resources. Though a lot still needs to be done, economic and educational development has weakened caste barriers in Uttar Pradesh. But castes are not classes. Constructed around caste, political representation and the activism surrounding it inevitably promotes symbolic rather than substantive changes. The politics is crucially limited by bitter competition for power and fights over resources. It is also marred by the absence of a common agenda on structural changes which could have facilitated the redistribution of resources. If we compare the Samajwadi party with parties in South India, it is clear the latter draws on a much longer history of social mobilisation and this has defined substantive social welfare agenda in the southern states. In UP, by contrast, political empowerment was not building on a long record of social mobilisation. In fact, OBC politics in Uttar Pradesh came into its own during the implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations that gave the members of backward classes a political heft. from the outset, it was principally a top-down process of gaining power. No attention was paid to the promotion of broader social policies with the aim to level the playing field for everyone. In Uttar Pradesh, OBC and Dalit politics was all about transforming the pre-existing balance of social powers, and not addressing socio-economic inequalities. Clearly, poverty is not seen as a problem on par with the problem of social inequality. Consequently, the state has lagged behind in terms of economic and social development in comparison to other Indian states. The two overarching themes of this election are the growing discontent with under-development and the wider aspiration for development. × The 2017 assembly election in Uttar Pradesh marks a transition from identity politics to the politics of development. The two overarching themes of this election are the growing discontent with under-development and the wider aspiration for development. Although the overall record of the past five years of the Samajwadi party led government is not encouraging, there had been a spurt in development activities in the last two years. In the event, the election is being contested on the promise of development. The current Chief Minister Akhilesh Yadav’s slogan ‘Kaam Bolta Hai’ (the work speaks for itself) signals the attempt at building a counter-narrative around economic development. Akhilesh has gone to the polls showcasing new expressways, the Lucknow metro project, distributing laptops to students and bicycles to girls. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s mordant criticism of the UP chief minister’s development work and his pungent disparagement of the claims all other parties underscore the sharp divide over which party can promote development better than others. Meanwhile, BJP claims ‘it will end development’s 14-year exile in UP’. As the 2017 election progressed from western to eastern UP, the focus of political campaigning shifted from development to the religion and caste arithmetic of the past. Speeches of almost all the major leaders suggest that religious polarisation is emerging as the central theme again. But the calculation is driven by a different impulse this time; there is a novel desire to remove caste and religion as the basis for economic distribution rather than the explicit assertion of it. Most upper-caste Hindus are expected to vote for the BJP and they will be doing so for communitarian rather than caste reasons × Some of the development policies and promises do appear to have had an electoral impact, this cannot be construed as an indication of the end of identity politics. All parties, in varying degrees, remain anchored to a caste-community calculus. But the dynamics of voting goes beyond the arithmetic of caste. And that makes politics of UP qualitatively different from the identity politics of the past. The 2017 campaign signifies that there is no contradiction between identity and issue-based politics. This necessitates that politicians underplay caste and communal identities and touch overarching topics. The sharper import of issue-based election might actually merge with identity-based social groupings. This coalescence would not do away with caste/community-based voting trends, but these are increasingly informed by development concerns. While voters say issues, such as livelihoods, employment and law and order are key concerns but when it comes to voting, there is a community bias in this election which is likely to overpower the instinctive caste bias of the UP voter. Every single news report indicates that most upper-caste Hindus are expected to vote for the BJP and they will be doing so for communitarian rather than caste reasons. Along the same line, the BSP and SP, claiming to represent the socially backward population as a whole, provide disproportionate representation to Dalits, Muslims and OBCs respectively.

Identity and development in the 2017 Uttar Pradesh elections

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Zee News Rajasthan

Editor

Zoya Hasan

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